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- [ It Is Not Obvious That A Machine Can Think ] [ By The GNN ]
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- IT IS NOT OBVIOUS THAT A MACHINE CAN THINK
- by THE GNN/DualCrew-Shining/uXu
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- It is popular for AI-researchers to claim that a mere computer program can
- simulate human thinking. The argument is quite easy to understand: since the
- mind is nothing more than the human brain, and the human brain is nothing
- more than cells, and cells are nothing more... etc., we need only copy the
- data of the smallest parts into a computer program and thus gain a
- fully-working model of the human brain.
- If we conceptually connect 'intelligence' with 'thinking' there is no
- problem. A pocket calculator 'thinks' within this definition. However, if we
- connect 'thinking' with 'consciousness', we enter a different realm. A pocket
- calculator has no consciousness; it has no concept about its own thinking.
- Can we gain the same sort of consciousness that we will find in a human
- being by merely copying the data of the brain into a computer program? Yes,
- some say - and repeat: since the consciousness is built upon the construction
- of the brain, we need only to copy the smallest parts into the program and
- so-and-so... we will get something that is identical to the human mind.
- But unfortunately, this is not a fact. If we want a consciousness that is
- like the human brain, a computer program will not do. The reason why the
- scientists believe this is because there is an inherent ambiguity in the very
- argument about identity that they use.
- To see this, let us distinguish between two different kinds of identity:
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- A-identity: The color of yellow requires the chemical constitution ABC.
- I.e., if we mix A, B and C we get a yellow paint. However, we
- can obtain the same kind of yellow color by mixing G, N, and Q.
- ABC and GNQ are two different sorts of chemical constructions
- but gives us the same kind of yellow. They are A-identical.
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- B-identity: Say that I enter a machine that scans my physical constitution,
- and constructs a copy of me with the help of the same sorts of
- particles. The person that I would meet after the copying would
- be exactly like me. We would be B-identical, our chemical
- particles would be of the same sort, but it would of course not
- be the same particles (I mean, I use them myself!).
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- It is obvious that A-identity and B-identity are not of the same kind. It
- would be wrong to claim that ABC and GNQ are the same sort of chemical
- constitution: it is a contradiction in terms.
- But me and my copy are of the same chemical constitution. We _are_ of the
- same kind, contrary to the two yellow colors that merely _look_ like as if
- they were of the same kind.
- When one copies 'the data of a human brain into a computer program' one
- gains A-identity, not B-identity. Because a computer program is not like the
- human brain in its physical constitution, which is a fact. However, the
- AI-scientists seems to believe that A-identity and B-identity is virtually
- the same thing. They mix their very way of gaining A-identity with the way
- one gains B-identity.
- All properties that belong to me as a person are in the copy of me if and
- only if we are B-identical. If we are merely A-identical, this is not the
- case. Now, some might say that the whole problem is trivial. Of course, the
- computer program will not be exactly like a human mind. It is, after all, not
- a brain but a program!
- But has the program a special sort of consciousness that need not be like
- the human mind, but alike? This is not obviously so (but then, it is not
- impossible either). Only because we have an A-identity between x and y,
- whereas x has the property p, it does not automatically (or conceptually)
- follow that y has, by necessity, this property too. Therefore, it is not
- correct to suppose that a mere computer program that simulates the human
- brain has consciousness.
- Something that would follow quite naturally from the above is a clear
- definition of what a 'consciousness' is - but that I do not have.
- But on the other hand, that is a completely different question.
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- uXu #392 Underground eXperts United 1997 uXu #392
- Call THE YOUNG GODS -> +351-1XX-XXXXX
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