The Hacker's Encyclopedia 1998/hackers_encyclopedia.iso/zines/phrack2/phrack46.027

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                              ==Phrack Magazine==

                 Volume Five, Issue Forty-Six, File 27 of 28

****************************************************************************

                             International Scenes

There was once a time when hackers were basically isolated.  It was
almost unheard of to run into hackers from countries other than the
United States.  Then in the mid 1980's thanks largely to the
existence of chat systems accessible through X.25 networks like
Altger, tchh and QSD, hackers world-wide began to run into each other.
They began to talk, trade information, and learn from each other.
Separate and diverse subcultures began to merge into one collective
scene and has brought us the hacking subculture we know today.  A
subculture that knows no borders, one whose denizens share the common goal
of liberating information from its corporate shackles.

With the incredible proliferation of the Internet around the globe, this
group is growing by leaps and bounds.  With this in mind, we want to help
further unite the communities in various countries by shedding light
onto the hacking scenes that exist there.  If you want to contribute a
file about the hacking scene in your country, please send it to us
at [e-mail].

This month we have files about the scenes in Denmark and Russia, updates
from Australia and Argentina, and a scan of Norway's toll-free exchange.

________________________________________________________________________________


                  The Computer Underground in Denmark


Dear Phrack Readers, what follows is a little about the Danish
computer underground, focusing on the hacking/phreaking scene.

A little introduction:

Even though Denmark itself is little country, with a little over 5 million
citizens, an active computer underground community thrives upon the growing
network links and computer systems which in these days seems to pop up all
over country.

The history of the hacking community in DK is not very old, but since the
first Danish hackers appeared some 5 years ago, there has been increasing
hacking activity, bringing on a history of busts, paranoia and times of war;
but also a history of great friendships, supremacy over the corporate machine,
and a process of learning more about the world we live in. But before we take
a look at the networks, boards and the community itself, let's go back in time,
and find the place where it all started.

The Past:

The first hackers to appear in DK was JubJub Bird and Sprocket, two high
school students which broke into 100's of computers world wide. At that time
there was no H/P scene in DK, no boards, no HP networks and no fellow hackers.
Nevertheless, JubJub's role in the Danish HP history plays a key role. JubJub
got busted early January '90, after being discovered in some of NASA's non
public machinery, and being under surveillance for a period of time. This was
the beginning of what was to become the Danish hacking scene. JubJub and
Sprocket never got a sentence, since the court had absolutely no idea of how
to handle a case like this. The court sat down a period of 2 years, and if
JubJub or Sprocket was caught in hacking within that period they would
get a verdict.

Anyway, after the bust of JubJub and Sprocket, the first stirs of hackers
appeared and began to expand like rings in water. And suddenly we had a growing
happy hacking community. Hackers from all over the country gathered at newly
started 'HPA only boards' which was a rarely seen thing among the sea of WaReZ
boards. One of the coolest boards was Fantasia, the headquarters of MoTIGoL,
which was being run by Netrunner. Fantasia was the largest in Denmark, maybe
even in Scandinavia, and had callers from all over the world. At that time,
nobody was afraid of getting busted, and A LOT of BlueBoxing, X25, and general
hacking on Inet was done. But one day all that changed.

During the winter '91 DIKU (Institute of computer science, Copenhagen
university) was used as a meeting place of hackers. A lot of novice hackers
used the machines to learn about Internet and UNIX in general, skating through
the internet, trading info, chatting at IRC and stuff like that. What nobody
knew was that Jgen Bo Madsen, security expert and high paid consultant
working for UNI*C, was monitoring all traffic from and off DIKU, with evil
intentions of busting! The law enforcement specter was soon to cast its dark
shadow on the whole of the Danish scene.

It all ended one winter afternoon. I remember turning on the TV, not really
paying attention to the news, reading a book or so, when suddenly the news
lady starts speaking about how the secret service is soon to unravel the biggest
hacker conspiracy ever in Denmark, one hacker was already arrested and 10 more
would be arrested in near future. Saron was the one who got busted. He had used
an x25 datapak link, which normally only was used for electronic mail, to
access DIKU, coming in from a German PAD to make tracing harder, but also
making a hell of a big bill for the stolen NUI's owner. Anyway, it came out
that JBM (Jgen Bo Madsen) had traced 76 calls to DIKU, and had monitored the
breakins of computers in Greece, Brazil, Mexico and USA.

At that moment the entire scene more or less panicked. Most dudes moved
their precious machinery out of the house and all boards closed down.
A period of isolation began. The SysOp of Fantasia, Netrunner pulled out his
harddisk hiding it somewhere out of reach, if JBM and his secret service
buddies should show up.

No more busts happened and people calmed down after a month or so. Everybody
knew that things wouldn't be the same after the DIKU incident. Netrunners
harddisk broke down after he had reinstalled it, because all the dirt it
had consumed from 2 years constant running, was too much for the thing to
handle when it was powered back on. So, Fantasia closed and the underground
network PhoenixNet also closed when it came out that JBM had infiltrated
the net. An era was over, and a new was to begin.


The Present:

Today's scene is doing quite good. It has became harder in a way, more
careful and more closed than ever. But still, we have open boards
and a public network. FOOnet which focuses on computer security and is
used as an forum open for discussions. Mostly by hackers and people into
computer security in general, but every once in awhile JBM and Sysadm's
drop by too. Also, the Danish scene is proud to release CrackerJack, made by
Jackal, which we still claim is the fastest UNIX passwd cracker available for
PC. Not that cracking passwd files is a major element in hacking, but its nice
to have a fast cracker every once in awhile :)

The Danish computer underground scene is filled with WaReZ boards,
but only a few real H/P/A boards are running. Boards like Free Speech Inc.
and Freeside are places where the Danish hackers hang out. None of these
boards are public, but JBM is quite aware of them and had once infiltrated
Freeside, even though it was clearly stated that the bbs was private and
no one related to any gov agencies was allowed to use the board. So, JBM
is actually doing what he has accused us for over the years, which is
intruding people's privacy.

Other than FOOnet, there is a few other networks, such as SDC which
once had a good mail flow in the hacking conferences, but today more
is turning into a demo/warez net. A few other truly H/P nets are running
successful with a good mail flow, but those shall remain anonymous in
this article.

The links from the Danish scene to fellow hackers around the world is
very good. Due to numerous nights spent at QSD, connections is established
to a lot of dudes in Brazil which frequently drops by Free Speech Inc. and
Freeside, dudes in UK as well as fellow hackers in US like Alby/Empire.

Okay, this is it. The section about hacking in Denmark. The stuff
that you had to read all the above boring shitty sentimental stuff,
to get to!!


Hacking in Denmark:

The two main networks in DK which is used for hacking and meeting fellow
hackers are, (of course) Internet and the X25 datapak link. Internet is
accessible via all Universities like diku.dk, daimi.aau.dk, auc.dk and so on.
(Nobody uses DIKU anymore though). The university is doing a brave struggle
to keep the hackers out by upgrading to C2 passwd security, meaning that
passwds must be at least 8 chars, contain 1 uppercase and 1 non alphabetic
char.

The upper level of the top 10 of chosen C2 security passwd's goes something
like: q1w2e3r4*, a1s2d3f4*, these do not contain any uppercase chars and
therefore should not have been accepted as a passwd by the system, but
apparently the C2 software finds them secure. Also, a nice thing to do is
taking your wordlist and using Therion's Passwd Utility, TPU which is a word
list manipulator, and add a 1* to all words in the list and uppercase the first
letter. Gives a lot of accounts.

Another popular thing, in order to keep hackers out, is to setup a so-called
'modem security password' on all dialups. So when you call up the system,
before you ever get to the server you have to enter a password. And if you get
through, not all accounts are cleared to use the modem dialup facilities,
and unless you've got your sleazy hands on a cleared account, you get the boot.

Even though the universities puts such a great effort into keeping
hackers out, they aren't doing very good. In fact, they are doing real
bad. A legit account costs appr. 1900 dkr, which is about a little over
300$ US., which goes into the pockets of UNI*C, so its no wonder that
we like to use the nice free facilities present at the universities.

Other ways to get on Internet, are via other machines under the ministry
of education and certain private and government systems. It's surprising
how many bugs (that we all know of) in certain UNIX versions, that still
have not been patched, and therefore leave the systems wide open.
This goes not only for Denmark, but generally throughout machines on Internet
in Europe. Also, a well known phenomena in DK throughout the sector of
private corporation computer systems, is lousy security. Elementary
stuff like bad file permissions, left over suid shell scripts, and
open guest accounts are everywhere.

Regarding the X25 datapak links. The official Danish PAD can be
reached at dialup 171. This is totally free number just like 80xxxxxx
are, which doesn't affect your phone bill. Keep in mind that all calls made in
DK are billed, even local calls within same city are charged, and charged
high! I remember a time when I was kind of addicted to a certain MUD. For one
month alone I got a bill on 1800 dkr, appr. 300 US$! So, the 171 X25 link is
nice thing, since all calls are billed to the owner of the Network User Id
(NUI) and NOT on your phone bill.

However, X25 can be a dangerous thing to use. Especially if you only
have a single NUI to use. The phone company is having some trouble tracing
the 171, but all calls made in DK on digital lines are logged. So, when
some corporation gets a bill on, say 2-3000$ or an amount much higher
than usual, the phone company can compare the logs on who dialed 171,
to the X25 logs, on which date and time the NUI in question was abused,
and figure out who abused the NUI. On analog lines the logging is
harder to do, and only goes back a month or so. The format of the NUIs
consist of a user number and a password. The first char indicates
either a K or J, depending on the NUI's owner, either located under KTAS
or JTAS districts. Jutland is covered by JTAS and Copenhagen Sjlland,
by KTAS. Then follows 7 or 8 numbers and usually a word of 7-8 chars. Like,
K0100872DKDIANEC, this is a valid NUI open for public use by everybody,
but its restricted to only to connect to a specific system. Sum lame
menu database thing. Most NUI's allows access to most computers, world
wide on the X25 network, by an NUA (network User Address). The most use
of X25 is to gain free access to Internet by connecting to a PAD which
allows telnet. Most of the telnet PAD's has been closed recently because
of an increasing (ab)use. However, there is still sites like isosun-t.
ariadne.gr which carries an X25 PAD, and because the sysadm there comes off
like a dick and is a jerk I'll give u all his NUA. Its 020233181282010. Also,
check out gw.sdbs.dk, carries a 9k6 x25 link as well as normal Inet axx.


A few people to mention, who either has or is playing an important
part of the Danish hacking community:

JubJub Bird, Sprocket, Saron, Ravan, Netrunner / Sense/NET, Descore, WedLock,
Le Cerveau, Parrot-Ice, Jackal, Temp, Therion, and myself I guess... :)

If u like, check out:

Free Speech Inc. ([phone]  SysOp: NiteCrawler
Freeside         ([phone]   -"- : Descore  (Off. CJ Dist. site.)

This is it. Hope u enjoyed this little file. We are always happy to
meet foreign hackers, so call one of the above boards and lets exchange
accou.. ehh... intercultural hacking research information :)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------


               Why would you or why wouldn't you want
              to hack in the ex-USSR or in other words
                  what the hell do we do up here.

                By Digital Empiror and Stupid Fucker

Russia is a great country, with absolutely no laws against hacking or
phreaking, both are very easy to do and get away with. It's for that
reason, that most of the famous online services like CompuServe and Delphi
closed registrations coming out of the biggest country in the world via
SprintNet, (you guys think we still can't get in? ... take that as a hint).
If some great telephone company installed a payphone that can charge calls
onto a credit card (very rare in this country) then we can use it as well,
credit card numbers are not hard to compile, especially if you know that
it is not really illegal. What about those great cellular telephones, you
know, we love to use those for free, (can't you guys get it? we know that
we are pain in the ass, but LIVE WITH IT!).

Most of our switchboards in Russia are very ancient, screwed up
relay-analog switches, they don't have methods for protocol-ing
telephone calls and present undependable methods for identifying telephone
numbers. Also there is special equipment which allows making it impossible
to detect your phone number, or even making detection equipment mistake your
phone number. Interstate switchboards have to have special methods of
detecting your phone number, which are of course only accessible to
Interstate switchboards and not to the rest of commercial companies. There
was a case once were SprintNet caught one of our great hackers, but he had
sent them to his great grandfather's (wanna try doing that with the
FBI?) because as he said 'You can't really be sure that it was really ME
calling since in this country you can't rely on your number detection
equipment...'

Another great thing is how the networks are set up in Russia. The greatest
and the biggest X.25 network is of course SprintNet (for which they have to
pay of course, if not them then somebody else...), it's a little slow here,
but that's OK. The administrators who set up the PADs are very lame and
stupid, and of course can't set up their PADs like SprintNet would want
them to. They can, for example, they were setting up their PAD so, that it
would let you connect with virtually ANY system without asking for a NUI,
and even when they detected, that hackers do it, they couldn't do anything
besides changing their PAD instead of just changing one register!

Besides that, their is no problem with finding a NUI for Russian X.25
networks, most of them don't support collect calls like SprintNet, so most
Russian services that would like their customers to access their service
via X.25 give the users a unique NUI, that specifies that they can only
access THIS service, but they usually forget to set it up right so the
stupid customers like another of our great hackers, will instead of getting
charged for the service, go to an outdial and call his favorite BBS in
Clearwater, FL for an example (do they have boards there?).  I don't know
if you like to access CitiBank machines from SprintNet, but we love to do
stuff like that.  For example, recently we found a lone standing computer,
I don't think the guys in CitiBank really understood what they were doing
when they left their modem setup option on that machine without a password,
it was a pleasure to change their modem strings knowing that it's absolutely
legal to do so and nobody has even a right to call about it!  Also there
are Internet providers in Russia, only two, from which only one is
interesting - RELCOM!  Most of Internet in Russia is done via UUCP and
costs a bundle of money, so if I am in a bad mood, I'll drop 10-20 megs of
mail into an address that doesn't exist, and will laugh and you know why?
In RELCOM, everybody pays the central router - KIAE.SU, so if you send megs
of stuff, it will go through a lot of systems that will have to pay first
each other then to KIAE.SU, but there will be THE last system, that will
say 'ya know? there is no such address!', so then the trouble will start.
So if you are in a bad mood, then please, do us a favor, drop a gig or 2 to
machine that does not have an IP address, better for it to go via a few of
those machines, for example, to be original:

kaija.spb.su!arcom.spb.su!<any machine in USA>!kiae.su!kaija.spb.su!root

I am sure if you have NSLOOKUP, you can be original and make your best
route via a dozen systems. When doing it, you can be sure, that it will
call a lot of arguments from every one of that dozen concerning to who will
pay for that gig (1mb of mail in Russia costs $50 - $150, that enough money
for poor Russian Internet hosts).

It's all really great, but we are all on our own, and are not organized into a
group.  There are not many of us and we are not known by any of our western
colleagues, to contact us, mail us at:

        [e-mail]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        PhreeFone Numbers in Norway
                     Research and Norwegian Edition by

                          cyber aktiF (01-Feb-94)

               English Translation by Codex/DBA (26-Apr-1994)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

DISCLAIMER: The author of this document takes no responsibility as to how
            the information herein is used. I hope everyone who uses this
            information use it for inquisitive purposes only, and don't
            use it for ANY destructive purposes whatsoever.

WARNING:    Unauthorized use of PBX and other communications equipment
            owned by others, be it private or business, is illegal and may
            result in banishment from the Norwegian telephone company (Tele-
            verket) and/or punishment by law.

                                     ---

After many sporadic travels over the phone network, in other words scanning
the number region 800 3xxxx, I've come across several interesting things. I
therefore thought it was in its right place to make a complete list of which
numbers have a carrier and which have not. The carriers only apply to modems.
Televerket has (currently) allocated the region 800 30000 to 800 3500 for
these services.

These lines are 100% phreefone, which means that the owner of these services
pays for the conversation plus a surcharge per unit. This allows for long
permutations of numbers and passwords without adding to your own phone bill.
On the other hand, the owner of the line will have a phonebill which equals
American Express's.

Televerket and/or the company/person supplying the service(s) have NO problem
finding out what the caller's number is. This is regardless whether or not
you have filled in the "don't reveal my number to those I call" part of
Televerket's connection form/document. Therefore, nosing around these numbers
should be done with some care.

I haven't tried blueboxing 800 numbers (too much work for something which is
free in the first place), but theoretically it is possible. [Codex: Would
this lessen the number identification risk?]

I had severe difficulties with a number which answered with an 1800Hz tone
in 1 second, after which it became silent. This box phoned me in intervals
of 5 minutes from 12:00 the next day -- in other words, an automatic
WarDial :/. If you discover the same problem, the following solution is
a guaranteed success: Program your local trunk to send all incoming calls
to ANOTHER number which answers with an 1800Hz tone. Let this be active an
hour's time, and you should be rid of it.

                                 - MODEM -

The list of numbers where modem carriers are commented with a single line. I
haven't (at the time of writing) done a deeper investigation of any of the
services, so none of them should be inactive.

There are several interesting things -- especially the gateways and the
X.25 PAD. Please note that the security at most of the systems are pretty
good. Obscure terminal types, data locks and systems which won't identify
themselves are the most common types. Someone has done a good job in making
the system safe from unauthorized sources. However, as said before,
phreefone numbers can be exposed to attacks and permutations of zimmering
quantities.

When I had a look at the unidentified services, the best way to connect was
using a raw-mode tty which won't accept special characters. If you run a
cooked-mode terminal, the text will become even more unreadable.

-- Modem carrier tones ------------------------------------------------------

80030004 - Data Lock (1)
80030010 - *no output*
80030067 - *no output*
80030068 - Courier ASCII Dev. adapter
80030078 - Courier ASCII Dev. adapter
80030095 - Modem Outdial (password)
80030115 - *no output*
80030130 - *uknown*
80030180 - *uknown*
80030225 - *no output*
80030301 - *no output*
80030404 - *unknown* - prompts @ter
80030456 - *unknown* - terminal
80030485 - *unknown*
80030456 - Data Lock 4000 (1)
80030514 - garbage - password
80030606 - *no output*
80031040 - *no output*
80031065 - *no output*
80031315 - IBM Aix v3 RISC system/6000 (2)
80031470 - garbage
80031490 - Dr V.Furst. Med. Lab
80031666 - prompts - @ter
80031815 - prompts - <
80031920 - *unknown* - password
80031950 - *unknown* - hangup after 5 seconds
80032165 - Dr V.Furst. Med. Lab
80032340 - *uknown*
80032410 - Wangvs VAX/VMS
80032470 - *no output*
80032480 - Perle Model 3i - V 02.00G - Apotekernes F. Innkj
80032590 - *unknown* - password
80032635 - *unknown* - terminal
80033338 - TSS Gateway (3)
80033443 - *no output*
80033490 - *no output*
80033580 - *unknown* - hangup after 5 seconds
80033601 - *no output*
80033620 - TIU Gateway (3)
80033720 - *no output*
80033815 - *unknown* - hangup after 5 seconds
80033914 - *unknown* dumps lots of texts [Codex: What type?]
80034248 - *unknown* - prompts for login
80034866 - X.25 PAD

(1) DATA LOCK
    If someone can get into one of these, he/she can look forward to getting
    a Nobel prize. Data locks are modem front-end protectors, almost
    impossible to crack without physical access.

(2) IBM AIX
    AIX is one of the best flavors of UNIX there is (even though it was
    made by IBM) -- unfortunately the security at this site was so terrible
    that anyone with a minimal knowledge of UNIX and access to this machine
    could pull it apart blindfolded (making the life really unpleasant for
    the estate agents who own the LAN. Write me for an account ;).

(3) GATEWAYS
    Free internet access within grasping distance if you can break through.
    Not easy, but possible. ;) I am already working on it, so I'm not sure
    how long it will take until they increase the security.

[Codex: Comment about Study-By-Byte removed, as I didn't know what to call
the school in English ;). Another fact was that since no number was provided,
and little seemed to be gained by access to this site anyway, I figured it
wasn't too important. Get hold of cyb3rF is you really think it's needed.]

-- End of modem carrier listing ---------------------------------------------

                              - VOICE/PBX/FAX -

Here, ladies and gentlemen, is the list of all the phones in the 800 3xxxx
region which answer. Which is what, I'll leave up all you people out there.
I have mapped some of the list, but won't spread it [Codex: Yet? ;)].

Only one number per line is noted down. This is to easy the job for everyone
who's going to (and you will try ;) run these numbers through their scanner
scripts on the lookout for PBX's and other oddities.

Good luck guys!

cyber aktiF - 01/02/94

-- Answering 800 3xxxx services ---------------------------------------------

80030000
80030001
80030002
80030003
80030005
80030006
80030007
80030008
80030009
80030011
80030012
80030014
80030015
80030016
80030017
80030018
80030019
80030022
80030023
80030024
80030025
80030027
80030028
80030029
80030030
80030032
80030033
80030035
80030036
80030037
80030043
80030044
80030045
80030046
80030048
80030050
80030051
80030053
80030055
80030057
80030058
80030060
80030065
80030066
80030070
80030071
80030072
80030073
80030074
80030075
80030077
80030080
80030082
80030088
80030094
80030096
80030097
80030098
80030099
80030100
80030101
80030102
80030103
80030105
80030106
80030110
80030111
80030113
80030114
80030116
80030120
80030131
80030136
80030140
80030144
80030151
80030155
80030160
80030166
80030170
80030171
80030175
80030177
80030189
80030190
80030195
80030199
80030200
80030202
80030203
80030205
80030210
80030211
80030212
80030213
80030215
80030222
80030227
80030230
80030233
80030235
80030239
80030250
80030255
80030258
80030260
80030265
80030270
80030275
80030277
80030288
80030290
80030294
80030295
80030297
80030299
80030300
80030302
80030303
80030305
80030306
80030308
80030310
80030311
80030313
80030315
80030318
80030319
80030322
80030323
80030330
80030333
80030336
80030337
80030340
80030344
80030345
80030355
80030360
80030363
80030366
80030377
80030380
80030388
80030390
80030395
80030400
80030401
80030407
80030408
80030411
80030415
80030420
80030422
80030433
80030440
80030445
80030450
80030452
80030466
80030470
80030472
80030475
80030480
80030488
80030490
80030495
80030500
80030501
80030502
80030511
80030520
80030522
80030531
80030540
80030545
80030550
80030555
80030560
80030565
80030566
80030570
80030571
80030580
80030585
80030600
80030601
80030603
80030600
80030601
80030603
80030610
80030616
88030640
80030650
80030666
80030670
80030680
80030683
80030690
80030700
80030701
80030707
80030725
80030730
80030750
80030770
80030777
80030788
80030800
80030803
80030811
80030828
80030830
80030840
80030844
80030850
80030855
80030860
80030866
80030870
80030875
80030880
80030888
80030889
80030890
80030900
80030906
80030910
80030911
80030915
80030920
80030922
80030930
80030940
80030950
80030955
80030959
80030960
80030975
80030990
80030994
80031000
80031001
80031006
80031007
80031008
80031010
80031020
80031030
80031031
80031043
80031044
80031048
80031055
80031058
80031060
80031064
80031066
80031070
80031075
80031080
80031082
80031085
80031092
80031097
80031103
80031108
80031110
80031111
80031112
80031113
80031122
80031123
80031140
80031144
80031150
80031151
80031155
80031160
80031166
80031180
80031188
80031200
80031210
80031211
80031212
80031220
80031221
80031229
80031230
80031231
80031234
80031240
80031241
80031244
80031250
80031255
80031266
80031288
80031290
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-- End of list of answering 800 3xxxx services ------------------------------

This file was brought to you in English by Codex/DBA, 26-Apr-1994. I didn't
ask cyb3rF for permission to translate this document, but I hope he won't
mind. I also understand that the document is of varied use to some people
(those of you who can't dial in free to Norway (cc 47), don't bother), but I
thought any information, however useful might be of some interrest to the
English speaking crowd out there.

Re: cyb3rF, Sicko, BattleAng, Maelstrom, Uridium, Enigma, Golan, BadS, vale_
    and any other people I've forgotten to mention right now (flame me on
    #phreak, guys ;).

I'll be back in Norway in June.

                                                      Codex/DBA, 26-Apr-1994.
-- "Men I haelvete gutar, vaent paa meg!!" ----------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

More about the Argentine Internet scenery.


It's difficult to add something to an already good article like Opii's one,
but here is some info which may interest you besides what you already know:

* The local Net started as late as January 1989, when the National Commission
for Atomic Power (CNEA) connected to the BITNET network. The three first
nodes were: ARGCNE (an IBM 9370-60 mainframe), ARGCNEA1 (IBM/370 158),
and ARGCNEA2 (Comparex 7/68), all running RSCS V1. Release3 for data comm.

The node ARGCNEA2 was (I think it still is) the main link in Argentina to
Bitnet. Until late 1992, they still used a manual DIAL-UP LINK (!) to the
Chilean node UCHCECVM (IBM 4341MO2) at the Chile's National University in
Santiago city, connecting at 9600 bps to exchange mail. I'm not sure about
if the Chilean link is still working, due to the existing new leased line
connection of the government's foreign office.

In mid-1990, the national university of La Plata, joined ranks and also
connected to the Bitnet network. The two nodes, CESPIVM1 and CESPIVM2
(Running on IBM mainframes) also served as hosts to a VAX 11-780, and a
experimental link to some computers in Uruguay's (country) national
University.

Another different beast is what's called the RAN network (National Academic
Network), which is nothing more than a UUCP network connecting a hundred
different nodes through the country. Again, until mid-92 they used X.25
ARPAC connections (!!EXPENSIVE!!) and manual Dial-up calls(!!) for the
"international" connection into UUCO. More recently (two months ago), they
have got their own 64kbps leased line to the US, which finally will let
people around the world to mess and GET into our computers :-).

While the project was to connect to Maryland University (financed by the
US National Science Foundation, they love us), I still don't know what's the
host at the other side of the leased line.

Well, that's the end of the FACTS that I have... now some political opinions:
Things are getting a *little* better, but I don't expect any improvements
for "Joe average" user, since to make things work, we must get rid off the
current LD and data monopoly of the two European private telcos that own us.
Until 1999, they have the exclusive right to use and abuse the market of
both voice and data transmissions, and no competition can enter without
passing through their satellite links (and rates). Very nice for a government
that is always speaking of "free markets".

Until we get AT&T and/or MCI competing for the market, we won't have affordable
rates, and US companies like CIS, Delphi, etc. than could be doing BIG
business NOW, will have to wait until late 1999, when the monopoly ends by
law. (Or, BTW: or they can talk to Mr. Al Gore, so he can kick a little our
beloved president to end the telcos ripoff).

Chileans, in contrast, have a lot better scene, with well-established direct
internet links, an X.25 network with 9600bps access through the country, and
even Gopher servers since a long time ago!.

Following is a quick and dirty list of Internet domains for both Chile and
Argentina:

ARGENTINA:

ar.ar (unspecified)
athea.ar (unspecified)
atina.ar (united nations development programme, argentina) (RAN UUCP HOST)
ba.ar (unspecified)
cb.ar (unspecified)
com.ar (unspecified)
edu.ar (unspecified)
gov.ar (government of argentina)   <- give my regards to our corrupt gvt!
mz.ar (unspecified)
ncr.ar (national cash register corporation, argentina)
nq.ar (unspecified)
org.ar (centro de estudios de poblacion corrientes',)
sld.ar (unspecified)
subdomain.ar (unspecified)
test.ar (unspecified)
tf.ar (unspecified)
tm.ar (unspecified)
buenosaires.ncr.ar (national cash register corporation, buenos aires, arg)
city.ar.us (unspecified)
datage.com.ar (unspecified)
guti.sld.ar (unspecified)
secyt.gov.ar (unspecified)
unisel.com.ar (unspecified)
unlp.edu.ar (universidad nacional de la plata, argentina)

CHILE:

altos.cl (altos chile limiteda. el corregidor, santiago, chile)
apple.cl (axis calderon, santiago, chile)
ars.cl (ars innovandi (el arte de innovar), chile)
bci.cl (unspecified)
campus.cl (indae limiteda. area de computacion, manuel montt, chile)
cepal.cl (comision economica para america latina (cepal) santiago, chile)
conicyt.cl (unspecified) <-- Government education branch
contag.cl (contagio avda. ricardo lyon, idencia, santiago, chile)
cronus.cl (familia fuentealba olea, chile) <-- a family with their node!
difusion.cl (editorial difusion, chile)
eclac.cl (unspecified)
epson.cl (epson, chile)
eso.cl (european southern observatory la silla, la serena, chile)
frutex.cl (frutexport lota, santiago, chile)
fundch.cl (fundacion, chile)
fwells.cl (fundacion wells claro solar, casilla, temuco, chile)
gob.cl (unspecified)  <--- CHILEAN GOVERNMENT! Send a note to Mr. Pinochet!
ingenac.cl (ingenac pedor de valdivia, idencia, santiago, chile)
lascar.cl (university of catolica, chile)
mic.cl (las condes, santiago, chile)
ncr.cl (national cash register corporation, chile)
opta.cl (opta limiteda. las violetas, idencia, santiago, chile)
orden.cl (orden huerfanos piso, fax, santiago, chile)
placer.cl (placer dome) <--- WHAT IS THIZ??? "Pleasure dome?" !!!!!!!!!!
puc.cl (catholic university of chile (universidad catolica de chile)
rimpex.cl (rimpex chile pedro de valdivia, casilla, correo santiago, chile)
safp.cl (superintendencia de administradoras de fondos de pensiones, chile)
scharfs.cl (scharfstein, las condes, santiago, chile)
sisteco.cl (sisteco, santiago, chile)
sonda.cl (sonda digital teatinos, santiago, chile)
tes.cl (d.c.c. sistemas, chile)
uai.cl (unspecified)
ubiobio.cl (unspecified)
uchile.cl (universidad de chile)
ucv.cl (unspecified)
udec.cl (universidad de concepcion de ingenieria de sistemas,)
unisys.cl (unisys, chile)
unorte.cl (universidad del norte, antofagasta, chile)
usach.cl (universidad de santiago de chile de ingenieria informatica,)
uta.cl (universidad de tarapaca, arica, chile)
utfsm.cl (universidad tecnica de electronica, valparaiso, chile)
ac.cam.cl (unspecified)
agr.puc.cl (agriculture department, catholic university of chile
astro.puc.cl (catholic university of chile (pontificia universidad catolica
bio.puc.cl (catholic university of chile santiago)
cec.uchile.cl (universidad de chile)
cfm.udec.cl (universidad de concepcion, concepcion, chile)
dcc.uchile.cl (department o. de ciencias de la computacion)
dfi.uchile.cl (universidad de chile)
die.udec.cl (universidad de concepcion de ingenieria de sistemas)
dii.uchile.cl (universidad de chile)
dim.uchile.cl (universidad de chile)
dis.udec.cl (universidad de concepcion, concepcion, chile)
disca.utfsm.cl (universidad tecnica federico santa maria, chile)
dpi.udec.cl (universidad de concepcion de ingenieria de sistemas)
elo.utfsm.cl (universidad tecnica federico santa maria, )
finanzas.fundch.cl (fundacion, chile)
fis.utfsm.cl (universidad tecnica federico santa maria,)
inf.utfsm.cl (universidad tecnica federico santa maria,)
ing.puc.cl (engineering, catholic university of chile )
mat.puc.cl (mathematics department, catholic university of chile
mat.utfsm.cl (universidad tecnica federico santa maria,
qui.puc.cl (catholic university of chile  santiago)
seci.uchile.cl (universidad de chile)
soft.udec.cl (universidad de concepcion de ingenieria de sistemas,)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Australian Scene Report Part II
by Data King
-------------------------------

This is the sequel to the Australian scene report that appeared in Phrack
Issue 45. There have been a few developments since I wrote that report which I
think people may be interested in.

Old NEWS
~~~~~~~~
But first before I deal with what's new, I need to deal with something that's
old. Shortly after Phrack 45 was published, I received a fakemail that
basically threatened me and also made a lot of claims, I would like to take
this opportunity to reply to the author of this letter.

First of all this person claims I have not been in the scene for ages, well
if I am not in the scene that is news to me!

The letter contained several threats to do something like redirect my
telephone number to a 0055 number, for people outside of Australia, a 0055
is a recorded timed call service.

To this I say: 'Go ahead, if your capable DO IT!'

I wont bother dealing with most of the rubbish contained in the article, it
was just general BS.

Finally I have something to say directly to the person who wrote the mail:
"If your so goddamn good, then don't hide behind fakemail, come out in the
open and let us all fear you, come one get your lame ass on IRC and lets talk!"

Also I was told not to submit anything more to Phrack for publishing or bad
things would happen, Well I guess either I have no phear, or I don't take
these threats seriously.


New NEWS
~~~~~~~~
AusCERT

Australia is forming it's own version of CERT, to be called AusCERT and
based in Queensland, Australia. Everybody is shaking in their boots worrying
- NOT!

Networks

In the last report you may remember I talked about the Australia Military
Network in a very vague fashion, well now I have some more detailed info for
you.

The Australian Defense Forces (ADF) have what they call "the Defense
Integrated Secure Communications Network (DISCON)". This network is
relatively new. Circuit switched operations only began in 1990. Packet
switching came into effect during 1992.

It provides all the ADF's communication needs in terms of data, voice,
video, and so on, secure and non secure communications.

Main control is exercised from Canberra (believed to be from within the DSD
compound at Russell Offices), and the network is interconnected via a total
of 11 ground stations across the country using Aussat.

Also the Australian Federal Police have an internet connection now.
sentry.afp.gov.au is the main machine from what I can tell, from the looks
of it, the machine is either a setup or they don't know much about security.

NeuroCon

There was a Con organized by The Pick held here in Melbourne a little while
ago, from all reports it was a total disaster, once again showing the apathy
of Australian people in the scene.

For Instance the organizers kept the location secret, and where supposed to
pick people up in the city, at several allocated times they did not show up.

When one of the potential attendees rang and asked what was going on they
were told by the organizers: "We are too drunk to come and get you".

Come on guys this is LAME, sure everyone likes a drink, but if you keep the
location secret, make sure someone is able to go and get the people waiting
to be picked up!

HackFEST 94

The Year is quickly approaching an end and as yet I have not managed to
fully organize this event. I am in need of people who wish to speak on various
topics, so if you are so inclined and have an idea, send me mail and we will
see what we can organize.

As always I can be contacted at [e-mail], but please note
my PGP signature has changed, so please do a finger on the account if you want
my new PGP signature.

Information in this article has come from various sources, but they shall
remain nameless as they do not wish the attention of the AFP. They know who
they are, and I send them my thanks - Thanks Guys!