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╞┼─┼╥┴╠╔╙╘ ╬O. 59

├ONCERNING THE ╨OWER OF ├ONGRESS TO ╥EGULATE THE ┼LECTION OF
═EMBERS
╞ROM THE ╬EW ┘ORK ╨ACKET. ╞RIDAY, ╞EBRUARY 22, 1788.

╚┴═╔╠╘╧╬

╘O THE ╨EOPLE OF THE ╙TATE OF ╬EW ┘ORK:
╘╚┼ NATURAL ORDER OF THE SUBJECT LEADS US TO CONSIDER, IN THIS
PLACE, THAT PROVISION OF THE ├ONSTITUTION WHICH AUTHORIZES THE
NATIONAL LEGISLATURE TO REGULATE, IN THE LAST RESORT, THE
ELECTION OF ITS OWN MEMBERS. ╔T IS IN THESE WORDS: "╘HE ╘╔═┼╙,
╨╠┴├┼╙, AND ═┴╬╬┼╥ OF HOLDING ELECTIONS FOR SENATORS AND
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE PRESCRIBED IN EACH ╙TATE BY THE
LEGISLATURE THEREOF; BUT THE ├ONGRESS MAY, AT ANY TIME, BY LAW,
MAKE OR ALTER ╙╒├╚ ╥┼╟╒╠┴╘╔╧╬╙, EXCEPT AS TO THE ╨╠┴├┼╙ OF
CHOOSING SENATORS. "1 ╘HIS PROVISION HAS NOT ONLY BEEN DECLAIMED
AGAINST BY THOSE WHO CONDEMN THE ├ONSTITUTION IN THE GROSS, BUT
IT HAS BEEN CENSURED BY THOSE WHO HAVE OBJECTED WITH LESS
LATITUDE AND GREATER MODERATION; AND, IN ONE INSTANCE IT HAS BEEN
THOUGHT EXCEPTIONABLE BY A GENTLEMAN WHO HAS DECLARED HIMSELF THE
ADVOCATE OF EVERY OTHER PART OF THE SYSTEM. ╔ AM GREATLY
MISTAKEN, NOTWITHSTANDING, IF THERE BE ANY ARTICLE IN THE WHOLE
PLAN MORE COMPLETELY DEFENSIBLE THAN THIS. ╔TS PROPRIETY RESTS
UPON THE EVIDENCE OF THIS PLAIN PROPOSITION, THAT ┼╓┼╥┘
╟╧╓┼╥╬═┼╬╘ ╧╒╟╚╘ ╘╧ ├╧╬╘┴╔╬ ╔╬ ╔╘╙┼╠╞ ╘╚┼ ═┼┴╬╙ ╧╞ ╔╘╙ ╧╫╬
╨╥┼╙┼╥╓┴╘╔╧╬. ┼VERY JUST REASONER WILL, AT FIRST SIGHT, APPROVE
AN ADHERENCE TO THIS RULE, IN THE WORK OF THE CONVENTION; AND
WILL DISAPPROVE EVERY DEVIATION FROM IT WHICH MAY NOT APPEAR TO
HAVE BEEN DICTATED BY THE NECESSITY OF INCORPORATING INTO THE
WORK SOME PARTICULAR INGREDIENT, WITH WHICH A RIGID CONFORMITY TO
THE RULE WAS INCOMPATIBLE. ┼VEN IN THIS CASE, THOUGH HE MAY
ACQUIESCE IN THE NECESSITY, YET HE WILL NOT CEASE TO REGARD AND
TO REGRET A DEPARTURE FROM SO FUNDAMENTAL A PRINCIPLE, AS A
PORTION OF IMPERFECTION IN THE SYSTEM WHICH MAY PROVE THE SEED OF
FUTURE WEAKNESS, AND PERHAPS ANARCHY. ╔T WILL NOT BE ALLEGED,
THAT AN ELECTION LAW COULD HAVE BEEN FRAMED AND INSERTED IN THE
├ONSTITUTION, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ALWAYS APPLICABLE TO EVERY
PROBABLE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY; AND IT WILL
THEREFORE NOT BE DENIED, THAT A DISCRETIONARY POWER OVER
ELECTIONS OUGHT TO EXIST SOMEWHERE. ╔T WILL, ╔ PRESUME, BE AS
READILY CONCEDED, THAT THERE WERE ONLY THREE WAYS IN WHICH THIS
POWER COULD HAVE BEEN REASONABLY MODIFIED AND DISPOSED: THAT IT
MUST EITHER HAVE BEEN LODGED WHOLLY IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE,
OR WHOLLY IN THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES, OR PRIMARILY IN THE LATTER
AND ULTIMATELY IN THE FORMER. ╘HE LAST MODE HAS, WITH REASON,
BEEN PREFERRED BY THE CONVENTION. ╘HEY HAVE SUBMITTED THE
REGULATION OF ELECTIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE, TO THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS; WHICH, IN ORDINARY
CASES, AND WHEN NO IMPROPER VIEWS PREVAIL, MAY BE BOTH MORE
CONVENIENT AND MORE SATISFACTORY; BUT THEY HAVE RESERVED TO THE
NATIONAL AUTHORITY A RIGHT TO INTERPOSE, WHENEVER EXTRAORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT RENDER THAT INTERPOSITION NECESSARY TO ITS
SAFETY. ╬OTHING CAN BE MORE EVIDENT, THAN THAT AN EXCLUSIVE
POWER OF REGULATING ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN THE
HANDS OF THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES, WOULD LEAVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE
╒NION ENTIRELY AT THEIR MERCY. ╘HEY COULD AT ANY MOMENT
ANNIHILATE IT, BY NEGLECTING TO PROVIDE FOR THE CHOICE OF PERSONS
TO ADMINISTER ITS AFFAIRS. ╔T IS TO LITTLE PURPOSE TO SAY, THAT
A NEGLECT OR OMISSION OF THIS KIND WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO TAKE
PLACE. ╘HE CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITY OF THE THING, WITHOUT AN
EQUIVALENT FOR THE RISK, IS AN UNANSWERABLE OBJECTION. ╬OR HAS
ANY SATISFACTORY REASON BEEN YET ASSIGNED FOR INCURRING THAT
RISK. ╘HE EXTRAVAGANT SURMISES OF A DISTEMPERED JEALOUSY CAN
NEVER BE DIGNIFIED WITH THAT CHARACTER. ╔F WE ARE IN A HUMOR TO
PRESUME ABUSES OF POWER, IT IS AS FAIR TO PRESUME THEM ON THE
PART OF THE ╙TATE GOVERNMENTS AS ON THE PART OF THE GENERAL
GOVERNMENT. ┴ND AS IT IS MORE CONSONANT TO THE RULES OF A JUST
THEORY, TO TRUST THE ╒NION WITH THE CARE OF ITS OWN EXISTENCE,
THAN TO TRANSFER THAT CARE TO ANY OTHER HANDS, IF ABUSES OF POWER
ARE TO BE HAZARDED ON THE ONE SIDE OR ON THE OTHER, IT IS MORE
RATIONAL TO HAZARD THEM WHERE THE POWER WOULD NATURALLY BE
PLACED, THAN WHERE IT WOULD UNNATURALLY BE PLACED. ╙UPPOSE AN
ARTICLE HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THE ├ONSTITUTION, EMPOWERING THE
╒NITED ╙TATES TO REGULATE THE ELECTIONS FOR THE PARTICULAR
╙TATES, WOULD ANY MAN HAVE HESITATED TO CONDEMN IT, BOTH AS AN
UNWARRANTABLE TRANSPOSITION OF POWER, AND AS A PREMEDITATED
ENGINE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ╙TATE GOVERNMENTS? ╘HE
VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLE, IN THIS CASE, WOULD HAVE REQUIRED NO
COMMENT; AND, TO AN UNBIASED OBSERVER, IT WILL NOT BE LESS
APPARENT IN THE PROJECT OF SUBJECTING THE EXISTENCE OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN A SIMILAR RESPECT, TO THE PLEASURE OF THE
╙TATE GOVERNMENTS. ┴N IMPARTIAL VIEW OF THE MATTER CANNOT FAIL
TO RESULT IN A CONVICTION, THAT EACH, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, OUGHT
TO DEPEND ON ITSELF FOR ITS OWN PRESERVATION. ┴S AN OBJECTION TO
THIS POSITION, IT MAY BE REMARKED THAT THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
NATIONAL ╙ENATE WOULD INVOLVE, IN ITS FULL EXTENT, THE DANGER
WHICH IT IS SUGGESTED MIGHT FLOW FROM AN EXCLUSIVE POWER IN THE
╙TATE LEGISLATURES TO REGULATE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS. ╔T MAY BE
ALLEGED, THAT BY DECLINING THE APPOINTMENT OF ╙ENATORS, THEY
MIGHT AT ANY TIME GIVE A FATAL BLOW TO THE ╒NION; AND FROM THIS
IT MAY BE INFERRED, THAT AS ITS EXISTENCE WOULD BE THUS RENDERED
DEPENDENT UPON THEM IN SO ESSENTIAL A POINT, THERE CAN BE NO
OBJECTION TO INTRUSTING THEM WITH IT IN THE PARTICULAR CASE UNDER
CONSIDERATION. ╘HE INTEREST OF EACH ╙TATE, IT MAY BE ADDED, TO
MAINTAIN ITS REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL COUNCILS, WOULD BE A
COMPLETE SECURITY AGAINST AN ABUSE OF THE TRUST. ╘HIS ARGUMENT,
THOUGH SPECIOUS, WILL NOT, UPON EXAMINATION, BE FOUND SOLID. ╔T
IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES, BY FORBEARING THE
APPOINTMENT OF SENATORS, MAY DESTROY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. ┬UT
IT WILL NOT FOLLOW THAT, BECAUSE THEY HAVE A POWER TO DO THIS IN
ONE INSTANCE, THEY OUGHT TO HAVE IT IN EVERY OTHER. ╘HERE ARE
CASES IN WHICH THE PERNICIOUS TENDENCY OF SUCH A POWER MAY BE FAR
MORE DECISIVE, WITHOUT ANY MOTIVE EQUALLY COGENT WITH THAT WHICH
MUST HAVE REGULATED THE CONDUCT OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT TO
THE FORMATION OF THE ╙ENATE, TO RECOMMEND THEIR ADMISSION INTO
THE SYSTEM. ╙O FAR AS THAT CONSTRUCTION MAY EXPOSE THE ╒NION TO
THE POSSIBILITY OF INJURY FROM THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES, IT IS AN
EVIL; BUT IT IS AN EVIL WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED WITHOUT
EXCLUDING THE ╙TATES, IN THEIR POLITICAL CAPACITIES, WHOLLY FROM
A PLACE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. ╔F THIS
HAD BEEN DONE, IT WOULD DOUBTLESS HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED INTO AN
ENTIRE DERELICTION OF THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE; AND WOULD CERTAINLY
HAVE DEPRIVED THE ╙TATE GOVERNMENTS OF THAT ABSOLUTE SAFEGUARD
WHICH THEY WILL ENJOY UNDER THIS PROVISION. ┬UT HOWEVER WISE IT
MAY HAVE BEEN TO HAVE SUBMITTED IN THIS INSTANCE TO AN
INCONVENIENCE, FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF A NECESSARY ADVANTAGE OR A
GREATER GOOD, NO INFERENCE CAN BE DRAWN FROM THENCE TO FAVOR AN
ACCUMULATION OF THE EVIL, WHERE NO NECESSITY URGES, NOR ANY
GREATER GOOD INVITES. ╔T MAY BE EASILY DISCERNED ALSO THAT THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD RUN A MUCH GREATER RISK FROM A POWER IN
THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES OVER THE ELECTIONS OF ITS ╚OUSE OF
╥EPRESENTATIVES, THAN FROM THEIR POWER OF APPOINTING THE MEMBERS
OF ITS ╙ENATE. ╘HE SENATORS ARE TO BE CHOSEN FOR THE PERIOD OF
SIX YEARS; THERE IS TO BE A ROTATION, BY WHICH THE SEATS OF A
THIRD PART OF THEM ARE TO BE VACATED AND REPLENISHED EVERY TWO
YEARS; AND NO ╙TATE IS TO BE ENTITLED TO MORE THAN TWO SENATORS;
A QUORUM OF THE BODY IS TO CONSIST OF SIXTEEN MEMBERS. ╘HE JOINT
RESULT OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE, THAT A TEMPORARY
COMBINATION OF A FEW ╙TATES TO INTERMIT THE APPOINTMENT OF
SENATORS, COULD NEITHER ANNUL THE EXISTENCE NOR IMPAIR THE
ACTIVITY OF THE BODY; AND IT IS NOT FROM A GENERAL AND PERMANENT
COMBINATION OF THE ╙TATES THAT WE CAN HAVE ANY THING TO FEAR. ╘HE
FIRST MIGHT PROCEED FROM SINISTER DESIGNS IN THE LEADING MEMBERS
OF A FEW OF THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES; THE LAST WOULD SUPPOSE A
FIXED AND ROOTED DISAFFECTION IN THE GREAT BODY OF THE PEOPLE,
WHICH WILL EITHER NEVER EXIST AT ALL, OR WILL, IN ALL
PROBABILITY, PROCEED FROM AN EXPERIENCE OF THE INAPTITUDE OF THE
GENERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF THEIR HAPPINESSGIN WHICH
EVENT NO GOOD CITIZEN COULD DESIRE ITS CONTINUANCE. ┬UT WITH
REGARD TO THE FEDERAL ╚OUSE OF ╥EPRESENTATIVES, THERE IS INTENDED
TO BE A GENERAL ELECTION OF MEMBERS ONCE IN TWO YEARS. ╔F THE
╙TATE LEGISLATURES WERE TO BE INVESTED WITH AN EXCLUSIVE POWER OF
REGULATING THESE ELECTIONS, EVERY PERIOD OF MAKING THEM WOULD BE
A DELICATE CRISIS IN THE NATIONAL SITUATION, WHICH MIGHT ISSUE IN
A DISSOLUTION OF THE ╒NION, IF THE LEADERS OF A FEW OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT ╙TATES SHOULD HAVE ENTERED INTO A PREVIOUS CONSPIRACY
TO PREVENT AN ELECTION. ╔ SHALL NOT DENY, THAT THERE IS A DEGREE
OF WEIGHT IN THE OBSERVATION, THAT THE INTERESTS OF EACH ╙TATE,
TO BE REPRESENTED IN THE FEDERAL COUNCILS, WILL BE A SECURITY
AGAINST THE ABUSE OF A POWER OVER ITS ELECTIONS IN THE HANDS OF
THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES. ┬UT THE SECURITY WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED
AS COMPLETE, BY THOSE WHO ATTEND TO THE FORCE OF AN OBVIOUS
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE IN THE PUBLIC
FELICITY, AND THE INTEREST OF THEIR LOCAL RULERS IN THE POWER AND
CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR OFFICES. ╘HE PEOPLE OF ┴MERICA MAY BE
WARMLY ATTACHED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ╒NION, AT TIMES WHEN THE
PARTICULAR RULERS OF PARTICULAR ╙TATES, STIMULATED BY THE NATURAL
RIVALSHIP OF POWER, AND BY THE HOPES OF PERSONAL AGGRANDIZEMENT,
AND SUPPORTED BY A STRONG FACTION IN EACH OF THOSE ╙TATES, MAY BE
IN A VERY OPPOSITE TEMPER. ╘HIS DIVERSITY OF SENTIMENT BETWEEN A
MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE, AND THE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE THE
GREATEST CREDIT IN THEIR COUNCILS, IS EXEMPLIFIED IN SOME OF THE
╙TATES AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, ON THE PRESENT QUESTION. ╘HE
SCHEME OF SEPARATE CONFEDERACIES, WHICH WILL ALWAYS NULTIPLY THE
CHANCES OF AMBITION, WILL BE A NEVER FAILING BAIT TO ALL SUCH
INFLUENTIAL CHARACTERS IN THE ╙TATE ADMINISTRATIONS AS ARE
CAPABLE OF PREFERRING THEIR OWN EMOLUMENT AND ADVANCEMENT TO THE
PUBLIC WEAL. ╫ITH SO EFFECTUAL A WEAPON IN THEIR HANDS AS THE
EXCLUSIVE POWER OF REGULATING ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, A COMBINATION OF A FEW SUCH MEN, IN A FEW OF THE MOST
CONSIDERABLE ╙TATES, WHERE THE TEMPTATION WILL ALWAYS BE THE
STRONGEST, MIGHT ACCOMPLISH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ╒NION, BY
SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY OF SOME CASUAL DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE
PEOPLE (AND WHICH PERHAPS THEY MAY THEMSELVES HAVE EXCITED), TO
DISCONTINUE THE CHOICE OF MEMBERS FOR THE FEDERAL ╚OUSE OF
╥EPRESENTATIVES. ╔T OUGHT NEVER TO BE FORGOTTEN, THAT A FIRM
UNION OF THIS COUNTRY, UNDER AN EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT, WILL
PROBABLY BE AN INCREASING OBJECT OF JEALOUSY TO MORE THAN ONE
NATION OF ┼UROPE; AND THAT ENTERPRISES TO SUBVERT IT WILL
SOMETIMES ORIGINATE IN THE INTRIGUES OF FOREIGN POWERS, AND WILL
SELDOM FAIL TO BE PATRONIZED AND ABETTED BY SOME OF THEM. ╔TS
PRESERVATION, THEREFORE OUGHT IN NO CASE THAT CAN BE AVOIDED, TO
BE COMMITTED TO THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ANY BUT THOSE WHOSE SITUATION
WILL UNIFORMLY BEGET AN IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN THE FAITHFUL AND
VIGILANT PERFORMANCE OF THE TRUST. ╨╒┬╠╔╒╙. ╔ST CLAUSE, 4TH
SECTION, OF THE ╔ST ARTICLE.


╞┼─┼╥┴╠╔╙╘ ╬O. 60

╘HE ╙AME ╙UBJECT ├ONTINUED
(├ONCERNING THE ╨OWER OF ├ONGRESS TO ╥EGULATE THE ┼LECTION OF
 ═EMBERS)
╞ROM THE ╬EW ┘ORK ╨ACKET.
╘UESDAY, ╞EBRUARY 26, 1788.

╚┴═╔╠╘╧╬

╘O THE ╨EOPLE OF THE ╙TATE OF ╬EW ┘ORK:
╫┼ ╚┴╓┼ SEEN, THAT AN UNCONTROLLABLE POWER OVER THE ELECTIONS TO
 THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT, WITHOUT HAZARD, BE COMMITTED TO
 THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES. ╠ET US NOW SEE, WHAT WOULD BE THE DANGER ON
 THE OTHER SIDE; THAT IS, FROM CONFIDING THE ULTIMATE RIGHT OF
 REGULATING ITS OWN ELECTIONS TO THE ╒NION ITSELF. ╔T IS NOT
 PRETENDED, THAT THIS RIGHT WOULD EVER BE USED FOR THE EXCLUSION OF
 ANY ╙TATE FROM ITS SHARE IN THE REPRESENTATION. ╘HE INTEREST OF ALL
 WOULD, IN THIS RESPECT AT LEAST, BE THE SECURITY OF ALL. ┬UT IT IS
 ALLEGED, THAT IT MIGHT BE EMPLOYED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PROMOTE
 THE ELECTION OF SOME FAVORITE CLASS OF MEN IN EXCLUSION OF OTHERS,
 BY CONFINING THE PLACES OF ELECTION TO PARTICULAR DISTRICTS, AND
 RENDERING IT IMPRACTICABLE TO THE CITIZENS AT LARGE TO PARTAKE IN
 THE CHOICE. ╧F ALL CHIMERICAL SUPPOSITIONS, THIS SEEMS TO BE THE
 MOST CHIMERICAL. ╧N THE ONE HAND, NO RATIONAL CALCULATION OF
 PROBABILITIES WOULD LEAD US TO IMAGINE THAT THE DISPOSITION WHICH A
 CONDUCT SO VIOLENT AND EXTRAORDINARY WOULD IMPLY, COULD EVER FIND
 ITS WAY INTO THE NATIONAL COUNCILS; AND ON THE OTHER, IT MAY BE
 CONCLUDED WITH CERTAINTY, THAT IF SO IMPROPER A SPIRIT SHOULD EVER
 GAIN ADMITTANCE INTO THEM, IT WOULD DISPLAY ITSELF IN A FORM
 ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT AND FAR MORE DECISIVE.
╘HE IMPROBABILITY OF THE ATTEMPT MAY BE SATISFACTORILY INFERRED
 FROM THIS SINGLE REFLECTION, THAT IT COULD NEVER BE MADE WITHOUT
 CAUSING AN IMMEDIATE REVOLT OF THE GREAT BODY OF THE PEOPLE, HEADED
 AND DIRECTED BY THE ╙TATE GOVERNMENTS. ╔T IS NOT DIFFICULT TO
 CONCEIVE THAT THIS CHARACTERISTIC RIGHT OF FREEDOM MAY, IN CERTAIN
 TURBULENT AND FACTIOUS SEASONS, BE VIOLATED, IN RESPECT TO A
 PARTICULAR CLASS OF CITIZENS, BY A VICTORIOUS AND OVERBEARING
 MAJORITY; BUT THAT SO FUNDAMENTAL A PRIVILEGE, IN A COUNTRY SO
 SITUATED AND ENLIGHTENED, SHOULD BE INVADED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
 GREAT MASS OF THE PEOPLE, BY THE DELIBERATE POLICY OF THE
 GOVERNMENT, WITHOUT OCCASIONING A POPULAR REVOLUTION, IS ALTOGETHER
 INCONCEIVABLE AND INCREDIBLE.
╔N ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL REFLECTION, THERE ARE CONSIDERATIONS
 OF A MORE PRECISE NATURE, WHICH FORBID ALL APPREHENSION ON THE
 SUBJECT. ╘HE DISSIMILARITY IN THE INGREDIENTS WHICH WILL COMPOSE
 THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND ╒STILL MORE IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY
 WILL BE BROUGHT INTO ACTION IN ITS VARIOUS BRANCHES, MUST FORM A
 POWERFUL OBSTACLE TO A CONCERT OF VIEWS IN ANY PARTIAL SCHEME OF
 ELECTIONS. ╘HERE IS SUFFICIENT DIVERSITY IN THE STATE OF PROPERTY,
 IN THE GENIUS, MANNERS, AND HABITS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE DIFFERENT
 PARTS OF THE ╒NION, TO OCCASION A MATERIAL DIVERSITY OF DISPOSITION
 IN THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TOWARDS THE DIFFERENT RANKS AND CONDITIONS
 IN SOCIETY. ┴ND THOUGH AN INTIMATE INTERCOURSE UNDER THE SAME
 GOVERNMENT WILL PROMOTE A GRADUAL ASSIMILATION IN SOME OF THESE
 RESPECTS, YET THERE ARE CAUSES, AS WELL PHYSICAL AS MORAL, WHICH
 MAY, IN A GREATER OR LESS DEGREE, PERMANENTLY NOURISH DIFFERENT
 PROPENSITIES AND INCLINATIONS IN THIS RESPECT. ┬UT THE CIRCUMSTANCE
 WHICH WILL BE LIKELY TO HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE IN THE MATTER,
 WILL BE THE DISSIMILAR MODES OF CONSTITUTING THE SEVERAL COMPONENT
 PARTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. ╘HE ╚OUSE OF ╥EPRESENTATIVES BEING TO BE
 ELECTED IMMEDIATELY BY THE PEOPLE, THE ╙ENATE BY THE ╙TATE
 LEGISLATURES, THE ╨RESIDENT BY ELECTORS CHOSEN FOR THAT PURPOSE BY
 THE PEOPLE, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE PROBABILITY OF A COMMON INTEREST
 TO CEMENT THESE DIFFERENT BRANCHES IN A PREDILECTION FOR ANY
 PARTICULAR CLASS OF ELECTORS.
┴S TO THE ╙ENATE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT ANY REGULATION OF "TIME
 AND MANNER," WHICH IS ALL THAT IS PROPOSED TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE
 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN RESPECT TO THAT BODY, CAN AFFECT THE SPIRIT
 WHICH WILL DIRECT THE CHOICE OF ITS MEMBERS. ╘HE COLLECTIVE SENSE
 OF THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES CAN NEVER BE INFLUENCED BY EXTRANEOUS
 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THAT SORT; A CONSIDERATION WHICH ALONE OUGHT TO
 SATISFY US THAT THE DISCRIMINATION APPREHENDED WOULD NEVER BE
 ATTEMPTED. ╞OR WHAT INDUCEMENT COULD THE ╙ENATE HAVE TO CONCUR IN A
 PREFERENCE IN WHICH ITSELF WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED? ╧R TO WHAT
 PURPOSE WOULD IT BE ESTABLISHED, IN REFERENCE TO ONE BRANCH OF THE
 LEGISLATURE, IF IT COULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THE OTHER? ╘HE
 COMPOSITION OF THE ONE WOULD IN THIS CASE COUNTERACT THAT OF THE
 OTHER. ┴ND WE CAN NEVER SUPPOSE THAT IT WOULD EMBRACE THE
 APPOINTMENTS TO THE ╙ENATE, UNLESS WE CAN AT THE SAME TIME SUPPOSE
 THE VOLUNTARY CO-OPERATION OF THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES. ╔F WE MAKE
 THE LATTER SUPPOSITION, IT THEN BECOMES IMMATERIAL WHERE THE POWER
 IN QUESTION IS PLACEDGWHETHER IN THEIR HANDS OR IN THOSE OF THE
 ╒NION.
┬UT WHAT IS TO BE THE OBJECT OF THIS CAPRICIOUS PARTIALITY IN
 THE NATIONAL COUNCILS? ╔S IT TO BE EXERCISED IN A DISCRIMINATION
 BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF INDUSTRY, OR BETWEEN THE
 DIFFERENT KINDS OF PROPERTY, OR BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF
 PROPERTY? ╫ILL IT LEAN IN FAVOR OF THE LANDED INTEREST, OR THE
 MONEYED INTEREST, OR THE MERCANTILE INTEREST, OR THE MANUFACTURING
 INTEREST? ╧R, TO SPEAK IN THE FASHIONABLE LANGUAGE OF THE
 ADVERSARIES TO THE ├ONSTITUTION, WILL IT COURT THE ELEVATION OF
 "THE WEALTHY AND THE WELL-BORN," TO THE EXCLUSION AND DEBASEMENT
 OF ALL THE REST OF THE SOCIETY?
╔F THIS PARTIALITY IS TO BE EXERTED IN FAVOR OF THOSE WHO ARE
 CONCERNED IN ANY PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRY OR PROPERTY, ╔
 PRESUME IT WILL READILY BE ADMITTED, THAT THE COMPETITION FOR IT
 WILL LIE BETWEEN LANDED MEN AND MERCHANTS. ┴ND ╔ SCRUPLE NOT TO
 AFFIRM, THAT IT IS INFINITELY LESS LIKELY THAT EITHER OF THEM SHOULD
 GAIN AN ASCENDANT IN THE NATIONAL COUNCILS, THAN THAT THE ONE OR THE
 OTHER OF THEM SHOULD PREDOMINATE IN ALL THE LOCAL COUNCILS. ╘HE
 INFERENCE WILL BE, THAT A CONDUCT TENDING TO GIVE AN UNDUE
 PREFERENCE TO EITHER IS MUCH LESS TO BE DREADED FROM THE FORMER THAN
 FROM THE LATTER.
╘HE SEVERAL ╙TATES ARE IN VARIOUS DEGREES ADDICTED TO
 AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE. ╔N MOST, IF NOT ALL OF THEM, AGRICULTURE
 IS PREDOMINANT. ╔N A FEW OF THEM, HOWEVER, COMMERCE NEARLY DIVIDES
 ITS EMPIRE, AND IN MOST OF THEM HAS A CONSIDERABLE SHARE OF
 INFLUENCE. ╔N PROPORTION AS EITHER PREVAILS, IT WILL BE CONVEYED
 INTO THE NATIONAL REPRESENTATION; AND FOR THE VERY REASON, THAT
 THIS WILL BE AN EMANATION FROM A GREATER VARIETY OF INTERESTS, AND
 IN MUCH MORE VARIOUS PROPORTIONS, THAN ARE TO BE FOUND IN ANY SINGLE
 ╙TATE, IT WILL BE MUCH LESS APT TO ESPOUSE EITHER OF THEM WITH A
 DECIDED PARTIALITY, THAN THE REPRESENTATION OF ANY SINGLE ╙TATE.
╔N A COUNTRY CONSISTING CHIEFLY OF THE CULTIVATORS OF LAND,
 WHERE THE RULES OF AN EQUAL REPRESENTATION OBTAIN, THE LANDED
 INTEREST MUST, UPON THE WHOLE, PREPONDERATE IN THE GOVERNMENT. ┴S
 LONG AS THIS INTEREST PREVAILS IN MOST OF THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES, SO
 LONG IT MUST MAINTAIN A CORRESPONDENT SUPERIORITY IN THE NATIONAL
 ╙ENATE, WHICH WILL GENERALLY BE A FAITHFUL COPY OF THE MAJORITIES OF
 THOSE ASSEMBLIES. ╔T CANNOT THEREFORE BE PRESUMED, THAT A SACRIFICE
 OF THE LANDED TO THE MERCANTILE CLASS WILL EVER BE A FAVORITE OBJECT
 OF THIS BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE. ╔N APPLYING THUS
 PARTICULARLY TO THE ╙ENATE A GENERAL OBSERVATION SUGGESTED BY THE
 SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY, ╔ AM GOVERNED BY THE CONSIDERATION, THAT
 THE CREDULOUS VOTARIES OF ╙TATE POWER CANNOT, UPON THEIR OWN
 PRINCIPLES, SUSPECT, THAT THE ╙TATE LEGISLATURES WOULD BE WARPED
 FROM THEIR DUTY BY ANY EXTERNAL INFLUENCE. ┬UT IN REALITY THE SAME
 SITUATION MUST HAVE THE SAME EFFECT, IN THE PRIMATIVE COMPOSITION AT
 LEAST OF THE FEDERAL ╚OUSE OF ╥EPRESENTATIVES: AN IMPROPER BIAS
 TOWARDS THE MERCANTILE CLASS IS AS LITTLE TO BE EXPECTED FROM THIS
 QUARTER AS FROM THE OTHER.
╔N ORDER, PERHAPS, TO GIVE COUNTENANCE TO THE OBJECTION AT ANY
 RATE, IT MAY BE ASKED, IS THERE NOT DANGER OF AN OPPOSITE BIAS IN
 THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH MAY DISPOSE IT TO ENDEAVOR TO SECURE
 A MONOPOLY OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION TO THE LANDED CLASS? ┴S
 THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE SUPPOSITION OF SUCH A BIAS WILL
 HAVE ANY TERRORS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY INJURED BY IT, A
 LABORED ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BE DISPENSED WITH. ╔T WILL BE
 SUFFICIENT TO REMARK, FIRST, THAT FOR THE REASONS ELSEWHERE
 ASSIGNED, IT IS LESS LIKELY THAT ANY DECIDED PARTIALITY SHOULD
 PREVAIL IN THE COUNCILS OF THE ╒NION THAN IN THOSE OF ANY OF ITS
 MEMBERS. ╙ECONDLY, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TEMPTATION TO VIOLATE THE
 ├ONSTITUTION IN FAVOR OF THE LANDED CLASS, BECAUSE THAT CLASS WOULD,
 IN THE NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS, ENJOY AS GREAT A PREPONDERANCY AS
 ITSELF COULD DESIRE. ┴ND THIRDLY, THAT MEN ACCUSTOMED TO
 INVESTIGATE THE SOURCES OF PUBLIC PROSPERITY UPON A LARGE SCALE,
 MUST BE TOO WELL CONVINCED OF THE UTILITY OF COMMERCE, TO BE
 INCLINED TO INFLICT UPON IT SO DEEP A WOUND AS WOULD RESULT FROM THE
 ENTIRE EXCLUSION OF THOSE WHO WOULD BEST UNDERSTAND ITS INTEREST
 FROM A SHARE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THEM. ╘HE IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCE,
 IN THE VIEW OF REVENUE ALONE, MUST EFFECTUALLY GUARD IT AGAINST THE
 ENMITY OF A BODY WHICH WOULD BE CONTINUALLY IMPORTUNED IN ITS FAVOR,
 BY THE URGENT CALLS OF PUBLIC NECESSITY.
╔ THE RATHER CONSULT BREVITY IN DISCUSSING THE PROBABILITY OF A
 PREFERENCE FOUNDED UPON A DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT KINDS
 OF INDUSTRY AND PROPERTY, BECAUSE, AS FAR AS ╔ UNDERSTAND THE
 MEANING OF THE OBJECTORS, THEY CONTEMPLATE A DISCRIMINATION OF
 ANOTHER KIND. ╘HEY APPEAR TO HAVE IN VIEW, AS THE OBJECTS OF THE
 PREFERENCE WITH WHICH THEY ENDEAVOR TO ALARM US, THOSE WHOM THEY
 DESIGNATE BY THE DESCRIPTION OF "THE WEALTHY AND THE WELL-BORN."
 ╘HESE, IT SEEMS, ARE TO BE EXALTED TO AN ODIOUS PRE-EMINENCE OVER
 THE REST OF THEIR FELLOW-CITIZENS. ┴T ONE TIME, HOWEVER, THEIR
 ELEVATION IS TO BE A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF THE SMALLNESS OF THE
 REPRESENTATIVE BODY; AT ANOTHER TIME IT IS TO BE EFFECTED BY
 DEPRIVING THE PEOPLE AT LARGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY OF EXERCISING THEIR
 RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE IN THE CHOICE OF THAT BODY.
┬UT UPON WHAT PRINCIPLE IS THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE PLACES OF
 ELECTION TO BE MADE, IN ORDER TO ANSWER THE PURPOSE OF THE MEDITATED
 PREFERENCE? ┴RE "THE WEALTHY AND THE WELL-BORN," AS THEY ARE
 CALLED, CONFINED TO PARTICULAR SPOTS IN THE SEVERAL ╙TATES? ╚AVE
 THEY, BY SOME MIRACULOUS INSTINCT OR FORESIGHT, SET APART IN EACH OF
 THEM A COMMON PLACE OF RESIDENCE? ┴RE THEY ONLY TO BE MET WITH IN
 THE TOWNS OR CITIES? ╧R ARE THEY, ON THE CONTRARY, SCATTERED OVER
 THE FACE OF THE COUNTRY AS AVARICE OR CHANCE MAY HAVE HAPPENED TO
 CAST THEIR OWN LOT OR THAT OF THEIR PREDECESSORS? ╔F THE LATTER IS
 THE CASE, (AS EVERY INTELLIGENT MAN KNOWS IT TO BE,1) IS IT NOT
 EVIDENT THAT THE POLICY OF CONFINING THE PLACES OF ELECTION TO
 PARTICULAR DISTRICTS WOULD BE AS SUBVERSIVE OF ITS OWN AIM AS IT
 WOULD BE EXCEPTIONABLE ON EVERY OTHER ACCOUNT? ╘HE TRUTH IS, THAT
 THERE IS NO METHOD OF SECURING TO THE RICH THE PREFERENCE
 APPREHENDED, BUT BY PRESCRIBING QUALIFICATIONS OF PROPERTY EITHER
 FOR THOSE WHO MAY ELECT OR BE ELECTED. ┬UT THIS FORMS NO PART OF
 THE POWER TO BE CONFERRED UPON THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. ╔TS
 AUTHORITY WOULD BE EXPRESSLY RESTRICTED TO THE REGULATION OF THE
 ╘╔═┼╙, THE ╨╠┴├┼╙, THE ═┴╬╬┼╥ OF ELECTIONS. ╘HE QUALIFICATIONS OF
 THE PERSONS WHO MAY CHOOSE OR BE CHOSEN, AS HAS BEEN REMARKED UPON
 OTHER OCCASIONS, ARE DEFINED AND FIXED IN THE ├ONSTITUTION, AND ARE
 UNALTERABLE BY THE LEGISLATURE.
╠ET IT, HOWEVER, BE ADMITTED, FOR ARGUMENT SAKE, THAT THE
 EXPEDIENT SUGGESTED MIGHT BE SUCCESSFUL; AND LET IT AT THE SAME
 TIME BE EQUALLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT ALL THE SCRUPLES WHICH A
 SENSE OF DUTY OR AN APPREHENSION OF THE DANGER OF THE EXPERIMENT
 MIGHT INSPIRE, WERE OVERCOME IN THE BREASTS OF THE NATIONAL RULERS,
 STILL ╔ IMAGINE IT WILL HARDLY BE PRETENDED THAT THEY COULD EVER
 HOPE TO CARRY SUCH AN ENTERPRISE INTO EXECUTION WITHOUT THE AID OF A
 MILITARY FORCE SUFFICIENT TO SUBDUE THE RESISTANCE OF THE GREAT BODY
 OF THE PEOPLE. ╘HE IMPROBABILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF A FORCE EQUAL
 TO THAT OBJECT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AND DEMONSTRATED IN DIFFERENT
 PARTS OF THESE PAPERS; BUT THAT THE FUTILITY OF THE OBJECTION UNDER
 CONSIDERATION MAY APPEAR IN THE STRONGEST LIGHT, IT SHALL BE
 CONCEDED FOR A MOMENT THAT SUCH A FORCE MIGHT EXIST, AND THE
 NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SHALL BE SUPPOSED TO BE IN THE ACTUAL POSSESSION
 OF IT. ╫HAT WILL BE THE CONCLUSION? ╫ITH A DISPOSITION TO INVADE
 THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMUNITY, AND WITH THE MEANS OF
 GRATIFYING THAT DISPOSITION, IS IT PRESUMABLE THAT THE PERSONS WHO
 WERE ACTUATED BY IT WOULD AMUSE THEMSELVES IN THE RIDICULOUS TASK OF
 FABRICATING ELECTION LAWS FOR SECURING A PREFERENCE TO A FAVORITE
 CLASS OF MEN? ╫OULD THEY NOT BE LIKELY TO PREFER A CONDUCT BETTER
 ADAPTED TO THEIR OWN IMMEDIATE AGGRANDIZEMENT? ╫OULD THEY NOT
 RATHER BOLDLY RESOLVE TO PERPETUATE THEMSELVES IN OFFICE BY ONE
 DECISIVE ACT OF USURPATION, THAN TO TRUST TO PRECARIOUS EXPEDIENTS
 WHICH, IN SPITE OF ALL THE PRECAUTIONS THAT MIGHT ACCOMPANY THEM,
 MIGHT TERMINATE IN THE DISMISSION, DISGRACE, AND RUIN OF THEIR
 AUTHORS? ╫OULD THEY NOT FEAR THAT CITIZENS, NOT LESS TENACIOUS THAN
 CONSCIOUS OF THEIR RIGHTS, WOULD FLOCK FROM THE REMOTE EXTREMES OF
 THEIR RESPECTIVE ╙TATES TO THE PLACES OF ELECTION, TO VOERTHROW
 THEIR TYRANTS, AND TO SUBSTITUTE MEN WHO WOULD BE DISPOSED TO AVENGE
 THE VIOLATED MAJESTY OF THE PEOPLE?
╨╒┬╠╔╒╙.
1 ╨ARTICULARLY IN THE ╙OUTHERN ╙TATES AND IN THIS ╙TATE.