ftp.xmission.com/2014.06.ftp.xmission.com.tar/ftp.xmission.com/pub/lists/abolition-usa/archive/v01.n058

Internet Message Format | 1999-01-17 | 50KB

From: [e-mail] (abolition-usa-digest)
To: [e-mail]
Subject: abolition-usa-digest V1 #58
Reply-To: abolition-usa-digest
Sender: [e-mail]
Errors-To: [e-mail]
Precedence: bulk


abolition-usa-digest     Monday, January 18 1999     Volume 01 : Number 058




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sun, 10 Jan 1999 18:17:06 -0800 (PST)
From: Timothy Bruening <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Stop The Presses! Pentagon and the Russian Military Favor Nuclear Disarmament!

Below is a draft of a letter to the editor about nuclear arms reductions.
Please suggest improvements in my letter, and feel free to write similar
letters to your newspapers and representatives.

In recent months, both the U.S. and Russian militaries have recommended
reducing nuclear arsenals to save billions of dollars (and trillions of
rubles).

Due to the Russian economic crisis, the Russian military wants to reduce the
Russian nuclear arsenal.  Russia can no longer afford to maintain an arsenal
of several thousand warheads, according to a report released in October by
Deputy Prime Minister Maslyudov.  Russia can only afford a few hundred
nuclear warheads, so the Maslyudov report urges action on START II and START
III, and the Russian military is pressing the Duma to ratify START II, so
that the U.S. will reduce its nuclear arsenal to a level Russia can match.

Meanwhile, the New York Times reported on November 23, 1998 that "Pentagon
officials are quietly recommending that the Clinton Administration consider
unilateral reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal."  Reducing the U.S.
nuclear arsenal would save money, which could be used to boost troop
readiness.  Over the past two years, the Pentagon has spent $95 million on
weapons which would have been dismantled under START II (stalled in the Duma
for the past 6 years), which would reduce the 2 nations' nuclear arsenals to
3,000 to 3,500 warheads each.  This year, the extra cost will be $100
million.  The Navy will pay over $5 billion between now and 2003 to refuel
nuclear reactors and install new missiles on four Trident subs slated for
dismantling under START II.  Implementing START II could save taxpayers $6.3
billion between now and 2008, and reducing nuclear warheads to the 1,000
anticipated in START III would save even more.  Moreover, reducing the
arsenal would make it unnecessary to produce tritium (at a cost of $9.5
billion over the next 40 years), since tritium could be recycled from
dismantled warheads.  However, a law passed by Congress prevents the
military from reducing the U.S. arsenal to under 6,000 warheads.

I believe that, as Senator Kerry says, we should go "as low as the Russians
are willing to go."  Therefore, I urge you to contact President Clinton
(202-456-1111 between 6am and 2pm on weekdays; [e-mail]; The
White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C., 20500) to urge him
to begin immediate negotiations to drastically reduce Russian and U.S.
nuclear arsenals, call on Congress to repeal that ridiculous law preventing
further reductions in the U.S. arsenal, and reduce the risk of an accidental
nuclear war (caused by the infamous Y2K bug or by other problems) by taking
our missiles off alert, by removing the warheads from their delivery
vehicles, and by calling on Russia to do the same to its nuclear missiles.

Please also contact Senators Feinstein and Boxer (202-224-3121;
[e-mail], [e-mail], U.S. Senate,
Washington D.C., 20510) to urge them to sponsor legislation to repeal the
ban on nuclear reductions, and sponsor resolutions calling for negotiations
to reduce the U.S. and Russian arsenals and calling on the U.S. and Russia
to take their missiles off alert by remove the warheads from their delivery
vehicles.


- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1999 23:41:03 -0500
From: Bob Tiller <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Job announcement

Friends,

Physicians for Social Responsibility, a national membership organization
committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons, is seeking an Associate
Director of Security Programs, who will have responsibilities in two
broad areas:

Research and Policy:
     *Provide research and technical expertise on a broad range of
nuclear weapons issues, including: nuclear weapons dismantlement,
fissile material disposition, MOX fuel, cleanup of  DOE's nuclear
weapons complex, nuclear waste disposition, nuclear weapons-related
public health matters, the Stockpile Stewardship program, the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, tritium production and other
nuclear weapons topics.
     *Monitor and report on legislative matters and executive branch
developments in issue areas.
     *Prepare issue briefs, articles and other materials for
decision-makers and for activists.
     *Assist in developing advocacy initiatives.
     *Conduct special projects.

Organizing and Education:
     *Enlarge and strengthen PSR's Security activist network.
     *Maintain regular communication with PSR chapters, activists and
physician experts.
     *Produce educational materials for chapters and activists.
     *Mobilize activists for action.
     *Assist in coordinating national advocacy campaigns.
     *Maintain and update the Security portion of PSR's website.
     *Assist in drafting media statements.
     *Assist in planning and organizing conferences, training programs
and other educational events.

Qualifications:
     *Commitment to abolition of nuclear weapons
     *Knowledge of nuclear weapons-related issues
     *Strong writing and speaking skills
     *Ability to handle multiple tasks and to meet deadlines
     *Ability to work both independently and cooperatively
     *Minimum Bachelor's degree, Master's degree preferred
     *Minimum of three years of relevant experience

To apply, send resume to:
  Robert Tiller
  Physicians for Social Responsibility
  1101 14th St. N.W.
  Washington D.C. 20005
  E-mail <[e-mail]>

Deadline is Jan. 21, 1999.

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1999 23:51:27 -0600 (CST)
From: [e-mail]
Subject: (abolition-usa) Fwd: US Navy Backs Cut in Trident Subs, Let's Lobby Senator Kerrey On This One

- ------Begin forward message-------------------------

Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1999 12:58:33 +1300
From: [e-mail] (Rob Green)
Message-Id: <v01540b0900924486efb9@[203.96.43.161]>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Precedence: bulk
Sender: [e-mail]
Subject: US Navy Backs Cut in Trident Subs
To: [e-mail]
X-Sender: [e-mail]

Dear Abolitionists,

     Friends,
              Thanks to Robb for this re-posting. As mentioned in The Post article, Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska is
pushing for unilateral U.S. reductions in its strategic forces. Let's lobby him to push harder & let's lobby both our
Senators & our Congressperson on this. The Congressional switchboard can be reached for any Senator or Congressperspon at:
202-224-3121. Let's all Call Kerrey weather we're one of his constituents or not & then ask each of our Senators &
Representatives to not just support such a manuever but to initiate & then circulate a "Dear Colleague" letter asking that
U.S. unilateral reductions be implemented immediately. The Russians pose no nuclear threat to us. The only threats are
those of accident [including Y2K], continuing pollution, economic drain. We have to stop them, they won't stop themselves.



    -Bill Smirnow


Apologies if you've already seen this.

Best wishes,
Rob Green
Chair, World Court Project UK


>------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
>From:          "David Culp" <[e-mail]>
>To:            "START II Recipients" <[e-mail]>
>Subject:       Navy Backs Cut in Trident Subs
>Date:          Thu, 7 Jan 1999 09:00:12 -0500
>
>Naval Chief Backs Cut In Force of Trident Subs
>14 Would Suffice, Admiral Tells Senate
>
>By Walter Pincus
>Washington Post Staff Writer
>Thursday, January 7, 1999; Page A23
>
>The chief of naval operations has told Congress for the first time
>that he would like to reduce the number of operational Trident
>ballistic missile submarines from 18 to 14, opening the way for
>Congress to repeal its ban against cutting U.S. strategic nuclear
>force levels until the Russian parliament ratifies the START II
>treaty.
>
>"My personal belief is that a 14-boat force is the minimum acceptable
>force right now," Adm. J.L. Johnson said. Under present law, if the
>Russian Duma continues to delay approval of the 1993 strategic arms
>control treaty as it has done for the past year, the Navy must plan to
>spend up to $500 million in fiscal 2000 to stay operational at the
>START I level of 18. That number includes four of the older, giant
>Tridents that were scheduled to be decommissioned beginning in 2002.
>
>But at Tuesday's Senate Armed Services Committee session, when Chief
>of Naval Operations Johnson was asked by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy
>(D-Mass.) whether the Navy would rather have 14 of the subs and use
>the money for other priorities, he replied, "Personally I would, yes,
>sir."
>
>The amendment that froze strategic forces at START I levels was added
>two years ago to the defense authorization bill by Sen. Robert C.
>Smith (R-N.H.), chairman of the Armed Services strategic forces
>subcommittee. Opponents of the provision want to debate the issue
>"based on what forces are needed," a senior congressional aide said
>yesterday, "and not on the politics associated with the arms control
>treaties."
>
>Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the committee, said before
>the hearing that "we have to reevaluate priorities" on strategic
>weapons. "We may be able to redirect money from strategic weapons to
>strategic defense," he said. A spokesman said Smith was tied up with
>meetings yesterday and unavailable for comment.
>
>Eugene E. Habiger, a retired Air Force general and former head of the
>U.S. Strategic Command, which included the Tridents, said "it would
>make sense" for the Navy to go down to 14, because "there is no need
>to stay at the START I level from a military prospective; although if
>you stay at that level it may give you some political leverage" with
>the Russians. But Habiger also noted that Moscow's "sub fleet is
>belly-up."
>
>A military source familiar with intelligence said Moscow had a serious
>problem with one of the ballistic subs in the Northern Fleet last year
>when seawater got into the missile compartment when some seals leaked.
>The sub immediately surfaced and was brought back into port. The other
>alert Russian ballistic missile sub was brought back from its patrol
>in the Pacific for repairs. So for two to three weeks, the Russians
>for the first time in recent memory had no ballistic missile subs
>patrolling on alert. The Russians do keep at least two other ballistic
>missile subs on pier-side alert, one in the Atlantic and the other in
>the Pacific.
>
>The United States maintains five Trident subs on patrol alert, with
>five others either coming or going on patrol and ready to fire their
>missiles if needed. The Tridents each have 24 missiles that can carry
>up to eight warheads. The warheads have seven times the force of the
>Hiroshima bomb and are designed to destroy Russian missiles in
>hardened silos.
>
>Sen. Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.), who is pushing for the United States to
>begin making unilateral reductions in its strategic forces, said
>yesterday that "waiting for the Russians to act on START II is a
>mistake." With their economy collapsing, their nuclear systems
>deteriorating and their experiment with democracy on the line, Kerrey
>said, members of the Russian parliament "don't have time to talk about
>nuclear arms control."
>
>As of today, there are 10 modern Tridents based at Kings Bay, Ga., all
>armed with highly accurate D-5 missiles that can travel more than
>4,000 miles. Eight older Tridents, fitted with 24 of the earlier C-4
>missiles, are based at Bangor, Wash.
>
>If current law continues, all eight of the older Tridents would have
>to have their nuclear engines refurbished and their launching systems
>would need to be retrofitted to carry modern D-5 missiles.
>
>
>c Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

            Commander Robert D Green, Royal Navy (Retired)
                   Chair, World Court Project UK

NZ: Disarmament & Security Centre           UK: 2 Chiswick House
    PO Box 8390                                 High Street
    Christchurch                                Twyford
    Aotearoa/New Zealand                        Berkshire RG10 9AG

Tel/Fax: [phone]               Tel/Fax: [phone]

                   Email: [e-mail]

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *



- ------End forward message---------------------------



- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1999 10:35:39 EST
From: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Stop The Presses! Pentagon and the Russian Military Favor...

Dear Timothy,

It would be worth adding in your letter to President Clinton that the
International Court of Justice unanimously concluded that there is an
obligation to conclude negotiations on the total elimination of nuclear
weapons. Such international law overrides any domestic legislation that you
cite preventing progress on elimination. In addition, over 80% of US citizens
(according to two public opinion polls) support the elimination of nuclear
weapons through a nuclear weapons convention.

Peace
Alyn Ware

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1999 11:07:43 -0600 (CST)
From: [e-mail]
Subject: (abolition-usa) Fwd: Race for the Superbomb

- ------Begin forward message-------------------------

Return-Path: <[e-mail]>

Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1999 22:28:26 -0800 (PST)
From: Guin <[e-mail]>
Subject: Race for the Superbomb


Monday January 11 8:37 AM ET

PBS examines continuing ``Superbomb'' menace
Race for the Superbomb (Mon. (11), 9-11 p.m., PBS)

By David Mermelstein

HOLLYWOOD (Variety) - With the Cold War seemingly safely behind us,
it's easy to see the specter of nuclear annihilation as a past worry.

But Thomas Ott's ``Race for the Superbomb'' should change all that:
his two-hour documentary on PBS' ``American Experience'' series
recalls just why the idea of a nuclear holocaust proved so frightening
- -- and just how real such threats remain.

In meticulous detail, and with the invaluable aid of some of the
participants in these historic events, Ott's film chronicles the
development of the so-called Superbomb, or H-bomb, in the years
following World War II. In what is portrayed as a scarily escalating
series of events, this show chronicles how Soviet envy of America's
nuclear weapons program sowed the seeds for what eventually became a
superpower arms race, once that concluded only with the breakup of the
Soviet Union in 1991.

Adopting a primarily nonjudgmental tone, Ott's documentary efficiently
summarizes most of the major developments in nuclear weapons
technology up to the obsession with delivery systems that
characterized the arms race during and after the 1960s. But the
primary focus here is the intense competition between American and
Soviet physicists in the mid-1950s to create weapons that would dwarf
the power of the atom bombs the United States dropped on Japan in the
final days of the Second World War.

The constant presence of the famously driven physicist Edward Teller
is perhaps this program's biggest coup. As the now-90-year-old
scientist vividly recalls the sense of mission that dominated his
activities during the early years of Cold War, viewers are transported
backward in time, where a horrible inevitability underlies the manic
activities of both the American and Soviet weapons teams as they race
toward nuclear primacy -- and the ability to destroy human
civilization with the touch of a button.

Later in the program, attention is paid to how the U.S. government
sold the idea of a nuclear arsenal to its citizens.

Excerpts from public service announcements that would be funny were
they not real demonstrate how easily one can survive global
thermonuclear war with a few simple precautions. That we now see such
propaganda for what it is attests to how far we've come in our
understanding of the awesome, awful potential of nuclear armaments.

One might think that there's little even this well-researched and
polished documentary can reveal about such familiar history, but
``Race for the Superbomb'' astonishes most when it deals with the
obvious. The recently declassified footage of American nuclear testing
is mesmerizing, for instance. There is a terrible, otherworldly
quality to watching this very real hellfire sweep away what man and
God have wrought, and those seeing these images are unlikely to forget
them anytime soon.

Even the many clips of talking heads are employed judiciously and with
the aim of increasing this program's accessibility.

``Race for the Superbomb'' leaves viewers with one of history's great
paradoxes. After spending nearly two hours explaining the difficulties
in cracking the riddles of physics to achieve this recondite
technology, narrator David Ogden Stiers notes that ridding ourselves
of this menace is proving even harder.

Narrator David Ogden Stiers

Filmed in the United States and Russia by WGBH Boston for PBS.
Executive producer, Margaret Drain; senior producer, Mark Samels;
associate producer, Sharon Grimberg; producer/director, Thomas Ott;
writer, Ott; camera, Brian Dowley; editor, Peter Rhodes; music,
Michael Whalen; sound, Mark van der Willigen.

Reuters/Variety






_________________________________________________________
DO YOU YAHOO!?
Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com


- ------End forward message---------------------------



- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 12 Jan 1999 12:16:32 -0500
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Stop The Presses! Pentagon and the Russian Military Favor...

Dear Friends,
According to an April 1997 poll by the distinguished polling firm, Lake
Sosin Snell, headed by Celinda Lake who is well-known to President Clinton,
87% of all Americans said they would like a treaty to eliminate nuclear
weapons; 84% said they would feel safer if no country had nuclear weapons
including the US.  Alice Slater

At 10:35 AM 1/12/99 -0500, [e-mail] wrote:
>Dear Timothy,
>
>It would be worth adding in your letter to President Clinton that the
>International Court of Justice unanimously concluded that there is an
>obligation to conclude negotiations on the total elimination of nuclear
>weapons. Such international law overrides any domestic legislation that you
>cite preventing progress on elimination. In addition, over 80% of US
>citizens
>(according to two public opinion polls) support the elimination of nuclear
>weapons through a nuclear weapons convention.
>
>Peace
>Alyn Ware
>
>-
> To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
> with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
> For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
> "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.
>
Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons.

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 15 Jan 1999 10:45:44 -0700
From: [e-mail] (Jack & Felice Cohen-Joppa)
Subject: (abolition-usa) DU Citizen's Inspection Trial

        On December 10, 1998, Human Rights Day, six members of a Citizen's
Weapons Inspection Team faced trial in Tucson City Court.  About 50
supporters attended a support rally beforehand and filled the courtroom
throughout the day-long trial.
        Last March 1, the six had gone to Davis Monthan Air Force Base in
Tucson, Arizona to inspect for weapons of mass destruction.  They believed
depleted uranium (DU) was present at the base because flight training for
the A-10 anti-tank aircraft is based at Davis Monthan, and the A-10's were
responsible for firing more than 80% of the DU used during the Gulf War.
The base commander told the inspection team that DU is stored at the base,
but refused their request to inspect.  Col. John Corley instead had them
arrested for trespass when the inspectors insisted on continuing their
work, based on an understanding of their obligations regarding moral
responsibility and  International Law.
        Col. Corley testified for more than an hour as the prosecution's
first witness.  He claimed that although DU is stored at the base, they do
not fly or train with it.   Citing security concerns, Corley refused to
disclose how the DU is transported on and off base.  He stated that if
ordered, he would deploy the DU munitions from Davis Monthan in the event
of war.
        The citizen's weapons inspectors based their defense on
international law and the doctrine of necessity.   The six defendants were
permitted to testify extensively about the motivations which brought them
to Davis Monthan AFB on March 1; about depleted uranium and its effects on
veterans and civilians; about international law and weapons of mass and
indiscriminate destruction; and about the imminent U.S. threat of renewed
bombing of Iraq at the time of their arrest.
         At the end of the trial, City Magistrate Mitchell Eisenberg
complimented the group on their integrity and told them he had never met
anyone with convictions such as theirs.  While convinced that they met two
of the three tests for a successful defense of necessity - imminence of
potential harm and reasonable connection between action taken and harm to
be averted - he ruled that the six had alternative means to get their
message out.  He then found them all guilty of trespass.  Ignoring the
base's request for prison time and three years of probation, Eisenberg
sentenced each to six months of unsupervised probation and 10 hours of
community service.  Feeling that their inspection attempt was itself a
service to the community, the six will continue to speak out about the
dangers of depleted uranium.

xxx

        In addition to press coverage on the trial in local papers, radio
and television, a "Guest Comment" about depleted uranium was published by
the Arizona Daily Star the morning of the trial.  For more information
about the action or trial, or a copy of the guest editorial, please contact
The Nuclear Resister, P.O. Box 43383, Tucson, AZ 85733, phone/fax
[phone], email: [e-mail]

        Citizen's Weapons Inspection Team members:   Gery Armsby, Felice
Cohen-Joppa, Carolyn Epple, Lisa Kiser, Dwight Metzger and Carolyn
Trowbridge.



- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 18 Jan 1999 15:48:51 -0500
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Fwd: Nuclear Crossroads program

>Date: Thu, 14 Jan 1999 23:43:40 -0500
>Subject: Nuclear Crossroads program
>To: [e-mail], [e-mail], [e-mail],
> [e-mail], [e-mail], [e-mail],
> [e-mail], [e-mail], [e-mail],
> [e-mail], [e-mail],
> [e-mail]
>From: [e-mail] ([e-mail])
>
>This is a really good program.  Please pass this message along to others
>who
>might be interested, and call your local public or community radio station.
>
>-Tom
>
>
>
>
>>>Return-Path: <[e-mail]>
>>>Date: Mon, 11 Jan 1999 06:58:11 -0700 (MST)
>>>From: "David B. Wilson" <[e-mail]>
>>>To: Tom Marshall <[e-mail]>
>>>cc: [e-mail]
>>>Subject: Nuclear Crossroads program
>>>
>>>
>>>RETURN TO THE NUCLEAR CROSSROADS
>>>PROTEST AND RESISTANCE
>>>AT THE ROCKY FLATS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANT.
>>>
>>>A special two part documentary presented by Alternative Radio, airing on
>>>public radio stations over the next few weeks.
>>>
>>>Written and produced by David Barrett Wilson
>>>
>>>Call your local public radio station for more details about times.
>>>
>>>OR CALL ALTNERATIVE RADIO AT 1-800-444-1977 TO ORDER COPIES OR TO LEARN
>>>WHERE AR IS BROADCAST IN YOUR AREA.
>>>
>>>------------------------
>>>
>>>For the past three decades, Rocky Flats, located just west of Denver
>>>Colorado, has stood at the center of protest and resistance to nuclear
>>>weapons production.   This sprawling nuclear weapons facility made
>>>plutonium trigggers, small atomic bombs at the
>>>heart of each U.S. warhead.  The plant stopped production in 1989, after
>>>the FBI raided it seeking evidence of environmental crimes.  The raid
>>>confirmed many of the concerns peace and environmental activists voiced
>>>for years.  But that is far from the end
>>>of the stroy.
>>>
>>>Tune in to your local public radio station over the next few weeks as
>>this
>>>highly produced documentary explores the history of protest at Rocky
>>Flats
>>>from the early 1970's through present. Using rare archival tape and
>>recent
>>>interviews, these programs
>>>share the stories of many of the nation's leading anti-nuclear activists:
>>>Daniel Ellsberg, Helen Caldecott, Bonnie Raitt, Pam Solo, and Allen
>>>Ginsberg who read his famous "Plutonium Ode" while blockading the plant
>>in
>>>1978.  These compelling programs will
>>>put you back on the railroad tracks of resistance at Rocky Flats while
>>>bringing you up-to-date in understanding where the nuclear disarmament
>>>movement is headed.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
>
>                Tom Marshall
>            Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center
>                P.O. Box 1156
>                Boulder, CO  80306
>            ph: 303/444-6981    fax: [phone]
>
Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons.

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 18 Jan 1999 16:20:06 -0500
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Fwd: nukes and Y2K symposium

>Date: Fri, 15 Jan 1999 11:48:29 -0500
>Subject: nukes and Y2K symposium
>To: [e-mail]
>X-FC-Forwarded-From: [e-mail]
>From: [e-mail] ([e-mail])
>
>STAR (Standing for Truth About Radiation) is sponsoring a one-day
>symposium on nuclear power and weapons and Y2K issues, March 8 at the
>Cannon Caucus Room in the Cannon House Office Building in Washington,
>DC. The event is co-sponsored by NIRS and BASIC (British American
>Security Information Council).  Tentative speakers list includes Dr.
>Helen Caldicott of STAR; Michael Kraig, BASIC; Paul Gunter, NIRS; Dr.
>Michio Kaku; physicist Ted Taylor; John Pike, Federation of American
>Scientists, and more. For more information, contact STAR at
>[e-mail] or call STAR at 516.324.0655
>
>In other Y2K news, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has informed NIRS
>our three petitions for rulemaking on nuclear power and Y2K will be
>published in the Federal Register for public comment "imminently."
>However, the NRC says that at this point it will not support the
>petitions because it is not convinced it needs to "mandate" that
>utilities, for example, ensure their emergency diesel generators are
>operable and have sufficient fuel onsite; that non-Y2K-compliant
>reactors are shutdown by December 1, etc. The full text of NIRS'
>petitions is available at www.nirs.org
>
Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons.

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 18 Jan 1999 17:18:11 -0500
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) US Conditions for the CTB

Dear Friends,
We are hearing that Clinton will make a big push for CTBT ratification.
Does anyone know what India was promised to buy its ratification of the
CTB?  Originally, we asked that they sign it without conditions--but now
we're hearing that NSA's Sandy Berger thinks India will agree to sign.
Listed below is Clinton's letter to the Senate with the US conditions for
CTB ratification--Lest we forget!!  Peace, Alice



September 23, 1997

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

     I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the "Treaty" or
"CTBT"), opened for signature and signed by the United States at New York on
September 24, 1996.  The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and two
Annexes to the Protocol, all of which form integral parts of the Treaty. I
transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the
Department of State on the Treaty, including an Article-by-Article analysis
of the Treaty.

     Also included in the Department of State's report is a document
relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on the Establishment of a
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Organization, adopted by the Signatory States to the Treaty on November 19,
1996.  The Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in
preparing detailed procedures for implementing the Treaty and making
arrangements for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty.  In particular, by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory
Commission will be responsible for ensuring that the verification regime
established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at such time as
the Treaty enters into force.  My Administration has completed and will
submit separately to the Senate an analysis of the verifiability of the
Treaty, consistent with section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act,
as amended.  Such legislation as may be necessary to implement the Treaty
also will be submitted separately to the Senate for appropriate action.

     The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a signal
event in the history of arms control.  The subject of the Treaty is one that
has been under consideration by the international community for nearly 40
years, and the significance of the conclusion of negotiations and the
signature to date of more than 140 states cannot be overestimated.  The
Treaty creates an absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon
test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere.  Specifically, each
State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or
any other nuclear explosion; to prohibit and prevent any nuclear explosions
at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and to refrain from causing,
encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.[APPARENTLY THIS
DOESN'T INCLUDE SUB-CRITICAL TESTS EXPLOSIONS--A MAJOR OBJECTION RAISED BY
INDIA]
[FIRST HE SAID HE DIDN'T INHALE; THEN HE SAID HE DIDN'T HAVE SEX; NOW HE
SAYS HE'S NOT DOING NUCLEAR TESTS!]

     The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime, based on the
provision of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound data by a
global network (the "International Monitoring System") consisting of the
facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol.  Data provided by the
International Monitoring System will be stored, analyzed, and disseminated,
in accordance with Treaty-mandated operational manuals, by an International
Data Center that will be part of the Technical Secretariat of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization.  The verification regime
includes rules for the conduct of on-site inspections, provisions for
consultation and clarification, and voluntary confidence-building measures
designed to contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns
arising from possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to
chemical explosions that a State Party intends to or has carried out.
Equally important to the U.S. ability to verify the Treaty, the text
specifically provides for the right of States Parties to use information
obtained by national technical means in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law for purposes of verification
generally, and in particular, as the basis for an on-site inspection
request.  The verification regime provides each State Party the right to
protect sensitive installations, activities, or locations not related to the
Treaty.  Determinations of compliance with the Treaty rest with each
individual State Party to the Treaty.

     Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the Eisenhower
Administration.  During the period 1978-1980, negotiations among the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR (the Depositary Governments of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but
ended without agreement. Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon states called
for test-ban negotiations, the United States urged the Conference on
Disarmament (the "CD") to devote its attention to the difficult aspects of
monitoring compliance with such a ban and developing elements of an
international monitoring regime.  After the United States, joined by other
key states, declared its support for comprehensive test-ban negotiations
with a view toward prompt conclusion of a treaty, negotiations on a
comprehensive test-ban were initiated in the CD, in January 1994.  Increased
impetus for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the
end of 1996 resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in
conjunction with the indefinite and unconditional extension of that Treaty,
of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"
that listed the conclusion of a CTBT as the highest measure of its program
of action.

   On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a "zero yield"
CTBT, I stated that:

   ". . . As part of our national security strategy, the United States must
and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future
hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from
acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear
advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenance of a
safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the
United States.

   "I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear
weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear
deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program
without nuclear testing.  I directed the implementation of such a program
almost 2 years ago, and it is being developed with the support of the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  This
program will now be tied to a new certification procedure.  In order for
this program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must
provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program
over the next decade and beyond.  I am committed to working with the
Congress to ensure this support.

   "While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be
successful, as President I cannot dismiss the possibility, however unlikely,
that the program will fall short of its objectives. [HERE ARE THE US
CONDITIONS:]
Therefore,in addition to the new annual certification procedure for our
nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also establishing concrete, specific
safeguards that define the
conditions under which the United States can enter into a CTBT . . ."

   The safeguards that were established are as follows:

   The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a
high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in
the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective
and continuing experimental programs.

   The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in
theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology that will attract, retain,
and ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to
those programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.

   The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities
prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere
to this Treaty.

   The continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to
improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.

   The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and
analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive
information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development
programs, and related nuclear programs.

   The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed
by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE) -- advised by
the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of  DOE's nuclear weapons
laboratories, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command -- that a high
level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type
that the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent
could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the
Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard
"supreme national interests" clause in order to conduct whatever testing
might be required.  With regard to the last safeguard:

   The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the safety and reliability
of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter affecting the supreme interests
of the country and will regard any events calling that confidence into
question as "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
treaty." It will exercise its rights under the "supreme national interests"
clause if it judges that the safety or reliability of its nuclear weapons
stockpile cannot be assured with the necessary high degree of confidence
without nuclear testing.

   To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy --
advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council or "NWC" (comprising representatives
of DOD, JCS, and DOE), the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories
and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command -- will report to the
President annually, whether they can certify that the Nation's nuclear
weapons stockpile and all critical elements thereof are, to a high degree of
confidence, safe and reliable, and, if they cannot do so, whether, in their
opinion and that of the NWC, testing is necessary to assure, with a high
degree of confidence, the adequacy of corrective measures to assure the
safety and reliability of the stockpile, or elements thereof.  The
Secretaries will state the reasons for their conclusions, and the views of
the NWC, reporting any minority views.

   After receiving the Secretaries' certification and accompanying report,
including NWC and minority views, the President will provide them to the
appropriate committees of the Congress, together with a report on the
actions he has taken in light of them.

   If the President is advised, by the above procedure, that a high level of
confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to
the Nation's nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified without nuclear
testing, or that nuclear testing is necessary to assure the adequacy of
corrective measures, the President will be prepared to exercise our "supreme
national interests" rights under the Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.

   The procedure for such annual certification by the Secretaries, and for
advice to them by the NWC, U.S. Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear
weapons laboratories will be embodied in domestic law.  As negotiations on a
text drew to a close it became apparent that one member of the CD, India,
would not join in a consensus decision to forward the text to the United
Nations for its adoption.  After consultations among countries supporting
the text, Australia requested the President of the U.N. General Assembly to
convene a resumed session of the 50th General Assembly to consider and take
action on the text.  The General Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of
158 to 3 the Treaty was adopted.  On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was
opened for signature and I had the privilege, on behalf of the United
States, of being the first to sign the Treaty.

   The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its implementation to
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the "Organization"),
to be established in Vienna.  The Organization, of which each State Party
will be a member, will have three organs: the Conference of the States
Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.  The
Technical Secretariat will supervise the operation of and provide technical
support for the International Monitoring System, operate the International
Data Center, and prepare for and support the conduct of on-site inspections.
The Treaty also requires each State Party to establish a National Authority
that will serve as the focal point within the State Party for liaison with
the Organization and with other States Parties.

   The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of
instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to the
Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years after its being opened for
signature.  If, 3 years from the opening of the Treaty for signature, the
Treaty has not entered into force, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will convene a
conference of the states that have deposited their instruments of
ratification if a majority of those states so requests.  At this conference
the participants will consider what measures consistent with international
law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to
facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty.  Their decision on such
measures must be taken by consensus.

     Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the Treaty are
not permitted.  Reservations may be taken to the Protocol and its Annexes so
long as they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.
Amendment of the Treaty requires the positive vote of a majority of the
States Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened Amendment Conference
at which no State Party casts a negative vote.  Such amendments would enter
into force 30 days after ratification by all States Parties that cast a
positive vote at the Amendment Conference.  The Treaty is of unlimited
duration, but contains a "supreme interests" clause entitling any State
Party that determines that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty to withdraw
from the Treaty upon 6-month's notice.     Unless a majority of the Parties
decides otherwise, a Review Conference will be held 10 years following the
Treaty's entry into force and may be held at 10-year intervals thereafter if
the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a majority vote (or more
frequently if the Conference of the States Parties so decides by a
two-thirds vote).

     The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular significance
to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and strengthen
regional and global stability.  Its conclusion marks the achievement of the
highest priority item on the international arms control and nonproliferation
agenda. Its effective implementation will provide a foundation on which
further efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons can be soundly based.
By responding to the call for a CTBT by the end of 1996, the Signatory
States, and most importantly the nuclear weapon states, have demonstrated
the bona fides of their commitment to meaningful arms control measures.  The
monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of the CTBT exceed those
imposed by any previous nuclear test-related treaty.  Our current capability
to monitor nuclear explosions will undergo significant improvement over the
next several years to meet these challenges.  Even with these enhancements,
though, several conceivable CTBT evasion scenarios have been identified.
Nonetheless, our National Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the
Treaty's verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United
States with the means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable.  By this, I
mean that the United States: will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the
totality of information available in public and private channels, and the
mechanisms established by the Treaty) for addressing compliance concerns and
imposing sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and will thereby have the
means to: (a) assess whether the Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear
explosions (in terms of yields and number of tests) that could damage U.S.
security interests and constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and (b) take prompt and effective counteraction.     My judgment that the
CTBT is effectively verifiable also reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear
deterrence would not be undermined by possible nuclear testing that the
United States might fail to detect under the Treaty, bearing in mind that
the United States will derive substantial confidence from other factors --
the CTBT's "supreme national interests" clause, the annual certification
procedure for the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and the U.S. Safeguards program. I
believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the best
interests of the United States.  Its provisions will significantly further
our nuclear nonproliferation and arms control objectives and strengthen
international security.  Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and
favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to
ratification as soon as possible.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 22, 1997



Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons.

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

End of abolition-usa-digest V1 #58
**********************************

-
 To unsubscribe to $LIST, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe $LIST" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.