The Hacker's Encyclopedia 1998/hackers_encyclopedia.iso/zines/cud/cud685.txt

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Computer underground Digest    Wed  Sep 28, 1994   Volume 6 : Issue 85
                           ISSN  1004-042X

       Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer ([e-mail])
       Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
       Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
       Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
                          Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
                          Ian Dickinson
       Urban Legend Editor:  E. Greg Shrdlugold

CONTENTS, #6.85 (Wed, Sep 28, 1994)

File 1--"Green Card Lawyers" Threaten T-Shirt Maker
File 2--ACLU letter and release on FBI Wiretap bill
File 3--Internet Security Seminar (Nov 12 '94)
File 4--Police, Press, and Porn in Toronto
File 5--Canadian BBS Sysops Plead Guilty to "Piracy"
File 6--PHRACK hardcopies available from SotMESC / GCMS
File 7--ACLU Gopher
File 8--Telecommunication Reform Bill (S. 1822) DEAD!
File 9--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged)

CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Tue, 20 Sep 1994 16:42:43 -0400
From: [e-mail](eye WEEKLY)
Subject: File 1--"Green Card Lawyers" Threaten T-Shirt Maker


Toronto's arts newspaper                      .....free every Thursday
                         ===================
EYE NET                                                        EYE NET

                        ALL HAIL THE CHIC GEEK!
           Scum-sucking weasel lawyers as fashion statements

                                  by
                             K.K. CAMPBELL


Coupla weeks ago, eye Net reported how North Carolina university
student Joel Furr ([e-mail]) designed a popular
collectible -- T-shirts about net.poltergeist "Serdar Argic." Furr
promised to follow-up with a T-shirt featuring Arizona lawyers
Laurence Canter and Martha Siegel.

On June 18, eye Net reported how this wife-and-hubby law team sent
an ad for the American "Green Card lottery" to thousands of
newsgroups (win a work permit raffle run by the U.S. government;
C&S offered to fill in a few forms for merely hundreds of dollars).
This posting tactic is called "spamming." C&S did it twice.

Spammers are loathed. Commercial spammers are loathed more.
Snotty lawyer commercial spammers attain monumental loathing. So
'twas no surprise C&S were mailbombed into oblivion after each
spam attack against Usenet. Both times, the lawyer's Internet
providers terminated their account after a global deluge of
complaints.

The legal weasels squealed in anger and threatened to sue their
Internet providers. But nothing came of it.

Now they've threatened to sue Furr over his little non-profit T-shirt
featuring the net.vermin. Shirt design features a four-color logo of a
hand clutching a green card bursting forth from a globe. Around it:
"The Green Card Lawyers -- Spamming the Globe."

On Aug. 8, Furr publicly announced C&S had sent him private email, a
standard nasty-lawyer letter. C&S asserted the "use of their names,
likenesses or nickname is prohibited" -- meaning he couldn't even
call them, "The Green Card Lawyers." Furthermore, Furr was
informed "several large companies" had contacted the lawyers about
a line of C&S T-shirts and Furr's plan to sell maybe 10 dozen shirts
"would hurt their marketability."

A clarification: Furr's shirt mocks C&S -- who the hell would wear
it, let alone buy it, otherwise? The claim that "several large
companies" are considering issuing a friendly C&S shirt is a source
of much mirth and merriment about Planet Earth.

Furr knew C&S was fullashit -- indeed, most of Usenet-reading
Planet Earth is sure they're fullashit -- but, being a student, he
knew he'd neither the time nor resources to fight a nuisance suit.
Thus he concluded his Aug. 8 public post: "I think I have lots and lots
of legal legs to stand on, but I can't afford to fight a lawsuit." The
term "Green Card Lawyers" would be removed from the shirt.

But Furr's mailbox soon brimmed with offers of legal assistance,
even monetary help -- anything to thwart the most hated husband-
wife team in Usenet history. (And Canter has said several times he's
going to write a book about how to advertise on the net!)

Electronic Frontier Foundation's chief legal counsel Mike Godwin
([e-mail]) advised Furr C&S "threats" were impotent bluster,
Furr told eye in a telephone interview, because 1) C&S are not members
of the Arizona bar; 2) they are under investigation by the Tennessee
bar; 3) they can sue only in the state in which Furr does business; and
4) they have no trademark over the term "Green Card Lawyers."

This last means that just because Usenetters call C&S the "Green
Card Lawyers" doesn't grant them a trademark on the term. For
instance, eye calls them the "Two-Bit, Suck-My-Left-Nut Lawyers"
-- Martha and Larry don't own that name either.

Bottomline: Furr's going ahead with the original design.

"Green Card Lawyers" T-shirts are $11 U.S. -- XXL $1 more, XXXL $2
more. Canadians add $1. Write Furr for more details. To join the
net.collectibles mailing list, send email with the message
"subscribe netstuff" (without the quotes) to
[e-mail] . For the latest on the net.vermin, read
alt.flame.canter-and-siegel .

                             ===========
Retransmit freely in cyberspace        Author holds standard copyright
Full issue of eye available in archive ==> gopher.io.org or ftp.io.org
Mailing list available                           http://www.io.org/eye

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 26 Sep 1994 17:57:50 -0400
From: ACLU Information <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 2--ACLU letter and release on FBI Wiretap bill

     ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU * ACLU
      NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE * NEWS RELEASE

ACLU Opposes FBI Wiretap Access Bill;
Legislation Would Create Dangerous Precedent

For IMMEDIATE RELEASE
September 26, 1994

Contact: Barry Steinhardt
         BarryS @ aclu.org
         or Kathy Parrent, 212-944-9800, ext. 424


The American Civil Liberties Union today called on the House
Judiciary Committee to reject the FBI Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922,
which would require private electronics manufacturers to insure that the
FBI can wiretap using developing telecommunications technologies.

In a letter sent to Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee, the ACLU stated that the bill "... creates a
dangerous and unprecedented presumption that government not only has the
power, subject to warrant to intercept private communications, but that it
can require private parties to create special access. It is as if the
government had required all builders to construct new housing with an
internal surveillance camera for government use."

"Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such an
extraordinary requirement is necessary..." the letter said.

A copy of the full letter with the ACLU's detailed objections
follows.
___________________________________________________________________________

September 22, 1994




Honorable Jack Brooks
Congressman, State of Texas
2449 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4309

Dear Congressman Brooks:

We are writing to you to express the ACLU's opposition to the
FBI-Wiretap Access Bill, H.R. 4922.  While we were not actively involved
in Subcommittee deliberations, we have reviewed the legislation and we
have several major concerns.

The principal problem remains that any digital telephone bill
which mandates that communications providers make technological changes
for the sole purpose of making their systems wiretap-ready creates a
dangerous and unprecedented presumption that government not only has the
power, subject to warrant, to intercept private communications, but that
it can require private parties to create special access.  It is as if the
government had required all builders to construct new housing with an
internal surveillance camera for government use.  Even if such use were
triggered only by a judicial warrant, such a requirement would be strongly
resisted by the American people.  H.R. 4922 establishes a similar
requirement, and is without precedent.

Moreover, the FBI has not borne the burden of proving why such an
extraordinary requirement is necessary.  In 1993, there were fewer than
1,000 wiretaps authorized and many of them failed to yield any substantive
evidence while intercepting many innocent conversations.  It is far from
clear that digital telephones will substantially obstruct legitimate law
enforcement efforts.  Without further public discussion and debate, the
public will not have a sufficient opportunity to weigh the loss of privacy
against the FBI's claims.  There has been no opportunity to learn the full
extent of the types of investigations that the FBI claims were precluded
because of a restriction on their public dissemination.  Yet, based on
these secret assertions, 91 such incidents were cited by the FBI.  On
those slim assertions, the public's loss of privacy in digital
communications is all but assured and taxpayers will be asked to pay an
extraordinary price.

H.R. 4922 authorizes $500 million over the next four years to
reimburse telecommunications carriers for the costs that would be imposed
by the bill. Even if you accept these cost estimates -- the industry puts
the real cost in the billions -- we will spending $125 million or $125,000
per wiretap, for the fewer than 1,000 taps that will be conducted each
year.

As you know, the ACLU has the greatest respect for Congressman
Edwards and Senator Leahy. Both have been tireless champions for civil
liberties. The Edwards/Leahy proposal is an improvement over earlier
versions offered by the FBI and we applaud their efforts to add new
privacy protections.

The proposed expansion of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act to cordless phones and the requirement that a court order be obtained
for transactional data from electronic communication providers both are
steps forward and merit separate consideration by the Congress.  But they
cannot and should not be traded for the unprecedented intrusion
represented by H.R. 4922.

In several respects, H.R. 4922 is still too broad in its
application.

For example, earlier versions of the bill would have applied
directly to on-line communication and information services such as
internet providers, America On Line, Compuserve, Prodigy etc. H.R. 4922
would apply directly only to "telecommunications carriers" such as the
Regional Bell Operating Companies.

But this provision does not narrow the scope of the bill as much
as it might seem. First, with the new presumption that the government is
entitled to require private manufacturers to insure its ability to
wiretap, law enforcement will undoubtedly be back in future years
insisting that this limitation thwarts its efforts and will seek to
broaden the coverage to other information providers.  Once the basic
principle of H.R. 4922 is accepted, what arguments remain to resist its
expansion.  The limited application of H.R. 4922 is surely temporary; what
matters is the basic requirement, not its immediate application.

More importantly, law enforcement will still have the opportunity
to intercept on-line communications over the internet or commercial
on-line networks, by tapping into the facilities of the telecommunications
companies. As critics of the earlier versions had noted the coverage of
the on-line providers was largely redundant.  All these communications
still pass over telephone lines.

Law enforcement does not need access at every point in a
telecommunication in order to intercept it. Access at any one point is
sufficient and that would be readily available since ultimately on-line
communications must travel over the public switched telephone network
which the bill requires be wiretap ready.

Moreover, given the commingled nature of digital communication
lines, it is inevitable that more private information from third parties
will be intercepted than would be the case with analog phones, and the
minimization requirements in the bill will not prevent this.

In the end, this proposal will make our telecommunications
structure more, not less vulnerable.

In its original form the FBI Digital Telephony proposal would have
given the power to the Attorney General to impose standards on
communication providers which would guarantee that their systems were
wiretap-ready.

Essentially, this would have created a centralized wiretapping
system that threatened the privacy of the entire nation and was dependent
for its security on a few select people.

This raised the real concern that if electronic communications
service providers must design their systems to allow and ensure FBI
access, then the resulting mandatory "back doors" may become known to and
be exploited by "criminals."

The new proposal contains the same risks. It would have the
technical standards developed by the industry, through trade associations
or standard-setting bodies, in consultation with the Attorney General.
But it contains a "safe harbor" provision, which protects a carrier from
sanction if it is in compliance with standards created by this approach.

The safe harbor provision virtually guarantees that the standards
developed through the industry-based process will be adopted by all.
Whether the standards are directly imposed by government or created by
concerted industry action, in consultation with the government, makes
little difference. The result is the same.  A centralized wiretapping
capacity with all of its vulnerabilities will still be created.

Finally, we have grave concerns about the encryption provisions.
The Edwards/Leahy version has been described as "neutral" on encryption.
The bill provides that telecommunications providers do not need to decrypt
data, unless they hold the key.

In the short term, this is an improvement over the earlier
versions of the bill which would have created obligations to decrypt, but
there are at least two longer term problems.

First, is the new presumption that industry has the affirmative
responsibility to create special technical capacity for the government to
snoop. Can there be any real doubt that the FBI will be back in the years
to come asserting that its ability to intercept communications has been
thwarted by easily available encryption and that an industry obligation,
analogous to the new obligation to provide wiretap capacity, must be
created.

Secondly, in some cases the telecommunications providers may well
hold the key -- particularly as they expand the services they provide to
their customers.

H.R. 4922 proposes a radical and expensive change in our
telecommunications structure.  The threats it poses, now and
prospectively, are real, but the need for it far less than evident or
proven. We urge that your Committee not rush into consideration of this
far reaching measure with so little time left in the session.

We thank you for your consideration of our views and we would be
happy to sit down with you to discuss these issues.

Sincerely,

Ira Glasser                                   Laura Murphy Lee

                        =====================

The ACLU urges interested persons to contact the following members of
Congress immediately:

Rep. Jack BrooksSen. Howard Metzenbaum
[phone] (voice)[phone] (voice)
[phone] (fax)[phone] (fax)

=============================================================

ACLU Free Reading Room  |  American Civil Liberties Union
gopher://aclu.org:6601  | 132 W. 43rd Street, NY, NY 10036
mailto:[e-mail]|    "Eternal vigilance is the
ftp://aclu.org          |         price of liberty"

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Sep 1994 08:35:44 GMT
From: [e-mail](Scott Corcoran)
Subject: File 3--Internet Security Seminar (Nov 12 '94)

                         INTERNET SECURITY
             SECURE COMMUNICATIONS OVER UNTRUSTED NETWORKS

               A one-day seminar on November 12, 1994
           Embarcadero Hyatt Regency Hotel in San Francisco.


Methods of achieving authentication, authorization,
confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation are key to the
successful realization of the National Information
Infrastructure (NII).  Today's Internet is a proving ground for
what will become the NII.

The San Francisco Chapter of the IEEE Computer Society has put
together an outstanding program on encryption, intrusion
detection, firewalls, architectures, and protocols for Internet
Security.  Speakers in this seminar will describe several of
the main techniques that exist today and the directions in
which they are evolving.  The seminar will be helpful to
engineers, engineering managers and product planners seeking
current knowledge of Internet Security.


PROGRAM

8:30 a.m.  Registration opens

9:00 a.m.  Introduction

9:05 a.m.  Keynote Address James Bidzos, President of RSA

9:45 a.m.  Steven Bellovin, Ph.D., Bell Labs
           "Firewalls for Computer Security"

11:00 a.m. Teresa Lunt, SRI
           "Intrusion Detection"

11:45 a.m.  Round Table Lunch (incl. with registration)

1:00 p.m.  Professor Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Stanford
           "Cryptography: The Foundation of Secure Networks"

2:00 p.m.  Dan Nessett, Ph.D.,
           SunSoft and PSRG
           "Future Internet Security Architecture"

3:00 p.m.  Matt Blaze, Ph.D., Bell Labs
           "Protocols: Security Without Firewalls"

4:00 p.m.  "Public Safety vs. Private Liberty"
           A Panel Discussion on the Social
           Implications of Internet Security
           Rex Buddenberg        NPS
           Alan McDonald         FBI
           Stewart Baker         formerly of the NSA
           James Bidzos          President of RSA
           Matt Blaze            Bell Labs
           Martin Hellman        Stanford


A one day seminar in San Francisco, on Saturday, November 12th,
covering private and public-key encryption, key-escrow,
fire-walls, architecture and protocols for security,
intrustion detection, and a spirited panel discussion on
"Public Safety vs. Private Liberty" !

SEATING IS LIMITED. PRE-REGISTER BY OCTOBER 15TH.


9:05  Keynote Address

James  Bidzos,  President of  RSA

James Bidzos, President of RSA Data Security, will present the
keynote address.  Mr. Bidzos heads a company whose encryption
technologies are licensed for products ranging from computer
operating systems, to software copy protection, to electronic
mail, to secure telephones.  RSA has licensed several million
copies of its encryption software, and has become a focal point
for debate on appropriate application of cryptography.

Mr. Bidzos has gained a unique perspective on the requirements
of effective cryptographic systems.  He will highlight the
problem of providing strong encryption for users of computer
networks while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement


9:45  Steven Bellovin,  Ph.D.,  Bell  Labs
      "Firewalls for Computer Security"

When you connect your computer to the Internet, you also create
a channel into your computer.  Clever vandals, thieves and
industrial spies have found ways to abuse most of the Internet
protocols from FTP and Telnet to the World Wide Web and
Network Time Protocols.  Short of pulling the plug, firewalls
provide the surest defense.  The firewall administrator must
keep abreast of new methods of attack and understand how
firewalls can mitigate the threat. Steven M. Bellovin, Ph.D.,
is a senior researcher at AT&T's Bell Laboratories and
co-author of the well known guide "Firewalls and Internet
Security:  Repelling the Wily Hacker."  As one responsible for
protecting "the phone company" from Internet hackers, Dr. Bellovin
can describe from firsthand experience how firewalls can be
constructed to screen them out.  Dr. Bellovin will join us in a
live video teleconference from Bell Laboratories.

11:00  Teresa  Lunt,  SRI "Intrusion Detection"

Inevitably, someone will try to breach your firewall and might
succeed.  The time it takes you to discover the intrusion and
catch the culprit depends on the event logging you have
established.  However, logging the many different transactions
that might expose trespassing produces mountains of data.
Automatic digestion of the logs is the only hope of monitoring
them all. Teresa F. Lunt, Director of Secure Systems Research
at SRI's Computer Systems Laboratory, directs work in
multilevel database systems and intrusion detection.  Ms. Lunt
will describe intrusion detection and demonstrate automated
tools developed at SRI to analyze audit data for suspicious
behavior.

1:00 Professor  Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Stanford
"Cryptography: The Foundation of Secure  Networks"

Data in transit across unsecured networks like the Internet
are subject to wiretapping attacks and impersonation.
Moreover, privacy of communication and authentication of the
sender's message are essential to Internet commerce, with
exchange of contracts, receipts, credit card drafts and the
like increasingly commonplace. Encryption can solve some of
these problems, but what kind of encryption?  Authentication
only or encrypted messages?  Secret key or public key, or
both?  Will you need a giant key ring for mes sage keys,
session keys, file keys, and passwords?  Martin E. Hellman,
Ph.D., Professor of Electrical Engineering at Stanford
University, is co-inventor of public key cryptography with
Whitfield Diffie and Ralph Merkle.  He was elected a Fellow of
the IEEE for contributions to cryptography.  Dr. Hellman will
explore threats to communication and costs of electronic
countermeasures.  He will explain the importance and means of
authenticating electronic messages, and he will survey public key
cryptography.  Dr. Hellman will describe public key techniques
including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal
and Digital Signature  Standard (DSS).  He will also describe
the current status of export control and encryption standards
such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Escrowed
Encryption Standard (EES) and its encryption algorithm,
Skipjack, which is implemented in Clipper and Capstone chips.

2:00 Dan Nessett, Ph.D., SunSoft and PSRG
    "Future Internet Security Architecture"

Dan Nessett, Ph.D., of the SunSoft Division of Sun
Microsystems, and until recently with Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, has worked extensively in local area
networks, distributed operating systems and distributed systems
security.  He is a member of the Privacy and Security Research
Group (PSRG), which is convened under the auspices of the
Internet Society.  Dr. Nessett will explain the emerging
Internet security architecture work undertaken by the PSRG.
The architecture will guide the development of security
mechanisms used in Internet standards.


3:00 Matt Blaze, Ph.D., Bell Labs
     "Protocols: Security Without Firewalls"

We use firewalls because Internet protocols are not inherently
secure.  Can we rehabilitate the Internet protocols to produce
protocols which are secure, not computationally prohibitive,
and compatible with existing protocols?  Matt Blaze, Ph.D., of
Bell Laboratories will talk about the problems of integrating
cryptographic protection into large-scale network infrastructure.
Dr. Blaze is the author of "A Cryptographic
File System for Unix," presented at the 1993 ACM Conference on
Communications and Computer Security, and co-author with John
Ioann idis of "The Architecture and Implementation of
Network-Layer Security Under UNIX," which describes "swIPe," a
network-layer security protocol for the IP protocol suite.
Dr. Blaze will address issues concerning network security
protoc ols, key management and distribution, and threats and
models for cryptographic engineering.

4:00  A Panel Discussion on the Social Implications of
Internet Security "Public Safety vs. Private Liberty"

At one end of an imagined security spectrum lies the
information police-state. Through traffic analysis,
mandatory personal ID numbers and escrowed encryption, and
the ability to record all messages and commerce carried out
on the Information Superhighway, governments could maintain
dossiers on every aspect of the personal life and business
of its citizens.  Privacy advocates fear that a corrupt government
could use such information against its political enemies and to
subvert personal freedoms. At the other extreme lies information
anarchy. Through the use of digital cash, anonymous remailers,
and strong non-escrowed encryption, the Information
Superhighway could become a hide-out for criminals and
national security threats.  The potential for black-market
activity and the associated tax-evasion is so enormous that
some have speculated that governments could eventually
collapse.  Law-enforcem ent advocates fear that they will be
unable to keep up with criminals and terrorists who ply their
trade electronically.  Our distinguished panel will provide
insight into the interplay between the rights of individuals
to privacy and freedom, the rights of companies to conduct
unrestrained trade, and the ability of law enforcement and
security agencies to perform their functions efficiently.
This conclusion to the seminar will put into perspective
the social changes that might be wrought by the technical
advances discussed earlier in the day.

Panelists include:

           Rex Buddenberg        NPS
           Alan McDonald         FBI
           Stewart Baker         formerly of the NSA
           James Bidzos          President of RSA
           Matt Blaze            Bell Labs
           Martin Hellman        Stanford

Rex Buddenberg, Instructor of information systems architecture
and applied networking at the Naval Postgraduate School, will
moderate the panel.  Mr. Buddenberg is a maritime command,
communication, control and intelligence (C3I) consultant and a
computer networking author.  As a C3I architect for the U.S.
Coast Guard, he developed plans and specifications for
extending Internet connectivity to oceanographic ships.  Mr.
Buddenberg contemplates the means and effects of net warfare as
both the good guys and bad guys share the same network.

Alan McDonald, Special Counsel for Electronic Surveillance Matters,
Information Resources Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
is a specialist in the law and policy concerning electronic
surveillance, Digital Telephony, and encryption issues.
He frequently represents the FBI's view of law enforcement equities
in light of advanced telecommunications and encryption.

Stewart Baker is a former General Counsel to the NSA and
a partner in Steptoe & Johnson, a Washington, DC law firm.
His expertise is in telecommunications, computer export policy,
security of national information infrastructure and encryption.
Mr. Baker brings direct experience with the problem that strong
encryption creates for the NSA in protecting our national
security.


QUESTIONS? CALL (415)-327-6622.

Cut-off and complete this form, enclose your check payable to
the IEEE SFCS,  and mail to:  IEEE Council Office 701 Welch
Rd. #2205 Palo Alto, CA. 94304

To qualify for the reduced Pre-registration fees, your
application with check must be postmarked no later than Oct.
15, 1994.  Registration fee includes lunch, refreshments, and
parking.  Seating is limited. To make sure the seminar is
not sold out, call [phone].

please check the appropriate box

Fees on or before Oct. 15th:

___ IEEE Member   $ 110
___ Non-member    $ 120
___ Student       $  85

Fees after Oct. 15th:
___ IEEE Member    $ 125
___ Non-member     $ 145
___ Student        $ 100 (students must present ID)


The seminar location is the Hyatt Regency Embarcadero Hotel,
near the Ferry Building, in San Francisco.
Your registration fee includes the all day seminar, lunch,
and convenient parking in the garages underneath adjacent
Embarcadero  Centers 1, 2, or 3.  (Keep your ticket for validation).


Please print clearly:

Name   : __________________________________________

Title  : __________________________________________

Company: __________________________________________

Address: __________________________________________

         __________________________________________

         _______________________________ ___ ______

Day phone #:(___)_____-_______

IEEE member (or affiliate) #:_______ ____ (for discount)

College/University (if student):___________________

___ Vegetarian lunch option


Refunds will be honored through October 22nd, substitutions
any time.  Additional information can be obtained by telephoning
the IEEE Bay Area Council Office: [phone].

IEEE SFCS RESERVES THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES TO THE SEMINAR

Sponsored by the San Francisco Chapter of the IEEE Computer
Society. The IEEE is a non-profit organization.

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 25 Sep 1994 20:28:58 -0400
From: [e-mail](eye WEEKLY)
Subject: File 4--Police, Press, and Porn in Toronto


                     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
eye WEEKLY                                           September 22 1994
Toronto's arts newspaper                      .....free every Thursday
                     ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
EYE NET                                                        EYE NET

                  PRESS, POLICE AND PORN REVISITED

                                  by
                             K.K. CAMPBELL


Once again, the news media finds itself being used to misrepresent
the nature of the net for the Big Story about the 3Ps -- Pedophilia,
Pornography or Piracy.

On Sept. 13, CITY-TV's CityPulse News did a story about "Mr.
Concerned Citizen," who is worried children can access hardcore
porn on the net through a system called called Interlog. Mr.
Concerned Citizen is Bruce Lloyd of Agincourt, who filed a complaint
with Metro Police Chief William McCormack against Interlog.

We also met Interlog owner Matt Harrop ([e-mail]), a
19-year-old with dyed-purple hair. It's the sort of juxtaposition of
images that the camera loves: Mr. Concerned-Citizen-Who-Loves-
Children versus Freaky-Haired Porn-Peddler.

But that's not quite the whole story.

It turns out Lloyd is himself a writer of copious vile material. Lloyd
had not counted on some elements of the news media discovering his
net.history. (Joe Baptista, a friend of Lloyd's, similarly suckered
CITY news in January with the fake story that the Ontario
government computers held banned Karla Homolka newstories in
them.)

In fact, as this column will demonstrate, Lloyd's complaint issues
from a personal vendetta against Harrop.

Sysadmins, take note.

                           LLOYD IN ACTION

Let's review some of Lloyd's posting habits. It all seems to have
started around Aug. 21, when Lloyd entered into a flamewar with
rabid homophobe Chuck Whealton ([e-mail]).

* Lloyd began mailbombing Whealton's site, a definite no-no.

* Lloyd soon claimed he'd found out where Whealton lives and that he
and friends would drive down to Delaware and gang rape Whealton: "I
can't wait to have sex with him ... maybe we could do it at the same
time! I bet he's never had two guys up his ass at once before!"

* Lloyd has the curious distinction of being even more hated by most
online gays than brain-dead homophobes like Whealton. Quotes from
his public posts afford a glimpse into why. Lloyd wrote some
interesting posts to lesbian netters: "You just can't leave me alone
... Enjoy being a failure, Cuntlicker." "Perchance a rigorous butt-fuck
is what you need to loosen up, Cuntrag?"

In a phone interview, Lloyd admitted to eye he wrote these remarks
-- in fact, he giggled when admitting to them. "Well, you know, I
was trying to be insulting."

* His interest in protecting children from porn is also clear from
this Usenet post: "I love straight fuckers like this. What they really
need is to have their dicks tied up in leather straps and then have
needles pierced right through them."

* On the "pornography" front, Lloyd sent a very detailed post called
"How To Suck A Penis" to newsgroups accessible by children. (He did
not write it, just distributed it.)

"If Mr. Lloyd is so concerned about children being allowed on this
network, why was he contributing his own obscene material?" asks
Ken Weaverling ([e-mail]), manager of computer services at
Stanton/Wilmington Campuses of Delaware Technical & Community
College -- the site that has Whealton as a user.

For a fuller archive of Lloyd's public Usenet posts, use anonymous
FTP to hopi.dtcc.edu in directory ~ftp/interlog.

To experienced netters, these quotes from Lloyd's net.writings
aren't that shocking and are dismissed as immature attempts to
shock. They are really just his way of "turning up the heat" in this
medium.

But they become important to prove Lloyd's motives when he lays a
complaint with the chief of police.

                          HARROP IN ACTION

Other netters had long been complaining about Lloyd to sysadmin
Harrop. After the rape threat, Harrop asked Lloyd to tone it down.

"I informed him his account would be terminated if he kept it up,"
Harrop said. "At this point, he attempted to blackmail me. He said
he'd go to the police with obscenity charges against Interlog if he
was removed."

Reading that, Harrop said enough was enough and wrote Lloyd email
that his account was history.

Lloyd was permitted a farewell letter, which Harrop would use as
proof Lloyd had read the termination notice. It begins: "Matt, I'll let
you know that you've pissed me off. You've wasted a lot of your time
and energy on nothing. I encouraged a lot of people to use your
system. Now, they will not. I am very sorry, Matt, it sounds like you
are going to lose a lot more than just me as a user. You are also
going to lose Apple as a customer."

(When eye called Apple, a spokesperson emphatically denied that
Lloyd is an actual Apple employee. He is a subcontracted phone-tech
support staffer -- he answers questions from Mac users who forget
where the "on" switch is.)

Lloyd again made the police threat: "I might mention that I am
thinking of going to the police anyway. You are carrying highly
illegal material on your system. Pornographic and obscene material.
You are directly responsible for this."

The next day (Sept. 13), Lloyd faxed media a release entitled "Metro
Police To Investigate Obscenity Charges Against Toronto Internet
Service Provider" -- before the police had even read the complaint.

Lloyd told eye it's strictly coincidence his complaint came the day
after he was kicked off Interlog. Most netters don't buy Lloyd's story
for a second. But they worry that unless press and/or police get
savvy to how the Internet works, anyone with a grudge will be able
to do what Lloyd did.

Meanwhile, the real victim in all this is business owner Matt Harrop
and Interlog, portrayed by a gullible mainstream media outlet as
purveyors of porn to children.


               ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Press Release

For More Information, Call:

Bruce Lloyd
Telephone:  [phone]

METRO POLICE TO INVESTIGATE OBSCENITY CHARGES AGAINST
TORONTO INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER

   Metropolitan Toronto Police have been asked to investigate obscenity
charges against INTERLOG INTERNET SERVICES, and Internet service
provider operating from 1235 Bay Street, Suite 400, Toronto. (A copy of
the complaint to Metro Police is attached).

   The complain stems from my discovery of obscene materials on the
computer system of Interlog.  The materials include:  sexually graphic
texts, pictures involving bestiality, and other pictures showing both
women and men in degrading and obscene activity.  Such material would
clearly be in contravention of Canadian law.

   The obscene material in question is distributed via the Internet:  A
world-wide computer network, often referred to as "The Information
Superhighway".  The material is received by Interlog, from computer
users around the world, and held on a hard disk drive at the Bay Street
address.

   Anyone willing to pay Interlog9s membership fee of $22.50/month can
access the information.  Of particular concern is the fact that
children have full access to this information -- As Interlog requires
no proof of age or identification when registering.

   This will be an interesting case in law:  The decision of Metro
Police and the Crown Attorney to pursue or not to pursue charges in
this matter, will have repercussions for Ontarian's with regard to what
information they will be able to access, in the future, on the
Information Superhighway.  Further, the actions of the authorities in
this matter may help establish the status of Internet Service Providers
as "common carriers" (like Canada Post or Bell Canada), or not.

*  *  *  *  *

September 13, 1994

FAX

Chief William McCormack
Metropolitan Toronto Police
40 College Street
Toronto, ON

Dear Chief McCormack:

Please accept this correspondence as my official request for you to
commence an investigation into the operations and practices of Interlog
Internet Services (Interlog).  Interlog is an Internet service
provider, operated from 1235 Bay Street, Suite 400, Toronto, (416)
975.2655 (voice), [phone] (fax), [phone] (data) my Mr.
Matt Harrop.

As you may be aware, the Internet is a world-wide computer network.  At
present, approximately 20 million people have some form of access to
the Internet; and approximately 300,000 information databases are
available to users.  Part of the Internet consists of Usenet.  Usenet
is a forum of "newsgroups", which provide for the exchange of
information on a variety of topic specific areas.  Of particular
concern to me, in relation to this complain, are the
"alt.binaries.pictures" hierarchy of newsgroups.  One of these
newsgroups is "alt.pictures.binaries.tasteless".  In this newsgroups, I
have found pictures which I consider to be pornographic and obscene,
and in contravention of Canadian Law.

Interlog Internet Services provides access to these newsgroups to
anyone who is willing to pay their fee of $22.50/month.  The procedure
for obtaining an account with Interlog consists of mailing a cheque
along with a completed and signed registration form.  I have attached
copy of the registration form, for your information.  You will notice
that it is not necessary to submit identification with this form:
This, I am further concerned by the fact that children could easily
register and access the obscene material contained in
alt.binaries.pictures.tasteless.

The information contained in alt.binaries.pictures.tasteless, and other
newsgroups (including ones dealing with the Homolka publication ban,
and many sexually explicit groups), is downloaded by Mr. Harrop of
Interlog.  It is then held on his computer system, and accessed by his
registered users.

Chief McCormack, at this time I ask that you undertake to investigate
the information which is contained on the computer systems of Interlog
Internet Services.  Further I would expect that you would seek judicial
authorization to seize any equipment found to contain obscene
materials, and shut the service down.  Lastly, I would ask that you
pursue criminal charges in this matter, should your investigations
determine that in fact Mr. Harrop is storing and transmitting obscene
materials.

Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.  I will look
forward to speaking with your investigators at the earliest
opportunity, in order to provide any further information that may be
required.

Sincerely,

Bruce M. Lloyd
30 Thunder Grove, Suite 1612,
Agincourt, Ontario, M1V 4A3
[phone]

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Sep 1994 15:15: 06 EDT
From: [e-mail]
Subject: File 5--Canadian BBS Sysops Plead Guilty to "Piracy"

* Copied (from: CAN_SYSLAW) by Steven Horn using timEd 1.01.g2+.

Hello All!

The following story appeared in Wednesday's The Globe and Mail Report on
 Business (Sept. 21, 1994, National edition, p. 5):

   "Two bulletin board operators in Montreal and Toronto recently
 pleaded guilty to the illegal distribution of software and were fined
 a total of $22,500.

   'This sends an important message that software piracy in Canada
 will not be tolerated -- at any level,' said Frank Clegg, president
 of the Canadian Alliance Against Software Theft, which announced the
 convictions yesterday.

   In August, the RCMP raided a Montreal bulletin board system (BBS)
 known as 90 North, revealing the distribution of unlicenced software
 by Lotus, Microsoft, Novell and Novell/WordPerfect Applications
 Group.  Its operator, Michael Solomon, was fined $20,000.

   In September, Sergio Arana, operator of Toronto-based Legion of
 Death, was fined $2,500 after investigators infiltrated his BBS and
 downloaded sufficient software to confirm illegal activity."

There's nothing I can add.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 22 Sep 94 14:25 CDT
From: [e-mail]
Subject: File 6--PHRACK hardcopies available from SotMESC / GCMS

                     Press Release

     The SotMESC is presenting three volumes of the collected
works from Phrack in a bounded treasury.  These collectors
items can be obtained from the non-profit SotMESC organization.
Phrack 1-42 (c) SotMESC are being offered to the public to
fund our organization in protecting network liberties, freedom
and privacy.

     The Phrack volumes and other assorted fundings we are
publishing can be found in our current catalog available for
$1 via Smail at: SotMESC, Box 573, Long Beach, Ms  39560.

     More information on the SotMESC can be obtained by
pointed to http://www.phantom.com/~king with Mosaic.

------------------------------

Date:         Sat, 24 Sep 1994 12:47:15 -0500
From:         "William B. Collins" <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 7--ACLU Gopher

Point your gophers to aclu.org:6601/11/ for access to the ACLU Free
Reading Room. The following document is from the ACLU Gopher. It is also
available through the World Wide Web.

                       =======================
                  THE ACLU FREE READING ROOM

Welcome to the American Civil Liberties Union Free Reading Room,
a publications, software, and information resource of the
nation's oldest and largest defender of the principles set forth
in the Bill of Rights.

The ACLU Free Reading Room makes available to users of the
internet a growing collection of our publications and information
resources.  Currently, the collection includes our basic line
of publications on issues of high public interest; the current issue
of our membership newsletter, Civil Liberties; a growing collection of
recent public policy reports and action guides; Congressional voting
records for the 103rd Congress; and an archive of news releases from the
National Office.

The collection will grow to include calls to action on legislative
issues, testimony delivered to Congress, and a collection of ACLU legal
briefs submitted in important Supreme Court cases.

In the future, we plan to develop a variety of electronic
publications, including an adaptation of our newsletter and other
special interest mailing lists.  Please watch this space for
further information.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

The ACLU Free Reading Room is a project of the Public Education
Department of the National Office of the American Civil Liberties
Union.  Programming services are provided by The Pipeline
Network, an Internet access provider based in New York.

The ACLU Free Reading Room contains publications and other
materials from the ACLU in a gopher and ftp accessible resource,
and is a read-only site.  At this time, we recommend that
follow-ups and public discussion of the materials at this site
take place in the USENET news group alt.society.civil-liberties,
alt.censorship or other newsgroups or bulletin boards where
appropriate.  Comments and questions about this resource may be
directed to [e-mail].

Unless otherwise indicated, documents in this resource may be
circulated in whole with acknowledgement, and may of course be
quoted under fair use guidelines.  Print reproduction other than
for personal use should be requested from [e-mail], or
by mail at this address: American Civil Liberties Union, Department of
Public Education, 132 West 43rd Street, New York, New York 10036

Consulting this resource is not a means of obtaining legal advice
or representation from the ACLU.  For information about seeking
assistance from the ACLU, consult section 10 of this gopher.  At this
time, we do not have the capacity to forward electronic mail to our state
offices, who are responsible for reviewing legal complaints
arising in their areas and offering legal assistance.  Therefore,
requests for legal assistance sent to [e-mail] cannot be
accepted.

------------------------------

Date:         Mon, 26 Sep 1994 12:17:02 CDT
From:         Vigdor Schreibman - FINS <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 8--Telecommunication Reform Bill (S. 1822) DEAD!

FINS SPECIAL REPORT                              September 23, 1994

S. 1822 DEAD!
Hollings Throws In The Towel

Washington, DC, Sept 23, 1994--Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC), announced
today that "we will be unable to pass comprehensive telecommunications
reform legislation this Congress."  Hollings noted that "only one sector
of the industry continues to oppose the bill . . . the telephone
companies, and especially, the RBOCs."  Moreover, Hollings listed a
serious of reasons that would make passage of the bill "impossible this
Congress."  This included (among others reasons), the fact that "the
RBOCs have violated the terms of the agreement they have reached with
me and the other members of the committee on long distance" as well as
an ultimatum delivered by Sen. Dole.  Dole informed the Committee
yesterday that a serious of revisions of the bill, were required,
which were "non-negotiable."  The provisions would have "substantially
deregulated the industry" according to Hollings.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1994 22:51:01 CDT
From: CuD Moderators <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 9--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994)

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------------------------------

End of Computer Underground Digest #6.85