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- EFFector Online Volume 07 No. 05 Mar. 11, 1994 editors@eff.org
- A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation ISSN 1062-9424
-
-
- In This Issue:
-
- DPSWG Coalition's Digital Telephony Letter to White House
- Letter of DPSWG to FBI Dir. Freeh on Wiretap Bill's Privacy Threat
- EFF Files Email "Interception" Brief in Steve Jackson Games Appeal
- Executive Director Position Opening Soon as EFF Expands
- New EFF SysOp Membership Option
- What YOU Can Do
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- The two letters below deserve your immediate attention, and further
- redistribution. The FBI has released a draft of the new version of its
- Digital Telephony legislation, aimed at crippling all future communications
- technology to enhance their ability to wiretap and gain the ability to
- perform communications traffic analysis without a warrant. To add
- insult to injury, tacked on to the end of the bill draft are some sections
- that would hope to apply the privacy protections of the ECPA to certain
- wireless communications, allowing the FBI to name their would-be bill,
- "Digital Telphony and Communications Privacy Improvement Act of 1994: A
- legislative proposal to protect the American public from criminal activity
- and ensure privacy in telecommunications". Do not be fooled. The FBI
- scheme would turn the data superhighway into a national surveillance
- network of staggering proportions.
-
- The letters that follow show an unprecedented consensus of civil liberties
- and industry organizations on the need to protect privacy, and on the
- adverse consequences to security and privacy threatened by the Digital
- Telephony bill.
-
-
- "Only in a police state is the job of a policeman easy."
- -Orson Welles
-
- "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich
- Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of
- phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps."
- - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", _TIME_, Mar. 14 1994
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: DPSWG Coalition's Digital Telephony Letter to White House
- ------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- On March 9, the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group sent the following
- letter to the Administration calling into question the procedures by which
- the FBI's Digital Telephony "Wiretap Bill" draft is being examined, and
- expressing harsh criticism of the would-be legislation. The DPSWG is a
- coalition of privacy and civil liberties organizations, trade
- associations, and industry leaders, coordinated by the Electronic Frontier
- Foundation.
-
- March 9, 1994
-
- The President William J. Clinton
- The White House
- Washington, D.C. 20500
-
- The Vice President of the United States
- United States Senate
- Washington, D.C. 20510
-
- Dear Mr. President and Mr. Vice President:
-
- Telecommunications carriers and other members of the Digital Privacy and
- Security Working Group are keenly aware of the concerns raised by the
- Administration regarding the ability to intercept communications
- transmitted over advanced commu nications networks.
-
- We are concerned, however, about the nature of the process upon which the
- Administration has embarked to address these issues. Seeking immediate
- industry reaction to the FBI's draft legislation and congressional passage
- of such legislation shortly thereafter is troubling. It suggests
- curtailment of public debate and of congressional deliberation. Given the
- interest of the public in these matters and their complexity, it is
- essential that there be a full public debate on these issues.
-
- Industry is currently cooperating with appropriate authorities to avoid
- future problems and to expand existing capacities. This is not to say that
- there have not been some transitional concerns particularly upon the
- introduction of new technologies that have grown greatly in popularity. But,
- whenever transitional problems have arisen, industry representatives have
- worked with law enforcement officials to resolve them.
-
- The FBI's actions are especially troubling in light of our view that
- legislation is not needed to accomplish the agency's goals. We still see
- no evidence that current law enforcement efforts are being jeopardized by
- new technologies. Nor are we convinced that future law enforcement
- activities will be jeopardized given industry cooperation.
-
- We still believe that continued cooperation by government and industry
- within the working relationship that has emerged from the 1992 Quantico
- Joint Government Industry Group will resolve "the digital telephony
- problem" and preserve the government's current authorities. The
- discussions have succeeded in identifying specific problems and have begun
- the process of generating concrete, cost-effective solutions. This process
- has facilitated a more robust exchange of technical information and
- an identification of possible new equipment and police tactics needed to
- achieve law enforcement goals. Nevertheless, we are prepared to work with
- the Congress and the Administration to attempt to resolve the legitimate
- concerns of law enforcement.
-
- The signatories to this letter cannot overemphasize how critical it is that
- any new initiatives in this area preserve the public's confidence in the
- privacy of information carried over the public switched network. Less than
- a decade after enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
- 1986, the nation can ill afford to undercut customer privacy expectations.
- Indeed, on the eve of the National Information Infrastructure's deployment,
- preserving customer confidence is all the more important. Privacy
- protection is not a secondary interest here.
-
- Survey after survey performed by Professor Alan Westin and others have
- demonstrated the public's concern with privacy and the security of their
- communications. We all must seek to maximize those interests and assure
- the public that their communications are protected.
-
-
- Sincerely yours,
-
- Apple Computer, Inc.
- AT&T
- American Civil Liberties Union
- Business Software Alliance
- Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
- Computer Business Equipment & Manufacturers Assn
- Digital Equipment Corporation
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Electronic Messaging Association
- GTE Corporation
- Information Industry Association
- Information Technology Association of America
- Iris Associates, Inc
- McCaw Cellular
- MCI Communications Corporation
- People for the American Way
- Software Publishers Association
- Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc.
- Trusted Information Systems
- United States Telephone Association
-
-
-
- cc: Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- John Podesta, Office of the President
- Michael Nelson, Office of the Vice President
- Senator Patrick Leahy
- Senator Ernest Hollings
- Representitive Don Edwards
- Representative Edward Markey
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: Letter of DPSWG to FBI Dir. Freeh on Wiretap Bill's Privacy Threat
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- On March 11, the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group sent the
- letter below to FBI Dir. Louis Freeh as a followup to the March 9 letter to
- the Administration, detailing the DPSWG's criticisms of the FBI's proposed
- Digital Telephony bill, and raising serious privacy questions. EFF and
- the DPSWG feel that the Digital Telephony scheme, coupled with the
- Administration's Clipper Chip plan, could turn the future National
- Inforamation Infrastructure into a nationwide surveillance network.
- It is clear that law enforcement needs and wants do not require
- such overly-broad legislative action, and the possible gain to law
- enforcement is vastly outweighed by the massive threat to citizen privacy.
- The DPSWG is a coalition of privacy and civil liberties organizations, trade
- associations, and industry leaders, coordinated by the Electronic Frontier
- Foundation.
-
-
-
-
- March 11, 1994
-
- By Hand Delivery
- Mr. Louis Freeh
- Director
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Washington, D.C.
- Dear Director Freeh:
-
- This letter is a follow-up to our letter of March 9, 1994 to President
- Clinton and Vice President Gore (a copy is attached). While we do not
- believe that new legislation is needed to accomplish the FBI's goals, we
- take this opportunity to more specifically raise some of the questions that
- should be answered in pursuing any digital telephony legislation. The
- draft that the White House has given us for comment is overly broad, and
- it is our hope that this letter will assist in narrowing the scope of any
- legislation.
- While we have additional, important questions and concerns, this letter
- sets forth our primary concerns.
-
- (1) Should digital telephony legislation reach "call setup information"
- independently of a "Title III" search warrant?
-
- The New York Times of February 28, 1994 quotes you as stating, "My real
- objective is to get access to the content of telephone calls." The bill
- should therefore be limited to content of communications and incidental
- call setup or transactional data.
-
- Legislation should apply to "call setup information" only when that
- information is incident to a warrant issued for wire, oral, or electronic
- communications as set forth in 18 U.S.C. ñ 2518. Extending the legislation's
- scope beyond the acquisition of content (pursuant to a warrant under
- section 2518) to the independent acquisition of call setup information
- raises many issues that require examination. For example, currently the
- legal standard for obtaining transactional data is a certification (via
- subpoena or statement to a judge) that the sought-after data is relevant to
- an ongoing criminal investigation. In the era of personal communications
- services ("PCS") and of the information highway, transactional data will
- reveal far more about individuals than it has in the past. In fact, in some
- cases it may be equivalent to content information. This transactional data
- certainly could make it possible to build a detailed model of an individual's
- behavior and movements. The net result could be government dictating to
- industry that it create a surveillance-based system that will allow federal,
- state, and local government to use a service provider's electronic
- communication facilities to conduct minute-by-minute surveillance of
- individuals.
-
- As long as they have an IRS or other administrative subpoena or a law
- enforcement agent willing to certify that the sought-after data is
- relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation, law enforcement officials
- could demand that they be notified at some remote location every time
- certain individuals communicate by telephone, and their location at the
- time, as well as every database they connect to and when they log on and
- off. In short, law enforcement officials could insist on instantaneously
- knowing the existence of every single electronic communication (but not
- its content).
-
- The enormous potential for abuse and threat to personal privacy suggests
- that, if transactional data were to be covered by digital telephony
- legislation, it should be incidental to a "Title III" wiretap warrant. This
- would not limit in any way law enforcement's access to trap and trace, pen
- register, or call billing information under current law or practice. This is
- particularly true given that there has been no case made that
- demonstrates any current or potential difficulty in getting this non-content
- information under current practices. The technology in fact has made
- these type of services much easier for law enforcement to use and access.
- Additional legislation is simply not necessary to obtain this data.
-
- (2) What is covered?
-
- The obligation to isolate the content of communications must be reasonably
- related to the service provider's telecommunications services. It would
- be unreasonable for the FBI to demand any person involved with the
- communication to furnish it with access to that communication. For
- example, most providers, including local telephone companies, usually
- need to isolate communications for purposes of billing and maintenance. It
- is appropriate for the FBI to seek their assistance in intercepting
- communications on their networks only when the requests are reasonably
- related to the telecommunications services they provide.
-
- Therefore, the question is not necessarily who is covered, but what
- telecommunications services are covered. For example, the legislation
- should reflect the fact that, in reselling services, even local telephone
- companies sometimes are unable in those instances to furnish call setup
- information regardless of whether it is incident to the acquisition of a
- communication's content.
-
- (3) What will be the requirements placed upon service providers and what
- will be the standard of compliance that will be applied?
-
- Legislation should carefully define the obligations of service providers.
- This is not the case with the FBI's current draft of proposed legislation.
- These obligations are vague and subject to considerable interpretation.
- Service providers and manufactures must have flexibility to adopt
- procedures that reasonably comply with the specific functional performance
- requirements of law enforcement.
-
- This is particularly true where, as here, compliance requires an
- assessment of future needs and interoperability requirements. There
- is a difference between compliance and a guarantee, and legislation must
- reflect that difference. Carriers should be required to provide reasonable
- cooperation and that cooperation should be measured by a standard of
- reasonable compliance.
-
- In installing new software or equipment under this statute, a service
- provider must be able to reasonably assess future demands by law
- enforcement. Other industries subject to regulation at least know, for
- example, the temperature at which they must maintain the specimens, the
- emission standard they must satisfy, or the type of safety restraint
- equipment they must install and the date by which they must have it
- installed in vehicles. Service providers cannot be held to an absolute
- standard of compliance where they are using and delivering new
- technologies to the public and the demands of law enforcement are not
- clearly specified. This applies to both capability and capacity. Law
- enforcement must be specific in its requirements for capacity and
- capability from each service provider.
-
- (4) What is expected of commercial mobile service providers?
-
- It is not a foregone conclusion that mobility in a digitized
- telecommunications environment will degrade or otherwise impede the
- law enforcement community's ability to effectively execute court-
- approved wiretap orders.
-
- Wireless carriers are committed to assisting law enforcement agencies to
- successfully wiretap and intercept voice communications. To accomplish
- this goal, the wireless industry understands that available excess port
- capacity is needed in all switches throughout the nation. While it may be
- reasonable for federal and state law enforcement agencies to acquire the
- contents of wireless communications pursuant to "Title III" warrants
- through additional port capacity, it would be prohibitively expensive to
- require that every one of the nation's switches be connected to the FBI to
- enable it to acquire such information on a "real time" basis at remote
- locations.
-
- Connecting every one of the nation's switches to the FBI, moreover,
- would increase exponentially the risk of unauthorized access to wireless
- communications. Further, the proliferation of fraudulent use of wireless
- telephones through such techniques as "cloning" and "tumbling" ESNs
- (electronic serial numbers) poses additional questions with respect to
- privacy and the ability of law enforcement to properly execute court-
- approved wiretap orders.
-
- (5) What are the responsibilities of manufacturers and suppliers, if any?
-
- The FBI wishes manufacturers of telecommunications equipment and providers
- of support services to fall within the scope of the legislation. But,
- would service providers be held liable for software or hardware that
- is not available from vendors? Why? How would the obligations be
- enforced against foreign manufacturers? What would be the liability of a
- domestic carrier that relies upon foreign manufacturers? What are the
- trade implications of having domestic manufacturers export equipment
- designed for governmental surveillance?
-
- (6) How, and during what period, are costs to be recovered to ensure that
- there is a direct relationship between the costs reasonably incurred
- by covered entities and the government's requirements?
-
- Government should pay for what it needs, which will help focus attention
- upon the facilities that truly need upgrading. If the government does not
- pay for upgrades or facilities, then the service providers should not be
- held responsible. The FBI appears to have accepted the concept that
- government should pay for the costs of compliance but has so far
- underestimated these costs and proposed an arbitrary three-year limit on
- cost reimbursement. Government compensation should be ongoing with
- industry's compliance.
-
- * * *
-
- We trust you find our comments helpful. We remain prepared to work with
- you, Congress, and others to attempt to resolve the legitimate concerns of
- law enforcement.
-
- Sincerely yours,
-
- [signed]
- Jerry Berman
- (202) 347-5400
-
- [signed]
- Ronald Plesser
- (202) 861-3969
- Enclosure
- cc: John Podesta, Office of the President
- Michael Nelson, Office of Science & Technology Policy
- Senator Joseph Biden
- Senator Ernest Hollings
- Senator Patrick Leahy
- Representative Jack Brooks
- Representative John Dingell
- Representative Don Edwards
- Representative Edward Markey
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: EFF Files Email "Interception" Brief in Steve Jackson Games Appeal
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- In a move that could have significant ramifications for the proposed
- "information superhighway," Steve Jackson of Austin, Texas, and his
- company, Steve Jackson Games Incorporated -- together with three users of
- the company's electronic bulletin board system (BBS) -- are asking a
- federal appeals court to rule on how federal wiretap laws apply to
- electronic mail.
-
- In an appeal filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
- Circuit in New Orleans, the plaintiffs seek a ruling that a seizure of
- electronic mail (e-mail) before the addressee receives it qualifies as an
- "interception" under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
-
- The appeal follows a court victory last year for Steve Jackson Games, a
- small roleplaying-games book publisher in Austin, Texas. On March 1, 1990,
- United States Secret Service Agents seized the company's BBS and three
- computers containing the company's business records and all copies of an
- upcoming publication. On March 12, 1993, Judge Sam Sparks of the U.S.
- District Court for the Western District of Texas found that Secret Service
- agents involved with the raid had violated the Privacy Protection Act of
- 1980, which is designed to protect publishers. Steve Jackson Games was
- awarded $51,040 in damages under that claim.
-
- In addition, the trial judge held that the seizure of electronic mail on
- the company's electronic bulletin board system was a violation of the
- stored communications provisions of the ECPA and awarded each of the
- plaintiffs $1,000 in statutory damages.
-
- On a third, independent claim, however, the trial judge ruled against the
- plaintiffs, holding that electronic mail that had not yet been accessed by
- its intended recipient is not "intercepted" under the ECPA. Judge Sparks
- held that an interception can occur when a only communication is acquired
- at the same time it is occurring -- in other words, in real time as the
- message is actually travelling over the wires.
-
- Plaintiffs base their appeal on Congress' intention in creating separate
- statutory provisions for "intercepted" communications and on the plain
- meaning of the term "interception." "As any defensive back knows," states
- the plaintiffs' brief, "this is the classic definition of an
- 'interception,' and one comfortably within the statute's definition."
-
- Three organizations interested in electronic communications, the Electronic
- Frontier Foundation, The Society for Electronic Access and InterCon Systems
- Corporation, filed a friends of the court brief to support Plaintiffs'
- definition of "interception" under ECPA. "For purposes of intercepting the
- contents of an electronic mail message, the time the message actually
- travels through the wire between computers is a technical detail of the
- delivery process that should not be relevant to the law."
-
- The Justice Department has 30 days to reply.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: Executive Director Position Opening Soon as EFF Expands
- ----------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
- For Immediate Release
- 03/03/94
-
- The Board of Directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation announced
- today that has begun the search for a new Executive Director. An increase
- in EFF's activities with the rapid development of the national information
- infrastructure requires an addition to the management team.
-
- The new Executive Director will work collaboratively with EFF's current
- Executive Director, Jerry Berman. Mr. Berman will continue as the
- Foundation's Director of Policy in order to devote full time leadership to
- EFF's critical and expanding public policy activities.
-
- EFF identifies significant issues related to information and communication
- technologies, and creates activities that seek to understand how they will
- affect society, and change the way that people think, work and interact.
- Current EFF activities focus on public policy, civil liberties, and public
- education.
-
- The new Executive Director will build organizational capacity by
- implementing management, fundraising and membership programs, and will
- expand the scope of the Foundation's activities by developing diverse
- projects that encompass:
-
- - information infrastructure;
- - the development and application of law;
- - evolution of new technology;
- - protection of civil liberties;
- - changes in social fabric and the meaning of community;
- - opportunities and effects on commerce/economics; and
- - international issues.
-
- EFF was started in 1990 by Mitchell Kapor, founder of Lotus Development
- Corporation, and John Perry Barlow, an author and lecturer interested in
- digital technology and society. Both founders will continue to remain
- active on the Board of Directors of the organization.
-
- For more information contact:
-
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Attn: Executive Director Search Committee
- 1001 G St. NW, Suite 950 E, Washington DC 20001
- 202-347-5400
- search@eff.org
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: New EFF SysOp Membership Option
- ----------------------------------------
-
- EFF is now offering a special members for BBS sysops. For a *$10*
- tax-deductible membership contribution, sysop members will receive a
- subscription to EFF's biweekly electronic newsletter (EFFector Online), a
- subscription to our quarterly hardcopy newsletter (Networks & Policy) and
- access to our online bulletin board system. In addition, sysop members will
- receive a special version of our Frontier Files diskette containing some of
- EFF's most popular resources which can be posted for distribution, ASCII
- and ANSI screens announcing your system's membership in EFF, and the
- opportunity to be listed in a directory of boards supporting EFF and its
- work. Sysop members are eligible to renew at the special discounted rate
- of $10 if in the course of their 1 year membership they recruit 10 new EFF
- members.
-
- As soon as EFF's BBS (Outpost) is fully functional, sysop members will be
- among the first invited to join our new FTN- and QWK-format network.
- Information will be forwarded about Outpost and the network as soon as it
- is available.
-
- SysOp membership may be open to operators/admins of other online services
- as well, not just the prototypical BBS.
-
- Any questions regarding EFF or the sysop membership can be directed to
- EFF's Membership coordinator at membership@eff.org. For general
- information about EFF and it's mission, send mail to info@eff.org.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Subject: What YOU Can Do
- ------------------------
-
- "In order to keep up with the criminals and to protect our national
- security, the solution is clear: we need legislation to ensure that
- telephone companies and other carriers provide law enforcement with access
- to this new technology."
-
- - FBI Dir. Louis Freeh, 12/8/93, on hampering new telecom technology
- to make it easily wiretappable. [Full text of this Dec. 1993 DC Press
- Club speech available for anonymous ftp as wiretap.speech from
- ftp.eff.org in Pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel93_freeh.speech]
-
- That's right - it's the Digital Telephony proposal. Again. The FBI wants
- guaranteed access to *your* communications. If you want to fight
- government invasions of your privacy, join EFF!
-
- You've been following the newspapers and reading EFFector Online.
- You know that today there are several battles being fought over the future
- of personal privacy. The Clipper Chip, export restrictions, the Digital
- Telephony Proposal - the arguments are numerous and complex, but the
- principles are clear. Who will decide how much privacy is "enough"?
-
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation believes that individuals should be
- able to ensure the privacy of their personal communications through any
- technological means they choose. However, the government's current
- restrictions on the export of encrytion software have stifled the
- development and commercial availability of strong encryption in the U.S.
- Rep. Maria Cantwell has introduced a bill (H.R. 3627) in the House that
- would liberalize export controls on software that contains encryption, but
- needs vocal support if the bill is to make it out of the committee stage.
-
- The decisions that are made today will affect our futures indefinitely.
- EFF is a respected voice for the rights of users of online technologies
- and EFF members receive regular online updates on the issues that affect
- our online communications and particpate in shaping the future.
-
- Now, more than ever, EFF is working to make sure that you are the one that
- makes these decisions for yourself. Our members are making themselves heard
- on the whole range of issues. To date, EFF has collected over 4800 letters
- of support for Rep. Cantwell's bill to liberalize restrictions on
- cryptography. We also have over 1400 letters supporting Sen. Leahy's
- open hearings on the proposed Clipper encryption scheme
-
- If you'd like to add your voice in support of the Cantwell bill and the
- Leahy hearings, you can send your letters to:
-
- cantwell@eff.org, Subject: I support HR 3627
- leahy@eff.org, Subject: I support hearings on Clipper
-
- Your letters will be printed out and hand delivered to Rep. Cantwell and
- Sen. Leahy by EFF.
-
- You KNOW privacy is important. You have probably participated in our online
- campaigns. Have you become a member of EFF yet? We feel that the best
- way to protect your online rights is to be fully informed and to make your
- opinions heard. EFF members are informed, and are making a difference.
- Join EFF today!
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- MEMBERSHIP IN THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
- ================================================
-
- Print out in monospaced (non-proportional) font and mail to:
-
- Membership Coordinator
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- 1001 G Street, NW, Suite 950 East, Washington, DC 20001
-
-
- SIGN ME UP!
- -----------
-
- I wish to become a member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. I enclose:
-
- ___ Regular membership -- $40
- ___ Student membership -- $20
- ___ SysOp membership -- $10*
-
- * SysOp members are required to bring in 10 new members to renew at the
- SysOp membership rate (otherwise normal rates apply). Send queries to
- membership@eff.org for more info.
-
- Special Contribution
-
- I wish to make an additional tax-deductible donation in the amount of
- $__________ to further support the activities of EFF and to broaden
- participation in the organization.
-
-
- PAYMENT METHOD:
- ---------------
-
- ___ Enclosed is a check or money order payable to
- the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
-
- ___ Please charge my:
-
- ___ MasterCard ___ Visa ___ American Express
-
- Card Number: _____________________________________________
-
- Expiration Date: _________________________________________
-
- Signature: _______________________________________________
-
- NOTE: We do not recommend sending credit card information via email!
-
-
- YOUR CONTACT INFORMATION:
- -------------------------
-
- Name: __________________________________________________________
-
- Organization: __________________________________________________
-
- Address: _______________________________________________________
-
- _______________________________________________________
-
- _______________________________________________________
-
- E-mail addresses: ______________________________________________
-
- ______________________________________________
-
- Phone: _____________________ FAX: ___________________________
-
- BBS: _____________________ Modem Type: ____________________
-
- _____________________ ________________________________
-
- _____________________ ________________________________
-
- BBS Info: BBS Name: ___________________________________________
-
- SysOps:______________________________________________
-
- Voice/Support Phone: ________________________________
-
- Network Addresses: __________________________________
-
- __________________________________
-
- BBS Notes (OS, modem types/speeds, Internet connectivity,
- access requirments, hours, fees, software, focus
- or special interests, unique features, etc.)
-
- _____________________________________________________
-
- _____________________________________________________
-
- _____________________________________________________
-
- EFF will maintain a publicly available list of BBSs and similar services
- that support the efforts of the Electronic Fontier Foundation. Members
- with BBSs who do not opt for the SysOp Membership plan are welcome to
- be listed as well.
-
- Include my BBS in the EFF Member BBS Directory _______
-
-
- PREFERRED CONTACT
-
- ___ Electronic: Please contact me via the Internet address listed above.
- I would like to receive the following at that address:
-
- ___ EFFector Online - EFF's biweekly electronic newsletter
- (back issues available from ftp.eff.org,
- pub/EFF/Newsletters/EFFector).
-
- ___ Online Bulletins - bulletins on key developments
- affecting online communications.
-
- NOTE: Traffic may be high. You may wish to browse these
- publications in the Usenet newsgroup comp.org.eff.news (also
- available in FidoNet, as EFF-NEWS).
-
- ___ Paper: Please contact me through the US Mail at the street
- address listed above.
-
- NOTE: Paper documents available upon request.
- "Networks & Policy" Newsletter automatically sent via US Mail.
-
-
- PRIVACY POLICY
- --------------
-
- EFF occasionally shares our mailing list with other organizations promoting
- similar goals. However, we respect an individual's right to privacy and
- will not distribute your name without explicit permission.
-
- ___ I grant permission for the EFF to distribute my name and contact
- information to organizations sharing similar goals.
-
- [This form came from eff.org - please leave this line on the form!
- If you found it elsewhere, please tell us where so we see how far it goes.]
-
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation is a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) organization
- supported by contributions from individual members, corporations and
- private foundations. Donations are tax-deductible.
-
- ------------------------------
-
-
- Administrivia
- =============
-
- EFFector Online is published biweekly by:
-
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- 1001 G Street, N.W., Suite 950 East
- Washington, DC 20001, USA
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- End of EFFector Online v07 #05
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