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- EFFector Online Volume 09 No. 09 July 25, 1996 editors@eff.org
- A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation ISSN 1062-9424
-
- IN THIS ISSUE:
-
- Bernstein Files for Partial Summary Judgment in Crypto Case
- Internet Society's Strong Encryption Policy Statement
- NewsNybbles
- EFF/EFC Toronto Benefit Concert Wrap-up
- Upcoming Events
- Quote of the Day
- What YOU Can Do
- Administrivia
-
- * See http://www.eff.org/Alerts/ or ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/ for more
- information on current EFF activities and online activism alerts! *
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: Bernstein to File for Partial Summary Judgment in Crypto Case
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- BERNSTEIN TO FILE FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN CRYPTO CASE
-
- Claims Government's Restrictions on Export
- of Cryptographic Speech Violates First Amendment
-
-
- July 26, 1996 Electronic Frontier Foundation
-
- Contacts:
- Shari Steele, Staff Counsel
- 301/375-8856, ssteele@eff.org
-
- Mike Godwin, Staff Counsel
- 510/548-3290, mnemonic@eff.org
-
- Lori Fena, Executive Director
- 415/436-9333, lori@eff.org
-
-
- San Francisco, CA -- A University of Illinois at Chicago faculty member
- who is suing the U.S. Department of State will file a motion Friday that
- could strengthen his claim that government restrictions on information
- about cryptography violate the First Amendment's protections for freedom
- of speech.
-
- Relying on Judge Marilyn Hall Patel's prior ruling that computer source
- code is speech protected by the First Amendment, mathematician Daniel J.
- Bernstein will file a motion for partial summary judgment in his suit
- against the State Department.
-
- In his 45-page memorandum in support of his motion, Bernstein sets forth
- several First Amendment arguments:
-
- LEGAL ARGUMENTS
-
- * Any legal framework that requires a license for First Amendment
- protected speech, which may be granted or withheld at the discretion of a
- government official, is a prior restraint on speech. In order for this
- framework to be acceptable, the government has the burden of showing that
- publication will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
- damage to our Nation or its people" and that the regulation at issue is
- necessary to prevent this damage. The government has not met this burden
- regarding the ITAR legal framework.
-
- * Because restrictions on speech about cryptography are
- content-based, the court must apply a strict scrutiny test in determining
- whether individuals can be punished for engaging in this speech. A strict
- scrutiny test requires that a regulation be necessary to serve a
- compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
- end. The ITAR regulatory scheme has adopted the *most* restrictive
- approach by prohibiting all speech in the area of cryptography.
-
- * The ITAR regulatory framework lacks the necessary procedural
- safeguards. Grants of administrative discretion must be limited by clear
- standards, and judicial review must be available. "Quite simply, the ITAR
- Scheme allows its administrative agencies to make inconsistent, incorrect
- and sometimes incomprehensible decisions censoring speech, all without the
- protections of judicial review or oversight."
-
- * The ITAR framework is unconstitutionally vague. The government
- doesn't even seem to know what its regulations include and exclude! Here,
- the lack of standards has allowed the government to misuse a statute aimed
- at commercial, military arms sales to limit academic and scientific
- publication.
-
- * The ITAR regulatory scheme is overbroad. In an internal memo
- written almost 20 years ago, the government's own Office of Legal Counsel
- concluded that the ITAR s licensing standards "are not sufficiently
- precise to guard against arbitrary and inconsistent administrative
- action." The OLC specifically warned that the coverage was so broad it
- could apply to "communication of unclassified information by a technical
- lecturer at a university or to the conversation of a United States
- engineer who meets with foreign friends at home to discuss matters of
- theoretical interest." This is exactly what is happening here, and it is
- unconstitutional.
-
-
- CASE BACKGROUND
-
- While a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley,
- Bernstein completed the development of an encryption equation (an
- "algorithm") he calls "Snuffle." Bernstein wishes to publish a) the
- algorithm, (b) a mathematical paper describing and explaining the
- algorithm, and (c) the "source code" for a computer program that
- incorporates the algorithm. Bernstein also wishes to discuss these items
- at mathematical conferences, college classrooms and other open, public
- meetings. The Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in
- Arms Regulations (the ITAR regulatory scheme) required Bernstein to submit
- his ideas about cryptography to the government for review, to register as
- an arms dealer, and to apply for and obtain from the government a license
- to publish his ideas. Failure to do so would result in severe civil and
- criminal penalties. Bernstein believes this is a violation of his First
- Amendment rights and has sued the government.
-
- In the first phase of this litigation, the government argued that since
- Bernstein's ideas were expressed, in part, in source code, they were not
- protected by the First Amendment. On April 15, 1996, Judge Marilyn Hall
- Patel in the Northern District of California rejected that argument and
- held for the first time that computer source code is protected speech for
- purposes of the First Amendment.
-
- Because of its far-reaching implications, the Bernstein case is being
- watched closely by privacy advocates, the computer industry, the export
- and cryptography communities, and First Amendment activists. In fact,
- several members of these communities provided declarations that were
- submitted in support of Bernstein's motion.
-
-
- ABOUT THE ATTORNEYS
-
- Lead counsel on the case is Cindy Cohn of the San Mateo law firm of
- McGlashan & Sarrail, who is offering her services pro bono. Major
- additional pro bono legal assistance is being provided by Lee Tien of
- Berkeley; M. Edward Ross of the San Francisco law firm of Steefel, Levitt
- & Weiss; and James Wheaton and Elizabeth Pritzker of the First Amendment
- Project in Oakland.
-
-
- ABOUT THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
-
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a non-profit civil liberties
- organization working in the public interest to protect privacy, free
- expression, and access to online resources and information. EFF is a
- primary sponsor of the Bernstein case. EFF helped to find Bernstein pro
- bono counsel, is a member of the Bernstein legal team, and helped collect
- members of the academic community and computer industry to support this
- case.
-
- Full text of the lawsuit and other paperwork filed in the case is
- available from EFF's online archives:
-
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject:Internet Society's Strong Encryption Policy Statement
- -------------------------------------------------------------
-
- IAB and IESG (divisions of the Internet Society) issued this statement on
- US encryption policy, yesterday, linking Internet standards bodies'
- positions on this crucial issue to those of civil libertarians and online
- businesses, in a strong front against Clinton administration key "escrow"
- proposals and unconstitutional restrictions on encryption export.
-
-
- IAB AND IESG STATEMENT ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET
-
- July 24, 1996
-
- The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering
- Steering Group (IESG), the bodies which oversee architecture and
- standards for the Internet, are concerned by the need for increased
- protection of international commercial transactions on the Internet,
- and by the need to offer all Internet users an adequate degree of
- privacy.
-
- Security mechanisms being developed in the Internet Engineering
- Task Force to meet these needs require and depend on the international
- use of adequate cryptographic technology. Ready access to such
- technology is therefore a key factor in the future growth of the
- Internet as a motor for international commerce and communication.
-
- The IAB and IESG are therefore disturbed to note that various
- governments have actual or proposed policies on access to cryptographic
- technology that either:
- (a) impose restrictions by implementing export controls; and/or
- (b) restrict commercial and private users to weak and inadequate
- mechanisms such as short cryptographic keys; and/or
- (c) mandate that private decryption keys should be in the hands of
- the government or of some other third party; and/or
- (d) prohibit the use of cryptology entirely, or permit it only
- to specially authorized organizations.
-
- We believe that such policies are against the interests of consumers
- and the business community, are largely irrelevant to issues of
- military security, and provide only a marginal or illusory benefit
- to law enforcement agencies, as discussed below.
-
- The IAB and IESG would like to encourage policies that allow ready
- access to uniform strong cryptographic technology for all Internet
- users in all countries.
-
- The IAB and IESG claim:
-
- The Internet is becoming the predominant vehicle for electronic
- commerce and information exchange. It is essential that the support
- structure for these activities can be trusted.
-
- Encryption is not a secret technology monopolized by any one country,
- such that export controls can hope to contain its deployment. Any
- hobbyist can program a PC to do powerful encryption. Many algorithms
- are well documented, some with source code available in textbooks.
-
- Export controls on encryption place companies in that country at
- a competitive disadvantage. Their competitors from countries without
- export restrictions can sell systems whose only design constraint
- is being secure, and easy to use.
-
- Usage controls on encryption will also place companies in that
- country at a competitive disadvantage because these companies cannot
- securely and easily engage in electronic commerce.
-
- Escrow mechanisms inevitably weaken the security of the overall
- cryptographic system, by creating new points of vulnerability that
- can and will be attacked.
-
- Export controls and usage controls are slowing the deployment of
- security at the same time as the Internet is exponentially increasing
- in size and attackers are increasing in sophistication. This puts
- users in a dangerous position as they are forced to rely on insecure
- electronic communication.
-
-
- * TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
-
- KEY SIZE
-
- It is not acceptable to restrict the use or export of cryptosystems
- based on their key size. Systems that are breakable by one country
- will be breakable by others, possibly unfriendly ones. Large
- corporations and even criminal enterprises have the resources to
- break many cryptosystems. Furthermore, conversations often need
- to be protected for years to come; as computers increase in speed,
- key sizes that were once out of reach of cryptanalysis will become
- insecure.
-
-
- PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
-
- Use of public key cryptography often requires the existence of a
- "certification authority". That is, some third party must sign a
- string containing the user's identity and public key. In turn,
- the third party's key is often signed by a higher-level certification
- authority.
-
- Such a structure is legitimate and necessary. Indeed, many
- governments will and should run their own CAs, if only to protect
- citizens' transactions with their governments. But certification
- authorities should not be confused with escrow centers. Escrow
- centers are repositories for private keys, while certification
- authorities deal with public keys. Indeed, sound cryptographic
- practice dictates that users never reveal their private keys to
- anyone, even the certification authority.
-
-
- KEYS SHOULD NOT BE REVEALABLE
-
- The security of a modern cryptosystem rests entirely on the secrecy
- of the keys. Accordingly, it is a major principle of system design
- that to the extent possible, secret keys should never leave their
- user's secure environment. Key escrow implies that keys must be
- disclosed in some fashion, a flat-out contradiction of this principle.
- Any such disclosure weakens the total security of the system.
-
- DATA RECOVERY
-
- Sometimes escrow systems are touted as being good for the customer
- because they allow data recovery in the case of lost keys. However,
- it should be up to the customer to decide whether they would prefer
- the more secure system in which lost keys mean lost data, or one
- in which keys are escrowed to be recovered when necessary. Similarly,
- keys used only for conversations (as opposed to file storage) need
- never be escrowed. And a system in which the secret key is stored
- by a government and not by the data owner is certainly not practical
- for data recovery.
-
- SIGNATURE KEYS
-
- Keys used for signatures and authentication must never be escrowed.
- Any third party with access to such keys could impersonate the
- legitimate owner, creating new opportunities for fraud and deceit.
- Indeed, a user who wished to repudiate a transaction could claim
- that his or her escrowed key was used, putting the onus on that
- party. If a government escrowed the keys, a defendant could claim
- that the evidence had been forged by the government, thereby making
- prosecution much more difficult. For electronic commerce,
- non-repudiation is one of the most important uses for cryptography;
- and non-repudiation depends on the assumption that only the user
- has access to the private key.
-
- PROTECTION OF THE EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE
-
- In some cases, it is technically feasible to use cryptographic operations
- that do not involve secrecy. While this may suffice in some cases, much
- of the existing technical and commercial infrastructure cannot be
- protected in this way. For example, conventional passwords, credit
- card numbers, and the like must be protected by strong encryption,
- even though some day more sophisticated techniques may replace them.
- Encryption can be added on quite easily; wholesale changes to diverse
- systems cannot.
-
- CONFLICTING INTERNATIONAL POLICIES
-
- Conflicting restrictions on encryption often force an international
- company to use a weak encryption system, in order to satisfy legal
- requirements in two or more different countries. Ironically, in
- such cases either nation might consider the other an adversary
- against whom commercial enterprises should use strong cryptography.
- Clearly, key escrow is not a suitable compromise, since neither
- country would want to disclose keys to the other.
-
- MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION
-
- Even if escrowed encryption schemes are used, there is nothing to
- prevent someone from using another encryption scheme first. Certainly,
- any serious malefactors would do this; the outer encryption layer,
- which would use an escrowed scheme, would be used to divert suspicion.
-
-
- ESCROW OF PRIVATE KEYS WON'T NECESSARILY ALLOW DATA DECRYPTION
-
- A major threat to users of cryptographic systems is the theft of
- long-term keys (perhaps by a hacker), either before or after a
- sensitive conversation. To counter this threat, schemes with
- "perfect forward secrecy" are often employed. If PFS is used, the
- attacker must be in control of the machine during the actual
- conversation. But PFS is generally incompatible with schemes
- involving escrow of private keys. (This is an oversimplification,
- but a full analysis would be too lengthy for this document.)
-
-
-
- * CONCLUSIONS
-
- As more and more companies connect to the Internet, and as more and
- more commerce takes place there, security is becoming more and more
- critical. Cryptography is the most powerful single tool that users
- can use to secure the Internet. Knowingly making that tool weaker
- threatens their ability to do so, and has no proven benefit.
-
- ______________
-
- The Internet Architecture Board is described at http://www.iab.org/iab
-
- The Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Engineering
- Steering Group are described at http://www.ietf.org
- ______________
-
- (C) Internet Society 1996. Reproduction or translation of the
- complete document, but not of extracts, including this notice,
- is freely permitted.
-
- [end]
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: NewsNybbles
- --------------------
-
- * EFF/EFC Toronto Benefit Concert Wrap-up
-
- The Eden MusicFest, a benefit concert (produced by ICONcerts) for the
- Electronic Frontier Foundation and it's Canadian sister organization,
- Electronic Frontier Canada, recently gathered more than 50,000 fans of
- modern rock music for a weekend camping adventure at the Mosport
- International Speedway, in Ontario, Canada.
-
- Set in rural farmland an hour east of Toronto, the festival staged over 40
- bands in a three day period, July 12-14, 1996, and featured headliners
- such as the Cure, the Tragically Hip, Live, Porno For Pyros and Love and
- Rockets. Music began about noon each day and continued on each of two
- stages until close to midnight. A Netcast of the concert weekend was
- produced by MediaCast and included live feeds from the main stage,
- interviews with band members and discussions with attendant notables
- such as EFF Executive Director Lori Fena, via Xing StreamWorks,
- RealAudio, IChat, and other Internet innovations.
-
- "Music forums are one of the online "killer apps" most at
- risk when governments pass overly-board Internet censorship laws.
- Eden MusicFest was a great venue for celebrating free-speech online and
- raising awareness of the threats to our rights," said Fena.
-
- EFF's own Dennis Derryberry had virtual centerstage between main acts,
- performing an acoustic guitar-backed original song about EFF-related
- issues, for the cybercast and the giant twin screens on either side of
- the main stage.
-
- EFF's and EF-Canada's presence in the Internet Expo tent attracted the
- interest of many wishing to decorate themselves with a free temporary
- tattoo. The tattoos bore the blue ribbon--a symbol employed in recent
- months to promote the free expression of ideas online around the world,
- and a protest the Communications Decency Act and similar government
- Net censorship proposals in other countries.
-
- Two trailers were set up adjacent to our tent with Internet connections
- and Compaq terminals, allowing Internet rookies to sample the online
- world, and where veteran Netizens could be found checking their email
- every few hours. Across the pavilion from our booth, passers-by stopped to
- play a few chords at the Gibson Entertainment booth, where more than 20
- guitars glimmered atop a table, with demonstration effects racks poised
- for the many music fans experiencing stage envy.
-
- After the event, all at EFF agreed that the weekend was a success not
- only as a benefit event, but from the perspective of having made
- contacts within the music and entertainment world who are sympathetic to
- EFF's mission to protect free speech online. Many band members wore EFF
- t-shirts[*] and pins during their performances, while others took time to
- talk about civil liberties concerns on the cybercast (and, between
- bands, on the stage's side screens).
-
- The simple fact that an event of this magnitude can be organized this
- quickly around issues of privacy and free speech on the Internet sends a
- clear message - these concerns are not a special interest to be swept aside,
- but are now a mainstream interest, a sizeable blip on the voting public's
- radar. It bodes well for all of us. This a very big first step in taking
- the "cyberliberty" message to general public, and preaching beyond the
- online "choir".
-
- For those of you who missed the Netcast of the festival, visit
- MediaCast's archives at http://www.edencast.com where you'll find many
- pictures, reports and other information about the happenings at Eden
- Music Festival.
-
- Lastly, we'd like to thank the sponsors of the event, and those who organized
- and staffed the event for making it all happen, as well as EF-Canada's
- and our own wonderful volunteers for helping run the info booth.
-
- [* Note: if you have ordered an EFF t-shirt and have not received it, do
- not be alarmed at this fact. The shirts arrived shortly before the
- festival, and are now being sent to those of you who are on a back-order
- list. Thanks for your patience.]
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Upcoming Events
- ---------------
-
- This schedule lists EFF events, and those we feel might be of interest to
- our members. EFF events (those sponsored by us or featuring an EFF speaker)
- are marked with a "*" instead of a "-" after the date. Simlarly, government
- events (such as deadlines for comments on reports or testimony submission,
- or conferences at which government representatives are speaking) are marked
- with "!" in place of the "-" ("!?" means a govt. speaker may appear, but
- we don't know for certain yet.) And likewise, "+" in place of "-"
- indicates a non-USA event. If it's a foreign EFF event with govt. people,
- it'll be "*!+" instead of "-". You get the idea.
-
- The latest version of the full EFF calendar is available from:
-
- ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/calendar.eff
- gopher: gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF, calendar.eff
- http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/calendar.eff
-
- See also our new Now-Up-to-Date HTML calendar at:
- http://events.eff.org
-
-
- July 27-
- 31 + "Realigning Your Organization to Learning in the Information
- Age," sponsored by On the Horizon and the University of North
- Carolina School of Education. The University of Edinburgh,
- Edinburgh, Scotland.
- Contact: James Morrison
- Phone: +1 919 962 2517
- Fax: +1 919 962 1533
- Email: Morrison@unc.edu
- URL: http://sunsite.unc.edu/horizon
-
- July 28-
- 30 * Spotlight: an Executive Conference Directing the Future of
- Multimedia; discussion of critical issues facing interactive
- media industry; EFF Executive Director Lori Fena will speak;
- Ritz-Carlton, Laguna Niguel, CA.
- Tel: 415 312 0687
-
- July 28-
- 31 ! The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams's 8th
- Conference and Workshop on Computer Security Incident Handling and
- Response; Santa Clara, CA
- URL: http://ciac.llnl.gov/firstconf
-
- Aug. 5- * Progress and Freedom Foundation; annual summit held in Aspen,
- 6 Colorado, will feature EFF Chairman Esther Dyson, Alvin Toffler
- and Congressman Rick White and Senator Bill Bradley; "An
- exploration of the Electronic Frontier's impact on American
- society."
- Info: +1 202 289 8928 Email to: mail@pff.org
-
- Aug. 5-
- 9 + International Conference on Computational Linguistics;
- University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark.
- Email: coling96@nttkb.ntt.jp
-
- Aug. 8 - Registration deadline for SAB96, Sep. 9, 1996.
-
- Aug. 8-
- 10 - Conference on Computing and Philosophy; Carnegie Mellon
- University, Pittsburgh, PA. Deadline for submissions: Feb. 19.
- Contact: +1 412 268 7643
- Email: rc2z@andrew.cmu.edu
- URL: http://www.lcl.cmu.edu/CAAE/CAPpage.html
-
- Aug. 14-
- 16 + Information Seeking in Context: an International Conference on
- Information Needs, Seeking and Use in Different Contexts; Tampere,
- Finland. Deadline for submission of abstracts: October 15, 1995.
- Contact: +358 31 215 7039 (voice), +358 31 215 6560 (fax)
- Email: inf@uta.fi
-
- Aug. 14-
- 17 - 7th Macintosh Summit Conference; learn the latest tips, tricks
- and techniques of the Mac platform from the Mac giants.
- University of California, Santa Barbara.
- Contact: Fati Erdogan
- Tel: 805 893 2811
- Fax: 805 893 4943
- URL's: http://www.metatools.com/metauniv
- http://www.xlrn.ucsb.edu
-
- Aug. 21-
- 23 + China-U.S. Meeting on Global Information Access: Challenges and
- Opportunities; Beijing, China.
- Email: leeh@ohiou.edu
-
- Aug. 26 - ACM SIGCOMM '96: Applications, Technologies, Architectures and
- Protocols for Computer Communication; Stanford University,
- Stanford, CA
- URL: http://www.acm.org/sigcomm/sigcomm96/
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: Quote of the Day
- -------------------------
-
- "The Singapore government isn't interested in controlling information,
- but wants a gradual phase-in of services to protect ourselves. It's not
- to control, but to protect the citizens of Singapore. In our society,
- you can state your views, but they have to be correct."
- - Ernie Hai, coordinator of the Singapore Government Internet Project
-
- Find yourself wondering if your privacy and freedom of speech are safe
- when bills to censor the Internet are swimming about in a sea of of
- surveillance legislation and anti-terrorism hysteria? Worried that in
- the rush to make us secure from ourselves that our government
- representatives may deprive us of our essential civil liberties?
- Concerned that legislative efforts nominally to "protect children" will
- actually censor all communications down to only content suitable for
- the playground? Alarmed by commercial and religious organizations abusing
- the judicial and legislative processes to stifle satire, dissent and
- criticism?
-
- Join EFF!
- http://www.eff.org/EFFdocs/join_eff.html (or send any message to info@eff.org).
-
- Even if you don't live in the U.S., the anti-Internet hysteria will soon
- be visiting a legislative body near you. If it hasn't already.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: What YOU Can Do
- ------------------------
-
- * The Communications Decency Act & Other Censorship Legislation
-
- The Communications Decency Act and similar legislation pose serious
- threats to freedom of expression online, and to the livelihoods of system
- operators. The legislation also undermines several crucial privacy
- protections.
-
- Business/industry persons concerned should alert their corporate govt.
- affairs office and/or legal counsel. Everyone should write to their own
- Representatives and Senators, letting them know that such abuses of
- public trust will not be tolerated, that legislators who vote against
- your free speech rights will be voted against by you in the next elections.
-
- Join in the Blue Ribbon Campaign - see http://www.eff.org/blueribbon.html
-
- PARTICIPATE IN BLUE RIBBON ACTIVISM EFFORTS:
- http://www.eff.org/blueribbon/activism.html
-
- Support the EFF Cyberspace Legal Defense Fund:
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/cyberlegal_fund_eff.announce
-
- For more information on what you can do to help stop this and other
- dangerous legislation, see:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/
-
- If you do not have full internet access (e.g. WWW), send your request
- for information to ask@eff.org.
-
- IMPORTANT! KEEP AN EYE ON YOUR LOCAL LEGISLATURE. All kinds of wacky
- censorious legislation is turning up at the US state and non-US
- national levels. Don't let it sneak by you - or by the online activism
- community. Without locals on the look out, it's very difficult for the
- Net civil liberties community to keep track of what's happening locally
- as well as globally.
-
-
- * New Crypto-Privacy Legislation
-
- Urge your Represenatitives to support the Pro-CODE crypto export bill
- (and to fix the few remaining bugs in it).
-
- For years US export controls on encryption have hampered the development
- of secure communications online. This technology is vital for online
- commerce, for national security, and for YOUR electronic privacy.
-
- The new Pro-CODE legislation will go a long way to rectifying the situation.
-
- Join in the Golden Key Campaign - see http://www.eff.org/goldkey.html
-
- PARTICIPATE IN GOLDEN KEY ACTIVISM EFFORTS:
- http://www.eff.org/goldkey/activism.html
-
- Support the EFF Cyberspace Legal Defense Fund:
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/cyberlegal_fund_eff.announce
-
- See also:
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/
- http://www.privacy.org/ipc/
- http://www.crypto.com/
- for more info.
-
-
- * Digital Telephony/Comms. Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
-
- The FBI has been seeking both funding for the DT/CALEA wiretapping
- provisions, and preparing to require that staggering numbers of citizens be
- simultaneously wiretappable.
-
- To oppose the funding, write to your own Senators and Representatives
- urging them to vote against any appropriations for wiretapping.
-
- We are aware of no major action on this threat at present, but keep your
- eyes peeled. It will be back.
-
- See http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Surveillance/ for more info.
-
-
- * Anti-Terrorism Bills
-
- Several bills threatening your privacy and free speech have been introduced
- recently. One passed, but none of the rest of them are close to passage at
- this very moment - however, this status may change. Urge your
- Congresspersons to oppose these unconstitutional and Big-Brotherish
- bills, which threaten freedom of association, free press, free speech,
- and privacy. One such bill passed a few weeks ago, stripped of some of the
- more onerous provisions. It could have been worse, and could yet still
- be worse.
-
- Keep up the pressure. Write to your legislators: No
- secret trials and deportations, no expansion of wiretapping scope or
- authority, no national or "smart-card" ID systems!
-
- For more information on some of this legislation, see
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Terrorism_militias/
-
-
- * Medical Privacy Legislation
-
- Several bills relating to medical privacy issues are floating in Congress
- right now. Urge your legislators to support only proposals that *truly*
- enhance the medical privacy of citizens.
-
- More information on this legislation will be available at
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Medical/ soon. Bug mech@eff.org to make
- it appear there faster. :)
-
-
- * Child Privacy Legislation
-
- A new bill to protect children from unethical marketing practices (e.g.
- tricking kids into revealing personal information by offering prizes or
- games) has been introduced. EFF and other civil liberties organizations
- like, and dislike, various points in this bill. The legislators
- sponsoring the bill appear interested in resolving the problems in the
- statutory language they have proposed.
-
-
- * Find Out Who Your Congresspersons Are
-
- Writing letters to, faxing, and phoning your representatives in Congress
- is one very important strategy of activism, and an essential way of
- making sure YOUR voice is heard on vital issues.
-
- EFF has lists of the Senate and House with contact information, as well
- as lists of Congressional committees. These lists are available at:
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Activism/Congress_cmtes/
- gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Issues/Activism/Congress_cmtes
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Activism/Congress_cmtes/
-
- The full Senate and House lists are senate.list and hr.list, respectively.
- Those not in the U.S. should seek out similar information about their
- own legislative bodies. EFF will be happy to archive any such
- information provided to us, so pass it on!
-
- If you are having difficulty determining who your US legislators are,
- try contacting your local League of Women Voters, who maintain a great
- deal of legislator information, or consult the free ZIPPER service
- that matches Zip Codes to Congressional districts with about 85%
- accuracy at:
- http://www.stardot.com/~lukeseem/zip.html
-
- Computer Currents Interactive has provided Congress contact info, sorted
- by who voted for and against the Communcations Decency Act:
- http://www.currents.net/congress.html
-
-
- * Join EFF!
-
- You *know* privacy, freedom of speech and ability to make your voice heard
- in government are important. You have probably participated in our online
- campaigns and forums. Have you become a member of EFF yet? The best way to
- protect your online rights is to be fully informed and to make your
- opinions heard. EFF members are informed and are making a difference. Join
- EFF today!
-
- For EFF membership info, send queries to membership@eff.org, or send any
- message to info@eff.org for basic EFF info, and a membership form.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Administrivia
- =============
-
- EFFector Online is published by:
-
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation
- 1550 Bryant St., Suite 725
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- +1 415 436 9993 (fax)
- Membership & donations: membership@eff.org
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-
- Editor: Stanton McCandlish, Online Activist, Webmaster (mech@eff.org)
-
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-
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- ------------------------------
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-
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-
-
- End of EFFector Online v09 #09 Digest
- *************************************
-
- $$
-