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- DIGITAL FREE PRESS
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Volume 1.0 Issue 3.0
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- * A Publication of The Underground Computing Foundation (UCF) *
-
- * Send Subscription Requests to: dfp-req%underg@uunet.uu.net *
-
- * Send Submissions to: hackers%underg@uunet.uu.net *
-
- * Editor: Max Cray (max%underg@uunet.uu.net) *
-
- * BBS: The Underground (401) 847-2603 (v.32) *
-
- Back issues can be found in the CUD archives at EFF.ORG.
-
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Statement of Purpose and Disclaimer
-
- The Digital Free Press is an uncensored forum to document current
- activities in and of the world of modern technology. It is published under the
- premise that it is better to know, rather than not know, so no attempt is made
- to hide any information no matter how dangerous it may be. Information is a
- double edged sword. It is neither good nor bad, and can be used for either
- good or bad. Warning: Some information in this document could be used for
- illegal activities. Use at your own risk. Articles are the opinion of the
- authors listed, and not of the editor (unless of course the editor wrote
- it).
-
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- In this Issue:
-
- 1. Mail to Max
- 2. Viral Footprints by GodNet Raider
- 3. Character Codes by The BBC
- 4. Mail Insecurity on Telegard BBS Systems by Hard Rock
- 5. The NNSC Info Server by Max Cray
-
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Mail to Max:
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- To: max%underg@underg.UUCP
- Subject: Re: Digital Free Press #2
- Newsgroups: alt.bbs,alt.cyberpunk,comp.org.eff.talk,ri.cug
- Organization: The Puzzle Palace, UKentucky
- Date: Mon, 9 Mar 92 15:03:42 GMT
- From: Wes Morgan <uunet!ms.uky.edu!morgan>
- Sender: uunet!ms.uky.edu!morgan
-
- In article <wVe0gB2w164w@underg.UUCP> you write:
-
- >[Editor's note: Lesson here is be sure you know your upstream sysadmin's
- >policy on distribution of controversial material. I was able to get the uucp
- >connection back, but only after agreeing not to distribute DFP anymore
- >through his site.]
-
- I was glad to see this comment. Given the fact that "the net" now en-
- compasses everything from Crays to AppleIIs, cooperation between admins
- and users (even in mundane matters such as electronic mail) is more
- necessary than ever before.
-
- I was puzzled, however, when I continued reading this issue of DFP. Even
- after you alluded to the importance of foreknowledge, discussion, and
- cooperation, you wrote this:
-
- >Accessing and using equipment that you do not own is okay as long as
- >you do not prevent those who own it from using it, or damage anything.
-
- How does a remote hacker KNOW the results of his actions? How will the
- remote hacker KNOW if he causes damage? How does the remote hacker KNOW
- that he is using one of a limited number of access ports? The simple answer,
- in many cases, is that he does not, and will not, know the results of many
- of his actions.
-
- I have watched hackers attempt to bring my system to a halt through both
- subtle and gross methods. have watched hackers muck about aimlessly in
- user files, erasing/corrupting them at random. There are some types of
- files which can be corrupted by simply opening them with an editor!
-
- [ Editor's comment: How does a hacker know? By trying it and seeing what
- happens, of course, or by reading information, asking others. Same way
- everyone else learns. Now why would a hacker try to bring down your system?
- Hackers *LIKE* computers. Just because someone was trying to cause you harm
- does not mean that all hackers are vandals. Perhaps you could post some
- guidelines on your machine, for example a list of files not to be opened
- with the editor, and ways that those files could be viewed, etc.]
-
- >Sure he got the source code for VMS, but is there any evidence
- >that he used this information for personal gain, or did he simply use the
- >information to improve his understanding of the VMS operating system?
-
- This is a moot point. The source code for VMS (or any commercial operating
- system) is a copyrighted work. By securing his own copies, he violated that
- copyright law and deprived DEC of revenue. There are any number of books
- available for loan/purchase which give details of operating system design.
- I have seen several such texts which explicitly document VMS internals.
- Why weren't those texts an acceptable alternative?
-
- [ Editor's comment: You mean Kevin M. would have bought a copy of VMS,
- but since he was able to just take it, he deprived them of revenue? I do
- not think so. He never would have bought it. DEC has the same amount of
- money no matter if Kevin had the code, or not.
- However, I would be interested in that information you have on the
- VMS internals.]
-
- >Who owns the Internet?
-
- There is no single entity to which we can assign the label "Internet". The
- "Internet" is, in reality, is a conglomerate of cooperating networks. Some
- of these networks, such as SURANet, are regional networks; these are funded
- by their members. Others, such as THEnet, are limited to a single state;
- these are often funded by the government of the State in question. Others
- are not really "networks" at all; uucp, which is based on store-and-forward
- via telephone calls (rather than a constant connection over a leased line),
- is a good example. There is a "backbone" which connects many of these par-
- ticipating networks; it is known as NSFnet, and it is maintained by the
- National Science Foundation. Many nets which participate in the "Internet"
- are commercial; HP, DEC, and IBM have gatewayed their internal networks to
- the "Internet".
-
- There may be parts of this conglomerate for which we can determine owner-
- ship. Obviously, HP's network belongs to HP, while THEnet belongs to the
- State of Texas. Their participation in large-scale networking does NOT
- effect any change in their ownership of their own networks/systems.
-
- >Is it some mysterious 'them'
- >or is it our net?
-
- It is, most assuredly, NOT "our net". The mere fact that we can access
- a facility does NOT imply that we have any rights/privileges whatsoever
- on that facility.
-
- Actually, the fact that a network connects two sites is irrelevant. The
- question is a simple one: Have the operators/owners of that site granted
- me any privileges to use that system? If the system in question has a
- GUEST login or, perhaps, an anonymous FTP service, then I have been granted
- a certain "privilege of use"; if not, I have neither the privilege nor the
- right to attempt access to that system. As I said, the existence of a
- connective network is irrelevant; the same rules would apply to me if I
- walked into the machine room at that remote site, wouldn't they?
-
- [ Editor's comment: Ok so what good is having access if you don't have any
- rights or privledges? Who decides what those rights or privledges are?
- Are these rights or privledges stated anywhere? Who said Morris did not
- have authorization to write a self-propagating program?]
-
- >If it is our net, then we should be able to try some stuff
- >on it, Яand to heck with 'them' if they can't take a joke.
-
- When someone's "stuff" results in downtime, corrupted files, and trashed
- systems, it is NOT a joke. I know sysadmins who spent days recovering from
- hacker "exploration" of their system. If it's a commercial site (one which
- charges for access), it may lose thousands of dollars in revenue during
- recovery. If it's an academic site, hundreds (or thousands) of users may
- suffer; research grinds to a halt, academic assignments cannot be finished,
- electronic mail stops in its tracks, and all users are displaced by hackers'
- exploration. Is this a "joke"? Is your "exploration" and "learning" more
- important than the work of hundreds, or thousands, of others?
-
- [Editor's comment: Hey mistakes happen. That is part of life. If you can't
- handle it then you should not be a sysadmin, and if you do decide to quit
- your job let me know. I would love to be a sysadmin and get to work with big
- computers.If its a commercial site my heart bleeds for them. If its an
- academic site, then maybe everyone learned something from the experience.]
-
- > It is my contention that hackers did not change. Society changed, and it
- >changed for the worse. The environment the early hackers were working in
- >correctly viewed these activities as the desire to utilize technology in a
- >personal way.
-
- There is an important distinction between the "early hackers" and those of
- today. The early hackers did not operate on any system they could find;
- their activities were restricted to local machines. In a sense, this limita-
- tion made them responsible for their activities. RMS didn't go looking for
- systems to "explore" at other universities. Today, hackers rarely operate
- on their own systems; most of them prefer to anonymously wander the networks,
- looking for systems which they can use/misuse/abuse. To me, that "crosses
- the line" between "good" and "bad" hacking. In addition, most of today's
- hackers refuse to accept responsibility for their actions. The Dutch hacker
- conglomerate, for instance, believes that they can hack any system in the
- world, since hacking is currently legal under Dutch law. They saw no prob-
- lem in hacking/cracking/crashing systems throughout Europe and the USA. In
- fact, one of them said in an interview, "In the real world, I would never
- commit a crime."; this person has a badly skewed set of morals, in my opinion.
-
- [ Editor's comment: I do not really see much of a distinction here. Why is it
- okay to hack on a local machine that does not belong to you, but not a
- networked machine that does not belong to you?
- I agree with you about the responsibility thing. I do think hackers
- should be responsible for thier actions, even in cyberspace.]
-
- >By definition hackers believe in the free access to computers
- >and to the freedom of information.
-
- This definition, sadly, is no longer correct. Today's hackers believe
- that computing should be free FOR THEMSELVES; they don't really care
- about others. RMS kept to his principles; the gnu.ai.mit.edu systems
- provide access for almost anyone who asks. Some other ex-hackers have
- set up public access sites, such as Nyx; these are in keeping with the
- hacker ethic of the past.
-
- Today's hackers, on the other hand, don't want to expend any of their
- own resources. In a recent email conversation with a hacker, he claimed
- that his lack of resources gave him the "right" (his word) to hack on
- other systems through the networks. That's ridiculous.
-
- I've even been hacked from MIT, a site which has far greater compu-
- ting resources than mine. Why would someone at MIT *need* to hack my
- systems, when so much is available to them there? The only conclu-
- sion I can reach is that those hackers do not want to accept respon-
- sibility for their actions. Are you arguing that I have some obli-
- gation to condone/support/accept such irresponsibility?
-
- [Editors comment: Perhaps many of today's hackers do not believe in the
- hacker ethic of the past. I believe one of the main points of my editorial
- was that we should reinforce the hacker ethic. Encourage them to contribute
- and be responsible. Perhaps they could perform some sort of service for you
- on your machine, in exchange for its use?
- Of course they did not *need* to hack your system. A hacker does not
- *need* to do anything. There was probably something about your system
- they liked. Consider it a compliment.]
-
- >Current bad mouthing of hackers is simply snobbery.
-
- Hardly; I know that my attitude toward today's hackers comes from my
- obligation and responsibility to the owners of my systems, as well as
- my obligation to the legitimate users.
-
- [ Editors's comment: You are sounding an awful lot like a suit...]
-
- We had a local hacking incident last year. After tracking down the
- responsible parties, I offered to give them full access to a small
- Unix system (an AT&T 3B2/310), with only one condition; they would
- be responsible for the actions taken with that system. None of the
- individuals involved wanted to assume responsibility, even though I
- was willing to give them root access to a Unix system.
-
- [ Editors comment: ? Got me. I would have taken it. Was it networked? Of
- course networked machines are always more interesting.]
-
- >Rather than cracking down on the modern hacker, we
- >should reinforce the hacker ethic, a code of conduct not based upon greed and
- >lust for the almighty dollar, but instead for personal growth through the free
- >access of computers and information, and a respect for technology.
-
- How about adding "respect for the property of others" to that statement?
- If I purchased a Porsche, would you assume that you have the "right" to
- open up the hood and start tinkering with the engine? I don't think so.
- Why should my purchase of, say, a Convex C240 be treated any differently?
-
- [ Editor's comment: Hmm maybe you are right. Maybe they should not be
- treated differently. Where do you park it? :) ]
-
- In closing, let me address the question of resources. Many hackers have
- told me that "they don't have the money for a Unix system"; in fact, this
- is often one of their cardinal arguments in defense of their actions. A
- Unix system for 286/386 microcomputers may be purchased for US$99. I find
- it very difficult to believe that these people cannot afford that small
- amount of money. Most of today's hackers would prefer to siphon their
- needs from the monies and efforts spent by the owners/operators of other
- systems. They want someone else to fund their "exploration".
-
- [ Editor's comment: The old 'Coherent is just as good as my mainframe'
- argument. It is just not the same. Ok, I want to learn VMS. So how about
- a $99 VMS clone for my PC?]
-
- My systems are intended for use by a particular group of users; we cannot
- fund the needs of the world. No single site can afford to support everyone.
- If I could afford to support such activities, I would set up a public access
- system. I can't afford that, so I expect others to respect my policies.
-
- This entire discussion boils down to a single question, and no one has been
- able to provide a suitable answer:
-
- Why should a site be expected to provide access to anyone
- other than those for whom it is purchased/maintained?
-
- Best,
- Wes Morgan
-
- --
- morgan@ms.uky.edu |Wes Morgan, not speaking for| ....!ukma!ukecc!morgan
- morgan@engr.uky.edu |the University of Kentucky's| morgan%engr.uky.edu@UKCC
- morgan@ie.pa.uky.edu |Engineering Computing Center| morgan@wuarchive.wustl.edu
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- [Editor's note: Thanks for your e-mail Wes. And to answer your question, I do
- not think a site should be expected to provide access to anyone other than
- those for whom it is purchased/maintained. However it would be nice if it
- did.]
-
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ##############################################################################
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- From: gnr@tsf.UUCP (GodNet Raider)
- Subject: virus scanner codes.
- Organization: The CyberUnderground
-
-
- -=[ The 'McAfee scan' viral footprint codes ]=-
-
- -or-
-
- /*******************************************/
- /* A fool and his scanner, can part a user */
- /* from his hard earned money. */
- /*******************************************/
-
- - written by -
- GodNet Raider
- - of -
- The CyberUnderground
-
- -=[ "Information is the greatest weapon of power to the modern wizard." ]=-
-
- ]----------------------------------------------------------------------------[
-
- Introduction:
- -------------
-
- Recently I began to wonder about the usefulness of 'virus scanners'
- and what if any difference do they have with a simple text/hex search
- program (like Nortons filefind/ts). And if there was no real DIFFERENCE,
- how secure is the system that used them.
-
- Problems with scanning:
- -----------------------
-
- The first question I had to ask was, What does a 'virus scanner' actually
- look for? Does it only look for one string of codes or several at different
- places in the file?
-
- To answer this question I called a local BBS an dl'ed McAfee's
- Scan3.7v64 (to evaluate and after my tests, it was erased for its lack of
- offering any real protection). Then I went to my archives to retrieve some
- viruses I have experimented with in the past (of which where Jerusalem B and
- Dark Avenger).
-
- I ran scan to verify that the virus files where viruses (3 of which did
- not set off any alarm even tho there was a listing in the documentation for
- them, so I removed them from the test). Then using a sector editor looked at
- the source for the McAfee asso. Scan3.7v64 (here after know just as Scan64)
- to find that the footprint information was encoded. Needless to say this did
- not stop me (for the sake of those who are into the tech aspects of things,
- the actual method used to get the codes are included at the end of the
- article with the codes found), It took less than an hour to get the codes I
- was looking for (without disassembling the code but by looking into the
- memory allocated to the program).
-
- What I found out was that Scan was just a simple hex searcher (that kept
- its data locked up till needed). It could also be fooled by any program
- that contained the same hex string as a real virus (this was proved when,
- using a sector editor, I added the Scan64 footprint for the Jerusalem B
- into the top of a text file (a place this code would never show up in a real
- infection) then renamed it to *.com; Scan64 reported it as infected).
-
- Once the codes where obtained, using Debug directly on a virus file,
- I was able to mutate the virus to no longer be detectable by Scan64 without
- destroying the integrity of it. For the virus was still able to infect files,
- and Scan64 could no longer track it. I was still able to track and control it
- using Norton's filefind, diskmon, diskedit, and (of course) DOS erase.
-
- So it seems my question was answered. Some 'virus scanners' just scan
- for a single string of hex character. This is fine if viruses NEVER changed
- or programs would NEVER use code similar to what a virus would (the smaller
- the footprint string the bigger the chance of mistaken alarms). For if
- a 'virus scanner' programer just keeps making a new release each time there
- is a new virus (an I will not get into the morality of charging customers
- the full price of an software upgrade rather than allowing them to buy/dl
- new footprint data files as they become available) for the program will
- eventually grow to unwieldy sizes. An it should be noted there are other
- programs that may do the same job faster, more upward compatibility, and
- you may already have them on hand.
-
- A possible solution:
- --------------------
-
- One thing that I think is a good idea is when a program allows users
- to add new footprint data to it (like Nortons' virus package). For now
- users don't need to buy new releases for detection of viruses they may not
- get/be able to detect. Instead for the cost of a call to a support bbs (part
- of the original software agreement?) the user can get new data as it becomes
- available or when they fine a new one on their system they can immediately
- add the new footprint rather than wait for the next version to be released.
-
- Method used to obtain footprints:
- ---------------------------------
-
- After finding the data I was looking for was encoded I thought, How can
- I get the data I wanted for my tests?
-
- Disassembling was out, not for any MORAL reason but, for the time
- involved. So I thought it must have to decode the data for it's own use
- and to save time it would do it all before the scan rather than slow the
- process down by doing a full decode. So I needed to look at the memory
- image of the running program. Thanks to DOS 5.0 and Dosshell I was able to
- do this.
-
- After spawning the scan task under the dos shell I used alt-tab to
- swap back to the shell. Once back in the shell I used the shell commands to
- copy the ~tmpxxx.swp to foo.img and terminating Scan64 and Dosshell.
-
- Then using a sector editor I searched though the temp file created by
- the dos shell. I found an area of data that contained the virus names and
- non ascii text data separating them. Even though the strings of ascii data
- (virus names) ended with a zero character (as variable strings have a
- tendency to), the random data did not end with a common signal character (as
- expected for code can be any character). There was also no character count
- stored (the data length varied so it could not be assumed by the scan
- program as well). So I continued to search though the data.
-
- I eventually found another area that had the same text strings (virus
- names). This time the first character of the none ascii data gave the count
- of the data size to the following text string. I knew I had found it so I
- extracted this data to another file (starting at 0 offset in the new file).
- Then wrote down the some codes and checked them against viruses I had.
-
- The codes I had did not seem match. This did not stop me. I took one
- virus (that my understanding said scan was only looking for 6 consecutive
- bytes to match) and started zapping bytes (in a file scan said was infected)
- to find what it was looking for. The processes involved zapping one sector
- at a time till scan said it was not infected, then half of that sector, then
- half of a half, and so on. It came down to 6 CONSECUTIVE bytes as I expected.
- But they where DIFFERENT from the ones I had.
-
- So I went to the windows calculator (it allows byte arithmetic in hex,
- ie.. 0xff + 0x04 = 0x03 (rollover, carry is ignored), it would be outside
- the scope of this ARTICLE to explain why I thought byte arithmetic was
- important). Some quick subtraction found a 0x93 (decimal 147) DIFFERENCE
- between the actual codes and the ones from the allocated memory uses by
- scan.
-
- So taking another virus that scan said was infected I did the minor
- hex math on the codes in the allocated memory used by scan and found the
- codes. Then i zapped only the codes and ran scan on the updated virus file.
- It said there was no infection. I knew I now had the right codes (after a few
- more checks).
-
- So I created a simple C program (see below) to convert the extract file I
- created and converted the codes to a readable form (output from program
- listed at end of ARTICLE). Then tested other viruses against the list. An
- found the same results.
-
- Binary to hex program:
- ----------------------
-
- /*
- fp2txt.c
- Convert footprint binary information to text.
- by GodNet Raider
-
- Notes:
- Please forgive the unrefined/un annotated nature of this code it was
- designed as a one shot.
- */
-
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
-
- #define TRUE 1
- #define MAGICNUM 0x93
-
- void
- main (void);
-
- void main (void)
- {
- unsigned char
- sVirusFP [128],
- *ptVirusInfo,
- szVirusName [128];
- register unsigned int
- nTmpCnt;
- FILE
- *Stream;
-
- Stream = fopen ("fp2.img", "rb");
- while (!feof (Stream))
- {
- ptVirusInfo = sVirusFP;
- if (!(*sVirusFP = getc (Stream)))
- exit (0);
- nTmpCnt = (unsigned int) *sVirusFP;
- while (nTmpCnt--)
- *(++ptVirusInfo) = ((unsigned char) getc (Stream)) - MAGICNUM;
- ptVirusInfo = szVirusName;
- while ((*(ptVirusInfo++) = getc (Stream)));
- printf ("\n%s:\n ", szVirusName);
- ptVirusInfo = sVirusFP;
- nTmpCnt = (unsigned int) *sVirusFP;
- while (nTmpCnt--)
- {
- printf ("0x%02x ", (unsigned int) *(++ptVirusInfo));
- if (nTmpCnt && !((*sVirusFP - nTmpCnt) % 8))
- printf ("\n ");
- }
- printf ("\n");
- getc (Stream);
- }
- exit (0);
- }
-
-
- Footprints discovered:
- ----------------------
-
- The following is a list of the footprint codes found in McAfee asso.
- Scan3.7v64.
-
- 1008 Virus [1008]:
- 0x81 0xed 0x38 0x00 0xe8 0xc3
-
- Stoned-II Virus [S-2]:
- 0x9c 0x2e 0xff 0x1e 0x09 0x00
-
- VHP-2 Virus [VHP2]:
- 0x1c 0x8c 0x44 0x02 0xb8 0x24 0x35 0xcd
- 0x21 0x89
-
- VHP Virus [VHP]:
- 0x07 0x89 0x7e 0x8a 0x8d 0x7e 0x90 0x89
- 0x7e 0x88
-
- Taiwan3 Virus [T3]:
- 0x17 0x0f 0x32 0x0a 0x32 0x0a 0x90 0x0b
- 0xfb 0x08
-
- Armagedon Virus [Arma]:
- 0xb8 0x00 0x43 0xcd 0x21 0x2e 0x89 0x0e
- 0x48 0x01
-
- 1381 Virus [1381]:
- 0x1e 0x06 0x8c 0xc8 0x8e 0xd8 0xb8 0x40
- 0x00 0x8e
-
- Tiny Virus [Tiny]:
- 0xb4 0x40 0x8d 0x94 0xab 0x01 0xb9 0x02
- 0x00 0xcd
-
- Subliminal Virus [Sub]:
- 0x8b 0x3e 0x25 0x01 0x8b 0xd7 0x2e 0x8e
- 0x06 0x27
-
- Sorry Virus [Sorry]:
- 0xeb 0x96 0x83 0x2e 0x12 0x00 0x40 0x83
- 0x2e 0x03
-
- 1024 Virus [1024]:
- 0xc8 0x75 0xed 0x8b 0xd1 0xb8 0x00 0x42
- 0xcd 0x21 0x72
-
- RedX Virus [RedX]:
- 0x52 0x8b 0x9c 0x17 0x04 0xb9 0x19 0x03
- 0x8d 0x94
-
- VP Virus [VP]:
- 0x21 0x89 0x1e 0x22 0x03 0x8c 0x06 0x24
- 0x03 0xb4
-
- Print Screen-2 [P-2]:
- 0x74 0x01 0xbf 0x03 0x00 0xb9 0x20 0x00
- 0xf3 0xa4
-
- Joshi Virus [Joshi]:
- 0xf3 0xa4 0x8c 0xc0 0x05 0x20 0x00 0x8e
- 0xc0 0xbb
-
- Microbes Virus [Micro]:
- 0x8e 0xd0 0xbc 0x00 0xf0 0xfb 0xa1 0x13
- 0x04 0x2d 0x04
-
- Print Screen Virus [Prtscr]:
- 0xcd 0x05 0xfe 0xc8 0xa2 0x60 0x01 0xc3
- 0x6f 0x6e 0x2d
-
- Form Virus [Form]:
- 0xe8 0xb2 0x00 0x5a 0x5e 0x1f 0x33 0xc0
- 0x50 0xb8 0x00 0x7c
-
- June 13th Virus [J13]:
- 0x12 0x00 0xb9 0xb1 0x04 0x2e 0x30 0x04
- 0x46 0xe2
-
- JoJo Virus [JoJo]:
- 0x4d 0x2b 0xd0 0x4a 0x45 0x03 0xe8 0x45
- 0x8e 0xc5
-
- Victor Virus [Victor]:
- 0x74 0x26 0x80 0xfc 0x5b 0x74 0x21 0x80
- 0xfc 0x39
-
- 5120 Virus [5120]:
- 0x10 0xa2 0xf6 0x0f 0xe8 0xd0 0xfe 0x80
- 0x3e 0x4a 0x10 0x02 0x7d 0x22 0xc6 0x46
-
- W-13 Virus [W13]:
- 0xf3 0xa4 0x8b 0xfa 0xb4 0x30 0xcd 0x21
- 0x3c 0x00
-
- Slow Virus [Slow]:
- 0x81 0xc6 0x1b 0x00 0xb9 0x90 0x06 0x2e
- 0x80 0x34
-
- Liberty Virus [Liberty]:
- 0xe8 0xfd 0xfe 0x72 0x2a 0x3b 0xc1 0x7c
- 0x27 0xe8
-
- Fish Virus [Fish]:
- 0x0e 0x01 0xcf 0xe8 0x00 0x00 0x5b 0x81
- 0xeb 0xa9
-
- Shake Virus [Shake]:
- 0x31 0xd2 0x8b 0xca 0xcd 0x21 0x3d 0x00
- 0xf0 0x73
-
- Murphy Virus [Murphy]:
- 0x81 0x7c 0xfe 0x2e 0x43 0x75 0xed 0xb8
- 0x02 0x3d
-
- V800 Virus [V800]:
- 0x51 0xad 0x33 0xd0 0xe2 0xfb 0x59 0x31
- 0x15 0x47
-
- Kennedy Virus [Kennedy]:
- 0x8c 0x55 0x02 0xb8 0x01 0x43 0x33 0xc9
- 0xcd 0x21
-
- Yankee Two Virus [Doodle2]:
- 0x73 0x03 0x5a 0x5e 0xc3 0x8b 0xf2 0xf6
- 0x44 0x15
-
- 1971 Virus [1971]:
- 0x33 0xd2 0xb8 0x00 0x42 0xcd 0x21 0x72
- 0x26 0x81 0x7c
-
- June 16th Virus [June16]:
- 0x4d 0xa9 0xa5 0x2e 0x70 0x66 0x2e 0x57
- 0x09 0x0f
-
- AIDS II Virus [A2]:
- 0xa4 0x00 0x55 0x89 0xe5 0x81 0xec 0x02
- 0x02 0xbf 0xca 0x05 0x0e 0x57 0xbf 0x3e
- 0x01
-
- 1210 Virus [1210]:
- 0xc4 0x74 0xf0 0x2e 0x80 0x3e 0x2f 0x04
- 0x01 0x75
-
- 1720 Virus [1720]:
- 0xd8 0x2e 0xa1 0x2c 0x00 0xa3 0xfc 0x03
- 0x2e 0xa0
-
- Saturday 14th Virus [Sat14]:
- 0x0e 0x1f 0xb8 0x24 0x35 0xcd 0x21 0x8c
- 0x06 0x6f
-
- XA1 (1539) Christmas Virus [XA1]:
- 0xfa 0x8b 0xec 0x58 0x32 0xc0 0x89 0x46
- 0x02 0x81
-
- 1392 (Amoeba) Virus [1392]:
- 0x16 0xa3 0x21 0x01 0x8b 0x44 0x14 0xa3
- 0x23 0x01
-
- Vcomm Virus [Vcomm]:
- 0x77 0x02 0xb9 0x20 0x00 0xb4 0x4e 0xcd
- 0x21
-
- ItaVir Virus [Ita]:
- 0xb8 0x58 0x45 0x89 0x40 0x02 0xb0 0x00
- 0x88 0x40 0x04
-
- Korea Virus [Korea]:
- 0x8e 0xd0 0xbc 0xf0 0xff 0xfb 0xbb 0x13
- 0x04
-
- Solano Virus [Solano]:
- 0x12 0x75 0x0e 0x2e 0x8b 0x0e 0x03 0x01
-
- V2000 Virus [2000]:
- 0x51 0xe8 0x39 0xfd 0x8e 0xc3 0x26 0x8b
-
- 12 Tricks Trojan [Tricks]:
- 0x64 0x02 0x31 0x94 0x42 0x01 0xd1 0xc2
- 0x4e 0x79 0xf7
-
- 12 Tricks Trojan [Tricks-B]:
- 0xe4 0x61 0x8a 0xe0 0x0c 0x80 0xe6 0x61
-
- 1559 Virus [1559]:
- 0x03 0x26 0x89 0x1e 0x92 0x00 0xfb 0xc3
- 0x50 0x53 0x51 0x52 0x06
-
- 512 Virus [512]:
- 0x01 0x8c 0x45 0x70 0x1f 0x89 0x57 0x14
- 0x8c 0xca 0x8e 0xda
-
- EDV Virus [EDV]:
- 0x75 0x1c 0x80 0xfe 0x01 0x75 0x17 0x5b
- 0x07 0x1f 0x58 0x83
-
- Icelandic-3 Virus [Ice-3]:
- 0x24 0x2e 0x8f 0x06 0x3b 0x03 0x90 0x2e
- 0x8f 0x06
-
- Perfume Virus [Fume]:
- 0x04 0x06 0xbf 0xba 0x00 0x57 0xcb 0x0e
- 0x1f 0x8e 0x06
-
- Joker Virus [Joke]:
- 0x56 0x07 0x45 0x07 0x21 0x07 0x1d 0x49
- 0x27 0x6d 0x20 0x73 0x6f 0x20 0x6d 0x75
- 0x63
-
- Virus-101 [101]:
- 0xb3 0x01 0xb4 0x36 0x70 0xb7 0x01 0xb4
- 0x36 0x70 0x8b 0x37 0xb4 0x36 0x70 0xb3
- 0x03 0xb4 0x36 0x70 0x03 0xf3 0xb4
-
- Halloechen Virus [Hal]:
- 0x8c 0xd0 0x8b 0xd4 0xbc 0x02 0x00 0x36
- 0x8b 0x0e
-
- Taiwan Virus [Taiwan]:
- 0x8a 0x0e 0x95 0x00 0x81 0xe1 0xfe 0x00
- 0xba 0x9e
-
- Oropax Virus [Oro]:
- 0x3e 0x01 0x1d 0xf2 0x77 0xd1 0xba 0x00
-
- Chaos Virus [Chaos]:
- 0xa1 0x49 0x43 0x68 0x41 0x4f 0x53 0x50
- 0x52 0x51 0xe8
-
- 4096 Virus [4096]:
- 0xf6 0x2e 0x8f 0x06 0x41 0x12 0x2e 0x8f
- 0x06 0x43
-
- Virus-90 [90]:
- 0x81 0xb8 0xfe 0xff 0x8e 0xd8 0x2d 0xcc
-
- AIDS Information Trojan [Aids]:
- 0x31 0x30 0x30 0x2c 0x36 0x32 0x2c 0x33
- 0x32 0x00
-
- Devil's Dance Virus [Dance]:
- 0x5e 0x1e 0x06 0x8c 0xc0 0x48 0x8e 0xc0
- 0x26
-
- Amstrad Virus [Amst]:
- 0x72 0x02 0xeb 0x36 0x76 0xba 0x80 0x00
- 0xb4 0x1a 0xcd 0x21 0x80 0x3e
-
- Datacrime II-b Virus [Crime-2B]:
- 0x2e 0x8a 0x07 0x32 0xc2 0xd0 0xca 0x2e
-
- Holland Girl Virus [Holland]:
- 0x36 0x03 0x01 0x33 0xc9 0x33 0xc0 0xac
-
- Do Nothing Virus [Nothing]:
- 0x72 0x04 0x50 0xeb 0x07 0x90 0xb4 0x4c
-
- Lisbon Virus [Lisb]:
- 0x8b 0x44 0x79 0x3d 0x0a 0x00 0x72 0xde
-
- Sunday Virus [Sunday]:
- 0x75 0x10 0x07 0x2e 0x8e 0x16 0x45 0x00
- 0x2e 0x8b
-
- Typo COM virus [Typo]:
- 0x99 0xfe 0x26 0xa1 0x5a 0x00 0x2e 0x89
-
- DBASE Virus [Dbase]:
- 0x80 0xfc 0x6c 0x74 0xea 0x80 0xfc 0x5b
- 0x74 0xe5
-
- Ghost Virus :
- 0x90 0xea 0x59 0xec 0x00 0xf0 0x90 0x90
-
- Jerusalem Virus Strain B [Jeru]:
- 0x47 0x00 0x33 0xc0 0x8e 0xc0 0x26 0xa1
- 0xfc 0x03
-
- Alabama Virus [Alabama]:
- 0x8f 0x06 0x18 0x05 0x26 0x8f 0x06 0x1a
-
- 1701/1704 Virus - Version B [170X]:
- 0x31 0x34 0x31 0x24 0x46 0x4c
-
- Datacrime Virus [Crime]:
- 0x36 0x01 0x01 0x83 0xee 0x03 0x8b 0xc6
- 0x3d 0x00
-
- Stoned Virus [Stoned]:
- 0x00 0x53 0x51 0x52 0x06 0x56 0x57 0xbe
-
- Vacsina virus [Vacs]:
- 0xb8 0x01 0x43 0x8e 0x5e 0x0e 0x8b 0x56
- 0x06 0x2e
-
- Den Zuk Virus :
- 0x8e 0xc0 0xbe 0xc6 0x7c 0xbf 0x00 0x7e
-
- Ping Pong Virus (old string):
- 0x59 0x5b 0x58 0x07 0x1f 0xea
-
- Pakistani Brain Virus [Brain]:
- 0x8e 0xd8 0x8e 0xd0 0xbc 0x00 0xf0 0xfb
- 0xa0 0x06
-
- Yale/Alameda Virus [Alameda]:
- 0xb4 0x00 0xcd 0x13 0x72 0x0d 0xb8 0x01
-
- Lehigh Virus [Lehigh]:
- 0x5e 0x83 0xee 0x03 0x8b 0xde 0x81 0xeb
- 0x91 0x01
-
- Pakistani Brain/Ashar Virus [Brain]:
- 0x20 0x8c 0xc8 0x8e 0xd8 0x8e 0xd0
-
- Fu Manchu Virus - Version A [Fu]:
- 0x26 0xc7 0x06 0xfc 0x03 0xf3 0xa4 0x26
- 0xc6 0x06
-
- Ping Pong Virus - Version B [Ping]:
- 0@xa1 0@xf5 0x81 0@xa3 0@xf5 0x7d 0x8b 0x36
- 0xf9 0x81
-
- 1536 (Zero Bug) Virus [Zero]:
- 0xeb 0x2b 0x90 0x5a 0x45 0xcd 0x60 0x2e
-
- Vienna (DOS 62) Virus - Version B [Vienna]:
- 0x8b 0@xfe 0x36 0x6f 0xc7 0x1f 0x36 0x6f
- 0x8b 0@xde 0x36 0x6f 0xc6 0x1f
-
- Ghost Version of DOS-62 [Ghost-C]:
- 0x8e 0xd8 0@xa1 0x13 0x04 0x2d 0x02 0x00
- 0x90 0xa3 0x13
-
- Friday 13th Virus [@Fri13]:
- 0xb4 0x4f 0xcd 0x21 0x73 0@xf7 0x58
-
- 405 virus [405]:
- 0x19 0xcd 0x21 0x26 0xa2 0x49 0x02 0xb4
- 0x47 0x04 0x01 0x50
-
- 3066/2930 Traceback Virus [3066]:
- 0x14 0x8b 0x4d 0x16 0x8b 0xc1 0x8a 0xcd
-
- Pentagon Virus :
- 0xeb 0x34 0x90 0x48 0x41 0x4c 0x20 0x20
-
- Israeli Boot Virus:
- 0xcd 0x13 0xb8 0x02 0x02 0xb9 0x06 0x27
- 0xba 0x00 0x01
-
- Typo Boot Virus:
- 0x24 0x13 0x55 0xaa
-
- Datacrime-2 Virus [Crime-2]:
- 0x8a 0x94 0x03 0x01 0x8d 0xbc 0x29 0x01
- 0x8d 0x8c 0xea 0x06
-
- Ohio Virus:
- 0xeb 0x29 0x90 0x49 0x34 0x12 0x00 0x01
- 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
-
- 3551 (Syslock) Virus [Syslock]:
- 0x33 0x06 0x14 0x00 0x31 0x04 0x46 0x46
- 0xe2 0xf2
-
- Dark Avenger virus [Dav]:
- 0xa1 0x4f 0x07 0x89 0x07 0x2e 0xa1 0x51
-
- MIX1/Icelandic Virus [Ice]:
- 0x43 0x81 0x3f 0x45 0x58 0x75 0xf1 0xb8
- 0x00 0x43
-
- Disk Killer Virus [Killer]:
- 0xc3 0x10 0xe2 0xf2 0xc6 0x06 0xf3 0x01
- 0xff 0x90 0xeb 0x55
-
- AIDS Virus [Taunt]:
- 0x42 0xe8 0xef 0xe3 0xbf 0xca 0x03 0x1e
-
- Yankee Doodle Virus [Doodle]:
- 0x35 0xcd 0x21 0x8b 0xf3 0x8c 0xc7
-
- Suriv A Virus [SurivA]:
- 0x90 0x73 0x55 0x52 0x49 0x56 0x00
-
- Suriv B Virus [SurivB]:
- 0x00 0x73 0x55 0x52 0x49 0x56 0x00
-
- ]============================================================================[
- --
- ...uunet!underg!tsf!gnr (GodNet Raider)
- -=[ "Information is the greatest weapon of power to the modern wizard." ]=-
- -=[ "You gotta learn to listen, before you learn to play." ]=-
-
- [ Editor's note: This was recently posted to alt.hackers, and comp.viruses
- and is republished for those who missed it, or do not have access to Usenet,
- and for archival purposes. A more devious mind could think of all sorts of
- fun using this information, like fake virus programs, etc. The scan
- signatures themselves are not dangerous.]
-
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ##############################################################################
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Phun With Character Codes
- by The BBC
-
- Sunny day... Bringing the clouds your way... On your way to where
- the minds aren't clean.......... Can you tell us how to get... How
- to get to Hackers street... How to get to Hackers street... How to
- get to Hackers street.........
-
- Today on Hackers street... We learn about the control letters...
- S... and G... An the number....... 0....
-
- Hello kiddies, An what a dreary day in the neighborhood... [Oops
- sorry wrong show]..... Well any way welcome to Hackers street... We
- are your good friends The BBC... Today we thought.... Why look there
- is Big Hackbird, an he looks depressed, lets find out why...
-
- Hackbird Why so down... 'Well BBC it seems that all the
- users\sysop stoped using ANSI [AAAAHHHHHHHH] on their systems'...
- 'Now I can't make problem messages'... 'What is a Hackbird to do'...
- Never fear, Hackbird, The BBC is here... Have we ever let you down
- before??? 'Well yes, there was that time you dropped me and a short
- sysop from the world trade center to prove that all objects fall at
- the same rate on last weeks show and...' [Smack] Well anyway...
-
- So today then we will learn [Thanks to the new feature of some
- boards that let users [and hackers] upload messages using protocols
- other than ascii]... Yes now you can imbed into messages special
- chars. that can not be typed in, in some cases... Three of which
- are... ^G, ^S, and the null char. [0x00]... An what nasty little
- things they could be used for... Not that We would even suggest
- such things...
-
- First we will talk about ^G [0x07] better know as the bell
- char.... 'Me, know about bell. Noisy, don't like'... 'But it bother
- ears to put in and some boards don't take'... 'An what is few beep
- anyway'...That is true Crashy monster... But, Remember there are now
- boards that let us upload large messages... An we are no longer
- talking a few beeps but instead a few thousand beeps... For till a
- paused is reached [80 * 24 or 1920 chars. in some cases] a person
- must listen to our lil' musical... Crash in 'c' minor... 'Yes, me
- see... Me like, me like'... Well if you liked that you will love
- what comes next... But first would like to help us test something...
- 'Ya, Ya what... New Virus, Trojan, Password cracker'... No just this
- new trap door and spiked pit... 'What spiked... AHHHHHHHHhhhhhh
- [Splat]'...
-
- 'Yes, this is Kermit t. Protocol reporting from BBC labs'...
- Today they are hard at work with their new toy ^S [0x13]...
- 'Professor BBC tell us about this ^S'... Well lil' green buddy it is
- the infamous Xoff char.... It is used to signal the remote not to
- send anymore chars. till a ^Q [0x11 (Xon)] is received... What this
- will do is make the caller think his keyboard is locked for what he
- types is not sent... Ohhhh if they have any brains they will hit
- the ^Q manually but don't expect much... An to put a few of these
- in a message will cause a bit of a problem... An the quote features
- will carry them forward as well.. 'That is nice, what else is BBC
- labs working on'... We are glad you asked... We have branched out
- into the realm of comedy... Like over here is out latest joke... How
- would you like to be part of this great experiment kermy... 'Well I
- guess... what the blender for?'... Ok, Ready... What is green and
- red n' goes 120 MPH... 'I don't know... Hey! What are you doing...'
- .. Kermit t. Protocol in a blender... [BUZZZZZZZZZZZ]
- 'Ahhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh...
-
- Finally kiddies, Grover the pirate will help us with... 'Yes! I
- Grover the pirate will help the BBC with their talk about...'
- Groovy... Now, you want to be in next weeks show, right... 'Well
- yes.. but why wouldn't I'... Well you could meet with a nasty
- mishap... 'What kind of mishap?'... Well like someone could hit this
- rope with a knife [Snap]... 'So'... Well that rope supported a 16
- ton weight over your head... 'What 16 to....[Splat]'... Now kids we
- hope you learned from this, an remember never play with knives near
- ropes attached to 16 ton weights... Well now that we will not be
- bothered... The Null char. [0x00] is a funny little thing in that
- some BBS software will not send it in ansii mode... So you ask what
- good is a char. like that... Well there may come the time you need a
- timer... a way to make the host wait a few seconds after sending a
- group of chars. like an Attention signal [in most cases '+++']...
- For to get a message to the host modem you must sent an attention
- signal then wait about 3 seconds before sending the hangup command
- [ATH0] to have the users session bail out in mid message... Of
- course you will have to send about 5 pages worth [no line returns]
- of this char. to get the right delay... But thank to the non ascii
- upload method this will be easy... An we would hope you will not use
- this to send an hangup followed by a call command to a 900 number...
- That would be most evil... An you may grow up to be scum like...
-
- The BBC
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
- ...uunet!underg!tsf!bbc (The BBC)
- -=[ "Anarchy is never HAVING to say you're sorry." ]=-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ##############################################################################
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- To: hackers@underg.UUCP
- Subject: All I want is to be is in DFP #3
- From: hardrock@underg.UUCP (hard rock)
- Date: Wed, 15 Apr 92 18:13:56 EDT
- Organization: Underground Computing Foundation
-
- ******************************************************************
- ** WAY TO READ OTHER PEOPLE'S MAIL ON TELEGARD BBS! **
- ******************************************************************
-
- Well a friend of yours or maybe a enemy, well who ever this person
- is, is a regular caller of the BBS type Telegard v2.7. You out of
- normal curious nature, would like to know what he is writing about
- to the other babes on the system. Well a couple of ways can be
- used, some legal some not:
-
- A) Break into the sysop's house when he/she is at work, or on
- vacation and just reading, hoping the neighbors didn't hear
- you use TNT to break down the door. This method can be
- somewhat dangerous, but still possible.
-
- B) Find out the working schedule of the sysop and when he/she is
- not home, spend it trying to hack out the privileged accounts.
- This could get kind of boring or tiring after a while. Also,
- if you are a *real* hacker, you live on pizza and chips. Well
- the chip company and local pizza joint will be getting a lot
- of your drug money.
-
- C) Use the method I am going to tell you. Can be a little tedious,
- if you want to read a lot of mail from different users.
-
- D) And any other scummy forms of hacking.
-
- Well, I feel the most logical one is 'C'. Well to get down to how
- to do it, first you must find out the full alias used by the
- victim. For example: Let me pick a name randomly out of my head,
- well how about 'TWO FACE'. Hey, no booing allowed!!! What I
- mean by FULL ALIAS, is don't try it will TWO or 2FACE, basically
- use that thing between your ears. With this name, you would try
- to log on as 'TWO FACE2' or 'TWO FACE1'. The object is to make
- sure a character follows the real name. It will allow you to log
- on, after the logon, go to the message section and start reading.
-
- The reason this works is because, simple: In the message section
- the computer looks at the first message FROM:Peter Pan TO:Killer
- Bee. Your name, TWO FACE2, doesn't start with a P or a K so it
- skips that message. The next message it looks at, FROM:Amy Lowell
- TO:TWO FACE. The 'T''W''O'' ''F''A''C''E'' is all equal. It
- allows you to read it. It doesn't check to see that you have a
- extra character.
-
- Well enjoy, this small but useful hack. I will be reporting if
- this works on other BBS systems. Maybe, PCBoard has a small error
- like this. (c)1992 Hard Rock
-
-
- * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * NOTE * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
- I am NOT in any way responsible for you getting you ass screwed
- because you attempt to mess around with some local subscription
- system. Don't say to the sysop or cops, well it was HARD ROCK,
- yeah that dude who wrote the document. LAST TIME: THIS IS FOR
- INFORMATION USE ONLY!!!
-
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ##############################################################################
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- The NNSC Info Server
- by Max Cray
-
- The National Science Foundation Network Service Center (NNSC) operates
- the Info-Server for the purpose of providing important Internet
- documents by email.
-
- To order the help document, Send a message to info-server@nnsc.nsf.net.
- The Subject field does not matter and may be omitted. Place the
- following text in the body of the message:
-
- request: info
- topic: help
-
-
- For example, this document can be obtained from this service:
-
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- NETWORK PROVIDER REFERRAL LIST
- NSF Network Service Center (NNSC)
- 13 April 1992
-
- The NSF Network Service Center (NNSC) often receives the initial calls from
- sites wishing to connect to the Internet. The NNSC refers such callers to
- the appropriate contacts for any networks which might be able to serve them.
- The current list of contacts used by NNSC for this purpose follows. If you
- have any updates or corrections to this information, please send a message
- to nnsc@nnsc.nsf.net.
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Network Service Area
- Contact Name Phone Number Mail Address
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Providers Based in the United States of America
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Alternet US and International
- UUNET (800) 4UUNET3 alternet-info@uunet.uu.net
-
- ANS US and International
- Joel Maloff (313) 663-7610 maloff@nis.ans.net
-
- BARRNET Bay Area, California (CA)
- William Yundt (415) 723-3104 gd.why@forsythe.stanford.edu
-
- CERFnet Western US and International
- CERFnet Hotline (800) 876-2373 help@cerf.net
-
- CICnet Midwest US (MN, WI, IA, IN, IL, MI, OH)
- John Hankins (313) 998-6102 hankins@cic.net
-
- CO Supernet Colorado (CO)
- Ken Harmon (303) 273-3475 kharmon@csn.org
-
- CONCERT North Carolina (NC)
- Joe Ragland (919) 248-1404 jrr@concert.net
-
- International Connections Manager (ICM) International
- Robert Collet (703) 904-2230 rcollet@icm1.icp.net
-
- INet Indiana (IN)
- Dick Ellis (812) 855-4240 ellis@ucs.indiana.edu
-
- JVNCnet US and International
- Sergio Heker (800) 35TIGER market@jvnc.net
- Allison Pihl
-
- Los Nettos Los Angeles Area (CA)
- Ann Westine Cooper (213) 822-1511 los-nettos-request@isi.edu
-
- MichNet/Merit Michigan (MI)
- Jeff Ogden (313) 764-9430 jogden@merit.edu
-
- MIDnet Mid US (NE, OK, AR, MO, IA, KS, SD)
- Dale Finkelson (402) 472-5032 dmf@westie.unl.edu
-
- MRnet Minnesota (MN)
- Dennis Fazio (612) 342-2570 dfazio@mr.net
-
- MSEN Michigan (MI)
- Owen Medd (313) 741-1120 info@msen.com
-
- NEARnet Northeastern US (ME NH VT CT RI MA)
- John Curran (617) 873-8730 nearnet-staff@nic.near.net
-
- netILLINOIS Illinois (IL)
- Joel L. Hartman (309) 677-3100 joel@bradley.bradley.edu
-
- NevadaNet Nevada (NV)
- Don Zitter (702) 784-6133 zitter@nevada.edu
-
- NorthwestNet Northwestern US (WA OR ID MT ND WY AK)
- Eric Hood (206) 562-3000 ehood@nwnet.net
-
- NYSERnet New York (NY)
- Jim Luckett (315) 443-4120 info@nysernet.org
-
- OARnet Ohio (OH)
- Alison Brown (614) 292-8100 alison@oar.net
-
- PACCOM Hawaii (HI) and Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Hong Kong
- Torben Nielsen (808) 956-3499 torben@hawaii.edu
-
- PREPnet Pennsylvania (PA)
- Thomas Bajzek (412) 268-7870 twb+@andrew.cmu.edu
-
- PSCNET Eastern US (PA, OH, WV)
- Eugene Hastings (412) 268-4960 pscnet-admin@psc.edu
-
- PSINet US and International
- PSI, Inc. (800) 82PSI82 info@psi.com
-
- Sesquinet Texas (TX)
- Farrell Gerbode (713) 527-4988 farrell@rice.edu
-
- SDSCnet San Diego Area (CA)
- Paul Love (619) 534-5043 loveep@sds.sdsc.edu
-
- SURAnet Southeastern US (WV, VA, SC, NC, TN, KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, FL)
- Jack Hahn (301) 982-4600 hahn@sura.net
-
- THEnet Texas (TX)
- Tracy LaQuey Parker (512) 471-2444 tracy@utexas.edu
-
- VERnet Virginia (VA)
- James Jokl (804) 924-0616 jaj@virginia.edu
-
- Westnet Western US (AZ, CO, ID, NM, UT, WY)
- Pat Burns (303) 491-7260 pburns@yuma.acns.colostate.edu
-
- WiscNet Wisconsin (WI)
- Tad Pinkerton (608) 262-8874 tad@cs.wisc.edu
-
- WVNET West Virginia (WV)
- Harper Grimm (304) 293-5192 cc011041@wvnvms.wvnet.edu
-
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Providers Based Outside the United States of America
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- AARNet Australia
- AARNet Support +61 6 249 3385 aarnet@aarnet.edu.au
-
- UKnet United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- UKnet Support +44-227-475497 postmaster@uknet.ac.uk
-
- EUnet Europe, CIS-region, and Northern Africa
- EUnet Support +31 20 592-5124 glenn@eu.net
-
-
- --------
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- ##############################################################################
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Well folks, thats all for DFP #3. Information needed for future articles:
-
- 1. Hacker and Computer Underground Resources: Magazines, Journals, BBSes,
- Archives, etc. If you have any information to share please e-mail
- complete details to hackers%underg@uunet.uu.net. The information
- will be summarized in a future article.
-
- 2. E-Mail addresses of famous people. If you know of any e-mail addresses
- of famous people please e-mail them. All sources will be kept
- confidential. If you are a famous person, and do not want to be on
- the list please send e-mail (heheh).
-
- Keep that e-mail coming!
-
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- -= Max Cray =-
- Internet: underg!max@uunet.uu.net Support
- UUCP: ...!uunet!underg!max Free
- Data: The Underground Computing Foundation BBS Software
- 401-847-2603 -=- 9600 baud (v.32) (w/src)
- CI$: 76334,2203
-
-
-
-
-