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- EFFector Online Volume 08 No. 18 Nov. 6, 1995 editors@eff.org
- A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation ISSN 1062-9424
-
- IN THIS ISSUE:
-
- ALERT: Net Censorship: Christian Coalition Tops Even Exon
- The Latest News
- What You Can Do Now
- The letter & suggested legislation from Ed Meese and the Christian Right
- Chronology of the CDA
- For More Information
- List Of Participating Organizations
- ALERT: Digital Telephony Action - Nov. 15 Deadline!
- Background: FBI Draft Capacity Requirements
- What You Can Do Now
- Congress May Just Not Buy It
- House Rejects First DT/CALEA Funding Attempt
- Sen. Leahy Definitely Not Buying It
- Canadian Law Enforcement Taking the FBI Hint
- The Text of the FBI's Federal Register Notice
- Newsbytes
- EFF Relocation Complete
- EFF Rated in Top 5% of the Net by Point Survey
- Commerce Dept. IPWG Report on Online Intellectual Property Meets Resistance
- IPWG Report's Suggested Legislation: Passed and Pending (+ Canada Tie-In)
- Upcoming Articles
- Upcoming Events
- Quote of the Day
- What YOU Can Do
- Administrivia
-
- * See http://www.eff.org/Alerts/ or ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/ for more
- information on current EFF activities and online activism alerts! *
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: ALERT: Net Censorship, and Christian Coalition v. Human Rights Watch
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
- CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE EXON/COATS COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
- (SEE THE LIST OF CAMPAIGN COALITION MEMBERS AT THE END)
-
- Update: -Latest News:
- The Christian Coalition is pushing Congress to censor
- the net more heavily than even Sen. J.J. Exon ever imagined.
- There is the very real possibility that they may succeed.
-
- You should be very worried. We are.
-
- -What You Can Do Now:
- Follow the directions below and call House Speaker
- Gingrich and Senate Leader Dole. Implore them
- to allow parents to make choices for their children,
- instead of government censors.
-
- Volunteer to join the fight by helping organize in your
- home town.
-
- CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
- Nov 2, 1995
-
- PLEASE WIDELY REDISTRIBUTE THIS DOCUMENT WITH THIS BANNER INTACT
- REDISTRIBUTE ONLY UNTIL December 1, 1995
- REPRODUCE THIS ALERT ONLY IN RELEVANT FORUMS
-
- ________________________________________________________________________
-
- CONTENTS
- The Latest News
- What You Can Do Now
- The letter & suggested legislation from Ed Meese and the Christian Right
- Chronology of the CDA
- For More Information
- List Of Participating Organizations
-
- ________________________________________________________________________
-
- THE LATEST NEWS
-
- Since the very first day that Senator J.J. Exon (D-NE) proposed censorship
- legislation for the Internet, the Christian Right has pushed for the most
- restrictive regulations they could think of.
-
- The Religious Right (which does not necessarily speak for all religious
- people concerned with this issue) recently tipped their hand in a letter
- to Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD) and Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-VA) requesting
- a new and more restrictive net censorship proposal.
-
- There are essentially three new dangerous elements of their campaign
- to shut down cyberspace:
-
-
- INTERNET PROVIDERS, ONLINE SERVICES, AND LIBRARIES CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR
- EXPRESSION ONLINE
- The Religious Right has proposed to hold anyone who provides access to the
- Internet or other interactive media, including online services providers,
- ISP's, BBS's, Libraries, and Schools, criminally liable for all speech
- carried on the network.
-
- In order to avoid liability under this provision, service providers would be
- forced to monitor user's electronic communications to be assured that
- no "indecent" material is transmitted across their networks.
-
- This proposal is MORE RESTRICTIVE than the Exon Communications Decency Act,
- or any other net censorship legislation currently in Congress.
-
- In their letter to Congress, the Religious Right says:
-
- [Providers] would simply be required to avoid KNOWING violations of
- the law. [emphasis added]
-
- However, the "knowing" standard is vague enough that the mere knowledge
- that such material exists could be sufficient to trigger criminal liability.
- A single complaint or even a news report could force a service provider to
- take down a web page, remove posts to chat rooms or other discussion
- forums, or shut down listservs in order to avoid going to jail and facing
- huge fines.
-
-
- A STANDARD FOR INDECENCY
- The proposals pushed by the Christian Coalition relies on the
- unconstitutional "indecency standard". Like the Exon Communications
- Decency Act, the Christian Coalition seeks to regulate all indecent
- speech online.
-
- Indecency is a broad category that includes everything from George Carlin's
- "seven dirty words" to such classic novels and "The Catcher in the Rye" and
- "Lady Chatterly's Lover".
-
- The Supreme Court has ruled that restrictions on indecent speech are
- Constitutional only if they rely on the "least restrictive means". Broad
- indecency restrictions on interactive media do not satisfy the "least
- restrictive means" test, because interactive media allows users and
- parents tremendous control over the information they receive.
-
- Any legislation which attempts to apply an indecency restriction to the
- Internet is unconstitutional on its face.
-
- The Christian Coalition's proposal that relies on an indecency
- restriction contemplates dumbing down every conversation, web page,
- newsgroup, and mailing list on the Internet to the level of what is
- not offensive to children.
-
- What kind of discussions between adults are possible in an arena
- where everything has been reduced to the level of the Lion King?
-
-
- UNPRECEDENTED CONTROL OVER ONLINE SPEECH FOR THE FCC
- The Christian Coalition would give the FCC broad jurisdiction over
- cyberspace. It would allow the FCC jurisdiction over your online
- speech, and over the design Internet software, such as web browsers and
- filtering programs that parents can use to control their children's
- access to the Internet.
-
- The Internet has developed from a government project to a market-driven
- economic boom for thousands of businesses. Giving the FCC authority over
- this medium would significantly hinder the growth of this new industry.
-
- ________________________________________________________________________
-
- WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW
-
- 1. The proposals from the Religious Right will literally destroy online
- speech as we know it. The odds of stopping this are not certain.
-
- There is a very real chance that this legislation will pass, and
- we will experience a period of uncertainty and chilling of speech
- while an appropriate test case attempts to reach the Supreme Court
- (should it even get there!)
-
- The Religious Right has a strong grass-roots network. We need to
- counter their energy and ensure cyberspace is not lost due to them.
-
- IMMEDIATELY CALL House Speaker Gingrich (R-GA) and Senate Leader
- Dole (R-KS) and urge them to oppose the Christian Coalition's
- proposal.
-
- Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax
- ======================== ============== ==============
- R GA Gingrich, Newt 1-202-225-4501 1-202-225-4656
- R KS Dole, Robert 1-202-224-6521 1-202-224-8952
-
- If you're at a loss for words, try one of the following:
-
- Please oppose the recent proposal from the Religious Right to
- censor the Internet. The only effective way to address children's
- access to the Internet is through parental control tools outlined
- by the Cox/White/Wyden approach.
- or
- As a religious person and a parent, I oppose the Religious Right's
- attempts to censor the Internet. I am the best person to monitor
- my child's access to the Internet using parental control tools
- as outlined in the Cox/White/Wyden approach.
-
- 2. Join the online fight by becoming a volunteer for your district!
-
- Check to see if your legislator is in the list below. If they are
- not, consult the free ZIPPER service that matches Zip Codes to
- Congressional districts with about 85% accuracy at:
-
- URL:http://www.stardot.com/~lukeseem/zip.html
-
- The conference committee legislators are:
- House: Barr (R-GA), Barton (R-TX), Berman (R-CA), Bliley (R-VA),
- Boucher (D-VA), Brown (D-OH), Bryant (D-TX), Buyer (R-IN),
- Conyers (D-MI), Dingell (D-MI), Eshoo (D-CA), Fields (R-TX),
- Flanagan (R-IL), Frisa (R-NY), Gallegly (R-CA), Goodlatte (R-VA),
- Gordon (D-TN), Hastert (R-IL), Hoke (R-OH), Hyde (R-IL),
- Jackson-Lee (D-TX), Klug (R-WI), Lincoln (D-AR), Markey (D-MA),
- Moorhead (R-CA), Oxley (R-OH), Paxon (R-NY), Rush (D-IL),
- Schaefer (R-CO), Schroeder (D-CO), Scott (D-VA), Stearns (R-FL),
- White (R-WA)
- Senate: Burns (R-MT), Exon (D-NE), Ford (D-KY), Gorton (R-WA),
- Hollings (D-SC), Inouye (D-HI), Lott (R-MS), McCain (R-AZ),
- Pressler (R-SD), Rockefeller (D-WV), Stevens (R-AK)
-
- If your legislator is on the conference committee, you have a chance
- to influence their vote on this issue with your power as a constituent.
- Volunteer to help educate your legislator by sending mail to
- volunteer@vtw.org. A coalition volunteer will be in touch with you.
-
- You can starting working to help spread the word in your district by
- sending this letter to five friends. Ask them to call Dole and Gingrich
- as well.
-
- 3. The People for the American Way (PFAW) and the American Civil Liberties
- Union are organizing a letter from ORGANIZATIONS to the Conference
- Committee to oppose the censorship provisions.
-
- If you are a representative of an organization that would like to
- signon to this letter, you should contact jlesser@pfaw.org IMMEDIATELY.
-
- 4. We can't suggest relaxing at this point. The stakes are too high, and
- the risk is too great. Everything now hangs in the balance.
-
- ________________________________________________________________________
-
- THE LETTER & SUGGESTED LEGISLATION FROM ED MEESE AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT
-
- October 16, 1995
-
- The Honorable Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. Chairman
- Committee on Commerce
- United States House of Representatives
- Washington, DC 20515
-
- The Honorable Larry Pressler, Chairman
- Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
- United States Senate
- Washington, DC 20510
-
- Re: Computer Pornography Provisions in Telecommunications Bill
-
- Dear Mr. Chairmen:
-
- We are writing to urge the conference committee seeking to reconcile the
- telecommunications bills passed by the House and Senate include in the
- final bill the strongest possible criminal law provisions to address the
- growing and immediate problem of computer pornography without any
- exemptions, defenses, or political favors of any kind accorded to those
- who knowingly participate in the distribution of obscenity to anyone or
- indecency to children. While there is no perfect solution to the problem
- of computer pornography, Congress could not hope to solve this problem by
- holding liable only some who are responsible for the problem.
-
- The recent Justice Department prosecution project targeting those who
- violated federal child pornography law using America On-Line is
- instructive in this regard. More than ninety individuals were targeted for
- prosecution although many others, perhaps as many as 3,000 according to
- one press report, were originally targeted by the Department of Justice as
- potential violators of child pornography laws. Apparently due to a
- shortage of investigative and prosecutorial resources, the project was
- limited. Since there are insufficient resources to investigate and
- prosecute but a fraction of those that are trafficking in child
- pornography by computer, then there will likely be even fewer resources
- available to investigate and prosecute those involved in obscenity and
- indecency.
-
- Thousands of individuals both in this country and abroad are regularly
- placing obscenity and indecency on the Internet. It is not possible to
- make anything more than a dent in the serious problem of computer
- pornography if Congress is willing to hold liable only those who place
- such material on the Internet while at the same time giving legal
- exemptions or defenses to service or access providers who profit from and
- are instrumental to the distribution of such material. The Justice
- Department normally targest the major offenders of laws. In obscenity
- cases prosecuted to date, it has targeted large companies which have been
- responsible for the nationwide distribution of obscenity and who have made
- large profits by violating federal laws. Prosecution of such companies has
- made a substantial impact in curbing the distribution of obscenity, with
- many such offenders going out of business altogether. So too will
- prosecution of access providers which _knowingly_ traffic in obscenity
- have a substantial impact, a far greater impact than just the prosecution
- of a person who places one or a few prohibited images on the Internet.
- Such a person could not traffic in pornography without the aid or
- facilitation of the service or access providers. Indeed, if Congress
- includes provisions protecting access or service providers in whatever
- bill is finally passed, it is likely that most in this country who are
- trafficking in indecency to children or obscenity would continue to do so
- since the threat of prosecution would be minuscule, given the numbers of
- those currently involved in this activity. It is also likely that those
- outside our country who are engaged in these activities would continue to
- do so since it would be nearly impossible to extradite them to the United
- States for prosecution. Thus, unless all who knowingly participate in such
- matters are subject to the law, the Internet will remain the same and
- Congress will have failed in its responsibilities to the children and
- families of America.
-
- Federal law has traditionally assigned equal liability both for those who
- commit a crime and those who aid and abet a crime. See Title 18 U.S.C.
- Code Section 2: "(a) whoever [sic] commits an offense against the United
- States or aids, abets, councils [sic], commands, induces, or procures its
- commission, is punishable as a principle [sic]." Service or access
- providers who knowingly participate in the distribution of indecency to
- children or in obscenity to anyone are aiders and abettors in the
- commission of those crimes and thus should have liability under any law
- Congress passes. Current federal law on child pornography provides no no
- exemption or defense for access providers. Thus, the child pornography law
- provides a strong deterrent against trafficking in child pornography for
- those who would otherwise knowingly participate in its distribution by
- computer whether pedophile or access provider.
-
- The changes in law which we support would not hold an access provider
- criminally liable for all illegal pornography on the Internet which their
- services may be used to obtain. Nor would it require that access providers
- check all communications to ensure that no violations of the law are
- occurring. They would simply be required to avoid knowing violations of
- the law. This is an obligation imposed on all citizens. Technology exists
- today for access providers, through a simple process, to target or flag
- and remove files containing objectionable material.
-
- We support the House-passed language insofar as it addresses obscenity by
- amendment Title 18, Sections 1462, 1465, and 1467 of the United States
- Code. The provision restricting transmission of indecency in the House-passed
- bill, an amendment to Section 1465, is inadequate, and we urge that it be
- substantially revised.
-
- Attached is the specific language we support which includes the House
- passed language on obscenity and includes revisions on both the House
- passed language on indecency, which would amend Title 18 and the
- Senate-passed language on indecency, which would amend Title 47. The
- combination of these provisions, we believe, would provide effective laws
- to curb obscenity and indecency on the Internet by establishing that all
- who knowingly participate in the distribution or facilitation of obscenity
- to anyone or indecency to children would be subject to the law.
-
- Thank you for your concern and attention to this matter.
-
-
- [signed]
-
- Edwin Meese III
-
- Ralph Reed
- Christian Coalition
-
- Donald E. Wildmon
- American Family Association
-
- Alan Sears, Former Executive Director
- Atty General's Commission on Pornography
-
- Phyllis Shafly
- Eagle Forum
-
- Beverly LaHaye
- Concerned Women for America
-
- Reverend Louis P. Sheldon
- Traditional Values Coalition
-
- Jay Sekulow
- American Center for Law and Justice
-
- Paul Weyrich
- Free Congress Foundation
-
- Paul McGeady
- Morality in Media
-
- Len Munsil
- National Family Legal Foundation
-
- Robert Peters
- Morality in Media
-
- Kenneth Sukhia
- Former United States Attorney, N.D., FL
- Former Chairman, Atty General's Advisory Committee
- Subcommittee on Child Exploitation and Obscenity
-
- __________________________
-
- Section 1465 of Title 18, United States Code, is amended to punish
- distribution by computer of indecent material to minors by adding at the
- end the following:
-
- Whoever knowingly communicates, transmits, or makes available for
- communication or transmission, in or effecting interstate or foreign
- commerce an indecent communication by computer to any person the
- communicator or transmitter believes has not attained the age of 18 years
- of age, knowing that such communication will be obtained by a person
- believed to be under 18 years of age, shall be fined under this title or
- imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
-
- TITLE IV -- OBSCENE, HARASSING, AND WRONGFUL UTILIZATION OF
- TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY
-
- SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE
- This title may be cited as the "Communications Decency Act of
- 1995".
-
- Sec. 402. OBSCENE OR HARASSING USE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES UNDER
- THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
-
- Section 223 (47 U.S.C. 223) is amended --
- (1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting in lieu of [sic]:
- ``(a) Whoever--
- ``(1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign
- communications --
- ``(A) by means of telecommunications device knowingly--
- ``(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
- ``(ii) initiates the transmission of,
- any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
- communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or
- indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass
- another person;
- ``(B) makes a telephone call or utilizes a
- telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or
- communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and
- with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person
- at the called number or who receives the communication;
- ``(C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly
- or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at
- the called number; or
- ``(D) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly
- initiates communication with a telecommunications device,
- during which conversation or communication ensues, solely to
- harass any person at the called number or who receives the
- communication;
- ``(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility
- under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by
- paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for
- such activity,
-
- shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more
- than two years, or both.''; and
-
- (2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
-
- ``(d) Whoever--
- ``(1) knowingly within the United States or in foreign
- communications with the United States by means of
- telecommunications device makes or makes available any
- indecent communication in any form including any comment,
- request, suggestion, proposal, or image, to any person under
- 18 years of age regardless of whether the
- maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the
- communication; or
- ``(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility
- under such person's control to be used for an activity
- prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be
- used for such activity,
- shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more
- than two years or both.
- ``(e) Defenses to subsections (a) and (d), restrictions on
- access, judicial remedies respecting restrictions for
- persons providing information services and
- access to information services--
- "(1) It is a defense to prosecution that a person has complied
- with regulations designed to restrict access to indecent
- communications to those 18 years old or older as enacted by the
- Federal Communications Commission which shall prepare final
- regulations within 120 days of the passage of this bill. Until
- such regulations become effective, it is a defense to
- prosecution that the person has blocked or restricted access
- to indecent communications to any person under 18 years
- of age through the use of verified credit card, adult access
- code, or adult personal identification number (PIN).
- Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to treat
- enhanced information services as common carriage."
- "(2) No cause of action may be brought in any
- court or any administrative agency against any person on account
- of any activity which is not in violation of any law punishable
- by criminal or civil penalty, which activity the person has taken in
- good faith to implement a defense authorized under this section or
- otherwise to restrict or prevent the transmission of, or access to,
- a communication specified in this section.
- (f) Nothing in this subsection shall preclude any State or
- local government from enacting and enforcing laws and regulations
- which do not result in the imposition of inconsistent obligations on
- the provision of interstate services. Nothing in this subsection
- shall preclude any State or local government from governing conduct
- not covered by subsection (d)(2)."
- (g) Nothing in subsection (a), (d), or (e) or in the
- defenses to prosecution under (e) shall be construed
- to affect or limit the application or enforcement of any other
- Federal law.
- (h) The use of the term 'telecommunications device' in this
- section shall not impose new obligations on (one-way) broadcast
- radio or (one-way) broadcast television operators licensed by the
- Commission or (one-way) cable services registered with the
- Federal Communications Commission and covered by obscenity and
- indecency provisions elsewhere in this Act.
-
- Sec. 403. OBSCENE PROGRAMMING ON CABLE TELEVISION.
-
- Section 639 (47 U.S.C. 559) is amended by striking "10,000" and
- inserting "$100,000"
-
- Sec. 404. BROADCASTING OBSCENE LANGUAGE ON THE RADIO.
-
- Section 1466 of Title 18, United States Code, is amended by
- striking out "$10,000" and inserting "$100,000".
-
- Sec. 405 SEPARABILITY
-
- "(a) If any provision of this Title, including amendments to this
- Title of [sic] the application thereof to any person or circumstance is
- held invalid, the remainder of this Title and the application of such
- provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
- thereby."
-
- ________________________________________________________________________
-
- CHRONOLOGY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
-
- Sep 26, '95 Sen. Russ Feingold urges committee members to drop
- Managers Amendment and the CDA from the Telecommunications
- Deregulation bill
- Aug 4, '95 House passes HR1555 which goes into conference with S652.
- Aug 4, '95 House votes to attach Managers Amendment (which contains
- new criminal penalties for speech online) to
- Telecommunications Reform bill (HR1555).
- Aug 4, '95 House votes 421-4 to attach HR1978 to Telecommunications
- Reform bill (HR1555).
- Jun 30, '95 Cox and Wyden introduce the "Internet Freedom and Family
- Empowerment Act" (HR 1978) as an alternative to the CDA.
- Jun 21, '95 Several prominent House members publicly announce their
- opposition to the CDA, including Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA),
- Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA), and Rep. Ron Wyden (D-OR).
- Jun 14, '95 The Senate passes the CDA as attached to the Telecomm
- reform bill (S 652) by a vote of 84-16. The Leahy bill
- (S 714) is not passed.
- May 24, '95 The House Telecomm Reform bill (HR 1555) leaves committee
- in the House with the Leahy alternative attached to it,
- thanks to Rep. Ron Klink of (D-PA). The Communications
- Decency Act is not attached to it.
- Apr 7, '95 Sen. Leahy (D-VT) introduces S.714, an alternative to
- the Exon/Gorton bill, which commissions the Dept. of
- Justice to study the problem to see if additional legislation
- (such as the CDA) is necessary.
- Mar 23, '95 S314 amended and attached to the telecommunications reform
- bill by Sen. Gorton (R-WA). Language provides some provider
- protection, but continues to infringe upon email privacy
- and free speech.
- Feb 21, '95 HR1004 referred to the House Commerce and Judiciary committees
- Feb 21, '95 HR1004 introduced by Rep. Johnson (D-SD)
- Feb 1, '95 S314 referred to the Senate Commerce committee
- Feb 1, '95 S314 introduced by Sen. Exon (D-NE) and Gorton (R-WA).
-
- ________________________________________________________________________
-
- FOR MORE INFORMATION
-
- Web Sites
- URL:http://www.vtw.org/exon/
- URL:http://epic.org/
- URL:http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/
- URL:http://www.cdt.org/cda.html
- URL:http://outpost.callnet.com/outpost.html
-
- FTP Archives
- URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/policy/freespeech/00-INDEX.FREESPEECH
- URL:ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Alerts/
-
- Gopher Archives:
- URL:gopher://gopher.panix.com/11/vtw/exon
- URL:gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Alerts
-
- Email:
- vtw@vtw.org (put "send alert" in the subject line for the latest
- alert, or "send cdafaq" for the CDA FAQ)
- cda-info@cdt.org (General CDA information)
- cda-stat@cdt.org (Current status of the CDA)
-
- ________________________________________________________________________
-
- LIST OF PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS
-
- In order to use the net more effectively, several organizations have
- joined forces on a single Congressional net campaign to stop the
- Communications Decency Act.
-
-
- American Civil Liberties Union * American Communication Association *
- American Council for the Arts * Arts & Technology Society * Association
- of Alternative Newsweeklies * biancaTroll productions * Boston
- Coalition for Freedom of Expression * Californians Against Censorship
- Together * Center For Democracy And Technology * Centre for Democratic
- Communications * Center for Public Representation * Citizen's Voice -
- New Zealand * Cloud 9 Internet *Computer Communicators Association *
- Computel Network Services * Computer Professionals for Social
- Responsibility * Cross Connection * Cyber-Rights Campaign * CyberQueer
- Lounge * Dutch Digital Citizens' Movement * ECHO Communications Group,
- Inc. * Electronic Frontier Canada * Electronic Frontier Foundation *
- Electronic Frontier Foundation - Austin * Electronic Frontiers
- Australia * Electronic Frontiers Houston * Electronic Frontiers New
- Hampshire * Electronic Privacy Information Center * Feminists For Free
- Expression * First Amendment Teach-In * Florida Coalition Against
- Censorship * FranceCom, Inc. Web Advertising Services * Friendly
- Anti-Censorship Taskforce for Students * Hands Off! The Net * Inland
- Book Company * Inner Circle Technologies, Inc. * Inst. for Global
- Communications * Internet On-Ramp, Inc. * Internet Users Consortium *
- Joint Artists' and Music Promotions Political Action Committee * The
- Libertarian Party * Marijuana Policy Project * Metropolitan Data
- Networks Ltd. * MindVox * MN Grassroots Party * National Bicycle
- Greenway * National Campaign for Freedom of Expression * National
- Coalition Against Censorship * National Gay and Lesbian Task Force *
- National Public Telecomputing Network * National Writers Union * Oregon
- Coast RISC * Panix Public Access Internet * People for the American Way
- * Republican Liberty Caucus * Rock Out Censorship * Society for
- Electronic Access * The Thing International BBS Network * The WELL *
- Voters Telecommunications Watch
-
- (Note: All 'Electronic Frontier' organizations are independent entities,
- not EFF chapters or divisions.)
-
- ________________________________________________________________________
-
- End Alert
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: ALERT: Digital Telephony Action - Nov. 15 Deadline!
- ------------------------------------------------------------
-
- In Oct. 16's Federal Register, the FBI published a request for public
- comments *due November 15 1995* and a request for surveillance capacity.
- This is the first major step, since passage of the Digital Telephony
- legislation in 1994, in setting up the FBI's dream and our nightmare:
- forced compliance with law enforcement and intellegence demands to make
- all communications networks wiretappable.
-
-
- * Background: FBI Draft Capacity Requirements
-
- The 1994 "Digital Telephony and Privacy Improvement Act" (DT), passed as the
- more honestly-titled "Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act"
- (CALEA), did add significant statutory privacy protections and public
- oversight provisions for surveillance actions, but in essence requires
- telecommunications carriers including "plain old telephone service"
- companies and related telphonic services, to make their networks
- wiretap-friendly. There are several steps to implementation:
-
- 1) Approval of capability requirements (can the network be tapped?)
- 2) Approval of capacity requirements (how many wiretaps can be done?)
- 3) Approval of funding to pay for this mess
-
- The subject of the FBI's request, reproduced below, is capacity. The
- capacity request specifies the number of simultaneous wiretaps (by which
- term we simplify a bit: it includes actual communications intercepts, pen
- register (dialed number) information captures, and trap-and-trace actions)
- the government estimates that it will need to conduct authorized
- surveillance. Telecom companies will have 6 months to respond to this
- final notice published after the public comment period, and outline what
- part of their systems are not wiretap-friendly, at which point the
- government may opt to pay for a system to be "upgraded" or decide to let
- it slide.
-
- The demanded capacities range from .05% of "engineered capacity" (which
- according to the FBI initially means the maximum number of subscribers to a
- particular service or facility) to a full 1% of engineered capacity. In a
- worst-case scenario this could mean that 1 person on every residential
- city block could be wiretapped at all times - or, enough to wiretap 20,000
- people at the same time in New York City alone - one of the cities
- targetted for the higher capacity. According to industry executives,
- there have never been more than 7 simultaneous wiretaps conducted from a
- single US telco location. Current wiretapping activity is roughly one
- tap per 170,000 phone lines. Isn't increasing wiretapping capacity more
- than a thousand times over a just a wee bit excessive? Clark Matthews,
- writing for _The_Spotlight_ estimates that under the current proposal, as
- many as 500,000 to 1,500,000 simultaneous wiretaps could be conducted
- nation-wide, given sufficient law enforcement resources. Compare this to
- the average of less than 1000 court-authorized wiretaps annually (though
- up to 1730 in 1994), less than half of them done for federal law enforcement.
-
- Recent reports indicate that there may have been an error in someone's
- figures somewhere (perhaps even in the Fed. Register notice, which pretty
- clearly states "1%"), and that the real number is 1 out of 1000 *lines*,
- but 1 out of 100 phone *calls*. Even if this is true, that's a
- staggering increase in wiretapping capacity.
-
- Considerably after-the-fact, the FBI revised its statements of what
- "engineered capacity" means, saying it means "total number of
- simultaneous phone calls" rather than subscriber lines. This appears to
- be a smokescreen, and is irrelevant anyway: the capacity to tap 1% of all
- ongoing phone calls is still frighteningly Big-Brotherish. And EPIC claims
- that the FBI's estimate of how many calls correspond to how many lines may
- be at least 100% less than the real figures.
-
- Even using the lowest of the percentages, .05% in rural areas until 1998
- (five times that, later), the Bureau wants the capacity to conduct
- surveillance on 1 out of every 20000 lines, and one out of every 2000
- calls. Again, the current ratio is 1 to 170,000 or thereabouts. Even in
- the deepest woods of Maine or the deserts of Nevada, the FBI wants to
- tap more than 8 times as many people as it currently can spy on -
- 40 times as many in 1999.
-
- FBI director Louis Freeh continues to deny, deny, deny, saying "We have not
- and are not asking for the ability to monitor 1 out of every 100
- telephone numbers or any other ridiculous number like that. To obtain
- that many court orders and conduct that extent of wiretapping would be
- nearly impossible." His denials, however, simply don't match the Fed.
- Register notice, and furthermore ignore the fact that warrants only need
- be sought when the evidence to be gained from the surveillance is to be
- used in court (to quote from the statute itself: wiretaps conducted
- "pursuant to a court order *or other legal authorization*", emphasis
- added.) Not to mention that this legislation isn't for this year,
- it's for the future. Who knows what will be possible under a bloated FBI
- budget in future years?
-
- An AP article quotes Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick as saying,
- "There is no intention to expand the number of wiretaps or the extent of
- wiretapping ... . I don't think the American people should be worried
- about that."
-
- Well, please forgive us if we "worry". The capability to tap one out of
- every 100 or 1000 phone lines simultaneously, even in "high crime areas", is
- truly wretched excess, even presuming that wiretaps are a good idea in
- the first place. As Brock Meeks reported ("Riding a Straw Horse",
- _Cyberwire_Dispatch_, Sept. 13 1994), "In 1991, the latest year figures
- are available, most Americans, across all age groups, disapproved when
- asked the question: 'Everything considered, would you say that you
- approve or disapprove of wiretapping?' Some 67% of all 18-20 year olds
- gave the thumbs down, as did 68% of the Gen[eration]-X crowd...Boomers
- disapproved of wiretapping almost 3-to-1 while 67% of those 50 and over
- disapproved."
-
- The _New_York_Times_ reports that the FBI refuses to elaborate on its
- internally perceived need to increase wiretapping capacity to this
- extent, saying only that "The full implementation is absolutely essential
- for law enforcement and public safety. We are in ongoing discussions with
- the communications industry. Therefore it would be inappropriate to
- comment further at this point." Apparently the FBI considers their
- discussions more imporant than your rights. And those discussions may
- even be on the subject of negotiating, outside of public review, for even
- *more* wiretapping capacity that the Bureau has already asked for in the
- Federal Register. Enough is enough.
-
- DT/CALEA's *capability* requirements are still under development. In short,
- the FBI will state what it wants, and the industry must try to comply with
- this, within certain limits, including the right of members of the public
- to challenge the requirments before the FCC.
-
- The funding issue: Congress authorized but did not appropriate US$500million
- to implement CALEA in 1994. The Justice dept. has proposed that a 30%-40%
- extra fine ("surcharge") be attached to all civil and criminal penalties
- and fines to pay for this, and has attached this proposal to both the
- stalled and in many cases unconsitutional anti-terrorism legislation,
- and a pending appropriations bill.
-
- EFF is committed to opposing any such funding efforts for the wiretap
- bill's provisions.
-
-
- * What You Can Do Now
-
- See the FBI Federal Register notice below. It includes instructions on
- how to submit comments. Remember, these comments are part of the public
- record. The FBI cannot hide them, and they *do* matter. THE DEADLINE IS
- NOV. 15! Act now, or perhaps forever hold thy peace!
-
- Remember that FBI director Louis Freeh himself states:
-
- "There is no intention to expand the number of wiretaps or the
- extent of wiretapping. Those who use the public comment notice
- to argue the contrary are wrong."
-
- If your comments focus on a the (nonetheless quite reasonable)
- proposition that the FBI intends to wiretap an order of magnitude more
- people that they do now, your comments may end up being disregarded.
- Instead, criticize the ridiculous draft requirement for this much wiretap
- capacity in the first place if the FBI doesn't intend to use it.
- Remember, you have them, either way. The current proposal is simply
- senseless.
-
- Next steps: Contact your legislators, and keep an eye on the progress of
- bills that the FBI has attached DT/CALEA funding language to - sending
- letters to the members of committess examining such legislation is important.
-
- In your letter to your own Senators and Representatives, please stress
- that
-
- * the FBI has not shown that it effectively uses wiretapping to
- prevent domestic terrorism, despite its claims and despite this being
- the prime reason the FBI has expressed for this legislation;
-
- * the FBI has not provided the public or Congress any of the information
- that it claims supports its outrageous requests for wiretapping capacity,
- orders of magnitude greater than present-day capacity in some areas;
-
- * the FBI may be, counter to the specifications of CALEA, entering into
- negotiations with telecom industry leaders that are hidden from the public;
-
- * the FBI has shown no evidence to back up its claims that digital
- telephone technology is actually thwarting effective law enforcement;
-
- * FOIA-obtained documents from the FBI itself indicate that the
- above-mentioned Bureau claim is a complete fabrication anyway;
-
- * Citizen privacy is not to be stripped for the convenience of law
- enforcement.
-
- Congress contact information is available at:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Activism/Congress_contact/
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Activism/Congress_contact
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Activism/Congress_contact/
-
- A list of Congress-member email addresses is available at:
- gopher://una.hh.lib.umich.edu:70/00/socsci/poliscilaw/uslegi/conemail
-
-
- * Congress May Just Not Buy It
-
- The FBI did not once seek a warrant for a wiretap in cases involving
- "weapons, arson, or explosives" since the 1980s. Yet they claim that one
- of the main motivations for CALEA is to combat domestic terrorism. Where
- were they when the Oklahoma City federal building was blown up?
-
- Investigations are also underway into the decidely poor law
- enforcement handling of several cases, such as the Waco incident and the
- Randy Weaver seige.
-
- In the wake of CIA honcho Aldrich Ames's rooting-out as a traitor, the
- same _NYT_ issue that covered the FBI Fed. Register notice also reveals
- that the CIA and other intelligence agencies - the same national security
- interests behind DT and crypto key "escrow" - have lied consistently to
- the President and Congress, and have been riddled with Soviet and other
- double agents for decades. The article suggests that the CIA is a
- "laughingstock" in Washington right now.
-
- The new Congress may at times be only too willing to censor, but we can
- hope they won't fall for this surveillance rigamarole.
-
-
- * House Rejects First DT/CALEA Funding Attempt
-
- On Oct. 25, the House of Representatives voted to *not* include the FBI's
- CALEA funding language in the Omnibus Budget Bill (which is expected to
- be vetoed anyway). This version of the measure called for a 40%
- "surcharge" to be added to all criminal fines, to raise US$500mil. to pay
- for implementation of the "upgrades" to telephonic equipment that the FBI
- hopes to require. Other versions of the FBI legislation are, however,
- still appended to various appropriations and terrorism bills - the Bureau
- can be said to be hedging its bets.
-
- The Electronic Privacy Information Center reported this event as a
- victory, though others have suggested that the reason the measure was
- rejected was not because of privacy concerns, but rather because some
- arch-conservatives consider the suggested funding measure to be a form of
- tax increase. The anti-tax conservatives may have been "thrown a bone"
- on a bill expected to die anyway, so they'll have already played their
- cards when the issue comes up in other bills.
-
- Whatever's really going on in Congressional minds, (and a _New_York_Times_
- article tends to, believe it or not, support *both* viewpoints), the FBI's
- loss here certainly remains cause for very guarded celebration. But the
- issue *will* be back.
-
-
- * Sen. Leahy Definitely Not Buying It
-
- Nov. 3, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) sent a public letter to FBI Director
- Louis Freeh. It stated in part:
-
- The Federal Bureau of
- Investigation recently published in the Federal Register a proposed notice
- of law enforcement's capacity demands predicated upon an historical
- baseline of electronic surveillance activity and an analysis of that
- activity. The Federal Register notice did not include publication of those
- two documents.
-
- Please provide me with copies of those two documents, which I also urge you
- to release to the public and publish in the Federal Register to ensure the
- fullest dissemination of the information.
-
- I appreciate your prompt attention to this matter.
-
-
- EFF joins CDT in commending Sen. Leahy for his no-nonsense approach, and
- for his consideration of the public interest in making this request.
- EFF, EPIC, or any other organization could obtain this information via
- Freedom of Information Act lawsuits, but that could take years, and it'd
- be much better if the FBI released the information voluntarily.
-
- The full text of Sen. Leahy's letter is available at:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Privacy/Digital_Telephony_FBI/leahy_freeh_110395.letter
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Privacy/Digital_Telephony_FBI, leahy_freeh_110395.letter
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Digital_Telephony_FBI/leahy_freeh_110395.letter
-
-
- * Canadian Law Enforcement Taking the FBI Hint
-
- Electronic Frontier Canada reports that Canadian police chiefs are
- clamoring for some kind of "back door" into citizen communications, right
- on the heels of many other governments put under pressure by the US
- Administration to support its privacy-invasive policies.
-
- Canadian law enforcement may be shying away from Clipper-like crypto key
- "escrow" (possibly because they realize what a ridiculous idea it is?),
- but are already considering a ban on cellular phones that prevent
- eavesdropping.
-
- The 90th Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
- (Regina, Saskatchewan, August 24, 1995) produced numerous policy
- recommendations and resolutions, including an unsupported decision that
- "violent" media programming has "no" value at all and should be banned
- (including an explict recommendation that online material that "exploits
- violence" be attacked); that "the Internet System [sic] is devoid of any
- standards and controls necessary to regulate the nature of information being
- disseminated worldwide", that anonymity should be banned, and that the
- Canadian government should "enact legislation that will effectively
- control and regulate the Internet System" [sic]; that roadway video
- surveillance be instituted; that crime *suspect* be subject to "DNA
- warrants" and have their genetic information added to a federal database;
- and (surprised?) that "new communications technology is threatening the
- ability of...police agencies to conduct court-approved electronic
- surveillance". This is the same, unsubstantiated, claim being made by the
- US Federal Bureau of Investigation.
-
- The Canadian proposal continues: "the telecommunications systems and
- networks are often used to further serious criminal activities, including
- drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, extortion, corruption,
- and money laundering" [not unlike cars, fingers, shoes, etc. And they
- forgot that favorite buzzphrase: "child molestation and pornography".]
-
- The rest of the recommendations regarding police surveillance and modern
- communications is all but plagiarized from the FBI's statements and
- legislation, and concludes, "the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
- urges the Government of Canada to enact the appropriate legislation
- requiring that all present and new telecommunications technologies
- contain capabilities that will provide law enforcement agencies with the
- technical assistance necessary to accomplish court-authorized
- interceptions pursuant to the applicable sections of the Criminal Code of
- Canada (s.184.2, 184.3, 186, 188, 487.01, 492.1, 492.2)."
-
- To our northern neighbors: Be afaid.
-
- The full text of the CACP recommendations can be found at:
-
- http://insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/law/doc/cacp.24aug95.html
-
-
- * The Text of the FBI's Federal Register Notice
-
- [Federal Register: October 16, 1995 (Volume 60, Number 199)]
- [Notices]
- [Page 53643-53646]
- >From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
-
- DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
-
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
-
- Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law
- Enforcement Act
-
- AGENCY: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
-
- ACTION: Initial notice and requests for comments.
-
- _________________________________________________________
-
- SUMMARY: The FBI is providing initial notification of law enforcement
- capacity requirements as mandated in section 104 of the Communications
- Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. Comments regarding this initial
- notice will be considered in the development of the final capacity
- notice.
-
- DATES: Written comments must be received on or before November 15,
- 1995.
-
- ADDRESSES: Comments should be submitted in triplicate to the
- Telecommunications Industry Liaison Unit (TILU), Federal Bureau of
- Investigation, P.O. Box 220450, Chantilly, VA 22022-0450.
-
- FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
- Contact TILU at (800) 551-0336. Please refer to your question as a
- capacity notice question.
-
- I. Background
-
- On October 25, 1994, the President signed into law the Communications
- Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) (Public Law 103-414; 47 U.S.C.
- 1001-1010). This law presents law enforcement's requirements for the
- surveillance of wire or electronic communications. The primary purpose of
- the CALEA is to clarify a telecommunications carrier's duty to assist law
- enforcement agencies with the lawful interception of communications and
- the acquisition of call-identifying information in an ever-changing
- telecommunications environment. To ensure that law enforcement agencies can
- continue to conduct authorized surveillance of wire or electronic
- communications, the CALEA states that telecommunications carriers must meet
- the assistance capability requirements set forth in section 103 of the
- Act (and restated in Appendix A of this notice).
-
- Section 104 of the CALEA mandates that the Attorney General of the
- United States provide notice of estimates for the actual and maximum
- number of pen register, trap and trace, and communication intercepts
- that law enforcement agencies may conduct and use simultaneously.
-
- The definitions for ``actual capacity'' and ``maximum capacity''
- are included below:
-
- Actual Capacity--``notice of the actual number of communication
- interceptions. pen registers, and trap and trace devices, representing
- a portion of the maximum capacity that the Attorney General estimates
- that government agencies authorized to conduct electronic surveillance
- may conduct and use simultaneously by the date that is 4 years after
- the date of enactment of the CALEA'' (CALEA, section 104(a)(1)(A)).
-
- Maximum Capacity--``notice of the maximum capacity required to
- accommodate all of the communication interceptions, pen registers, and
- trap and trace devices that the Attorney General estimates that
- government agencies authorized to conduct electronic surveillance may
- conduct and use simultaneously after the date that is 4 years after of
- enactment of the CALEA'' (CALEA, section 104(a)(1)(B)).
-
- This Federal Register announcement serves as the initial notice of
- the government's actual and maximum capacity requirements. These
- requirements will aid telecommunications carriers in developing and
- deploying solutions to meet the assistance capability requirements set
- forth in section 103 of the CALEA. A final notice will be issued in
- accordance with the CALEA requirements after considering comments to
- this initial notice.
-
- The actual and maximum capacity requirements were developed by the
- FBI in coordination with law enforcement. By order of the Attorney
- General of the United States, as codified in 28 CFR 0.85 (o),
- government implementation responsibilities under the CALEA were
- delegated to the FBI. The FBI, in turn, is establishing TILU to carry
- out the government's implementation responsibilities, including the
- publication of capacity notices.
-
- For the purposes of this document, the terms defined in section
- 2510 of title 18, United States Code, and section 102 of the CALEA
- (section 1001 of title 47, United States Code) have, respectively, the
- meanings stated in those sections. Additional clarification of terms is
- provided in Appendix B of this notice.
-
- II. Introduction
-
- The capacity figures in this notice reflect the combined number of
- simultaneous pen register, trap and trace, and communication
- interceptions that law enforcement may conduct by October 25, 1998. All
- telecommunications carriers must, within 3 years after the publication
- of the final notice of capacity requirements or within 4 years after
- the date of enactment of the CALEA, whichever is longer, ensure that
- their systems are capable of accommodating simultaneously the number of
- pen register, trap and trace, and communication interceptions
- identified in the actual capacity requirements. Furthermore, all
- telecommunications carriers shall ensure capabilities exist to
- expeditiously accommodate any increase in the actual number of pen
- register, trap and trace, and communication interceptions that
- authorized agencies may seek to conduct and use, up to the maximum
- capacity requirement. Some carriers may not need to make modifications
- to their equipment, facilities, and services in response to this notice
- because they currently meet all law enforcement capacity and capability
- requirements for electronic surveillance.
-
- The capacity requirements are not intended to specify, required or
- prohibit adoption of any particular system design or configuration by a
- telecommunications carrier, equipment manufacturer, or support services
- provider. These entities must develop an appropriate solution to comply
- with the capacity requirements set forth in this notice and with the
- assistance capability requirements found in section 103 of the CALEA.
- In developing solutions, carriers should consider the effect that
- particular services and features may have on capacity requirements. For
- example, the required number of ports, lines, or other network
- resources may vary depending upon the use of particular services and
- features by an intercept subject. The FBI, along with other law
- enforcement agencies, will be available, through the consultative
- process, to discuss these engineering issues.
-
- In accordance with the intent of the CALEA, carriers must ensure
- that their equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer
- or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct
- communications are capable of meeting the capability and capacity
- requirements mandated by the CALEA. These requirements apply to
- existing and future telecommunications carriers.
-
- III. Capacity Requirements Derivation
-
- The capacity figures that are presented in this initial notice were
- derived as a result of a thorough analysis of electronic surveillance
- needs. Information regarding electronic surveillance activities for a
- specific time period was obtained from telecommunications carriers, law
- enforcement, U.S. District Courts, State Courts, State Attorneys
- General, and State District Attorneys to establish a historical
- baseline of activity.
-
- The historical baseline of electronic surveillance activity was
- determined after examination of both the location and occurrence of
- each electronic surveillance reported. The historical baseline was then
- analyzed to derive the total and simultaneous electronic surveillance
- activity by switch and within specific geographic areas. Future
- capacity needs were then determined after consideration of the impact
- of demographics, market trends, and other factors on the historical
- baseline.
-
- The analysis indicates that electronic surveillance activity varies
- by geographic area. Therefore, the capacity requirements will vary by
- geographic area. The capacity requirements are reported by category,
- with each geographic area being assigned to one of three distinct
- categories. The use of categories enables capacity requirements to be
- stated in a manner that reasonably represents law enforcement
- electronic surveillance needs in all geographic areas, yet does not
- overburden the telecommunications industry by holding all carriers to
- the same level of capacity.
-
- Category I (the highest category) and Category II (the intermediate
- category) represent those geographic areas where the majority of
- electronic surveillance activity occurs. Only a few of the most densely
- populated areas, which have historically been areas of high electronic
- surveillance activity, are grouped into Category I. Other densely
- populated areas and some suburban areas, with moderate electronic
- surveillance activity, are grouped into Category II. The numbers for
- these categories were derived based on the analysis described above.
- Category I and Category II apply to approximately 25 percent of the
- equipment, facilities, and services covered by the survey over the time
- period.
-
- Category III (the lowest category) represents law enforcement's
- minimum acceptable capacity requirements for electronic surveillance
- activity. This category covers all other geographic areas. The numbers
- for Category III were derived by analyzing areas of historically low
- electronic surveillance activity and projecting future needs in order
- to establish a requirement for a minimum level of capacity for
- electronic surveillance.
-
- All telecommunications carriers are expected to meet the minimum
- capacity requirements of Category III. Carriers will be individually
- notified of those specific geographic areas within the areas they serve
- that exceed Category III and warrant a Category I or Category II
- capacity requirement. The individual carrier notifications will occur
- contemporaneously with the publication of the final notice. It is
- anticipated that the majority of the area served by a carrier will fall
- into Category III; however, if Category I and Category II capacity
- requirements are necessary, they are likely to affect only a small
- portion of their area served.
-
- This initial capacity notice includes the actual and maximum
- capacity requirements for Categories I, II, and III. After considering
- comments to this initial notice, a final notice will be published.
- Future changes to the maximum capacity requirements issued in the final
- notice will be published in the Federal Register, as necessary, in
- accordance with section 104(c).
-
- IV. Initial Statement of Actual and Maximum Capacity
-
- The actual and maximum capacity requirements are presented as a
- percentage of the engineered capacity of the equipment, facilities, and
- services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to
- originate, terminate, or direct communications. Engineered capacity
- refers to the maximum number of subscribers that can be served by that
- equipment, facility, or service. Frequently, the percentage is applied
- to the engineered subscriber capacity of a switch, however, the
- percentage can also apply to nonswitch equipment (i.e., network
- peripherals) involved in the origination, termination, or direction of
- communications. Percentages are being used rather than fixed numbers
- due to the dynamics and diversity of the telecommunications industry.
- The use of percentages allows telecommunications carriers the
- flexibility to adjust to changes in marketplace conditions or changes
- in the number of subscribers, access lines, equipment, facilities,
- etc., and still know the required level of capacity.
-
- As a result of extensive consultation with federal, State, and
- local law enforcement agencies, telecommunications carriers, providers
- of telecommunications support services, and manufacturers of
- telecommunications equipment, the FBI proposes the following capacity
- requirements for Categories I, II, and III:
-
- Category I
-
- Actual Capacity
-
- Each telecommunications carrier must provide the ability to meet
- the capability assistance requirements defined in section 103 of the
- CALEA for a number of simultaneous pen register, trap and trace, and
- communication interceptions equal to 0.5% of the engineered capacity of
- the equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or
- subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct
- communications.
-
- Maximum Capacity
-
- Each telecommunications carrier must ensure that it can
- expeditiously increase its capacity to meet the assistance capability
- requirements defined in section 103 of the CALEA for a number of
- simultaneous pen register, trap and trace, and communication
- interceptions equal to 1% of the engineered capacity of the equipment,
- facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the
- ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications.
-
- Category II
-
- Actual Capacity
-
- Each telecommunications carrier must provide the ability to meet
- the capability assistance requirements defined in section 103 of the
- CALEA for a number of simultaneous pen register, trap and trace, and
- communication interceptions equal to 0.25% of the engineered capacity
- of the equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or
- subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct
- communications.
-
- Maximum Capacity
-
- Each telecommunications carrier must ensure that it can
- expeditiously increase its capacity to meet the assistance capacity
- requirements defined in section 103 of the CALEA for a number of
- simultaneous pen register, trap and trace, and communication
- interceptions equal to 0.5% of the engineered capacity of the
- equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or
- subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct
- communications.
-
- Category III
-
- Actual Capacity
-
- Each telecommunications carrier must provide the ability to meet
- the capability assistance requirements defined in section 103 of the
- CALEA for a number of simultaneous pen register, trap and trace, and
- communication interceptions equal to 0.05% of the engineered capacity
- of the equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or
- subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct
- communications.
-
- Maximum Capacity
-
- Each telecommunications carrier must ensure that it can
- expeditiously increase its capacity to meet the assistance capability
- requirements defined in section 103 of the CALEA for a number of
- simultaneous pen register, trap and trace, and communication
- interceptions equal to 0.25% of the engineered capacity of the
- equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or
- subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct
- communications.
-
- When translated from percentages to numbers, capacity requirements
- should be rounded up to the nearest whole number.
-
- V. Carrier Statements and Consultation
-
- As set forth in section 104(d) of the CALEA, each telecommunications
- carrier is required to provide within 180 days after publication of the
- final capacity notice a statement identifying any of its systems or
- services that do not have the capacity to meet the assistance capability
- requirements stated in section 103 of the CALEA. These carrier statements
- will be used in conjunction with law enforcement priorities and other
- factors to determine the specific equipment, facilities, and services that
- require immediate modification and that may be eligible for cost
- reimbursement. The FBI will consult with telecommunications carriers to
- establish a template for responding to the capability and capacity
- requirements.
-
- Dated: October 10, 1995.
-
- Louis J. Freeh,
- Director.
-
- [FR Doc. 95-25562 Filed 10-13-95; 8:45 am]
- BILLING CODE 4410-02-M
-
- [editor's note -- Appendicies have been deleted to save space. The entire
- text of this document can be found at EFF's and CDT's Digital Telephony Web
- Pages. See "For More Information", below.]
-
-
- * For More Information
-
- See the following Internet sites:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Privacy/Digital_Telephony_FBI/
- gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Privacy/Digital_Telephony_FBI
- http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Privacy/Digital_Telephony_FBI/
-
- http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/
-
- http://www.cdt.org/digtel.html
-
-
- [Portions of this alert based on material from CDT, EPIC and VTW, various
- articles, and several independent reports.]
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: Newsbytes
- ------------------
-
- * EFF Relocation Complete
-
- Our new, permanent contact info is:
-
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation
- 1550 Bryant St., Suite 725
- San Francisco CA 94103 USA
-
- +1 415 436 9333 (voice) <-- That's 436 9EFF
- +1 415 436 9993 (fax)
-
- ask@eff.org (or, for "canned" general info, info@eff.org).
-
- Bernstein- or Scientology-case queries should go to EFF Staff Counsel
- Shari Steele (ssteele@eff.org), +1 301 375 8856.
-
- Other Press and legal queries should go to EFF Staff Counsel Mike Godwin
- (mnemonic@eff.org), +1 510 548 3290.
-
-
- * EFF Rated in Top 5% of the Net by Point Survey
-
- Point Survey, one of the most comprehensive WWW site review
- services on the net, http://www.pointcom.com, rated EFFWeb as one of the
- top 5% net sites. Their review calls us a "great resource for those who
- want to protect cyberspace." The full review is available at:
-
- http://www.pointcom.com/gifs/reviews/10_29038.htm
-
-
- * Commerce Dept. IPWG Report on Online Intellectual Property Meets Resistance
-
- The Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) of the National
- Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) was created by the
- executive branch of the U.S. government to recommend policy and
- legislation on the "Information Superhighway". In the wake of the
- LaMacchia case, The IITF set up a working group to make recommendations
- on copyright law and intellectual property. The "White Paper" is the
- report of this working group. The legislation recommended in the White
- Paper was sent to Congress on Thursday, September 28, 1995. The White
- Paper is based on a 1994 draft, the "Green Paper", both strongly
- influenced by the Intellectual Property Rights Working Group chair,
- Patent & Trademark Office Commissioner Bruce Lehman.
-
- The recent White Paper version is available at:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Intellectual_property/ipwg_nii_ip_lehman.report
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Intellectual_property, ipwg_nii_ip_lehman.report
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual_property/ipwg_nii_ip_lehman.report
-
- The Green Paper version was the subject of strong criticism from many sides,
- including Prof. Pamela Samuelson, who opposed the attempt to pass off
- sweeping recommended changes as "minor". Samuelson, in her critique,
- states that the Green Paper's recommendations "would abolish longstanding
- rights that the public has enjoyed to make use of copyrighted works,
- rights that have been consistently upheld in courts and in the copyright
- statute."
-
- The draft (Green Paper) version, and Prof. Samuelson's critique are
- available at (respectively):
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Intellectual_property/ipwg_nii_ip_lehman_report.draft
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Intellectual_property, ipwg_nii_ip_lehman_report.draft
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual_property/ipwg_nii_ip_lehman_report.draft
-
- and
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Intellectual_property/ipwg_nii_ip_report_samuelson.comments
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Intellectual_property, ipwg_nii_ip_report_samuelson.comments
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual_property/
- ipwg_nii_ip_report_samuelson.comments
-
- EFF Board of Directors Chair Esther Dyson and Vice-Chair John Perry Barlow
- have written forward-looking pieces on online "i-p", both pointing in
- directions strongly at odds with IITF's vision of intellectual property's
- future. These articles can be found at (respectively):
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Publications/Esther_Dyson/ip_on_the_net.article
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Publications/Esther_Dyson, ip_on_the_net.article
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/Esther_Dyson/HTML/ip_on_the_net.html
-
- and
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/idea_economy.article
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow, idea_economy.article
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/
- idea_economy_article.html
-
- The new "White Paper" version of the IITF report doesn't seem to have
- fixed anything. Most criticisms that applied to the Green Paper draft
- hold for the final version. The National Writers Union says of the
- report, "We are struck by the remote character of the report in that it
- misses the daily realities of the individual writer, artist or other
- creator...we must voice concerns that favor the rights of information
- users at the same time that we seek fair compensation for our work."
- NWU suggests that the report points fingers at individuals and libraries
- for copyright infringement, when the real culprits are media conglomerates,
- and calls the working group's bias against the public interest and toward
- media centralization "a disconnection from reality", and a failure to
- uphold the public's fair use rights. NWU closes by saying, "Legislation
- and regulatory action on intellectual property and the National Information
- Infrastructure must do a more complete job than has been done by this
- report to include the concerns of the creators of intellectual property
- and of the general public."
-
- The full NWU comments can be found at:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Intellectual_property/nwu_ipwg_paper.comments
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Intellectual_property, nwu_ipwg_paper.comments
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual_property/nwu_ipwg_paper.comments
-
- The Commercial Internet eXchange (CIX) has criticised the white paper as
- well, in a draft position statement, pointing out that IPWG would criminalize
- all service providers for the illegal actions of their users.
-
- CIX's response paper states in part, "CIX members transmit nearly half a
- billion messages each day, and cannot realistically be expected to
- monitor the content of those transmissions. Moreover, the instantaneous
- nature of digital communications precludes access providers from viewing,
- judging, monitoring or editing the content of most messages posted or
- accessed by their subscribers. Finally, [Internet Access Providers] are
- similar to common carriers in that they have no control over which
- members of the public use their facilities or the content members of the
- public choose to transmit. For these reasons, access providers should not
- be treated as a publisher [sic] for copyright purposes. Unfortunately,
- that is precisely what the Working Group has proposed by including in its
- suggested revisions to the Copyright Act the undefined word 'transmit' as
- part of the definition of 'publish.'"
-
- The full CIX comments can be found at:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Intellectual_property/cix_ipwg_paper.comments
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Intellectual_property, cix_ipwg_paper.comments
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual_property/cix_ipwg_paper.comments
-
-
- The IITF report recommended that the Copyright Act "be amended to
- expressly recognize that copies or phonorecords of works can be
- distributed to the public by transmission, and that such transmissions
- fall within the exclusive distribution right of the copyright owner."
- This portion of the suggested legislation has already been passed by both
- houses of Congress.
-
- Whether other aspects will find their way into law remains to be seen.
- They probably will, though. Criticism of the White Paper is common and
- solid, but this does not seem to be dissuading legislators from taking
- the Report's conclusions and recommendations at face value and running
- with them.
-
-
- * IPWG Report's Suggested Legislation: Passed and Pending (+ Canada Tie-In)
-
- Samuelson, CIX, Barlow, NWU, Dyson, Jessica Littman, and numerous others
- have pointed out, in articles and at conferences, an almost uncountable
- number of flaws in the IITF NII intellectual property report. Some have
- labelled it "a wolf in sheep's clothing", which systematically ignores
- cases which don't support its extreme positions in order to make its
- radical proposals look more reasonable. At this early stage, the White
- Paper's endorsement of criminalizing traditionally protected behaviors
- such as private, non-commercial copying is not well understood. Nor is
- it well understood how biased a document it is, or how it supposes a
- view of the world in which every information transaction can be subject
- to a private tax with the threat of criminal sanction behind it.
-
- Critics of the report suggest that its drafting process is heavily
- dominated by special interests to such an extent that a fair outcome is
- unlikely - the lobbyists (and former lobbyists like PTO Commissioner
- Lehman), may be motivated by fear that digitalization will mark the end
- of the economic hegemony of certain media interests, who seek to bend the
- law to their exclusive advantage with no regard for the tranditional
- balance in intellectual property law between i-p rights holders and the
- public.
-
- Then again, others, such as the Software Publisher Association complain
- loudly of lost profits in the billions due to online copyright violation,
- and even the NWU supports major changes to current intellectual property law.
-
- Few seem to doubt that current law is quite right for the state of modern
- communications. The disagreement seems largely about what changes must
- be made, and perhaps more to the point - whether now is a good time to
- change them or on the other hand whether anyone proposing immediate changes
- has any idea what they are doing.
-
- Senators Orrin Hatch and Pat Leahy think they do, and introduced S. 1284,
- the "Information Infrastructure Copyright Act of 1995" in September.
- the IICA is based heavily on the IITF White Paper, and comprises sections.
- The first, the "NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995", explicitly covers
- digital transmission of copyrighted works, as one might expect. It also
- makes it a crime to alter or provide false "copyright management
- information" on someone else's intellectual property, or to
- circumvent copy protection schemes or provide software or hardware to do
- so ("copyright management information" being author and copyright holder
- name and contact info, terms & conditions of use),
-
- Not particularly disturbing? Until you consider that reverse-analysis of
- software, including copy protection, is useful and legitimate, as are
- utilities to update one's own information stored by the copy protection
- features in software. Or until you consider that many copy protection
- schemes are poorly designed, and essentially require one to break the
- copy protection to make backups or to install a new copy of the software
- from backup disks. Or until you get to the section that lays the
- burden of proving innocence on the accused. Or until you realize that
- the only way to enforce these provisions would be for system operators
- (and libraries and other services) to act as "net cops" and spy on
- users continuously and in great detail. Fines are up to half a million
- dollars and/or 5 years in prison.
-
- The bill panders to large-scale copyright holders, and fails to balance
- their rights with those of authors & creators, not to mention the public's
- right of fair use. A coalition of organizations, individuals and a
- companies, the Digital Future Coalition, further criticizes the bill as
- hindrance to the development of tele-education and general market innovation.
- EFF is considering joining DFC and endorsing their upcoming letter to the
- sponsors of this bill.
-
- Ironically, it was Sen. Leahy who said (referring to the Digital
- Telephony bill) in April 1994, "The part that frightens the hell out of
- me is the goverment deciding where technology goes."
-
- Should this legislation pass, it is likely that the actual authors and
- creators (as opposed to corporate copyright holders) will make less money
- than ever from their works, and that information vendors (and access
- providers - unless and until we have a common-carrier-like liability
- protection for them) will have to make redoubled efforts to check the
- copyright and royalty/licensing situation of any information their
- services provide. This could be the next step on one of two paths:
- increasing "net.cop" behavior on the part of access providers, or
- increased civil disobedience of unenforceable laws that are almost
- physically impossible to abide by for system operators.
-
-
- Senator Leahy, this time with Sen. Feingold, is interested in even more
- changes to intellectual property law. They introduced S.1122,
- the "Criminal Copyright Improvement Act of 1995" in August, making it an
- offense to assist others in the reproduction or distribution of an
- infringed work, and allowing prosecutors to go after bulletin board
- operators and other service providers when the end-user cannot be
- tracked down. Leahy's bill, the inspiration for which appears to be
- highly questionable statistics from software manufacturers' trade
- associations, poses fairly clear threats to all system operators that do
- not track users and get a variety of verified personal information from
- all customers. In a speech at a conference, Leahy tied S.1122 into his
- and Sen. Orrin Hatch's new bill to combat the counterfeiting of goods,
- S.1136, proposing fines up to US$1,000,000. S.1122 has language related
- to faked goods, including software, as well. It may be that the two
- bills are intended to be merged.
-
- S. 1122 is intended to snare system operators whose systems are used for
- software piracy by customers. One section states"
-
- SEC. 2. CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS.
- (a) DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL GAIN- Section 101 of title 17, United
- States Code, is amended by inserting after the undesignated
- paragraph relating to the term `display', the following new
- paragraph:
- `The term `financial gain' includes receipt of anything of
- value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.'.
- (b) CRIMINAL OFFENSES- Section 506(a) of title 17, United States
- Code, is amended to read as follows:
- `(a) CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT- Any person who infringes a copyright
- willfully either--
- `(1) for purposes of commercial advantage or private
- financial gain; or
- `(2) by the reproduction or distribution, including by
- transmission, or assisting others in such reproduction or
- distribution, of 1 or more copies, of 1 or more copyrighted
- works, which have a total retail value of $5,000 or more,
- shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18.'.
-
-
- EFF currently has no position on this legislation, but may take one. The
- Center for Democracy and Technology will support the bill, provided it is
- modified (See CDT Policy Post for more info.)
-
- On the one hand, few doubt that allowing a system to be used as a sort of
- "pirated software clearinghouse" should be illegal even if the sysop does
- not profit from this activity (Cf. the LaMacchia case). However, this
- bill would appear to be insufficiently narrow, and may hold criminally
- liable system operators whose users exchange software, audio files or
- other material copyrighted by others, even without the permission or
- knowledge of the system operator. EFF remains committed to establishing
- a form of common-carrier-like liability protection for online service
- operators so that sysadmins and BBS sysops are not fined or imprisoned
- for crimes committed by users. The bill also does not appear to
- adequately take into account the people's rights of fair use.
-
-
- At a conference, Borland Sr. VP Robert Kohn and author of a
- treatise on online music licensing, pointed out for the audience Internet
- sites devoted to recording artists such as Frank Sinatra, and noting that
- they probably were not licensed to have the copies of song lyrics they
- offered from their sites. As if mirroring Kohn's sentiments, SOCAN,
- roughly the Canadian equivalent of US music intellectual property
- clearinghouses BMI and ASCAP, have filed a proposed tariff which will
- allow licensing of music transmitted over the Internet or BBSs, so that
- SOCAN can collect royalities for online uses of sound clips or lyric
- texts. The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of
- Canada's Tariff 22 is entitled "Transmission of Musical Subscribers [sic]
- via a Telecommunications Service not Licensed Under Tariff 16 or 17". The
- proposed Tariff provides a licence fee of $0.25 for every subscriber on
- a service that does not earn advertising revenue. For services that do
- earn revenue from advertising, the licence is based on 3.2% of gross
- revenues, with a minimum fee of $0.25 per subscriber. A correspondent,
- John Lax, contacted SOCAN for more details, and found that SOCAN plans
- that anyone wanting to make online use of songs controlled by SOCAN would
- have to be licensed by the organization, and be subject to audits and
- inspection by SOCAN.
-
- While some note that sites like IUMA, providing online but copyrighted music
- information such as song lyrics, should have to pay royalties, the
- administrator of one such site says that the artists involved are, in at
- least some cases, not at all pleased by moves like SOCAN's, and will end up
- paying any SOCAN fees *themselves* because the Internet music sites
- provide free advertising for them, resulting in far more income from new
- sales than incoming lost from uncollected penny-ante royalities for
- online lyric reading or soundclip downloads. This is fairly interesting
- in light of NWU's criticism of the Lehman paper, that the report
- reflects not the interests of creators at all, but rather the interests
- of media mega-corporations who thrive on royalty percentages.
-
- While there's no direct tie-in between SOCAN's proposed tarrif and the
- IETF i-p report, there's an indirect one, in the form of a bill which
- recently passed both the US Senate and, unanimously, the House of
- Representatives. H.R.1506, the Digital Performance Right in Sound
- Recordings Act of 1995", gives copyright holders the authority to collect
- royalties each time a sound recording is transmitted in digital form.
- Measures that were suggested independently by both SOCAN and IITF are
- about to be the law of the land in the US, despite the fact that little
- debate on this matter has occurred, and some content producers think this
- will cost, not save, them money.
-
- The bills referred to above are available at:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Legislation/Bills_by_number/
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Legislation/Bills_by_number
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Legislation/Bills_by_number/
-
-
-
- NOTE: IITF is not to be confused with IETF, the Internet Engineering Task
- Force, which is a non-governmental volunteer standards body.
-
-
- [Some text in the above two articles borrowed from CIX, SOCAN, and NWU
- statements; Computer Law Report #11 was also used as source material, as
- were several action alerts and posts by participants on EFF and EFC
- mailing lists.]
-
-
- * Upcoming Articles
-
- Bernstein Case - Update
- Public Govt. Info Online - Update
- Scientology v. Critics - Update
- A Look at Internet Domain Name Fees and Alternatives to InterNIC
- EFC Opposes Bell Canada Trademark on "The Net"
- Arthur Halavais Censored from Internet by Judge
- Minnesota v. the Whole Wide World
- PROFS Case - Update
- Tony Davis Case - Update
- Lorne Shantz Case - Update
-
- Some of these were expected this issue, but have been put off due to the
- size of the artices in the current issue.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: Upcoming events
- ------------------------
-
- This schedule lists events that are directly EFF-related. A much more
- detailed calendar of events likely to be of interest to our members and
- supporters is maintained at:
-
- ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/calendar.eff
- gopher: gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF, calendar.eff
- http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/calendar.eff
-
-
- Nov. 7 * European Summit on the Information Superhighway; Amsterdam,
- Netherlands. Speakers include EFF co-founder John Perry Barlow.
-
- Nov. 9 * Doors of Perception Conference; Amsterdam, Netherlands. Speakers
- include EFF co-founder John Perry Barlow.
-
- Nov. 23-
- 25 * HyperMedia Conference; Oita Japan. Speakers include
- EFF boardmember David Farber.
-
- Nov. 27 * Internet Society Japan Conference; Kobe Japan. Speakers include
- EFF boardmember David Farber.
-
- Nov. 29 * Japan Ministry of Posts and Telecom. Annual Conference on
- Advances in Communications; Tokyo Japan. Foreign Keynote speech
- by EFF boardmember, David Farber.
-
- Jan. 17-
- 18 * Innovation Now; Oregon Convention Center, Portland Oregon.
- Sponsored by American Electronics Association's Oregon Council,
- et al. Speakers include EFF chair of the board Esther Dyson.
- URL: http://www.innovationnow.org/
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: Quote of the Day
- -------------------------
-
- "You are all optimizing against the imaginable, not the probable. And the
- imaginable, especially the imaginable evil, has no inertia at all. There
- is no limit to what it might do and therefore, there is no limit to what one
- must do to prevent it...If we are to design all of our policies around the
- worst thing that could possibly happen, if we are trying to achieve a
- world of such absolute safety that no one in power can ever be blamed for
- a human-caused catastrophe, we will have to endow law enforcement with
- powers of surveillance which will make a police state not just imaginable
- but probable."
- - EFF co-founder John Perry Barlow, in a letter to Administration staffers
- regarding the Clipper and Digital Telephony surveillance scheme, on
- which the Administration refused to back down, citing fear of terrorists
- using untappable communications to plan a nuclear bombing of the
- World Trade Center, and the reaction the voting public would have
- toward the Adminstration in the event of such terrorism.
-
- Find yourself wondering if your privacy and freedom of speech are safe
- when bills to censor the Internet are swimming about in a sea of of
- surveillance legislation and anti-terrorism hysteria? Worried that in
- the rush to make us secure from ourselves that our government
- representatives may deprive us of our essential civil liberties?
- Concerned that legislative efforts nominally to "protect children" will
- actually censor all communications down to only content suitable for
- the playground?
-
- Join EFF!
-
- Even if you don't live in the U.S., the anti-Internet hysteria will soon
- be visiting a legislative body near you. If it hasn't already.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: What YOU Can Do
- ------------------------
-
- * The Communications Decency Act & Other Censorship Legislation
-
- The Communications Decency Act and similar legislation pose serious
- threats to freedom of expression online, and to the livelihoods of system
- operators. The legislation also undermines several crucial privacy
- protections.
-
- Business/industry persons concerned should alert their corporate govt.
- affairs office and/or legal counsel. Everyone should write to their own
- Representatives and Senators, asking them to oppose Internet censorship
- legislation, and write to the conference committee members to support
- the reasonable approaches of Leahy, Klink, Cox and Wyden, and to oppose
- the unconstitutional proposals of Exon, Gorton and others. See the first
- article in this newsletter for more detailed info.
-
- For more information on what you can do to help stop this and other
- dangerous legislation, see:
-
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/
- gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/
-
- If you do not have full internet access, send your request
- for information to ask@eff.org.
-
-
- * Digital Telephony/Comms. Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
-
- The FBI is now seeking both funding for the DT/CALEA wiretapping provisions,
- and preparing to require that staggering numbers of citizens be
- simultaneously wiretappable.
-
- To oppose the funding, write to your own Senators and Representatives
- urging them to vote against any appropriations for wiretapping.
- To oppose the FBI's wiretapping capacity demands, see the FBI Federal
- Register notice at the end of the second article in this newsletter, which
- contains instructions on how to submit formal comments on the ludicrous
- and dangerous proposal.
-
-
- * Anti-Terrorism Bills
-
- Numerous bills threatening your privacy and free speech have been introduced
- this year. None of them are close to passage at this very moment, but
- this status may change. Urge your Congresspersons to oppose these
- unconstitutional and Big-Brotherish bills.
-
-
- * The Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act
-
- This bill is unlikely to pass in any form, being very poorly drafted, and
- without much support. However, the CDA is just as bad and passed with
- flying colors [the jolly roger?] in the Senate. It's better to be safe
- than sorry. If you have a few moments to spare, writing to, faxing, or
- calling your Congresspersons to urge opposition to this bill is a good
- idea. If you only have time to do limited activism, please concentrate
- on the CDA instead. That legislation is far more imminent that the AERA.
-
-
- * Find Out Who Your Congresspersons Are
-
- Writing letters to, faxing, and phoning your representatives in Congress
- is one very important strategy of activism, and an essential way of
- making sure YOUR voice is heard on vital issues.
-
- EFF has lists of the Senate and House with contact information, as well
- as lists of Congressional committees. (A House list is included in this
- issue of EFFector). These lists are available at:
- ftp.eff.org, /pub/Activism/Congress_cmtes/
- gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Issues/Activism/Congress_cmtes
- http://www.eff.org/pub/Activism/Congress_cmtes/
-
- The full Senate and House lists are senate.list and hr.list, respectively.
- Those not in the U.S. should seek out similar information about their
- own legislative bodies. EFF will be happy to archive any such
- information provided.
-
- If you are having difficulty determining who your Representatives are,
- try contacting your local League of Women Voters, who maintain a great
- deal of legislative information.
-
-
- * Join EFF!
-
- You *know* privacy, freedom of speech and ability to make your voice heard
- in government are important. You have probably participated in our online
- campaigns and forums. Have you become a member of EFF yet? The best way to
- protect your online rights is to be fully informed and to make your
- opinions heard. EFF members are informed and are making a difference. Join
- EFF today!
-
- For EFF membership info, send queries to membership@eff.org, or send any
- message to info@eff.org for basic EFF info, and a membership form.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Administrivia
- =============
-
- EFFector Online is published by:
-
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation
- 1550 Bryant St., Suite 725
- San Francisco CA 94103 USA
- +1 415 436 9333 (voice)
- +1 415 436 9993 (fax)
- Membership & donations: membership@eff.org
- Legal services: ssteele@eff.org
- General EFF, legal, policy or online resources queries: ask@eff.org
-
- Editor:
- Stanton McCandlish, Online Services Mgr./Activist/Archivist (mech@eff.org)
-
- This newsletter is printed on 100% recycled electrons.
-
- Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged. Signed
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-
- To subscribe to EFFector via email, send message body of "subscribe
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-
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-
- To get the latest issue, send any message to effector-reflector@eff.org (or
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- at EFFweb. HTML editions of the current issue sometimes take a day or
- longer to prepare after issue of the ASCII text version.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
-
-
-
- End of EFFector Online v08 #18 Digest
- *************************************
-
- $$
-