home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
Text File | 2003-06-11 | 46.3 KB | 1,425 lines |
-
- ### ###
- ### ###
- ### #### ### ### ### ####
- ### ### ##### ### ###
- ### ### ### ### ###
- ### ### ##### ### ###
- ########## ### ### ##########
- ### ###
- ### ###
-
- Underground eXperts United
-
- Presents...
-
- ####### ## ## ####### # # ####### #### #######
- ## ## ## ## ##### ## ## ## ##
- #### ## ## #### # # ####### ## #######
- ## ## ## ## ##### ## ## ##
- ## ## ####### ####### # # ####### ###### #######
-
- [ The Voter's Paradox ] [ By Leon Falkins ]
-
-
- ____________________________________________________________________
- ____________________________________________________________________
-
-
-
- 6330 words
- First Serial Rights
- (c) Leon Felkins, 1994
-
-
-
-
- THE VOTER'S PARADOX
-
-
- (The Conflict of Group Interest and Individual Rationality)
-
-
- by
-
-
- Leon Felkins
-
- leonf@nancy.msfc.nasa.gov
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Version: 6/18/94
-
-
-
-
-
- [Note, this is an abbreviated version of a work now in
- progress to be published in the near future.]
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Introduction
-
- Diabolical Choices of the Individual in a
- Group
-
- Related Philosophical Dilemmas
-
- Definition of the Paradox
-
- Exploring all sides of the issue
-
- Public Vs Private Solutions
-
- The Paradox in other Dimensions
-
- Time
-
- Looking out for Future Generations
-
- The Classic Definition
-
- The Extended Definition
-
- Rational Behavior
-
- The Rationale for being Rational
-
- "Rational Behavior" defined
-
- Limited Resources and Tradeoffs
-
- Internal Programming
-
- The Perceived Environment
-
- Good feelings
-
- Is it a good thing?
-
- My Reputation
-
- The Motivating Forces behind Good
-
- Feelings
-
- The Programming - Genes and
-
- Memes
-
- The Current Environment
-
- Our Perceptions
-
- Ignorance ("extra rational")
-
- Detailed Analysis
-
- The Net Return
-
- BG
-
- Community Center built from
-
- Volunteer Contributions
-
- Volunteers save the Town by
-
- Sandbagging the Levee
-
- BI
-
- Contribution to Public
-
- Television
-
- C
-
- The "Holistic" effects
-
- Impact of Infinite Vs Finite payoff
-
- The impact of Discreet results
-
- "But my vote might break the tie"
-
- The Wasted Vote Myth
-
- The Impact of Large size with some
- randomness
-
- A change so small it cannot be detected
-
- Impact of group size
-
- The Size of the Group
-
- Anonymity
-
- The Psychological
-
- Cost/Benefits
-
- Behavior and the size of the
- group
-
- Freeloaders
-
- But what if everyone did that?
-
- Examples
-
- Cutting off my nose to spite my face
-
- Ramifications
-
- Crime
-
- Social acceptability of criminal
- activity
-
- Decrease in expected punishment
-
- Reduced expectation of actually being
- punished
-
- Sex
-
- Politics
-
- Government
-
- Ways to Remove the Paradox
-
- Directly tying the return to the cost
-
- Small Groups
-
- Coercion and other outside inducements
-
- Using the Government to do your dirty
- work
-
- Environmental Groups
-
- Funding of the arts
-
- Summary
-
- Societal Problems resulting from the VP
-
- Many do cooperate and that is enough for
- success in many situations
-
- References
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- I. Introduction
-
-
-
- A. Diabolical Choices of the Individual in a Group
-
- When an individual has reason to contribute to what is
- basically a group activity in which the benefits of the
- group activity are shared by the group, certain puzzling
- phenomena are evident that can only be described as
- "diabolical". While there is no generally accepted
- terminology for these phenomena, various manifestations are
- often referred to as the "Voter's Paradox", the "Volunteer's
- Paradox", the "Tragedy of the Commons", and similar terms.
-
- The definition for "paradox" used in this essay is "a
- person, situation, act, etc. that seems to have
- contradictory or inconsistent qualities" from Webster's
- dictionary. Basically, what we have is two apparently
- contradictory truths in the same phenomena.
-
- Strangely, the "Voter's Paradox" manifestation seems to
- be a double paradox. The first can be expressed as, "while
- it is true that a particular endeavor would return a benefit
- to all members of the group where each individual would
- receive rewards that more than compensate for each
- individual's contribution, it is also true that any
- particular individual would receive an even greater net
- return by not contributing anything". I will call this the
- "freerider" aspect.
-
- The second paradox is that, "while it is true that the
- outcome of a group effort is made up of the sum of the
- individual efforts, in many cases a particular individual's
- contribution makes no significant and/or measurable impact
- on the outcome". I will call this the "my vote doesn't
- count" aspect.
-
- Let us make sure we have a clear understanding of what
- we are talking about as the insinuation that a paradox
- exists is a serious assertion. Utmost precision is required
- to insure that we are not just experiencing a problem of
- sloppy thinking here.
-
- The claim is that a situation can exist such that: (1);
- while everyone would be better off if everyone contributed
- (cooperating), a particular individual is always better off
- not contributing (defecting) and (2); the individual's
- contribution will not effect the outcome anyway. The reader
- should not be too quick to cynically regard this assertion
- as some academic pathological construct. On the contrary, I
- will attempt to show in this essay that the situation
- described is extremely common by providing examples
- occurring in all walks of life.
-
- B. Related Philosophical Dilemmas
-
- Some logical philosophers claim that the Voter's
- Paradox is a special case of another well known peculiar
- situation called the "Prisoner's Dilemma". In the Prisoner's
- Dilemma, a situation is described in which rewards are in
- amounts such that it would be in the long term best
- interests of the participants to cooperate but the short
- term best interests of an individual is to defect. That is,
- if you played the game over and over and you added up
- everyone's score, the total would be a maximum if everyone
- cooperated all the time. Yet a logical player is presented a
- payoff matrix that pays most for defection in every single
- play. The situation we want to discuss here, "The Voter's
- Paradox", is similar in the conflict in payoffs but
- otherwise is much different from "The Prisoner's Dilemma" -
- and is much more common in the real world.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- II. Definition of the Paradox
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- A. Exploring all sides of the issue
-
- It is the rule rather than the exception that the
- contribution a person would make to some group activity will
- exceed the benefit that individual might receive in return
- from being a member of the group. The voting example is a
- particularly good example of this phenomena in that it can
- easily be shown that one vote is highly unlikely to do any
- good whatsoever while there is cost to the person making the
- vote (admittedly small, usually).
-
- The good news is that people do not always act
- "rationally" - in the sense just described. In fact, most of
- the time, enough people cooperate in these situations of
- public good such that the collective effort does not fail.
-
- In this article I will try to comprehensively explore
- these conflicts between the interests of the individual and
- the group. I will examine the question of why, in situations
- in which collective action is involved, do people cooperate
- when it is often not it their best interests to do so.
- Actually it is more difficult to explain why people
- cooperate rather than not.
-
- My attempt in this essay is to define the phenomena of
- the so-called "Voter's Paradox" (which I will abbreviate to
- "VP" for convenience) and related phenomena as clearly as
- possible. While it is recognized that the impact of the VP
- on our daily lives is enormous1. the primary purpose of this
- essay is to present the paradox itself in enough detail such
- that the phenomena can be clearly understood and evaluated.
-
- When the VP is presented to most people, the typical
- response is "But what if everyone did that"? Upon the most
- casual examination, the question turns out to be quite
- ridiculous. If everyone chose not to vote then the election
- would fail. That's the answer, but it has nothing to do with
- the VP.
-
- Let us examine the two cases:
-
- 1. Everyone behaves as usual. Result: my
- choice to not vote has no impact.
-
- 2. Everyone chooses not to vote. Result: my
- choice to not vote still doesn't do anything
- (Strangely, if I chose to vote, my vote might
- now be significant!)
-
- Is there a problem of my action of not voting
- influencing others to do the same? Not very likely. It is
- very difficult for the private citizen to influence others
- even if he or she tried. Practically speaking, my actions in
- any group large enough for anonymity, are not likely to have
- any impact on what others do.
-
-
-
- 1. Public Vs Private Solutions2
-
- Many people that have the means to do so, accepting
- that an individual investment into the solution to a public
- problem nets a very minuscule return, take the matter in
- their own hands and sponsor a private solution. For example,
- if the community's public water supply is running low,
- rather than contributing to the public fund, a person may
- elect to put in his own pump.
-
- 2. The Paradox in other Dimensions
-
- a) Time
-
- The VP can be displayed in time as well as space. For
- example, in a long project in which the end date is subject
- to significant variability, what difference would taking a
- day off make?
-
- Most likely, it would make no difference at all. Most
- large projects have definate break points in time for the
- major milestones. If you miss the due date, the impact could
- be severe. But if you are early, a day one way or the other
- will make no difference in the final outcome.
-
- But what if I take lots of days off? There you go
- again. That is still a meaningless question since we were
- only talking about one day's impact on the final result.
-
- b) Looking out for Future Generations
-
- Why should I make significant sacrifices for the
- benefit of those yet to come? Even if I consume a great part
- of the Earth's resources and just leave garbage and
- contamination, I will likely not live to see the
- consequences. It is difficult for a rational person to give
- up very much for the generations that come after his or her
- death.
-
- There is the possibility that our actions today may
- spell the end of humanity. What if our selfish actions today
- results in the destruction of the survival resources of the
- earth? What if the war machines we build create a very high
- probability that the Earth will be destroyed? Should I
- sacrifice my safety and immediate financial rewards?
-
- Here we have a double whammy of the VP. First, will
- anything I do as an individual affect what the mass of
- humanity receives in rewards? No. Second will anything I do
- affect future generations to come? Possibly, but I will not
- be here.
-
- B. The Classic Definition
-
- Consider a group with two or more members and a
- situation in which the group as a whole would benefit from
- certain actions of the individuals in the group. While it is
- not necessary that the benefits be shared equally, we will
- assume that all members get some portion of the benefits and
- that a portion received by a member is not dependent on
- his/her contribution. The contribution of the individual is
- voluntary.
-
- Under these conditions, so common to modern society,
- the payoff to the individual (share of group benefit minus
- his/her cost) is usually optimum when the individual does
- nothing at all!
-
- Further, we can assume that if all or most of the
- members of the group contribute, all members of the group
- would benefit more than they would if there was not
- cooperation. That is, if most or all would contribute, the
- return for each individual is greater than it would be if
- each kept his or her contribution and proceeded alone. A
- valid assumption since otherwise there would be little
- reason to cooperate in the first place.
-
- In summary, in this classic "individuals may volunteer
- but everyone benefits" scenario, it is evident that the
- decision to do nothing is always the best strategy
- regardless of what the rest of the group does since the
- individual partakes of the benefits whether he or she
- contributes or not.
-
- C. The Extended Definition
-
- The classic definition, as described above, suffers
- from the criticisms that it is too general, leaves out some
- additional complicating details, and does not include real
- world secondary reactions that would impact a "rational"
- person's reasoning. An example of "complicating details" is
- the binary nature of elections. And many will suggest that
- secondary effects such as a person's reputation may
- completely override such "rational" decisions to be
- uncooperative.
-
- I will try to examine these additional details by
- extending the definition in several ways.
-
- D. Rational Behavior
-
- 1. The Rationale for being Rational
-
- The theme of this essay is based on the concept that a
- person should be rational. Rather complex philosophical
- arguments can be made that this may not always be the case.
- Some would argue that ignorance is best for most of humanity
- and evidence from recent history would seem to support this
- in that it appears that for much of the world, the loss of
- innocence seems to be closely correlated with diminished
- happiness.
-
- These arguments lead in to philosophical morass that
- any study of would be far outside of the scope of this
- article. Therefore, in this essay, we will assume that it is
- in the best interests of an individual to be rational.
-
- 2. "Rational Behavior" defined
-
- To make any progress in the study of this apparent
- dilemma, the concept of "rational behavior" has to be
- carefully defined. Unfortunately, that is extremely
- difficult. Reviewing references in support of this essay
- revealed that most authors avoid the subject alltogether.
-
- This essay places much emphasis on rational behavior.
- In particular, statements are made that supporting the
- group's interest over the individual's interest is most
- likely not "rational". So, when we say a person acts
- irrationally, what do we mean? Do we mean that the person
- had good information but ignored it or that the person had
- bad information,thought it was correct, and acted logically
- based on that information?
-
- For the purposes of this analaysis, "rational behavior"
- means that behavior that would actually provide a good
- return for the person's contribution - based on the
- currently available information whether that information is
- correct or not (an action can be rational even if the
- information available is faulty or erroneous). This does not
- require optimality but does require that the return to the
- individual be at least equal to the cost to the individual.
- When there are alternate paths to take and a choice must be
- made, a rational choice would be the one that would provide
- the best actual return to the individual making the choice
- (assuming correct information).
-
- It comes as no surprise that a person's perceptions
- and/or a person's internal programming can cause irrational
- behavior - based on the above definition.
-
- 3. Limited Resources and Tradeoffs
-
- The person having unlimited resources is a rarity. By
- far, most of us are burdened by the fact that every
- contribution of time and/or resource to any particular
- action is at the cost to all other actions we might take
- with that time and/or resource. That is, when we ponder
- whether we can contribute $10 to some particular activity
- that would result is some reward, a rational person must
- consider the impact of the loss of that ten bucks to all
- other potentially rewarding activities.
-
- 4. Internal Programming
-
- How a person reacts to the environment is determined by
- that person's internal programming. For the purpose of this
- analysis, that programming is considered to consist of two
- categories: genes and memes. An excellent discussion on both
- of these forces is contained in Dr. Dawkin's book, The
- Selfish Gene3. Also, see the essay by Henson4. For our
- purposes here it should be sufficient to say that "memes"
- are those psychological forces that become instilled in a
- person from learning and societal influences.
-
- 5. The Perceived Environment
-
- The individual must act in any situation on his or her
- perception of the environment and the expected results of
- whatever action might be taken. That these perceptions are
- likely to be in serious error in many situations, is no
- surprise to anyone. The available data is almost always
- incomplete and often contaminated by others who wish to
- control the individual's action. Further, the analysis of
- this data by the individual is usually flawed due to the
- confused and improper internal programming of the individual
- making the analysis.
-
- Of course, people don't act on just material rewards
- alone. The benefits that a person receives come in many
- forms, but the most common non-material benefit is likely to
- be "good feelings".
-
- a) Good feelings
-
- The good feelings that many get from making a
- contribution to the public welfare may be substantial and
- may exceed the cost considerably.
-
- (1) Is it a good thing?
-
- Many people are motivated to contribute to a group
- activity if they believe that the activity is honest and
- useful.
-
- (2) My Reputation
-
- "How will I be regarded by the rest of the community
- for the action I am about to take?" is a very powerful
- consideration for most people. Note, however, this powerful
- influence fades away when the community is large and my
- actions are unknown.
-
- b) The Motivating Forces behind Good Feelings
-
- (1) The Programming - Genes and Memes
-
- The good feeling we get from doing any particular thing
- comes from our programming by our genes and memes.
-
- (2) The Current Environment
-
- The psychological environment that a person is subject
- to has a great impact on the feelings that a person has
- about doing or not doing a specific act. For example, in
- World War II, a group of soldiers boarding a landing boat in
- preparation to attack a beach, knowing that there is little
- chance of survival, still do it. That is because that action
- is the only acceptable action in that current environment.
- But times change; in more recent wars, soldiers have refused
- to fight because the pressure to do so was not so great.
-
- (3) Our Perceptions
-
- Whether we take a particular action or not is
- determined by what we believe the values of the variables in
- the cost-return equation to be - not what they might
- actually turn out to be. Our beliefs can change the
- perceived values of these factors enormously.
-
- Much cooperative activity that would be deemed as
- irrational if all facts were known may be still carried out
- if the future result is not known for certain but only as a
- probability. While a person would most likely not bother to
- vote if he or she knew that the potential winner was
- thousands of votes ahead and he/she was the only one left to
- vote, that person would still vote if the election details
- were still unknown or in the future even though there was
- reliable information that one of the candidates is expected
- to win by thousands of votes. For much of the population,
- "as long as there is some chance" that their vote will
- "count", they vote without regard for the incredibly small
- probabilities involved.
-
- Some people apparently believe that their actions will
- encourage others to do the same. This belief greatly impacts
- the perceived value of the group benefit.
-
- c) Ignorance ("extra rational")
-
- If cooperating is more beneficial to the group, but
- cooperating is irrational for the individual, then ignorance
- can actually be best for the group - a concept well known by
- governments and religions.
-
- E. Detailed Analysis
-
- If we hope to understand this apparent paradox, we must
- examine each of its components very carefully. While the end
- result appears to be paradoxical, each component, under
- careful consideration, is quite straightforward.
-
- 1. The Net Return
-
- Let us define a few symbols to make the reasoning more
- concise and precise.
-
-
-
- Let
-
- C = The direct personal cost or
- contribution
-
- BG = Benefit derived from being a member
- of the group
-
- BI = Benefit derived directly to the
- individual
-
- R = Net return
-
-
-
- Then for any action taken,
-
-
-
- R = BG + BI - C
-
-
-
- Again, I must emphasize that the most important fact to
- recognize in understanding the VP is that the components of
- R can be, and usually are, quite independent. I believe that
- a misunderstanding of this fact is the reason that many
- people have a hard time accepting and understanding the VP.
-
- Further, since a person must act now on the basis of a
- future return, these variables represent perceived not
- actual values. Obviously, the individual acts on what he or
- she perceives the costs and benefits to be, not what they
- actually are. This is very significant and will be discussed
- further in the following pages.
-
- a) BG
-
- BG is the benefit to the individual derived from being
- a member of the group and the result of this particular
- action. BG could be a function of C but this article's
- purpose is to examine the case in which it is independent or
- nearly so. Societal benefits generally accrue to the
- individual whether the individual makes a contribution or
- not (unless no one or an insufficient number contributes).
- More examples will be presented in detail later but for now
- a couple will be provided to illustrate the independence.
-
- (1) Community Center built from Volunteer
- Contributions
-
- Our community wants to build a Community Center and to
- do it from contributions. I can contribute or not but in
- either case I still get to use the Center. Unless, of
- course, no one contributes (more precisely, the
- contributions are below some minimum value), in which case
- the community center will not be built.
-
- (2) Volunteers save the Town by Sandbagging the
- Levee
-
- I may volunteer or not but in either case, my home will
- be saved just like everyone else's.
-
- b) BI
-
- BI is the benefit that the individual receives directly
- from his action without regard to the group benefit. An
- example follows.
-
- (1) Contribution to Public Television
-
- A public spirited individual contributes $25 to Public
- Television and receives a Viewer's guide. The guide is an
- immediate and significant benefit above and independent of
- the group benefits received from being able to watch the
- station.
-
- c) C
-
- C is the cost to the individual for performing a
- particular action. For example, C would include the cost of
- driving to the polling booth for the voter. C can be quite
- small or even zero. Again, I must emphasize that BG usually
- has little or no dependence on C.
-
- C should always be evaluated in a marginal sense. That
- is, what additional return will I get for this additional
- contribution? For example, a minimum contribution of $25 may
- get me coverage from the local volunteer fire department -
- an excellent investment. An additional $25 contribution may
- provide for a very slight improvement to service but the
- return on this marginal investment is very poor.
-
- 2. The "Holistic" effects
-
- An aspect of the extended VP, more common than not, is
- the situation in which the return to the group exceeds the
- contribution of the sum of the individuals. Of course, this
- is the basis for the overwhelming desire of most responsible
- citizens to have individuals contribute to the common good.
- The return we get from everyone or nearly everyone voting
- far exceeds the cost of the sum of the individual efforts.
-
- So, while group efforts can and often do result in a
- return less than the investment, most reasonable group
- efforts are characterized by the holistic effect, creating
- the diabolical condition of the VP.
-
-
-
- 3. Impact of Infinite Vs Finite payoff
-
- Cooperative efforts can be classified into two distinct
- types: those that have finite return and therefore the
- return to an individual is diminished by the return given to
- other individuals and those in which the return to the
- individual is the same regardless of the benefits it
- provides to other individuals. And example of this type of
- reward would be the repair of the levee that saves the town.
- That my neighbor's house is saved does not impact my benefit
- of having my house saved.
-
-
-
- This is of significance since in the "infinite payoff"
- case, freeloaders present no cost to the contributors. If
- you contribute to Public Radio, it doesn't cost you anymore
- if I, a non-contributor, also listen to it.
-
-
-
- However, whether the payoff is infinite or not does not
- change the basic paradox. The contributor is still presented
- with the problem that the contribution exceeds the return.
-
-
-
- 4. The impact of Discreet results
-
- Many phenomena such as elections have a result that is
- binary in nature. The result is either true or false
- depending on a value reaching a minimum value. A politician
- is elected only if he receives a majority of the votes. This
- has particular impact on the phenomena of the VP in that it
- is highly unlikely that one vote will have any effect on the
- outcome. In fact, the number of votes can vary over a wide
- range without changing the outcome.
-
- This situation is best illustrated by a simple
- experiment. Suppose that you had a balance scale with the
- balance pans filled with marbles with a sensitivity such
- that a one marble difference caused the scale indicator to
- go against its stop. If an equal number of marbles is in
- each pan, then the scale indicator is at center. Otherwise,
- the pointer is either at the left or right stop.
-
- Suppose there are a few more marbles in one pan than
- the other (few being more than 2). I can remove a marble
- from either pan and nothing happens. Or I can transfer a
- marble from one pan to the other and still nothing happens.
- This example perfectly illustrates the VP for the situation
- where the results are binary.
-
- a) "But my vote might break the tie"
-
- It is difficult for people to understand what an
- incredibly small chance there is of a major election ending
- in a tie.5
-
- The probability of a tie in a state election is
- infinitesimally small. And, if the election ends in a near
- tie, a recount will be called for anyway! National elections
- do not end in ties.
-
- b) The Wasted Vote Myth
-
- A better understanding of the VP might put to bed the
- specious argument heard so often in the last election that,
- "I really would like to vote for Perot, but I realize that
- my vote would be wasted (since he is not likely to get
- enough votes to win) so I will vote for Clinton". This bit
- of choice reasoning, apparently used by millions of voters,
- likely made a major impact on the vote count in the last
- election. Note the fallacies: (1) Since no particular
- individual's vote will impact the election results, that
- individual would receive greater satisfaction by voting
- their "conscience". (2) The fact that many people considered
- a vote for Perot as being wasted and therefore switched
- their vote to another candidate significantly impacted the
- vote count for Perot and conceivably caused him to lose. We
- will never know.
-
- 5. The Impact of Large size with some randomness
-
- In the real world, randomness is the rule rather than
- the exception. When the number of things in a collection is
- very large, the addition or removal of one of these things
- may be less than the random variation of the quantity. This
- would make it undetectable.
-
- There are situations in which the impact of one event
- is just insignificant compared to the normal random
- variations. The amount of water I use to take a shower is
- less than the normal variations of the volume of water in
- the reservoir. Therefore, my taking of a shower,
- practically, has no impact on the water situation.
-
- 6. A change so small it cannot be detected
-
- While random variations can make detection impossible
- for one event, another factor is involved in the detection:
- the sensitivity of the detector. Even if there was no random
- variation of the water volume in the reservoir, no means of
- measuring the volume is sensitive enough to detect the usage
- of one shower by one individual.
-
- But we are not in general talking about some device
- that does detection - we are talking about human beings. If
- the event is not detectable by humans, then it is likely of
- no practical significance. The rock star on the stage cannot
- detect whether I clap or not. Most humans cannot detect if I
- say "aye" or nothing in a voice vote of 50 or so people.
-
- 7. Impact of group size
-
- The Voter's Paradox seems to mostly occur when there
- are large numbers of anonymous members in a group. Those two
- factors -group size and anonymity - need to be examined more
- carefully.
-
- a) The Size of the Group
-
- A thoughtful person upon first examining the VP might
- speculate that the paradox results from the sheer size of
- the group. "My vote doesn't count because there are so many
- voters, the situation makes my vote insignificant".
-
- So, how many votes does it take to make your vote
- insignificant?
-
- Regardless of how small the number, your vote only
- counts when there is a tie, plus or minus one vote. Consider
- that there are 4 voters and you are one of them. If you did
- not vote and A got 2 votes and B got 1 then your vote could
- have caused a tie if you voted for B or done no good if you
- voted for A. If you didn't vote at all, then A wins.
- Regardless of the number of votes, this situation obviously
- prevails.
-
- b) Anonymity
-
- (1) The Psychological Cost/Benefits
-
- BI, the direct benefit to the individual and C, the
- cost to the individual contain components that we will call
- "psychological rewards" (BIP) or punishment (CP). For most
- individuals, BIP and/or CP are very powerful components in
- the cost/benefit equation. In fact, the factors account for
- most of the "irrational" but good behavior that civilization
- depends upon to exist!
-
- Let's look at an example. Suppose your church wants to
- add a new audio/video room that will provide free access to
- educational materials. They wish to do this by means of
- contributions. How do you think the results would compare
- between allowing the members to contribute anonymously or to
- contribute to a basket being passed while all are sitting in
- their pews? I'm afraid anonymous contributions would not do
- very well at all.
-
- Given that there are enormous social pressures to "do
- the right thing", what is the effect of anonymity in the
- group? It practically nullifies any "do-good" activity. If I
- contribute to a cause and the contribution is anonymous,
- then these psychological forces are not at play. Other
- factors, particularly guilt must account for this behavior.
-
- (2) Behavior and the size of the group
-
- The understanding that anonymity nullifies the
- psychological pressures to "do the right thing", then
- explains why people in small towns act in socially desirable
- ways and people in big cities typically do not. As long as
- most people in your group are fully aware of your actions,
- you will most likely act responsibly with regard to both
- personal and group activities.6
-
- (3) Freeloaders
-
- If the logic presented so far in this essay is sound -
- especially the fact that a single individual's actions are
- of no consequence to the outcome and there is anonymity -
- then society will most likely have a problem with "free
- riders". And of course it does with enormous costs in money,
- time and security.
-
- While some actions are more sinister than others, we
- all freeload to some extent. We cheat Sears by taking back a
- product for exchange or refund when we did the damage. Why
- not? Sears is a big corporation and one return will not make
- any difference. Besides, they don't know me from Adam. Of
- course, I wouldn't even think of doing this to someone that
- knows me personally.
-
- We cheat the insurance companies and the health plans
- that our dollars collectively support.
-
- We take advantage of every benefit from the government
- that we can whether we are justified or not.
-
- In the view of some, more sinister examples are the
- cheating on welfare and the wasting of public funds and the
- goofing off by government employees.
-
- Freeriding is a rational action when the "benefit-cost"
- value is positive. Public programs provided by the
- government, insurance companies and health plans provide
- great benefits compared to the cost to the free rider.
- Society can increase the cost to the potential freerider by
- changing the mental make-up of the individuals or by
- increased controls and punishments. It is most important to
- realize that these increased costs to the freerider usually
- also greatly increase the cost of the benefits to everyone
- else.
-
- An interesting aspect of the freeloader phenomena is
- that the freeloader can not exist without the contributions
- of those who do not freeload. The hippie living on welfare
- and using the public medical facilities depends on the
- existence of the straight people that they hold in contempt.
- That is, "without the host, the parasite dies".
-
- 8. But what if everyone did that?
-
- When most people hear the argument for the VP the first
- time, the most common reaction is, "But what if everyone did
- that?". Obviously, if everyone declined to vote, democracy
- would fail. Still the argument is specious. The impact of
- "everyone doing it" would radically change the analysis of
- any logical discussion. What if everyone decided to withdrew
- their money from the bank? What if everyone decided to quit
- buying new cars? What if everyone decided to not go to work
- tomorrow? What if everyone decided to read this article?
-
- Thousands of examples can be given in which a certain
- action is harmless when committed by you and me but becomes
- a disaster if "everyone does it". Like I said, a specious
- argument.
-
- Consider another case: let us say the Red Cross
- broadcasts a mass appeal for more blood as a result of needs
- coming from some disaster. What if you didn't feel quite up
- to giving blood at this time? Would their appeal fail? Of
- course not. But what if everyone followed your example?
-
- While most people clearly understand the above
- arguments for the cases presented, they seem to have
- difficulty understanding the ramifications of other problems
- that are characterized by the same phenomena - the classic
- example being voting in a national election. Your vote in a
- national election has even less impact on the results of
- that election than the sale of one share of IBM stock would
- have on the price of IBM stock! And far less impact than
- your withholding of a pint of blood from the Red Cross.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- III. Examples
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- A. Cutting off my nose to spite my face
-
- Should I refuse to buy shoes made in China that I can
- get much cheaper than USA manufactured shoes even though I
- dislike China's human rights policy? Should I avoid buying
- Willie Nelson's albums because he is an alleged tax cheat
- even though I really like his music? Should I avoid buying
- products at Walmart's, that save me a lot of money, because
- some clerk got nasty with me once?
-
- To take any of these actions causes me to lose the
- direct and substantial benefits while having no significant
- impact on the problems I dislike.
-
- I will keep buying Willie's albums.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- IV. Ramifications
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- What are the consequences of the VP? How does it impact
- our daily lives? The impact is enormous.
-
- A. Crime
-
- If you have followed the above arguments and accept the
- logic, you should have no problem accepting the conclusion
- that most crime is a result of the VP as defined in this
- essay. That is, crime is usually committed based on the
- individual's assessment that the benefit will exceed the
- cost. It would seem reasonable that crime will increase if
- either the benefit is increased or the cost is decreased.
- Most likely, the large increase in crime our society is now
- experiencing is a result of the decrease in cost to the
- criminal. Some examples of the decreased cost are:
-
- 1. Social acceptability of criminal activity
-
- In the last few decades, in many communities, crime has
- become more socially acceptable - even "cool". As we have
- discussed earlier, social psychological pressures are very
- powerful (enough to cause a person to sacrifice their life
- rather than be seen as a coward, for instance). This
- psychological good feeling of being looked up to by the
- individual's peers far outweighs the potential future
- destruction to the community that all will suffer from -
- including the perpetrator.
-
- 2. Decrease in expected punishment
-
- 3. Reduced expectation of actually being punished
-
- B. Sex
-
- Socially unacceptable sexual activity is on the
- increase in spite of the widening of the definition of what
- is acceptable. In particular, sexual activity by the young
- and others in which the results present a burden to society
- are on the increase. Much of this is a result of the VP
- phenomena.
-
- C. Politics
-
- Politicians generally do what is in their own best
- interests with often disastrous impacts on society in
- general - even though they are a member of that society.
-
-
- D. Government
-
- Government burden and suppression of individual rights
- continues to increase since it benefits a few. Yet, we all
- suffer from these infringements, including those that
- benefit from it. Unfortunately, their direct reward exceeds
- their losses from being a member of society.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- V. Ways to Remove the Paradox
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- A. Directly tying the return to the cost
-
- The paradox goes away when a person is directly
- rewarded or punished by their actions. For example, if a
- device was placed on the water meter that would report any
- use of the water during the times such use is prohibited,
- then that individual could be punished.
-
- B. Small Groups
-
- As discussed above, we have few problems with the
- freerider aspect of the VP when everyone in the group knows
- each other.
-
- C. Coercion and other outside inducements
-
- 1. Using the Government to do your dirty work
-
- Most activist groups use the government to enforce
- cooperation when it is obvious that voluntary cooperation
- will not do the job.
-
- a) Environmental Groups
-
- Environmental groups know that there is little chance
- of successful environmental voluntary action by the
- population due to the problem of the VP. So they have the
- government enforce their philosophy.
-
- b) Funding of the arts
-
- Those that would provide culture to the masses know
- that the masses would not support this by any voluntary
- sacrifice. So they use the force of law to give the masses
- what they "need".
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- VI. Summary
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- In this article, the phenomena of the so-called
- "Voter's Paradox" has been examined in detail. There are two
- major aspects to this paradox, both of which present
- enormous difficulties for a society based on social
- interaction. First there is the problem that it seems to be
- quite evident that certain scenarios requiring the
- cooperation of all or most of the individuals in a group
- would provide benefits for everyone far in excess of what
- they would be able to do privately. Good examples are
- elections, roads, water supplies, river levees and other
- large investments. Yet, at the same time, it is obvious that
- for a particular individual, his or her maximum return is
- obtained by making no contribution - that is, freeriding.
- For example, if the levee could possibly break, the
- individual would be best served by not contributing to the
- sandbagging at the main levee but instead working on
- defenses around his own home.
-
- The second major component of the "Voter's Paradox" is
- that the contribution of the individual in large groups may
- be absolutely or practically of no significance. On a
- national election, one vote cannot possibly determine the
- outcome of the election. If the levee broke because it was
- shy 100 sandbags and I could only do 50, then my effort was
- useless. If it didn't break because it had at least 50 more
- than it needed, my contribution was useless.
-
- A. Societal Problems resulting from the VP
-
- Most of the major problems facing large societies can
- be traced to the VP. Massive non-cooperation results in a
- breakdown of many group activities that would be useful. The
- massive growth of the welfare roles, crime, government
- spending, government waste, and etc. are examples of
- individuals maximizing their own return at the expense of
- the group. The paradox is that they are acting rationally!
-
- Solutions to these problems are difficult but possible.
- However, solutions are beyond the scope of this article
- which is devoted to explaining the theory of the paradox.
-
- B. Many do cooperate and that is enough for success
- in many situations
-
- That society functions at all is a testimony to the
- fact that a large part of society does "cooperate".
- According to Hardin7, some experimental data indicates that
- about one half of the participants cooperate. I suspect that
- more cooperated in the past and less will in the future.
-
- Another dilemma for society is that people are more
- likely to cooperate and not do what is in their personal
- best interest if they are ignorant and/or living lives
- controlled by myths. An educated person is more likely to be
- cognizant of the tradeoffs between self interest and group
- interest.
-
- Fortunately, it does not require 100 percent
- cooperation for most group efforts to succeed. Many public
- projects function with only a small percentage contributing.
- Voting is a good example.
-
- Success can also be achieved for group activities that
- would fail if based on voluntary cooperation by invoking the
- force of law. Environment groups have made much use of this
- approach.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- VII. References
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Hardin, Garrett, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science,
-
- 162:1243-1248, 1968
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Hardin, Russell, Collective Action, Johns Hopkins University
-
- Press, Baltimore, 1982.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Dawkins, Richard; The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford
-
- University Press, 1976.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Axelrod, Robert; The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books,
-
- New York, 1984.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Glance, Natalie and Huberman, Bernardo; Dynamics of social
-
- dilemmas. Scientific American. March, 1994
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Diekmann, Andreas and Mitter, Petter, Editors; Paradoxical
-
- Effects of Social Behavior - Essays in Honor of Anatol
-
- Rapoport. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1986.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Poundstone, William; Prisoner's Dilemma.Doubleday, New York,
-
- 1992
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- Glance, Natalie S.; Dynamics with Expectations , Doctoral
-
- Dissertation at Stanford University, June 1993. This paper
-
- and others related are located at the Internet site,
-
- parc.xerox.com.
-
-
-
- _______________________________
-
- 1A discussion on the impact of the VP on society will
-
- be contained in another paper by this author, now in
-
- preparation.
-
- 2Hardin, Russell; Collective Action, John Hopkins
-
- University Press, Baltimore, 1982, Page 75
-
- 3Dawkins, Richard; The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford
-
- University Press, 1976.
-
- 4Henson, H. Keith; "Memes Meta-Memes and Politics", (An
-
- article available on the Internet. Use Archie to find.)
-
- 5Hardin, Russell, Page 60
-
- 6There are several papers located at the Internet site,
-
- parc.xerox.com by Dr. Benardo Huberman and Dr. Natalie
-
- Glance that discuss the effect of keeping organizational
-
- size small to improve cooperation.
-
- 7Hardin, Russell, Page 29
-
-
-
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
- uXu #219 Underground eXperts United 1994 uXu #219
- Call LHDM-2 -> +1-818-546-2332
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-