The Hacker's Encyclopedia 1998/hackers_encyclopedia.iso/zines/cud/cud967.txt

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Computer underground Digest    Sun  Sep 7, 1997   Volume 9 : Issue 67
                           ISSN  1004-042X

       Editor: Jim Thomas ([e-mail])
       News Editor: Gordon Meyer ([e-mail])
       Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
       Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
       Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
                          Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
                          Ian Dickinson
       Field Agent Extraordinaire:   David Smith
       Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest

CONTENTS, #9.67 (Sun, Sep 7, 1997)

File 1--Free Speech Coalition v. Reno (text of CPPA decision)
File 2--Court Upholds Child Pornography Prevention Act (ACLU fwd)
File 3--Wired News on Child Porn Act Decision
File 4--Boylovers, NAMBLA, and Net-vigilantes, from The Netly News
File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)

CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sat, 30 Aug 1997 14:06:22 -0500
From: [e-mail](Jim Thomas)
Subject: File 1--Free Speech Coalition v. Reno (text of CPPA decision)

Following is the  ruling in _Free Speech Coalition v. Reno_,
which upholds the Child Pornography Prevention Act on First
Amendment grounds, courtesy of Greg Broilesi at

-  http://www.parrhesia.com/cp.html

    HTML by  Greg Broiles .
     _________________________________________________________________

   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA



   THE FREE SPEECH COALITION, et al.,
   Plaintiffs,

   v.

   JANET RENO, et al.,
   Defendants.


   No. C 97-0281 SC
   ORDER RE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

   FILED AUG 12 1997, Richard W. Wieking, Clerk, U.S. District Court,
   Northern District of California


   I. INTRODUCTION

   Plaintiffs in this action consist of a trade association that defends
   First Amendment rights against censorship, the publisher of a book
   "dedicated to the education and expression of the ideals and
   philosophy associated with nudism," and individual artists whose works
   include nude and erotic photographs and paintings. Plaintiffs have
   filed a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of certain
   provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA"),
   alleging that they are vague, overbroad, and constitute impermissible
   content-specific regulations and prior restraints on free speech. Both
   plaintiffs and defendants have moved for summary judgment.

   II. BACKGROUND

   Congress has passed several laws(1) in an ongoing attempt to combat
   child pornography, the market that such pornography has created and
   maintained, and the harms that such pornography wreaks on children's
   physical, psychological, emotional, and mental health. S. Rep. No.
   104-358, at 8 (1996) ("Sen. Rep."). The most recent of these laws was
   passed in 1996, and was enacted specifically to combat the use of
   computer technology to produce pornography that conveys the impression
   that children were used in the photographs or images. In passing the
   legislation, Congress recognized that the dangers of child pornography
   are not limited to its effect on the children actually used in the
   pornography. Additionally, child pornography "stimulates the sexual
   appetites and encourages the activities of child molesters and
   pedophiles, who use it to feed their sexual fantasies." Sen. Rep. At
   12. Child pornography is also used by child molesters and pedophiles
   "as a device to break down the resistance and inhibitions of their
   victims or targets of molestation, especially when these are
   children." Id. at 13. "A child who may be reluctant to engage in
   sexual activity with an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit
   photos, can sometimes be persuaded to do so by viewing depictions of
   other children participating in such activity." Id.

   Congress recognized that computer technology is capable of "alter[ing]
   perfectly innocent pictures of children. . . to create visual
   depictions of those children engaging in any imaginable form of sexual
   conduct." Id. at 15. These computer-generated pictures are often
   indistinguishable from photographic images of actual children.
   "Computer generated images which appear to depict minors engaging in
   sexually explicit conduct are just as dangerous to the well-being of.
   . . children as material using actual children." Id. at 19. Thus,
   Congress passed the 1996 Act in order to prevent the effects that such
   computer-generated images might have, even if no children were
   actually used in the creation of the images.


     Specifically, the CPPA defines child pornography as:
     any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video,
     picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether
     made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of
     sexually explicit conduct, where --
     (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
     minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
     (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging
     in sexually explicit conduct;
     (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to
     appear that such an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually
     explicit conduct; or
     (D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented,
     described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
     impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a
     minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. . . .

   18 U.S.C. 2256(8).

   The CPPA goes on the define "sexually explicit conduct" as actual or
   simulated:

     (A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital,
     anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or
     opposite sex;
     (B) bestiality;
     (C) masturbation;
     (D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
     (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
     person.



   18 U.S.C. 2256(2).

   The CPPA also provides an affirmative defense for violations of the
   Act if:


     (1) the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual
     person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
     (2) each such person was an adult at the time the material was
     produced; and
     (3) the defendant did not advertise, promote, present, describe, or
     distribute the material in such a manner as to convey the impression
     that it is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
     sexually explicit conduct.



   18 U.S.C. 2252A(c).

   Plaintiffs contend that the CPPA "sweeps within its purview materials
   that involve no actual children and that traditionally and logically
   have never been considered to be child pornography." Pls.' Mem in
   Supp. Of Mot. For Summ. Judg. at 3. They argue that the CPPA, by
   prohibiting images that appear to be of children, actually
   criminalizes the production and sale of legitimate works that include
   images that look like children, but that in reality were made using
   adults, not children. They allege that the CPPA's "use of overbroad
   and vague language criminalizes forms of expression in violation of
   the First and Fifth Amendments." Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.
   Judg. at 4.

   III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

   A. Standing

   Defendants first argue that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a
   claim in this Court, as they have not suffered "actual or threatened
   injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
   defendant." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
   Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
   Defendants contend that plaintiffs' activities fall squarely within
   the affirmative defense set out in 18 U.S.C. 2252A(c), as plaintiffs
   have admitted that their works involve the depiction only of
   non-minors(2) and that they do not market their works as child
   pornography.(3)

   Plaintiffs counter that they have indeed been injured by the CPPA, as
   plaintiffs have, in some cases, discontinued the production,
   distribution, and possession of the certain materials for fear of
   prosecution under the CPPA. The CPPA, therefore, has had a chilling
   effect on their speech which is sufficient to constitute standing.
   See, e.g., San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno, 98 F.3d
   1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996)(holding that a chilling effect on speech is
   a sufficient basis to establish standing in overbreadth facial
   challenges to government actions involving free speech); Stoianoff v.
   Montana, 695 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983).

   Furthermore, plaintiffs contend that they have standing to bring their
   suit because the affirmative defense set out in 18 U.S.C. 2252A(c)
   does not protect consumers and distributors who possess the
   potentially illegal materials but who are not involved in the
   production of sexually explicit materials, and who therefore have no
   way of knowing whether or not the persons depicted are real and are
   not minors. Plaintiffs have set forth affidavits of businesses and
   individuals engaged in distributing, selling, or renting sexually
   explicit materials who have withheld or stopped distributing certain
   of plaintiffs' products that plaintiffs argue should fit within the
   statutory defense, out of fear that they will be prosecuted under the
   CPPA for possession of the materials. Plaintiffs are no longer
   marketing or sending those products to its distributors. See Virginia
   v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988)(harm
   resulting from speech regulation may be one of self-censorship).

   The Court finds that plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to
   establish the requisite standing to bring their claims before the
   Court.

   B. Standard of Review

   In evaluating the constitutionality of legislation that infringes free
   speech under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has identified the
   appropriate criteria by which the language of the act and the purposes
   underlying the passage of the act shall be judged. "[T]he government
   may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
   protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without
   reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
   narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
   that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
   the information." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791,
   reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989)(internal quotations omitted).

   In order to determine whether a regulation is content-neutral, "the
   principal inquiry. . . is whether the government has adopted a
   regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
   conveys." Id. A "regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
   content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental
   effect on some speakers or messages but not others." Id.; see also
   City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48, reh'g
   denied 475 U.S. 1132 (1986)(upholding ordinance prohibiting adult
   motion picture theaters within 1,000 feet of residential zones,
   churches, parks, or schools on basis that regulation was
   content-neutral because it was aimed at the secondary effects of such
   theaters on the surrounding community). If it can be shown that the
   regulation is justified without reference to the content of the
   speech, then it is deemed content-neutral. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.

   The contested provisions of the CPPA are content-neutral regulations.
   They have clearly been passed in order to prevent the secondary
   effects of the child pornography industry, including the exploitation
   and degradation of children and the encouragement of pedophilia and
   molestation of children. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has afforded
   "greater leeway" to regulations of child pornography. New York v.
   Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982). The Supreme Court has "sustained
   legislation aimed at protecting the physical and well-being of youth
   even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of
   constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 757. Given the nature of
   the evils that anti-child pornography laws are intended to prevent,
   the CPPA can easily be deemed a content-neutral regulation. For even
   if no children are involved in the production of sexually explicit
   materials, the devastating secondary effect that such materials have
   on society and the well-being of children merits the regulation of
   such images.

   Plaintiffs' contention that the CPPA is content-specific is
   unpersuasive. They claim that the terms of the CPPA clearly target
   materials that convey certain ideas to their viewers. The Court finds
   that the CPPA is designed to counteract the effect that such materials
   has on its viewers, on children, and to society as a whole, and is not
   intended to regulate or outlaw the ideas themselves. If child
   pornography is targeted by the regulation, it is due to the effect of
   the pornography on innocent children, not to the nature of the
   materials themselves, especially if that pornography contains
   computer-generated images of children. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass'n v.
   Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1994)(legislation requiring producers
   of sexually explicit material to document the names and ages of the
   persons portrayed was content-neutral, as it was intended "not to
   regulate the content of sexually explicit materials, but to protect
   children by deterring the production and distribution of child
   pornography"); Chesapeake B&M Inc., v. Hartford County, 58 F.3d 1005,
   1010 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 567 (1995).

   According to the Supreme Court, "[a] content-neutral regulation will
   be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important
   governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and
   does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further
   those interests." Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Fed.
   Communications Comm'n, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 1186 (1997).

   The CPPA clearly advances important and compelling government
   interests: the protection of children from the harms brought on by
   child pornography and the industry that such pornography has created.
   It is beyond debate that the protection of children from sexual
   exploitation is an important governmental interest; indeed, the
   Supreme Court has deemed the protection of the physical and
   psychological well-being of minors to be a "compelling" interest.
   Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-7; see also Sen. Rep. At 9 (There is a
   "compelling governmental interest [in prohibiting] all forms of child
   pornography.") Furthermore, the CPPA burdens no more speech than
   necessary in order to protect children from the harms of child
   pornography. As stated aforesaid, the CPPA specifically defines
   "sexually explicit conduct" as "sexual intercourse, including
   genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether
   between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; masturbation;
   sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the
   genitals or pubic area of any person." 18 U.S.C. 2256(2). It also
   defines "child pornography" as any visual depiction of sexually
   explicit conduct where the production involves the actual use of
   minors engaging in such conduct, the depiction is or appears to be of
   a minor engaging in such conduct, the depiction has been created,
   adapted, or modified to appear that a minor is engaging in such
   conduct, or the depiction is advertised, presented or promoted in such
   a way as to convey the impression that minor is engaging in such
   conduct. 18 U.S.C. 2256(8). Although there may be a degree of
   ambiguity in the phrase "appears to be a minor," any ambiguity
   regarding whether a particular person depicted in a particular work
   appears to be over the age of eighteen can be resolved by examining
   whether the work was marketed and advertised as child pornography.
   Given that the goal of the CPPA is to prevent the digital manipulation
   of images to create child pornography even when no children were
   actually used in the production of the material, the CPPA meets that
   goal by regulating the narrowest range of materials that might fall
   within the targeted category and including an explicit definition of
   the prohibited conduct. Congress certainly intended to exclude from
   the CPPA's reach materials that do not involve the actual or apparent
   depiction of children: "[The CPPA] does not, and is not intended to,
   apply to a depiction produced using adults engaging in sexually
   explicit conduct, even where a depicted individual may appear to be a
   minor." Sen. Rep. At 21.

   The affirmative defense laid out in 18 U.S.C. 2252A(c) limits even
   further the scope of the CPPA by removing from the range of criminal
   behavior the exact type of activity in which plaintiffs claim to
   engage. Plaintiffs contend that their works do not involve actual
   children, and that their works are not marketed or advertised as works
   featuring sexually explicit conduct by children. Their behavior, then,
   falls squarely within the category specifically set out by Congress as
   beyond the scope of the CPPA. The Court finds that the incidental
   harms laid out by the plaintiffs as support for their assertion of
   standing in this action do not amount to the CPPA's regulating
   "substantially more speech than necessary to further" the goal of
   preventing the dangers of child molestation and pedophilia.(4) See
   Pls.' Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 7-8. Although the
   effects of a content-neutral speech regulation may be substantial, if
   they are incidental and largely unavoidable, they will pass
   constitutional muster. Am. Library Ass'n. v. Reno, 33 F.3d at 87-8.
   Also, "[t]he mere assertion of some possible self-censorship resulting
   from a statute is not enough to render an antiobscenity law
   unconstitutional." Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana 489 U.S. 46, 60
   (1989). The contested provisions of the CPPA survive the intermediate
   scrutiny set forth by the Supreme Court for content-neutral
   regulations.

   The instant case is quite similar to that which the Supreme Court
   confronted in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In Ferber, the
   Court upheld a New York statute that prohibited person from knowingly
   promoting a sexual performance by a child under the age of 16 by
   distributing material which depicts such a performance. The Court
   concluded that the statute did not violate the First Amendment.
   According to the Court, the unprotected nature of the works involved
   permitted the state to prohibit the particular category of works from
   distribution, especially given the compelling state interest in
   protecting children from the harms of child pornography. 458 U.S. at
   765.

   The final inquiry this Court must make is whether the regulations
   leave open alternative channels for communication of the information
   at issue. Defendants contend that "plaintiffs are free to communicate
   any substantive message they desire, through any medium they desire,
   as long as they are not depicting actual or computer-generated
   children engaged in sexually explicit conduct." Defs.' Mem. In Supp.
   of Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 20. The Court finds this argument
   persuasive. Because plaintiffs allege that their materials are not
   produced using minor children, and that they do not market their
   materials so as to suggest that they are child pornography or to
   exploit the sexual qualities of the work as child pornography,
   plaintiffs should have no trouble conforming their activities to fit
   within the confines of the text of the CPPA or to escape the reach of
   the law altogether.

   C. Overbreadth and Vagueness

   Plaintiffs contend that the CPPA is unconstitutionally overbroad and
   vague. First, regulations that prohibit constitutionally protected
   speech as well as activity that can legitimately be prohibited are
   considered to be overbroad. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97
   (1940). Plaintiffs base their overbreadth argument on the assertion
   that the CPPA "impermissibly suppresses material that is protected
   under the First Amendment" by defining child pornography as including
   visual depictions of adults that appear to be minors. Pls.' Mem. In
   Supp. of Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 12. In doing so, plaintiffs argue,
   the CPPA "bans a wide array of sexually-explicit, non-obscene material
   that has serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value."
   Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 13. Finally, plaintiffs
   cite the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Reno v. ACLU that the
   governmental interest in protecting children "does not justify an
   unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults." 1997
   U.S. LEXIS 4037 at *54 (striking as unconstitutional two provisions of
   the Communications Decency Act of 1996 that prevent the transmission
   of "indecent" and "patently offensive" materials over the Internet).

   The Court finds that the CPPA is not overbroad. It specifies that only
   materials that do not use adults and that appear to be child
   pornography, even if they are digitally produced, are prohibited. By
   plaintiffs' own admission, plaintiffs' products do not fall into these
   categories and are also exempt under the CPPA's affirmative defense
   provisions. It is highly unlikely that the types of valuable works
   plaintiffs fear will be outlawed under the CPPA -- depictions used by
   the medical profession to treat adolescent disorders, adaptations of
   sexual works like "Romeo and Juliet," and artistically-valued drawings
   and sketches of young adults engaging in passionate behavior -- will
   be treated as "criminal contraband." As long as a work does not depict
   children, or what appears to be children, engaged in sexually explicit
   conduct as defined by the statute, and the work is not marketed as
   child pornography or in such a way that exploits its sexual nature as
   child pornography, then there is no likelihood that the work will be
   prohibited by the CPPA. The CPPA is not overbroad because it prohibits
   only those works necessary to prevent the secondary pernicious effects
   of child pornography from reaching minors.

   Plaintiffs contend that the CPPA is also unconstitutionally vague
   because it does not give a person of ordinary intelligence a
   reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act
   accordingly. Grayned v. City of Rockford 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
   However, the CPPA does exactly what the Supreme Court has required of
   child pornography legislation as set out in Ferber: it must (1)
   adequately define the prohibited conduct; (2) be limited to visual
   depictions of children below a specific age; and (3) suitably limit
   and describe the category of forbidden "sexual conduct." 458 U.S. at
   764. The CPPA clearly and specifically defines the prohibited conduct
   as the depiction of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. It
   is limited to visual depictions of minors, but simply redefines the
   term "depiction" to include images of children that were produced
   using computers or other artificial means. Finally, it suitably limits
   and describes the category of forbidden conduct. As long as the person
   portrayed in the work is an adult, and the work is not marketed or
   advertised as child pornography and does not convey the impression
   that it is child pornography, then the CPPA's affirmative defense
   applies and removes the work from the scope of its provisions. The
   Court finds that the CPPA is not unconstitutionally vague, as it gives
   sufficient guidance to a person of reasonable intelligence as to what
   it prohibits.(5)

   D. Prior Restraint

   Plaintiffs contend that the CPPA imposes a prior restraint on speech
   by enacting a complete ban on material that contains sexually-explicit
   depictions of adults who appear to be minors and by chilling the
   expression of "artists, photographers, film makers, publishers, and
   merchants" by preventing them from disseminating such depictions.
   Plaintiffs also contend that the CPPA places unbridled discretion in
   the hands of government officials and deals an unnecessarily severe
   punishment for an incorrect determination of whether or not an adult
   appears to be a minor. The Court agrees with defendants that the CPPA
   neither completely bans depictions of adults who appear to be minors
   nor punishes producers or distributors who create works in which
   adults appear who might be mistaken as minors. Indeed, the affirmative
   defense laid out in 18 U.S.C. 2252A(c) clearly permits the use of
   adults, even if they look like minors, as long as the works in which
   they appear are not marketed as child pornography. In addition "[n]o
   government official is vested with authority to permit or deny
   plaintiffs the right to produce these works, and thus the [CPPA]
   imposes no unconstitutional prior restraint on speech." Defs.' Opp. to
   Pls.' Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 17-18. The CPPA represents no more of a
   prior restraint on speech than the New York statute at issue in
   Ferber, and the CPPA comes within the rationale of the Supreme
   Court's holding in that case. Because the CPPA does not require
   advance approval for production or distribution of adult pornography
   that does not use minors, and does not effect a complete ban on
   constitutionally protected material, it does not constitute an
   improper prior restraint on speech.

   IV. CONCLUSION

   Therefore, this court finds that the CPPA meets constitutional
   standards and is therefore constitutional as written. For the
   foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is hereby
   DENIED. Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

   IT IS SO ORDERED.

   Dated: August 12, 1997.

   /s/ Samuel Conti
   United States District Judge




   1 See Am. Library Ass'n v. Barr 956 F.2d 1178, 1181-85 (D.C. Cir.
   1992) for a discussion of the history of national anti-child
   pornography legislation.

   2 Pls.' Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 1.

   3 Defendants also contend that plaintiffs lack standing because, in
   their complaint, plaintiffs allege that they do not produce the type
   of "hard-core" sexual images that would be subject to regulation by
   the CPPA. As a result, defendants argue, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate
   a real and immediate threat of injury and therefore cannot bring this
   claim. See Barr, 956 F.2d at 1187. The Court rejects this argument.
   The parameters of pornography are difficult to define, and dismissing
   plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing is not appropriate in this
   case, given the variety of the plaintiffs' products.

   4 These incidental harms include the depiction of images created
   within the imagination of the artist. If the images depicted are of
   children, albeit imaginary ones, and not of actual adults or imaginary
   people who unequivocally appear to be adults, then the evils
   associated with child pornography cannot be avoided.

   5 For examples of other cases that have upheld similarly worded child
   pornography statutes against vagueness challenges, see, e.g., U.S. v.
   Smith, 795 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032
   (1987); U.S. v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 2 Sep 1997 15:51:59 GMT
From: "ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update Owner"@newmedium.com
Subject: File 2--Court Upholds Child Pornography Prevention Act (ACLU fwd)

Source - ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, Tuesday, September 2, 1997

Free speech activists have vowed to appeal a recent decision by a
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California that
upholds the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 ("CPPA"),
calling it vague, overbroad and an impermissible prior restraint
on speech.

The lawsuit, filed by the Free Speech Coalition, which includes
free speech activists and producers and distributors of
"adult-oriented materials," was a pre-enforcement challenge to the
CPPA which argued that the law is so broadly worded that it covers
any picture in which an adult portrays a minor engaged in sexual
activity.  The CPPA applies to computer-generated images as well
as films and photographs and bans any visual depiction that "is,
or appears to be, of a minor engaged in sexually explicit
conduct."

In his decision, U.S. District Judge Samuel Conti rejected claims
that the CPPA is content based and stated that the law was passed
to prevent "secondary effects" of the child pornography industry.

"The court finds that the CPPA is designed to counteract the
effect that such materials has on its viewers, on children, and to
society as a whole, and is not intended to regulate or outlaw the
ideas themselves.  If child pornography is targeted by the
regulation, it is due to the effect of the pornography on innocent
children, not to the nature of the materials themselves,
especially if that pornography contains computer generated images
of children."

The opinion states that "[e]ven if no children are involved in the
production of sexually explicit materials, the devastating ...
effect that such materials have on society and the well-being of
children merits the regulation of such images."

However, Ann Brick, a staff attorney for the ACLU of Northern
California contended, "This is not a law about using real kids to
make pornography.  It's a law that wants to put off-limits the
subject of teenagers engaging in sex --- regardless of whether
real minors are used in the portrayal."

Brick added that Congress did not merely ban computer-generated
images of children in sexual activities, but also declared that it
was "illegal to use young-looking adults if we don't like the way
you marketed it."

She said the rationale used by Congress and Conti -- that the
images would help molesters recruit young victims -- could ban all
"literature that describes sex in a way that makes it seem
beautiful."

In a supporting brief, the American Civil Liberties Union and
others said the vagueness of the law was particularly dangerous in
light of a recent court ruling applying the previous child
pornography ban to sexually suggestive pictures of fully clad
minors.  However, Judge Conti's opinion claims that any ambiguity
of the laws application "can be resolved by examining whether the
work was marketed and advertised as child pornography."

Full text of this decision is available at the Free Speech
Coalition Site at <http://www.freeexpression.org>

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 14 Aug 1997 12:47:29 -0800
From: "--Todd Lappin-->" <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 3--Wired News on Child Porn Act Decision

Source -  [e-mail]

http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/6012.html


Activists Down on Child Porn Act Decision

by Ashley Craddock
5:06am  13.Aug.97.PDT

Free-speech activists said they
would appeal a San Francisco judge's decision to uphold the
1996 Child Pornography Protection Act, a ruling they
called ridiculous. The court on Tuesday rejected arguments
that a new federal definition of pornography created an
overbroad and unconstitutional prior restraint on content.

"The court totally ignored the fact that this law creates a
whole new unprotected category of speech - non-obscene
depictions of what only appear to be minors engaged in
sexual activity," said William Bennett Turner, a First
Amendment specialist in San Francisco who, in conjunction
with the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a brief
arguing that the Child Pornography Protection Act was
unconstitutionally vague. "It galls me that the court ruled
that the law is content-neutral."

"Anyone who's concerned about the First Amendment should
find this ruling scary," said Louis Sirkin, who originally
filed suit on behalf of the Free Speech Coalition, a group of
more than 600 producers and distributors of
adult-oriented materials. Sirkin was denied the chance to
argue his case in court when US District Court Judge
Samuel Conti last week canceled a hearing on the matter in
favor of perusing both sides' briefs in the comfort of his
chambers. He will appeal the decision today.

In his original brief, Sirkin argued that the 1996 law,
which bans visual depictions that are or appear to be "of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct," is so broad that
it could criminalize the manufacture or possession of any
movie - think Lolita or Romeo and Juliet - in which a
body double is used to depict a minor involved in sexual
activity.

In Tuesday's decision, however, Conti rejected that
argument outright, finding that the child-porn act merely
attempts to limit the consequences of pseudo-child-smut.
"Even if no children are involved in the production of
sexually explicit materials, the devastating ... effect that
such materials have on society and the well-being of
children merits the regulation of such images," Conti wrote.

While well-intentioned, that judgment, says Ann Brick, a
staff attorney with the Northern California ACLU, is
completely inconsistent with the Supreme Court's definition
of content-based regulation. "Over and over again, the court
has ruled that banning speech because of its potential
secondary affect on listeners is an unconstitutional
restraint on content."

"I mean, if your argument is, 'It's illegal because it might
make someone want to go out and have sex with kids,' where
do you draw the line? What about books that describe sex
with kids? What about movies that depict adults having
sex? What about sexy drawings and paintings?"

According to a brief filed by government attorneys, part of
the Child Pornography Protection Act's explicit aim was, in
fact, to move that line forward and address the digital-age
problem of technologically manufactured juvi porn.

But that argument is ridiculous, contend Turner and Brick.
"There is a real difference between touching children
sexually and touching computer keys to create images: The
former is wrong in itself and within the power of
government to prohibit; but there is nothing inherently
wrongful about using either a computer or adults to create
sexually explicit images," argued the ACLU brief.

Copyright  1993-97 Wired Ventures Inc. and affiliated
companies.
All rights reserved.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 29 Jul 1997 10:03:46 -0700 (PDT)
From: Declan McCullagh <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 4--Boylovers, NAMBLA, and Net-vigilantes, from The Netly News

((MODERATORS' NOTE: Some of the best Net-related discussions and
information come from Declan McCullah's fight-censorship
discussion group. In this issue, we include a few items from his
list related to "net porn."))

Source -  [e-mail]

-----

http://pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1222,00.html

The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/)
July 29, 1997

This Boy-Lover's Life
by Declan McCullagh ([e-mail])

        Anne Cox is nothing if not determined. For months the
   Net-vigilante has been unwavering in her crusade against pedophiles,
   undaunted by insults, threats and even the "horrible things" done to
   pictures of her as a baby that she had digitized and placed online.
   She fought back with just about every possible tactic: argument,
   public humiliation and sometimes-spurious threats of legal action.

        Now, the war is escalating.

        It started in May, after Cox launched an assault on "boy-lover"
   web sites in an attempt to force them offline. But she and her allies
   ran into a serious obstacle: the sites aren't illegal. They're filled
   not with child pornography -- which is banned by federal law -- but,
   instead, photos of boys in swimsuits. "They shouldn't be doing these
   things with the children's pictures," Cox says.

[...]

        Some argue that Cox and her allies have gone too far. Besides
   boy-pix sites, this team of Net-vigilantes has attacked a group of gay
   teens organizing "to fight against" discrimination. They've tried to
   take down a consensual spanking page for gay adults, and even an
   archive of sexually-explicit stories that specifically rejects tales
   about pedophilia. Then there's the murky Children's Protection and
   Advocacy Coalition, which Cox claims to run -- yet she refuses to name
   its member organizations.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
From: CuD Moderators <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)

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End of Computer Underground Digest #9.67
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