Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0103/01034.txt

Text File | 1991-06-25 | 41KB | 618 lines

$Unique_ID{COW01034}
$Pretitle{222}
$Title{Cyprus
Chapter 4C.   Foreign Policy}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Margarita Dobert}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{greek
cypriots
turkish
cyprus
cypriot
states
turkey
united
makarios
un}
$Date{1979}
$Log{}
Country:     Cyprus
Book:        Cyprus, A Country Study
Author:      Margarita Dobert
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1979

Chapter 4C.   Foreign Policy

     From the moment of its inception as a state, Cyprus became more than a
domestic dispute between two ethnic groups; it became an international problem
that brought two Western allies into direct confrontation and threatened the
stability of the eastern Mediterranean. The Cyprus problem had three
interlinking dimensions-all of which had a direct bearing on the foreign
policy direction and strategy subsequently adopted by Cypriot policymakers.
At the core of the problem was the internecine struggle between the two major
ethnic groups on the island-the Greek Cypriots who formed a nearly 77-percent
majority and the Turkish Cypriots who constituted roughly 18 percent of the
population. The Greek Cypriot demand for a unitary and sovereign state with
majority rule clashed with the Turkish Cypriot demand for a separate and
relatively autonomous Turkish Cypriot territory within a loose federal
framework.

     At an intermediate level, providing the parameters within which the two
ethnic groups were able to maneuver, were the two foreign powers-Greece and
Turkey-who had the most direct stake in the island's future. Greece, urged
on by the Greek Cypriot people, pressed for self-determination-at first a
euphemism for enosis with Greece and later a byword for unrestricted
independence. Turkey favored partition (taksim) or a biregional
federation-solutions designed to protect Turkish Cypriot minority rights.
Both countries, while ostensibly concerned about the fate of their ethnic
brethren, were also motivated by their own security interests and national
aspirations.

     At the outer level lay the strategic confrontation between the
superpowers. The United States and the Western alliance, anxious to avoid a
generalized conflict in the Mediterranean, sought to contain the problem and
to find a solution amenable to both Greek and Turkish interests. The Soviet
Union and East European countries, recognizing the potential for tactical and
strategic gains, sought to neutralize Western hegemony in the area. East
European interests were best served by an independent and demilitarized
Cyprus-or even better, protracted tension in the area.

     It was against this backdrop that the Greek Cypriots were left to carve
out and pursue a foreign policy that would aid them in finding what they
considered an acceptable solution to their domestic troubles. The Greek
Cypriots were quick to perceive that under the circumstances their foreign
policy options and room for maneuver were limited. Operating from a position
of weakness, they steered a straight and narrow course-accepting independence
(but "unfettered" independence) as a compromise between either enosis or
partition and opting for a so-called Third World nonalignment to avoid
becoming a pawn to either Western alliance or East European interests. To this
end Makarios, their charismatic and effective leader, initiated what one
foreign journalist termed "a politics and diplomacy of calculated ambiguity
and artful procrastination." Despite years of communal tension in the 1960s
and a major armed intervention by Turkey in 1974, the foreign policy and
strategy undertaken by the republic displayed a remarkable degree of
consistency into the late 1970s.

The Turbulent Years: 1960-74

     The Republic of Cyprus was born with the drafting and signing of the
Zurich-London agreements in early 1959 (see The Emergency, ch. 1). It was a
difficult birth, however-conceived during years of violence and bloodshed and
delivered in a spirit of uneasy compromise between two proud and often
antagonistic parent countries. The agreements provided for the independence,
territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus. Yet, ironically, the
compromise of independence was somewhat of a contradiction in real terms.
The agreements, far from severing the umbilical cords that connected the two
ethnic communities with their respective motherlands, only served to
strengthen and legitimize Greek and Turkish interference in Cypriot affairs.

     A twenty-seven point document provided the basic provisions of a Cypriot
constitution. These provisions, drawn up without Cypriot participation, were
declared immutable; in other words, they could not be amended at any time by
the Cypriot people themselves without the consensus of Britain, Greece, and
Turkey (see Government Structure, this ch). The Treaty of Guarantee, while
recognizing and protecting the independence of Cyprus sanctioned the
collective (and in some cases unilateral) intervention of the three guarantor
powers in the event of a threat to the sovereignty of the island or the status
quo. The Treaty of Alliance (a defense pact between Cyprus, Greece, and
Turkey) provided for the establishment of a tripartite headquarters and thus
permitted the motherlands to garrison troops on the island. Both the Treaty of
Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance were incorporated into the basic
provisions of the Zurich-London agreements, giving them constitutional force.
Finally, the agreements allowed Britain to retain two Sovereign Base Areas-one
at Akrotiri near Limassol and one at Dhekelia near Larnaca (see Introduction;
The Emergency, ch. 1).

     The Zurich-London agreements clearly undermined the very independence and
sovereignty they were meant to guarantee. Moreover, the constitution quickly
proved unworkable, and there began an internal tug-of-war as the Greek
Cypriots attempted to pull the new state in the direction of majority rule
while the Turkish Cypriots struggled to maintain the privileges they had
gained at Zurich and London. The next fourteen years were characterized by
periods of relative calm, interrupted by two major outbreaks of communal
violence in 1963-64 and 1967 and a major international crisis in 1974 that
included a coup against Makarios and a major armed intervention by Turkey.

     Makarios' proposals for amendments to the constitution in November 1963
led to open fighting that continued intermittently throughout the end of 1963
and 1964. A Turkish show of force and threat of massive intervention was
countered by a Greek pledge of armed support for the Greek Cypriots. Only a
stern letter from United States President Lyndon B. Johnson to Turkish Prime
Minister Ismet Inonu in June 1964 forestalled a Turkish invasion, thereby
avoiding a move that could have led to full-scale war in the Mediterranean.
Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew into enclaves, and the two
communities for all intents and purposes began to develop separately. An
uneasy truce took hold, largely because of UN efforts and the presence of
the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), but the two
Cypriot communities continued to stockpile illegal arms.

     Fighting erupted again in late 1967. And again a Turkish military
intervention was narrowly averted-this time through the mediation of special
United States envoy Cyrus R. Vance. In the process Greece was forced to recall
the more than 10,000 Greek troops that had infiltrated from the mainland since
1964. Shortly thereafter, the Turkish Cypriots declared a transitional
administration, which operated as a kind of shadow government to its
internationally recognized Greek Cypriot counterpart. The separation of the
two communities had created by this time a de facto disaggregation of the
population (see Population, ch. 2). Nevertheless intercommunal talks began in
1968 under UN auspices and continued off and on through the beginning of 1974.
The two communities were reportedly nearing a compromise when new violence
rocked the uneasy tranquillity of the island. This time, ho