The Hacker's Encyclopedia 1998/hackers_encyclopedia.iso/zines/cud/cud532.txt

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Computer underground Digest    Sun May 2 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 32
                           ISSN  1004-042X

       Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer ([e-mail])
       Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
       Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
                          Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
                          Ian Dickinson
       Cyop Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Senior

CONTENTS, #5.32 (May 2 1993)
File 1--If you missed the Galactic Hacker Party of 1989....
File 2--SPA Needs A Different Direction
File 3--Some thoughts on Clipper and the Constitution (1)
File 4--Some thoughts on Clipper and the Constitution (2)
File 5--Clinton Administration Freedom of Information Policy
File 6--Hacker Accused of Rigging Radio Contests
File 7--"Hacker" Executed in China
File 8--Electronic Privacy Conf w/Oliver North & Chris Goggans

Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 04:12:57 -0700
From: Emmanuel Goldstein <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 1--If you missed the Galactic Hacker Party of 1989....

Hack-Tic presents:

   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   H A C K I N G   A T   T H E   E N D   O F   T H E   U N I V E R S E
   -------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     An 'in-tents' summer congress



H U H?
+-------

Remember the Galactic Hacker Party back in 1989? Ever wondered what
happened to the people behind it? We sold out to big business, you
think. Think again, we're back!

That's right. On august 4th, 5th and 6th 1993, we're organising a
three-day summer congress for hackers, phone phreaks, programmers,
computer haters, data travellers, electro-wizards, networkers, hardware
freaks, techno-anarchists, communications junkies, cyberpunks, system
managers, stupid users, paranoid androids, Unix gurus, whizz kids, warez
dudes, law enforcement officers (appropriate undercover dress required),
guerilla heating engineers and other assorted bald, long-haired and/or
unshaven scum. And all this in the middle of nowhere (well, the middle
of Holland, actually, but that's the same thing) at the Larserbos
campground four metres below sea level.

The three days will be filled with lectures, discussions and workshops
on hacking, phreaking, people's networks, Unix security risks, virtual
reality, semafun, social engineering, magstrips, lockpicking,
viruses, paranoia, legal sanctions against hacking in Holland and
elsewhere and much, much more. English will be the lingua franca for
this event, although some workshops may take place in Dutch. There
will be an Internet connection, an intertent ethernet and social
interaction (both electronic and live). Included in the price are four
nights in your own tent. Also included are inspiration, transpiration,
a shortage of showers (but a lake to swim in), good weather
(guaranteed by god), campfires and plenty of wide open space and fresh
air. All of this for only 100 dutch guilders (currently around US$70).

We will also arrange for the availability of food, drink and smokes of
assorted types, but this is not included in the price. Our bar will be
open 24 hours a day, as well as a guarded depository for valuables
(like laptops, cameras etc.). You may even get your stuff back! For
people with no tent or air mattress: you can buy a tent through us for
100 guilders, a mattress costs 10 guilders. You can arrive from 17:00
(that's five p.m. for analogue types) on August 3rd. We don't have to
vacate the premises until 12:00 noon on Saturday, August 7 so you can
even try to sleep through the devastating Party at the End of Time
(PET) on the closing night (live music provided). We will arrange for
shuttle buses to and from train stations in the vicinity.


H O W ?
+-------

Payment: In advance only. Even poor techno-freaks like us would like
to get to the Bahamas at least once, and if enough cash comes in we
may just decide to go. So pay today, or tomorrow, or yesterday, or in
any case before Friday, June 25th 1993. Since the banks still haven't
figured out why the Any key doesn't work for private international
money transfers, you should call, fax or e-mail us for the best way to
launder your currency into our account. We accept American Express,
even if they do not accept us. But we are more understanding than they
are. Foreign cheques go directly into the toilet paper recycling bin
for the summer camp, which is about all they're good for here.


H A !
+-----

Very Important: Bring many guitars and laptops.


M E ?
+-----

Yes, you! Busloads of alternative techno-freaks from all over the
planet will descend on this event. You wouldn't want to miss that,
now, would you?

Maybe you are part of that select group that has something special to
offer! Participating in 'Hacking at the End of the Universe' is
exciting, but organising your very own part of it is even more fun. We
already have a load of interesting workshops and lectures scheduled,
but we're always on the lookout for more. We're also still in the
market for people who want to help us organize this during the
congress.

In whatever way you wish to participate, call, write, e-mail or fax us
soon, and make sure your money gets here on time. Space is limited.


S O :
+-----

> 4th, 5th and 6th of August

> Hacking at the End of the Universe
      (a hacker summer congress)

> ANWB groepsterrein Larserbos
      (Flevopolder, Netherlands)

> Cost: fl. 100,- (+/- 70 US$) per person
      (including 4 nights in your own tent)


M O R E   I N F O :
+-------------------

Hack-Tic
Postbus 22953
1100 DL  Amsterdam
The Netherlands

tel     : [phone]
fax     : [phone]
E-mail  : [e-mail]

V I R U S :
+-----------

If you know a forum or network that you feel this message belongs on,
by all means slip it in. Echo-areas, your favorite bbs, /etc/motd, IRC,
WP.BAT, you name it. Spread the worm, uh, word.

------------------------------

Date: 29 Apr 93 21:31:10 EDT
From: Gordon Meyer <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 2--SPA Needs A Different Direction

Michael Alexander, Editor in Chief and Associate Publisher of
INFOSECURITY NEWS had some interesting comments about the SPA in his
May/June editorial.  Here are excerpts, for the full remarks refer to
page 7.

Several years ago I attended the first meeting of the Software
Publishers Association, which was being held during the Winter
Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas... I recall little about that
initial meeting other than the fact that it was not particularly well
organized. Based on the low turnout, ... I wrote a small article about
the meeting and I think I suggested that the software industry had
little need for the proposed association.

Obviously I was wrong.  The SPA has grown to more than 1,000 members
in the past eight years and has become a powerful force in the
industry. The SPA has also be come known as the "Software Police" as a
result of is raids against copyright infringers and software pirates.

...

Few people would argue with the fact that all software publishers
should be compensated fairly for their products and that copyright
laws must be protected on ethical and financial grounds.

However, I believe that the SPA's much-publicized raids on businesses
whose users are allegedly making unauthorized copies of software do
little to advance the cause of information systems security. Any
infosecurity practitioner will tell you that fear, intimidation and
threats do not make for better security. What works is education,
communication and cooperation.

The vast majority of infosecurity professionals are aware of the
pitfalls of copyright infringement and are working diligently to
control the problem within their organizations. The SPA itself
confirms that the problem of copyright in the US is declining.  Thus
it is time for the SPA to put its clout to more productive use.

...

One of the first things the SPA should do is to withdraw its current
print ads, such as the ones depicting users behind bars. These ads are
in poor taste and insulting both to infosecurity professionals and to
the people who provide the billions in revenues that the SPA's members
receive.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 12:57:01 PDT
From: [e-mail]
Subject: File 3--Some thoughts on Clipper and the Constitution (1)

Date--Mon, 26 Apr 93 17:55:36 -0500
[e-mail] (Mike Godwin)
Newsgroups--austin.eff
Subject--Some thoughts on Clipper and the Constitution

   Note: These notes were a response to a question during Saturday's
   Cypherpunks meeting about the possible implications of the Clipper
   Chip initiative on Fourth Amendment rights. Forward to anyone else who
   might think these interesting.

   --Mike


Notes on Cryptography, Digital Telephony, and the Bill of Rights
By Mike Godwin

I.  Introduction

      A.  The recent announcement of the federal government's "Clipper
Chip" has started me thinking again about what the principled "pure
Constitutional" arguments a) opposed to Digital Telephony and b) in favor
of the continuing legality of widespread powerful public-key encryption.
      B.  These notes do *not* include many of the complaints that have
already been raised about the Clipper Chip initiative, such as:
         1.  Failure of the Administration to conduct an inquiry before
embracing a standard,
         2.  Refusal to allow public scrutiny of the chosen encryption
algorithm(s), which is the normal procedure for testing a cryptographic
scheme, and
         3.  Failure of the administration to address the policy questions
raised by the Clipper Chip, such as whether the right balance between
privacy and law-enforcement needs has been struck.
      C.  In other words, they do not address complaints about the federal
government's *process* in embracing the Clipper Chip system. They do,
however, attempt to address some of the substantive legal and
Constitutional questions raised by the Clipper Chip and Digital Telephony
initiatives.

II.  Hard Questions from Law Enforcement

      A.  In trying to clarify my own thinking about the possible
Constitutional issues raised by the government's efforts to guarantee
access to public communications between individuals, I have spoken and
argued with a number of individuals who are on the other side of the
issues from me, including Dorothy Denning and various respresentatives of
the FBI, including Alan McDonald.
      B.  McDonald, like Denning and other proponents both of Digital
Telephony and of a standard key-escrow system for cryptography, is fond of
asking hard questions: What if FBI had a wiretap authorization order and
couldn't implement it, either because it was impossible to extract the
right bits from a digital-telephony data stream, or because the
communication was encrypted? Doesn't it make sense to have a law that
requires the phone companies to be able to comply with a wiretap order?
      C.  Rather than respond to these questions, for now at least let's
ask a different question. Suppose the FBI had an authorization order for a
secret microphone at a public restaurant. Now suppose it planted the bug,
but couldn't make out the conversation it was authorized to "seize"
because of background noise at the restaurant. Wouldn't it make sense to
have a law requiring everyone to speak more softly in restaurants and not
to clatter the dishes so much?
      D.  This response is not entirely facetious. The Department of
Justice and the FBI have consistently insisted that they are not seeking
new authority under the federal wiretap statutes ("Title III"). The same
statute that was drafted to outline the authority for law enforcement to
tap telephonic conversations was also drafted to outline law enforcement's
authority to capture normal spoken conversations with secret or remote
microphones. (The statute was amended in the middle '80s by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act to protect "electronic communications," which
includes e-mail, and a new chapter protecting _stored_ electronic
communications was also added.)
      E.  Should we understand the law the way Digital Telephony
proponents insist we do--as a law designed to mandate that the FBI (for
example) be guaranteed access to telephonic communications? Digital
Telephony supporters insist that it merely "clarifies" phone company
obligations and governmental rights under Title III. If they're right,
then I think we have to understand the provisions regarding "oral
communications" the same way. Which is to say, it would make perfect sense
to have a law requiring that people speak quietly in public places, so as
to guarantee that the government can bug an oral conversation if it needs
to.
      F.  But of course I don't really take Digital Telephony as an
initiative to "clarify" governmental prerogatives. It seems clear to me
that Digital Telephony, together with the "Clipper" initiative, prefigure
a government strategy to set up an information regime that precludes truly
private communications between individuals who are speaking in any way
other than face-to-face. This I think is an expansion of government
authority by almost any analysis.

III.  Digital Telephony, Cryptography, and the Fourth Amendment

      A.  In talking with law enforcement representatives such as Gail
Thackeray, one occasionally encounters the view that the Fourth Amendment
is actually a _grant_ of a Constitutional entitlement to searches and
seizures. This interpretation is jolting to those who have studied the
history of the Fourth Amendment and who recognize that it was drafted as a
limitation on government power, not as a grant of government power. But
even if one doesn't know the history of this amendment, one can look at
its  language and draw certain conclusions.
      B.  The Fourth Amendment reads: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
      C.  Conspicuously missing from the language of this amendment is any
guarantee that the government, with properly obtained warrant in hand,
will be _successful_ in finding the right place to be searched or persons
or things to be seized. What the Fourth Amendment is about is _obtaining
warrants_--similarly, what the wiretap statutes are about is _obtaining
authorization_ for wiretaps and other interceptions. Neither the Fourth
Amendment nor Title III nor the other protections of the ECPA constitute
an law-enforcement _entitlement_ for law enforcement.
      D.  It follows, then, that if digital telephony or widespread
encryption were to create new burdens for law enforcement, this would not,
as some law-enforcement representatives have argued, constitute an
"effective repeal" of Title III. What it would constitute is a change in
the environment in which law enforcement, along with the rest of us, has
to work. Technology often creates changes in our social environment--some,
such as the original innovation of the wiretap, may aid law enforcement,
while others, such as powerful public-key cryptography, pose the risk of
inhibiting law enforcement. Historically, law enforcement has responded to
technological change by adapting. (Indeed, the original wiretaps were an
adaptation to the widespread use of the telephone.) Does it make sense for
law enforcement suddenly to be able to require that the rest of society
adapt to its perceived needs?

IV.  Cryptography and the First Amendment

      A.  Increasingly, I have come to see two strong links between the
the use of cryptography and the First Amendment. The two links are freedom
of expression and freedom of association.
      B.  By "freedom of expression" I mean the traditionally understood
freedoms of speech and the press, as well as freedom of inquiry, which has
also long been understood to be protected by the First Amendment. It is
hard to see how saying or publishing something that happens to be
encrypted could not be protected under the First Amendment. It would be a
very poor freedom of speech indeed that dictated that we could *never*
choose the form in which we speak. Even the traditional limitations on
freedom of speech have never reached so far. My decision to encrypt a
communication should be no more illegal than my decision to speak in code.
To take one example, suppose my mother and I agree that the code "777",
when sent to me through my pager, means "I want you to call me and tell me
how my grandchild is doing." Does the FBI have a right to complain because
they don't know what "777" means? Should the FBI require pager services
never to allow such codes to be used? The First Amendment, it seems to me,
requires that both questions be answered "No."
      C.  "Freedom of association" is a First Amendment right that was
first clearly articulated in a Supreme Court case in 1958: NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson. In that case, the Court held that Alabama could
not require the NAACP to disclose a list of its members residing in
Alabama. The Court accepted the NAACP's argument that disclosure of its
list would lead to reprisals on its members; it held such forced
disclosures, by placing an undue burden on NAACP members' exercise of
their freedoms of association and expression, effectively negate those
freedoms. (It is also important to note here that the Supreme Court in
effect recognized that anonymity might be closely associated with First
Amendment rights.)
      D.  If a law guaranteeing disclosure of one's name is sufficiently
"chilling" of First Amendment rights to be unconstitutional, surely a law
requiring that the government be able to read any communications is also
"chilling," not only of my right to speak, but also of my decisions on
whom to speak to. Knowing that I cannot guarantee the privacy of my
communications may mean that I don't conspire to arrange any drug deals or
kidnapping-murders (or that I'll be detected if do), but it also may mean
that I choose not to use this medium to speak to a loved one, or my
lawyer, or to my psychiatrist, or to an outspoken political activist.
Given that computer-based communications are likely to become the dominant
communications medium in the next century, isn't this chilling effect an
awfully high price to pay in order to keep law enforcement from having to
devise new solutions to new problems?

V.  Rereading the Clipper Chip announcements

      A.  It is important to recognize that the Clipper Chip represents,
among other things, an effort by the government to pre-empt certain
criticisms. The language of announcements makes clear that the government
wants us to believe it has recognized all needs and come up with a
credible solution to the dilemma many believe is posed by the ubiquity of
powerful cryptography.
      B.  Because the government is attempting to appear to take a
"moderate" or "balanced" position to the issue, its initiative will tend
to pre-empt criticisms of the government's proposal on the grounds of
*process* alone.
      C.  But there is more to complain about here than bad process. My
rereading of the Clipper Chip announcements will reveal that the
government hopes to develop a national policy that includes limitations on
some kinds of cryptography. Take the following two statements, for
example:
      D.  'We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that can both
provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and
prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities.'
      E.  'The Administration is not saying, "since encryption threatens
the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it
outright" (as some countries have effectively done); nor is the U.S.
saying that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an
unbreakable commercial encryption product." '
      F.  It is clear that neither Digital Telephony nor the Clipper Chip
make any sense without restrictions on other kinds of encryption.
Widespread powerful public-key encryption, for example, would render
useless  any improved wiretappability in the communications
infrastructure, and would render superfluous any key-escrow scheme.
      G.  It follows, then, that we should anticipate, consistent with
these two initiatives, an eventual effort to prevent or inhibit the use of
powerful private encryption schemes in private hands.
      H.  Together with the Digital Telephony  and Clipper Chip
initiatives, this effort would, in my opinion, constitute an attempt to
shift the Constitutional balance of rights and responsibilities against
private entities and individuals and in favor of law enforcement. They
would, in effect, create _entitlements_ for law enforcement where none
existed before.
      I.  As my notes here suggest, these initiatives may be, in their
essence, inconsistent with Constitutional guarantees of expression,
association, and privacy.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 28 Apr 93 10:21:16 PDT
From: [e-mail]
Subject: File 4--Some thoughts on Clipper and the Constitution (2)

Mike Godwin's recent essay on the Clipper Chip (reprinted above),
Digital Telephony and the Constitution raises several interesting
points.  I'll confine my response to those points relating to the
"chilling effect" that encryption may have on the use of emerging
communications technology.

Firstly, I have to admit my philosophical bias against the
crippled-security scheme employed in the Clipper Chip.  I do not have
any better reason (better than the government's reason) for wanting a
snoop-proof communications system; however, I acknowledge that the
government believes that it has a good reason for desiring it.  As in
most civil liberties cases, the issue comes down to a balance of
"good" reasons by both parties.

How much will the crippled encryption scheme really "chill" our use of
emergent communications technology, i.e., threaten our free speech
protection to the point that we may opt (if possible) to use other
communication media?  My understanding is that law enforcement
officials will still need to procure a warrant prior to decrypting
encoded communication.  If this is the case, will not encrypted
communication enjoy the same expectation of privacy as standard
telephone communications and postal mail?  It seems that the warrant
is the best device we have to protect us from illegal search and
seizure.  The threat of a warrant does not seem to have a wide
chilling effect on the use of standard telephones and postal
mail--yet, the possibility of interception is still ever-present.

We have created and authorized government to see to our mutual
protection, among other things.  This protection involves the
execution of duly legislated laws and the prosecution of alleged
criminals.  In order that government may carry out this charge we have
empowered it with the ability to investigate crimes by seizing
evidence and arresting suspects.  It is in this area that we seek a
balance: evidence is often someone's valuable (and private) property
and suspects are innocent until proven guilty.

Does not the warrant sufficiently address this balance?  It protects
suspects and property from frivolous seizure.  It allows law
enforcement officers to investigate cases for which there appears
sufficient probable cause and supporting evidence. If the protection
that a warrant offers is not sufficient to alleviate our fears of
unwarranted search, seizure, and arrest, then perhaps there are bigger
problems to deal with other than encryption schemes.

I'm nowhere near as qualified as Mike to offer an opinion on this
issue, but it seems to me that the "process" is exactly where we
should be focusing--the Constitutional issues are fascinating, but
distracting.  I have to believe that the warrant is an acceptable
safeguard to both sides of the balance.  Given that, it appears that
the balance has been disturbed by an unilateral decision with respect
to the Clipper Chip.  The plan presented by the Clinton
Administration, as far as attempting to balance the concerns of
government and the people, seems sound.  The fact that the people (and
its organized interest groups) were not consulted has attracted undue
criticism to a feasible plan that is actually wanting of process.

This is a political problem in that a practical solution is available,
but cannot be agreed upon because the process leading to that solution
did not allow for the necessary consultation and input to insure its
acceptability.  I'm certain that once bruised egos are attended to and
future assurances of consultation are gained, that the solution
settled upon will be very much like the one that stands.

Rich MacKinnon
Department of Government
University of Texas-Austin

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 30 Apr 1993 11:23:41 EDT
From: Paul Hyland <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 5--Clinton Administration Freedom of Information Policy

>Originally [e-mail] (Rich Winkel)

/* Written  2:09 am  Apr 14, 1993 by [e-mail] in
 igc:alt.news-media */
/* ---------- "White House Official Outlines Freed" ---------- */

White House Official Outlines Freedom of Information Strategy
at 'Information Summit'
To: National Desk, Media Writer
Contact: Ellen Nelson of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center,
         615-321-9588

  NASHVILLE, Tenn., April 13  -- A White House official today outlined
a broad open government strategy for the Clinton administration,
throwing support behind legislation to apply the Freedom of
Information Act to electronic records.

  "At the Clinton White House, most of the debate over the E-mail
system is about how we can interconnect it to public services rather
than how we can destroy the records or tear out the hard drives before
the subpoenas come to reach us," said John Podesta, assistant to the
president and staff secretary.

  Podesta made his comments in front of 70 participants in the
nation's first Freedom of Information Summit, sponsored by The Freedom
Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University.

  Though the economy dominates the headlines, Podesta said the new
administration was quietly working across a broad front to open
government.  His "predictions for the first year," included:

  -- Working with Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) to win approval
this session for a bill allowing access to dozens of electronic
databases in the federal government.

  -- Developing an electronic mail system within the federal
government to improve citizen participation in government.

  -- Making the government's archives available on the nation's
"information highway," and appointing a national archivist "who cares
more about preserving history than about preserving his job."

  --Creating a "mood of declassification" with new executive orders
from the president outlining what government may keep secret.

  -- "Reinventing government" under initiatives developed by the fall
by Vice President Gore to require more openness on the part of civil
servants throughout the bureaucracy.

  Podesta also pledged lobbying reform and political reform to "get
rid of the soft money in campaigns." The Freedom of Information Act
may need strengthening in addition to electronic access, he said.

  Pinched by a dozen years of tight information policy, news
organizations have sent President Clinton a freedom of information
policy paper calling for wholesale personnel changes in FOIA-related
jobs, junking the secrecy classifications of President Reagan's
Executive Order 12356, overhauling the Freedom of Information Act and
ending military censorship of war reporting.

  "People working on behalf of the public on more openness in
government at all levels are heartened by the prospect of the White
House taking the lead in this area," said Paul McMasters, executive
director of The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt
University.

  The conference, sponsored by The Freedom Forum First Amendment
Center at Vanderbilt University, is focusing on issues ranging from
the Clinton administration's policies on open government to
restrictions on public access to crime, accident and disaster scenes.
The conference, open to the public, is at the Stouffer Hotel in
downtown Nashville.

  Speakers on the Clinton FOI Agenda included Richard Schmidt Jr.,
general counsel to the American Society of Newspaper Editors and
partner in the law firm of Cohn & Marks in Washington, D.C.; Theresa
Amato, the director of the FOI Clearinghouse in Washington, D.C. and
staff counsel for Public Citizens Litigation Group in Washington,
D.C.; and Quinlan Shea, former Carter administration official who
discussed problems of access to government.  Former American hostage
Terry Anderson will give the keynote address at the dinner tonight.

  The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University is
an independent operating program of The Freedom Forum.  The Center's
mission is to foster a better public understanding of and appreciation
for First Amendment rights and values, including freedom of religion,
free speech and press, the right to petition government and peaceful
assembly.

  The Freedom Forum is a nonpartisan, international organization
dedicated to free press, free speech and free spirit for all people.
It is supported entirely by an endowment established by Frank E.
Gannett in 1935 that has grown to more than $700 million in
diversified managed assets.  Its headquarters is The Freedom Forum
World Center in Arlington, Va.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 23 Apr 1993 13:25:21 -0700
From: Peter shipley <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 6--Hacker Accused of Rigging Radio Contests

(Reprinted from RISKS DIGEST, #14.55)

               Hacker Accused of Rigging Radio Contests
                By Don Clark Chronicle staff writer
                San Francisco Chronicle 22 Apr 1993

A notorious hacker was charged yesterday with using computers to
rig promotional contest at three Los Angeles radio stations, in a
scheme that allegedly netted two Porsches, $20,000 in cash and at
least two trips to Hawaii.

Kevin Lee Poulsen, now awaiting trial on earlier federal charges, is
accused of conspiring with two other hackers to seize control of
incoming phone lines at the radio stations.  By making sure that only
their calls got through, the conspirators were assured of winning the
contests, federal prosecutors said.  A new 19-count federal indictment
filed in Los Angeles charges that Poulsen also set up his own wire
taps and hacked into computers owned by California Department of Motor
Vehicles and Pacific Bell.  Through the latter, he obtained
information about the undercover businesses and wiretaps run by the
FBI, the indictment states.

Poulsen, 27, is accused of committing the crimes during 17 months on
the lam from earlier charges of telecommunications and computers fraud
filed in San Jose.  He was arrested in April 1991 and is now in the
federal Correctional Institution in Dublin.  In December, prosecutors
added an espionage charge against him for his alleged theft of a
classified military document.  The indictment announced yesterday adds
additional charges of computer and mail fraud, money laundering,
interception of wire communications and obstruction of justice.

Ronald Mark Austin and Justin Tanner Peterson have pleaded guilty to
conspiracy and violating computer crime laws and have agreed to help
against Poulsen.  Both are Los Angeles residents.  Poulsen and Austin
have made headlines together before.  As teenagers in Los Angeles, the
two computer prodigies allegedly broke into a Pentagon-organized
computer network that links researchers and defense contractors around
the country.  Between 1985 and 1988, after taking a job at Menlo
Park-based SRI International, Poulsen allegedly burglarized or used
phony identification to sneak into several Pacific Bell offices to
steal equipment and confidential access codes that helped him change
records and monitor calls.  After being indicted on these charges in
1989, Poulsen skipped bail and fled to Los Angeles where he was
eventually arrested at a suburban grocery store.  One of the
unanswered mysteries about the case is how he supported himself as a
fugitive.  The new indictment suggests that radio stations KIIS-FM,
KRTH-FM and KPWR-FM unwittingly helped out.

Poulsen and his conspirators are accused of hacking into Pacific Bell
computers to block out other callers seeking to respond to contests at
the stations.  The conspirators allegedly used the scheme to let
Poulsen and Austin win Porsches from KIIS and let a confederate win
$20,000 from KPWR.  Poulsen created aliases and phony identification
to retrieve and sell one of his Porsches and launder the proceeds of
the sale, the indictment states.  In February 1989, they arranged for
Poulsen's sister to win a trip to Hawaii and $1,000 from KRTH, the
indictment states.
          [Included in RISKS with permission of the author]

------------------------------

Date: 28 Apr 93 22:24:19 EDT
From: Anonymous <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 7--"Hacker" Executed in China

(Associated Press, April 26)-- A man accused of invading a computer
and embezzling some $192,000 has been executed in China.  The French
Agence France-Press International News Service says Shi Biao, an
accountant at the Agricultural Bank of China's Jilin branch, was
accused of forging deposit slips from Aug.  1 to Nov. 18, 1991.  AFP,
reporting from Beijing, quoted the Xinhua news agency as saying the
crime was "the first case of bank embezzlement via computer" in China,
adding it came to light when Shi and his alleged accomplice, Yu Lixin,
tried to wire part of the money to Shenzhen in southern China.
--Charles Bowen

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 30 Apr 1993 22:25:12
From: CuD Moderators <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 8--Electronic Privacy Conf w/Oliver North & Chris Goggans

Systems Technology Services, Inc., of Newton, N.J., is sponsoring the
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY IN THE 90'S conferenceon May 13-14, 1993 in
Washington, D.C. Billed as "A management Awareness Program, the stated
intent is to "present an array of guest speakers with a diversity of
backgrounds." According to the conference brochure:

     This presentation has been designed to introduce the threat of
     loss of assets due to the growing changes in electronic
     technologies.  Participants are experienced professionals, each
     of who offers years of real time experiences within his own realm
     of expertise.

Featured participants include Stansfield Turner, former director of
the CIA, Oliver North, described as:

    ...CEO of Guardian Technologies, which manufactures protective
    equipment for law enforcement, serves as Prsident of Freedom
    Alliance, a non-profit foundation dedicated to promoting the
    principles of liberty, strong defense and traditional morality
    in national policy.

Other featured speakers include Jim Ross of Ross Engineering, Tobey B.
Marzouk, an partner at the Washington, D.C. law firm of Marzouk &
Perry, and Donald P. Delany, a computer crime investigator with the
New York State Police.

Chris Goggans is the final featured speaker.

------------------------------

End of Computer Underground Digest #5.32
************************************