ftp.xmission.com/2014.06.ftp.xmission.com.tar/ftp.xmission.com/pub/lists/abolition-usa/archive/v01.n076

Internet Message Format | 1999-02-08 | 46KB

From: [e-mail] (abolition-usa-digest)
To: [e-mail]
Subject: abolition-usa-digest V1 #76
Reply-To: abolition-usa-digest
Sender: [e-mail]
Errors-To: [e-mail]
Precedence: bulk


abolition-usa-digest     Tuesday, February 9 1999     Volume 01 : Number 076




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Tue, 09 Feb 1999 15:06:52 -0500
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Fwd: New British website on NATO at 50

>From: [e-mail] ([e-mail])
>
>The British Ministry of Defence has a new website on the NATO at Fifty.
>Its address is
>
>http://www.mod.uk/policy/nato/nato50/index.htm
>
>The text of two pages on nuclear policy follow:
>****************************
>NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY
>
>NATO's nuclear strategy is contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept. Its
>principal elements are:
>
>oDeterrence: the unique and essential role played by nuclear weapons in
>maintaining peace and stability and preventing war or coercion of any
>kind.
>
>oParticipation and the trans-Atlantic link: an emphasis on the need for a
>widespread sharing of the burdens and risks involved with nuclear weapons.
>Furthermore, the importance of the US forward deployment in Europe as an
>essential part of trans-Atlantic linkage.
>
>oReduced force levels: the decreased risk since the end of the Cold War of
>nuclear weapons being used and the consequent reduction in NATO
>sub-strategic forces.
>
>The United Kingdom believes that these elements still adequately describe
>Alliance nuclear strategy, and we do not expect major changes to be made in
>the new Concept.
>*****************************
>PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL & CHEMICAL WEAPONS
>
>The challenges faced in today's operational environment include those
>arising from the proliferation of nuclear and, in particular, biological
>and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. The threat is not new. In
>January 1994 at the NATO Summit, the Heads of State recognised that it was
>a matter of concern for NATO.
>
>Since then the Alliance has expanded its political and defence efforts
>against NBC proliferation. It has continued to support the full
>implementation and rigorous verification of international disarmament
>regimes which remain essential in the prevention, and reversal of
>proliferation. But it has also taken steps to ensure that NATO maintains
>the range of military capabilities required to respond appropriately to the
>developing threat.
>
>At their meeting in Brussels in December 1998, NATO Defence Ministers,
>considering the issue of proliferation of NBC weapons, said in their
>Communique:
>
>"Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on proliferation, we
>are prepared to expand NATO's effort to address the evolving proliferation
>threat. We join Alliance Foreign Ministers in tasking the Council in
>Permanent Session to prepare for the Washington Summit proposals for an
>initiative to ensure that the Alliance has the political and military
>capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the challenges of the
>proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery."
>*************************
>Nicola Butler
>The Acronym Institute
>24, Colvestone Crescent, London E8 2LH, England.
>telephone (UK +44) (0) 171 503 8857
>fax                (0) 171 503 9153
>website http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym
>
Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons.

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 9 Feb 1999 12:50:15 -0800
From: "David Crockett Williams" <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Russia's Nuclear War Plans

Defector Reveals Russian War Plans
Christopher Ruddy
February 8, 1999

For NewsMax.com and The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review
NewsMax.com has just released a new video with Colonel Lunev, and a speci=
al
report by Christopher Ruddy on how Y2K increases the risk of a Russian
surprise attack against the United States.


WASHINGTON - Russia cannot threaten the United States. She is poor. She i=
s
weak. She is starving. She is in chaos.

Think again, says Stanislav Lunev.

Col. Lunev is the highest ranking military intelligence officer ever to
have defected from Russia. He did so in 1992 after the Soviet Union
dissolved and Boris Yeltsin had come to power.

At the time of his defection Lunev was living in Washington with his wife=
,
working a cover job as a journalist for TASS, the Russian news agency,
while doing his real job: spying on America.

As a GRU officer Lunev's spying related to military matters: gathering
information on America's military plans; reporting on U.S. vulnerabilitie=
s;
devising special operations in the advent of war.

Last year, Lunev detailed just some of his activities in a new book he
co-authored with Ira Winkler, "Through the Eyes of the Enemy: Russia's
Highest Ranking Military Defector Reveals Why Russia is More Dangerous th=
an
Ever" (Regnery, [phone]).

The book is a light read with some sensational details about Russian plan=
s
to bring suitcase nuclear bombs into America and to use special forces to
assassinate the president and congressional, military and other leaders
during the initial phases of a war.

Lunev claims in "Through the Eyes of the Enemy" that Russian military
leaders still view a war with the United States as "inevitable" and that
the Cold War never really ended.

Save for some talk radio outlets and the Internet, Lunev's book got littl=
e
media coverage. This comes as no surprise since most Americans believe th=
e
United States won the Cold War. Russia is not a threat and any suggestion
that it is has to be written off as just paranoid jingoism.

Lunev is used to unfriendly receptions. When he did defect, higher-ups at
the CIA and the Pentagon did not accept what he had to say.

What he said was rather simple. Russia is continuing its old ways. The
military is still preparing for war against the United States. A nuclear
war.

In the era of fuzzy warm feelings between the United States and Russia,
American officials were not going to upset the applecart no matter how mu=
ch
evidence Lunev offered.

In the intervening years, Russia has appeared to further disintegrate. Ca=
n
she really be a threat? skeptics ask. Lunev most certainly has been prove=
n
wrong.

Lunev says think again. He retorts that Russia still retains a formidable
military-industrial complex. She is one of the world's largest arms
exporters. She makes quality products and delivers them on time.

Russia continues to build nuclear submarines, bombers and missiles. Last
year Yeltsin commissioned Peter the Great, the largest ballistic missile
cruiser ever built by mankind. This past Christmas, Russia deployed a
regiment of 10 Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles, missiles
reportedly more sophisticated than anything we have. Just last month,
Russia unveiled her stealth bomber. The New York Times reports Russia
continues to build huge underground bunkers, some as large as cities, in
case of war. She also continues to build an arsenal of chemical and
biological weapons. Russia's nuclear arsenal remains the world's largest.
She continues testing of her nuclear weapons.

Such facts demonstrate that Lunev, who refuses to be photographed for
security reasons, is not to be dismissed.

INTERVIEW

Ruddy: Colonel Lunev, you were first and foremost a spy for Russia who
posed as a journalist. In your book you discuss the help you received fro=
m
American journalists. How significant was the Russian penetration of the
American press corps? How many American journalists were working for
Russia?

Lunev: In my book I talk about myself. Keep this in mind, when I worked i=
n
TASS' Washington bureau, I had two colleagues from the KGB also working a=
s
agents.

So we had plenty of people undercover working as journalists. How many
people they recruited? I don't know. But I can tell you that journalists,
American journalists and foreign journalists in this country, were
considered a major target. They were the same level of target as military=
,
government personnel or Capitol Hill staff.

Ruddy: When you say targets, you mean?

Lunev: Recruits.

Ruddy: It has been acknowledged that the East German government had as ma=
ny
as 5,000 spies working for it in West Germany.

Lunev: East German intelligence was very successful. Very successful. I
don't know exactly how many people they recruited, but they were very
successful. Not only in penetrations through Western Germany and the
European establishment, but through American institutions located in
Western Europe.

Ruddy: What do you think the degree of penetration is of the U.S.
government by communist or former communist countries in the CIA, the FBI=
,
and State Department?

Lunev: It could be hundreds. But I don't know the exact number.

Recently the FBI admitted there were a couple of hundred open cases of
espionage they were investigating. These are the ones they know about. So
you can multiply this number by many times to guess the number of people
who are working as spies whom the government does not know about.

Ruddy: You were not only a spy, but a military intelligence officer. Your
work involved developing military plans and learning of other countries'
plans. What did you study when you were in military schools in Russia?

Lunev: We had a lot of special subjects we needed to learn, including
military science. We learned basic ways of commanding armies and how to
conduct military operations.

Ruddy: How much of your training and education was geared toward fighting=
 a
nuclear war?

Lunev: All of our educational process and training was connected to the
actual fulfillment of military plans in time of a nuclear war.

Ruddy: Your book suggests that the whole Russian military structure, the
whole society during the Soviet era was geared for a nuclear war, and tha=
t
has not changed under the new regime.

Lunev: Yes. The Soviet plan was the use of strategic forces to destroy
strategic targets in America and the West, followed by the use of nuclear
and conventional forces. This was the Soviet way, and the Russian militar=
y
still thinks the same way today. They are much more dangerous now because
the Russian military is relying more on their nuclear weapons.

Ruddy: What about a first strike on the United States?

The likely plan does not include use of missiles first. First the Russian=
s
would use their special operation forces, special troops, inside of the
United States to destroy targets like communications facilities, airfield=
s,
command centers, and other targets that might be difficult to destroy wit=
h
a missile attack.

Suitcase nuclear bombs at strategic locations are just one small part of
their arsenal. I mentioned this in my book and I have been so surprised
that the American public is so interested in this. Why? This is not
something unusual for Russian military plans.

Ruddy: One of your jobs here in the U.S. as a spy was to look for locatio=
ns
to hook up these suitcase nukes to electric power sources.

It's not really necessary to have an electric power source because the
devices can work on a battery. But not for very long.

Ruddy: Are there such bombs in the United States already?

Lunev: It's possible.

Ruddy: How soon could this war come?

Lunev: The Russian conventional forces are not in a state of readiness.
Their rocket and nuclear forces are. This war scenario could be in place =
by
the request of Russian government in a short time.

Russia is a country on the edge of social explosion. The total decline of
living conditions: human, industrial, political, social, and now the
financial crisis. This could lead to war.

Ruddy: It's dangerous because the Russians may consider their only option
is to use the "gun." At the same time, the United States has been
destroying its nuclear forces.

Lunev: Yes! I am sorry, but let me ask you, what's going on in this
country? Right now the Russians are engaging in criminal extortion for
money. This is the same method criminals use. Every other day, in
conversations with Western leaders, the Russians are saying "show me the
money or something dangerous will happen in my country with tens of
thousands of nuclear warheads." It's extortion.

There could be an explosion, a catastrophe. It could happen in Russia, an=
d
somebody like a major general or a one-star general or colonel will come =
to
power without any international experience. If such a person would come t=
o
power, pushing the nuclear button would be no problem.

Ruddy: If that happened, how long would it take for a strong leader to ge=
t
the conventional forces ready if he wanted to start a nuclear war against
the United States?

Lunev: A few months. You have to remember that the Russians have the same
number of submarines, nuclear missile submarines, ships, bombers, fighter=
s,
tanks and the like as they did at the height of Soviet military power. I
know that Russian military downswing was connected with Army divisions
only, and these divisions could be rebuilt in weeks or months.

Ruddy: China also is moving closer to Russia. China has the largest
conventional army in the world. What danger does that pose?

Lunev: If China and Russia would ally in a war against the United States,
with Russia providing the strategic weapons and China the troops, they
could begin the war tomorrow.

Ruddy: Recent press reports state that the Russians have been helping the
Chinese develop ballistic missile technology.

Lunev: I would say that actually the Chinese missile industry was created
by the Soviet Union, by Soviet specialists, by Soviet technology and by
education of Chinese engineers and scientists in Soviet institutions. So
the Soviet Union, let's say, played the major role in the establishment o=
f
the Chinese missile industry. But this was in the '50s before the
Sino-Russia split. This split was healed in the late 1980s and any
ideological obstacle for helping China was removed. China, of course, pay=
s
big money to Russia for this technology.

Ruddy: Well, it does seem that some steps the Russians are taking suggest
war preparations. They are building a huge underground complex in the Ura=
l
Mountains. Have you heard about that?

Lunev: You ask about Yamantau Mountain. Well, this is a huge underground
city which could be used in time when many Russian cities are destroyed,
but the military and political elite will survive and live until our plan=
et
will try to restore itself.

Ruddy: The American military is downsizing because there is no Warsaw Pac=
t.
We have let down our defenses. If the Russians were to launch a first
strike, a surprise attack against the United States, they could wipe us
almost off the map. European countries like Britain and France have small
nuclear arsenals. If the U.S. does not exist, Russia rules the world
because after an attack, she will still have a huge nuclear arsenal.

Lunev: Yes.

Ruddy: Is it possible that the Russian Communists planned this? That the
intelligence agencies and the military establishment said, "Hey, if we gi=
ve
up Eastern Europe, if we throw open the economy, democratize, allow the
country to seem in chaos, the Americans will let down their guard. We can
get them to reduce their strategic nuclear forces, and they won't think o=
f
us as a threat."

Lunev: I believe there was a plan. I cannot prove it to you. It is my hun=
ch
this is what happened. This is based on my experiences, things I saw goin=
g
on. Because now, six years later, it looks like it was planned, but at th=
at
time we didn't have any idea that it was possible to plan all this
activity.

Ruddy: Well, it seems to me the most important information you have is th=
at
the Cold War isn't over: that the Russian military believes inevitably th=
at
there will be a war with the United States.

Lunev: In April of 1998, Russia used its strategic bombers in an exercise
against the United States. These exercises were organized for the future
war against America. Before that there were several nuclear exercises.

In the fall of 1998, President Yeltsin commissioned Peter the Great, the
world's largest nuclear missile cruiser. They have been doing ground forc=
es
exercises. Airborne force exercises. All of these exercises are being
conducted for a reason, for the future war against America.

Ruddy: What do you think are the chances, I know this is highly
speculative, that there will be a nuclear global war between Russia and t=
he
United States within the next five years?

Lunev: I need to repeat myself. In a time of social explosion in Russia,
nobody can exclude the possibility that it will begin. Preparations for
this nuclear war are now being made in Russia.

Ruddy: Would the Russian people support such a war?

Lunev: In recent years and times, the feelings of the Russian people towa=
rd
America have begun to change. The Russian people believe the United State=
s
is giving money to the corrupt Russian government, which never helps the
ordinary Russians. America has identified herself so strongly with Yeltsi=
n,
and now Yeltsin and his government are viewed as corrupt.

There is a perception that America, who destroyed the old Soviet Union, i=
s
again trying to destroy Russia.

Ruddy: A former American general, Benjamin Partin, suggested that if, aft=
er
the Allies had beaten Hitler in World War II, and the new German governme=
nt
was filled with ex-Nazis in the Cabinet, ex-Nazis in the military, ex-Naz=
is
in the private businesses, would we believe we won? General Partin notes
that in today's Russia, ex-Communists, many high-level Soviet officials,
run most of the government and private businesses. Most of the republics
are run by former Communists.

Lunev: Well, almost all, yes. General Partin is correct in his concerns.

Ruddy: It appears that in 1917 when the Communists came to power in Russi=
a,
they were not much more than organized crime figures.

Lunev: Yes, they are the same. They are together. There is no difference.

Ruddy: It seems this permanent government will be always seeking
domination, whether official or through organized crime means.

Lunev: And you are right, but how will you sell this idea to America?

Ruddy: You can't sell it to America, because they believe all the bad guy=
s
just gave up with the end of the Cold War. One day it was all over, we wo=
n.
End of story.

Lunev: You should know this did not happen in one day, like on Christmas
Day of 1991 when Gorbachev dissolved the Soviet Union. A long time before
this the KGB began to transfer Communist Party money to private accounts
under the names of different people in Western countries.

At the same time the KGB moved some of their very experienced people,
including generals, sometimes four-star generals, into the new private
businesses being formed in Russia. For example, former KGB agents joined
financial and industrial groups. Since they had intelligence backgrounds,
they could be placed in various positions, like vice president in charge =
of
personnel or foreign operations.

The KGB established these private accounts, controlled by their own peopl=
e
using money from the CCCP - the Communist Party assets - for the future,
for the future restoration of communism.

Ruddy: The power of organized crime in Russia developed so quickly. What
role did the KGB play in its rise to power?

Lunev: The KGB and the old-line Communists needed to use criminals in thi=
s
phase because who had experience in money laundering? Who has connections
with drug cartels? With other organized crime groups in Western countries=
?
The KGB worked closely with these groups and actually provided passports
and permission for criminals to travel abroad.

Organized crime in Russia has existed for a long time, as long as anyone
can remember. Yet the criminals never played any sufficient or important
role in Russian or Soviet society until the so-called reforms were begun
under Gorbachev.

Ruddy: You mentioned earlier that the KGB transferred funds outside of
Russia for the future restoration of the Communist Party.

Lunev: Yes, for the future.

Ruddy: So people are thinking in terms of restoring the Communist Party
there?

Lunev: Yes, I think that they made plans to bring back the Communists. Th=
e
Politburo accomplished this at the end of the 1980s and the early '90s wh=
en
millions, if not billions, of dollars from Communist Party accounts were
transferred by KGB officers with assistance and help from criminals.

NewsMax.com has just released a new video with Colonel Lunev, and a speci=
al
report by Christopher Ruddy on how Y2K increases the risk of a Russian
surprise attack against the United States. For More Info Click Here



=A9 1998, NewsMax.com Original Site Design by David Grumm / HTML by Luke
Kelly



    http://www.angelfire.com/on/GEAR2000
*********************************************************
Global Emergency Alert Response:  GEAR2000
David Crockett Williams                805-822-3309
20411 Steeple Court, Tehachapi CA 93561 USA
*********************************************************
        CAMPAIGN for a BETTER AMERICA
              with General Agency Services
*********************************************************
      UNITED NATION   Global  Peace  Walk
Oakland City Hall to UC Berkeley, February 26th*
Annually:   22apr Taos, NM, --->  Santa Fe 26apr
1999:  16sep New York -> Washington DC 24oct
Ceremony rededicating  Washington Monument
as a symbol of peace, UN DAY 24OCT99
2000:  15jan  San Francisco --> New York  24oct
             16sep Washington, DC
   ONE NATION, Aware of God as Love for All !
       GLOBAL PEACE NOW !!     Help Now !!!
*********************************************************
http://www.egroups.com/list/global-peace-walk


- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 09 Feb 1999 16:39:47 -0500
From: Kathy Crandall <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Fwd: BMD vs disarmament

You're absolutely right Alice.

ASlater wrote:

> Dear Friends,
> We might want to consider the material below in preparing a strategy for
> the US Abolition Campaign.  If we can't stop Star Wars, I'm afraid there's
> going to be more of an up hill battle on eliminating nukes.  Regards, Alice
> Slater
>
> >Subject: The Looming Threat to Disarmament in the U.S. Senate
> >  Date:  Mon, 8 Feb 1999 17:03:54 -0500
> >  From:  "David Culp" <[e-mail]>
> >
> >
> >[In the next few weeks, the U.S. Senate, and possibly the House of
> >Representatives, is expected to vote on a bill supporting
> >deployment of a national ballistic missile defense system.  While
> >the same legislation was defeated in the Senate last year by one vote,
> >the Senate Republican leadership believes they can win this year.
> >Below is a brief analysis of why this issue is critical to further nuclear
> >disarmament progress.  David Culp<[e-mail]>]
> >
> >-----------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >GOING UP THE HILL AND DOWN AGAIN:
> >WHY THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION ON MISSILE DEFENSE
> >IS A GENUINE CRISIS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
> >
> >By Jonathan Dean
> >Union of Concerned Scientists
> >Washington, D.C.
> >February 4, 1999
> >
> >
> >Many people believe that deployment of nationwide missile defenses
> >will have negative impact on prospects for nuclear disarmament. That's
> >true. But there is an even more difficult problem: How do you get out
> >of the mess once deployment has actually taken place?
> >
> >The plans of the Clinton administration announced by Secretary of
> >Defense Cohen on January 20 to proceed with preparations for
> >deployment of a nationwide missile defense system by 2005 mean that
> >the administration may well decide by mid-2000 on the deployment of a
> >"thin" defense in two sites, necessitating extensive renegotiation
> >with Russia on the ABM Treaty -- or U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.
> >
> >The nearly certain result of missile defense deployment in the United
> >States will be to freeze nuclear arsenals at their present or higher
> >levels for decades to come, postponing deep cuts in nuclear weapons
> >and blocking a stage where complete elimination of nuclear weapons can
> >be seriously discussed.
> >
> >These highly probable results of deployment mean that those interested
> >in nuclear disarmament should join in strong opposition to deployment
> >of missile defenses.
> >
> >
> >Background
> >
> >Faced by these developments in U.S. policy, in the long run, Russia
> >may agree to amend the ABM Treaty to permit two U.S. sites, as was the
> >case with the original version of the treaty; Russia has a continuing
> >interest in limiting the scope of United States missile defenses. But
> >in return, Russia will also very probably require U.S. acquiescence in
> >maintaining the Russian arsenal at around the 2,000 warhead level,
> >rather than going down to the 1,000 warhead level that has been urged
> >by many Russians. The 2,000 warhead level will be retained to assure
> >Russia that it can still overcome a "thin" nationwide defense. Russia
> >will in turn argue that multiple warheads (MIRVs) be retained in order
> >to enable Russia to maintain a 2,000 warhead level without having to
> >spend a great deal of money in constructing new single warhead "Topol
> >M" missiles. (To do this, SS-19 multiple warhead missiles or even some
> >of the heavy, dreaded SS-18 multiple warhead missiles would be
> >retained in service until a new generation of Topol M multiple warhead
> >missiles can be constructed and deployed.)
> >
> >If these developments take place, the hope of reducing U.S. and
> >Russian holdings of strategic-range missiles down to about 1,000 each
> >in a few years through a START III Treaty and then bringing the other
> >weapon states into negotiated reductions will have to be postponed
> >indefinitely. China, which has repeatedly criticized the missile
> >defense project, will probably decide to increase the size of its own
> >nuclear arsenal in order to be able to surmount U.S. missile defenses
> >and to maintain a deterrent. It may also develop MIRVs for its
> >missiles if Russia retains them.
> >
> >Once deployed, a "thin" nationwide defense can be fairly rapidly
> >converted into a heavy nationwide defense and there will be continuing
> >political pressure in the U.S. to do so. Fully effective, high
> >capacity nationwide missile defense against all-out missile attack is
> >probably impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, it is likely that other
> >nuclear weapon states will follow worst case analysis and credit the
> >U.S. with high capability. As a result of developments like these,
> >nuclear disarmament will remain in indefinite stasis until some way
> >around this obstacle can be found.
> >
> >
> >Can We Get Out of This Situation?
> >
> >This is how the U.S. will march up the hill. To evaluate the
> >seriousness of the situation, we have to calculate what it may take to
> >march down again on the far side of the hill toward renewed
> >negotiation of deep nuclear cuts.
> >
> >One way, the easy way, would be for the grossly inflated threat of
> >rogue missile attack on the United States to collapse before U.S.
> >missile defenses are fully deployed, perhaps with the collapse of the
> >North Korean regime and with peaceful Korean reunification, with
> >collapse of the Iranian threat through emergence of a less theocratic
> >regime and improved U.S.-Iranian relations, as well as with
> >replacement of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Then, the U.S. might
> >return to leadership of incremental nuclear disarmament and regain
> >Russia's interest in deep cuts through the United States' main source
> >of leverage with Russia - money.
> >
> >A serious nuclear incident, such as an act of nuclear terrorism, might
> >also restore the momentum of nuclear disarmament.
> >
> >Other than these fortuitous developments, the remaining possibility
> >for restoring momentum to nuclear disarmament is the emergence of a
> >United States or Russian leader who actively presses for disarmament.
> >Prospects here are not very promising now.
> >
> >In the material sense, what would have to be done to march down the
> >hill is either to dismantle the "thin" nationwide defenses or abandon
> >them unfinished, as was done with the United States Grand Forks site
> >when the ABM Treaty was signed by President Nixon in 1972.
> >
> >Then, at the height of the cold war, the U.S. and Russia decided that
> >deployment of nationwide defenses would result in increased deployment
> >of offensive missiles. Now, after the cold war has wound down, this
> >argument lacks force. As stated, deployment of a thin system (and
> >apprehension that it could someday become a thick one), will probably
> >freeze current warhead levels in Russia, and may somewhat increase
> >them in China. But if this takes place, it is improbable that the
> >increased nuclear deployments would be so large that they would
> >mobilize opposition public opinion in the U.S. against missile
> >defenses, or even that public opinion would at this stage be intensely
> >interested in the general problem. Some segments of public opinion
> >might be engaged earlier if they understood that the road to nuclear
> >disarmament might be blocked for a long period.)
> >
> >That is the point. This new situation, and especially the difficulty
> >of reversing missile defense deployment once it has taken place, means
> >that organizations and individuals who support elimination of nuclear
> >weapons will have to become involved in the opposition to deployment
> >of nationwide missile defenses.
> >
> >
> >Arguments Against Missile Defense
> >
> >There are four main arguments against missile defense:
> >
> >1) It is an expensive waste; the equipment thus far has failed its
> >tests and it probably will not work; countermeasures by attackers will
> >make the task of defense much harder.
> >
> >2) The danger of rogue missile attack has been greatly exaggerated.
> >The contention that North Korea could produce a missile which could
> >reach important areas of the U.S. has probably not been exaggerated.
> >What has been exaggerated out of all proportion is the implication
> >that the damage that could be done by one or two North Korean missiles
> >strike is equivalent to the danger to which the U.S. was exposed in
> >the cold war nuclear confrontation with Russia.
> >
> >In the cold war, the entire population of the U.S. and Russia and the
> >northern hemisphere were at stake -- and possibly all life on earth in
> >a global winter. With North Korea, we are talking about one or two
> >missiles with a small payload which probably would not hit their
> >targets but which at worst could do damage in one or two restricted
> >sites, leaving the U.S. fully able to retaliate with very strong
> >conventional forces.
> >
> >The administration should be pressed to give the U.S. public an
> >accurate account of the limited dangers that actually face it from
> >rogue ICBM attacks.
> >
> >3) Given the current articulation of U.S. military strategy, the
> >United States is itself increasingly dependent on its own missiles,
> >especially cruise missiles, while trumpeting warnings over the dangers
> >of missile proliferation and possible missile attack on the U.S.
> >Consequently, the U.S. has not undertaken measures to control missiles
> >beyond the Missile Control Technology Regime, whose members are
> >missile-producing governments.
> >
> >The administration should now be pressed to move step-by-step toward a
> >worldwide regime restricting production, possession and deployment of
> >long-range ballistic missiles for military purposes. One proposal is
> >discussed in Jonathan Dean, "Controlling Ballistic and Cruise
> >Missiles," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 31, October 1998.
> >
> >4) Because the great damage from deploying missile defenses is to
> >intensify competition in nuclear weapons, one possible way of
> >mitigating the damage is to insist on maintenance of the ABM Treaty so
> >that deployment of missile defenses can at least be limited rather
> >than be allowed to develop into all-out competition.
> >
> >Beyond this, it is argued by some that the safest way to move toward
> >nuclear disarmament is to build missile defenses and then to agree on
> >step-by- step nuclear disarmament, replacing deterrence with defense.
> >Such defenses would not protect against attack by aircraft, cruise
> >missiles, land-based rockets and artillery or terrorist action, all of
> >which are more plausible than seriously damaging long-range missile
> >attack or deal with other motives of the weaker states for retaining
> >their weapons. Moreover, agreement to replace deterrence with defense
> >would require the full trust among weapon states from the outset that
> >is the hoped-for end result of step-by-step disarmament. It would also
> >probably require a global missile defense system with global and
> >completely standardized defense components available to all states
> >willing to pay for them.
> >
> >Even so, the U.S. and other rich countries could buy and deploy more
> >defense systems than other countries -- to its potential military
> >advantage. Consequently, there would have to be an agreed maximum
> >limit per country based on some more or less equitable formula of
> >population and area. All of this would not be an easy project and
> >there is reason for real skepticism about this approach.
> >
> >A more limited variant of this approach, intended to mitigate negative
> >Russian reaction to U.S. deployment of missile defenses, would be for
> >the U.S. to seek Russian agreement to collaborate on the development
> >of missile defenses. The U.S. and Russia agreed in September 1998 to
> >cooperate in warning of missile launches. But this approach would go
> >beyond that limited agreement to require cooperation in the production
> >of actual defenses. It is difficult to believe that such an
> >undertaking could prosper when it comes to exchanging details of
> >interceptor research, or that suspicious Russians would prefer it to
> >maintaining high levels of Russian offensive missiles.
> >
> >This brief review illustrates the real difficulty under today's
> >conditions of getting rid of a missile defense system -- once it has
> >been deployed -- in order to resume movement toward nuclear
> >disarmament. It therefore makes clear the importance of energetic
> >opposition to the deployment before it takes place.
> >
> >************
> >
> >January 26, 1999
> >
> >John Holum
> >Director
> >U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
> >320 21st Street, NW, Room 5930
> >Washington, DC 20451
> >
> >
> >Dear John Holum,
> >
> >With many others, I am worried by some major trends in U.S. defense
> >policy over the past few years. I believe that two current, related
> >Administration policies are having extremely negative effects on
> >efforts to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
> >
> >The first is the Administration's very energetic effort to make
> >Americans aware of the dangers of attack by "Weapons of Mass
> >Destruction" by rogue countries.
> >
> >Over the past two or three years, this possible threat has gradually
> >superseded the two-region war strategy as the dominant public
> >justification, not merely of U.S. counterproliferation efforts, but of
> >the U.S. defense budget generally. And because it is more vague and
> >more menacing than the threat posed to U.S. security by a few small
> >countries like Iraq, Iran or North Korea, this threat provides a more
> >convincing public rationale for the U.S. defense posture.
> >
> >This emphasis on WMD also gives rise, apparently deliberately, to the
> >impression that the current threats to the United States from "Weapons
> >of Mass Destruction" are equal in their gravity to the cold war threat
> >of all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This approach seriously
> >misleads the American public - one indicator is the rising number of
> >biological warfare hoaxes in this country -- and results in a
> >distortion of policy and diversion of scarce resources from greater
> >threats to U.S. security than missile attacks by rogue states.
> >
> >In actuality, other than mass nuclear attack by Russia and possibly
> >China, no conceivable "WMD" attack on the United States for the next
> >decade could affect more than one or two sites in the U.S., sites
> >quite possibly not even the target of the attack. We are no longer in
> >a situation where the entire country could be wiped out by a nuclear
> >exchange. In the long term future, biological weapons might create
> >such a possibility, but not now.
> >
> >There is an enormous difference between a threat of total annihilation
> >and a threat which may entail limited destruction. One major
> >difference is that, in the case of limited attack, the United States
> >would remain able to retaliate with overwhelming force against any
> >known perpetrator. And if we talking of anything other than a covert
> >terrorist attack, the perpetrator would probably be known. Quite aside
> >from the fact that both chemical and biological weapons have
> >considerable limitations; for the next decades, no country in the
> >world except Russia and possibly China has or will have the delivery
> >capability to do more than strike one or two targets in the United
> >States.
> >
> >Given these facts, the first negative effect of the current
> >overemphasis on the WMD threat is that it diverts attention and
> >resources from the greatest real threat both of possible direct
> >nuclear attack and of proliferation of nuclear materials and knowledge
> >-- the Russian nuclear arsenal. The Russian situation entails the
> >entire range of threats from nuclear weapons, including accidental
> >launch, illicit launch, launch on warning, threats of use, and, under
> >extreme circumstances, deliberate attack. The dangers also include
> >threats of use or actual use in or on the borders of Russia, violent
> >seizure or theft of nuclear components and fissile material, and
> >export of nuclear material and of expert knowledge. Given in
> >particular the uncertain fate of the START process in Russia and the
> >limited influence the Russian government has over the Duma, these
> >risks amount to the most serious current threat to U.S. national
> >security.
> >
> >In the current economic misery of the Russian government and people,
> >with its bitterness and anti-American feeling and with confused
> >disputes over Russia's security interests, U.S. capacity to provide
> >Russia money for disarmament actions is by far our greatest source of
> >leverage. To meet our biggest genuine defense emergency, we should be
> >willing to spend several times the cost of current Nunn-Lugar programs
> >and to devise new ones to meet this threat more adequately. In other
> >words, instead of spending $12 billion additional on force readiness,
> >we should be spending it on buying warhead dismantlement and fissile
> >material from Russia.
> >
> >Second, the exaggerated focus on possible WMD attack on the U.S. has
> >been accompanied by an Administration policy of deliberate ambiguity
> >on possible retaliatory use of nuclear weapons by the United States,
> >including their possible use in response to chemical or biological
> >attack. These statements are obviously intended to deter such attack.
> >But, here again, they are dangerous overkill.
> >
> >I accept that in the event of massive, catastrophic, nationwide
> >chemical or biological attacks on the U.S., any U.S. administration
> >would consider retaliation with any weapon at its disposal, no matter
> >what its stated doctrine on use of nuclear weapons. But we are not
> >talking about such a situation. Only Russia has the delivery means for
> >a nationwide chemical or biological attack and it would be ill-advised
> >in such circumstances to use chemical or biological weapons instead of
> >nuclear weapons. In any event, any form of long-range attack from
> >Russia would presumably be deterred by U.S. second-strike nuclear
> >capability. U.S. nuclear weapons will not be needed if limited
> >biological or chemical attacks occur, nor, for political reasons, is
> >it at all likely that U.S. nuclear weapons would in fact be used in
> >response.
> >
> >However, deliberate emphasis on the usefulness of nuclear weapons in
> >such a situation is the most powerful advocacy of possession of
> >nuclear weapons heard since the cold war ended. It dangerously
> >undermines nonproliferation goals, first, by greatly increasing the
> >attractions of having nuclear weapons and undermining the norm against
> >any use of nuclear weapons, and second, by frustrating and annoying
> >non-nuclear states which correctly conclude that this policy vitiates
> >U.S. pledges not to use nuclear weapons in NPT negative security
> >assurances and U.S. pledges of non-use in connection with nuclear free
> >zones. This frustration can express itself in increasing support for
> >extreme measures of nuclear abolition, in withholding cooperation for
> >desirable improvements of the non-proliferation regime, and possibly
> >in future demonstrative withdrawal from the NPT to make a political
> >point.
> >
> >The third negative effect of the overemphasis on the possibility and
> >consequences of WMD attack on the U.S. is that it increases motivation
> >to establish nationwide missile defense and to withdraw from the ABM
> >Treaty. This issue is being widely debated in the United States and
> >there is no consensus over it. However, whatever putative advantages
> >it may have, a U.S. decision to deploy nationwide defenses and
> >withdraw from the ABM Treaty will decrease Russian and Chinese
> >willingness to engage in further steps of nuclear arms control. It
> >could also motivate increases in their nuclear arsenals. As a result,
> >it would perpetuate the risks to U.S. security from existing nuclear
> >weapon arsenals. It would also divert resources from more productive
> >programs and possibilities. For example, other than the MTCR, the
> >administration is doing nothing to tackle the missile problem at the
> >source.
> >
> >What is needed, instead of current exaggeration of the damage from
> >potential rogue state missile attack on the United States, is for the
> >Administration to put the rogue state problem in perspective with the
> >American public, making clear the wide difference of this threat from
> >the cold war nuclear threat and pointing out that the United States
> >would know where an attack came from, would remain fully capable of
> >response, and would do so with its entire conventional arsenal,
> >including targeting the decisionmakers involved. This posture would be
> >a more effective deterrent than misleading and damaging threats of
> >nuclear retaliation.
> >
> >Sincerely,
> >
> >Jonathan Dean
> >Adviser on International Security Issues
> >
> >
> >--
> >Bill Robinson, Project Ploughshares,
> >Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada  N2L 3G6
> >Phone: [phone] x264  Fax: [phone]
> >E-mail: [e-mail]
> >http://www.ploughshares.ca
> >
> >Project Ploughshares is a member of the Canadian Network to Abolish
> >Nuclear Weapons (http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/cnanw/cnanw.html)
> >
> Alice Slater
> Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
> 15 East 26th Street, Room 915
> New York, NY 10010
> tel:  [phone]
> fax:  [phone]
> email:  [e-mail]
>
> GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
> to eliminate nuclear weapons.
>
> -
>  To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
>  with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
>  For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
>  "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

- --
DISARMAMENT CLEARINGHOUSE
Nuclear Disarmament Information, Resources & Action Tools
Kathy Crandall, Coordinator
1101 14th Street NW #700, Washington DC 20005
TEL: [phone] ext. 232 FAX: [phone]
E-MAIL: [e-mail]
http://www.psr.org/Disarmhouse.htm
http://www.psr.org/ctbtaction.htm

A project of: Friends Committee on National Legislation
     Peace Action, Physicians for Social Responsibility
     and Women's Action for New Directions



- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

End of abolition-usa-digest V1 #76
**********************************

-
 To unsubscribe to $LIST, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe $LIST" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.