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$Unique_ID{COW02106}
$Pretitle{385B}
$Title{Kuwait
Chapter 1C. Labor Force}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Darrel R. Eglin, Donald M. Seekins}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{percent
government
oil
foreign
kuwait
industrial
workers
kuwait's
products
early}
$Date{1984}
$Log{}
Country: Kuwait
Book: Persian Gulf States, An Area Study: Kuwait
Author: Darrel R. Eglin, Donald M. Seekins
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1984
Chapter 1C. Labor Force
Kuwait's economic development was achieved in part by importing foreign
workers. By 1980 non-Kuwaitis made up 79 percent of the employed labor force
(see table 8, Appendix A). During the decade of the 1970s, Kuwaitis in the
work force increased by the high average rate of 5.7 percent a year, but the
non-Kuwaiti segment grew even faster-an average 8.1 percent a year. The
critical importance of foreign workers to the economy was difficult to
overstress. Non-Kuwaitis appeared prominently throughout the employment
spectrum, filling professional, technical managerial, and clerical posts-for
which there were not enough qualified Kuwaitis-and industrial and menial jobs
that Kuwaitis would not accept. In 1980 non-Kuwaitis held 84 percent of the
27,400 professional, technical, and managerial jobs in the country and had
about a five-to-one advantage over nationals in terms of having university
degrees. At the other end of the spectrum, construction, which employed large
numbers of unskilled laborers, was made up of nearly 99 percent expatriates.
A major factor contributing to the reliance on foreign workers was the
low educational level of Kuwaitis, reflecting the gradual development of an
educational system. In 1975 illiterate Kuwaitis in the labor force amounted
to 36 percent, and another 23 percent claimed ability to read and write but
lacked an elementary education, leading one observer to conclude that over
half of working Kuwaitis should be considered illiterate. Expansion of the
educational system after the 1950s started to remedy the situation, but it
was a slow and ongoing process (see Education, this ch.) The low participation
of females in the work force was another important factor contributing to the
reliance on foreign workers. Although Kuwaiti women were clearly more
emancipated than others in the Gulf and many had taken advantage of the
opportunities for education, their entrance into the labor force was slow.
In 1980 Kuwaiti women constituted only 13 percent of all employed Kuwaitis.
The bulk of Kuwaitis were employed in service industries-88 percent in
1980. The government was the largest employer in the country and employed
most of the Kuwaitis in the labor force (about 47,000 in 1983). The
Constitution essentially guarantees jobs to citizens, and the government
implemented this through its liberal employment policy. Many Kuwaitis
preferred government employment to other positions even when it meant routine
tasks that often under-utilized their skills and time. Observers usually
noted the country's excessive bureaucracy and over-staffing of many positions,
to the extent that several people were often assigned to what should have been
a single job. In 1983 there were 4.5 citizens for every civil servant.
Observers and experts have long advocated reform of the civil service to
reduce the inefficiency and underuse of available manpower.
In 1980 some 60 percent of the foreign workers in Kuwait were Arabs,
and another 28 percent were Asians, particularly from Iran, Pakistan, and
India. Americans and West Europeans accounted for about 1.5 percent, and a
few hundred Africans constituted the remainder. Palestinians and Egyptians
were especially prominent in professional, technical, and government work.
Pakistanis and Indians tended to be skilled workers in technical jobs.
Iranians and Iraqis often had menial positions in production or service
activities. An influx of East Asian construction workers accompanied the
construction boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s. A 1983 government survey
found a substantial slowing of the increase in Kuwait's expatriate community
since the 1980 census, presumably reflecting a similar reduction in the rate
of growth of foreign workers in the labor force. The reduction was probably
attributable to diminished development expenditures as well as completion of
some of the large construction projects, which resulted in the return home of
the imported construction force.
In spite of the country's heavy reliance on imported workers since the
1950s, government policy sharply discriminated against them. Most non-Kuwaitis
were paid less than their Kuwaiti counterparts and often less than a Kuwaiti
with few qualifications in a less responsible job. The country's social
security system, including a 1976 revision, and most retirement benefits were
limited to Kuwaitis. Foreigners could not own real property and usually rented
in the poorer neighborhoods or sought shelter in shanties constructed of scrap
materials. Modern suburban housing developments with many amenities were
exclusively for citizens. Foreign workers could not form their own unions,
but they could join Kuwaiti unions, although they were prohibited from running
for union offices or voting. Acquiring Kuwaiti citizenship was difficult and
very limited, even for highly educated expatriates who had worked for 20
years or more in Kuwait and raised families there.
The large number of expatriates created social tensions between the
foreigners and the native population. Foreign workers-particularly those who
had worked many years in Kuwait-resented the discrimination against them.
Natives often viewed the foreign workers with suspicion, if not hostility.
In order to enhance the foreign workers' stake in the country's development
and to reduce departures of highly trained personnel for jobs elsewhere in
the Middle East (where there was less discrimination), some observers
suggested granting naturalization or permanent residency on a larger scale to
foreign workers who had much needed skills. But the political climate in early
1984 was not conducive to liberalization. Seven car bombings in December 1983,
involving some long-term, legal, Iraqi residents, increased the apprehension
of Kuwaiti authorities over foreign workers and led to more stringent policies
toward applications for work permits. The authorities faced a serious dilemma,
however, in choosing between security considerations and the dependence of
the economy on foreign workers.
Agriculture
Scant rainfall, little irrigation water, and poor soils have always
limited farming in Kuwait. Before the discovery of oil, nomads moving
livestock to the limited forage in the desert and pearling and fishing
contributed much of agricultural income, but none of these occupations
provided much more than subsistence. Growth of the economy and welfare
measures since World War II drew workers away from traditional pursuits and
lessened the role of agriculture. By 1984 agriculture, including some fishing,
contributed only a small fraction of 1 percent to GDP and employed less than 2
percent of the labor force.
Kuwait's total area amounted to 1,781,800 hectares. In 1980 official data
indicated 44,041 hectares were uncultivable; the bulk of the land, 1,717,910
hectares, was listed as pasture, which obviously meant primarily the scant
forage available in the desert. Some 16,229 hectares were listed as fallow but
not part of farm holdings; it appeared doubtful that much of the fallow land
could be cultivated. Areas with trees amounted to 2,269 hectares, but this
appeared too large for commercial tree crops such as date palms and presumably
included substantial areas of desert scrub growth. In 1980 the area under
crops amounted to 1,351 hectares, less than 0.1 percent of the country's total
area. Nonetheless, the cropped area had increased by 85 percent between 1975
and 1980.
In 1980 the 1,351 hectares that were cropped belonged to 501 agricultural