$Unique_ID{COW01034} $Pretitle{222} $Title{Cyprus Chapter 4C. Foreign Policy} $Subtitle{} $Author{Margarita Dobert} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{greek cypriots turkish cyprus cypriot states turkey united makarios un} $Date{1979} $Log{} Country: Cyprus Book: Cyprus, A Country Study Author: Margarita Dobert Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1979 Chapter 4C. Foreign Policy From the moment of its inception as a state, Cyprus became more than a domestic dispute between two ethnic groups; it became an international problem that brought two Western allies into direct confrontation and threatened the stability of the eastern Mediterranean. The Cyprus problem had three interlinking dimensions-all of which had a direct bearing on the foreign policy direction and strategy subsequently adopted by Cypriot policymakers. At the core of the problem was the internecine struggle between the two major ethnic groups on the island-the Greek Cypriots who formed a nearly 77-percent majority and the Turkish Cypriots who constituted roughly 18 percent of the population. The Greek Cypriot demand for a unitary and sovereign state with majority rule clashed with the Turkish Cypriot demand for a separate and relatively autonomous Turkish Cypriot territory within a loose federal framework. At an intermediate level, providing the parameters within which the two ethnic groups were able to maneuver, were the two foreign powers-Greece and Turkey-who had the most direct stake in the island's future. Greece, urged on by the Greek Cypriot people, pressed for self-determination-at first a euphemism for enosis with Greece and later a byword for unrestricted independence. Turkey favored partition (taksim) or a biregional federation-solutions designed to protect Turkish Cypriot minority rights. Both countries, while ostensibly concerned about the fate of their ethnic brethren, were also motivated by their own security interests and national aspirations. At the outer level lay the strategic confrontation between the superpowers. The United States and the Western alliance, anxious to avoid a generalized conflict in the Mediterranean, sought to contain the problem and to find a solution amenable to both Greek and Turkish interests. The Soviet Union and East European countries, recognizing the potential for tactical and strategic gains, sought to neutralize Western hegemony in the area. East European interests were best served by an independent and demilitarized Cyprus-or even better, protracted tension in the area. It was against this backdrop that the Greek Cypriots were left to carve out and pursue a foreign policy that would aid them in finding what they considered an acceptable solution to their domestic troubles. The Greek Cypriots were quick to perceive that under the circumstances their foreign policy options and room for maneuver were limited. Operating from a position of weakness, they steered a straight and narrow course-accepting independence (but "unfettered" independence) as a compromise between either enosis or partition and opting for a so-called Third World nonalignment to avoid becoming a pawn to either Western alliance or East European interests. To this end Makarios, their charismatic and effective leader, initiated what one foreign journalist termed "a politics and diplomacy of calculated ambiguity and artful procrastination." Despite years of communal tension in the 1960s and a major armed intervention by Turkey in 1974, the foreign policy and strategy undertaken by the republic displayed a remarkable degree of consistency into the late 1970s. The Turbulent Years: 1960-74 The Republic of Cyprus was born with the drafting and signing of the Zurich-London agreements in early 1959 (see The Emergency, ch. 1). It was a difficult birth, however-conceived during years of violence and bloodshed and delivered in a spirit of uneasy compromise between two proud and often antagonistic parent countries. The agreements provided for the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus. Yet, ironically, the compromise of independence was somewhat of a contradiction in real terms. The agreements, far from severing the umbilical cords that connected the two ethnic communities with their respective motherlands, only served to strengthen and legitimize Greek and Turkish interference in Cypriot affairs. A twenty-seven point document provided the basic provisions of a Cypriot constitution. These provisions, drawn up without Cypriot participation, were declared immutable; in other words, they could not be amended at any time by the Cypriot people themselves without the consensus of Britain, Greece, and Turkey (see Government Structure, this ch). The Treaty of Guarantee, while recognizing and protecting the independence of Cyprus sanctioned the collective (and in some cases unilateral) intervention of the three guarantor powers in the event of a threat to the sovereignty of the island or the status quo. The Treaty of Alliance (a defense pact between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey) provided for the establishment of a tripartite headquarters and thus permitted the motherlands to garrison troops on the island. Both the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance were incorporated into the basic provisions of the Zurich-London agreements, giving them constitutional force. Finally, the agreements allowed Britain to retain two Sovereign Base Areas-one at Akrotiri near Limassol and one at Dhekelia near Larnaca (see Introduction; The Emergency, ch. 1). The Zurich-London agreements clearly undermined the very independence and sovereignty they were meant to guarantee. Moreover, the constitution quickly proved unworkable, and there began an internal tug-of-war as the Greek Cypriots attempted to pull the new state in the direction of majority rule while the Turkish Cypriots struggled to maintain the privileges they had gained at Zurich and London. The next fourteen years were characterized by periods of relative calm, interrupted by two major outbreaks of communal violence in 1963-64 and 1967 and a major international crisis in 1974 that included a coup against Makarios and a major armed intervention by Turkey. Makarios' proposals for amendments to the constitution in November 1963 led to open fighting that continued intermittently throughout the end of 1963 and 1964. A Turkish show of force and threat of massive intervention was countered by a Greek pledge of armed support for the Greek Cypriots. Only a stern letter from United States President Lyndon B. Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu in June 1964 forestalled a Turkish invasion, thereby avoiding a move that could have led to full-scale war in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew into enclaves, and the two communities for all intents and purposes began to develop separately. An uneasy truce took hold, largely because of UN efforts and the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), but the two Cypriot communities continued to stockpile illegal arms. Fighting erupted again in late 1967. And again a Turkish military intervention was narrowly averted-this time through the mediation of special United States envoy Cyrus R. Vance. In the process Greece was forced to recall the more than 10,000 Greek troops that had infiltrated from the mainland since 1964. Shortly thereafter, the Turkish Cypriots declared a transitional administration, which operated as a kind of shadow government to its internationally recognized Greek Cypriot counterpart. The separation of the two communities had created by this time a de facto disaggregation of the population (see Population, ch. 2). Nevertheless intercommunal talks began in 1968 under UN auspices and continued off and on through the beginning of 1974. The two communities were reportedly nearing a compromise when new violence rocked the uneasy tranquillity of the island. This time, however, the violence was touched off by an Athens-inspired coup against Makarios. That was enough, however, to provoke a Turkish intervention, and an impotent Greece watched helplessly as the northern 37 percent of the island was brought under Turkish control before a stable cease-fire was arranged. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s subtle but important shifts were taking place in relations between the Cypriots and the Greek and Turkish mainland governments. The Turkish Cypriot community was content to let the Turkish government guide its policies. Turkey, after all, had bargained well in Zurich and London and had shown its willingness to intervene to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots as the weaker of the two communities economically and militarily needed aid from the mainland to survive as a separate community. The Greek Cypriots, in contrast, were less than willing to entrust their fate to successive Greek governments. They were deeply disappointed that Greece had been ready to compromise their future at Zurich and London in order to preserve tranquillity in the Western alliance. Moreover, in the face of the 1963-64 crisis, Greece had failed, from the Cypriot viewpoint, to provide adequate material support and had shown its willingness to accept a NATO solution that the Greek Cypriots felt was unacceptable. The imposition of a military junta in Greece in April 1967 led to a further deterioration in relations between Greece and the Greek Cypriots. Makarios was anathema to the staunchly anticommunist regime in Athens. His flirtation with Eastern Europe and Third World nations, his refusal to stem criticism of the dictatorship, and his charismatic appeal to Greeks everywhere were causes of major concern to the Athens leadership. The infiltration of Greek soldiers from the mainland, which at first had been a source of comfort to the majority of Greek Cypriots, became a threat almost equal to that from the Turkish mainland. By the early 1970s the rift between the Athens junta and the Makarios government had become open. Athens allegedly had been financing the operations of anti-Makarios organizations and newspapers and was widely thought responsible for attempts on Makarios' life. After an open letter in which Makarios challenged the junta's destabilizing actions, the Cypriot National Guard led by Greek officers staged a coup that ultimately resulted in a Turkish armed intervention and the junta's demise. United States and NATO interest in Cyprus was apparent from the birth of the republic. Cyprus was considered strategically important, and any conflict that threatened the stability of the island and relations between two key NATO allies was bound to draw Western attention. Britain was the third guarantor power and had a vested interest in the two Sovereign Base Areas. As Britain's reluctance and inability to handle the Cyprus problem alone began to surface, the United States was gradually drawn into the dispute. Cyprus, as one observer aptly noted, was quickly becoming "the Archilles heel of the Western alliance." British attempts to reach a compromise settlement and establish a cease-fire during the 1963-64 fighting were futile, and Britain appealed to the United States for help in establishing a NATO peacekeeping force. Makarios adamantly refused a NATO-based force and opted instead for an international force under UN auspices. NATO, in the view of many Greek Cypriots, had been responsible for Greece's willingness to compromise at Zurich and London and was therefore apt to lean in favor of a settlement amenable to Turkey. A Geneva peace conference held under UN auspices in August 1964 was attended by Dean Acheson, a former United States secretary of state and President Johnson's special envoy. He presented the Greek and Turkish governments with a plan that amounted to "double enosis." Cyprus was to be united with Greece, but Turkey would be given a military base on Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriots would be allowed to maintain one or two autonomous cantons. The Greek Cypriots considered the Acheson Plan a disguised form of partition and rejected it immediately. They were also highly critical of the fact that they had not been involved in the discussions, and popular demonstrations against the plan took place in front of the American and British embassies in Nicosia and Athens. The Acheson Plan pointed up an important discrepancy between the American and Cypriot assessments of the Cyprus problem. The United States, for the most part, considered the problem a dispute between Greece and Turkey-one of a number of issues that was souring bilateral relations between the two countries. Thus, Western efforts to solve the problem centered on accommodating the strategic interests of Greece and Turkey and ultimately NATO. Therefore the United States sought to contain the dispute and limit the number of parties involved. The Cypriots, however, considered the problem an internal dispute exacerbated by foreign interference. Since they could not limit the conflict to the domestic arena, they favored enlarging the number of actors in order to balance out those powers having the most direct interests in the island. In the late 1960s Cypriot-United States relations suffered from the widespread belief among Greeks and Greek Cypriots that the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had backed the military coup in Athens in April 1967. Nevertheless, on many occasions Makarios reiterated Cyprus' basic sympathy with the West. Despite occasional verbal attacks against the British base areas-designed mainly to win nonaligned support-removal of the bases was never a serious policy issue. The bases were too important to the country's economy and also provided a moderating effect against Turkish military interference. In addition, the Cypriots were aware that major Turkish military action in Cyprus had been forestalled twice, largely owing to United States intervention. As a result of the 1974 crisis, however, Cypriot-United States relations reached a new low. Cypriots were angered over what they considered United States inaction; the United States, in their opinion, had been slow to condemn the coup against Makarios and had failed to prevent a Turkish military operation on Cyprus as in 1964 and 1967. Makarios was an artful manager of superpower politics, and as the West increased pressure on him to accept a NATO-based solution, he turned to the East for support. The Soviet Union was more than willing to lend verbal support and military aid since turmoil in the region weakened the southeastern flank of NATO. During the early 1960s the Soviet Union had given Makarios a cautious endorsement. The communist party AKEL had been allowed to operate unhindered under Makarios, and the Soviets favored Makarios' policy of nonalignment and his calls for a demilitarized Cyprus. Thus, the Soviet Union was receptive to the Cypriot appeal for diplomatic and material support in early 1964 to counteract a possible Turkish intervention. The Soviets condemned efforts to arrange a NATO peacekeeping force as "a case of crude encroachment on the sovereignty, independence, and freedom of the Republic of Cyprus." In March, as communal violence escalated and Turkey seemed poised for action, the Soviets sent two warships cruising through the Turkish straits and warned the Turkish government against aggressive action on Cyprus. A military aid agreement was signed between Cyprus and the Soviet Union in the fall of 1964, and Soviet armaments began to flow into the country via Egypt. Relations between the two began to cool somewhat throughout 1965 and 1966. Turkey had begun its own campaign of rapprochement with the Soviet Union and its East European neighbors, and its approaches were warmly received. The Soviets modified their stand on Cyprus, excluding enosis but accepting the possibility of a federal solution-a position the Turkish government had been advocating in lieu of partition. In early 1967 the discovery of a Soviet spy network resulted in the deportation of a Soviet embassy official, among others. Cypriot-Soviet relations, however, entered a new high when the military junta came to power in Greece. The Soviets feared that the new pro-NATO Athens regime might be tempted to settle the Cyprus problem on the basis of a joint Greek-Turkish agreement, thereby bringing Cyprus into the NATO fold. Thus, the Soviets renewed their earlier appeals for noninterference in Cypriot affairs and continued their verbal attack on NATO. At the invitation of the Soviet government, Makarios paid an eight-day visit to the Soviet Union in June 1971 in his capacity as both president and church leader. A joint communique issued at the conclusion of the visit emphasized the sovereignty and political independence of Cyprus and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island and the abolition of foreign bases. The July 1974 coup against Makarios was immediately condemned by the Soviets as were the subsequent Turkish military actions on the island. Unlike 1964, however, the Soviets did not attempt to thwart the Turkish intervention. The Greek Cypriots were reluctant, however, to ally themselves with either the West or the East, for they believed the best way to realize the complete independence and sovereignty of Cyprus was to balance out superpower interests by adopting a policy of nonalignment. During the Cypriot campaign against the British in the 1950s, Makarios had traveled widely and had formed many close friendships with such emerging world leaders as Josef Broz Tito of Yugoslavia and Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt. He saw many parallels between the problems confronting Cyprus and those facing the countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Like Cyprus, many had gained independence only recently and had potentially divisive ethnic problems of their own. Makarios was one of twenty-five leaders to attend the first nonaligned summit meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September 1961. During the crisis of 1963-64 Egypt, like the Soviet Union, pledged military aid. (Egypt was anxious to neutralize the British bases in Cyprus to prevent their use in a possible Middle East conflict.) At the 1964 Cairo conference-the second nonaligned summit-a strongly worded resolution was adopted that called for an end to foreign interference and the abolition of the British base areas in Cyprus. Makarios continued to court nonaligned sympathy, and resolutions calling for the peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem were adopted at the third nonaligned conference in Lusaka, Zambia (September 1970) and the fourth nonaligned conference in Algiers (September 1973). On the eve of the July 1974 coup, Makarios' policy of friendship toward all culminated in his visit to China as the guest of the aging Mao Tse-tung. (The two countries had established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level in December 1971.) Nonaligned support proved invaluable given the Greek Cypriot decisions to "internationalize" the Cyprus problem. The independence granted Cyprus in 1960, albeit limited, had provided the Greek Cypriots with an opportunity to join international organizations and attend international conferences. The Greek Cypriots were to use these international platforms to their best advantage. Cyprus was admitted to the UN in September 1960. In March 1961 it became a member of the Commonwealth, and in May 1961 it joined the Council of Europe. Active participation in international and regional organizations was taken seriously, and Makarios attended many of the meetings personally or sent his experienced foreign minister Kyprianou. The UN was the forum in which Greek Cypriots concentrated most of their diplomatic efforts. During the 1963-64 crisis, Makarios had urged the establishment of an international peacekeeping force under UN Security Council auspices. A Security Council resolution passed in March 1964 resulted in the establishment of the UNFICYP. The resolution, although obliquely referring to the Zurich-London agreements, emphasized the provisions in the UN charter that called for member states to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states. It also referred to the government of Cyprus as the sole legal authority for maintaining law and order on the island. Besides authorizing a peacekeeping force, it asked the secretary general to appoint a mediator to help the parties arrive at a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. The work of the UN mediator led to the publication of a report (the Galo Plaza report) in March 1965. It recommended a solution based on a unitary state as advocated by the Greek Cypriots because the kind of federal solution proposed by the Turkish Cypriots would necessitate the mass transfer of populations and ultimately lead to de facto partition. However, the report also asked the Greek Cypriots to renounce any plans for enosis. It suggested that the UN play a role in guaranteeing any final settlement and consider the establishment of a special commission to protect individual and minority rights on Cyprus. Turkey immediately rejected the report; Greece and the Greek Cypriots welcomed most recommendations with the exception of that limiting the "right of self-determination" (i.e., enosis). The Greek Cypriots achieved their most important diplomatic victory at the UN General Assembly meeting in the fall of 1965. Thirty-one nonaligned nations submitted a resolution favorable to the Greek Cypriot view. The resolution explicitly referred to the 1964 Cairo conference and called on member states to respect the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and to refrain from interference in its affairs. It also requested the Security Council to continue its mediation efforts. The motion passed by a vote of forty-seven to five with fifty-four abstentions. The United States was among the five states that voted against the resolution while West European and East European countries were among those that abstained. Greek Cypriots hailed the vote as a victory for justice and morality, and Makarios contended that from an international standpoint the resolution effectively terminated the Zurich-London agreements. Turkey, conversely, considered the resolution a "recommendation" that could not nullify international treaties. The pattern was set, however, and throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s Greek Cypriots continued to insist that UN resolutions form the basis of any settlement and that negotiations be conducted within the framework of the UN. Foreign Policy in the Late 1970s The events of 1974 dramatically altered the internal balance of power between the two Cypriot communities. The Turkish Cypriots, backed by the presence of some 40,000 Turkish troops and in control of the north, suddenly found themselves bargaining from a position of strength. The Turkish military intervention, however, had not created a viable solution, and the two communities were further apart than ever in reaching a compromise settlement. On the international front, the triangular relationship between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey grew more tense. Greece and Turkey were brought to the brink of war, and the disagreements on Cyprus began to affect and spill over into other bilateral disputes. The southeastern flank of NATO was weakened by the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO and the continuing crisis atmosphere. Both Greece and Turkey began to reevaluate their relations with the West and to cultivate warmer relations with the East European countries. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, began to capitalize on the rift within the Western alliance. Cypriot foreign policy and strategy, however, changed very little. As in times past, the Greek Cypriots were compelled to shape their foreign policy in light of the three interlinking dimensions-the intercommunal conflict, the national interests of Greece and Turkey, and the strategic confrontation of the superpowers. Greek Cypriots continued to pursue their goal of an independent and sovereign Cyprus by opting for neutralism and nonalignment and by presenting their case in international conferences and forums. The intercommunal talks, which had been interrupted in 1974, began again in January 1975, but they only served to point up the vast chasm separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot visions of a just settlement (see The Quest for Intercommunal Compromise, this ch.). Turkish Cypriots favored "federation by evolution," which would initially entail a weak central government and the separate development of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot economies. For security reasons, they also pressed for a bizonal settlement (i.e., a separate territory for each community). The Greek Cypriots favored a unitary state, but they were prepared to accept a federal solution as long as it permitted freedom of movement and provided for what was in their view an effective central government. The question of territory and the return of refugees figured prominently in Greek Cypriot proposals for a settlement. Each new round of talks led to a stalemate with the Turkish Cypriots accusing the Greek Cypriots of failing to submit to the realities of the situation and attempting to return to the 1963 status quo. In turn, Greek Cypriots accused the Turkish Cypriots of offering no substantive concessions and attempting to gain de jure recognition for a series of "faits accomplis" that had been created through force of arms. The talks were hampered by the fact that both sides tended to approach negotiations in ways designed to curry international favor. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots began to consolidate their hold over the northern part of the island. In February 1975 they proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which was to form the foundation of a biregional federation and to administer the Turkish-held zone until a constitutional settlement had been arranged. The disaggregation of the two communities continued. Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south were allowed to move north while Greek Cypriots in the north were strongly encouraged to move south. After the 1974 crisis Turkish Cypriot dependence on Turkey became almost total while Greece and the Greek Cypriots moved away from the adversary relationship that had characterized the early 1970s to a relationship of relatively comfortable cooperation. In the Greek Cypriot view, northern Cyprus was an "occupied territory." As proof of this, the Greek Cypriots pointed to the continuing presence of Turkish troops on the island and the gradual integration of the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish economies. Turkey had gradually withdrawn some of the 40,000 troops comprising the original complement stationed in the north. As of mid-1979 an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 still remained. In 1975 the Turkish Cypriots adopted the Turkish lira as legal tender, and they increasingly relied on Turkey to meet their manpower and capital needs. About half of the revenues of the 1979 Turkish Cypriot budget were expected to be met through foreign aid, loans, and investment-much of it originating directly from Turkey. To the frustration of the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktas, both President Makarios and his successor Kyprianou refused to recognize him as an equal. The real center of power, according to the Greek Cypriots, lay in Ankara, and the Greek Cypriots therefore concentrated their foreign policy efforts toward encouraging the international community to pressure the Turkish government into making concessions on Cyprus. Greece, meanwhile, had emerged from seven years of dictatorship and the abortive coup attempt on Cyprus in a weak position. The new Karamanlis government faced critical domestic problems and important Turkish challenges to air space and continental shelf rights in the Aegean Sea. As a result, Greece was forced to confine itself to economic and diplomatic support of the Greek Cypriots at international conferences and in the course of bilateral discussions. Outwardly Greek and Greek Cypriot policy-with respect to the Cyprus issue-was in harmony although discerning observers detected slight deviations in policy. Karamanlis was said to favor a more moderate and conciliatory stand on Cyprus than either Makarios or Kyprianou, both of whom advocated a "long struggle" in the face of what they perceived as Turkish "intransigence." The Greek government was also anxious to reenter NATO and repair its damaged relations with Turkey. Moreover, the tripartite American-British-Canadian plan submitted to the two Cypriot communities in November 1978 reportedly had found favor in official Greek circles although it was later rejected by Greek Cypriot policymakers as a framework for negotiations. Nevertheless the Greek government continued to give its full public support to the policies adopted by the Greek Cypriots and made no attempt to involve itself in Cypriot domestic politics. In addition, the two governments were in agreement on one very important policy approach-the involvement of Greek Cypriots would be absolutely essential in reaching a settlement, and the Cyprus issue would not be linked to the settlement of Greek-Turkish bilateral disputes in the Aegean. Cypriot-United States relations (as well as bilateral relations between the United States and Greece and Turkey) suffered considerably after 1974. Many Greek Cypriots believed that the United States could have prevented Turkish military actions on Cyprus. In their view United States failure to do so indicated a marked "Turkish tilt" in United States foreign policy. Greek Cypriots reacted favorably, however, to two domestic developments in the United States. The first was the legislation passed by the United States Congress suspending arms sales to Turkey until progress toward a Cyprus settlement had been made. Contrary to United States laws Turkey had used American supplied arms in its military operations on Cyprus. An arms embargo took effect in February 1975, although it was partially lifted in October. The second favorable development was the election of Carter as president and his appointment of Vance as secretary of state. Greek Cypriots hoped that Carter and Vance would change the policies followed by former President Gerald R. Ford and his Secretary of State Kissinger, whom the Greek Cypriots blamed for their current predicament. Shortly after taking office, Carter dispatched Clark Clifford, a former secretary of defense, on a fact-finding mission to Cyprus. Clifford carried with him no concrete proposals, but he was said to have impressed on all parties the need to make reasonable concessions and begin meaningful negotiations. His visit came just after the Makarios-Denktas meeting of February 1977 and before the sixth round of intercommunal talks in Vienna, Austria, in March. Initial reaction after the Clifford visit was one of guarded optimism. Nevertheless the talks broke down, and the situation in the Mediterranean grew more tense. Disturbed by the weakened defense capability of Turkey and Turkish overtures for increased cooperation with the Soviet Union, Carter requested that Congress lift the arms embargo in April 1978, and it was finally removed in September of that year. At about the same time, the United States began its next major initiative on Cyprus. In concert with Britain and Canada, it prepared a twelve-point proposal designed to provide a framework for the resumption of intercommunal negotiations. (Basic authorship of the document was attributed to Matthew Nimetz, the Counselor of the United States Department of State.) The plan provided for a federal solution and touched on a number of key issues-the Constitution and the powers of the central government, the question of territory, the withdrawal of foreign military forces, and the refugee problem. It was presented to officials of the two Cypriot communities in November 1978. Both sides hesitated to condemn the plan, but both expressed early reservations on its substance and eventually rejected it. Turkish Cypriots found passages on territorial concessions, freedom of movement, and refugee issues disquieting while Greek Cypriots were not pleased with the proposed constitutional arrangements and the structures and functions of the central government. As of mid-1979 Greek and Turkish Cypriots were wary of United States initiatives aimed at settling the Cyprus problem. Greek Cypriots believed that only the United States could pressure Turkey into making substantial concessions, and they were disturbed that the United States had lifted its arms embargo against Turkey. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, in turn, resented efforts to link progress on the Cyprus issue to questions of military and economic aid. Relations between the governments of the Soviet Union and Cyprus in the mid- to late 1970s followed a seesaw pattern and, as in the past, reflected the changing configuration of influence in the Mediterranean. The Soviets had expressed strong verbal support for the Greek Cypriots after the 1974 crisis. The Soviets had not, however, provided military support or used the threat of force to deter the Turkish intervention. In early 1978 Cypriot-Soviet relations began to cool as Turkey, angered by the United States arms embargo and congressional delay in approving a defense cooperation agreement, sought detente with the Soviet Union. A visit to Turkey by Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov drew heavy criticism from the Greek Cypriots, who were especially disturbed by Ogarkov's pledge of military cooperation. (Ogarkov's visit to Turkey was the first by a Soviet chief of staff in some forty years.) In June 1978 Prime Minister Ecevit paid a state visit to the Soviet Union that resulted in a declaration of friendship and cooperation and a strengthening of bilateral economic and trade relations. The new Soviet-Turkish rapprochement was reflected in the policies of AKEL. During the latter half of 1978 and early 1979, AKEL began deemphasizing the long struggle and encouraging normalization of relations between the two Cypriot communities through closer cooperation in the economic sphere. Nevertheless Greek Cypriots and Soviets continued building trade links. The Soviets moderated their verbal attacks on Turkey but still advocated a unified and independent Cyprus. In early 1979 the Soviets issued an invitation to President Kyprianou to visit the Soviet Union. Preparations were under way, and the date had been set for sometime in mid-1979 when the Soviets suddenly canceled the visit. The ill health of Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was given as an explanation, but there was speculation that the postponement was politically motivated-a Soviet concession to Turkish sensitivities. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, however, was scheduled to visit the Soviet Union in October 1979. As in the 1960s and early 1970s, nonaligned countries proved to be the most consistent international base of support for the Greek Cypriots. Divisions within the nonaligned movement, however, made the conduct of foreign relations somewhat difficult. Cyprus had always maintained strong and friendly political relations with Middle Eastern countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Arab condemnation of Egypt for signing a bilateral peace treaty with Israel posed a dilemma for Cypriot policymakers. In the past Egypt had been one of the Cypriots' staunchest supporters. Nevertheless Greek Cypriots joined in condemning the treaty. Relations with Egypt had already been complicated in early 1978 by an Egyptian attempt-against Cypriot directives-to stage a rescue operation of a hijacked plane at Larnaca airport. (The two Arab terrorists who hijacked the plane had murdered an Egyptian journalist.) Greek Cypriots were negotiating the release of hostages and had the situation under control when an Egyptian commando unit arrived on the scene and attempted to overrun the hijacked plane. Several Egyptian fighters died in the ensuing clash with the Cypriot National Guard. As a result of the incident, Egypt recalled its ambassador, and diplomatic relations were severely taxed. As of mid-1979 the two governments had not yet restored full relations. The overall agreement of the Greek Cypriot political parties on the basic approach to foreign policy aided efforts to maintain firm nonaligned support. Thus, contacts by party officials of AKEL and EDEK tended to complement government-to-government ties. For example, Lyssarides, head of EDEK, was also vice president of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), which formed an important pressure group within the nonaligned movement. At nonaligned conferences held after the 1974 crisis, Cyprus continued to receive support. At the 1976 nonaligned summit in Colombo, Sri Lanka, a strongly worded resolution was adopted calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the return of refugees to their homes. In addition, unilateral attempts to change the demographic composition of the island were condemned. At the foreign minister's conference in Belgrade in July 1978 an even stronger resolution was passed. It demanded the immediate implementation of UN resolutions on Cyprus and urged the UN Security Council to consider sanctions against Turkey under Chapter VII of the UN charter. It also called for the disarmament and demilitarization of Cyprus in accordance with a proposal made by Kyprianou at the UN conference on disarmament in May 1978. The sixth nonaligned summit meeting was scheduled for Havana, Cuba, in September 1979, and Greek Cypriots hoped it would be another diplomatic success. Support from the nonaligned states also proved most helpful during UN debates. Greek Cypriots were aware that UN resolutions, unless backed by substantive sanctions, lacked physical clout, but they hoped that collective international pressure on Turkey would at least prevent further consolidation of the Turkish hold on northern Cyprus. Between July 1974 and the end of 1978, the UN had adopted twenty-six resolutions on Cyprus-five through the General Assembly and twenty-one through the Security Council. General Assembly resolutions were uniformly favorable to the Greek Cypriot view and formed the basis of Greek Cypriot proposals for a settlement. The most significant resolution was that passed in November 1974 just three months after the armed Turkish intervention. The motion, submitted by a group of nonaligned states, reaffirmed the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus and called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the safe return of all refugees, and the negotiation of a political settlement within the UN framework. It was adopted unanimously. Similar resolutions were adopted at the General Assembly meetings in 1975, 1976, and 1977. Greek Cypriot efforts to obtain progressively stronger UN resolutions culminated in the adoption of a resolution in November 1978 that recommended that the Security Council consider invoking "all appropriate and practical measures under the Charter of the United Nations" in seeking implementation of the UN motions. Since 1974 UN Secretary General Waldheim has played a vital role in attempting to bring the two Cypriot communities to the negotiating table. He was instrumental in arranging the Makarios-Denktas meeting in which a four-point framework for negotiations was agreed on. Unfortunately the intercommunal talks that began in Vienna in March 1977 quickly broke down. A new initiative launched in 1978-79 resulted in a May 1979 meeting between Kyprianou and Denktas. This time the two sides adopted a ten-point document providing the guidelines to be followed in intercommunal negotiations. Talks resumed under UN auspices in June. Differences in the interpretation of the guidelines, however, led to another stalemate.