The Hacker's Encyclopedia 1998/hackers_encyclopedia.iso/zines/a_m/jauc1.txt

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  THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN UNDERGROUND COMPUTING / Published Quarterly
  ===================================================================
  ISSN 1074-3111           Volume One, Issue One       March 19, 1994
  ===================================================================

      Editor-in-Chief:         Scott Davis
      NetSurfer:               John Logan
      It's A Conspiracy!:      Gordon Fagan

      E-Mail - [e-mail]
      ** ftp site: etext.archive.umich.edu    /pub/Zines/JAUC

      U.S. Mail:
      The Journal Of American Underground Computing
      10111 N. Lamar #25
      Austin, Texas 78753

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  To Subscribe to "TJOAUC", send mail to:              [e-mail]
  All questions/comments about this publication to:    [e-mail]
  Send all articles/info that you want published to:   [e-mail]
  Commercial Registration for Profitable Media:        [e-mail]

 "The underground press serves as the only effective counter to a growing
 power, and more sophisticated techniques used by establishment mass media
 to falsify, misrepresent, misquote, rule out of consideration as a priori
 ridiculous, or simply ignore and blot out of existence: data, books,
 discoveries that they consider prejudicial to establishment interest..."

 (William S. Burroughs and Daniel Odier, "The Job", Viking, New York, 1989)

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  Contents Copyright (C) 1994 The Journal Of American Underground Computing
  and/or the author of the articles presented herein. All rights reserved.
  Nothing may be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission
  of the Editor-In-Chief and/or the author of the article. This publication
  is made available quarterly to the amateur computer hobbyist free of charge.
  Any commercial usage (electronic or otherwise) is strictly prohibited
  without prior consent of the Editor, and is in violation of applicable
  US Copyright laws. To subscribe, send email to [e-mail]

  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

  DISCLAIMER AND NOTICE TO DISTRIBUTORS -

  NOTE: This electronic publication is to be distributed free of charge
  without modifications to anyone who wishes to have a copy. Under NO
  circumstances is any issue of this publication, in part or in whole,
  to be sold for money or services, nor is it to be packaged with other
  computer software, including, but not limited to CD Rom disks, without
  the express written or verbal consent of the author and/or editor.
  To obtain permission to distribute this publication under any of the
  certain circumstances stated above, please contact the editor at one of
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  in any of the ways described above, or you are in doubt about whether or
  not your intentions conflict with the restrictions, please contact the
  editor. FOR A COPY OF THE REGISTRATION FORM, MAIL - [e-mail]

  This publication is provided without charge to anyone who wants it.
  This includes, but is not limited to lawyers, government officials,
  cops, feds, hackers, social deviants, and computer hobbyists. If anyone
  asks for a copy, please provide them with one, or mail the subscription
  list so that you may be added.

  The articles and information printed herein are the property of the author
  and / or The Journal Of American Underground Computing. An electronic mail
  address of the author will be provided when made available to us so that you
  can contact the author with your comments. No article in this publication
  can be reprinted without the permission of the author / editor. Any attempt
  to do so will be in direct violation of United States Copyright laws.
  Any attempt to sell this publication in part or in whole, on CD Rom or
  while packaged with any other software bundle without the express consent
  of the editor is also a direct violation of United States Copyright laws.

  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

     THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN UNDERGROUND COMPUTING - Volume 1, Issue 1

                          TABLE OF CONTENTS

 1) Introduction To TJOAUC                               Editors
 2) Control Of Information In The Mass Media             Gordon Fagan
 3) Some Thoughts On Clipper, NSA, ...                   Jim Bidzos
 4) CIA Corrupt, Stupid, Should Be Abolished             Mark Lane
 5) Legion Of Doom T-Shirts...get 'em!!                  Chris Goggans

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      Introduction To The Journal Of American Underground Computing

 By The Editors ([e-mail])

        First of all, I want to personally thank you for taking the time
 to read this electronic publication. The editors of this publication had a
 large hand in The World View Magazine, a publication that became defunct as
 of January 1, 1993. We had become stagnant with that publication, so we
 jointly agreed to ditch it. Since then, we have received hundreds of
 subscription requests for the magazine. After consulting with each other
 for several months, we have decided to do a "new-and-improved" version of
 that popular magazine...but under a different name. And in a more official
 capacity I might add. So here it is...Issue one, Volume one. The format for
 this magazine is totally undefined. The decision to do it this way is better
 than focusing on a certain area in the sense that we can cover anything and
 everything...and people will not be suprised when they see an article that
 is "out of character". Also, I hope that it will inspire people to write
 about whatever they feel intimate with...be it politics, computer networking,
 hacking, etc...or any remote aspect of such topics. So please read on, and
 keep in mind that we encourage you to comment on anything you agree with,
 disagree with, like, dislike, etc...we will print comments like that.
 Your input is necessary. Thanks for reading, and enjoy. A special thanks
 goes to "The Spotlight", a weekly publication in our nation's capital for
 permission to reprint, etc...Thanks to Don Markey!

  Editors

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                 CONTROL OF INFORMATION IN THE MASS MEDIA

 By Gordon Fagan ([e-mail])


 The Public's right to know is not always what the Public ends up
 getting. The Public frequently gets one-sided, biased information
 and not just from the mass media. It's easy to have a long arm that
 protects the special interest groups: this kind of a "one world
 family" of insiders that is capable of affecting federal judges,
 U.S. attorneys, to slant or obstruct justice, to hide or cover up
 crucial information, and to interfere with our liberties.

 There has been a major campaign on the part of the Central
 Intelligence Agency to place Central Intelligence Agency agents, in
 various news media posts.  Documents have been found on this.  It was
 called "Operation Mocking Bird".  They placed operatives in places
 like TIME Magazine and LIFE Magazine, the New York Times, inside CBS
 and ABC News.  The National Student Association and other student
 groups were also targeted.

 Originally, the intent of "Operation Mocking Bird" was to make
 certain that these major media outlets and student organizations
 reflected an adequately anti-communist perspective. And then, of
 course, as they became entrenched and in-place, any time the Central
 Intelligence Agency wanted a story killed or distorted they would
 contact their agents inside.  They have bragged openly in private
 memos back and forth inside the Agency about how proud they are of
 having very important "assets" inside virtually every major news
 media in the United States.

 For example, the Chief National Security Correspondent for TIME
 Magazine, Bruce Van Voorst, is a regular Central Intelligence
 Agency officer.  It turns out that Ben Bradlee from the Washington
 Post was a regular Central Intelligence Agency officer prior to
 coming to his post at the Washington Post.  Bob Woodward at the
 Washington Post was the Point-Briefer for U.S. Naval Intelligence
 of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff before he went over to the Washington
 Post.  What we're told in the media (and what we're told officially
 from Government sources) and what is the truth are frequently at
 varying degrees against each other.

 We find these people constantly in the news media.  When the New
 York Times was refusing to print any information about Oliver North,
 Richard Secord, Albert Hakim and Rob Owen, and all of the other men
 who, throughout 1985 and 1986, were engaged in a massive criminal
 conspiracy to violate the Boland Amendment prohibiting any weapons
 shipments to the Contras, and who were involved in smuggling TOW
 missiles to Iran.  Keith Schneider, who was one of the reporters
 assigned to look into the issue, said that the Times was refusing to
 print any of it because their high-level sources inside the Central
 Intelligence Agency refused to confirm the stories.

 This kind of relationship between self-conscious "assets" of the
 Covert Operations Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is a
 political police force on an international level to protect the
 ostensible economic interests of United States industries by placing
 these people inside a news media which, under the First Amendment,
 ostensibly has the responsibility to critique and investigate
 potential injustices on the part of the State, inside the Government
 is an extraordinarily dangerous development here in the United States.

  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

  Article printed with permission of the author, Jim Bidzos
  Jim Bidzos is the President and CEO of RSA Data Security, and is a
  well respected authority in the area of security and encryption.

      SOME THOUGHTS ON CLIPPER, NSA, AND ONE KEY ESCROW ALTERNATIVE

 By Jim Bidzos ([e-mail])

 In a recent editorial, Dr. Dorothy Denning of Georgtown University
 argued in support of the U.S. government's proposed Clipper Chip, a
 security device that would allow law enforcement to decipher the
 communications of users of such devices.

 Dr. Denning attempts to argue that Clipper is necessary for law
 enforcement agencies to be able to do their job.  I'm not going to
 argue that one; there are plenty of people who can argue that
 compromising privacy for all citizens in order  to aid law enforcement
 is a bad idea more effectively than I, particularly in the Clipper
 case, where the arguments from law enforcement are dubious at best.
 (The current justification is inadequate; there may be better reasons,
 from a law enforcement perspective, but we haven't heard them yet.)

 Without doubt, law enforcement and intelligence are huge stakeholders
 in the debate over encryption. But every individual and corporation in
 the U.S. must be included as well. Are NSA's actions really in the
 best interests of all the stakeholders? Are there alternatives to the
 current key escrow program?

 If one steps back and looks at what has happened over the last few
 years, one might well question the government's approach with Clipper,
 if not its motivation, for dealing with this problem.  (I believe it
 may even be possible to conclude that Clipper is the visible portion
 of a large-scale covert operation on U.S. soil by NSA, the National
 Security Agency.) Over a number of years, through their subversion of
 the Commerce Department (who should be championing the causes of U.S.
 industry, not the intelligence agencies), NSA has managed to put many
 U.S. government resources normally beyond their control, both legally
 and practically, to work on their program of making U.S. and
 international communications accessible.

 The first step was the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) between the
 Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology
 (NIST) and the Defense Department's NSA.  This document appears to
 contravene the provisions of the Computer Security Act of 1987, the
 intent of which was to give NIST control over crypto standards-making
 for the unclassified government and commercial sectors.  The MOU
 essentially gave NSA a veto over any proposals for crypto standards by
 NIST.

 By using the standards making authority of NIST, NSA is attempting to
 force the entire U.S.  government to purchase Clipper equipment since
 only NIST-standard equipment may be purchased by government agencies.
 This purchasing power can then be used to force U.S. manufacturers to
 build Clipper products or risk losing government business.  (GSA is
 currently questioning NSA's authority to control government-wide
 procurement, and should continue to do so.)  This of course not only
 subsidizes Clipper products, but could make Clipper a de facto
 standard if the costs associated with alternatives are too high.
 These costs to industry, of ignoring Clipper, come in the form of lost
 government market share, costly support for multiple versions of
 incompatible products, and non-exportability of non-Clipper products.

 It also appears that NSA is desperately seeking a digital signature
 standard that would force users to take that signature capability
 wrapped up with a Clipper chip.  If this is the case, as it appears to
 be, then NSA has is trying to use what is probably the most powerful
 business tool of the information age as a means to deny us its
 benefits unless we subsidize and accept Clipper in the process.  This
 would, if true, be an unprecedented abuse of government power to
 influence U.S.  industry and control individual privacy.  (Clipper is
 part of a chip called Capstone, which is where their proposed digital
 signature standard would be used.)

 The overall cost of these policies is unknown.  We only know that NSA
 has spent a considerable amount of money on the program directly.
 Other costs are not so obvious. They are:

 - A burdened U.S. industry, which will have to build multiple products
 or more expensive products that support multiple techniques;

 - A low-intensity "trade war" with the rest of the world over
 encryption;

 - Lost sales to U.S. companies, since international buyers will surely
 go to non-U.S. suppliers for non- Clipper encryption, as may buyers in
 the U.S.;

 - Potential abuses by government and loss of privacy for all citizens.

 Does NSA truly believe they can displace other methods with Clipper?
 With over three million licensed, documented RSA products, the
 technology they feel threatened by, in use in the U.S. today? Not
 likely; therefore, they have already decided that these costs are
 acceptable even if they only delay the inevitable, and that U.S.
 industry and U.S. taxpayers should bear these costs, whatever they
 are.  This policy was apparently developed by unelected people who
 operate without oversight or accountability.  Does the White House
 really support this policy?

 It has been reported that NSA is attempting to gain support from
 foreign governments for escrow technology, especially if "local
 control" is provided.  Even if NSA can convince their sister
 organizations around the world to support key escrow (by offering
 Clipper technology with a do-your-own-escrow option), will these other
 organizations succeed in selling it to their government, industry and
 citizens?  Most countries around the world have much stronger privacy
 laws and a longer history of individual privacy than the U.S.

 WHY AGAIN WHEN IT DIDN'T WORK THE FIRST TIME?

 Many seem to have forgotten or are not aware that the Clipper program
 is not new, and it's also not the first time NSA has attempted to
 force communications security on U.S. industry that it could
 compromise.  In the mid-80's, NSA introduced a program called the
 Commercial COMSEC Endorsement Program, or CCEP. CCEP was essentially
 Clipper in a black box, since the technology was not sufficiently
 advanced to build lower-cost chips.  Vendors would join CCEP (with the
 proper security clearances) and be authorized to incorporate
 classified algorithms into communications systems.  NSA had proposed
 that they themselves would actually provide the keys to end-users of
 such systems.  The new twist is access by key escrow.

 To see how little things have changed, consider this quote: "...RSA
 Data Security, Inc.  asserts that since CCEP-2 is not published and
 therefore cannot be inspected by third parties, the NSA could put a
 'trap door' in the algorithm that would enable the agency to inspect
 information transmitted by the private sector.  When contacted, NSA
 representative Cynthia Beck said that it was the agency's policy not
 to comment on such matters."  That was in 1987. ("The Federal Snags in
 Encryption Technology," Computer and Communications Decisions, July
 1987, pp.  58-60.)

 To understand NSA's thinking, and the danger of their policies,
 consider the reply of a senior NSA official when he was asked by a
 reporter for the Wall Street Journal if NSA, through the CCEP program,
 could read anyone's communications: "Technically, if someone bought
 our device and we made the keys and made a copy, sure we could listen
 in. But we have better things to do with our time." (The Wall Street
 Journal, March 28, 1988, page 1, column 1, "A Supersecret Agency Finds
 Selling Secrecy to Others Isn't Easy," by Bob Davis.) Another NSA
 official, in the same Journal story, said "The American Public has no
 problem with relying on us to provide the technology that prevents the
 unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. If you trust us to protect
 against that, you can trust us to protect private records."  Remember
 that the Cold War was still on at that time.

 Law enforcement and intelligence gathering are certainly impeded by
 the use of cryptography.  There are certainly legitimate concerns that
 these interests have.  But is the current approach really the way to
 gain support from industry and the public?  People with a strong
 military and intelligence bias are making all the decisions. There
 seem to be better ways to strike a balance.

 AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

 One approach would be to have NIST develop a standard with three
 levels.  The first level could specify the use of public-key for key
 management and signatures without any key escrow.  There could be a
 "Level II" compliance that adds government key escrow to message
 preparation.  "Level III" could be key escrow controlled by the user,
 typically a corporation.  Would this work? The first level, meeting
 the standard by itself, would back up the government's claim that key
 escrow is voluntary; if I want privacy and authentication without key
 escrow, then I can have it, as the government has claimed I can.
 Actions speak louder than words.

 Why would any vendors support Level II?  There would be several
 reasons. They would find a market in the government, since the
 government should purchase only Level II products. (I would certainly
 like our public servants to use key escrow, just as I want work
 product paid for by my corporation to be accessible. Of course, anyone
 can buy Level I products for home and personal use.)  So the
 government can still influence the private sector by buying only
 products that include Level II compliance. Also, Level II products
 would be decontrolled for export. This way the market can decide;
 vendors will do what their customers tell them to.  This satisifies
 the obvious desire on the part of the government to influence what
 happens with their purchasing power.

 Level III would allow any user to insert escrow keys they control into
 the process.  (Level II would not be a prerequisite to Level III.) My
 company may want key escrow; I, as an individual, may want to escrow
 my keys with my attorney or family members; a standard supporting
 these funtions would be useful.  I don't necessarily want or need the
 government involved.

 NIST already knows how to write a FIPS that describes software and
 hardware implementations, and to certify that implementations are
 correct.

 This approach cetainly isn't perfect, but if the administration really
 believes what it says and means it, then I submit that this is an
 improvement over a single key escrow FIPS foisted on everyone by NSA,
 and would stand a much better chance of striking a workable balance
 between the needs of the government and the right of individuals to
 privacy.  Therefore, it RISKS much less than the current plan.

 The real problem with the way NSA works is that we don't find out what
 they're really doing and planning for decades, even when they're
 wrong.  What if they are?

 In the 60's and 70's, the CIA was out of control, and the Congress,
 after extensive hearings that detailed some of the abuses of power by
 the CIA, finally moved to force more accountability and oversight.  In
 the 80's and 90's, NSA's activities should be equally scrutinized by a
 concerned Congress.

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

 SYSOPS: CAN YOU GO TO JAIL ?

 By Jeff A. Heyens
 Additional Comments By [e-mail]

     We have a new problem.  Everyone knows that lately there has
 been a crackdown on Bulletin Boards which carry pornography,
 pirated software, etc.  There is, however, a new and much more
 powerful threat which is threatening to stop all privately run
 BBS's.

     The Canadian Radio and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)
 is currently in the process of setting itself up to regulate
 Public bulletin boards.  They want to make it an offense to run a
 BBS without a CRTC license.  If licensing comes into effect, the
 BBS scene will quite literally shrivel up and die.

     Consider the example of radio in the 40's and 50's.  Before
 the CRTC was formed, anyone could broadcast radio signals legally
 from their home on any bandwidth.  Fearing obscenity and extreme
 access to information, the CRTC was formed to sell licenses to
 broadcasters.  Without such a license, you could be prosecuted
 for broadcasting.  The result of this action can be seen today:
 the only radio stations we see are totally mainstream and are
 hell-bent on making profit, not pleasing listeners or informing
 the public.

     We all know that the bulletin board systems are a great way
 to get alternative information.  We can get information on the
 Paul Teele / Karla Homolka trials.  We can get new insights as to
 what is really happening in the former Yugoslavia through the
 giant Internet.  We currently have access to multitudes of
 information that isn't available through the mainstream media.

     If licensing comes into affect, we will LOSE this access.
 Not only will the pirate boards be hunted down and exterminated,
 but all currently LEGAL PUBLIC DOMAIN BBS's will also be made
 illegal unless they can afford a license.  And who do you think
 will get licenses?  Only those willing to follow the CRTC
 guidelines for radio and television.  Corporations and rich
 executives.  The BBS world, our underground paradise (if you
 will) is in great danger of becoming a commercial hell like the
 rest of today's media.

     We don't yet know what the proposed licensing fee will be,
 but it could anywhere in the area of $300-$5,000.  This could
 also depend on the size of the BBS.  However, most BBS's will
 simply close up shop if the government wants a license.  The
 government will simply weed out all the little guys and support
 the big guys.

     This WILL HAPPEN, and sooner than you think!  The U.S.
 Government has already started doing this, with the new
 Information SuperHighway being the flag-ship of government
 regulated systems.  The Canadian government is going farther, and
 must be stopped now.

     Before I go into my plan of action, I want to tell you that
 if licensing comes into effect, if will be basically impossible
 to beat the system.  All pirate radio stations in North America
 have been crushed by the government in a matter of months.
 Imagine how easy it will be to crush pirate bulletin board
 systems (and by that I simply mean BBS's without a license) with
 traceable phone numbers.  Bell Canada would be sure to help the
 CRTC bust those boards.  And the RCMP would have a real easy time
 busting any boards with illegal software, because those boards
 would not have licenses.  The CRTC finds the board through Bell,
 arrests the sysop for running a board without a license, then
 informs the RCMP that this sysop was allowing copyrighted
 material to be transferred through his/her bbs.  That sysop, for
 the first time in his/her life, is suddenly looking at a possible
 jail term.


     COULD YOU IMAGINE GOING TO JAIL FOR RUNNING A BBS????????

 That, I admit, is the extreme case, but it is looking more and
 more likely as time goes on.  If you're as pissed off about this
 as I am, then keep reading, because I have a plan of
 action/protest to stop this from happening.

     WE are the only people out there who can stop this from
 transpiring.  Only the extremely computer literate, those of us
 who know the ins and outs of the BBS scene and computers
 generally, will be able to generate an argument strong enough to
 counter the argument of the government and the CRTC.

     I've been a user in different parts of Ontario for about six
 years.  I currently go to York University for Computer Science
 and my plan is to organize a campaign of users who will be
 willing to petition the government to stop this craziness.  My
 sister is a lawyer and also an occasional user of the boards.
 She would be willing to confront the CRTC on legal grounds if we
 have enough support from YOU.  I have to hear from you.  In order
 to force the CRTC to at least seriously listen to our argument,
 we need a lot of names, and a lot of letters to your local MP and
 to the CRTC.

     If I have enough support, I will set up a BBS which is
 dedicated to keeping you informed.  I will keep up to date as to
 what the CRTC is doing and open up discussion concerning what we
 should do about it.  I would also print out all the messages on
 the board and send them off to the prime minister, the CRTC and
 our local MP's.  At the same time, my sister and I will prepare a
 legal argument to present to the government and the CRTC.  IF we
 have the support of your names and your letters behind us, the
 CRTC will be forced to stop.

 OUR GOAL:  To stop the CRTC from requiring the licensing of
 bulletin board systems and get it written into the law books that
 private, home run bbs's are totally legal and should never be
 regulated, in the interests of free information.


     PLEASE send me E-mail or letter mail with your thoughts.  I
 WILL set up the bbs and get this ball rolling if we have enough
 support!  Please send this file to other BBS's and get this
 information out.  Contact me if you want to be involved.  We need
 all your support!

       Support USERS AGAINST THE LICENSING OF BBS's (UALBBS).

                    KEEP PRIVATE BBS's LEGAL!

 *** Begin Additional Comments: ***

 Reading the preceding document has brought a few thoughts to
 my mind.  First of all, there has been much apprehension about
 what the computerization of society holds for the freedom of the
 common citizen.  It seems that the more powerful a thing is, the
 more potential it has for both good and bad; and there is no doubt
 that the computerization of information is powerful indeed.

 On one side, the computerization of society holds the potential
 for a centralized authoritarian regime that could not have been
 dreamed of previously.  In the near future, there will be no further
 need for cash money and there will be no economic activity beyond
 the reach central intelligence and control.  And there will be no
 personal information that will be kept secret from the authorities.
 Even the USSR, with the model of central authority we feared most,
 could could not have been capable of realizing the degree of control,
 the dawn of which, we now witness.

 But the evil that we feared in Communism infects our own society.
 Abstract concepts such as truth and justice are minimum requirements
 for spiritual beings, yet we deny the spiritual and cling to the
 material.  If we assert that we are but material beings, how real
 can the spiritual necessities really be?  And yet, in order for
 us to have any hope of happiness, these must be acknowledged in
 any formula for a culture and society we might propose.  Even So,
 we increasingly embrace a purely materialist interpretation of
 existence in which such things as truth and justice, if not
 outright delusional, are relative.

 If we continue to embrace the same cosmology as drove the Soviet
 repression, and the tools of a police state become available,
 what of government's temptation to become the definer of truth and
 justice and all the things which are the very breath of life
 for the human soul?  Even one who is completely seduced by
 materialism would have to be blind indeed not to perceive what
 an enormous poison this is.

 On the other side, the proliferation of information technology has the
 same sort of potential as the cheap portable video camera.  The
 particular aspect of this potential I'm addressing has been made most
 obvious by the effect the video camera has had in totalitarian
 countries, namely, that it is increasingly difficult for these
 governments to suppress the truth of events by simple denial and
 propaganda.  The proliferation of information technology can
 have a parallel with the advent of the Guttenberg press, which made
 it more difficult for the Inquisition to suppress the works of
 heretics-- but only if it is allowed.  If the Church had tried
 to regulate the press, it would have been possible to operate them
 underground.  This is not the case with BBSs because the telephone
 network can be programmed to log all modem communications.

 From the positive aspect of information technology, there comes the
 potential for a democratic process that has not been practical
 until now.  As information technology becomes more accessible,
 there could come a world in which an average Joe might write an
 article about picking his nose, and it would have no less
 distribution than if it had been published in MacLean's or Newsweek.

 Although the suppression of pornography and other abuses has its
 attractiveness, the complete and unregulated liberation of
 information is our only defense against its dark side.  The
 scope of the suffering that information enslavement can inflict
 upon us is so great that "preventing misuse" can only be an
 excuse of those who would enslave us.

 Any move that leaves the dark potential of the new technology
 in place, while invalidating its positive aspects, leaves the
 potential for authoritarian abuse in place, while invalidating
 our only true defense.  Any such move is quite obviously
 a move toward enslaving us.  If any cause is worthy of struggle,
 the preservation of information liberty is indeed such a cause.

 Three other thoughts:

 1) If the traditional media loses its preeminence to the "new"
 media, it shows a flaw in the traditional media.  Then, the
 success of the alternative media will be the excuse for imposing
 the same regulation on the alternative media as on the traditional.
 But this will have the effect of imposing the same mediocrity into
 the alternative media as made the traditional media less
 attractive.  Such are the politics of information enslavement.

 2) Radio and television are vulnerable to interference from
 the incompetent and abusive.  But private BBSs must be explicitly
 dialled into.  Can the regulators seriously contend that they
 might protect us from information that we must access in
 such a deliberate and specific manner?

 3) If private BBSs are regulated, uucp and FidoNet, which amount
 to networks of BBSs for machines, will also be.

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 The following article reprinted from "The Spotlight" in Washington D.C
 with permission from Asst. Editor Don Markey.

                CIA CORRUPT, STUPID, SHOULD BE ABOLISHED

        We're spending untold billions on any international spying
        operation that can't figure out what it's own people are
        doing.  It's time for a change.

 By Mark Lane

 The arrest of Aldrich Hazen Ames, former head of the CIA's Soviet
 counterintelligence branch, as a Soviet spy, raises some seminal questions
 about the value of the CIA.  With the fox and his wife, Maria del Rosario
 Casas Ames, also charged as a Soviet spy, in charge of the henhouse, it is
 time to wonder about the fate of the chickens.

 During September, 1985, Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior KGB official, defected.
 Ames was assigned to debrief him.  Yurchenko, after that debriefing,
 escaped from his CIA controllers while having dinner with them in a
 restaurant in Georgetown and then returned to the Soviet Union.

 Edward Lee Howard, a CIA officer, was under secret FBI surveillance during
 the same period.  He too fled to the Soviet Union after he learned that he
 was about to be arrested.  Until now the CIA and FBI have been unable to
 figure out how Howard learned of his imminent incarceration.

 There is a simple rule employed by police departments throughout the
 United States to spot a possibly corrupt cop.  Is he living beyond his
 means?  Even unsophisticated local police organizations which do not
 regularly spy on their own colleagues or subject them to lie detector
 tests, as does the CIA, have established a relatively sound and simple
 method to locate potentially corrupt officers.  Did he buy a Cadillac
 instead of a Ford?  How can he afford to build a garage or construct an
 addition to his house?

 During his highest paid year with the CIA, Ames earned under $70,000.  His
 wife was a student.  Last year he bought a new Jaguar -- which cost about
 his annual income after taxes, unless it was loaded with extras.  He also
 bought a house in Arlington, Virginia (a Washington suburb) worth well
 over half-a-million dollars, a large farm and a number of condominiums in
 Columbia, his wife's country of birth.  He paid for the Virginia house --
 $540,000 -- in cash.

 Apparently he was paid approximately $1.5 million by the Soviet Union
 during the last several years and spent it all on a luxurious life style.
 And now, we are informed by the CIA that no one at the agency noticed the
 improved Ames lifestyle during the past decade.

 The Ames case is reminiscent of the case of CIA officer Edwin P. Wilson
 who engaged in a similar grand life, while earning a relatively meager
 salary at the CIA.  He was subsequently charged and convicted of illegally
 shipping explosives to Libya.  For years Wilson lived on a huge baronial
 estate in Virginia, kept horses and permitted other CIA officers,
 including his superiors, to send their children over to his mansion and
 stables to ride the horses.

 The CIA later claimed to be astonished that Wilson had some other income.
 He claimed the agency knew it all along and that he was the victim of a
 change in policy toward Libya in the smoke-filled rooms in Langley,
 Virginia (headquarters of the CIA) where the resident scholars engage in
 thinking too convoluted and too secret thoughts for ordinary Americans to
 comprehend.  Wilson is now in prison and the CIA is newly astonished by
 Ames.

 Most Americans have not yet decided to forgive the CIA for murdering
 President John F. Kennedy and the leaders of other states.  The only
 justification for its existence, immoral though it may be, is that at
 least it is effective.  That excuse has now expired.  So should the CIA.

 The American people deserve an intelligence agency created in the
 post-Communist world, one designed not to plot, overthrow and kill, but to
 inquire and determine.  An organization which can predict, based on work
 on the ground and contacts, trouble spots such as in Bosnia before they
 erupt, a financial crisis in Japan secured through evaluation and study of
 trends by competent scientists, the uprising of Mexican indigenous people
 before we enter into a NAFTA which makes us partners of their oppressors
 -- all of these would be of great value to America.

 Above all, a democratic society deserves an intelligence agency designed
 to meet the needs of such a country, not designed for a totalitarian
 state.

 This portion of the story ends on a light note.  The "Washington Times"
 reported in front page headlines that the Russians may lose billions of
 dollars in U.S. aid due to their perfidy of spying on us.  Just recently
 Philip Heyman, a Justice Department high official, over the objection of
 Janet Reno, the attorney general and his superior, demanded that Jonathan
 Pollard, the American who spied for Israel, be freed.  Pollard was paid in
 dollars which the United States had sent to Israel as part of its enormous
 contribution to that state.

 I am still looking for the headline that suggests that Israel may lose
 billions of dollars in U.S. aid.

*** An internationally known attorney and recognized authority on the
*** assassination of John F. Kennedy, Mark Lane is the author of "Rush to
*** Judgment", the definitive critique of the Warren Commission, and
*** "Plausible Denial", which links the CIA to the JFK assassination.  Both
*** books are available from Liberty Lobby, 300 Independence Avenue SE,
*** Washington, D.C.

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

                 LEGION OF DOOM T-SHIRTS!! Get 'em

 By Chris Goggans <[e-mail]>

After a complete sellout at HoHo Con 1993 in Austin, TX this past
December, the official Legion of Doom t-shirts are available
once again.  Join the net luminaries world-wide in owning one of
these amazing shirts.  Impress members of the opposite sex, increase
your IQ, annoy system administrators, get raided by the government and
lose your wardrobe!

Can a t-shirt really do all this?  Of course it can!

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

"THE HACKER WAR  --  LOD vs MOD"

This t-shirt chronicles the infamous "Hacker War" between rival
groups The Legion of Doom and  The Masters of Destruction.  The front
of the shirt displays a flight map of the various battle-sites
hit by MOD and tracked by LOD.  The back of the shirt
has a detailed timeline of the key dates in the conflict, and
a rather ironic quote from an MOD member.

(For a limited time, the original is back!)

"LEGION OF DOOM  --  INTERNET WORLD TOUR"

The front of this classic shirt displays "Legion of Doom Internet World
Tour" as well as a sword and telephone intersecting the planet
earth, skull-and-crossbones style.  The back displays the
words "Hacking for Jesus" as well as a substantial list of "tour-stops"
(internet sites) and a quote from Aleister Crowley.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

All t-shirts are sized XL, and are 100% cotton.

Cost is $15.00 (US) per shirt.  International orders add $5.00 per shirt for
postage.

Send checks or money orders.  Please, no credit cards, even if
it's really your card.


Name:       __________________________________________________

Address:    __________________________________________________

City, State, Zip:   __________________________________________


I want ____ "Hacker War" shirt(s)

I want ____ "Internet World Tour" shirt(s)

Enclosed is $______ for the total cost.


Mail to:   Chris Goggans
           603 W. 13th #1A-278
           Austin, TX 78701


These T-shirts are sold only as a novelty items, and are in no way
attempting to glorify computer crime.

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

        In the super-state, it really does not matter at all what
        actually happened.  Truth is what the government chooses
        to tell you.  Justice is what it wants to happen.
                    --Jim Garrison, New Orleans District Attorney

 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%


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