home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
The Best of the Bureau
/
The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso
/
dp
/
0100
/
01007.txt
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1992-08-07
|
35KB
|
643 lines
$Unique_ID{bob01007}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Findings and Conclusions}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{congress
covert
president
policy
nsc
staff
iran
contras
states
united}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author: Various
Date: 1987
Findings and Conclusions
The common ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were secrecy,
deception, and disdain for the law. A small group of senior officials
believed that they alone knew what was right. They viewed knowledge of their
actions by others in the Government as a threat to their objectives. They told
neither the Secretary of State, the Congress nor the American people of their
actions. When exposure was threatened, they destroyed official documents and
lied to Cabinet officials, to the public, and to elected representatives in
Congress. They testified that they even withheld key facts from the
President.
The United States Constitution specifies the process by which laws and
policy are to be made and executed. Constitutional process is the essence of
our democracy and our democratic form of Government is the basis of our
strength. Time and again we have learned that a flawed process leads to bad
results, and that a lawless process leads to worse.
Policy Contradictions and Failures
The Administration's departure from democratic processes created the
conditions for policy failure, and led to contradictions which undermined the
credibility of the United States.
The United States simultaneously pursued two contradictory foreign
policies - a public one and a secret one:
- The public policy was not to make any concessions for the release of
hostages lest such concessions encourage more hostage-taking. At the same
time, the United States was secretly trading weapons to get the hostages back.
- The public policy was to ban arms shipments to Iran and to exhort other
Governments to observe this embargo. At the same time, the United States was
secretly selling sophisticated missiles to Iran and promising more.
- The public policy was to improve relations with Iraq. At the same
time, the United States secretly shared military intelligence on Iraq with
Iran and North told the Iranians in contradiction to United States policy that
the United States would help promote the overthrow of the Iraqi head of
government.
- The public policy was to urge all Governments to punish terrorism and
to support, indeed encourage, the refusal of Kuwait to free the Da'wa
prisoners who were convicted of terrorist acts. At the same time, senior
officials secretly endorsed a Secord-Hakim plan to permit Iran to obtain the
release of the Da'wa prisoners.
- The public policy was to observe the "letter and spirit" of the Boland
Amendment's proscriptions against military or paramilitary assistance to the
Contras. At the same time, the NSC staff was secretly assuming direction and
funding of the Contras' military effort.
- The public policy, embodied in agreements signed by Director Casey, was
for the Administration to consult with the Congressional oversight committees
about covert activities in a "new spirit of frankness and cooperation." At
the same time, the CIA and the White House were secretly withholding from
those Committees all information concerning the Iran initiative and the Contra
support network.
- The public policy, embodied in Executive Order 12333, was to conduct
covert operations solely through the CIA or other organs of the intelligence
community specifically authorized by the President. At the same time,
although the NSC was not so authorized, the NSC staff secretly became
operational and used private, non-accountable agents to engage in covert
activities.
These contradictions in policy inevitably resulted in policy failure:
- The United States armed Iran, including its most radical elements, but
attained neither a new relationship with that hostile regime nor a reduction
in the number of American hostages.
- The arms sales did not lead to a moderation of Iranian policies.
Moderates did not come forward, and Iran to this day sponsors actions directed
against the United States in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.
- The United States opened itself to blackmail by adversaries who might
reveal the secret arms sales and who, according to North, threatened to kill
the hostages if the sales stopped.
- The United States undermined its credibility with friends and allies,
including moderate Arab states, by its public stance of opposing arms sales to
Iran while undertaking such arms sales in secret.
- The United States lost a $10 million contribution to the Contras from
the Sultan of Brunei by directing it to the wrong bank account - the result of
an improper effort to channel that humanitarian aid contribution into an
account used for lethal assistance.
- The United States sought illicit funding for the Contras through
profits from the secret arms sales, but a substantial portion of those profits
ended up in the personal bank accounts of the private individuals executing
the sales - while the exorbitant amounts charged for the weapons inflamed the
Iranians with whom the United States was seeking a new relationship.
Flawed Policy Process
The record of the Iran-Contra Affair also shows a seriously flawed
policymaking process.
Confusion
There was confusion and disarray at the highest levels of Government.
- McFarlane embarked on a dangerous trip to Tehran under a complete
misapprehension. He thought the Iranians had promised to secure the release
of all hostages before he delivered arms, when in fact they had promised only
to seek the hostages' release, and then only after one planeload of arms had
arrived.
- The President first told the Tower Board that he had approved the
initial Israeli shipments. Then, he told the Tower Board that he had not.
Finally, he told the Tower Board that he does not know whether he approved the
initial Israeli arms shipments, and his top advisers disagree on the question.
- The President claims he does not recall signing a Finding approving the
November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran. But Poindexter testified that the
President did sign a Finding on December 5, 1985, approving the shipment
retroactively. Poindexter later destroyed the Finding to save the President
from embarrassment.
- That Finding was prepared without adequate discussion and stuck in
Poindexter's safe for a year; Poindexter claimed he forgot about it; the White
House asserts the President never signed it; and when events began to unravel,
Poindexter ripped it up.
- The President and the Attorney General told the public that the
President did not know about the November 1985 Israeli HAWK shipment until
February 1986 - an error the White House Chief of Staff explained by saying
that the preparation for the press conference "sort of confused the
Presidential mind."
- Poindexter says the President would have approved the diversion, if he
had been asked; and the President says he would not have.
- One National Security Adviser understood that the Boland Amendment
applied to the NSC; another thought it did not. Neither sought a legal
opinion on the question.
- The President incorrectly assured the American people that the NSC
staff was adhering to the law and that the Government was not connected to the
Hasenfus airplane. His staff was in fact conducting a "full service" covert
operation to support the Contras which they believed he had authorized.
- North says he sent five or six completed memorandums to Poindexter
seeking the President's approval for the diversion. Poindexter does not
remember receiving any. Only one has been found.
Dishonesty and Secrecy
The Iran-Contra Affair was characterized by pervasive dishonesty and
inordinate secrecy.
North admitted that he and