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abolition-usa-digest     Tuesday, January 19 1999     Volume 01 : Number 059




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Mon, 18 Jan 1999 21:41:47 -0500
From: Peter Weiss <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) US Conditions for the CTB

"Supreme National Interest" has got to go. It's in most arms control
treaties ratified by the US, which makes them all virtually useless. I
don't know why other countries let the US get away with it (well, I do
know).
                        Peter

ASlater wrote:
>
> Dear Friends,
> We are hearing that Clinton will make a big push for CTBT ratification.
> Does anyone know what India was promised to buy its ratification of the
> CTB?  Originally, we asked that they sign it without conditions--but now
> we're hearing that NSA's Sandy Berger thinks India will agree to sign.
> Listed below is Clinton's letter to the Senate with the US conditions for
> CTB ratification--Lest we forget!!  Peace, Alice
>
> September 23, 1997
>
> TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
>
>      I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
> ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the "Treaty" or
> "CTBT"), opened for signature and signed by the United States at New York on
> September 24, 1996.  The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and two
> Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral parts of the Treaty. I
> transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the
> Department of State on the Treaty, including an Article-by-Article analysis
> of the Treaty.
>
>      Also included in the Department of State's report is a document
> relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on the Establishment of a
> Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
> Organization, adopted by the Signatory States to the Treaty on November 19,
> 1996.  The Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory
> Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in
> preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and making
> arrangements for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties
> to the Treaty.  In particular, by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory
> Commission will be responsible for ensuring that the verification regime
> established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at such time as
> the Treaty enters into force.  My Administration has completed and will
> submit separately to the Senate an analysis of the verifiability of the
> Treaty, consistent with section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act,
> as amended.  Such legislation as may be necessary to implement the Treaty
> also will be submitted separately to the Senate for appropriate action.
>
>      The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a signal
> event in the history of arms control.  The subject of the Treaty is one that
> has been under consideration by the international community for nearly 40
> years, and the significance of the conclusion of negotiations and the
> signature to date of more than 140 states cannot be overestimated.  The
> Treaty creates an absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon
> test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere.  Specifically, each
> State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or
> any other nuclear explosion; to prohibit and prevent any nuclear explosions
> at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and to refrain from causing,
> encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear
> weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.[APPARENTLY THIS
> DOESN'T INCLUDE SUB-CRITICAL TESTS EXPLOSIONS--A MAJOR OBJECTION RAISED BY
> INDIA]
> [FIRST HE SAID HE DIDN'T INHALE; THEN HE SAID HE DIDN'T HAVE SEX; NOW HE
> SAYS HE'S NOT DOING NUCLEAR TESTS!]
>
>      The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, based on the
> provision of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound data by a
> global network (the "International Monitoring System") consisting of the
> facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol.  Data provided by the
> International Monitoring System will be stored, analyzed, and disseminated,
> in accordance with Treaty-mandated operational manuals, by an International
> Data Center that will be part of the Technical Secretariat of the
> Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.  The verification regime
> includes rules for the conduct of on-site inspections, provisions for
> consultation and clarification, and voluntary confidence-building measures
> designed to contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns
> arising from possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to
> chemical explosions that a State Party intends to or has carried out.
> Equally important to the U.S. ability to verify the Treaty, the text
> specifically provides for the right of States Parties to use information
> obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with generally
> recognized principles of international law for purposes of verification
> generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site inspection
> request.  The verification regime provides each State Party the right to
> protect sensitive installations, activities, or locations not related to the
> Treaty.  Determinations of compliance with the Treaty rest with each
> individual State Party to the Treaty.
>
>      Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the Eisenhower
> Administration.  During the period 1978-1980, negotiations among the United
> States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR (the Depositary Governments of the
> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but
> ended without agreement. Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon states called
> for test-ban negotiations, the United States urged the Conference on
> Disarmament (the "CD") to devote its attention to the difficult aspects of
> monitoring compliance with such a ban and developing elements of an
> international monitoring regime.  After the United States, joined by other
> key states, declared its support for comprehensive test-ban negotiations
> with a view toward prompt conclusion of a treaty, negotiations on a
> comprehensive test-ban were initiated in the CD, in January 1994.  Increased
> impetus for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the
> end of 1996 resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in
> conjunction with the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty,
> of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"
> that listed the conclusion of a CTBT as the highest measure of its program
> of action.
>
>    On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a "zero yield"
> CTBT, I stated that:
>
>    ". . . As part of our national security strategy, the United States must
> and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future
> hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from
> acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear
> advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenance of a
> safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the
> United States.
>
>    "I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear
> weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear
> deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program
> without nuclear testing.  I directed the implementation of such a program
> almost 2 years ago, and it is being developed with the support of the
> Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  This
> program will now be tied to a new certification procedure.  In order for
> this program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must
> provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program
> over the next decade and beyond.  I am committed to working with the
> Congress to ensure this support.
>
>    "While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be
> successful, as President I cannot dismiss the possibility, however unlikely,
> that the program will fall short of its objectives. [HERE ARE THE US
> CONDITIONS:]
> Therefore,in addition to the new annual certification procedure for our
> nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also establishing concrete, specific
> safeguards that define the
> conditions under which the United States can enter into a CTBT . . ."
>
>    The safeguards that were established are as follows:
>
>    The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a
> high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in
> the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective
> and continuing experimental programs.
>
>    The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in
> theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology that will attract, retain,
> and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to
> those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.
>
>    The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities
> prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere
> to this Treaty.
>
>    The continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to
> improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.
>
>    The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and
> analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive
> information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development
> programs, and related nuclear programs.
>
>    The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed
> by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE) -- advised by
> the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of  DOE's nuclear weapons
> laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command -- that a high
> level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type
> that the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent
> could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the
> Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard
> "supreme national interests" clause in order to conduct whatever testing
> might be required.  With regard to the last safeguard:
>
>    The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the safety and reliability
> of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter affecting the supreme interests
> of the country and will regard any events calling that confidence into
> question as "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
> treaty." It will exercise its rights under the "supreme national interests"
> clause if it judges that the safety or reliability of its nuclear weapons
> stockpile cannot be assured with the necessary high degree of confidence
> without nuclear testing.
>
>    To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy --
> advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council or "NWC" (comprising representatives
> of DOD, JCS, and DOE), the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories
> and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command -- will report to the
> President annually, whether they can certify that the Nation's nuclear
> weapons stockpile and all critical elements thereof are, to a high degree of
> confidence, safe and reliable, and, if they cannot do so, whether, in their
> opinion and that of the NWC, testing is necessary to assure, with a high
> degree of confidence, the adequacy of corrective measures to assure the
> safety and reliability of the stockpile, or elements thereof.  The
> Secretaries will state the reasons for their conclusions, and the views of
> the NWC, reporting any minority views.
>
>    After receiving the Secretaries' certification and accompanying report,
> including NWC and minority views, the President will provide them to the
> appropriate committees of the Congress, together with a report on the
> actions he has taken in light of them.
>
>    If the President is advised, by the above procedure, that a high level of
> confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to
> the Nation's nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified without nuclear
> testing, or that nuclear testing is necessary to assure the adequacy of
> corrective measures, the President will be prepared to exercise our "supreme
> national interests" rights under the Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.
>
>    The procedure for such annual certification by the Secretaries, and for
> advice to them by the NWC, U.S. Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear
> weapons laboratories will be embodied in domestic law.  As negotiations on a
> text drew to a close it became apparent that one member of the CD, India,
> would not join in a consensus decision to forward the text to the United
> Nations for its adoption.  After consultations among countries supporting
> the text, Australia requested the President of the U.N. General Assembly to
> convene a resumed session of the 50th General Assembly to consider and take
> action on the text.  The General Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of
> 158 to 3 the Treaty was adopted.  On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was
> opened for signature and I had the privilege, on behalf of the United
> States, of being the first to sign the Treaty.
>
>    The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its implementation to
> the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the "Organization"),
> to be established in Vienna.  The Organization, of which each State Party
> will be a member, will have three organs: the Conference of the States
> Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.  The
> Technical Secretariat will supervise the operation of and provide technical
> support for the International Monitoring System, operate the International
> Data Center, and prepare for and support the conduct of on-site inspections.
> The Treaty also requires each State Party to establish a National Authority
> that will serve as the focal point within the State Party for liaison with
> the Organization and with other States Parties.
>
>    The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of
> instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to the
> Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years after its being opened for
> signature.  If, 3 years from the opening of the Treaty for signature, the
> Treaty has not entered into force, the Secretary-General of the United
> Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will convene a
> conference of the states that have deposited their instruments of
> ratification if a majority of those states so requests.  At this conference
> the participants will consider what measures consistent with international
> law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to
> facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty.  Their decision on such
> measures must be taken by consensus.
>
>      Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the Treaty are
> not permitted.  Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and its Annexes so
> long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.
> Amendment of the Treaty requires the positive vote of a majority of the
> States Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened Amendment Conference
> at which no State Party casts a negative vote.  Such amendments would enter
> into force 30 days after ratification by all States Parties that cast a
> positive vote at the Amendment Conference.  The Treaty is of unlimited
> duration, but contains a "supreme interests" clause entitling any State
> Party that determines that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by
> extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty to withdraw
> from the Treaty upon 6-month's notice.     Unless a majority of the Parties
> decides otherwise, a Review Conference will be held 10 years following the
> Treaty's entry into force and may be held at 10-year intervals thereafter if
> the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a majority vote (or more
> frequently if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a
> two-thirds vote).
>
>      The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular significance
> to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and strengthen
> regional and global stability.  Its conclusion marks the achievement of the
> highest priority item on the international arms control and nonproliferation
> agenda. Its effective implementation will provide a foundation on which
> further efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons can be soundly based.
> By responding to the call for a CTBT by the end of 1996, the Signatory
> States, and most importantly the nuclear weapon states, have demonstrated
> the bona fides of their commitment to meaningful arms control measures.  The
> monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the CTBT exceed those
> imposed by any previous nuclear test-related treaty.  Our current capability
> to monitor nuclear explosions will undergo significant improvement over the
> next several years to meet these challenges.  Even with these enhancements,
> though, several conceivable CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified.
> Nonetheless, our National Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the
> Treaty's verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United
> States with the means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable.  By this, I
> mean that the United States: will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the
> totality of information available in public and private channels, and the
> mechanisms established by the Treaty) for addressing compliance concerns and
> imposing sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and will thereby have the
> means to: (a) assess whether the Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear
> explosions (in terms of yields and number of tests) that could damage U.S.
> security interests and constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
> and (b) take prompt and effective counteraction.     My judgment that the
> CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear
> deterrence would not be undermined by possible nuclear testing that the
> United States might fail to detect under the Treaty, bearing in mind that
> the United States will derive substantial confidence from other factors --
> the CTBT's "supreme national interests" clause, the annual certification
> procedure for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program. I
> believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the best
> interests of the United States.  Its provisions will significantly further
> our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and strengthen
> international security.  Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and
> favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to
> ratification as soon as possible.
>
> WILLIAM J. CLINTON
>
> THE WHITE HOUSE, September 22, 1997
>
> Alice Slater
> Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
> 15 East 26th Street, Room 915
> New York, NY 10010
> tel:  [phone]
> fax:  [phone]
> email:  [e-mail]
>
> GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
> to eliminate nuclear weapons.
>
> -
>  To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
>  with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
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------------------------------

Date: Mon, 18 Jan 1999 21:11:24 -0800 (PST)
From: Jackie Cabasso <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Re: US Conditions for the CTB

Dear Abolitionists.  Regarding US conditions for the CTBT: If you're looking
for a medium length (5 pages), up-to-date, fact-filled summary of current US
nuclear weapons programs and policies, I've recently updated my November
INESAP Bulletin article, NUCLEAR HYPOCRISY: NEW WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND
ANTI-DISARMAMENT POLICIES IN THE US.  If you'd like a copy I can e-mail it
in an enclosed file (WordPerfect or MSWord) or plain text, or I can fax
it or send it by snail mail.  As the convenor of the "virtual" Beyond the
CTBT working group, I'm pleased to provide this service.  Please let me
know if and how you would like a copy sent.  Peace, -- Jackie Cabasso
   ********************************************
       WESTERN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
           1440 Broadway, Suite 500
             Oakland, CA USA 94612
              Tel: [phone]
              Fax: [phone]
               [e-mail]
   ********** Part of ABOLITION 2000 **********
   Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons


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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 08:52:32 EST
From: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Re: US Conditions for the CTB

Hi Jackie,
Yes, I would love to see it, if you can email in a form that I don't have to
download that will be good. If not snail mail is best.

I am troubled by PEace Actions support of CTB and opposition of stockpile
stwerardship as stockpile stewardship is a condition of ctb.

thanks,

Colby Lowe                    phone-203-373-9998
120 Federal Street          [e-mail]
Fairfield CT 06432           fax-203-373-1124

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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 10:38:18 -0500
From: War Resisters League <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Re: US Conditions for the CTB

Jackie,

I'd like to see a copy of your article.  It sounds interesting and useful.

Chris


At 09:11 PM 1/18/99 -0800, you wrote:
>Dear Abolitionists.  Regarding US conditions for the CTBT: If you're looking
>for a medium length (5 pages), up-to-date, fact-filled summary of current US
>nuclear weapons programs and policies, I've recently updated my November
>INESAP Bulletin article, NUCLEAR HYPOCRISY: NEW WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND
>ANTI-DISARMAMENT POLICIES IN THE US.  If you'd like a copy I can e-mail it
>in an enclosed file (WordPerfect or MSWord) or plain text, or I can fax
>it or send it by snail mail.  As the convenor of the "virtual" Beyond the
>CTBT working group, I'm pleased to provide this service.  Please let me
>know if and how you would like a copy sent.  Peace, -- Jackie Cabasso
>   ********************************************
>       WESTERN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
>           1440 Broadway, Suite 500
>             Oakland, CA USA 94612
>              Tel: [phone]
>              Fax: [phone]
>               [e-mail]
>   ********** Part of ABOLITION 2000 **********
>   Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons
>
>
>-
> To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
> with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
> For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
> "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.
>
>
**********
War Resisters League
339 Lafayette St.
New York, NY 10012
212-228-0450
212-228-6193 (fax)
1-800-975-9688 (YouthPeace and A Day Without the Pentagon)
[e-mail]
web address: http://www.nonviolence.org/wrl

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 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 11:20:26 -0500
From: "David Culp" <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) RE: US Conditions for the CTB

Earlier Peter Weiss <[e-mail]> wrote:

>  "Supreme National Interest" has got to go. It's in most arms control
>  treaties ratified by the US, which makes them all virtually useless. =
I
>  don't know why other countries let the US get away with it (well, I =
do
>  know).

Yes, there is "supreme national interest" clause in most arms control =
treaties, but it has never been invoked by the United States (or by any =
other country).  I am not sure why a clause that has never been used =
makes all arms control treaties "virtually useless".

Why it the clause in there?  You would never get the two-thirds vote =
needed for Senate ratification if it weren't.  I suspect the situation =
in similar with the Russian Duma today.


- --------------------------------------------
David Culp
Plutonium Challenge
245 Second Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.  20002-5761
E-mail: [e-mail]
- --------------------------------------------=20


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 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 09:32:19 -0700
From: "mesa's" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Re: US Conditions for the CTB

Hi Jackie, yes please, on MS Word
Suzanne at CCNS


>Jackie,
>
>I'd like to see a copy of your article.  It sounds interesting and useful.
>
>Chris
>
>
>At 09:11 PM 1/18/99 -0800, you wrote:
>>Dear Abolitionists.  Regarding US conditions for the CTBT: If you're looking
>>for a medium length (5 pages), up-to-date, fact-filled summary of current US
>>nuclear weapons programs and policies, I've recently updated my November
>>INESAP Bulletin article, NUCLEAR HYPOCRISY: NEW WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND
>>ANTI-DISARMAMENT POLICIES IN THE US.  If you'd like a copy I can e-mail it
>>in an enclosed file (WordPerfect or MSWord) or plain text, or I can fax
>>it or send it by snail mail.  As the convenor of the "virtual" Beyond the
>>CTBT working group, I'm pleased to provide this service.  Please let me
>>know if and how you would like a copy sent.  Peace, -- Jackie Cabasso
>>   ********************************************
>>       WESTERN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
>>           1440 Broadway, Suite 500
>>             Oakland, CA USA 94612
>>              Tel: [phone]
>>              Fax: [phone]
>>               [e-mail]
>>   ********** Part of ABOLITION 2000 **********
>>   Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons
>>
>>
>>-
>> To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
>> with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
>> For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
>> "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.
>>
>>
>**********
>War Resisters League
>339 Lafayette St.
>New York, NY 10012
>212-228-0450
>212-228-6193 (fax)
>1-800-975-9688 (YouthPeace and A Day Without the Pentagon)
>[e-mail]
>web address: http://www.nonviolence.org/wrl
>
>-
> To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
> with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
> For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
> "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.




- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 13:40:42 -0000
From: "Sally Light" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Re: US Conditions for the CTB

Jackie - I'd like a copy.  MSWord would be just fine.  Thanks, Sally.

- ----------
> From: Jackie Cabasso <[e-mail]>
> To: [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: (abolition-usa) Re: US Conditions for the CTB
> Date: Tuesday, January 19, 1999 5:11 AM
>
> Dear Abolitionists.  Regarding US conditions for the CTBT: If you're
looking
> for a medium length (5 pages), up-to-date, fact-filled summary of current
US
> nuclear weapons programs and policies, I've recently updated my November
> INESAP Bulletin article, NUCLEAR HYPOCRISY: NEW WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND
> ANTI-DISARMAMENT POLICIES IN THE US.  If you'd like a copy I can e-mail
it
> in an enclosed file (WordPerfect or MSWord) or plain text, or I can fax
> it or send it by snail mail.  As the convenor of the "virtual" Beyond the

> CTBT working group, I'm pleased to provide this service.  Please let me
> know if and how you would like a copy sent.  Peace, -- Jackie Cabasso
>    ********************************************
>        WESTERN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
>            1440 Broadway, Suite 500
>              Oakland, CA USA 94612
>               Tel: [phone]
>               Fax: [phone]
>                [e-mail]
>    ********** Part of ABOLITION 2000 **********
>    Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons
>
>
> -
>  To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to
"[e-mail]"
>  with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
>  For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
>  "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

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 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
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------------------------------

Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 15:58:31 -0500
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) URGENT ACTION ALERT: Mobile Chernobyl is back!

>Date: Tue, 19 Jan 1999 14:56:54 -0500
>Subject: Mobile Chernobyl is back!
>To: [e-mail]
>X-FC-Forwarded-From: [e-mail]
>From: [e-mail] ([e-mail])
>
>MOBILE CHERNOBYL ALERT! ALERT! ALERT! ALERT!
>
>Capital Switchboard 202-225-3121 Call now and often!
>
>Mobile Chernobyl, the idea of shipping all of the nation's high-level
>nuclear waste to a parking lot in Nevada is BACK! Although Congress has
>been unable to enact such legislation the past four years, the nuclear
>industry wasted no time this year: on the first day of the
>106th Congress, House members Fred Upton (R-MI) and Edolphus Towns
>(D-NY) introduced a new Mobile Chernobyl bill. This year, it is HR 45.
>
>The new bill is nearly identical to the previous House version of Mobile
>Chernobyl but has some new funding provisions and new dates--to reflect
>the atomic industry's previous failures to pass the legislation. The new
>date for the opening of a centralized storage site for irradiated fuel
>from nuclear power reactors and the military is 2003, which would
>trigger the largest nuclear waste shipping campaign in history.
>
>Transport of high-level nuclear waste from reactor sites, =BE of which are
>east of the Mississippi River, would impact 43 states, according to
>studies conducted by the State of Nevada. The legislation would require
>an ambitious 3,000 metric tons of irradiated fuel a year--or about the
>total amount that has been moved in the last 30 years, each year for the
>next 30 years or more. 50 million Americans live within a half mile on
>either side of the likely train tracks and highways this waste would
>pass by. This is because normal trade routes-major interstate highways
>and
>railroutes--would be used to move the waste. Urban areas should examine
>whether there is a disproportionate impact on some sectors of the
>community. For example, highways and railways often are placed in
>poorer, predominately minority areas.
>
>MOBILE CHERNOBYL IS MOVING FAST. The new Chair of the House Subcommittee
>on Energy and Water is Joe Barton, R-TX, who has long been a "water boy"
>for the nuclear industry. He was, for example, the chief sponsor of
>"one-step" reactor licensing legislation. Barton would like to move the
>bill out of his subcommittee THIS MONTH - with no hearings.
>
>Barton and his nuclear industry allies are counting on us to fold. They
>believe that we have fought this effort so long and hard, that we no
>longer have it in us to fight again. Guess again, Mr. Barton!
>
>National environmental and public interest groups are meeting weekly to
>launch an all-out offensive on Capital Hill. We have stopped this bill
>every year since it was first introduced in 1994. We can stop it now,
>but it requires immediate action from you, your friends and colleagues,
>your organizations.
>
>First target: demand hearings on this legislation. Since the funding
>mechanism has changed - and is really complicated - this is the perfect
>thing to focus on. NO MORE NUCLEAR WELFARE! Even if your U.S.
>Representative is not on the House Commerce Committee, call his/her
>office and demand that he/she:
>
>1) OPPOSE HR 45, the Mobile Chernobyl Act
>2) Demand new hearings: the bill is not the same and there are new
>members of Congress
>3) Focus on the money issues, the transport issue, and the fact that
>this is environmental plunder not environmental protection!!!
>
>While hearings might show the fallacy of the nuclear industry's funding
>schemes-which are intended to put the burden of radioactive waste
>storage on the taxpayer instead of the industry that created the waste,
>hearings are not enough.
>
>In fact, in December, 219 environmental groups demanded a complete end
>to the Yucca Mountain project, for temporary or permanent waste storage,
>because the science is now clear: Yucca Mountain cannot legally be
>licensed as a radioactive waste dump-unless the government changes its
>public health and safety licensing regulations and abandoning any effort
>to isolate this massive load of radioactivity from the environment.
>
>Here are a couple of other points you might want to make to your elected
>representatives and senators. The impeachment trial is certainly slowing
>things down in the Senate, but behind the scenes, the atomic industry's
>gophers, such as Sens. Frank Murkowski, Larry Craig and Pete Domenici,
>are readying new legislation there as well.
>
>HR 45, and any Mobile Chernobyl legislation, is one of the worst
>environmental bills ever. It does not provide a solution for nuclear
>waste, just a "fix" for the nuclear industry that gets to dump their
>waste on Native Shoshone lands, while at the same time making it the
>possession of the tax-payer in perpetuity.  The legislation authorizes
>the Department of Energy to curtail or preempt ALL environmental laws.
>
>HR 45 sets new deadlines that are more unrealistic than the current
>law's missed deadline of 1998.
>
>Yucca Mountain will not isolate nuclear waste from the environment. Data
>in the DOE's own "viability assessment" of the proposed Yucca Mountain
>Repository contradicts any assertion that Yucca Mountain will isolate
>nuclear waste from the environment. The constant seismic activity in the
>area has fractured the soft rock of Yucca Mountain, allowing rain to
>travel through the proposed repository site. The same fractures will
>allow radioactive gases to escape as the waste decays.
>
>A recent study of the funding of the Yucca Mountain Project shows that
>there will be about a 50% shortfall in total project funds. By law the
>funding for this project comes from the customers of nuclear power, and
>the original concept was that they should pay the full bill. A
>proportional 10% to be paid by taxpayers via the military budgets would
>cover the cost of military waste that would go to the same site (10% of
>the total waste). The fund is paid for monthly with the electric bill of
>those who get nuclear power, but at the current rate, this fund will
>deliver $28.1 Billion. The total projected cost of the program with
>centralized storage is  $53.9 Billion. This means that taxpayers would
>end up more than $25 billion in liability if these conservative
>projections are met-and every year the cost projections go higher=85.
>
>Our job is clear. We must stop HR 45 and all related legislation, and we
>must begin now.
>
>First, call your Congressmember at 202-224-3121 and demand that he/she
>actively oppose this bill. Point out the effect transportation of
>high-level atomic waste could have on your state.
>
>Second, write your Congressmember-even if you called. Surveys of
>Congressmembers clearly indicate that handwritten (or typed) letters
>from citizens of the district or state are the single most effective
>means of reaching your Congressmember. Faxes, e-mails, phone calls are
>all ok, but nothing is as effective as a letter in your own words.
>
>Third, organize your community, encourage more letters, phone calls,
>faxes, e-mails. The latest public opinion polls we have available show
>that some 67% of the public opposes Mobile Chernobyl, but only about 1/3
>of the public even knows about it. Moreover, the more people learn about
>it, according to the polls, the more likely they are to oppose it. That
>means we all have to get out and educate and organize, because if we can
>educate just 1/3 more of the public the battle will be over-we will win
>hands down. Let NIRS know what organizing and educational materials you
>need, we'll get them to you. You can also continue to collect signatures
>on the Don't Waste America petitions, although we hope you'll use those
>primarily as an educational tool, and encourage people to write their
>own letters. Try setting up tables at public locations with a few sample
>letters to Congress, focusing on your local situation, and urge people
>to use these samples to write their own letters. Op-eds, letters to the
>editor, press releases-it's time to start them all up again.
>
>It is not too late to get resolutions against the legislation passed at
>municipal and county levels. A resolution against HR 45 on the basis of
>the transport of nuclear waste or any other issue is a very LOUD letter
>to your U.S. Rep. Contact us if you need help with that.
>
>It's time to stop Mobile Chernobyl once and for all. It's time to stop
>Yucca Mountain once and for all. Together, we WILL prevail.
>
>Michael  Mariotte
>Mary Olson
>NIRS
>202-328-0002
>http://www.nirs.org
>=20

Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons.

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