DP Tool Club 19/CD_ASCQ_19_010295.iso/vrac/com_gnd.zip/SAMPLER.DP

Common Ground | 1994-10-26 | 226KB | 676 lines

UltraShadow
sampler
CasqueOpenFace
A selection of writings
The complete documents are at
ftp.netcom.com, /pub/krusch
Internet Press
*  Knowledge at the blink of an eye
Bookman
^+Electronic Copyright
 1994 by Barry Krusch
PThis document may be (re-transmitted) by (any person, group, or organization) to
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Many other electronic mode of transmission) without (financial compensation to
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Uomitted or otherwise altered, other than for exclusively personal use). Permission is
Rgranted to make an unlimited number of hard copies of this electronic document for
Sany not-for-profit purpose.  The preceding right does not extend to documents saved
*in a format other than DP ELECTRONIC form.
SNOTE TO USER: The purpose of retaining copyright is to insure the textual integrity
of the following document.
Avant Garde
LAST UPDATED: October 26, 1994
7The latest version of this document may be obtained at
ftp.netcom.com
/pub/krusch
Stencil
introduction
Palatino
PDThis sampler document contains excerpts from various documents in my
Hdirectory at netcom.com.  I have prepared it for those who would like to
4preview the documents before downloading them first.
WHFor best results, print out the following pages.  They were typeset with
-printing in mind (not reading on the screen).
Minstrel
Barry Krusch
Stencil
from THE PRISONERS
 DILEMMA
Times
lCYou and a man named Jack are suspected of having committed an armed
HDrobbery, and you are each placed in separate jails, with no means of
Ocommunication.  Some hours later, a District Attorney enters your cell. You are
Rtold that there is enough evidence to convict both you and Jack on a lesser charge
Pof illegal possession of firearms, but not enough to convict on the more serious
Mcharge of armed robbery.  To avoid a lengthy trial, you are given a chance to
(confess, under the following conditions:
neither
)"5 you nor Jack confess, you will both be convicted of
illegal
possession
, which carries a sentence of
six months
 both
4 you and Jack confess, you will both get the MINIMUM
sentence
armed robbery
, which is
)2    two years
    only one
),&of you confesses, that person will be
considered a state witness
go free
)&.; the other will get the MAXIMUM sentence for
armed
robbery
, which is
twenty years
lNTo clarify this matrix of possibilities, you decide to construct the following
H#table, which you organize from the
fewest
)#' months you could possibly serve to the
! months you could possibly serve:
Helvetica Black
#POSSIBLE MONTHS THAT WILL BE SERVED
GIVEN THE POSSIBILITIES
CONFESSION POSSIBILITIES
I CONFESS, JACK DOESN'T
NOBODY CONFESSES
WE BOTH CONFESS
I DON'T CONFESS, JACK DOES
lJBefore you looked at this table, the answer seemed simple; neither you nor
HPJack should confess, thus limiting the time served by both of you to six months.
PBut then a thought enters your mind:
Jack must figure I don
t want to confess.
QYou decide to scan the table, and your eyes drop to the last row.  Uh oh.
Whoa
-if I don
t confess, and he does, he gets off
scot-free
no months in jail. Hmmm
HRthat
s a powerful incentive for him to confess!
 Then you look at the first row of
#the table.
Uh oh, there
s an even
worse
)!& incentive for him to give it up
H*incentive to confess!  How can Jack trust
when I can get off scot-free by
HRconfessing?
  Your mind is slowly changing, Dave, I can feel it. You decide to get
Reven more sophisticated by putting this analysis in a new table which contains the
+average results of the opposing strategies:
Helvetica Black
-    I CONFESS
I DON'T CONFESS
HE CONFESSES
HE DOESN
T CONFESS
AVERAGE RESULTS
Times
lDYup, looks pretty clear.  The average sentence you can serve with a
confess
strategy is
+ months, while the average sentence from a
t confess
 strategy is
H months.  Clear as day.  So, you confess.  And Jack, who knows you
re an
HPanalytical thinker just like him, chooses likewise.  You both end up serving two
Kyears, when simple cooperation would have reduced both your sentences by 75
Cpercent.  Thus operates the
logic
 of individualism embedded in a
Prisoners
Dilemma
 scenario.
Stencil
from  APHORISMS
Caslon 540 Roman
Every lamp needs an outlet.
Fear is the sweat of ignorance.
*$HWhy did they throw the dog a bone?  Because the dog was SATISFIED with a
bone.
People stuck at the
 never move on to the
from DIALOGUES TO THINK BY
Park Avenue
The Evolution of Cooperation
Oink.
Quack.
Quack
A and B beat up C.
%Reality is In the Eye of the Beholder
The Object
I see a
Psychologist:
projecting
Stencil
+TW,from THE ROLE OF FRAME ANALYSIS IN ENHANCING
THE TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE
Times
lKThe great power of frames leads to many different comprehension results, by
effecting how we
perceive
 reality,
categorize
reality, and
)G    evaluate
reality.  The
HPoutputs in our mind of
 and
different
 and
alien
familiar
 all take
Pplace within the context of how we take in information, a fact which has obvious
Kimplications for the theory of
common elements
 in transfer.  For example,
consider the items
Dolly Parton
Mozart
, and
    Babe Ruth
viewed through the
H    frame of
Dolly Parton
Mozart
)f    Babe Ruth
FEMALE
lCWithin this frame we see Mozart and Babe Ruth as
 (male), and
HVDolly Parton as
different
 (a female is not a male).   In this situation, within this
Lframe, Mozart and Babe Ruth are in the
majority.
  But Dolly is only in the
minority
 because we have chosen to view reality through that framework.  Note
(the re-ordering when we view through an
OCCUPATIONAL
 frame:
Dolly Parton
Mozart
)q    Babe Ruth
MUSICIAN
ATHLETE
lFNow Dolly is in
the majority.
 Are we to conclude from the above that
HTMozart is always fated to be in the majority?  No, since a third result obtains when
the items are viewed through a
NATIONALIST
 framework:
Times
Dolly Parton
Mozart
)v    Babe Ruth
AMERICAN
AUSTRIAN
lIHere we can see vividly that what counts as
common
 is a function of the
HPencoding and decoding framing processes used.  The question that remains is, how
Ncan these processes be used to facilitate transfer based on a theory of common
Kelements?  The answer is to utilize framing techniques to pitch educational
Iconcepts at the level that gives the greatest degree of transfer: at the
 level.
Stencil
from CLASSICAL CD HALL OF FAME
Delphian
CATEGORIES
ANGRY MUSIC
Palatino
Music by furious geniuses.
Garamond Narrow
Shostakovich:
Symphony No. 8
Corigliano:
Clarinet Concerto
Verdi:
Otello
Brahms:
Violin Concerto
BEAUTIFUL MUSIC
MThe kind of music that charms those savage beasts you've heard so much about.
Chopin:
)Q    Nocturnes
Dowland:
Pleasures of their Company
Dvorak:
)Q    Serenades
c    Gardiner:
)Q#Music for the Funeral of Queen Mary
Gorecki:
Symphony No. 3
Offenbach:
Suites for Two Cellos
Part:
Passio
Rachmaninoff:
Vespers
)BEST CD FOR PEOPLE NEW TO CLASSICAL MUSIC
BOLLING
 Suite for Flute and Jazz Piano
Rampal / Bolling / Milan
Minstrel
Accessibility:
Sound:
Great Track: 7
lZA wonderful CD to introduce people not only to the idiom of classical music, but also that
Hcof jazz.  This very accessible music deftly merges these two structures (the flute remaining in the
gclassical idiom, the piano generally in jazz), so seamlessly that one is not aware of this distinction.
fTwo weeks after its release, this CD was at the top of the Billboard charts, and kept its position for
]nearly two years, garnering gold and platinum records along the way.  The Suite stayed on the
Jcharts for a total of 530 weeks, in a virtual dead heat with Pink Floyd
Dark Side of the Moon
HXthe honor of being the album/CD with the record for that achievement.  When you hear the
dmusic, it
s not hard to see why.  As a bonus, the sound of this disc is impeccable: one of those too
HFrare moments when music, performance, and sound are all at their best.
Stencil
from DID YOU KNOW DEMOCRACY WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Times
lCThat the United States is a democracy would seem astonishing to our
HGFramers, who understood well the distinction between the two forms, and
,specifically authored the Constitution as a
check
) ! against democracy.  For those of
HPyou who haven
t yet been exposed to this bit of history, here are some essential
Epassages to read as a starting point in understanding our government.
$The following are quotes taken from
Federalist
, the series of articles
HFwritten by Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in support of the
KConstitution. They began by defining the distinction between the two forms:
A republic
C by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation
l-takes place, opens a different prospect, and
"promises the cure for which we are
seeking
8 Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure
    Democracy
, and
lNwe shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must
Cderive from the Union.  (all emphasis here and subsequent supplied)
    (FEDERALIST 10 Madison:24)
-The two great points of difference between a
Democracy
and a republic are: first,
lNthe delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest
)XA; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of
lCcountry, over which the latter may be extended. (emphasis supplied)
    (FEDERALIST 10 Madison:25)
JThe error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been
Runfolded and refuted in preceding papers.  I remark here only that it seems to owe
Hits rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a
    democracy
lPapplying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter.  The true
Rdistinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion.  It is,
that in a
)*    Democracy
):=, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a
lQrepublic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents.  A
    Democracy
):D, consequently, will be confined to a small spot.  A republic may be
extended over a large region.
    (FEDERALIST 14 Madison:2)
1[T]he same advantage which a republic has over a
    Democracy
, in controlling the
lEeffects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic . . .
    (FEDERALIST 10 Madison:33)
PUnder the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic
observations applicable to a
Democracy
)='only; and among others, the observation
lRthat it can never be established but among a small number of people, living within
a small compass of territory.
    (FEDERALIST 14 Madison:3)
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+fW(from THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FRAMERS
Caslon 540 Roman
 = The New Constitution to Cure the Prisoners
s Dilemma Disease
Times
D While their arguments for unity made eminent sense, the authors of
Federalist
):? had to counter an argument made by many: true, the Articles of
HFConfederation were imperfect, but it would be impossible to create any
Rgovernment that can control one nation of the size and scope of the United States.
PThe only answer, as these individuals saw it, was to divide up the United States
Minto three or four separate Nations, each distinct and supreme within its own
Osphere.  Though on looking back we can see that this would have been a disaster
L(considering the Civil War as just one example of what might have happened),
Ocertain men of the time were not similarly enlightened.  But Jay, Hamilton, and
6Madison were intuitively and empirically aware of the
Prisoners
 Dilemma
)r    .  It was
HStruly naive to think that separating the states would preserve harmony
  in fact,
the contrary was true:
MThe history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best
Hacquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons.  We may profit by their
Jexperience without paying the price which it cost them.  Although it seems
Kobvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one
Nnation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those
Dthree were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one
Manother.  Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental
Nnations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those
Onations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long
Iseries of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they
.were useful and assisting to each other. . . .
B Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
lNnations, would not the same thing happen?  Would not similar jealousies arise,
Nand be in like manner cherished?  Instead of their being "joined in affection"
Jand free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy
Lwould soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of
Oeach confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the
Lonly objects of their policy and pursuits.  Hence, like most other bordering
Mnations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in
"the constant apprehension of them.
Stencil
+}W#from WHY WE NEED A NEW CONSTITUTION
Times
l"THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DELAY
K[I]t would tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to
Iadd a new spring to the government, the utility of which would at best be
Oquestionable . . . [it] might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties
and inconveniences.
 Alexander Hamilton,
Federalist 65
)D%(on a separate body for Impeachments)
lNThe most obvious source of delay in Government due to the Separation of Powers
HVPrinciple as instituted in the Constitution is the Bicameral House
 every law must be
Vpassed in identical form by two separate Legislative bodies, a requirement that allows
Ufew laws to emerge unscathed. Even in 1776, this notion was seen as counterproductive
Pby an anonymous author, who wrote in
Four Letters on Interesting Subjects
 that
KThe notion of checking by having different houses, has but little weight in
Jit, when inquired into, and in all cases it tends to embarrass and prolong
Kbusiness; besides, what kind of checking is it that one house is to receive
Mfrom another? or which is the house that is most to be trusted to? . . . That
Asome kind of convenience might now and then arise from having two
Fhouses, is granted, and the same may be said of twenty houses; but the
Iquestion is, whether such a mode would not produce more hurt than good. .
J. . a perpetual and dangerous opposition would be kept up, and no business
>be got through: Whereas, were there a large, equal, and annual
Frepresentation in one house only, the different parties, by being thus
Hblended together, would hear each others arguments, which advantage they
2cannot have if they sit in different houses. . . .
AThe chief convenience arising from two houses is, that the second
lCmay sometimes amend small imperfections which would otherwise pass;
Lyet, there is nearly as much chance of their making alteration for the worse
Las the better; and the supposition that a single house may become arbitrary,
Gcan with more reason be said of two, because their strength is greater.
IBesides, when all the supposed advantages arising from two houses are put
Ltogether, they do not appear to balance the disadvantage.  A division in one
Fhouse will not retard business, but serves rather to illustrate; but a
?difference between two houses may produce serious consequences.
GThis warning, unfortunately, was not heeded by our Framers, even though
HLMadison acknowledged that
this complicated check on legislation may in some
Yinstances be injurious as well as beneficial . . .
 Over time, a Committee and Seniority
SSystem has been created in both houses of Congress which has exacerbated the latent
Vdefects of Bicameralism.  Under our Bicameral System as it exists in the 20th Century,
Jthe delay has been compounded in a way our anonymous author could not have
contemplated:
Times
+lRKIn order for the average bill to become a law it must be: (1) introduced in
Fboth the House of Representatives and the Senate; (2) referred by both
9houses to separate committees where hearings are held and
Frecommendations are made; (3) debated and passed in both chambers; (4)
Lsent to a conference committee if the versions passed in separate houses are
Edifferent; (5) approved by each house; and (6) signed into law by the
Bpresident.  Some bills, which overlap into more than one committee
Fjurisdiction in each house or must be sent to subcommittees, have even
 more obstacles to final passage.
>The passage of legislation is extremely difficult under such a
lHdecentralized system.  The multiple decision points through which a bill
Fmust pass require majority coalitions at each gate to push the measure
Kalong.  There is a complex division of labor in Congress.  Responsibilities
Efor specific policy areas are delegated among numerous committees and
Asubcommittees. There are 269 committees and subcommittees in both
Ihouses of Congress.  Broader issues, like the national defense, education
Jand health care are divided into smaller subissue categories for committee
consideration. . . .
CThe committees decide which bills will be reported to the floor for
lGdebate and which will be placed on the back burner of the congressional
Iagenda. Favorable committee reports do not necessarily ensure the passage
Kof the bill on the floor, but the more favorable the report from committee,
.the greater the probability for passage. . . .
>In the Eighty-ninth Congress (1965-1967), 26,566 measures were
lDintroduced, 4,200 were reported from committee and 810 became public
Ilaw.  A similar trend continued in the Ninety-seventh Congress:  although
Ffewer measures were introduced (only 13,240), 1,877 were reported from
Ecommittee and 473 became public law.  Thus, the committee system as a
Ggatekeeper of what is debated and what is not debated remains extremely
important . . .
GAs Greenberg (1986) noted, confirming the anonymous author of 1776, the
HWBicameral System inevitably led to the postponement of action, and has even changed the
Unature of the legislation ultimately passed.  The medium doesn
t allow every message:
I[T]he bicameral nature of Congress and its contrasting constituency bases
N[Districts vs. States] not only serve to slow down the pace of legislation but
Dalso significantly decrease the probability that any general purpose
Ilegislation will manage to wind its way to completion.  These elements of
Jthe constitutional organization of Congress make it halting, conservative,
Nand indecisive.  The Constitution further contributes to these characteristics
Kby specifying that only one-third of the Senate shall be up for election at
Eany one time, helping to insulate that body from the tides of popular
Msentiment.  By its constitutional organization, then, Congress faces barriers
)to decisive, popular, and unified action.
OWhile the Framers approved Bicameralism, they did so with no empirical evidence
H]of its ultimate effects, ultimate effects which were, in fact, seen by them as negative.  For
Sexample, the result of the Bicameral process was an enfeeblement of Government, and
Times
+HTEfeeble Government was seen as bad Government.  As Hamilton stated in
Federalist 70
A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill
Vexecuted, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government.
  Feeble
UGovernment, like a toothless watchdog, would bite neither mailmen nor burglars.  What
XHamilton wrote in a different context applies equally well to the Bicameral System:
Zmost to be expected from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative merit
@of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good.
The positive merit of doing good
 was made virtually impossible because of an
HYinstitutionalized and debilitating delay, a delay which was dangerous even in 1787, a far
#more relaxed time. As Jay wrote in
Federalist 64
lEThey who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have
Operceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration,
Jstrength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same
Gmanner or measure.  To discern and to profit by these tides in national
Iaffairs is the business of those who preside over them; and they who have
Ehad much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are
8occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are precious.
PThere could be no doubt that the Legislative process, stodgy by nature, would be
HUrendered even stodgier by the Bicameral requirement.  According to Justice William O.
VDouglas,
Legislative power . . . is slower to exercise [than Executive power].  There
Wmust be delay while the ponderous machinery of committees, hearings, and debates is put
Sinto motion.  That takes time; and while the Congress slowly moves into action, the
Temergency may take its toll.
  Delay feeds vicious circles, which are vicious enough
Qwithout help from Government.  Unsolved problems mount.  A failure to combat drug
Yabuse leads to crack addiction.  Crack addiction leads to crack babies.  The existence of
Tcrack babies leads to a diversion of medical resources to help the babies.  In turn,
Wresources need to be diverted to schools to help these children, many of whom are brain
HXdamaged, blind, or otherwise physically or mentally debilitated.  Thus, money that could
Uhave been used to create positive effects is wasted in attempting to counter negative
Teffects.  What most people would see as insane is inevitable, because in Washington,
<D.C., structural procrastination impedes fundamental action:
HA criticism often leveled at the U.S. Congress is its inability to enact
Clegislation concerned with pressing national problems without long,
Garduous delays.  It is not unusual for Congress to adjourn after a long
Hsession without having dealt with some urgent matter before it.  In past
Qyears it has failed, for example, to pass a fiscal year appropriations bill until
8months after the date when the actual fiscal year began.
@This lack of action handicaps orderly administration.  It is not
lEuncommon for Congress to approve minor, nondivisive measures in every
Ksession; moreover, in crises it can act quickly.  But often it is unable or
Munwilling to act on pressing problems unless they reach a crisis stage. . . .
Times
+lTSHazlitt (1942) understood that institutionalizing delay because it was occasionally
HTbeneficial was like refusing to teach people to think because some would think about
Tcommitting crimes:
A nation can erect a complicated set of hurdles and barriers to
_compel itself to delay decisions, but . . . [b]y the obstacles it erects, it discourages itself
Zfrom making any new decision, regardless of its merits.  The self-erected barriers tend to
Xbias its decision unduly against . . . proposed change.
  And Hamilton
s fears that
Rpositive merit of doing good
 would be in jeopardy have come to fruition. Today, a
Tpermanent stasis is apparent in Congress. As Representative Romano L. Mazzoli (D-KY)
Vstated,
There
s a frustration level.  It doesn
t seem like any problem is ever solved
around here.
QThus, the first defect of the Separation of Powers Principle as instituted in the
H]Constitution is that it creates delay in the face of a necessity for action.  But that
s only
the first problem.
Stencil
c"from THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION
Times
Article I, Section 2, Clause 4
Garamond
 :Every Representative shall appoint an Alternate, who shall
8serve for a single one-year term.  Every person shall be
>eligible to the office of Alternate who shall have attained to
;the age of twenty-one years, and been seven years a Citizen
;of the United States, and who shall, upon and subsequent to
<being appointed, be either in attendance at or a graduate of
8the Federal Academy, and without formal affiliation with
?any political party.  The Alternate shall serve in the District
5of the Representative as the intermediary between the
8Constituents of the District and the Representative, and
9shall have responsibility over services for Constituents.
=The Alternate shall refer Constituent requests for particular
<Legislation to the appropriate Legislative Committee.  If no
;Legislative Committee exists, the Alternate shall refer the
9Constituent to the Federal Committee.  No Alternate shall
>be eligible to the office of Representative until one year has
7elapsed from the end of his or her term, subject to the
exception of vacancy.
When vacancies happen in the
Representation from any State,
  the Executive Authority thereof
y7shall issue Writes of Election to fill such Vacancies.
the age
y6requirement for Representative shall, if necessary, be
6suspended, and the Alternate shall assume the vacancy.
0The Alternate shall be eligible for re-election.
lLVacancies may happen from various causes; resignation, disability, death, or
HQexpulsion.  The power to provide for vacancies is an obvious one, and this Clause
Yformerly assigned the power to the Governors of the States.  Unspecified in the Clause of
Uthe 1787 Constitution are the necessary temporal parameters regarding the issuance of
writs of election
 will a vacancy be filled if there are only six months left in the
Tterm? Ten? Twelve?  Generally, Governors did not call elections unless the unexpired
Uterm was over twelve months, due to the expense of a special election.  Consequently,
Times
+HRXunder this Clause, a District could conceivably be without representation for as long as
    one year.
UThe addition of the Alternate supersedes this passage.  In this regard, the Alternate
HWfunctions for the Representative in the same manner as the Vice-President functions for
Qthe President
 vacancies will be filled immediately.  However, the Alternate has
Yadditional obligations: the responsibility for constituent services, while serving as the
Zintermediary between the constituents of the District and the Representative, who is based
Yin Washington, D.C.  Thus, constituents will have direct contact with a Federal official.
ZAdditionally, it gives the Alternate, who will either be a graduate of the Federal Academy
Qor a third-year student, and who will in all likelihood be a future candidate for
WRepresentative, the opportunity to see first-hand the impact of Federal policies on the
Zlives of everyday people.  With this opportunity, the future candidate is out of the world
Wof abstractions and raw data and in the world of living, breathing human beings.  Along
Zwith this valuable
reality check,
 the Alternate is exposed to the concerns of the people
=who live in the District, the people s/he will one day serve.
JBecause the Alternate will be performing constituent services (freeing the
HWRepresentative from this time-consuming and potentially corrupting task), the Alternate
Twill become well-known in the District, and be able to build a
political base
 from
Kwhich to run for office.  Thus, a potential animosity may arise between the
ZRepresentative and the Alternate.  To ameliorate this potentially unhealthy situation, the
XAlternate is limited to a single one-year term (this also allows for more nominees to be
\exposed to the problems of the District).  As an additional precaution, the Alternate is not
Uallowed to run for election until one year after his or her term has expired, putting
Utemporal distance between the services performed for constituents and the Alternate
Zviews on National Policy.  Thus, the Alternate is more likely to be elected for his or her
Vviews, and not for services rendered to certain influential residents of the District.
UIn addition to performing constituent services, the Alternate will refer constituents
HOwho are either concerned with social problems, or who have proposals for future
Rlegislation, to the Legislative Committees set up for the purpose.  For example, a
Xconstituent concerned with the literacy problem will be referred to the Committee on the
LMonthly Book Program for Elementary School Children, or any one of the other
ZCommittees established to deal with the problem.  If the constituent is not satisfied with
Xany or all of these existing approaches, the constituent is invited to submit his or her
Tproposal for legislation dealing with the problem to the Federal Committee, which is
Xresponsible for the establishment of new Committees, subject to the rules established in
VSection Fifteen of this Article.  Under these Clauses, every taxpaying Citizen has the
Rsame freedom and authority granted to today
s lobbyists and special interests: the
5opportunity to place a proposal on the Public Agenda.
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