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1993-04-08
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COVER STORIES, Page 25BOSNIAHatred Ten Times Over
The U.N.'s outgoing man in Sarajevo, General Lewis MacKenzie,
is not optimistic
By DANIEL BENJAMIN/NEW YORK and Lewis MacKenzie.
Q. Sarajevo airport was shut down again this week. Has the
U.N.'s authority in Sarajevo been exhausted?
A. I've always said the agreement to protect the airport
from ground attack was hanging by a very fine thread. When you
start taking mortar fire on the bunkers our people are living
in and on the tarmac, that is a serious escalation. Before, we
were able to justify putting our finger in the flame despite
fighting going on close to the airport. The odd round dropping
short can be rationalized, but not when the airport is being
directly targeted.
Q. What do you think it would take to impose peace on
Sarajevo itself?
A. Well, from the tactical point of view, having to
control and occupy and dominate all the features around Sarajevo
and the city itself. Cities are famous for gobbling up
soldiers. I haven't done the detailed analysis, but a figure of
75,000 would probably be modest, if there is resistance. And the
resistance has to be handled 24 hours a day by people on the
ground. Air power can assist, but it can't stop people from
reoccupying positions.
Q. That's assuming that the act of bringing in a large
military force itself wouldn't have a powerful psychological
impact.
A. Yes. It's also presupposing that the peacemakers can
stay for a long time. Because what happens when they leave?
Everything goes back to the way it was because so much hate has
been generated. And then you have a force that is isolated. You
don't have secure communications. You're sitting in the middle
of a very, very hilly country.
Q. What would be the difference between an operation in
Bosnia and the Gulf War?
A. The same characteristic that dominates every military
operation: the ground. In Desert Storm there was a relatively
sophisticated infrastructure on which to develop your force.
There were tremendous areas of land on which to put it together
and to train and sort out problems -- and that took four months.
Where are you going to do that in Bosnia?
Q. You would not be able to wage tank warfare, as in the
Middle East?
A. No, you're talking infantry battles. You're talking
about classic, classic guerrilla country.
Q. Do you think the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims
would fight in the face of a huge force?
A. If I put myself in their shoes, there is no option. You
are talking about backing the Serbs into a corner. And if you
read history, it's not a very good idea. You're talking about
an organization with a significant capacity to fight and with
a significant amount of equipment. Serbia/Montenegro must be
one of the most densely militarized areas of the world now.
Q. To "pacify" all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what size
military operation would be needed ?
A. Well, the Germans gave it a try with 30 divisions, and
they weren't successful. A lot of people were killed. If there
were resistance throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and you had to
occupy it, you could be talking up to 1 million troops.
Q. Why not bomb artillery positions and send in helicopter
gunships?
A. You wouldn't be able to find all the weapons systems
that are doing the damage. Mortars are the favored weapon in
Bosnia, and they're hidden very easily and carried around in
everything from school buses to cars. What's much more important
is that if you do that, then the U.N. peacekeeping force is,
whether it likes it or not, affiliated with the side not being
attacked. Therefore you have sitting there 1,600 ((U.N.
soldier)) hostages.
Q. Can't you remove those troops in advance of any action?
A. If you do, that's an indication something big is going
to happen. So you've got yourself a very nice cul-de-sac,
unless you're prepared to sacrifice 1,600 people. I wouldn't
think that would be a particularly good idea.
Q. Is there anything that would rapidly improve the
situation in Bosnia?
A. Yes -- and the presidency ((of Bosnia)) will hate to
hear me say this: negotiations with the Serbian side within
Bosnia. The presidency will not talk to the other side because
they say this is a war of aggression controlled by Belgrade.
They feel that if they start to talk, the status quo will be
frozen, and they don't have a lot of territory. If you don't
want to talk, then there's only one solution: one side wins, one
side loses and a lot of people get killed in between. So my
feeling is that pressure has to be brought to bear to get them
to the table. The Serbs will talk any time, any place, at any
level because they probably have what they want. It seems to me
talking could get the Bosnian Muslims territory.
Q. Is anyone in the different leaderships really calling
the shots? Or is much of the fighting being driven at the grass
roots by units that decide they just want to fire their mortars?
A. You're absolutely right, there are large numbers of
individuals and units that are out of control. But they are out
of control within a defined chain of command. There's ample
evidence of units operating on their own agenda -- today. Maybe
tomorrow they'll operate on a common agenda. There are some
individuals and small organizations in Sarajevo who are paid to
kill. They get a bonus. Journalists are favorite targets in
Sarajevo. There are no video games in Sarajevo, so the next best
thing is to fire at a TV car going by.
Q. Is the word genocide appropriate for Yugoslavia?
A. I can't comment in detail on that because my mandate
was limited to Sarajevo. However, let me assure you that I have a
pound of paper for each hand of protests from one side accusing
the other of running detention camps, concentration camps,
prisoner-of-war camps.
Q. You don't entirely blame the Serbs?
A. When people ask me whom do you blame, I say, "Give me
the day and the month, and I'll tell you." What the Serbs did
three months ago was totally unacceptable: the city was
bombarded, civilians were targeted. Today it is more complex.
What we now see from the Bosnian presidency's side is that it's
in their interest to keep the thing going and get the Serbs to
retaliate in order to convince the international community that
intervention is a good idea. So I blame both sides.
Q. You have had nine peacekeeping tours in places like
Gaza, Nicaragua and Cyprus. How does this compare?
A. You can take the hate from all those previous tours and
multiply by 10. I've never seen anything close to that. Even if
only 10% of what each side accuses the other of doing is true,
in the minds of the people it has grown to horrendous
proportions. If the leadership said, "O.K., let's sit down and
sort this thing out," I'm not sure whether people would accept
that because there is so much hate for the other side. Really
deep, gut-wrenching hate. Once you start calling them baby
killers, pregnant-women killers, and talk about cooking babies,
those are not good grounds for negotiations.
Q. What difference did that make for your work?
A. On any of those previous tours, when you brokered a
deal, it was followed through. And if somebody along the line
didn't follow through, they were put in their place. It's
relatively easy to broker a deal in Bosnia. It's the execution
that is impossible.
Q. After your experience in Sarajevo, do you think there
is still a clear line between peacekeeping and peacemaking?
A. Yes, there is a clear line. It became cloudy in
Sarajevo only because we went there with good intentions and
then the war started, and that put us in an absolutely unique
position.
Peace imposition is war fighting. It's going in, taking on
somebody and beating them. In order to use a peacekeeping force,
you have to have a cease-fire. But we got ourselves into this
bind by having a war start around us.
Q. So you're a pessimist?
A. I used to use the term guarded optimism, but I've
dropped even that from my vocabulary. I still have hope. But I
won't be optimistic until they start to talk.