The Best of the Bureau/The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso/dp/0103/01031.txt

Text File | 1992-08-07 | 13KB | 260 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01031}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 7B   June 1986:  New Congressional Inquiry}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{north
poindexter
information
letter
boland
committee
meeting
resolution
amendment
congress}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 7B   June 1986:  New Congressional Inquiry

     On June 4, Representative Ron Coleman of Texas introduced a Resolution of
Inquiry (H. Res. 485), directing the President to provide documents and
information about support for the Contras.  In a public statement, the
Resolution's author explained the need "to get at the truth" behind the widely
publicized allegations:  "[D]isturbing new reports that our own government
officials may have deliberately violated the law that prohibited any open or
hidden U.S. assistance for military operations inside Nicaragua [suggest that
there] may have been an intentional disregard for our own democratic process."

     In a statement inserted into the Congressional Record, the author of the
Resolution explained the information sought from the Administration:

My resolution of inquiry seeks answers and information on two central
questions.  Did Lieutenant Colonel North develop and implement a plan for
Contra funding in the event that Congress did adopt the Boland Amendment?
. . .  Second, what was the degree of Lieutenant Colonel North's involvement
with the Contra high command before, during, and after the Boland Amendment
became the law of this land.  Did he assure the Contra generals that the
administration would find a way to ensure continued funding and assistance
even in the event of a congressional ban?  Did he, as alleged, provide regular
tactical and logistical assistance to the Contra high command on a regular
basis?  Did Lieutenant Colonel North then implement a sham network of
intermediaries to filter his continued advice to the Contra generals in direct
violation of at least the spirit of the Boland language?

Representative Coleman said he introduced his Resolution "very reluctantly,"
adding:  "No one can be allowed to operate above the law of this great country
- least of all those officials obligated to defend our Constitution."  He
concluded by stating that the Resolution "touches upon areas of concern that
go far beyond the question of one's position relative to Contra aid. Rather,
this course of action goes to accountability and ensuring that one branch of
our Government [does not] disregard . . . the other two."

     The Resolution of Inquiry directed the President to provide to the House
information and documents in three areas:

     1.  Funds and Supplies:  Information and documents on contacts between
any NSC staff member and private individuals or representatives of foreign
governments relating to the provision of funds and supplies to the Contras.

     2.  Military Activities:  Information and documents on contacts between
any NSC staff member and any member of the Nicaraguan Resistance relating to
Contra military activities.

     3.  Singlaub, Owen & Hull:  Information and documents on contacts between
any NSC staff member and Robert W. Owen, Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, and John
Hull.

     The Resolution was referred to the House Committees on Intelligence,
Foreign Affairs and Armed Services.  On June 25 and July 1, the Chairmen of
the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence Committee requested
comments from the President on the Resolution.

The Executive's Response

     On July 21, Poindexter wrote the Chairmen of the three Committees "in
reply to your letter to the President."  Poindexter testified that he
"probably" did not show the letter to the President, but discussed the issue
with him "in general terms . . . .  I probably told him about the Resolution
of inquiry and told him that we were opposed to it.  He agreed."

     In the one-page letter, Poindexter first stated the Administration's
opposition to the resolution of inquiry.  He continued:

Last fall, in an effort to cooperate with Chairman Barnes, my predecessor,
Robert C. McFarlane, met with members of your committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee.  While I did not participate in these discussions, I
understand that information on the specific issues raised in H. Res. 485, was
provided to your Committee and that this information made it clear that the
actions of the National Security Council staff were in compliance with both
the spirit and letter of the law regarding support of the Nicaraguan
resistance.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on H. Res. 485.  I have forwarded
similar letters to Chairman Fascell and Chairman Aspin and sincerely hope that
this matter can finally be put to rest.

Insisting that the letter was technically accurate, Poindexter acknowledged to
the Select Committees that the letter "clearly withholds information."

     By any standard the response was misleading.  First, the National
Security Adviser implied in the letter that he accepted the view that the
Boland Amendment applied to the NSC stall", and that the NSC staff under his
tenure was not providing covert lethal support to the Contras.  Poindexter
referred explicitly to the information McFarlane had provided Congress that
"made it clear that the actions of the National Security Council staff were in
compliance with both the spirit and the letter" of the Boland Amendment. He
did not disclose that he had authorized North to provide to the Contras
precisely the kind of covert aid the Boland Amendment was intended to prohibit
or that, as he put it, "We had been running this [Contra] operation on our own
for a long period of time."

     Asked how he could reconcile the statement that the NSC staff was
complying with the "letter and spirit" of the Boland Amendment with the
actions North had taken and that he had approved, Poindexter testified:

I felt that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC staff and I felt
that indeed we were complying with the letter and spirit of the Boland
Amendment.  Now, it doesn't say that we are not helping the Contras.  We were.

     In addition, Poindexter's letter implied that he had no dispute in 1985
with the categorical denials McFarlane gave Congress on allegations about
North's activities.  In fact, however, Poindexter was aware that North had
taken over coordination of Contra-support activities after enactment of the
Boland Amendment.  Moreover, when the Barnes letter arrived at the NSC on
August 17, 1985, it was Deputy National Security Adviser Poindexter who
assigned North to draft the response, intending that North would conceal his
true activities from Congress.  As Poindexter himself put it before these
Committees, he intended with his letter to say "that the questions had been
addressed by Mr. McFarlane in the previous year."  But McFarlane's denials had
misled Congress the previous year, as Poindexter's letter misled Congress in
1986.

August 1986:  North's Meeting with Members of Congress

     In response to the Resolution of Inquiry, the House Intelligence
Committee sought to meet with North.  On August 6, North met with 11 members
of the House Intelligence Committee in the White House Situation Room.  North
began the session with a presentation about his activities.  The description
echoed closely McFarlane's letters the year before to Representatives Hamilton
and Barnes: North's principal mission was to coordinate contacts with the
Contras; a main purpose of his job was to assess the viability of the
Nicaraguan Resistance as a democratic organization; and he explained to Contra
leaders the limitations on U.S. support as imposed by the Boland Amendment.
According to a memorandum based on notes taken at the meeting, North said
"that he did not in any way, nor at any time violate the spirit, principles or
legal requirements of the Boland Amendment."

     In response to specific questions, North denied that he had raised funds
for th