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abolition-usa-digest     Tuesday, February 9 1999     Volume 01 : Number 075




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Mon, 08 Feb 1999 10:58:18 -0800
From: Shundahai Network <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Request for Legal Information

Hello Friends,


Susi Snyder and myself, Reinard Knutsen, are scheduled to appear in Federal Court in Las Vegas on Wednesday, February 17, to face charges of:


Disturbance ( 41 CFR 101.20.305 Conduct on government property which created or obstructed the performance of Government operations.)


and Nonconformity (41 CFR 101.20.304 Nonconformity with direction during a demonstration.)


that resulted from our September 8th nonviolent lock down action at the Las Vegas Federal Building to bring attention to the U.S. subcritical nuclear weapons testing program. We have already had our pre-trial hearing where we plead not guilty to the charges and consolidated our separate cases into one.


This is our first time appearing in a Federal Court so we would appreciate any advice on what to expect.


We plan on arguing:


Technically we are not guilty of obstructing the Federal Building since our action did not block any access to the Federal Building and we had no criminal intent at the time.


That our action falls within our first amendment rights


Our Necessity defense follows that we were upholding Nevada State Law by trying to stop the further contamination of our groundwater by plutonium.


We were upholding international law


specifically,


International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

1996 ICJ ruling on illegality of preparations for nuclear war

1948 Nuremburg principles

1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty


If any body has any advice it is greatly appreciated. It is unfortunate that we are involved in so many important projects at the moment that we can not spend a whole lot of time preparing for this case. But we do what we can.


Thanks for your help! Peace, Reinard

><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><<
><<><< ><<><<


SHUNDAHAI NETWORK

"Peace and Harmony with all Creation"

<paraindent><param>out,out</param>5007 Elmhurst St., Las Vegas, NV
89108-1304

Phone:[phone] (FAX)647-9385

</paraindent>Email: [e-mail]

 <underline><color><param>0000,0000,fefe</param>http://www.shundahai.org


</color></underline>Shundahai Network is proud to be part of:


Healing Global Wounds Alliance, a multi-cultural alliance to

foster sustainable living and break the nuclear chain; and


Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons


><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><<
><<><< ><<><<




- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
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------------------------------

Date: Mon, 8 Feb 1999 13:51:22 -0600
From: "Boyle, Francis" <[e-mail]>
Subject: RE: (abolition-usa) Request for Legal Information

Dear Friends:

Several years ago, I helped participate in the defense of the Actor Martin
Sheen for one of his numerous anti-nuclear protest cases at the Nevada Test
Site. He was represented by the attorney, Al Marquis. I suggest that you
contact Mr. Marquis's office and try to get a copy of the papers he filed in
Martin's case. You can tell him I sent you. Francis A. Boyle

Albert G. Marquis, Esq.

Marquis Haney & Aurbach

First Floor

228 South Fourth Street

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

TEL: [phone]

FAX: [phone]

There is no DATE so I don't know how old this address is.

    -----Original Message-----

    From: Boyle, Francis

    Sent: Monday, February 08, 1999 1:11 PM



Francis A. Boyle
Law Building
504 E. Pennsylvania Ave.
Champaign, Ill. 61820
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
[e-mail]



- -----Original Message-----
From: Shundahai Network [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Monday, February 08, 1999 12:58 PM
To: [e-mail]; [e-mail];
[e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Subject: (abolition-usa) Request for Legal Information



Hello Friends,


Susi Snyder and myself, Reinard Knutsen, are scheduled to appear in Federal
Court in Las Vegas on Wednesday, February 17, to face charges of:


Disturbance ( 41 CFR 101.20.305 Conduct on government property which created
or obstructed the performance of Government operations.)


and Nonconformity (41 CFR 101.20.304 Nonconformity with direction during a
demonstration.)


that resulted from our September 8th nonviolent lock down action at the Las
Vegas Federal Building to bring attention to the U.S. subcritical nuclear
weapons testing program. We have already had our pre-trial hearing where we
plead not guilty to the charges and consolidated our separate cases into
one.


This is our first time appearing in a Federal Court so we would appreciate
any advice on what to expect.


We plan on arguing:


Technically we are not guilty of obstructing the Federal Building since our
action did not block any access to the Federal Building and we had no
criminal intent at the time.


That our action falls within our first amendment rights


Our Necessity defense follows that we were upholding Nevada State Law by
trying to stop the further contamination of our groundwater by plutonium.


We were upholding international law


specifically,


International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

1996 ICJ ruling on illegality of preparations for nuclear war

1948 Nuremburg principles

1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty


If any body has any advice it is greatly appreciated. It is unfortunate that
we are involved in so many important projects at the moment that we can not
spend a whole lot of time preparing for this case. But we do what we can.


Thanks for your help! Peace, Reinard

><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><><


SHUNDAHAI NETWORK

"Peace and Harmony with all Creation"

5007 Elmhurst St., Las Vegas, NV 89108-1304

Phone:[phone] (FAX)647-9385

Email: [e-mail]

http://www.shundahai.org


Shundahai Network is proud to be part of:


Healing Global Wounds Alliance, a multi-cultural alliance to

foster sustainable living and break the nuclear chain; and


Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons


><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><>< ><><




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with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message. For information
on digests or retrieving files and old messages send "help" to the same
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------------------------------

Date: Mon, 8 Feb 1999 17:03:54 -0500
From: "David Culp" <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) The Looming Threat to Disarmament in the U.S. Senate

[In the next few weeks, the U.S. Senate, and possibly the House of
Representatives, is expected to vote on a bill supporting
deployment of a national ballistic missile defense system.  While
the same legislation was defeated in the Senate last year by one vote,
the Senate Republican leadership believes they can win this year.
Below is a brief analysis of why this issue is critical to further =
nuclear
disarmament progress.  David Culp<[e-mail]>]

- -----------------------------------------------------------------

GOING UP THE HILL AND DOWN AGAIN:
WHY THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION ON MISSILE DEFENSE
IS A GENUINE CRISIS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

By Jonathan Dean
Union of Concerned Scientists
Washington, D.C.=20
February 4, 1999


Many people believe that deployment of nationwide missile defenses
will have negative impact on prospects for nuclear disarmament. That's
true. But there is an even more difficult problem: How do you get out
of the mess once deployment has actually taken place?=20

The plans of the Clinton administration announced by Secretary of
Defense Cohen on January 20 to proceed with preparations for
deployment of a nationwide missile defense system by 2005 mean that
the administration may well decide by mid-2000 on the deployment of a
"thin" defense in two sites, necessitating extensive renegotiation
with Russia on the ABM Treaty -- or U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.=20

The nearly certain result of missile defense deployment in the United
States will be to freeze nuclear arsenals at their present or higher
levels for decades to come, postponing deep cuts in nuclear weapons
and blocking a stage where complete elimination of nuclear weapons can
be seriously discussed.=20

These highly probable results of deployment mean that those interested
in nuclear disarmament should join in strong opposition to deployment
of missile defenses.=20


Background=20

Faced by these developments in U.S. policy, in the long run, Russia
may agree to amend the ABM Treaty to permit two U.S. sites, as was the
case with the original version of the treaty; Russia has a continuing
interest in limiting the scope of United States missile defenses. But
in return, Russia will also very probably require U.S. acquiescence in
maintaining the Russian arsenal at around the 2,000 warhead level,
rather than going down to the 1,000 warhead level that has been urged
by many Russians. The 2,000 warhead level will be retained to assure
Russia that it can still overcome a "thin" nationwide defense. Russia
will in turn argue that multiple warheads (MIRVs) be retained in order
to enable Russia to maintain a 2,000 warhead level without having to
spend a great deal of money in constructing new single warhead "Topol
M" missiles. (To do this, SS-19 multiple warhead missiles or even some
of the heavy, dreaded SS-18 multiple warhead missiles would be
retained in service until a new generation of Topol M multiple warhead
missiles can be constructed and deployed.)=20

If these developments take place, the hope of reducing U.S. and
Russian holdings of strategic-range missiles down to about 1,000 each
in a few years through a START III Treaty and then bringing the other
weapon states into negotiated reductions will have to be postponed
indefinitely. China, which has repeatedly criticized the missile
defense project, will probably decide to increase the size of its own
nuclear arsenal in order to be able to surmount U.S. missile defenses
and to maintain a deterrent. It may also develop MIRVs for its
missiles if Russia retains them.=20

Once deployed, a "thin" nationwide defense can be fairly rapidly
converted into a heavy nationwide defense and there will be continuing
political pressure in the U.S. to do so. Fully effective, high
capacity nationwide missile defense against all-out missile attack is
probably impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, it is likely that other
nuclear weapon states will follow worst case analysis and credit the
U.S. with high capability. As a result of developments like these,
nuclear disarmament will remain in indefinite stasis until some way
around this obstacle can be found.=20


Can We Get Out of This Situation?=20

This is how the U.S. will march up the hill. To evaluate the
seriousness of the situation, we have to calculate what it may take to
march down again on the far side of the hill toward renewed
negotiation of deep nuclear cuts.=20

One way, the easy way, would be for the grossly inflated threat of
rogue missile attack on the United States to collapse before U.S.
missile defenses are fully deployed, perhaps with the collapse of the
North Korean regime and with peaceful Korean reunification, with
collapse of the Iranian threat through emergence of a less theocratic
regime and improved U.S.-Iranian relations, as well as with
replacement of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Then, the U.S. might
return to leadership of incremental nuclear disarmament and regain
Russia's interest in deep cuts through the United States' main source
of leverage with Russia - money.=20

A serious nuclear incident, such as an act of nuclear terrorism, might
also restore the momentum of nuclear disarmament.=20

Other than these fortuitous developments, the remaining possibility
for restoring momentum to nuclear disarmament is the emergence of a
United States or Russian leader who actively presses for disarmament.
Prospects here are not very promising now.=20

In the material sense, what would have to be done to march down the
hill is either to dismantle the "thin" nationwide defenses or abandon
them unfinished, as was done with the United States Grand Forks site
when the ABM Treaty was signed by President Nixon in 1972.=20

Then, at the height of the cold war, the U.S. and Russia decided that
deployment of nationwide defenses would result in increased deployment
of offensive missiles. Now, after the cold war has wound down, this
argument lacks force. As stated, deployment of a thin system (and
apprehension that it could someday become a thick one), will probably
freeze current warhead levels in Russia, and may somewhat increase
them in China. But if this takes place, it is improbable that the
increased nuclear deployments would be so large that they would
mobilize opposition public opinion in the U.S. against missile
defenses, or even that public opinion would at this stage be intensely
interested in the general problem. Some segments of public opinion
might be engaged earlier if they understood that the road to nuclear
disarmament might be blocked for a long period.)=20

That is the point. This new situation, and especially the difficulty
of reversing missile defense deployment once it has taken place, means
that organizations and individuals who support elimination of nuclear
weapons will have to become involved in the opposition to deployment
of nationwide missile defenses.=20


Arguments Against Missile Defense=20

There are four main arguments against missile defense:=20

1) It is an expensive waste; the equipment thus far has failed its
tests and it probably will not work; countermeasures by attackers will
make the task of defense much harder.=20

2) The danger of rogue missile attack has been greatly exaggerated.
The contention that North Korea could produce a missile which could
reach important areas of the U.S. has probably not been exaggerated.
What has been exaggerated out of all proportion is the implication
that the damage that could be done by one or two North Korean missiles
strike is equivalent to the danger to which the U.S. was exposed in
the cold war nuclear confrontation with Russia.=20

In the cold war, the entire population of the U.S. and Russia and the
northern hemisphere were at stake -- and possibly all life on earth in
a global winter. With North Korea, we are talking about one or two
missiles with a small payload which probably would not hit their
targets but which at worst could do damage in one or two restricted
sites, leaving the U.S. fully able to retaliate with very strong
conventional forces.=20

The administration should be pressed to give the U.S. public an
accurate account of the limited dangers that actually face it from
rogue ICBM attacks.=20

3) Given the current articulation of U.S. military strategy, the
United States is itself increasingly dependent on its own missiles,
especially cruise missiles, while trumpeting warnings over the dangers
of missile proliferation and possible missile attack on the U.S.
Consequently, the U.S. has not undertaken measures to control missiles
beyond the Missile Control Technology Regime, whose members are
missile-producing governments.=20

The administration should now be pressed to move step-by-step toward a
worldwide regime restricting production, possession and deployment of
long-range ballistic missiles for military purposes. One proposal is
discussed in Jonathan Dean, "Controlling Ballistic and Cruise
Missiles," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 31, October 1998.=20

4) Because the great damage from deploying missile defenses is to
intensify competition in nuclear weapons, one possible way of
mitigating the damage is to insist on maintenance of the ABM Treaty so
that deployment of missile defenses can at least be limited rather
than be allowed to develop into all-out competition.=20

Beyond this, it is argued by some that the safest way to move toward
nuclear disarmament is to build missile defenses and then to agree on
step-by- step nuclear disarmament, replacing deterrence with defense.
Such defenses would not protect against attack by aircraft, cruise
missiles, land-based rockets and artillery or terrorist action, all of
which are more plausible than seriously damaging long-range missile
attack or deal with other motives of the weaker states for retaining
their weapons. Moreover, agreement to replace deterrence with defense
would require the full trust among weapon states from the outset that
is the hoped-for end result of step-by-step disarmament. It would also
probably require a global missile defense system with global and
completely standardized defense components available to all states
willing to pay for them.=20

Even so, the U.S. and other rich countries could buy and deploy more
defense systems than other countries -- to its potential military
advantage. Consequently, there would have to be an agreed maximum
limit per country based on some more or less equitable formula of
population and area. All of this would not be an easy project and
there is reason for real skepticism about this approach.=20

A more limited variant of this approach, intended to mitigate negative
Russian reaction to U.S. deployment of missile defenses, would be for
the U.S. to seek Russian agreement to collaborate on the development
of missile defenses. The U.S. and Russia agreed in September 1998 to
cooperate in warning of missile launches. But this approach would go
beyond that limited agreement to require cooperation in the production
of actual defenses. It is difficult to believe that such an
undertaking could prosper when it comes to exchanging details of
interceptor research, or that suspicious Russians would prefer it to
maintaining high levels of Russian offensive missiles.=20

This brief review illustrates the real difficulty under today's
conditions of getting rid of a missile defense system -- once it has
been deployed -- in order to resume movement toward nuclear
disarmament. It therefore makes clear the importance of energetic
opposition to the deployment before it takes place.=20

************=20

January 26, 1999=20

John Holum
Director
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
320 21st Street, NW, Room 5930
Washington, DC 20451=20


Dear John Holum,=20

With many others, I am worried by some major trends in U.S. defense
policy over the past few years. I believe that two current, related
Administration policies are having extremely negative effects on
efforts to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons.=20

The first is the Administration's very energetic effort to make
Americans aware of the dangers of attack by "Weapons of Mass
Destruction" by rogue countries.=20

Over the past two or three years, this possible threat has gradually
superseded the two-region war strategy as the dominant public
justification, not merely of U.S. counterproliferation efforts, but of
the U.S. defense budget generally. And because it is more vague and
more menacing than the threat posed to U.S. security by a few small
countries like Iraq, Iran or North Korea, this threat provides a more
convincing public rationale for the U.S. defense posture.=20

This emphasis on WMD also gives rise, apparently deliberately, to the
impression that the current threats to the United States from "Weapons
of Mass Destruction" are equal in their gravity to the cold war threat
of all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This approach seriously
misleads the American public - one indicator is the rising number of
biological warfare hoaxes in this country -- and results in a
distortion of policy and diversion of scarce resources from greater
threats to U.S. security than missile attacks by rogue states.=20

In actuality, other than mass nuclear attack by Russia and possibly
China, no conceivable "WMD" attack on the United States for the next
decade could affect more than one or two sites in the U.S., sites
quite possibly not even the target of the attack. We are no longer in
a situation where the entire country could be wiped out by a nuclear
exchange. In the long term future, biological weapons might create
such a possibility, but not now.=20

There is an enormous difference between a threat of total annihilation
and a threat which may entail limited destruction. One major
difference is that, in the case of limited attack, the United States
would remain able to retaliate with overwhelming force against any
known perpetrator. And if we talking of anything other than a covert
terrorist attack, the perpetrator would probably be known. Quite aside
from the fact that both chemical and biological weapons have
considerable limitations; for the next decades, no country in the
world except Russia and possibly China has or will have the delivery
capability to do more than strike one or two targets in the United
States.=20

Given these facts, the first negative effect of the current
overemphasis on the WMD threat is that it diverts attention and
resources from the greatest real threat both of possible direct
nuclear attack and of proliferation of nuclear materials and knowledge
- -- the Russian nuclear arsenal. The Russian situation entails the
entire range of threats from nuclear weapons, including accidental
launch, illicit launch, launch on warning, threats of use, and, under
extreme circumstances, deliberate attack. The dangers also include
threats of use or actual use in or on the borders of Russia, violent
seizure or theft of nuclear components and fissile material, and
export of nuclear material and of expert knowledge. Given in
particular the uncertain fate of the START process in Russia and the
limited influence the Russian government has over the Duma, these
risks amount to the most serious current threat to U.S. national
security.=20

In the current economic misery of the Russian government and people,
with its bitterness and anti-American feeling and with confused
disputes over Russia's security interests, U.S. capacity to provide
Russia money for disarmament actions is by far our greatest source of
leverage. To meet our biggest genuine defense emergency, we should be
willing to spend several times the cost of current Nunn-Lugar programs
and to devise new ones to meet this threat more adequately. In other
words, instead of spending $12 billion additional on force readiness,
we should be spending it on buying warhead dismantlement and fissile
material from Russia.=20

Second, the exaggerated focus on possible WMD attack on the U.S. has
been accompanied by an Administration policy of deliberate ambiguity
on possible retaliatory use of nuclear weapons by the United States,
including their possible use in response to chemical or biological
attack. These statements are obviously intended to deter such attack.
But, here again, they are dangerous overkill.=20

I accept that in the event of massive, catastrophic, nationwide
chemical or biological attacks on the U.S., any U.S. administration
would consider retaliation with any weapon at its disposal, no matter
what its stated doctrine on use of nuclear weapons. But we are not
talking about such a situation. Only Russia has the delivery means for
a nationwide chemical or biological attack and it would be ill-advised
in such circumstances to use chemical or biological weapons instead of
nuclear weapons. In any event, any form of long-range attack from
Russia would presumably be deterred by U.S. second-strike nuclear
capability. U.S. nuclear weapons will not be needed if limited
biological or chemical attacks occur, nor, for political reasons, is
it at all likely that U.S. nuclear weapons would in fact be used in
response.=20

However, deliberate emphasis on the usefulness of nuclear weapons in
such a situation is the most powerful advocacy of possession of
nuclear weapons heard since the cold war ended. It dangerously
undermines nonproliferation goals, first, by greatly increasing the
attractions of having nuclear weapons and undermining the norm against
any use of nuclear weapons, and second, by frustrating and annoying
non-nuclear states which correctly conclude that this policy vitiates
U.S. pledges not to use nuclear weapons in NPT negative security
assurances and U.S. pledges of non-use in connection with nuclear free
zones. This frustration can express itself in increasing support for
extreme measures of nuclear abolition, in withholding cooperation for
desirable improvements of the non-proliferation regime, and possibly
in future demonstrative withdrawal from the NPT to make a political
point.=20

The third negative effect of the overemphasis on the possibility and
consequences of WMD attack on the U.S. is that it increases motivation
to establish nationwide missile defense and to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty. This issue is being widely debated in the United States and
there is no consensus over it. However, whatever putative advantages
it may have, a U.S. decision to deploy nationwide defenses and
withdraw from the ABM Treaty will decrease Russian and Chinese
willingness to engage in further steps of nuclear arms control. It
could also motivate increases in their nuclear arsenals. As a result,
it would perpetuate the risks to U.S. security from existing nuclear
weapon arsenals. It would also divert resources from more productive
programs and possibilities. For example, other than the MTCR, the
administration is doing nothing to tackle the missile problem at the
source.=20

What is needed, instead of current exaggeration of the damage from
potential rogue state missile attack on the United States, is for the
Administration to put the rogue state problem in perspective with the
American public, making clear the wide difference of this threat from
the cold war nuclear threat and pointing out that the United States
would know where an attack came from, would remain fully capable of
response, and would do so with its entire conventional arsenal,
including targeting the decisionmakers involved. This posture would be
a more effective deterrent than misleading and damaging threats of
nuclear retaliation.=20

Sincerely,=20

Jonathan Dean
Adviser on International Security Issues


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------------------------------

Date: Mon, 8 Feb 1999 19:42:31 -0000
From: "Sally Light" <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Press Release - Subcricital Nuclear Test "Clarinet" to be Detonated Feb. 9, 1999

For Immediate Release February 8, 1999

Contact:  Marylia Kelley, Tri-Valley CAREs [phone]
       Sally Light, Tri-Valley CAREs [phone]

Livermore Lab-designed Subcritical Nuclear Test "Clarinet" is a Sour Note
to Outraged Activists.  Protest to be Held at Bechtel HQ in San Francisco,
Feb. 9 at Noon.

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has announced that another subcritical
nuclear test will be detonated at its Nevada Test Site (NTS) tomorrow,
February 9, 1999.  Code named "Clarinet," and designed by weaponeers at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, this will be the sixth such
underground detonation at NTS since the start of the test series in 1997.

A subcritical nuclear test advances nuclear bomb design capabilities by
detonating high explosives along with fissile material, such as plutonium,
a man-made radioactive metal with a half-life of 24,000 years.  Exotic
diagnostics record detailed data on the performance of the plutonium under
the test conditions.  The test is called "subcritical" because it is set up
so the high explosives stop short of triggering a self-sustaining nuclear
chain reaction in the bomb material.

The DOE justifies these tests as necessary to maintain the "safety and
reliability" of the US nuclear arsenal.  However, peace and environmental
groups such as Tri-Valley CAREs point out that the nuclear arsenal can be
properly maintained without such tests, and, further, that subcritical
nuclear tests contaminate the environment, risk public health and safety,
spur the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and undermine the ongoing
international ratification effort for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), signed by President Clinton in 1996 and now awaiting Senate
ratification.

Russia has answered the US subcritical tests "tit for tat" by conducting
five of its own such tests, beginning late last year.  Tri-Valley CAREs
sees this as an inevitable result of the US tests.

"Subcritical tests continue the US government's noncompliance with
international treaties, such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
the CTBT, which require us to end nuclear testing and, ultimately, to
eliminate our nuclear arsenal," stated Marylia Kelley, Executive Director
of Tri-Valley CAREs.  "If we as a nation are unwilling to abide by the
letter and spirit of the treaties we sign, we lose all moral authority to
persuade other nations to forego nuclear weapons development and abide by
their part of the bargain", Kelley added.

Tri-Valley CAREs, along with allied groups, will hold a protest at noon on
February 9, at Bechtel Corporation's international headquarters, 50 Beale
St., San Francisco, 1 block south of Market St.  Bechtel operates the
Nevada Test Site for the DOE.

"Bechtel's contract with the DOE is a perfect example of how the
"military-industrial complex" works," said Sally Light, Tri-Valley CAREs'
Nuclear Program Analyst.  "Bechtel earns an enormous $1.5 billion over five
years to carry out the DOE's nuclear tests, endanger the land, air, and
water, not to mention the tribes and other people both in the surrounding
area and downwind of the NTS," Light stated.

For further information, please call Tri-Valley CAREs at [phone]

- -30-


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 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
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 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 08 Feb 1999 23:01:46 -0800
From: Shundahai Network <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) 2/9 Actions to stop the subcritical nuclear tests

Hello Friends,


The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has announced plans to conduct a subcritical nuclear weapons test, code named "Clarinet" for Tuesday, February 9, 1999. The last Nevada Test Site radio transmission reported that everything was in place and they would be ready by 9am Tuesday. We believe that the Test will be conducted around 10am U.S. Pacific Standard Time. This test will take place on Western Shoshone land.


This will be the sixth subcritical nuclear test in the US since the beginning of the test series in 1997. Subcritical tests help fan the flames that continue the cold war mind set (Russia took up the "challenge" by detonating 5 subcriticals in 1998). These tests also threaten the international ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.


SUBCRITICAL TESTING MUST BE STOPPED!


Call President Clinton and demand that this nuclear insanity must stop right now!     [phone]

Department of Energy Washington DC Headquarters                    [phone]


In Nevada, Tuesday, February 9th:


We will be having a Prayer Ceremony lead by Corbin Harney at the gates to the Nevada Test Site beginning at 9am. This is 60 miles north west of Las Vegas on Hwy 95 at the Mercury exit. A Nonviolent Direct Action will take place. Come early to join affinity group discussions.


A protest vigil will be held 4pm - 5pm at the Foley Federal Building, 300 S Las Vegas Blvd. Bring your signs, drums and remember, we need to gather in as many numbers as possible to carry off a spirited, noisy, yet nonviolent event. Tell your friends, family, neighbors to join us.  Call [phone] for more information.


In the Bay Area (San Francisco CA):


A demonstration will be held on Tuesday, February 9, to protest continuing nuclear weapons development by the US. Bechtel manages the Nevada Test Site where the detonation will take place. Where: Bechtel Corp. HQ, 50 Beale St., San Francisco, 1 block south of

Market St., near the Embarcadero BART station. When: Noon, Tuesday, Feb. 9, 1999 The test was designed by weaponeers at Livermore Lab and its parts transported to the test site. The demonstration will be conducted along nonviolent guidelines. A "risk arrest" is possible for those wishing to do one. Bring: Banners, signs, puppets, "rad" suits and whatever other creative props you desire. For more information about this event please call Tri-Valley CAREs

(Communities Against a Radioactive Environment) <<http://www.igc.org/tvc/> - is our web site, please visit us there! [phone] - is our phone


There will also be demonstrations in  Japan, etc.


If any one is able to organize solidarity vigils or events please let us know so that we can include it in our media work.


Thank you for all you are able to do.


Peace,



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><<><< ><<><<


SHUNDAHAI NETWORK

"Peace and Harmony with all Creation"

<paraindent><param>out,out</param>5007 Elmhurst St., Las Vegas, NV
89108-1304

Phone:[phone] (FAX)647-9385

</paraindent>Email: [e-mail]

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</color></underline>Shundahai Network is proud to be part of:


Healing Global Wounds Alliance, a multi-cultural alliance to

foster sustainable living and break the nuclear chain; and


Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons


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Date: Tue, 09 Feb 1999 08:06:41 -0800
From: Shundahai Network <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) subcrit scheduled for 2pm

Dear Friends,


We have just received word that the subcritical nuclear weapons test "Clarinet" is scheduled to be conducted at 2pm U.S. Pacific Standard Time.

><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><<
><<><< ><<><<


SHUNDAHAI NETWORK

"Peace and Harmony with all Creation"

<paraindent><param>out,out</param>5007 Elmhurst St., Las Vegas, NV
89108-1304

Phone:[phone] (FAX)647-9385

</paraindent>Email: [e-mail]

 <underline><color><param>0000,0000,fefe</param>http://www.shundahai.org


</color></underline>Shundahai Network is proud to be part of:


Healing Global Wounds Alliance, a multi-cultural alliance to

foster sustainable living and break the nuclear chain; and


Abolition 2000: A Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons


><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><< ><<><<
><<><< ><<><<




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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 09 Feb 1999 11:49:47 -0500
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Fwd: BMD vs disarmament

Dear Friends,
We might want to consider the material below in preparing a strategy for
the US Abolition Campaign.  If we can't stop Star Wars, I'm afraid there's
going to be more of an up hill battle on eliminating nukes.  Regards, Alice
Slater

>Subject: The Looming Threat to Disarmament in the U.S. Senate
>  Date:  Mon, 8 Feb 1999 17:03:54 -0500
>  From:  "David Culp" <[e-mail]>
>
>
>[In the next few weeks, the U.S. Senate, and possibly the House of
>Representatives, is expected to vote on a bill supporting
>deployment of a national ballistic missile defense system.  While
>the same legislation was defeated in the Senate last year by one vote,
>the Senate Republican leadership believes they can win this year.
>Below is a brief analysis of why this issue is critical to further nuclear
>disarmament progress.  David Culp<[e-mail]>]
>
>-----------------------------------------------------------------
>
>GOING UP THE HILL AND DOWN AGAIN:
>WHY THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION ON MISSILE DEFENSE
>IS A GENUINE CRISIS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
>
>By Jonathan Dean
>Union of Concerned Scientists
>Washington, D.C.
>February 4, 1999
>
>
>Many people believe that deployment of nationwide missile defenses
>will have negative impact on prospects for nuclear disarmament. That's
>true. But there is an even more difficult problem: How do you get out
>of the mess once deployment has actually taken place?
>
>The plans of the Clinton administration announced by Secretary of
>Defense Cohen on January 20 to proceed with preparations for
>deployment of a nationwide missile defense system by 2005 mean that
>the administration may well decide by mid-2000 on the deployment of a
>"thin" defense in two sites, necessitating extensive renegotiation
>with Russia on the ABM Treaty -- or U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.
>
>The nearly certain result of missile defense deployment in the United
>States will be to freeze nuclear arsenals at their present or higher
>levels for decades to come, postponing deep cuts in nuclear weapons
>and blocking a stage where complete elimination of nuclear weapons can
>be seriously discussed.
>
>These highly probable results of deployment mean that those interested
>in nuclear disarmament should join in strong opposition to deployment
>of missile defenses.
>
>
>Background
>
>Faced by these developments in U.S. policy, in the long run, Russia
>may agree to amend the ABM Treaty to permit two U.S. sites, as was the
>case with the original version of the treaty; Russia has a continuing
>interest in limiting the scope of United States missile defenses. But
>in return, Russia will also very probably require U.S. acquiescence in
>maintaining the Russian arsenal at around the 2,000 warhead level,
>rather than going down to the 1,000 warhead level that has been urged
>by many Russians. The 2,000 warhead level will be retained to assure
>Russia that it can still overcome a "thin" nationwide defense. Russia
>will in turn argue that multiple warheads (MIRVs) be retained in order
>to enable Russia to maintain a 2,000 warhead level without having to
>spend a great deal of money in constructing new single warhead "Topol
>M" missiles. (To do this, SS-19 multiple warhead missiles or even some
>of the heavy, dreaded SS-18 multiple warhead missiles would be
>retained in service until a new generation of Topol M multiple warhead
>missiles can be constructed and deployed.)
>
>If these developments take place, the hope of reducing U.S. and
>Russian holdings of strategic-range missiles down to about 1,000 each
>in a few years through a START III Treaty and then bringing the other
>weapon states into negotiated reductions will have to be postponed
>indefinitely. China, which has repeatedly criticized the missile
>defense project, will probably decide to increase the size of its own
>nuclear arsenal in order to be able to surmount U.S. missile defenses
>and to maintain a deterrent. It may also develop MIRVs for its
>missiles if Russia retains them.
>
>Once deployed, a "thin" nationwide defense can be fairly rapidly
>converted into a heavy nationwide defense and there will be continuing
>political pressure in the U.S. to do so. Fully effective, high
>capacity nationwide missile defense against all-out missile attack is
>probably impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, it is likely that other
>nuclear weapon states will follow worst case analysis and credit the
>U.S. with high capability. As a result of developments like these,
>nuclear disarmament will remain in indefinite stasis until some way
>around this obstacle can be found.
>
>
>Can We Get Out of This Situation?
>
>This is how the U.S. will march up the hill. To evaluate the
>seriousness of the situation, we have to calculate what it may take to
>march down again on the far side of the hill toward renewed
>negotiation of deep nuclear cuts.
>
>One way, the easy way, would be for the grossly inflated threat of
>rogue missile attack on the United States to collapse before U.S.
>missile defenses are fully deployed, perhaps with the collapse of the
>North Korean regime and with peaceful Korean reunification, with
>collapse of the Iranian threat through emergence of a less theocratic
>regime and improved U.S.-Iranian relations, as well as with
>replacement of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Then, the U.S. might
>return to leadership of incremental nuclear disarmament and regain
>Russia's interest in deep cuts through the United States' main source
>of leverage with Russia - money.
>
>A serious nuclear incident, such as an act of nuclear terrorism, might
>also restore the momentum of nuclear disarmament.
>
>Other than these fortuitous developments, the remaining possibility
>for restoring momentum to nuclear disarmament is the emergence of a
>United States or Russian leader who actively presses for disarmament.
>Prospects here are not very promising now.
>
>In the material sense, what would have to be done to march down the
>hill is either to dismantle the "thin" nationwide defenses or abandon
>them unfinished, as was done with the United States Grand Forks site
>when the ABM Treaty was signed by President Nixon in 1972.
>
>Then, at the height of the cold war, the U.S. and Russia decided that
>deployment of nationwide defenses would result in increased deployment
>of offensive missiles. Now, after the cold war has wound down, this
>argument lacks force. As stated, deployment of a thin system (and
>apprehension that it could someday become a thick one), will probably
>freeze current warhead levels in Russia, and may somewhat increase
>them in China. But if this takes place, it is improbable that the
>increased nuclear deployments would be so large that they would
>mobilize opposition public opinion in the U.S. against missile
>defenses, or even that public opinion would at this stage be intensely
>interested in the general problem. Some segments of public opinion
>might be engaged earlier if they understood that the road to nuclear
>disarmament might be blocked for a long period.)
>
>That is the point. This new situation, and especially the difficulty
>of reversing missile defense deployment once it has taken place, means
>that organizations and individuals who support elimination of nuclear
>weapons will have to become involved in the opposition to deployment
>of nationwide missile defenses.
>
>
>Arguments Against Missile Defense
>
>There are four main arguments against missile defense:
>
>1) It is an expensive waste; the equipment thus far has failed its
>tests and it probably will not work; countermeasures by attackers will
>make the task of defense much harder.
>
>2) The danger of rogue missile attack has been greatly exaggerated.
>The contention that North Korea could produce a missile which could
>reach important areas of the U.S. has probably not been exaggerated.
>What has been exaggerated out of all proportion is the implication
>that the damage that could be done by one or two North Korean missiles
>strike is equivalent to the danger to which the U.S. was exposed in
>the cold war nuclear confrontation with Russia.
>
>In the cold war, the entire population of the U.S. and Russia and the
>northern hemisphere were at stake -- and possibly all life on earth in
>a global winter. With North Korea, we are talking about one or two
>missiles with a small payload which probably would not hit their
>targets but which at worst could do damage in one or two restricted
>sites, leaving the U.S. fully able to retaliate with very strong
>conventional forces.
>
>The administration should be pressed to give the U.S. public an
>accurate account of the limited dangers that actually face it from
>rogue ICBM attacks.
>
>3) Given the current articulation of U.S. military strategy, the
>United States is itself increasingly dependent on its own missiles,
>especially cruise missiles, while trumpeting warnings over the dangers
>of missile proliferation and possible missile attack on the U.S.
>Consequently, the U.S. has not undertaken measures to control missiles
>beyond the Missile Control Technology Regime, whose members are
>missile-producing governments.
>
>The administration should now be pressed to move step-by-step toward a
>worldwide regime restricting production, possession and deployment of
>long-range ballistic missiles for military purposes. One proposal is
>discussed in Jonathan Dean, "Controlling Ballistic and Cruise
>Missiles," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 31, October 1998.
>
>4) Because the great damage from deploying missile defenses is to
>intensify competition in nuclear weapons, one possible way of
>mitigating the damage is to insist on maintenance of the ABM Treaty so
>that deployment of missile defenses can at least be limited rather
>than be allowed to develop into all-out competition.
>
>Beyond this, it is argued by some that the safest way to move toward
>nuclear disarmament is to build missile defenses and then to agree on
>step-by- step nuclear disarmament, replacing deterrence with defense.
>Such defenses would not protect against attack by aircraft, cruise
>missiles, land-based rockets and artillery or terrorist action, all of
>which are more plausible than seriously damaging long-range missile
>attack or deal with other motives of the weaker states for retaining
>their weapons. Moreover, agreement to replace deterrence with defense
>would require the full trust among weapon states from the outset that
>is the hoped-for end result of step-by-step disarmament. It would also
>probably require a global missile defense system with global and
>completely standardized defense components available to all states
>willing to pay for them.
>
>Even so, the U.S. and other rich countries could buy and deploy more
>defense systems than other countries -- to its potential military
>advantage. Consequently, there would have to be an agreed maximum
>limit per country based on some more or less equitable formula of
>population and area. All of this would not be an easy project and
>there is reason for real skepticism about this approach.
>
>A more limited variant of this approach, intended to mitigate negative
>Russian reaction to U.S. deployment of missile defenses, would be for
>the U.S. to seek Russian agreement to collaborate on the development
>of missile defenses. The U.S. and Russia agreed in September 1998 to
>cooperate in warning of missile launches. But this approach would go
>beyond that limited agreement to require cooperation in the production
>of actual defenses. It is difficult to believe that such an
>undertaking could prosper when it comes to exchanging details of
>interceptor research, or that suspicious Russians would prefer it to
>maintaining high levels of Russian offensive missiles.
>
>This brief review illustrates the real difficulty under today's
>conditions of getting rid of a missile defense system -- once it has
>been deployed -- in order to resume movement toward nuclear
>disarmament. It therefore makes clear the importance of energetic
>opposition to the deployment before it takes place.
>
>************
>
>January 26, 1999
>
>John Holum
>Director
>U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
>320 21st Street, NW, Room 5930
>Washington, DC 20451
>
>
>Dear John Holum,
>
>With many others, I am worried by some major trends in U.S. defense
>policy over the past few years. I believe that two current, related
>Administration policies are having extremely negative effects on
>efforts to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
>
>The first is the Administration's very energetic effort to make
>Americans aware of the dangers of attack by "Weapons of Mass
>Destruction" by rogue countries.
>
>Over the past two or three years, this possible threat has gradually
>superseded the two-region war strategy as the dominant public
>justification, not merely of U.S. counterproliferation efforts, but of
>the U.S. defense budget generally. And because it is more vague and
>more menacing than the threat posed to U.S. security by a few small
>countries like Iraq, Iran or North Korea, this threat provides a more
>convincing public rationale for the U.S. defense posture.
>
>This emphasis on WMD also gives rise, apparently deliberately, to the
>impression that the current threats to the United States from "Weapons
>of Mass Destruction" are equal in their gravity to the cold war threat
>of all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This approach seriously
>misleads the American public - one indicator is the rising number of
>biological warfare hoaxes in this country -- and results in a
>distortion of policy and diversion of scarce resources from greater
>threats to U.S. security than missile attacks by rogue states.
>
>In actuality, other than mass nuclear attack by Russia and possibly
>China, no conceivable "WMD" attack on the United States for the next
>decade could affect more than one or two sites in the U.S., sites
>quite possibly not even the target of the attack. We are no longer in
>a situation where the entire country could be wiped out by a nuclear
>exchange. In the long term future, biological weapons might create
>such a possibility, but not now.
>
>There is an enormous difference between a threat of total annihilation
>and a threat which may entail limited destruction. One major
>difference is that, in the case of limited attack, the United States
>would remain able to retaliate with overwhelming force against any
>known perpetrator. And if we talking of anything other than a covert
>terrorist attack, the perpetrator would probably be known. Quite aside
>from the fact that both chemical and biological weapons have
>considerable limitations; for the next decades, no country in the
>world except Russia and possibly China has or will have the delivery
>capability to do more than strike one or two targets in the United
>States.
>
>Given these facts, the first negative effect of the current
>overemphasis on the WMD threat is that it diverts attention and
>resources from the greatest real threat both of possible direct
>nuclear attack and of proliferation of nuclear materials and knowledge
>-- the Russian nuclear arsenal. The Russian situation entails the
>entire range of threats from nuclear weapons, including accidental
>launch, illicit launch, launch on warning, threats of use, and, under
>extreme circumstances, deliberate attack. The dangers also include
>threats of use or actual use in or on the borders of Russia, violent
>seizure or theft of nuclear components and fissile material, and
>export of nuclear material and of expert knowledge. Given in
>particular the uncertain fate of the START process in Russia and the
>limited influence the Russian government has over the Duma, these
>risks amount to the most serious current threat to U.S. national
>security.
>
>In the current economic misery of the Russian government and people,
>with its bitterness and anti-American feeling and with confused
>disputes over Russia's security interests, U.S. capacity to provide
>Russia money for disarmament actions is by far our greatest source of
>leverage. To meet our biggest genuine defense emergency, we should be
>willing to spend several times the cost of current Nunn-Lugar programs
>and to devise new ones to meet this threat more adequately. In other
>words, instead of spending $12 billion additional on force readiness,
>we should be spending it on buying warhead dismantlement and fissile
>material from Russia.
>
>Second, the exaggerated focus on possible WMD attack on the U.S. has
>been accompanied by an Administration policy of deliberate ambiguity
>on possible retaliatory use of nuclear weapons by the United States,
>including their possible use in response to chemical or biological
>attack. These statements are obviously intended to deter such attack.
>But, here again, they are dangerous overkill.
>
>I accept that in the event of massive, catastrophic, nationwide
>chemical or biological attacks on the U.S., any U.S. administration
>would consider retaliation with any weapon at its disposal, no matter
>what its stated doctrine on use of nuclear weapons. But we are not
>talking about such a situation. Only Russia has the delivery means for
>a nationwide chemical or biological attack and it would be ill-advised
>in such circumstances to use chemical or biological weapons instead of
>nuclear weapons. In any event, any form of long-range attack from
>Russia would presumably be deterred by U.S. second-strike nuclear
>capability. U.S. nuclear weapons will not be needed if limited
>biological or chemical attacks occur, nor, for political reasons, is
>it at all likely that U.S. nuclear weapons would in fact be used in
>response.
>
>However, deliberate emphasis on the usefulness of nuclear weapons in
>such a situation is the most powerful advocacy of possession of
>nuclear weapons heard since the cold war ended. It dangerously
>undermines nonproliferation goals, first, by greatly increasing the
>attractions of having nuclear weapons and undermining the norm against
>any use of nuclear weapons, and second, by frustrating and annoying
>non-nuclear states which correctly conclude that this policy vitiates
>U.S. pledges not to use nuclear weapons in NPT negative security
>assurances and U.S. pledges of non-use in connection with nuclear free
>zones. This frustration can express itself in increasing support for
>extreme measures of nuclear abolition, in withholding cooperation for
>desirable improvements of the non-proliferation regime, and possibly
>in future demonstrative withdrawal from the NPT to make a political
>point.
>
>The third negative effect of the overemphasis on the possibility and
>consequences of WMD attack on the U.S. is that it increases motivation
>to establish nationwide missile defense and to withdraw from the ABM
>Treaty. This issue is being widely debated in the United States and
>there is no consensus over it. However, whatever putative advantages
>it may have, a U.S. decision to deploy nationwide defenses and
>withdraw from the ABM Treaty will decrease Russian and Chinese
>willingness to engage in further steps of nuclear arms control. It
>could also motivate increases in their nuclear arsenals. As a result,
>it would perpetuate the risks to U.S. security from existing nuclear
>weapon arsenals. It would also divert resources from more productive
>programs and possibilities. For example, other than the MTCR, the
>administration is doing nothing to tackle the missile problem at the
>source.
>
>What is needed, instead of current exaggeration of the damage from
>potential rogue state missile attack on the United States, is for the
>Administration to put the rogue state problem in perspective with the
>American public, making clear the wide difference of this threat from
>the cold war nuclear threat and pointing out that the United States
>would know where an attack came from, would remain fully capable of
>response, and would do so with its entire conventional arsenal,
>including targeting the decisionmakers involved. This posture would be
>a more effective deterrent than misleading and damaging threats of
>nuclear retaliation.
>
>Sincerely,
>
>Jonathan Dean
>Adviser on International Security Issues
>
>
>--
>Bill Robinson, Project Ploughshares,
>Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada  N2L 3G6
>Phone: [phone] x264  Fax: [phone]
>E-mail: [e-mail]
>http://www.ploughshares.ca
>
>Project Ploughshares is a member of the Canadian Network to Abolish
>Nuclear Weapons (http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/cnanw/cnanw.html)
>
Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons.

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