Time - Man of the Year/Time_Man_of_the_Year_Compact_Publishing_3YX-Disc-1_Compact_Publishing_1993.iso/moy/113092/11309937.000

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                                                                                THE MIDDLE EAST, Page 50

YITZAK RABIN: Peace Before Land


By Dean Fischer, William Dowell, Robert Slater and Yitzhak Rabin


    Q. Why did you suggest a meeting with President Assad?

    A. President Sadat of Egypt made a historic breakthrough
in 1977 when he put an end to war and convinced both Egyptians
and Israelis that he was ready to make peace. He broke down the
walls of suspicion and prejudice. Today President Assad is not
ready to do 2% of what Sadat did to convince Israel that he is
ready to take unexpected or unusual steps to achieve peace. I
said that I do not believe we can achieve peace without a
meeting between the top political leaders of the two countries,
because peace by correspondence has no meaning in the context of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, with its emotional backlog of hatred
and suspicion. It has to be done in a way that would signal to
both peoples that their leaders had decided to put an end to war
and establish peace.


    Q. Many Arabs feel Sadat sacrificed his life by visiting
Jerusalem and defying the rest of the Arab world. Is there
another gesture Assad could make to prove his sincerity?

    A. As Prime Minister, I changed Israel's position on peace
negotiations. I made it clear that we are ready to go along with
Resolution 242 of the U.N. Security Council, which specifies
withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries in the context
of peace. The former government of Israel stressed "peace for
peace" and nothing else. But I also said that the dimension of
the territorial concession should not be negotiated before we
know that Syria is ready for a full-fledged peace, with open
boundaries for the movement of people in groups, diplomatic
relations including embassies, and at least an agreement in
principle for the normalization of relations. Secondly, I said
that a peace treaty between Syria and Israel should not be
influenced by the success or lack of success of negotiations
with the other Arab delegations. I don't feel that Syria is
ready for a full-fledged peace and a peace treaty that will
stand on its own. Many Israelis wonder how Syria can be involved
in the peace negotiations while allowing rejectionist
Palestinian organizations with headquarters in Damascus to call
for the Palestinians to withdraw from those negotiations.
Although it is true that Hizballah is organized, inspired,
financed and armed by Iran, its main bases in Lebanon's Bekaa
Valley are under Syrian military control.


    Q. Is it possible to reach a separate Israeli-Syrian
agreement, outside the wider Arab context?

    A. I don't believe it is possible to reach a comprehensive
peace with all the Arab parties simultaneously. It has to be
done on a bilateral basis. From 1949 until 1979, we achieved
agreements with Arab countries only when we negotiated with one
Arab partner at a time.


    Q. The Syrians insist on a comprehensive peace and contend
that Sadat made a mistake in signing a bilateral treaty.

    A. I believe that without Sadat's courage and imagination
there would have been no peace between an Arab country and
Israel. He set the pattern. He proved that peace is not an
illusion or a dream.


    Q. The Syrians insist on a comprehensive peace because
they don't want to be isolated.

    A. In 1980 I interviewed President Sadat in Alexandria,
and I asked him if he had opposed having King Hussein of Jordan
join him at Camp David. He said, "You remember that we were
twice on the verge of a breakdown in the 13-day meeting. If we
had added Israel's problem with Jordan and the Palestinians to
the problems between Egypt and Israel, there would have been no
peace in the next 20 years." If you give one Arab partner a veto
right over another, forget about achieving peace.


    Q. What are the hazards involved in negotiating with Syria?

    A. There are risks for both Syria and Israel. In any
agreement we have to give tangibles; we get paper in return.
Agreements on paper can be torn to pieces; tangibles have to be
taken by force. When I say tangibles, I mean territory. We live
in a region in which international agreements are not based on
the Bible or the Koran. Two years ago, Iraq invaded, occupied
and annexed Kuwait, in flagrant violation of inter-Arab
agreements. If it can happen between two Arab countries, what
is to stop it from happening between Arabs and Israel?


    Q. Egypt got the entire Sinai back in exchange for peace
and diplomatic relations in the process of normalization. Why
can't the same formula apply to the Golan Heights?

    A. The geography is different. In the Sinai, 250 km of
desert separate Israel from that part of Egypt west of Suez. The
widest area that separates us from the Syrians on the Golan is
23 km. I have said that I am ready to add a territorial
dimension to the negotiations, but I don't want to negotiate the
size of it before I know that Syria is ready for a peace that
is not conditional on a comprehensive peace. We always strive
for a comprehensive peace, but it has to be built on bilateral
bridges. If we do not reach bilateral agreements with each of
the parties, we will not reach a comprehensive peace with all
of them.


    Q. Are there any circumstances under which you would
consider full withdrawal from the Golan?

    A. I will not even go so far as addressing the question of
withdrawal from the Golan without first knowing that Syria is
ready for full-fledged peace, a peace that stands by itself.


    Q. If Assad came to Jerusalem prepared to sign a peace
treaty, would that change your position on the Golan?

    A. You are not Assad. You don't represent Assad, and you
are not Prime Minister of Israel. Unfortunately, the Syrian
position as it was expressed by Foreign Minister Farouk Shara
-- "total withdrawal for total peace" -- is not very clear. I
don't know what total peace is. I do know what total withdrawal
is. It is not limited to Syria and Israel. It also concerns the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.


    Q. But could you apply his statements strictly to the
Syrian-Israeli negotiations?

    A. I don't know. He has never told us. So far, the Syrians
have made a clear distinction in the negotiations that what
they call peace is the implementation of Resolution 242. That
resolution doesn't speak about open boundaries or diplomatic
relations. I don't make guesses. I have to make decisions, and
decisions are made on concrete positions by the other side --
not on hypothetical questions.


    Q. During your election campaign you said you would try to
reach an agreement with the Palestinians within a year. Do you
still expect that to happen?

    A. I am sure within a year we will know whether this is
feasible. I tend to believe that at least in one area we will
reach an agreement, but we have a saying in the Middle East:
"For war, one side is enough. For peace, you need two."


    Q. What is the most promising area for an agreement?

    A. Lebanon is a Syrian protectorate. The Lebanese dare not
do anything without the approval of Damascus. We are not
interested in a square inch of Lebanese soil or a cubic meter
of their water. The problem there is security -- the absence of
a Lebanese government that can control its sovereign soil and
prevent terrorist acts against Israel. Jordan cannot have a
separate peace without solving the Palestinian problem. That
makes the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the
Israeli-Syrian negotiations the two key questions. With Syria
we have a partner, and a boss who makes decisions. To what
extent Assad is ready for real peace is questionable; nobody
discloses all his cards at the start of a negotiation. With the
Palestinians it could be easier because there is no need now for
territorial compromise on the part of Israel.


    Q. Do you think Clinton's victory will speed up or slow
down the peace process?

    A. I believe the policy of the U.S. will be in support of
the peace process.


    Q. Syria and other Arab states have proposed a complete
ban on all weapons of mass destruction. Do you object?

    A. We have made it clear more than once that we are ready
to make the Middle East nuclear-free, chemical- and
biological-free zones, on the basis of bilateral agreements.
Why? The Iraqis signed the NPT [nonproliferation treaty] and
the International Atomic Energy Agency was supervising them. Did
it discover anything there? Look at what happened. We believe
in a regional agreement based on bilateral agreements between
Israel and the countries in the region, as well as relevant,
mutual supervision. On that basis, I am ready to sign tomorrow.


    Q. Do Iran's large arms purchases pose a strategic threat
to Israel?

    A. No doubt. In addition, Iran can harass us through the
activities of Hizballah in Lebanon and outside the Middle East.
There are two lines of activity in the Middle East moving
parallel to each other, each contradicting the purpose of the
other. On the one hand, the peace negotiations; on the other,
the acceleration of the arms race. Countries that are not part
of the peace process -- Iran, Iraq and Libya -- are participants
in the arms race. Therefore we have to take care of our defense
capability to ensure that we will exist, to give enough security
to our citizens and our vital interests, and to convince Arab
leaders that they will achieve nothing through the use of force.


    Q. President Assad has been acquiring Scud missiles. Do
you think Syria could go to war against Israel?

    A. We have to take into account that there might be a
threat in case of a stalemate in the peace negotiations. I hope
not. It would not be wise for Syria alone to initiate war
against Israel. There is no longer a Soviet umbrella over the
heads of some Arab countries. They cannot rely on the support
of Iraq. Egypt will not join. Logic is not always the dominant
fact in deciding events in the Middle East, but I tend to
believe that it will not happen. But we have to be prepared for
any eventuality.


    Q. With the cold war over, do you think Israel will
continue to play a role as a strategic U.S. ally?

    A. That is for the U.S. to decide. As I see it, regional
security will be an issue for the foreseeable future. We have
seen what happened in the gulf crisis.


    Q. Some Arab leaders fear that if there is no progress in
the peace talks, extremist fundamentalism will threaten
stability. Does that concern you?

    A. We see it happening here and there, especially among
the Palestinians. The question is, What is the conclusion of
those who fear it on the Arab side? I believe it should lead
them to negotiate more seriously with Israel, because the rise
of fundamentalism is a result not only of our position but of
their position too. They need to understand that agreement is
reached by compromise on both sides.


    Q. Are you optimistic that total peace will be achieved in
your lifetime?

    A. I hope it will be achieved. I don't know if it will be
in my lifetime.