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- CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.23
- Original issue date: October 28, 1996
- Last revised: --
-
- Topic: Vulnerability in WorkMan
- - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- The original technical content for this advisory
- was published by the IBM-ERS response team and
- is used here with their permission.
-
- There is a vulnerability in the WorkMan compact disc-playing program that
- affects UNIX System V Release 4.0 and derivatives and Linux systems.
- When the program is installed set-user-id root, it can be used to make any
- file on the system world-writable.
-
- To address this problem, you should remove the set-user-id bit from the
- program.
-
- We will update this advisory as we receive additional information.
- Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.
-
- - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- I. Description
-
- WorkMan is a popular program used for playing audio compact disks on local
- workstation CD-ROM drives that is widely available from many sites around the
- Internet. Versions of WorkMan are also included with some operating system
- distributions, such as Linux.
-
- On systems where WorkMan was built and installed using the procedures that
- are given in "Makefile.linux" or "Makefile.svr4" (in general, this means on
- Linux systems and UNIX System V Release 4.0 systems), the WorkMan program
- is installed set-user-id root. This means that when the program is run,
- it will execute with super-user permissions.
-
- In order to allow signals to be sent to it, WorkMan writes its process-id
- to a file called /tmp/.wm_pid. The "-p" option to the program allows the
- user to specify a different file name in which to record this information.
- When a file is specified with "-p", WorkMan simply attempts to create and/or
- truncate the file, and if this succeeds, WorkMan changes the permissions on
- the file so that it is world-readable and world-writable.
-
- In the general case, when WorkMan is installed without the set-user-id bit
- set, the normal file access permissions provided by the operating system will
- prevent users from creating or truncating files they are not authorized to
- create or truncate. However, when WorkMan is installed set-user-id root,
- this process breaks down (because "root" is allowed to create/truncate any
- file).
-
- WorkMan does not require the set-user-id bit to work; it is installed this
- way only on systems that do not make the CD-ROM device file world-readable
- by default.
-
- Note: The vulnerability described by "r00t" on several mailing lists is not
- the same one that we describe in this advisory.
-
- II. Impact
-
- A user with access to an account on the system can use the "-p" option to
- create a file anywhere in the file system or to truncate any file in the file
- system. The file specified with "-p" will be world-readable and world-writable
- when WorkMan is finished. This can enable the user to create accounts,
- destroy log files, and perform other unauthorized actions.
-
- III. Solution
-
- 1. Remove the set-user-id bit from the WorkMan program using a command
- such as
-
- chmod u-s /usr/local/bin/workman
-
- 2. Make the CD-ROM device world-readable using a command such as
-
- chmod +r /dev/cdrom
-
- On multi-user systems, Step 2 will allow any user to access the contents
- of the disc installed in the CD-ROM; this may not be desirable in all
- environments.
-
- The vulnerability described in this advisory is related to the WorkMan
- program, not to the products of particular vendors. However, if a vendor sends
- us advice for their users, we will put it in Appendix A.
-
- ...........................................................................
-
- Appendix A - Vendor Information
-
- This appendix contains advice vendors wish to offer their users. Note that the
- vulnerability described in this advisory is related to the WorkMan program,
- not particular vendors' products.
-
- Sun Microsystems, Inc.
- ======================
-
- Sun does not recommend that workman and other utility programs
- be installed setuid root (or anything else) unless that step is
- absolutely necessary. Programs which were not designed with
- security in mind (and most non-setuid programs are not) are
- unlikely to have built-in allowances for abuse. The proper way to
- allow such programs to work is to install them as unprivileged,
- ordinary software, then modify device permissions as necessary
- to allow them to function.
-
- When an unprivileged users executes a recent version of the workman
- program on a properly configured Solaris 2.x system, a message
- similar to the following appears. (Ellipses added to save space.)
-
- As root, please run
-
- chmod 666 /devices/iommu@0,...sd@6,0:c,raw
-
- to give yourself permission to access the CD-ROM device.
-
-
- That's pretty good advice. Of course, if you don't want to give
- every user access to the contents of a CD (which will sometimes
- be data or software, and sometimes music) such permissions are
- not appropriate.
-
- - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
- The CERT Coordination Center thanks IBM-ERS for permission to reproduce the
- technical content in their IBM Emergency Response Service Security
- Vulnerability Alert ERS-SVA-E01-1996:005.1. These alerts are copyrighted 1996
- International Business Machines Corporation.
- - -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
- Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response
- and Security Teams (see ftp://info.cert.org/pub/FIRST/first-contacts).
-
-
- CERT/CC Contact Information
- - ----------------------------
- Email cert@cert.org
-
- Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
- CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
- and are on call for emergencies during other hours.
-
- Fax +1 412-268-6989
-
- Postal address
- CERT Coordination Center
- Software Engineering Institute
- Carnegie Mellon University
- Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
- USA
-
- Using encryption
- We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. We can
- support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT/CC for more information.
- Location of CERT PGP key
- ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key
-
- Getting security information
- CERT publications and other security information are available from
- http://www.cert.org/
- ftp://info.cert.org/pub/
-
- CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
- comp.security.announce
-
- To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send your
- email address to
- cert-advisory-request@cert.org
-
- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University
- This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided
- it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is
- included.
-
- CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.
- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- This file: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.23.workman_vul
- http://www.cert.org
- click on "CERT Advisories"
-
-
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
- Revision history
-
-
-
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