The Best of the Bureau/The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso/dp/0103/01030.txt

Text File | 1992-08-07 | 16KB | 263 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01030}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 7A   Keeping 'USC Fingerprints' Off: 1986}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{north
contras
poindexter
officials
nsc
administration
aid
activities
cia
support}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 7A   Keeping "USC Fingerprints" Off: 1986

     In 1986, the Contra support project finally achieved a degree of
operational success.  By mid-year, weapons and other material were being
dropped to Resistance troops inside northern Nicaragua; by fall, similar
airdrops were being made in the South.  Congress had appropriated funds for
the humanitarian needs of the Contras, it had authorized third-country
solicitation for humanitarian aid, and it had allowed the CIA to provide
intelligence to the Resistance.  But Congress had maintained the prohibition
on lethal support.  Following the pattern of 1984-1985, allegations in the
media and independently obtained information prompted Congressional inquiries,
which in turn were met with categorical denials by Administration officials,
some of whom knew the statements to be misleading and false.

     The expansion of the covert operation's activities in 1986 also created
new problems for officials still seeking to maintain secrecy.  In September, a
new Costa Rican Government threatened to reveal the existence of the Santa
Elena airfield, exposing the involvement of U.S. citizens and Government
officials in providing support to the Contras.  Administration officials
mobilized quickly to squelch the threatened press conference.  Successful at
first, the officials were unable to prevent disclosure by the Costa Rican
Government three weeks later.  Concerned that reporters might discover the
link between the airfield and U.S. officials, North immediately took steps to
ensure that no "USG fingerprints" would be found on Santa Elena.

     In October, the Sandinistas shot down an Enterprise plane on a resupply
mission (the Hasenfus flight).  Administration officials, not all of whom knew
the true facts, denied before Congress and to the media that the U.S.
Government was involved in the Hasenfus flight.  Even the President spoke out.
With no protest from his National Security Adviser or others aware of the
facts, the President told the American people:  "[T]here is no government
connection with that at all."

     For most of 1986, efforts to determine whether the U.S. Government was
providing lethal support to the Contras despite the legal restrictions were
thwarted by the same techniques used in 1985.

January to June 1986:  Press Reports

     Through the first quarter of 1986, Congressional and media attention on
the NSC staffs involvement with the Contras abated.  In Washington,
Congressional Committees had accepted the categorical denials the previous
fall by the National Security Adviser.  In Central America, the resupply
project was not fully operational and Resistance activities slowed.  A New
York Times reporter in the region in January found the "Nicaraguan guerrillas
. . . back in their camps;" in early March, the correspondent described the
Resistance as being "in its worst military condition since its formation in
1982."

     By the end of March, the Contras' fortunes began to shift, and articles
again appeared discussing the sources of Resistance funds and supplies.  Some
focused on charges that the Contras had received lethal support from American
mercenaries and funds from drug trafficking; others explored how the Contras
were spending the $27 million appropriated by Congress in August, 1985, for
humanitarian aid.  By the end of April, North had reemerged as the focus of
attention.  The allegations in the new series of articles were almost always
attributed to anonymous officials, and some of the details were incorrect. But
the main charge - that U.S. Government officials had continued to provide
lethal aid to the Contras despite the Boland Amendment - was accurate.  The
renewed reporting provided the context for a new round of Congressional
inquiries that would begin at the end of June.

Focus on North

     In an April 30, 1986, article headlined, "Colonel's Actions May Have
Broken Contra Aid Ban," the Miami Herald provided what it called "the first
glimpses at the inner workings of the well-oiled private contra support
machine that - with White House encouragement - developed after Congress
suspended contra aid."  The article asserted that Oliver North had arranged a
meeting between a potential donor and a Contra fundraiser.  It quoted
"administration officials" as saying that "North acted repeatedly on behalf of
the contras, especially in channeling potential donors to the rebels."  John
Singlaub and Robert Owen were cited in the article as two "conservatives
closely associated with the contras" who had frequent meetings with North. In
the article, "[a]n administration official authorized to reply to queries" was
quoted as saying that "Oliver North has not been involved in illegal
activities."

     On June 8, the Miami Herald ran on page one the headline, "Despite Ban,
U.S. Helping Contras."  Quoting anonymous Administration and Resistance
officials, the article reported that the Reagan Administration "continued
secretly to assist anti-Sandinista rebels in finding weapons and plotting
military strategy through a network of private operatives overseen by the
National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA."  According to the article, the
system was supervised by North with "advice from" officers in the CIA Central
American division.  After enactment of the Boland Amendment, "private
individuals were used as bridges between the administration and the rebels."
The Administration "feels it has honored" Congressional restrictions "by
channeling its involvement through private citizens."  This belief was
attributed to "two administration officials and a knowledgeable rebel leader."

     On June 22, the Miami Herald reported that the "controversial program to
coordinate private aid to anti-Sandinista rebels through the National Security
Council was approved by officials in the White House."  This was attributed to
"several current and former administration officials."  The article went on to
quote "one source," unidentified, as saying that McFarlane briefed Reagan on
the proposal to aid the Contras and that the President verbally approved the
plan.  The Herald reported that McFarlane denied knowledge of any such plan to
aid the Contras.

Concern for Secrecy

     As the Contra support operation expanded during 1986, the task of
maintaining secrecy became more challenging.  National Security Adviser John
Poindexter, who admitted to the Committees, "I wanted to withhold information
on the NSC operational activities in support of the Contras from most
everybody," did what he could to conceal the NSC connection.

     North oversaw two of the most important NSC "accounts," but Poindexter
kept North's title artificially low because "we wanted to provide a
significant amount of cover for Colonel North and his activities."  According
to Poindexter, North's responsibilities warranted the title Special Assistant
to the President, the third-level rank in the White House.  Instead, he kept
North as Deputy Director of Political Military Affairs.  "We didn't want to
call public attention to Colonel North," Poindexter testified.

     In July, shortly after the renewal of Congressional inquiries, Poindexter
tried further to downplay North's responsibilities.  He apparently leaked to
the Washington Times the story that North's position at the NSC staff was
"precarious" and that "NSC soft liners" were maneuvering "to edge him out."
In a PROF Note sent the day the article appeared, Poindexter reassured North
about his intentions:  "I do not want you to leave and to be honest cannot
afford to let you go."  He told North to call two reporters at the Washington
Times and "tell them to call off the dogs."