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$Unique_ID{bob00450}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Romania
Chapter 4. Finance}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Donald E. deKieffer}
$Affiliation{Embassy of Romania, Washington DC}
$Subject{currency
foreign
romania
bank
romanian
market
banks
monetary
credit
exchange}
$Date{1990}
$Log{}
Title: Romania
Book: Doing Business with the New Romania
Author: Donald E. deKieffer
Affiliation: Embassy of Romania, Washington DC
Date: 1990
Chapter 4. Finance
The collapse of the Ceausescu regime contained several ironic benefits
for the Romanian economy beyond the obvious. Through extreme austerity, the
Ceausescu monetary policies had succeeded in reducing Romania's external debt
of over $15 billion to a $1.7 billion surplus by the time he was deposed.
This contrasts sharply with the colossal debt of some surrounding countries
such as Hungary, which suffers one of the highest per-capita foreign debt
burdens in the world.
The severity of the burdens placed on the Romanian population for more
than a decade to achieve this enviable position also conditioned it to
accept only slight improvements in living standards following the revolution.
This has allowed the monetary and fiscal authorities of the new government
time in which to develop plans to transform the economy to one based on a true
market system without the immediate concern of civil insurrection due to
continued deprivation.
Notwithstanding the favorable external debt situation, the Romanian
economy still bears the substantial burden of either completing some of the
grandiose projects of the late dictator or writing them off at the cost of
billions of lei. Further, Ceausescu had a habit of awarding foreign credits
to countries whose favor he attempted to curry, with little regard to those
nations' ability to repay. It is likely that many of the "credits" carried on
Romania's books are in fact bad debts which will have to be written off.
Even with these, however, Romania still has at least a "balanced" foreign
account-something almost unheard of in newly-free countries.
CONVERTIBILITY
The most pressing problem for Romania's monetary authorities is the
lack of convertibility of the local currency. Even with a surplus in current
accounts, it would likely take the infusion of at least $5-6 billion in hard
currency if massive inflation is to be avoided. The extension of such credit,
of course, would likely come from the IMF. Their cooperation, in turn, would
depend upon their confidence in Romania's ability to make timely payments.
This, again, is problematic. In its zeal to pay down the loans over the last
ten years, the Ceausescu government curtailed imports of even capital goods
and high-technology equipment. Except for high-profile schemes such as
the "rebuilding" of central Bucharest, the infrastructure was ill-maintained,
and Romania's ability to compete with Western (and Asian) countries in a
world market deteriorated. It is precisely in these areas that Romanian
central bankers are most anxious to develop to improve their credit rating.
Compounding these problems in the legacy of currency control which
existed over the past five decades. During the Ceausescu era, black market
currency transactions occurred, but only at great risk to the participants.
The new government feels that 10-year prison sentences for currency
conversion are incompatible with its professed dedication to a free market
(and not incidentally to individual freedom). The result has been unfortunate.
While maintaining the old system of currency controls, enforcement is now
almost non-existent. While official numbers are not available for obvious
reasons, "street bankers" probably conduct as much business as the Romanian
Bank of Foreign Trade. The "spread" between the official rate and the (black)
market rate ranges from 3-1 to as much as 7-1. The "private" sector, then,
is undermining the efforts of the central bankers to implement a gradual
transition to a market economy. This may not be altogether bad. Bankers as a
race tend to be cautious. The growing disparity between their policies and the
reality of the marketplace may serve to drive individuals previously content
with handling government accounts to recognize the realities of a free market.
The stakes in this, however, are vast. Immediate conversion to a
"convertible" system would undoubtedly fuel massive inflation and drive down
living standards, something the new government can ill afford. The "street
market" pressures, however, will force the monetary authorities to
act with more alacrity than they might otherwise prefer in approving
development credits to finance the expensive "reentry" into the mercantile
world.
As it now stands, however, there are enormous bargains to be had in
Romania-even at the "official" rate. Traditionally, Romania had little
to sell to foreigners at almost any price. With the new commitment to private
ownership, however, land, factories, equipment and products can be purchased
for a fraction of their price in the West. This, too, concerns
the monetary authorities. They worry that a deluge of Japanese and European
money will literally indenture the country to foreigners. This is
an unhappy time to be a Romanian banker, but a delight to those with hard
currency. Given the skills of the Romanian work force, ample natural
resources, a strategic location and a commitment to liberal democracy,
establishment of production facilities in Romania before 1995 appears to be
a certain winner. The mid-term recovery of invested capital-in hard
currency-is almost forgone with prices as low as they are today-especially
since the monetary authorities themselves are encouraging this type of
investment to retrieve their credibility as a debtor.
BANKING
Until recently, Romania's banking system was a state monopoly. The
National Bank of Romania was nationalized on December 20, 1946, and all
private banks on June 11, 1948. for 43 years, the Romanian banking system
was an adjunct of Romania's centrally-planned fiscal and monetary
policies.
Recent changes in legislation, however, permit competition in the banking
sector, and the financial markets are due to become highly diversified
in the next several years. It is likely, however, that the existing banks will
continue to do business, although in substantially different forms. The main
financial institutions are the following:
The National Bank of Romania
The National Bank of Romania (NBR) exercises the functions of a central
bank and, together with the Ministry of Finance, sets the foreign exchange
rate, establishes foreign exchange budgets and decides on the distribution of
exchange balances among various currencies and depositories. The NBR also
issues and circulates currency, executes the state budget, supervises the
implementation of the financial credit and currency policy, cash and non-cash
discounts and loans to government corporations.
By 1991, it is likely that the functions of the NBR will be restricted
to the traditional functions of a central bank, and that its role is the chief
financing agency for government corporations will be shifted to the commercial
sector.
The Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade
This is the institution most frequently encountered by foreign
businessman. Although it is subordinate to the NBR, the two banks interchange
personnel. The RBFT is primarily responsible for payments related to
international trade and service transactions.
Services traditionally available from the RBFT include confirmation of
letters of credit, endorsement of bills of exchange, payment against shipping
documents, discount of commercial paper, credit guarantees, purchases and
sale of foreign currency, and other commercial transactions. The RBFT may
also conclude agreements with foreign banks concerning financial transactions
and accounting practices. The RBFT maintains correspondent relationships with
hundreds of banks worldwide and has a fair credit rating in world fin