home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
-
- ==Phrack Inc.==
-
- Volume Three, Issue 29, File #8 of 12
-
- ...........................................
- ||||||!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!||||||
- |||!!! !!!|||
- ||| The Myth and Reality About |||
- ||| Eavesdropping |||
- ||| |||
- ||| by Phone Phanatic |||
- ||| |||
- |||... October 8, 1989 ...|||
- ||||||...............................||||||
- !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
-
-
- Most Central Office (CO) eavesdropping intercepts in a Bell Operating Company
- (BOC) CO are today performed using a modified Metallic Facility Termination
- (MFT) circuit pack which places about a 100,000 ohm isolated bridging impedance
- across the subscriber line. Supervisory signaling is detected on the
- subscriber loop using a high-impedance electronic circuit, and the signaling is
- repeated in an isolated fashion using the A and B leads of the repeating coil
- in the MFT to "reconstruct" a CO line for the benefit of monitoring apparatus.
-
- The entire purpose of the above effort is to prevent any trouble or noise on
- the intercept line or monitoring apparatus from causing any trouble, noise or
- transmission impairment on the subject line.
-
- Some BOCs may elect to use service observing apparatus to provide the necessary
- isolation and repeated loop supervisory signaling. Less common are locally
- engineered variations which merely use an isolation amplifier from an MFT or
- other 4-wire repeater, and which provide no repeated supervisory signaling
- (which is not all that necessary, since voice-activated recorders and DTMF
- signaling detectors can be used, and since dial pulses can be counted by
- playing a tape at slow speed).
-
- Today, the use of a "bridge lifter" retardation coil for the purpose of
- connecting an eavesdropping intercept line is virtually non-existent since they
- do not provide sufficient isolation and since they provide a fair amount of
- insertion loss without loop current on the "observing" side. Bridge lifter
- coils are primarily intended for answering service intercept lines, and consist
- of a dual-winding inductor which passes 20 Hz ringing and whose windings easily
- saturate when DC current flows. Bridge lifter coils are used to minimize the
- loading effect (and consequent transmission impairment) of two subscriber loops
- on one CO line. Bridge lifter coils provide a significant insertion loss at
- voice frequencies toward the idle loop; i.e., the loop in use will have DC
- current flow, saturating the inductor, and reducing its insertion loss to
- 1.0 dB or less.
-
- Despite gadget advertised in magazines like The Sharper Image, the simple truth
- of the matter is that there is NO WAY for any person using ANY type of
- apparatus at the telephone set location to ascertain whether there is a
- properly installed eavesdropping device connected across their line in the CO.
- The only way such a determination can be made is through the cooperation of the
- telephone company.
-
- For that matter, there is virtually no way for any person using any type of
- apparatus in their premises to ascertain if there is ANY type of eavesdropping
- apparatus installed ANYWHERE on their telephone line outside their premises,
- unless the eavesdropping apparatus was designed or installed in an
- exceptionally crude manner (not likely today). Some types of eavesdropping
- apparatus may be located, but only with the full cooperation of the telephone
- company.
-
- The sole capability of these nonsense gadgets is to ascertain if an extension
- telephone is picked up during a telephone call, which is hardly a likely
- scenario for serious eavesdropping!
-
- These screw-in-the-handset gadgets work by sensing the voltage across the
- carbon transmitter circuit, and using a control to null this voltage using a
- comparator circuit. When a person makes a telephone call, the control is
- adjusted until the light just goes out. If an extension telephone at the
- user's end is picked up during the call, the increased current drain of a
- second telephone set will decrease the voltage across the carbon transmitter
- circuit, unbalancing the voltage comparator circuit, and thereby causing the
- LED to light.
-
- These voltage comparator "tap detectors" cannot even be left with their
- setpoint control in the same position, because the effective voltage across a
- subscriber loop will vary depending upon the nature of the call (except in the
- case of an all digital CO), and upon other conditions in the CO.
- Electromechanical and analog ESS CO's may present different characteristics to
- the telephone line, depending upon whether it is used at the time of: An
- originated intraoffice call (calling side of intraoffice trunk), an answered
- intraoffice call (called side of intraoffice trunk), an originated tandem call
- (interoffice tandem trunk), an originated toll call (toll trunk), or an
- answered tandem/toll call (incoming tandem or toll trunk). There is usually
- enough variation in battery feed resistance due to design and component
- tolerance changes on these different trunks to cause a variation of up to
- several volts measured at the subscriber end for a given loop and given
- telephone instrument.
-
- Even more significant are variations in CO battery voltage, which can vary
- (within "normal limits") from 48 volts to slightly over 52 volts, depending
- upon CO load conditions. 50 to 51 volts in most CO's is a typical daily
- variation. If anyone is curious, connect an isolated voltage recorder or data
- logger to a CO loop and watch the on-hook voltage variations; in many CO's the
- resultant voltage vs 24-hour time curve will look just like the inverse of a
- busy-hour graph from a telephone traffic engineering text!
-
- In some all-digital CO apparatus, the subscriber loop signaling is performed by
- a solid-state circuit which functions as a constant-current (or
- current-limiting) device. With such a solid-state circuit controlling loop
- current, there is no longer ANY meaningful reference to CO battery voltage;
- i.e., one cannot even use short-circuit loop current at the subscriber location
- to even estimate outside cable plant resistance.
-
- To explode this myth even further, let's do a little Ohm's Law:
-
- 1. Assume a CO loop with battery fed from a dual-winding A-relay (or
- line relay, ESS ferrod line scanner element, or whatever) having 200
- ohms to CO battery and 200 ohms to ground.
-
- 2. Assume a CO loop of 500 ohms (a pretty typical loop).
-
- 3. Assume an eavesdropping device with a DC resistance of 100,000 ohms
- (this is still pretty crude, but I'm being generous with my example).
-
- 4. Using some simple Ohm's law, the presence or absence of this
- hypothetical eavesdropping device at the SUBSCRIBER PREMISES will
- result in a voltage change of less than 0.5 volt when measured in the
- on-hook state. This voltage change is much less than normal
- variations of CO battery voltage.
-
- 5. Using some simple Ohm's law, the presence or absence of this
- hypothetical eavesdropping device at the CENTRAL OFFICE LOCATION will
- result in a voltage change of less than 0.2 volt when measured in the
- on-hook state. This voltage change is an order of magnitude less than
- the expected normal variation of CO battery voltage!
-
- Measuring voltage variations on a subscriber loop in an effort to detect a
- state-of-the-art eavesdropping device is meaningless, regardless of resolution
- of a voltage measuring device, since the "signal" is in effect buried in the
- "noise".
-
- Moving on to the subject of subscriber line impedance...
-
- There is simply no way for any device located on the subscriber's premises to
- obtain any MEANINGFUL information concerning the impedance characteristics of
- the subscriber loop and whether or not anything "unusual" is connected at the
- CO (or for that matter, anywhere else on the subscriber loop). There are a
- number of reasons why this is the case, which include but are not limited to:
-
- 1. The impedance of a typical telephone cable pair results from
- distributed impedance elements, and not lumped elements. Non-loaded
- exchange area cable (22 to 26 AWG @ 0.083 uF/mile capacitance) is
- generally considered to have a characteristic impedance of 600 ohms
- (it actually varies, but this is a good compromise figure). Loaded
- exchange area cable, such as H88 loading which are 88 mH coils spaced
- at 6 kft intervals, is generally considered to have a a characteristic
- impedance of 900 ohms (it actually varies between 800 and 1,200 ohms,
- but 900 ohms is generally regarded as a good compromise figure for the
- voice frequency range of 300 to 3,000 Hz). What this means is that a
- bridged impedance of 100,000 ohms located in the CO on a typical
- subscriber loop will result in an impedance change measured at the
- SUBSCRIBER LOCATION of 0.1% or less. That's IF you could measure the
- impedance change at the subscriber location.
-
- 2. As a general rule of thumb, the impedance of an exchange area
- telephone cable pair changes ONE PERCENT for every TEN DEGREES
- Fahrenheit temperature change. Actual impedance changes are a
- function of the frequency at which the impedance is measured, but the
- above rule is pretty close for the purposes of this discussion.
-
- 3. Moisture in the telephone cable causes dramatic changes in its
- impedance characteristics. While this may appear obvious in the case
- of pulp (i.e., paper) insulated conductors, it is also characteristic
- of polyethylene (PIC) insulated conductors. Only gel-filled cable
- (icky-PIC), which still represents only a small percentage of
- installed cable plant, is relatively immune from the effects of
- moisture.
-
- 4. From a practical standpoint, it is extremely difficult to measure
- impedance in the presence of the DC potential which is ALWAYS found on
- a telephone line. The subscriber has no means to remove the telephone
- pair from the switching apparatus in the CO to eliminate this
- potential.
-
- Therefore, any attempt at impedance measurement will be subject to DC
- current saturation error of any inductive elements found in an
- impedance bridge. The telephone company can, of course, isolate the
- subscriber cable pair from the switching apparatus for the purpose of
- taking a measurement -- but the subscriber cannot. In addition to the
- DC current problem, there is also the problem of impulse and other
- types of noise pickup on a connected loop which will impress errors in
- the impedance bridge detector circuit. Such noise primarily results
- from the on-hook battery feed, and is present even in ESS offices,
- with ferrod scanner pulses being a good source of such noise. While
- one could possibly dial a telephone company "balance termination" test
- line to get a quieter battery feed, this still leaves something to be
- desired for any actual impedance measurements.
-
- 5. Devices which connect to a telephone pair and use a 2-wire/4-wire
- hybrid with either a white noise source or a swept oscillator on one
- side and a frequency-selective voltmeter on the other side to make a
- frequency vs return loss plot provide impressive, but meaningless
- data. Such a plot may be alleged to show "changes" in telephone line
- impedance characteristics. There is actual test equipment used by
- telephone companies which functions in this manner to measure 2-wire
- Echo Return Loss (ERL), but the ERL measurement is meaningless for
- localization of eavesdropping devices.
-
- 6. It is not uncommon for the routing of a subscriber line cable pair to
- change one or more times during its lifetime due to construction and
- modification of outside cable plant. Outside cable plant bridge taps
- (not of the eavesdropping variety) can come and go, along with back
- taps in the CO to provide uninterrupted service during new cable plant
- additions. Not only can the "active" length of an existing cable pair
- change by several percent due to construction, but lumped elements of
- impedance can come and go due to temporary or permanent bridge taps.
-
- The bottom line of the above is that one cannot accurately measure the
- impedance of a telephone pair while it is connected to the CO switching
- apparatus, and even if one could, the impedance changes caused by the
- installation of an eavesdropping device will be dwarfed by changes in cable
- pair impedance caused by temperature, moisture, and cable plant construction
- unknown to the subscriber.
-
- About a year ago on a bulletin board I remember some discussions in which there
- was mention of the use of a time domain reflectometer (TDR) for localization of
- bridge taps and other anomalies. While a TDR will provide a rather detailed
- "signature" of a cable pair, it has serious limitations which include, but are
- not limited to:
-
- 1. A TDR, in general, cannot be operated on a cable pair upon which there
- is a foreign potential; i.e., a TDR cannot be used on a subscriber
- cable pair which is connected to the CO switching apparatus.
-
- 2. A TDR contains some rather sensitive circuitry used to detect the
- reflected pulse energy, and such circuitry is extremely susceptible to
- noise found in twisted pair telephone cable. A TDR is works well with
- coaxial cable and waveguide, which are in effect shielded transmission
- lines. The use of a TDR with a twisted cable pair is a reasonable
- compromise provided it is a _single_ cable pair within one shield.
- The use of a TDR with a twisted cable pair sharing a common shield
- with working cable pairs is an invitation to interference by virtue of
- inductive and capacitive coupling of noise from the working pairs.
-
- 3. Noise susceptibility issues notwithstanding, most TDR's cannot be used
- beyond the first loading coil on a subscriber loop since the loading
- coil inductance presents far too much reactance to the short pulses
- transmitted by the TDR. There are one or two TDR's on the market
- which claim to function to beyond ONE loading coil, but their
- sensitivity is poor.
-
- There is simply no device available to a telephone subscriber that without the
- cooperation of the telephone company which can confirm or deny the presence of
- any eavesdropping device at any point beyond the immediate premises of the
- subscriber. I say "immediate premises of the subscriber" because one presumes
- that the subscriber has the ability to isolate the premises wiring from the
- outside cable plant, and therefore has complete inspection control over the
- premises wiring.
-
- I have used the phrase "without the cooperation of the telephone company"
- several times in this article. No voltage, impedance or TDR data is meaningful
- without knowing the actual circuit layout of the subscriber loop in question.
- Circuit layout information includes such data as exact length and guages of
- loop sections, detailed description of loading (if present), presence and
- location of multiples and bridge taps, calculated and measured resistance of
- the loop, loop transmission loss, etc. There is NO way that a telephone
- company is going to furnish that information to a subscriber! Sometimes it's
- even difficult for a government agency to get this information without judicial
- intervention.
-
- Despite what I have stated in this article, you will see claims made by third
- parties as to the existence of devices which will detect the presence of
- telephone line eavesdropping beyond the subscriber's immediate premises. With
- the exception of the trivial cases of serious DC current draw by an extension
- telephone or the detection of RF energy emitted by a transmitter, this just
- ain't so. Companies like Communication Control Corporation (which advertises
- in various "executive" business publications) get rich by selling devices which
- claim to measure minute voltage and impedance changes on a telephone line --
- but consider those claims in view of the voltage changes due to CO battery
- variations and due to temperature changes in outside cable plant -- and you
- should get the true picture.
- _______________________________________________________________________________
-
-