федералист нO. 59 цONCERNING THE пOWER OF цONGRESS TO рEGULATE THE еLECTION OF мEMBERS фROM THE нEW ыORK пACKET. фRIDAY, фEBRUARY 22, 1788. хамилтон тO THE пEOPLE OF THE сTATE OF нEW ыORK: тхе NATURAL ORDER OF THE SUBJECT LEADS US TO CONSIDER, IN THIS PLACE, THAT PROVISION OF THE цONSTITUTION WHICH AUTHORIZES THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE TO REGULATE, IN THE LAST RESORT, THE ELECTION OF ITS OWN MEMBERS. иT IS IN THESE WORDS: "тHE тимес, плацес, AND маннер OF HOLDING ELECTIONS FOR SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE PRESCRIBED IN EACH сTATE BY THE LEGISLATURE THEREOF; BUT THE цONGRESS MAY, AT ANY TIME, BY LAW, MAKE OR ALTER суцх регулатионс, EXCEPT AS TO THE плацес OF CHOOSING SENATORS. "1 тHIS PROVISION HAS NOT ONLY BEEN DECLAIMED AGAINST BY THOSE WHO CONDEMN THE цONSTITUTION IN THE GROSS, BUT IT HAS BEEN CENSURED BY THOSE WHO HAVE OBJECTED WITH LESS LATITUDE AND GREATER MODERATION; AND, IN ONE INSTANCE IT HAS BEEN THOUGHT EXCEPTIONABLE BY A GENTLEMAN WHO HAS DECLARED HIMSELF THE ADVOCATE OF EVERY OTHER PART OF THE SYSTEM. и AM GREATLY MISTAKEN, NOTWITHSTANDING, IF THERE BE ANY ARTICLE IN THE WHOLE PLAN MORE COMPLETELY DEFENSIBLE THAN THIS. иTS PROPRIETY RESTS UPON THE EVIDENCE OF THIS PLAIN PROPOSITION, THAT ежеры гожернмент оугхт то цонтаин ин итселф тхе меанс оф итс овн пресержатион. еVERY JUST REASONER WILL, AT FIRST SIGHT, APPROVE AN ADHERENCE TO THIS RULE, IN THE WORK OF THE CONVENTION; AND WILL DISAPPROVE EVERY DEVIATION FROM IT WHICH MAY NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DICTATED BY THE NECESSITY OF INCORPORATING INTO THE WORK SOME PARTICULAR INGREDIENT, WITH WHICH A RIGID CONFORMITY TO THE RULE WAS INCOMPATIBLE. еVEN IN THIS CASE, THOUGH HE MAY ACQUIESCE IN THE NECESSITY, YET HE WILL NOT CEASE TO REGARD AND TO REGRET A DEPARTURE FROM SO FUNDAMENTAL A PRINCIPLE, AS A PORTION OF IMPERFECTION IN THE SYSTEM WHICH MAY PROVE THE SEED OF FUTURE WEAKNESS, AND PERHAPS ANARCHY. иT WILL NOT BE ALLEGED, THAT AN ELECTION LAW COULD HAVE BEEN FRAMED AND INSERTED IN THE цONSTITUTION, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ALWAYS APPLICABLE TO EVERY PROBABLE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY; AND IT WILL THEREFORE NOT BE DENIED, THAT A DISCRETIONARY POWER OVER ELECTIONS OUGHT TO EXIST SOMEWHERE. иT WILL, и PRESUME, BE AS READILY CONCEDED, THAT THERE WERE ONLY THREE WAYS IN WHICH THIS POWER COULD HAVE BEEN REASONABLY MODIFIED AND DISPOSED: THAT IT MUST EITHER HAVE BEEN LODGED WHOLLY IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE, OR WHOLLY IN THE сTATE LEGISLATURES, OR PRIMARILY IN THE LATTER AND ULTIMATELY IN THE FORMER. тHE LAST MODE HAS, WITH REASON, BEEN PREFERRED BY THE CONVENTION. тHEY HAVE SUBMITTED THE REGULATION OF ELECTIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, TO THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIONS; WHICH, IN ORDINARY CASES, AND WHEN NO IMPROPER VIEWS PREVAIL, MAY BE BOTH MORE CONVENIENT AND MORE SATISFACTORY; BUT THEY HAVE RESERVED TO THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY A RIGHT TO INTERPOSE, WHENEVER EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT RENDER THAT INTERPOSITION NECESSARY TO ITS SAFETY. нOTHING CAN BE MORE EVIDENT, THAN THAT AN EXCLUSIVE POWER OF REGULATING ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN THE HANDS OF THE сTATE LEGISLATURES, WOULD LEAVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE уNION ENTIRELY AT THEIR MERCY. тHEY COULD AT ANY MOMENT ANNIHILATE IT, BY NEGLECTING TO PROVIDE FOR THE CHOICE OF PERSONS TO ADMINISTER ITS AFFAIRS. иT IS TO LITTLE PURPOSE TO SAY, THAT A NEGLECT OR OMISSION OF THIS KIND WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE. тHE CONSTITUTIONAL POSSIBILITY OF THE THING, WITHOUT AN EQUIVALENT FOR THE RISK, IS AN UNANSWERABLE OBJECTION. нOR HAS ANY SATISFACTORY REASON BEEN YET ASSIGNED FOR INCURRING THAT RISK. тHE EXTRAVAGANT SURMISES OF A DISTEMPERED JEALOUSY CAN NEVER BE DIGNIFIED WITH THAT CHARACTER. иF WE ARE IN A HUMOR TO PRESUME ABUSES OF POWER, IT IS AS FAIR TO PRESUME THEM ON THE PART OF THE сTATE GOVERNMENTS AS ON THE PART OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT. аND AS IT IS MORE CONSONANT TO THE RULES OF A JUST THEORY, TO TRUST THE уNION WITH THE CARE OF ITS OWN EXISTENCE, THAN TO TRANSFER THAT CARE TO ANY OTHER HANDS, IF ABUSES OF POWER ARE TO BE HAZARDED ON THE ONE SIDE OR ON THE OTHER, IT IS MORE RATIONAL TO HAZARD THEM WHERE THE POWER WOULD NATURALLY BE PLACED, THAN WHERE IT WOULD UNNATURALLY BE PLACED. сUPPOSE AN ARTICLE HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THE цONSTITUTION, EMPOWERING THE уNITED сTATES TO REGULATE THE ELECTIONS FOR THE PARTICULAR сTATES, WOULD ANY MAN HAVE HESITATED TO CONDEMN IT, BOTH AS AN UNWARRANTABLE TRANSPOSITION OF POWER, AND AS A PREMEDITATED ENGINE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE сTATE GOVERNMENTS? тHE VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLE, IN THIS CASE, WOULD HAVE REQUIRED NO COMMENT; AND, TO AN UNBIASED OBSERVER, IT WILL NOT BE LESS APPARENT IN THE PROJECT OF SUBJECTING THE EXISTENCE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, IN A SIMILAR RESPECT, TO THE PLEASURE OF THE сTATE GOVERNMENTS. аN IMPARTIAL VIEW OF THE MATTER CANNOT FAIL TO RESULT IN A CONVICTION, THAT EACH, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, OUGHT TO DEPEND ON ITSELF FOR ITS OWN PRESERVATION. аS AN OBJECTION TO THIS POSITION, IT MAY BE REMARKED THAT THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL сENATE WOULD INVOLVE, IN ITS FULL EXTENT, THE DANGER WHICH IT IS SUGGESTED MIGHT FLOW FROM AN EXCLUSIVE POWER IN THE сTATE LEGISLATURES TO REGULATE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS. иT MAY BE ALLEGED, THAT BY DECLINING THE APPOINTMENT OF сENATORS, THEY MIGHT AT ANY TIME GIVE A FATAL BLOW TO THE уNION; AND FROM THIS IT MAY BE INFERRED, THAT AS ITS EXISTENCE WOULD BE THUS RENDERED DEPENDENT UPON THEM IN SO ESSENTIAL A POINT, THERE CAN BE NO OBJECTION TO INTRUSTING THEM WITH IT IN THE PARTICULAR CASE UNDER CONSIDERATION. тHE INTEREST OF EACH сTATE, IT MAY BE ADDED, TO MAINTAIN ITS REPRESENTATION IN THE NATIONAL COUNCILS, WOULD BE A COMPLETE SECURITY AGAINST AN ABUSE OF THE TRUST. тHIS ARGUMENT, THOUGH SPECIOUS, WILL NOT, UPON EXAMINATION, BE FOUND SOLID. иT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THE сTATE LEGISLATURES, BY FORBEARING THE APPOINTMENT OF SENATORS, MAY DESTROY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. бUT IT WILL NOT FOLLOW THAT, BECAUSE THEY HAVE A POWER TO DO THIS IN ONE INSTANCE, THEY OUGHT TO HAVE IT IN EVERY OTHER. тHERE ARE CASES IN WHICH THE PERNICIOUS TENDENCY OF SUCH A POWER MAY BE FAR MORE DECISIVE, WITHOUT ANY MOTIVE EQUALLY COGENT WITH THAT WHICH MUST HAVE REGULATED THE CONDUCT OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT TO THE FORMATION OF THE сENATE, TO RECOMMEND THEIR ADMISSION INTO THE SYSTEM. сO FAR AS THAT CONSTRUCTION MAY EXPOSE THE уNION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INJURY FROM THE сTATE LEGISLATURES, IT IS AN EVIL; BUT IT IS AN EVIL WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED WITHOUT EXCLUDING THE сTATES, IN THEIR POLITICAL CAPACITIES, WHOLLY FROM A PLACE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. иF THIS HAD BEEN DONE, IT WOULD DOUBTLESS HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED INTO AN ENTIRE DERELICTION OF THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE; AND WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE DEPRIVED THE сTATE GOVERNMENTS OF THAT ABSOLUTE SAFEGUARD WHICH THEY WILL ENJOY UNDER THIS PROVISION. бUT HOWEVER WISE IT MAY HAVE BEEN TO HAVE SUBMITTED IN THIS INSTANCE TO AN INCONVENIENCE, FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF A NECESSARY ADVANTAGE OR A GREATER GOOD, NO INFERENCE CAN BE DRAWN FROM THENCE TO FAVOR AN ACCUMULATION OF THE EVIL, WHERE NO NECESSITY URGES, NOR ANY GREATER GOOD INVITES. иT MAY BE EASILY DISCERNED ALSO THAT THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD RUN A MUCH GREATER RISK FROM A POWER IN THE сTATE LEGISLATURES OVER THE ELECTIONS OF ITS хOUSE OF рEPRESENTATIVES, THAN FROM THEIR POWER OF APPOINTING THE MEMBERS OF ITS сENATE. тHE SENATORS ARE TO BE CHOSEN FOR THE PERIOD OF SIX YEARS; THERE IS TO BE A ROTATION, BY WHICH THE SEATS OF A THIRD PART OF THEM ARE TO BE VACATED AND REPLENISHED EVERY TWO YEARS; AND NO сTATE IS TO BE ENTITLED TO MORE THAN TWO SENATORS; A QUORUM OF THE BODY IS TO CONSIST OF SIXTEEN MEMBERS. тHE JOINT RESULT OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE, THAT A TEMPORARY COMBINATION OF A FEW сTATES TO INTERMIT THE APPOINTMENT OF SENATORS, COULD NEITHER ANNUL THE EXISTENCE NOR IMPAIR THE ACTIVITY OF THE BODY; AND IT IS NOT FROM A GENERAL AND PERMANENT COMBINATION OF THE сTATES THAT WE CAN HAVE ANY THING TO FEAR. тHE FIRST MIGHT PROCEED FROM SINISTER DESIGNS IN THE LEADING MEMBERS OF A FEW OF THE сTATE LEGISLATURES; THE LAST WOULD SUPPOSE A FIXED AND ROOTED DISAFFECTION IN THE GREAT BODY OF THE PEOPLE, WHICH WILL EITHER NEVER EXIST AT ALL, OR WILL, IN ALL PROBABILITY, PROCEED FROM AN EXPERIENCE OF THE INAPTITUDE OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF THEIR HAPPINESSGIN WHICH EVENT NO GOOD CITIZEN COULD DESIRE ITS CONTINUANCE. бUT WITH REGARD TO THE FEDERAL хOUSE OF рEPRESENTATIVES, THERE IS INTENDED TO BE A GENERAL ELECTION OF MEMBERS ONCE IN TWO YEARS. иF THE сTATE LEGISLATURES WERE TO BE INVESTED WITH AN EXCLUSIVE POWER OF REGULATING THESE ELECTIONS, EVERY PERIOD OF MAKING THEM WOULD BE A DELICATE CRISIS IN THE NATIONAL SITUATION, WHICH MIGHT ISSUE IN A DISSOLUTION OF THE уNION, IF THE LEADERS OF A FEW OF THE MOST IMPORTANT сTATES SHOULD HAVE ENTERED INTO A PREVIOUS CONSPIRACY TO PREVENT AN ELECTION. и SHALL NOT DENY, THAT THERE IS A DEGREE OF WEIGHT IN THE OBSERVATION, THAT THE INTERESTS OF EACH сTATE, TO BE REPRESENTED IN THE FEDERAL COUNCILS, WILL BE A SECURITY AGAINST THE ABUSE OF A POWER OVER ITS ELECTIONS IN THE HANDS OF THE сTATE LEGISLATURES. бUT THE SECURITY WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS COMPLETE, BY THOSE WHO ATTEND TO THE FORCE OF AN OBVIOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE IN THE PUBLIC FELICITY, AND THE INTEREST OF THEIR LOCAL RULERS IN THE POWER AND CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR OFFICES. тHE PEOPLE OF аMERICA MAY BE WARMLY ATTACHED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE уNION, AT TIMES WHEN THE PARTICULAR RULERS OF PARTICULAR сTATES, STIMULATED BY THE NATURAL RIVALSHIP OF POWER, AND BY THE HOPES OF PERSONAL AGGRANDIZEMENT, AND SUPPORTED BY A STRONG FACTION IN EACH OF THOSE сTATES, MAY BE IN A VERY OPPOSITE TEMPER. тHIS DIVERSITY OF SENTIMENT BETWEEN A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE, AND THE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE THE GREATEST CREDIT IN THEIR COUNCILS, IS EXEMPLIFIED IN SOME OF THE сTATES AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, ON THE PRESENT QUESTION. тHE SCHEME OF SEPARATE CONFEDERACIES, WHICH WILL ALWAYS NULTIPLY THE CHANCES OF AMBITION, WILL BE A NEVER FAILING BAIT TO ALL SUCH INFLUENTIAL CHARACTERS IN THE сTATE ADMINISTRATIONS AS ARE CAPABLE OF PREFERRING THEIR OWN EMOLUMENT AND ADVANCEMENT TO THE PUBLIC WEAL. вITH SO EFFECTUAL A WEAPON IN THEIR HANDS AS THE EXCLUSIVE POWER OF REGULATING ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, A COMBINATION OF A FEW SUCH MEN, IN A FEW OF THE MOST CONSIDERABLE сTATES, WHERE THE TEMPTATION WILL ALWAYS BE THE STRONGEST, MIGHT ACCOMPLISH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE уNION, BY SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY OF SOME CASUAL DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE PEOPLE (AND WHICH PERHAPS THEY MAY THEMSELVES HAVE EXCITED), TO DISCONTINUE THE CHOICE OF MEMBERS FOR THE FEDERAL хOUSE OF рEPRESENTATIVES. иT OUGHT NEVER TO BE FORGOTTEN, THAT A FIRM UNION OF THIS COUNTRY, UNDER AN EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT, WILL PROBABLY BE AN INCREASING OBJECT OF JEALOUSY TO MORE THAN ONE NATION OF еUROPE; AND THAT ENTERPRISES TO SUBVERT IT WILL SOMETIMES ORIGINATE IN THE INTRIGUES OF FOREIGN POWERS, AND WILL SELDOM FAIL TO BE PATRONIZED AND ABETTED BY SOME OF THEM. иTS PRESERVATION, THEREFORE OUGHT IN NO CASE THAT CAN BE AVOIDED, TO BE COMMITTED TO THE GUARDIANSHIP OF ANY BUT THOSE WHOSE SITUATION WILL UNIFORMLY BEGET AN IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN THE FAITHFUL AND VIGILANT PERFORMANCE OF THE TRUST. публиус. иST CLAUSE, 4TH SECTION, OF THE иST ARTICLE. федералист нO. 60 тHE сAME сUBJECT цONTINUED (цONCERNING THE пOWER OF цONGRESS TO рEGULATE THE еLECTION OF мEMBERS) фROM THE нEW ыORK пACKET. тUESDAY, фEBRUARY 26, 1788. хамилтон тO THE пEOPLE OF THE сTATE OF нEW ыORK: ве хаже SEEN, THAT AN UNCONTROLLABLE POWER OVER THE ELECTIONS TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT, WITHOUT HAZARD, BE COMMITTED TO THE сTATE LEGISLATURES. лET US NOW SEE, WHAT WOULD BE THE DANGER ON THE OTHER SIDE; THAT IS, FROM CONFIDING THE ULTIMATE RIGHT OF REGULATING ITS OWN ELECTIONS TO THE уNION ITSELF. иT IS NOT PRETENDED, THAT THIS RIGHT WOULD EVER BE USED FOR THE EXCLUSION OF ANY сTATE FROM ITS SHARE IN THE REPRESENTATION. тHE INTEREST OF ALL WOULD, IN THIS RESPECT AT LEAST, BE THE SECURITY OF ALL. бUT IT IS ALLEGED, THAT IT MIGHT BE EMPLOYED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO PROMOTE THE ELECTION OF SOME FAVORITE CLASS OF MEN IN EXCLUSION OF OTHERS, BY CONFINING THE PLACES OF ELECTION TO PARTICULAR DISTRICTS, AND RENDERING IT IMPRACTICABLE TO THE CITIZENS AT LARGE TO PARTAKE IN THE CHOICE. оF ALL CHIMERICAL SUPPOSITIONS, THIS SEEMS TO BE THE MOST CHIMERICAL. оN THE ONE HAND, NO RATIONAL CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES WOULD LEAD US TO IMAGINE THAT THE DISPOSITION WHICH A CONDUCT SO VIOLENT AND EXTRAORDINARY WOULD IMPLY, COULD EVER FIND ITS WAY INTO THE NATIONAL COUNCILS; AND ON THE OTHER, IT MAY BE CONCLUDED WITH CERTAINTY, THAT IF SO IMPROPER A SPIRIT SHOULD EVER GAIN ADMITTANCE INTO THEM, IT WOULD DISPLAY ITSELF IN A FORM ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT AND FAR MORE DECISIVE. тHE IMPROBABILITY OF THE ATTEMPT MAY BE SATISFACTORILY INFERRED FROM THIS SINGLE REFLECTION, THAT IT COULD NEVER BE MADE WITHOUT CAUSING AN IMMEDIATE REVOLT OF THE GREAT BODY OF THE PEOPLE, HEADED AND DIRECTED BY THE сTATE GOVERNMENTS. иT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE THAT THIS CHARACTERISTIC RIGHT OF FREEDOM MAY, IN CERTAIN TURBULENT AND FACTIOUS SEASONS, BE VIOLATED, IN RESPECT TO A PARTICULAR CLASS OF CITIZENS, BY A VICTORIOUS AND OVERBEARING MAJORITY; BUT THAT SO FUNDAMENTAL A PRIVILEGE, IN A COUNTRY SO SITUATED AND ENLIGHTENED, SHOULD BE INVADED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE GREAT MASS OF THE PEOPLE, BY THE DELIBERATE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT, WITHOUT OCCASIONING A POPULAR REVOLUTION, IS ALTOGETHER INCONCEIVABLE AND INCREDIBLE. иN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL REFLECTION, THERE ARE CONSIDERATIONS OF A MORE PRECISE NATURE, WHICH FORBID ALL APPREHENSION ON THE SUBJECT. тHE DISSIMILARITY IN THE INGREDIENTS WHICH WILL COMPOSE THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND уSTILL MORE IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY WILL BE BROUGHT INTO ACTION IN ITS VARIOUS BRANCHES, MUST FORM A POWERFUL OBSTACLE TO A CONCERT OF VIEWS IN ANY PARTIAL SCHEME OF ELECTIONS. тHERE IS SUFFICIENT DIVERSITY IN THE STATE OF PROPERTY, IN THE GENIUS, MANNERS, AND HABITS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE уNION, TO OCCASION A MATERIAL DIVERSITY OF DISPOSITION IN THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TOWARDS THE DIFFERENT RANKS AND CONDITIONS IN SOCIETY. аND THOUGH AN INTIMATE INTERCOURSE UNDER THE SAME GOVERNMENT WILL PROMOTE A GRADUAL ASSIMILATION IN SOME OF THESE RESPECTS, YET THERE ARE CAUSES, AS WELL PHYSICAL AS MORAL, WHICH MAY, IN A GREATER OR LESS DEGREE, PERMANENTLY NOURISH DIFFERENT PROPENSITIES AND INCLINATIONS IN THIS RESPECT. бUT THE CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH WILL BE LIKELY TO HAVE THE GREATEST INFLUENCE IN THE MATTER, WILL BE THE DISSIMILAR MODES OF CONSTITUTING THE SEVERAL COMPONENT PARTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. тHE хOUSE OF рEPRESENTATIVES BEING TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY BY THE PEOPLE, THE сENATE BY THE сTATE LEGISLATURES, THE пRESIDENT BY ELECTORS CHOSEN FOR THAT PURPOSE BY THE PEOPLE, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE PROBABILITY OF A COMMON INTEREST TO CEMENT THESE DIFFERENT BRANCHES IN A PREDILECTION FOR ANY PARTICULAR CLASS OF ELECTORS. аS TO THE сENATE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT ANY REGULATION OF "TIME AND MANNER," WHICH IS ALL THAT IS PROPOSED TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN RESPECT TO THAT BODY, CAN AFFECT THE SPIRIT WHICH WILL DIRECT THE CHOICE OF ITS MEMBERS. тHE COLLECTIVE SENSE OF THE сTATE LEGISLATURES CAN NEVER BE INFLUENCED BY EXTRANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES OF THAT SORT; A CONSIDERATION WHICH ALONE OUGHT TO SATISFY US THAT THE DISCRIMINATION APPREHENDED WOULD NEVER BE ATTEMPTED. фOR WHAT INDUCEMENT COULD THE сENATE HAVE TO CONCUR IN A PREFERENCE IN WHICH ITSELF WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED? оR TO WHAT PURPOSE WOULD IT BE ESTABLISHED, IN REFERENCE TO ONE BRANCH OF THE LEGISLATURE, IF IT COULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THE OTHER? тHE COMPOSITION OF THE ONE WOULD IN THIS CASE COUNTERACT THAT OF THE OTHER. аND WE CAN NEVER SUPPOSE THAT IT WOULD EMBRACE THE APPOINTMENTS TO THE сENATE, UNLESS WE CAN AT THE SAME TIME SUPPOSE THE VOLUNTARY CO-OPERATION OF THE сTATE LEGISLATURES. иF WE MAKE THE LATTER SUPPOSITION, IT THEN BECOMES IMMATERIAL WHERE THE POWER IN QUESTION IS PLACEDGWHETHER IN THEIR HANDS OR IN THOSE OF THE уNION. бUT WHAT IS TO BE THE OBJECT OF THIS CAPRICIOUS PARTIALITY IN THE NATIONAL COUNCILS? иS IT TO BE EXERCISED IN A DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF INDUSTRY, OR BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PROPERTY, OR BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF PROPERTY? вILL IT LEAN IN FAVOR OF THE LANDED INTEREST, OR THE MONEYED INTEREST, OR THE MERCANTILE INTEREST, OR THE MANUFACTURING INTEREST? оR, TO SPEAK IN THE FASHIONABLE LANGUAGE OF THE ADVERSARIES TO THE цONSTITUTION, WILL IT COURT THE ELEVATION OF "THE WEALTHY AND THE WELL-BORN," TO THE EXCLUSION AND DEBASEMENT OF ALL THE REST OF THE SOCIETY? иF THIS PARTIALITY IS TO BE EXERTED IN FAVOR OF THOSE WHO ARE CONCERNED IN ANY PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRY OR PROPERTY, и PRESUME IT WILL READILY BE ADMITTED, THAT THE COMPETITION FOR IT WILL LIE BETWEEN LANDED MEN AND MERCHANTS. аND и SCRUPLE NOT TO AFFIRM, THAT IT IS INFINITELY LESS LIKELY THAT EITHER OF THEM SHOULD GAIN AN ASCENDANT IN THE NATIONAL COUNCILS, THAN THAT THE ONE OR THE OTHER OF THEM SHOULD PREDOMINATE IN ALL THE LOCAL COUNCILS. тHE INFERENCE WILL BE, THAT A CONDUCT TENDING TO GIVE AN UNDUE PREFERENCE TO EITHER IS MUCH LESS TO BE DREADED FROM THE FORMER THAN FROM THE LATTER. тHE SEVERAL сTATES ARE IN VARIOUS DEGREES ADDICTED TO AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE. иN MOST, IF NOT ALL OF THEM, AGRICULTURE IS PREDOMINANT. иN A FEW OF THEM, HOWEVER, COMMERCE NEARLY DIVIDES ITS EMPIRE, AND IN MOST OF THEM HAS A CONSIDERABLE SHARE OF INFLUENCE. иN PROPORTION AS EITHER PREVAILS, IT WILL BE CONVEYED INTO THE NATIONAL REPRESENTATION; AND FOR THE VERY REASON, THAT THIS WILL BE AN EMANATION FROM A GREATER VARIETY OF INTERESTS, AND IN MUCH MORE VARIOUS PROPORTIONS, THAN ARE TO BE FOUND IN ANY SINGLE сTATE, IT WILL BE MUCH LESS APT TO ESPOUSE EITHER OF THEM WITH A DECIDED PARTIALITY, THAN THE REPRESENTATION OF ANY SINGLE сTATE. иN A COUNTRY CONSISTING CHIEFLY OF THE CULTIVATORS OF LAND, WHERE THE RULES OF AN EQUAL REPRESENTATION OBTAIN, THE LANDED INTEREST MUST, UPON THE WHOLE, PREPONDERATE IN THE GOVERNMENT. аS LONG AS THIS INTEREST PREVAILS IN MOST OF THE сTATE LEGISLATURES, SO LONG IT MUST MAINTAIN A CORRESPONDENT SUPERIORITY IN THE NATIONAL сENATE, WHICH WILL GENERALLY BE A FAITHFUL COPY OF THE MAJORITIES OF THOSE ASSEMBLIES. иT CANNOT THEREFORE BE PRESUMED, THAT A SACRIFICE OF THE LANDED TO THE MERCANTILE CLASS WILL EVER BE A FAVORITE OBJECT OF THIS BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE. иN APPLYING THUS PARTICULARLY TO THE сENATE A GENERAL OBSERVATION SUGGESTED BY THE SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY, и AM GOVERNED BY THE CONSIDERATION, THAT THE CREDULOUS VOTARIES OF сTATE POWER CANNOT, UPON THEIR OWN PRINCIPLES, SUSPECT, THAT THE сTATE LEGISLATURES WOULD BE WARPED FROM THEIR DUTY BY ANY EXTERNAL INFLUENCE. бUT IN REALITY THE SAME SITUATION MUST HAVE THE SAME EFFECT, IN THE PRIMATIVE COMPOSITION AT LEAST OF THE FEDERAL хOUSE OF рEPRESENTATIVES: AN IMPROPER BIAS TOWARDS THE MERCANTILE CLASS IS AS LITTLE TO BE EXPECTED FROM THIS QUARTER AS FROM THE OTHER. иN ORDER, PERHAPS, TO GIVE COUNTENANCE TO THE OBJECTION AT ANY RATE, IT MAY BE ASKED, IS THERE NOT DANGER OF AN OPPOSITE BIAS IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH MAY DISPOSE IT TO ENDEAVOR TO SECURE A MONOPOLY OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION TO THE LANDED CLASS? аS THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE SUPPOSITION OF SUCH A BIAS WILL HAVE ANY TERRORS FOR THOSE WHO WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY INJURED BY IT, A LABORED ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BE DISPENSED WITH. иT WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO REMARK, FIRST, THAT FOR THE REASONS ELSEWHERE ASSIGNED, IT IS LESS LIKELY THAT ANY DECIDED PARTIALITY SHOULD PREVAIL IN THE COUNCILS OF THE уNION THAN IN THOSE OF ANY OF ITS MEMBERS. сECONDLY, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TEMPTATION TO VIOLATE THE цONSTITUTION IN FAVOR OF THE LANDED CLASS, BECAUSE THAT CLASS WOULD, IN THE NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS, ENJOY AS GREAT A PREPONDERANCY AS ITSELF COULD DESIRE. аND THIRDLY, THAT MEN ACCUSTOMED TO INVESTIGATE THE SOURCES OF PUBLIC PROSPERITY UPON A LARGE SCALE, MUST BE TOO WELL CONVINCED OF THE UTILITY OF COMMERCE, TO BE INCLINED TO INFLICT UPON IT SO DEEP A WOUND AS WOULD RESULT FROM THE ENTIRE EXCLUSION OF THOSE WHO WOULD BEST UNDERSTAND ITS INTEREST FROM A SHARE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THEM. тHE IMPORTANCE OF COMMERCE, IN THE VIEW OF REVENUE ALONE, MUST EFFECTUALLY GUARD IT AGAINST THE ENMITY OF A BODY WHICH WOULD BE CONTINUALLY IMPORTUNED IN ITS FAVOR, BY THE URGENT CALLS OF PUBLIC NECESSITY. и THE RATHER CONSULT BREVITY IN DISCUSSING THE PROBABILITY OF A PREFERENCE FOUNDED UPON A DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF INDUSTRY AND PROPERTY, BECAUSE, AS FAR AS и UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF THE OBJECTORS, THEY CONTEMPLATE A DISCRIMINATION OF ANOTHER KIND. тHEY APPEAR TO HAVE IN VIEW, AS THE OBJECTS OF THE PREFERENCE WITH WHICH THEY ENDEAVOR TO ALARM US, THOSE WHOM THEY DESIGNATE BY THE DESCRIPTION OF "THE WEALTHY AND THE WELL-BORN." тHESE, IT SEEMS, ARE TO BE EXALTED TO AN ODIOUS PRE-EMINENCE OVER THE REST OF THEIR FELLOW-CITIZENS. аT ONE TIME, HOWEVER, THEIR ELEVATION IS TO BE A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF THE SMALLNESS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY; AT ANOTHER TIME IT IS TO BE EFFECTED BY DEPRIVING THE PEOPLE AT LARGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY OF EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE IN THE CHOICE OF THAT BODY. бUT UPON WHAT PRINCIPLE IS THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE PLACES OF ELECTION TO BE MADE, IN ORDER TO ANSWER THE PURPOSE OF THE MEDITATED PREFERENCE? аRE "THE WEALTHY AND THE WELL-BORN," AS THEY ARE CALLED, CONFINED TO PARTICULAR SPOTS IN THE SEVERAL сTATES? хAVE THEY, BY SOME MIRACULOUS INSTINCT OR FORESIGHT, SET APART IN EACH OF THEM A COMMON PLACE OF RESIDENCE? аRE THEY ONLY TO BE MET WITH IN THE TOWNS OR CITIES? оR ARE THEY, ON THE CONTRARY, SCATTERED OVER THE FACE OF THE COUNTRY AS AVARICE OR CHANCE MAY HAVE HAPPENED TO CAST THEIR OWN LOT OR THAT OF THEIR PREDECESSORS? иF THE LATTER IS THE CASE, (AS EVERY INTELLIGENT MAN KNOWS IT TO BE,1) IS IT NOT EVIDENT THAT THE POLICY OF CONFINING THE PLACES OF ELECTION TO PARTICULAR DISTRICTS WOULD BE AS SUBVERSIVE OF ITS OWN AIM AS IT WOULD BE EXCEPTIONABLE ON EVERY OTHER ACCOUNT? тHE TRUTH IS, THAT THERE IS NO METHOD OF SECURING TO THE RICH THE PREFERENCE APPREHENDED, BUT BY PRESCRIBING QUALIFICATIONS OF PROPERTY EITHER FOR THOSE WHO MAY ELECT OR BE ELECTED. бUT THIS FORMS NO PART OF THE POWER TO BE CONFERRED UPON THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. иTS AUTHORITY WOULD BE EXPRESSLY RESTRICTED TO THE REGULATION OF THE тимес, THE плацес, THE маннер OF ELECTIONS. тHE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PERSONS WHO MAY CHOOSE OR BE CHOSEN, AS HAS BEEN REMARKED UPON OTHER OCCASIONS, ARE DEFINED AND FIXED IN THE цONSTITUTION, AND ARE UNALTERABLE BY THE LEGISLATURE. лET IT, HOWEVER, BE ADMITTED, FOR ARGUMENT SAKE, THAT THE EXPEDIENT SUGGESTED MIGHT BE SUCCESSFUL; AND LET IT AT THE SAME TIME BE EQUALLY TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT ALL THE SCRUPLES WHICH A SENSE OF DUTY OR AN APPREHENSION OF THE DANGER OF THE EXPERIMENT MIGHT INSPIRE, WERE OVERCOME IN THE BREASTS OF THE NATIONAL RULERS, STILL и IMAGINE IT WILL HARDLY BE PRETENDED THAT THEY COULD EVER HOPE TO CARRY SUCH AN ENTERPRISE INTO EXECUTION WITHOUT THE AID OF A MILITARY FORCE SUFFICIENT TO SUBDUE THE RESISTANCE OF THE GREAT BODY OF THE PEOPLE. тHE IMPROBABILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF A FORCE EQUAL TO THAT OBJECT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AND DEMONSTRATED IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THESE PAPERS; BUT THAT THE FUTILITY OF THE OBJECTION UNDER CONSIDERATION MAY APPEAR IN THE STRONGEST LIGHT, IT SHALL BE CONCEDED FOR A MOMENT THAT SUCH A FORCE MIGHT EXIST, AND THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SHALL BE SUPPOSED TO BE IN THE ACTUAL POSSESSION OF IT. вHAT WILL BE THE CONCLUSION? вITH A DISPOSITION TO INVADE THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMUNITY, AND WITH THE MEANS OF GRATIFYING THAT DISPOSITION, IS IT PRESUMABLE THAT THE PERSONS WHO WERE ACTUATED BY IT WOULD AMUSE THEMSELVES IN THE RIDICULOUS TASK OF FABRICATING ELECTION LAWS FOR SECURING A PREFERENCE TO A FAVORITE CLASS OF MEN? вOULD THEY NOT BE LIKELY TO PREFER A CONDUCT BETTER ADAPTED TO THEIR OWN IMMEDIATE AGGRANDIZEMENT? вOULD THEY NOT RATHER BOLDLY RESOLVE TO PERPETUATE THEMSELVES IN OFFICE BY ONE DECISIVE ACT OF USURPATION, THAN TO TRUST TO PRECARIOUS EXPEDIENTS WHICH, IN SPITE OF ALL THE PRECAUTIONS THAT MIGHT ACCOMPANY THEM, MIGHT TERMINATE IN THE DISMISSION, DISGRACE, AND RUIN OF THEIR AUTHORS? вOULD THEY NOT FEAR THAT CITIZENS, NOT LESS TENACIOUS THAN CONSCIOUS OF THEIR RIGHTS, WOULD FLOCK FROM THE REMOTE EXTREMES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE сTATES TO THE PLACES OF ELECTION, TO VOERTHROW THEIR TYRANTS, AND TO SUBSTITUTE MEN WHO WOULD BE DISPOSED TO AVENGE THE VIOLATED MAJESTY OF THE PEOPLE? публиус. 1 пARTICULARLY IN THE сOUTHERN сTATES AND IN THIS сTATE.