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$Unique_ID{bob01006}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Executive Summary}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{president
north
contras
arms
iran
november
sales
congress
poindexter
covert}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author: Various
Date: 1987
Executive Summary
The full story of the Iran-Contra Affair is complicated, and, for this
Nation, profoundly sad. In the narrative portion of this Report, the
Committees present a comprehensive account of the facts, based on 10 months of
investigation, including 11 weeks of hearings.
But the facts alone do not explain how or why the events occurred. In
this Executive Summary, the Committees focus on the key issues and offer their
conclusions. Minority, supplemental, and additional views are printed in
Section II and Section III.
Summary of the Facts
The Iran-Contra Affair had its origin in two unrelated revolutions in
Iran and Nicaragua.
In Nicaragua, the long-time President, General Anastasio Somoza Debayle,
was overthrown in 1979 and replaced by a Government controlled by Sandinista
leftists.
In Iran, the pro-Western Government of the Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi was
overthrown in 1979 by Islamic fundamentalists led by the Ayatollah Khomeini.
The Khomeini Government, stridently anti-American, became a supporter of
terrorism against American citizens.
Nicaragua
United States policy following the revolution in Nicaragua was to
encourage the Sandinista Government to keep its pledges of pluralism and
democracy. However, the Sandinista regime became increasingly anti-American
and autocratic; began to aid a leftist insurgency in El Salvador; and turned
toward Cuba and the Soviet Union for political, military, and economic
assistance. By December 1981, the United States had begun supporting the
Nicaraguan Contras, armed opponents of the Sandinista regime.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the U.S. Government agency that
assisted the Contras. In accordance with Presidential decisions, known as
Findings, and with funds appropriated by Congress, the CIA armed, clothed,
fed, and supervised the Contras. Despite this assistance, the Contras failed
to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua.
Although the President continued to favor support of the Contras, opinion
polls indicated that a majority of the public was not supportive. Opponents of
the Administration's policy feared that U.S. involvement with the Contras
would embroil the United States in another Vietnam. Supporters of the policy
feared that, without U.S. support for the Contras, the Soviets would gain a
dangerous toehold in Central America.
Congress prohibited Contra aid for the purpose of overthrowing the
Sandinista Government in fiscal year 1983, and limited all aid to the Contras
in fiscal year 1984 to $24 million. Following disclosure in March and April
1984 that the CIA had a role in connection with the mining of the Nicaraguan
harbors without adequate notification to Congress, public criticism mounted
and the Administration's Contra policy lost much of its support within
Congress. After further vigorous debate, Congress exercised its
Constitutional power over appropriations and cut off all funds for the
Contras' military and paramilitary operations. The statutory provision
cutting off funds, known as the Boland Amendment, was part of a fiscal year
1985 omnibus appropriations bill, and was signed into law by the President on
October 12, 1984.
Still, the President felt strongly about the Contras, and he ordered his
staff, in the words of his National Security Adviser, to find a way to keep
the Contras "body and soul together." Thus began the story of how the staff
of a White House advisory body, the NSC, became an operational entity that
secretly ran the Contra assistance effort, and later the Iran initiative. The
action officer placed in charge of both operations was Lt. Col. Oliver L.
North.
Denied funding by Congress, the President turned to third countries and
private sources. Between June 1984 and the beginning of 1986, the President,
his National Security Adviser, and the NSC staff secretly raised $34 million
for the Contras from other countries. An additional $2.7 million was provided
for the Contras during 1985 and 1986 from private contributors, who were
addressed by North and occasionally granted photo opportunities with the
President. In the middle of this period, Assistant Secretary of State A.
Langhorne Motley - from whom these contributions were concealed - gave his
assurance to Congress that the Administration was not "soliciting and/or
encouraging third countries" to give funds to the Contras because, as he
conceded, the Boland Amendment prohibited such solicitation.
The first contributions were sent by the donors to bank accounts
controlled and used by the Contras. However, in July 1985, North took control
of the funds and - with the support of two National Security Advisers (Robert
McFarlane and John Poindexter) and, according to North, Director Casey - used
those funds to run the covert operation to support the Contras.
At the suggestion of Director Casey, North recruited Richard V. Secord, a
retired Air Force Major General with experience in special operations. Secord
set up Swiss bank accounts, and North steered future donations into these
accounts. Using these funds, and funds later generated by the Iran arms
sales, Secord and his associate, Albert Hakim, created what they called "the
Enterprise," a private organization designed to engage in covert activities on
behalf of the United States.
The Enterprise, functioning largely at North's direction, had its own
airplanes, pilots, airfield, operatives, ship, secure communications devices,
and secret Swiss bank accounts. For 16 months, it served as the secret arm of
the NSC staff, carrying out with private and non-appropriated money, and
without the accountability or restrictions imposed by law on the CIA, a covert
Contra aid program that Congress thought it had prohibited.
Although the CIA and other agencies involved in intelligence activities
knew that the Boland Amendment barred their involvement in covert support for
the Contras, North's Contra support operation received logistical and tactical
support from various personnel in the CIA and other agencies. Certain CIA
personnel in Central America gave their assistance. The U.S. Ambassador in
Costa Rica, Lewis Tambs, provided his active assistance. North also enlisted
the aid of Defense Department personnel in Central America, and obtained
secure communications equipment from the National Security Agency. The
Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for the region, Elliott
Abrams, professed ignorance of this support. He later stated that he had been
"careful not to ask North lots of questions."
By Executive Order and National Security Decision Directive issued by
President Reagan, all covert operations must be approved by the President
personally and in writing. By statute, Congress must be notified about each
covert action. The funds used for such actions, like all government funds,
must be strictly accounted for.
The covert action directed by North, however, was not approved by the
President in writing. Congress was not notified about it. And the funds to
support it were never accounted for. In short, the operation functioned
without any of the accountability required of Government activities. It was
an evasion of the Constitution's most basic check on Executive action - the
power of the Congress to grant or deny funding for Government programs.
Moreover, the covert action to support the Contras was concealed from Congress
and the public. When the press reported in the summer of 1985 that the NSC
staff was engaged in raising money and furnishing military support to the
Contras, the President assured the public that the l