UltraShadow sampler CasqueOpenFace A selection of writings The complete documents are at ftp.netcom.com, /pub/krusch Internet Press * Knowledge at the blink of an eye Bookman ^+Electronic Copyright 1994 by Barry Krusch PThis document may be (re-transmitted) by (any person, group, or organization) to P(any other person, group, or organization) in (DP ELECTRONIC form only) via (any Jelectronic mode or media, including modem, storage on a BBS server, CD-ROM Sdistribution, DAT, Syquest, E-Mail, LocalTalk, Ethernet, FTP, ISDN, floppy disc, or Many other electronic mode of transmission) without (financial compensation to QInternet Press), provided that (no characters are added, substituted, rearranged, Uomitted or otherwise altered, other than for exclusively personal use). Permission is Rgranted to make an unlimited number of hard copies of this electronic document for Sany not-for-profit purpose. The preceding right does not extend to documents saved *in a format other than DP ELECTRONIC form. SNOTE TO USER: The purpose of retaining copyright is to insure the textual integrity of the following document. Avant Garde LAST UPDATED: October 26, 1994 7The latest version of this document may be obtained at ftp.netcom.com /pub/krusch Stencil introduction Palatino PDThis sampler document contains excerpts from various documents in my Hdirectory at netcom.com. I have prepared it for those who would like to 4preview the documents before downloading them first. WHFor best results, print out the following pages. They were typeset with -printing in mind (not reading on the screen). Minstrel Barry Krusch Stencil from THE PRISONERS DILEMMA Times lCYou and a man named Jack are suspected of having committed an armed HDrobbery, and you are each placed in separate jails, with no means of Ocommunication. Some hours later, a District Attorney enters your cell. You are Rtold that there is enough evidence to convict both you and Jack on a lesser charge Pof illegal possession of firearms, but not enough to convict on the more serious Mcharge of armed robbery. To avoid a lengthy trial, you are given a chance to (confess, under the following conditions: neither )"5 you nor Jack confess, you will both be convicted of illegal possession , which carries a sentence of six months both 4 you and Jack confess, you will both get the MINIMUM sentence armed robbery , which is )2 two years only one ),&of you confesses, that person will be considered a state witness go free )&.; the other will get the MAXIMUM sentence for armed robbery , which is twenty years lNTo clarify this matrix of possibilities, you decide to construct the following H#table, which you organize from the fewest )#' months you could possibly serve to the ! months you could possibly serve: Helvetica Black #POSSIBLE MONTHS THAT WILL BE SERVED GIVEN THE POSSIBILITIES CONFESSION POSSIBILITIES I CONFESS, JACK DOESN'T NOBODY CONFESSES WE BOTH CONFESS I DON'T CONFESS, JACK DOES lJBefore you looked at this table, the answer seemed simple; neither you nor HPJack should confess, thus limiting the time served by both of you to six months. PBut then a thought enters your mind: Jack must figure I don t want to confess. QYou decide to scan the table, and your eyes drop to the last row. Uh oh. Whoa -if I don t confess, and he does, he gets off scot-free no months in jail. Hmmm HRthat s a powerful incentive for him to confess! Then you look at the first row of #the table. Uh oh, there s an even worse )!& incentive for him to give it up H*incentive to confess! How can Jack trust when I can get off scot-free by HRconfessing? Your mind is slowly changing, Dave, I can feel it. You decide to get Reven more sophisticated by putting this analysis in a new table which contains the +average results of the opposing strategies: Helvetica Black - I CONFESS I DON'T CONFESS HE CONFESSES HE DOESN T CONFESS AVERAGE RESULTS Times lDYup, looks pretty clear. The average sentence you can serve with a confess strategy is + months, while the average sentence from a t confess strategy is H months. Clear as day. So, you confess. And Jack, who knows you re an HPanalytical thinker just like him, chooses likewise. You both end up serving two Kyears, when simple cooperation would have reduced both your sentences by 75 Cpercent. Thus operates the logic of individualism embedded in a Prisoners Dilemma scenario. Stencil from APHORISMS Caslon 540 Roman Every lamp needs an outlet. Fear is the sweat of ignorance. *$HWhy did they throw the dog a bone? Because the dog was SATISFIED with a bone. People stuck at the never move on to the from DIALOGUES TO THINK BY Park Avenue The Evolution of Cooperation Oink. Quack. Quack A and B beat up C. %Reality is In the Eye of the Beholder The Object I see a Psychologist: projecting Stencil +TW,from THE ROLE OF FRAME ANALYSIS IN ENHANCING THE TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE Times lKThe great power of frames leads to many different comprehension results, by effecting how we perceive reality, categorize reality, and )G evaluate reality. The HPoutputs in our mind of and different and alien familiar all take Pplace within the context of how we take in information, a fact which has obvious Kimplications for the theory of common elements in transfer. For example, consider the items Dolly Parton Mozart , and Babe Ruth viewed through the H frame of Dolly Parton Mozart )f Babe Ruth FEMALE lCWithin this frame we see Mozart and Babe Ruth as (male), and HVDolly Parton as different (a female is not a male). In this situation, within this Lframe, Mozart and Babe Ruth are in the majority. But Dolly is only in the minority because we have chosen to view reality through that framework. Note (the re-ordering when we view through an OCCUPATIONAL frame: Dolly Parton Mozart )q Babe Ruth MUSICIAN ATHLETE lFNow Dolly is in the majority. Are we to conclude from the above that HTMozart is always fated to be in the majority? No, since a third result obtains when the items are viewed through a NATIONALIST framework: Times Dolly Parton Mozart )v Babe Ruth AMERICAN AUSTRIAN lIHere we can see vividly that what counts as common is a function of the HPencoding and decoding framing processes used. The question that remains is, how Ncan these processes be used to facilitate transfer based on a theory of common Kelements? The answer is to utilize framing techniques to pitch educational Iconcepts at the level that gives the greatest degree of transfer: at the level. Stencil from CLASSICAL CD HALL OF FAME Delphian CATEGORIES ANGRY MUSIC Palatino Music by furious geniuses. Garamond Narrow Shostakovich: Symphony No. 8 Corigliano: Clarinet Concerto Verdi: Otello Brahms: Violin Concerto BEAUTIFUL MUSIC MThe kind of music that charms those savage beasts you've heard so much about. Chopin: )Q Nocturnes Dowland: Pleasures of their Company Dvorak: )Q Serenades c Gardiner: )Q#Music for the Funeral of Queen Mary Gorecki: Symphony No. 3 Offenbach: Suites for Two Cellos Part: Passio Rachmaninoff: Vespers )BEST CD FOR PEOPLE NEW TO CLASSICAL MUSIC BOLLING Suite for Flute and Jazz Piano Rampal / Bolling / Milan Minstrel Accessibility: Sound: Great Track: 7 lZA wonderful CD to introduce people not only to the idiom of classical music, but also that Hcof jazz. This very accessible music deftly merges these two structures (the flute remaining in the gclassical idiom, the piano generally in jazz), so seamlessly that one is not aware of this distinction. fTwo weeks after its release, this CD was at the top of the Billboard charts, and kept its position for ]nearly two years, garnering gold and platinum records along the way. The Suite stayed on the Jcharts for a total of 530 weeks, in a virtual dead heat with Pink Floyd Dark Side of the Moon HXthe honor of being the album/CD with the record for that achievement. When you hear the dmusic, it s not hard to see why. As a bonus, the sound of this disc is impeccable: one of those too HFrare moments when music, performance, and sound are all at their best. Stencil from DID YOU KNOW DEMOCRACY WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL? Times lCThat the United States is a democracy would seem astonishing to our HGFramers, who understood well the distinction between the two forms, and ,specifically authored the Constitution as a check ) ! against democracy. For those of HPyou who haven t yet been exposed to this bit of history, here are some essential Epassages to read as a starting point in understanding our government. $The following are quotes taken from Federalist , the series of articles HFwritten by Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in support of the KConstitution. They began by defining the distinction between the two forms: A republic C by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation l-takes place, opens a different prospect, and "promises the cure for which we are seeking 8 Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure Democracy , and lNwe shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must Cderive from the Union. (all emphasis here and subsequent supplied) (FEDERALIST 10 Madison:24) -The two great points of difference between a Democracy and a republic are: first, lNthe delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest )XA; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of lCcountry, over which the latter may be extended. (emphasis supplied) (FEDERALIST 10 Madison:25) JThe error which limits republican government to a narrow district has been Runfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I remark here only that it seems to owe Hits rise and prevalence chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy lPapplying to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The true Rdistinction between these forms was also adverted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a )* Democracy ):=, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a lQrepublic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A Democracy ):D, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. (FEDERALIST 14 Madison:2) 1[T]he same advantage which a republic has over a Democracy , in controlling the lEeffects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic . . . (FEDERALIST 10 Madison:33) PUnder the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a Democracy )='only; and among others, the observation lRthat it can never be established but among a small number of people, living within a small compass of territory. (FEDERALIST 14 Madison:3) Stencil +fW(from THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FRAMERS Caslon 540 Roman = The New Constitution to Cure the Prisoners s Dilemma Disease Times D While their arguments for unity made eminent sense, the authors of Federalist ):? had to counter an argument made by many: true, the Articles of HFConfederation were imperfect, but it would be impossible to create any Rgovernment that can control one nation of the size and scope of the United States. PThe only answer, as these individuals saw it, was to divide up the United States Minto three or four separate Nations, each distinct and supreme within its own Osphere. Though on looking back we can see that this would have been a disaster L(considering the Civil War as just one example of what might have happened), Ocertain men of the time were not similarly enlightened. But Jay, Hamilton, and 6Madison were intuitively and empirically aware of the Prisoners Dilemma )r . It was HStruly naive to think that separating the states would preserve harmony in fact, the contrary was true: MThe history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general the best Hacquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their Jexperience without paying the price which it cost them. Although it seems Kobvious to common sense that the people of such an island should be but one Nnation, yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those Dthree were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one Manother. Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental Nnations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those Onations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed, and for a long Iseries of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome than they .were useful and assisting to each other. . . . B Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four lNnations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, Nand be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" Jand free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy Lwould soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of Oeach confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the Lonly objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other bordering Mnations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in "the constant apprehension of them. Stencil +}W#from WHY WE NEED A NEW CONSTITUTION Times l"THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DELAY K[I]t would tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and to Iadd a new spring to the government, the utility of which would at best be Oquestionable . . . [it] might in practice be subject to a variety of casualties and inconveniences. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 65 )D%(on a separate body for Impeachments) lNThe most obvious source of delay in Government due to the Separation of Powers HVPrinciple as instituted in the Constitution is the Bicameral House every law must be Vpassed in identical form by two separate Legislative bodies, a requirement that allows Ufew laws to emerge unscathed. Even in 1776, this notion was seen as counterproductive Pby an anonymous author, who wrote in Four Letters on Interesting Subjects that KThe notion of checking by having different houses, has but little weight in Jit, when inquired into, and in all cases it tends to embarrass and prolong Kbusiness; besides, what kind of checking is it that one house is to receive Mfrom another? or which is the house that is most to be trusted to? . . . That Asome kind of convenience might now and then arise from having two Fhouses, is granted, and the same may be said of twenty houses; but the Iquestion is, whether such a mode would not produce more hurt than good. . J. . a perpetual and dangerous opposition would be kept up, and no business >be got through: Whereas, were there a large, equal, and annual Frepresentation in one house only, the different parties, by being thus Hblended together, would hear each others arguments, which advantage they 2cannot have if they sit in different houses. . . . AThe chief convenience arising from two houses is, that the second lCmay sometimes amend small imperfections which would otherwise pass; Lyet, there is nearly as much chance of their making alteration for the worse Las the better; and the supposition that a single house may become arbitrary, Gcan with more reason be said of two, because their strength is greater. IBesides, when all the supposed advantages arising from two houses are put Ltogether, they do not appear to balance the disadvantage. A division in one Fhouse will not retard business, but serves rather to illustrate; but a ?difference between two houses may produce serious consequences. GThis warning, unfortunately, was not heeded by our Framers, even though HLMadison acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some Yinstances be injurious as well as beneficial . . . Over time, a Committee and Seniority SSystem has been created in both houses of Congress which has exacerbated the latent Vdefects of Bicameralism. Under our Bicameral System as it exists in the 20th Century, Jthe delay has been compounded in a way our anonymous author could not have contemplated: Times +lRKIn order for the average bill to become a law it must be: (1) introduced in Fboth the House of Representatives and the Senate; (2) referred by both 9houses to separate committees where hearings are held and Frecommendations are made; (3) debated and passed in both chambers; (4) Lsent to a conference committee if the versions passed in separate houses are Edifferent; (5) approved by each house; and (6) signed into law by the Bpresident. Some bills, which overlap into more than one committee Fjurisdiction in each house or must be sent to subcommittees, have even more obstacles to final passage. >The passage of legislation is extremely difficult under such a lHdecentralized system. The multiple decision points through which a bill Fmust pass require majority coalitions at each gate to push the measure Kalong. There is a complex division of labor in Congress. Responsibilities Efor specific policy areas are delegated among numerous committees and Asubcommittees. There are 269 committees and subcommittees in both Ihouses of Congress. Broader issues, like the national defense, education Jand health care are divided into smaller subissue categories for committee consideration. . . . CThe committees decide which bills will be reported to the floor for lGdebate and which will be placed on the back burner of the congressional Iagenda. Favorable committee reports do not necessarily ensure the passage Kof the bill on the floor, but the more favorable the report from committee, .the greater the probability for passage. . . . >In the Eighty-ninth Congress (1965-1967), 26,566 measures were lDintroduced, 4,200 were reported from committee and 810 became public Ilaw. A similar trend continued in the Ninety-seventh Congress: although Ffewer measures were introduced (only 13,240), 1,877 were reported from Ecommittee and 473 became public law. Thus, the committee system as a Ggatekeeper of what is debated and what is not debated remains extremely important . . . GAs Greenberg (1986) noted, confirming the anonymous author of 1776, the HWBicameral System inevitably led to the postponement of action, and has even changed the Unature of the legislation ultimately passed. The medium doesn t allow every message: I[T]he bicameral nature of Congress and its contrasting constituency bases N[Districts vs. States] not only serve to slow down the pace of legislation but Dalso significantly decrease the probability that any general purpose Ilegislation will manage to wind its way to completion. These elements of Jthe constitutional organization of Congress make it halting, conservative, Nand indecisive. The Constitution further contributes to these characteristics Kby specifying that only one-third of the Senate shall be up for election at Eany one time, helping to insulate that body from the tides of popular Msentiment. By its constitutional organization, then, Congress faces barriers )to decisive, popular, and unified action. OWhile the Framers approved Bicameralism, they did so with no empirical evidence H]of its ultimate effects, ultimate effects which were, in fact, seen by them as negative. For Sexample, the result of the Bicameral process was an enfeeblement of Government, and Times +HTEfeeble Government was seen as bad Government. As Hamilton stated in Federalist 70 A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill Vexecuted, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government. Feeble UGovernment, like a toothless watchdog, would bite neither mailmen nor burglars. What XHamilton wrote in a different context applies equally well to the Bicameral System: Zmost to be expected from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative merit @of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good. The positive merit of doing good was made virtually impossible because of an HYinstitutionalized and debilitating delay, a delay which was dangerous even in 1787, a far #more relaxed time. As Jay wrote in Federalist 64 lEThey who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have Operceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration, Jstrength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same Gmanner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides in national Iaffairs is the business of those who preside over them; and they who have Ehad much experience on this head inform us, that there frequently are 8occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are precious. PThere could be no doubt that the Legislative process, stodgy by nature, would be HUrendered even stodgier by the Bicameral requirement. According to Justice William O. VDouglas, Legislative power . . . is slower to exercise [than Executive power]. There Wmust be delay while the ponderous machinery of committees, hearings, and debates is put Sinto motion. That takes time; and while the Congress slowly moves into action, the Temergency may take its toll. Delay feeds vicious circles, which are vicious enough Qwithout help from Government. Unsolved problems mount. A failure to combat drug Yabuse leads to crack addiction. Crack addiction leads to crack babies. The existence of Tcrack babies leads to a diversion of medical resources to help the babies. In turn, Wresources need to be diverted to schools to help these children, many of whom are brain HXdamaged, blind, or otherwise physically or mentally debilitated. Thus, money that could Uhave been used to create positive effects is wasted in attempting to counter negative Teffects. What most people would see as insane is inevitable, because in Washington, eligible to the office of Alternate who shall have attained to ;the age of twenty-one years, and been seven years a Citizen ;of the United States, and who shall, upon and subsequent to be eligible to the office of Representative until one year has 7elapsed from the end of his or her term, subject to the exception of vacancy. When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof y7shall issue Writes of Election to fill such Vacancies. the age y6requirement for Representative shall, if necessary, be 6suspended, and the Alternate shall assume the vacancy. 0The Alternate shall be eligible for re-election. lLVacancies may happen from various causes; resignation, disability, death, or HQexpulsion. The power to provide for vacancies is an obvious one, and this Clause Yformerly assigned the power to the Governors of the States. Unspecified in the Clause of Uthe 1787 Constitution are the necessary temporal parameters regarding the issuance of writs of election will a vacancy be filled if there are only six months left in the Tterm? Ten? Twelve? Generally, Governors did not call elections unless the unexpired Uterm was over twelve months, due to the expense of a special election. Consequently, Times +HRXunder this Clause, a District could conceivably be without representation for as long as one year. UThe addition of the Alternate supersedes this passage. In this regard, the Alternate HWfunctions for the Representative in the same manner as the Vice-President functions for Qthe President vacancies will be filled immediately. However, the Alternate has Yadditional obligations: the responsibility for constituent services, while serving as the Zintermediary between the constituents of the District and the Representative, who is based Yin Washington, D.C. Thus, constituents will have direct contact with a Federal official. ZAdditionally, it gives the Alternate, who will either be a graduate of the Federal Academy Qor a third-year student, and who will in all likelihood be a future candidate for WRepresentative, the opportunity to see first-hand the impact of Federal policies on the Zlives of everyday people. With this opportunity, the future candidate is out of the world Wof abstractions and raw data and in the world of living, breathing human beings. Along Zwith this valuable reality check, the Alternate is exposed to the concerns of the people =who live in the District, the people s/he will one day serve. JBecause the Alternate will be performing constituent services (freeing the HWRepresentative from this time-consuming and potentially corrupting task), the Alternate Twill become well-known in the District, and be able to build a political base from Kwhich to run for office. Thus, a potential animosity may arise between the ZRepresentative and the Alternate. To ameliorate this potentially unhealthy situation, the XAlternate is limited to a single one-year term (this also allows for more nominees to be \exposed to the problems of the District). As an additional precaution, the Alternate is not Uallowed to run for election until one year after his or her term has expired, putting Utemporal distance between the services performed for constituents and the Alternate Zviews on National Policy. Thus, the Alternate is more likely to be elected for his or her Vviews, and not for services rendered to certain influential residents of the District. UIn addition to performing constituent services, the Alternate will refer constituents HOwho are either concerned with social problems, or who have proposals for future Rlegislation, to the Legislative Committees set up for the purpose. For example, a Xconstituent concerned with the literacy problem will be referred to the Committee on the LMonthly Book Program for Elementary School Children, or any one of the other ZCommittees established to deal with the problem. If the constituent is not satisfied with Xany or all of these existing approaches, the constituent is invited to submit his or her Tproposal for legislation dealing with the problem to the Federal Committee, which is Xresponsible for the establishment of new Committees, subject to the rules established in VSection Fifteen of this Article. Under these Clauses, every taxpaying Citizen has the Rsame freedom and authority granted to today s lobbyists and special interests: the 5opportunity to place a proposal on the Public Agenda. $,'&# p(0@ @@H8 xTp0` xTp0` xTp0` xTp0` ph`@` K9)8=>?+*CA20 4$#F(- % GH'5D6" p 0p`P `X0x $,'&# K9)8=>?+*CA20 4$#F(- % GH'5D6" temp.0001 Barry Krusch Barry Krusch Microsoft Word Bookman Palatino Times Avant Garde Garamond Minstrel UltraShadow Garamond Narrow Delphian CasqueOpenFace Stencil9 Caslon 540 Roman:N Park Avenue:~ Helvetica Black K(C8K(C8 K(C8K(C8 rPREC ~PRVS &FNMS