Hacker Chronicles 1/HACKER1.ISO/cud3/cud326b.txt

Text File | 1992-09-20 | 7KB | 130 lines

Date: Mon, 15 Jul 91 02:21:46 CDT
From: "William  Vajk (igloo)" <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 2-- The Vajk-Spaf-Leichter dialogue continues......

More Questions....
====================

I have read Jerry Leichter's response in CuD 3.24, and have received
mail from Thomas Klotzbach which has also been submitted by him for
publication in CuD.

As a direct result of the issues raised by these two gentlemen, I
spent the better part of a day in one of the law libraries provided by
Cook County, Illinois, for use by the public. Instead of having
answers, the review of copyright laws in 17 USC only created more new
questions, which I'll address another time in yet another article.

Briefly stated, copyright laws do the best job of protecting tangible
goods wherein the expression constitutes the primary value. In other
cases where a visual rendition is possible but does not represent the
real value of the object, as with musical scores, the public
production rights also glean protection, but the primary purpose is to
preclude unauthorized reproduction of tangible medium versions.

It would seem that copyright protections for source code, as in UNIX
source code, is rather minimal. Indeed, rereading the Rose indictment
>from Maryland and the plea bargain, copyright is never mentioned. In
detail, the Rose case becomes further complicated in that he received
the code from a bailee.

Klotzbach is correct in one comment that there are criminal aspects to
copyright violations. They fall, however, in a particularly narrow
range, requiring willful action AND profit motive on part of the
miscreant. If you don't sell it, copyright law isn't applicable to
prosecution as a criminal.

I was unable to discover the exact requirements currently mandate for
deposit of software in order to support a copyright. The Rose
indictment calls the source code "confidential and proprietary." It is
confidential in an AT&T security employee's dream, and that's about
the extent. Leichter suggests that AT&T could claim to have never
published the source code. This would be true if sale or offer to sell
were a requirement. 17 USC addresses these issues with the term "vend"
instead of "sell." The source code we're talking about has been
published all right, and is in no way entitled to a "trade secret"
status.

Leichter defends the errors made by law enforcement, stipulating that
they have to learn how to deal with computer crime. Agreed, in
principle, but not in detail. The problems I am addressing have to do
with the general approach law enforcement seems to be taking to
solving all crime these days. The Constitution hasn't changed
recently. Essentially the same rules have applied to investigations.
What does an officer have to learn about computer criminality in order
to keep him from kicking in two doors because some law abiding
individual tried to get into a bbs that was no longer a bbs ? What
does he have to be taught in order to have the patience necessary to
simply wait for the guy to get home from work, and ask a few questions
? We are seeing some of the fallout from our permissiveness regarding
RICO.

These issues have nothing to do with computer criminality as opposed
to using sensible investigative techniques. Are we in an age where
we've been subjected to so many shoot-em-up cops versus the bad guys
TV shows that people here on usenet, among the best educated, most
sensible souls in the US, can accept kicking in doors and summary
confiscation of personal property as a valid and reasonable outcome
>from calling the wrong phone number a few times ?

We have a nation which based its laws on personal freedoms and rights
before any other consideration. Let's please try to remember the
importance of this simple philosophy.

CuD 3.25 arrived as I was finishing this article. A couple of points
for Gene Spafford to contemplate come to mind. He asks why it is that
I criticize him personally. The answer is simple. The way the articles
by Spafford have been written, it is impossible to separate the
concepts from the man. His style is the same in Communications of the
ACM. Interestingly, I have been criticized by him exactly in the same
way as he complained regarding my statements about him. I expected it.
I suppose Spafford didn't. These opinions are pretty personal. They
can hardly be discussed at arm's length.  It is not any more remote to
ask if readers find statements hypocritical, or the individual (see
Spafford's comments in referenced CuD.) I am not insulted by
Spafford's opinion. He holds it, he's entitled to it, I won't argue
the point. (Where do you cut notches, Spaf? :-)

Spafford asks a direct question of me to which I am happy to reply:

> If Joe Random were to shoot someone in front of witnesses, he would
> be innocent under the law until a jury returned a verdict in a trial,
> but he would NOT be innocent of the act. Would any witness to the
> crime, or anyone who spoke to the witness, then be equally condemned
> by Mr. Vajk for saying "Joe was not innocent of murder" before the
> conclusion of the trial?

Yes.

A witness can justly say "I saw him shoot the guy." A person who spoke
to a witness might reasonably say "He said he saw Joe Random shoot the
guy." Anyone can say "I believe Joe is guilty" and still be fair and
reasonable.  But to state someone IS guilty is the duty of the jury
(or judge.) We, all of us, have reserved that right to the judicial
process. I cannot fathom why anyone would be inclined to change that
now. When one begins to assume these responsibilities on themselves,
it becomes easy to victimize even individuals who haven't been charged
with crimes by painting them with a wide black brush of presumed
guilt. We've seen it happen, right here on this network. It has also
been called the tyranny imposed by the self-righteous.

And finally:

> ...one cannot champion free speech without also embracing the responsibility
> to to respect others who choose to exercise that right -- disagreement with
> views should not become contempt for people who (appear to) espouse them.

Of course it is possible to respect another's right to freedom of
expression while holding them in contempt. I respect the rights of
Nazis to march in Skokie.  If asked to testify regarding their rights,
I would most likely state that 'I believe this swill must be permitted
to march. Please issue the necessary permits.' I certainly will never
respect them in any way.

I don't, however, see anything hypocritical about respecting some
particular individual for some aspects regarding them, and detest
other aspects concurrently. Most of us aren't particularly narrow.

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