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Linux IPCHAINS-HOWTO Paul Russell Paul.Russell@rustcorp.com.au v0.8, 31 July 1998 This document aims to describe how to obtain, install and configure the enhanced IP firewalling chains software for Linux, and some ideas on how you might use them. ______________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 What? 1.2 Why? 1.3 How? 1.4 Where? 2. Packet filtering basics. 2.1 What? 2.2 Why? 2.3 How? 2.3.1 A kernel with packet filtering. 2.3.2 (TT 3. IP firewalling chains. 3.1 How packets traverse the filters. 3.1.1 Using 3.1.2 Operations on a single rule. 3.1.3 Filtering specifications. 3.1.3.1 Specifying source and destination IP addresses. 3.1.3.2 Specifying inversion. 3.1.3.3 Specifying protocol. 3.1.3.3.1 Specifying UDP and TCP ports. 3.1.3.3.2 Specifying ICMP type & code. 3.1.3.4 Specifying an interface. 3.1.3.5 Specifying TCP SYN packets only. 3.1.3.6 Handling fragments. 3.1.4 Filtering side effects. 3.1.4.1 Specifying a target. 3.1.4.2 Logging packets. 3.1.4.3 Manipulating the Type Of Service 3.1.4.4 Marking a packet. 3.1.4.5 Operations on an entire chain. 3.1.4.6 Creating a new chain. 3.1.4.7 Deleting a chain. 3.1.4.8 Flushing a chain. 3.1.4.9 Listing a chain. 3.1.4.10 Resetting (zeroing) counters. 3.1.4.11 Setting policy. 3.1.5 Operations on masquerading. 3.1.6 Checking a packet. 3.1.7 Multiple rules at once and watching what happens. 3.2 Useful Examples 3.2.1 Using 3.2.2 Using 4. Miscellaneous. 4.1 How to organise your firewall rules. 4.2 What 4.2.1 ICMP packets. 4.2.2 DNS replies. 4.2.3 FTP nightmares. 4.3 Filtering out Ping of Death. 4.4 Filtering out Teardrop and Bonk. 4.5 Filtering out Fragment Bombs. 4.6 Changing firewall rules. 4.7 How do I set up IP spoof protection? 4.8 Advanced projects. 4.9 Future enhancements. 5. Common problems. 5.1 Masquerading/forwarding doesn't work! 5.2 Wildcard interfaces don't work! 5.3 TOS doesn't work! 5.4 (TT 5.5 xosview is broken! 5.6 Segmentation fault with 5.7 I can't set masquerading timeouts! 5.8 I want to firewall IPX! 6. Appendix: Differences between 6.1 Quick-Reference table. 6.2 Examples of translated ipfwadm commands 7. Appendix: Using the 8. Appendix: thanks. ______________________________________________________________________ 1. Introduction This is the Linux IPCHAINS-HOWTO. You should read the Linux NET-3-HOWTO as well. The IP-Masquerading HOWTO, the PPP-HOWTO and the Ethernet-HOWTO might make interesting reading. (Then again, so might the alt.fan.bigfoot FAQ). If packet filtering is passe to you, read Section ``Why?'', Section ``How?'', and scan through the titles in Section ``IP Firewalling Chains''. If you are converting from ipfwadm, read Section ``Introduction'', Section ``How?'', and Appendices in section ``Differences between ipchains and ipfwadm'' and section ``Using the `ipfwadm-wrapper' script''. 1.1. What? Linux ipchains is a rewrite of the Linux IPv4 firewalling code (which was mainly stolen from BSD) and a rewrite of ipfwadm, which was a rewrite of BSD's ipfw, I believe. It is required to administer the IP packet filters in Linux kernel versions 2.1.102 and above. 1.2. Why? The older Linux firewalling code doesn't deal with fragments, has 32-bit counters (on Intel at least), doesn't allow specification of protocols other than TCP, UDP or ICMP, can't make large changes atomically, can't specify inverse rules, has some quirks, and can be tough to manage (making it prone to user error). 1.3. How? Currently the code is in the mainstream kernel from 2.1.102. For the 2.0 kernel series, you will need to download a kernel patch from the web page. If your 2.0 kernel is more recent than the supplied patch, the older patch should be OK; this part of the 2.0 kernels is fairly stable (eg. the 2.0.34 kernel patch works just fine on the 2.0.35 kernel). 1.4. Where? The official page is The Linux IP Firewall Chains Page <http://www.adelaide.net.au/~rustcorp/ipfwchains/ipfwchains.html> There is a mailing list for bug reports, discussion, development and usage. Join the mailing list by sending a message containing the word ``subscribe'' to ipchains-request at wantree.com.au. To mail to the list use `ipchains' instead of `ipchains-request'. 2. Packet filtering basics. 2.1. What? All traffic through a network is sent in the form of packets. For example, downloading this package (say it's 50k long) might cause you to receive 36 or so packets of 1460 bytes each, (to pull numbers at random). The start of each packet says where it's going, where it came from, the type of the packet, and other administrative details. This start of the packet is called the header. The rest of the packet, containing the actual data being transmitted, is usually called the body. Some protocols, such TCP, which is used for web traffic, mail, and remote logins, use the concept of a `connection' -- before any packets with actual data are sent, various setup packets (with special headers) are exchanged saying `I want to connect', `OK' and `Thanks'. Then normal packets are exchanged. A packet filter is a piece of software which looks at the header of packets as they pass through, and decide the fate of the entire packet. It might decide to deny the packet (ie. discard the packet as if it had never received it), accept the packet (ie. let the packet go through), or reject the packet (like deny, but tell the source of the packet that it has done so). Under Linux, packet filtering is built into the kernel, and there are a few trickier things we can do with packets, but the general principle of looking at the headers and deciding the fate of the packet is still there. 2.2. Why? Control. Security. Watchfulness. Control: when you are using a Linux box to connect your internal network to another network (say, the Internet) you have an opportunity to allow certain types of traffic, and disallow others. For example, the header of a packet contains the destination address of the packet, so you can prevent packets going to a certain part of the outside network. As another example, I use Netscape to access the Dilbert archives. There are advertisements from doubleclick.net on the page, and Netscape wastes my time by cheerfully downloading them. Telling the packet filter not to allow any packets to or from the addresses owned by doubleclick.net solves that problem (there are better ways of doing this though). Security: when your Linux box is the only thing between the chaos of the Internet and your nice, orderly network, it's nice to know you can restrict what comes tromping in your door. For example, you might allow anything to go out from your network, but you might be worried about the well-known `Ping of Death' coming in from malicious outsiders. As another example, you might not want outsiders telnetting to your Linux box, even though all your accounts have passwords; maybe you want (like most people) to be an observer on the Internet, and not a server (willing or otherwise) -- simply don't let anyone connect in, by having the packet filter reject incoming packets used to set up connections. Watchfulness: sometimes a badly configured machine on the local network will decide to spew packets to the outside world. It's nice to tell the packet filter to let you know if anything abnormal occurs; maybe you can do something about it, or maybe you're just curious by nature. 2.3. How? 2.3.1. A kernel with packet filtering. You need a kernel which has the new IP firewall chains in it. You can tell if the kernel you are running right now has this installed by looking for the file `/proc/net/ip_fwchains'. If it exists, you're in. If not, you need to make a kernel that has IP firewall chains. First, download the source to the kernel you want. If you have a kernel numbered 2.1.102 or higher, you won't need to patch it (it's in the mainstream kernel now). Otherwise, apply the patch from the web page listed above, and set the configuration as detailed below. If you don't know how to do this, don't panic -- read the Kernel-HOWTO. The configuration options you will need to set for the 2.0-series kernel are: ______________________________________________________________________ CONFIG_EXPERIMENTAL=y CONFIG_FIREWALL=y CONFIG_IP_FIREWALL=y CONFIG_IP_FIREWALL_CHAINS=y ______________________________________________________________________ For the 2.1 or 2.2 series kernels: ______________________________________________________________________ CONFIG_FIREWALL=y CONFIG_IP_FIREWALL=y ______________________________________________________________________ The tool ipchains talks to the kernel and tells it what packets to filter. Unless you are a programmer, or overly curious, this is how you will control the packet filtering. 2.3.2. ipchains . This tool replaces ipfwadm used for the old IP Firewall code. The package also contains a shell script called ipfwadm-wrapper which allows you to do packet filtering as it was done before. You should not use this script unless you want a quick way of upgrading a system which uses ipfwadm (it's slower, and doesn't check arguments, etc). In that case, you don't need this HOWTO much either. See Appendix ``Differences between ipchains and ipfwadm'' and Appendix ``Using the `ipfwadm-wrapper' script'' for more details on ipfwadm issues. 3. IP firewalling chains. This section describes all you really need to know to build a packet filter that meets your needs. 3.1. How packets traverse the filters. The kernel starts with three lists of rules; these lists arecalled firewall chains or just chains. The three chains are called input, output and forward. When a packet comes in (say, through the Ethernet card) the kernel uses the input chain to decide its fate. If it survives that step, then the kernel decides where to send the packet next (this is called routing). If it is destined for another machine, it consults the forward chain. Finally, just before a packet is to go out, the kernel consults the output chain. A chain is a checklist of rules. Each rule says `if the packet header looks like this, then here's what to do with the packet'. If the rule doesn't match the packet, then the next rule in the chain is consulted. Finally, if there are no more rules to consult, then the kernel looks at the chain policy to decide what to do. In a security- conscious system, this policy usually tells the kernel to reject or deny the packet. For ASCII-art fans, this shown the complete path of a packet coming into a machine. ACCEPT/ REDIRECT ACCEPT --> C --> S --> ______ --> D --> ~~~~~~~~ --> local ------> _______ --> h -> a |input | e {Routing } | __|____ -->->|output | e | n |Chain | m {Decision} | |forward| | |Chain | c | i |______| a ~~~~~~~~ | |Chain | | |_______| k | t | s | | |_______| | | s | y | q | | | | | u | | v e v | | | v m | | DENY/ r Local Process| v | DENY/ | | v REJECT a |------- DENY/ | REJECT | |DENY d | REJECT | v | e -------+--------------------- DENY| | ------------------------------ Here is a blow-by-blow description of each stage: Checksum: This is a test that the packet hasn't been corrupted in some way. If it has, it is denied. Sanity: There is actually one of these sanity checks before each firewall chain, but the input chain's is the most important. Some malformed packets might confuse the rule-checking code, and these are denied here (a message is printed to the syslog if this happens). input chain: This is the first firewall chain against which the packet will be tested. If the verdict of the chain is not DENY or REJECT, the packet continues on. Demasquerade: If the packet is a reply to a previously masqueraded packet, it is demasqueraded, and skips straight to the output chain. If you don't use IP Masquerading, you can mentally erase this from the diagram. Routing decision: The destination field is examined by the routing code, to decide if this packet should go to a local process (see Local process below) or forwarded to a remote machine (see forward chain below). Local process: A process running on the machine can receive packets after the Routing Decision step, and can send packets (which go through the output then input chains with interface set to `lo' if they are destined for a local process, otherwise they only traverse the output chain). This is inter-process chain traversal isn't fully shown on the diagram, as it is too icky. local: If the packet was not created by a local process, then the forward chain is checked, otherwise the packet goes straight to the output chain. forward chain: This chain is traversed for any packets which are attempting to pass through this machine to another. output chain: This chain is traversed for all packets just before they are sent out. 3.1.1. Using ipchains . First, check that you have the version of ipchains that this document refers to: $ ipchains --version ipchains 1.3.5, 26-June-1998 ipchains has a fairly detailed manual page (man ipchains), and if you need more detail on particulars, you can check out the programming interface (man 4 ipfw), or the file net/ipv4/ip_fw.c in the 2.1.x kernel source, which is (obviously) authoritative. There are several different things you can do with ipchains. First the operations to manage whole chains. You start with three built-in chains input, output and forward which you can't delete. 1. Create a new chain (-N). 2. Delete an empty chain (-X). 3. Change the policy for a built-in chain. (-P). 4. List the rules in a chain (-L). 5. Flush the rules out of a chain (-F). 6. Zero the packet and byte counters on all rules in a chain (-Z). There are several ways to manipulate rules inside a chain: 1. Append a new rule to a chain (-A). 2. Insert a new rule at some position in a chain (-I). 3. Replace a rule at some position in a chain (-R). 4. Delete a rule at some position in a chain (-D). 5. Delete the first rule that matches in a chain (-D). There are a few operations for masquerading, which are in ipchains for want of a good place to put them: 1. List the currently masqueraded connections (-M -L). 2. Set masquerading timeout values (-M -S). (But see ``I can't set masquerading timeouts!''). The final (and perhaps the most useful) function allows you to check what would happen to a given packet if it were to traverse a given chain. 3.1.2. Operations on a single rule. This is the bread-and-butter of ipchains; manipulating rules. Most commonly, you will probably use the append (-A) and delete (-D) commands. The others (-I for insert and -R for replace) are simple extensions of these concepts. Each rule specifies a set of conditions the packet must meet, and what to do if it meets them (a `target'). For example, you might want to deny all ICMP packets coming from the IP address 127.0.0.1. So in this case our conditions are that the protocol must be ICMP and that the source address must be 127.0.0.1. Our target is `DENY'. 127.0.0.1 is the `loopback' interface, which you will have even if you have no real network connection. You can use the `ping' program to generate such packets (it simply sends an ICMP type 8 (echo request) which all cooperative hosts should obligingly respond to with an ICMP type 0 (echo reply) packet). This makes it useful for testing. # ping -c 1 127.0.0.1 PING 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1): 56 data bytes 64 bytes from 127.0.0.1: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=0.2 ms --- 127.0.0.1 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 packets received, 0% packet loss round-trip min/avg/max = 0.2/0.2/0.2 ms # ipchains -A input -s 127.0.0.1 -p icmp -j DENY # ping -c 1 127.0.0.1 PING 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1): 56 data bytes --- 127.0.0.1 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss # You can see here that the first ping succeeds (the `-c 1' tells ping to only send a single packet). Then we append (-A) to the `input' chain, a rule specifying that for packets from 127.0.0.1 (`-s 127.0.0.1') with protocol ICMP (`-p ICMP') we should jump to DENY (`-j DENY'). Then we test our rule, using the second ping. There will be a pause before the program gives up waiting for a response that will never come. We can delete the rule in one of two ways. Firstly, since we know that it is the only rule in the input chain, we can use a numbered delete, as in: # ipchains -D input 1 # To delete rule number 1 in the input chain. The second way is to mirror the -A command, but replacing the -A with -D. This is useful when you have a complex chain of rules and you don't want to have to count them to figure out that it's rule 37 that you want to get rid of. In this case, we would use: # ipchains -D input -s 127.0.0.1 -p icmp -j DENY # The syntax of -D must have exactly the same options as the -A (or -I or -R) command. If there are multiple identical rules in the same chain, only the first will be deleted. 3.1.3. Filtering specifications. We have seen the use of `-p' to specify protocol, and `-s' to specify source address, but there are other options we can use to specify packet characteristics. What follows is an exhaustive compendium. 3.1.3.1. Specifying source and destination IP addresses. Source (-s) and destination (-d) IP addresses can be specified in four ways. The most common way is to use the full name, such as `localhost' or `www.linuxhq.com'. The second way is to specify the IP address such as `127.0.0.1'. The third and fourth ways allow specification of a group of IP addresses, such as `199.95.207.0/24' or `199.95.207.0/255.255.255.0'. These both specify any IP address from 192.95.207.0 to 192.95.207.255 inclusive; the digits after the `/' tell which parts of the IP address are significant. `/32' or `/255.255.255.255' is the default (match all of the IP address). To specify any IP address at all `/0' can be used, like so: # ipchains -A input -s 0/0 -j DENY # This is rarely used, as the effect above is the same as not specifying the `-s' option at all. 3.1.3.2. Specifying inversion. Many flags, including the `-s' and `-d' flags can have their arguments preceded by `!' (pronounced `not') to match addresses NOT equal to the ones given. For example. `-s ! localhost' matches any packet not coming from localhost. 3.1.3.3. Specifying protocol. The protocol can be specified with the `-p' flag. Protocol can be a number (if you know the numeric protocol values for IP) or a name for the special cases of `TCP', `UDP' or `ICMP'. Case doesn't matter, so `tcp' works as well as `TCP'. The protocol name can be prefixed by a `!', to invert it, such as `-p ! TCP'. 3.1.3.3.1. Specifying UDP and TCP ports. For the special case where a protocol of TCP or UDP is specified, there can be an extra argument indicating the TCP or UDP port, or an (inclusive) range of ports (but see ``Handling Fragments'' below). A range is represented using a `:' character, such as `6000:6010', which covers 11 port numbers, from 6000 to 6010 inclusive. If the lower bound is omitted, it defaults to 0. If the upper bound is omitted, it defaults to 65535. So to specify TCP connections coming from ports under 1024, the syntax would be as `-p TCP -s 0.0.0.0/0 :1024'. Port numbers can be specified by name, eg. `www'. Note that the port specification can be preceded by a `!', which inverts it. So to specify every TCP packet BUT a WWW packet, you would specify -p TCP -d 0.0.0.0/0 ! www It is important to realise that the specification -p TCP -d ! 192.168.1.1 www is very different from -p TCP -d 192.168.1.1 ! www The first specifies any TCP packet to the WWW port on any machine but 192.168.1.1. The second specifies any TCP connection to any port on 192.168.1.1 but the WWW port. Finally, this case means not the WWW port and not 192.168.1.1: -p TCP -d ! 192.168.1.1 ! www 3.1.3.3.2. Specifying ICMP type & code. ICMP also allows an optional argument, but as ICMP doesn't have ports, (ICMP has a type and a code) they have a different meaning. You can specify them as ICMP names (use ipchains -h icmp to list the names) after the `-s' option, or as a numeric ICMP type and code, where the type follows the `-s' option and the code follows the `-d' option. The ICMP names are fairly long: you only need use enough letters to make the name distinct from any other. Here is a small table of some of the most common ICMP packets: Number Name Required by 0 echo-reply ping 3 destination-unreachable Any TCP/UDP traffic. 5 redirect routing if not running routing daemon 8 echo-request ping 11 time-exceeded traceroute Note that the ICMP names cannot be preceeded by `!' at the moment. DO NOT DO NOT DO NOT block all ICMP type 3 messages! (See ``ICMP Packets'' below). 3.1.3.4. Specifying an interface. The `-i' option specifies the name of an interface to match. An interface is the physical device the packet came in on, or is going out on. You can use the ifconfig command to list the interfaces which are `up' (ie. working at the moment). The interface for incoming packets (ie. packets traversing the input chain) is considered to be the interface they came in on. Logically, the interface for outgoing packets (packets traversing the output chain) is the interface they will go out on. The interface for packets traversing the forward chain is also the interface they will go out on; a fairly arbitrary decision it seems to me. It is perfectly legal to specify an interface that currently does not exist; the rule will not match anything until the interface comes up. This is extremely useful for dial-up ppp links (usually interface ppp0) and the like. As a special case, an interface name ending with a `+' will match all interfaces (whether they currently exist or not) which begin with that string. For example, to specify a rule which matches all PPP interfaces, the -i ppp+ option would be used. The interface name can be preceded by a `!' to match a packet which does NOT match the specified interface(s). 3.1.3.5. Specifying TCP SYN packets only. It is sometimes useful to allow TCP connections in one direction, but not the other. For example, you might want to allow connections to an external WWW server, but not connections from that server. The naive approach would be to block TCP packets coming from the server. Unfortunately, TCP connections require packets going in both directions to work at all. The solution is to block only the packets used to request a connection. These packets are called SYN packets (ok, technically they're packets with the SYN flag set, and the FIN and ACK flags cleared, but we call them SYN packets). By disallowing only these packets, we can stop attempted connections in their tracks. The `-y' flag is used for this: it is only valid for rules which specify TCP as their protocol. For example, to specify TCP connection attempts from 192.168.1.1: -p TCP -s 192.168.1.1 -y Once again, this flag can be inverted by preceding it with a `!', which means every packet other than the connection initiation. 3.1.3.6. Handling fragments. Sometimes a packet is too large to fit down a wire all at once. When this happens, the packet is divided into fragments, and sent as multiple packets. The other end reassembles the fragments to reconstruct the whole packet. The problem with fragments is that some of the specifications listed above (in particular, source port, destinations port, ICMP type, ICMP code, or TCP SYN flag) require the kernel to peek at the start of the packet, which is only contained in the first fragment. If your machine is the only connection to an external network, then you can tell the Linux kernel to reassemble all fragments which pass through it, by compiling the kernel with IP: always defragment set to `Y'. This sidesteps the issue neatly. Otherwise, it is important to understand how fragments get treated by the filtering rules. Any filtering rule that asks for information we don't have will not match. This means that the first fragment is treated like any other packet. Second and further fragments won't be. Thus a rule -p TCP -s 192.168.1.1 www (specifying a source port of `www') will never match a fragment (other than the first fragment). Neither will the opposite rule -p TCP -s 192.168.1.1 ! www. However, you can specify a rule specifically for second and further fragments, using the `-f' flag. Obviously, it is illegal to specify a TCP or UDP port, ICMP type, ICMP code or TCP SYN flag in such a fragment rule. It is also legal to specify that a rule does not apply to second and further fragments, by preceding the `-f' with `!'. Usually it is regarded as safe to let second and further fragments through, since filtering will effect the first fragment, and thus prevent reassembly on the target host, however, bugs have been known to allow crashing of machines simply by sending fragments. Your call. Note for network-heads: malformed packets (TCP, UDP and ICMP packets too short for the firewalling code to read the ports or ICMP code and type) are treated as fragments as well. Only TCP fragments starting at position 8 are explicitly dropped by the firewall code (a message should appear in the syslog if this occurs). As an example, the following rule will drop any fragments going to 192.168.1.1: # ipchains -A output -f -D 192.168.1.1 -j DENY # 3.1.4. Filtering side effects. OK, so now we know all the ways we can match a packet using a rule. If a packet matches a rule, the following things happen: 1. The byte counter for that rule is increased by the size of the packet (header and all). 2. The packet counter for that rule is incremented. 3. If the rule requests it, the packet is logged. 4. If the rule requests it, the packet's Type Of Service field is changed. 5. If the rule requests it, the packet is marked (not in 2.0 kernel series). 6. The rule target is examined to decide what to do to the packet next. For variety, I'll address these in order of importance. 3.1.4.1. Specifying a target. A target tells the kernel what to do with a packet that matches a rule. ipchains uses `-j' (think `jump-to') for the target specification. The simplest case is when there is no target specified. This type of rule (often called an `accounting' rule) is useful for simply counting a certain type of packet. Whether this rule matches or not, the kernel simply examines the next rule in the chain. For example, to count the number of packets from 192.168.1.1, we could do this: # ipchains -A input -s 192.168.1.1 # (Using `ipchains -L -v' we can see the byte and packet counters associated with each rule). There are six special targets. The first three, ACCEPT, REJECT and DENY are fairly simple. ACCEPT allows the packet through. DENY drops the packet as if it had never been received. REJECT drops the packet, but (if it's not an ICMP packet) generates an ICMP reply to the source to tell it that the destination was unreachable. The next one, MASQ tells the kernel to masquerade the packet. For this to work, your kernel needs to be compiled with IP Masquerading enabled. For details on this, see the Masquerading-HOWTO and the Appendix ``Differences between ipchains and ipfwadm''. This target is only valid for packets traversing the forward chain. The other major special target is REDIRECT which tells the kernel to send a packet to a local port instead of wherever it was heading. This can only be specified for rules specifying TCP or UDP as their protocol. Optionally, a port (name or number) can be specified following `-j REDIRECT' which will cause the packet to be redirected to that particular port, even if it was addressed to another port. This target is only valid for packets traversing the input chain. The final special target is RETURN which is identical to falling off the end of the chain immediately. (See ``Setting Policy'' below). Any other target indicates a user-defined chain (as described in ``Operations on an Entire Chain'' below). The packet will begin traversing the rules in that chain. If that chain doesn't decide the fate of the packet, then once traversal on that chain has finished, traversal resumes on the next rule in the current chain. Time for more ASCII art. Consider two (silly) chains: input (the built-in chain) and Test (a user-defined chain). `input' `Test' ---------------------------- ---------------------------- | Rule1: -p ICMP -j REJECT | | Rule1: -s 192.168.1.1 | |--------------------------| |--------------------------| | Rule2: -p TCP -j Test | | Rule2: -d 192.168.1.1 | |--------------------------| ---------------------------- | Rule3: -p UDP -j DENY | ---------------------------- Consider a TCP packet coming from 192.168.1.1, going to 1.2.3.4. It enters the input chain, and gets tested against Rule1 - no match. Rule2 matches, and its target is Test, so the next rule examined is the start of Test. Rule1 in Test matches, but doesn't specify a target, so the next rule is examined, Rule2. This doesn't match, so we have reached the end of the chain. We return to the input chain, where we had just examined Rule2, so we now examine Rule3, which doesn't match either. So the packet path is: v __________________________ `input' | / `Test' v ------------------------|--/ -----------------------|---- | Rule1 | /| | Rule1 | | |-----------------------|/-| |----------------------|---| | Rule2 / | | Rule2 | | |--------------------------| -----------------------v---- | Rule3 /--+___________________________/ ------------------------|--- v See the section ``How to Organise Your Firewall Rules'' for ways to use user-defined chains effectively. 3.1.4.2. Logging packets. This is a side effect that matching a rule can have; you can have the matching packet logged using the `-l' flag. You will usually not want this for routine packets, but it is a useful feature if you want to look for exceptional events (see man klogd or man dmesg). 3.1.4.3. Manipulating the Type Of Service There are four seldom-used bits in the IP header, called the Type of Service (TOS) bits. The effect the way packets are treated; the four bits are "Minimum Delay", "Maximum Throughput", "Maximum Reliability" and "Minimum Cost". Only one of these bits is allowed to be set. Rob van Nieuwkerk, the author of the TOS-mangling code, puts it as follows: Especially the "Minimum Delay" is important for me. I switch it on for "interactive" packets in my upstream (Linux) router. I'm behind a 33k6 modem link. Linux pri¡ oritises packets in 3 queues. This way I get acceptable interactive performance while doing bulk downloads at the same time. (It could even be better if there wasn't such a big queue in the serial driver, but latency is kept down 1.5 seconds now). The most common use is to set telnet & ftp control connections to "Minimum Delay" and FTP data to "Maximum Throughput". This would be done as follows: ipchains -A output -p tcp -d 0.0.0.0/0 telnet -t 0x01 0x10 ipchains -A output -p tcp -d 0.0.0.0/0 ftp -t 0x01 0x10 ipchains -A output -p tcp -s 0.0.0.0/0 ftp-data -t 0x01 0x08 The `-t' flag takes two extra parameters, both in hexadecimal. These allow complex twiddling of the TOS bits: the first mask is ANDed with the packet's current TOS, and then the second mask is XORed with it. If this is too confusing, just use the following table: TOS Name Value Typical Uses Minimum Delay 0x01 0x10 ftp, telnet Maximum Throughput 0x01 0x08 ftp-data Maximum Reliability 0x01 0x04 snmp Minimum Cost 0x01 0x02 nntp 3.1.4.4. Marking a packet. This is currently unused, but it is my hope that it will allow complex and powerful interactions with Alexey Kuznetsov's new Quality of Service implementation which replaces the Traffic Shaper in the v2.1 kernels. Thus, it is ignored altogether in the 2.0 kernel series. 3.1.4.5. Operations on an entire chain. A very useful feature of ipchains is the ability to group related rules into chains. You can call the chains whatever you want, as long as the names don't clash with the built-in chains (input, output and forward) or the targets (MASQ, REDIRECT, ACCEPT, DENY, REJECT or RETURN). I suggest avoiding upper-case labels entirely, since I may use these for future extensions. The chain name can be up to 8 characters long. 3.1.4.6. Creating a new chain. Let's create a new chain. Because I am such an imaginative fellow, I'll call it test. # ipchains -N test # It's that simple. Now you can put rules in it as detailed above. 3.1.4.7. Deleting a chain. Deleting a chain is simple as well. # ipchains -X test # Why `-X'? Well, all the good letters were taken. There are a couple of restrictions to deleting chains: they must be empty (see ``Flushing a Chain'' below) and they must not be the target of any rule. You can't delete any of the three built-in chains. 3.1.4.8. Flushing a chain. There is a simple way of emptying all rules out of a chain, using the `-F' command. # ipchains -F forward # If you don't specify a chain, then all chains will be flushed. 3.1.4.9. Listing a chain. You can list all the rules in a chain by using the `-L' command. # ipchains -L input Chain input (refcnt = 1): (policy ACCEPT) target prot opt source destination ports ACCEPT icmp ----- anywhere anywhere any # ipchains -L test Chain test (refcnt = 0): target prot opt source destination ports DENY icmp ----- localnet/24 anywhere any # The `refcnt' listed for test is the number of rules which have test as their target. This must be zero (and the chain be empty) before this chain can be deleted. If the chain name is omitted, all chains are listed, even empty ones. There are three options which can accompany `-L'. The `-n' (numeric) option is very useful as it prevents ipchains from trying to lookup the IP addresses, which (if you are using DNS like most people) will cause large delays if your DNS is not set up properly, or you have filtered out DNS requests. It also causes ports to be printed out as numbers rather than names. The `-v' options shows you all the details of the rules, such as the the packet and byte counters, the TOS masks, the interface, and the packet mark. Otherwise these values are omitted. For example: # ipchains -v -L input Chain input (refcnt = 1): (policy ACCEPT) pkts bytes target prot opt tosa tosx ifname mark source destination ports 10 840 ACCEPT icmp ----- 0xFF 0x00 lo anywhere anywhere any Note that the packet and byte counters are printed out using the suffixes `K', `M' or `G' for 1000, 1,000,000 and 1,000,000,000 respectively. Using the `-x' (expand numbers) flag as well prints the full numbers, no matter how large they are. 3.1.4.10. Resetting (zeroing) counters. It is useful to be able to reset the counters. This can be done with the `-Z' (zero counters) option. For example: # ipchains -v -L input Chain input (refcnt = 1): (policy ACCEPT) pkts bytes target prot opt tosa tosx ifname mark source destination ports 10 840 ACCEPT icmp ----- 0xFF 0x00 lo anywhere anywhere any # ipchains -Z input # ipchains -v -L input Chain input (refcnt = 1): (policy ACCEPT) pkts bytes target prot opt tosa tosx ifname mark source destination ports 0 0 ACCEPT icmp ----- 0xFF 0x00 lo anywhere anywhere any # The problem with this approach is that sometimes you need to know the counter values immediately before they are reset. In the above example, some packets could pass through between the `-L' and `-Z' commands. For this reason, you can use the `-L' and `-Z' together, to reset the counters while reading them. Unfortunately, if you do this, you can't operate on a single chain: you have to list and zero all the chains at once. # ipchains -L -v -Z Chain input (policy ACCEPT): pkts bytes target prot opt tosa tosx ifname mark source destination ports 10 840 ACCEPT icmp ----- 0xFF 0x00 lo anywhere anywhere any Chain forward (refcnt = 1): (policy ACCEPT) Chain output (refcnt = 1): (policy ACCEPT) Chain test (refcnt = 0): 0 0 DENY icmp ----- 0xFF 0x00 ppp0 localnet/24 anywhere any # ipchains -L -v Chain input (policy ACCEPT): pkts bytes target prot opt tosa tosx ifname mark source destination ports 10 840 ACCEPT icmp ----- 0xFF 0x00 lo anywhere anywhere any Chain forward (refcnt = 1): (policy ACCEPT) Chain output (refcnt = 1): (policy ACCEPT) Chain test (refcnt = 0): 0 0 DENY icmp ----- 0xFF 0x00 ppp0 localnet/24 anywhere any # 3.1.4.11. Setting policy. We glossed over what happens when a packet hits the end of a built-in chain when we discussed how a packet walks through chains in ``Specifying a Target'' above. In this case, the policy of the chain determines the fate of the packet. Only built-in chains (input, output and forward) have policies, because if a packet falls off the end of a user-defined chain, traversal resumes at the previous chain. The policy can be any of the first four special targets: ACCEPT, DENY, REJECT or MASQ. MASQ is only valid for the `forward' chain. It is also important to note that a RETURN target in a rule in one of the built-in chains is useful to explicitly target the chain policy when a packet matches a rule. 3.1.5. Operations on masquerading. There are several parameters you can tweak for IP Masquerading. They are bundled with ipchains because it's not worth writing a separate tool for them (although this will change). The IP Masquerading command is `-M', and it can be combined with `-L' to list currently masqueraded connections, or `-S' to set the masquerading parameters. The `-L' command can be accompanied by `-n' (show numbers instead of hostnames and port names) or `-v' (show deltas in sequence numbers for masqueraded connection, just in case you care). The `-S' command should be followed by three timeout values, each in seconds: for TCP sessions, for TCP sessions after a FIN packet, and for UDP packets. If you don't want to change one of these values, simply give a value of `0'. The default values are listed in `/usr/include/net/ip_masq.h', currently 15 minutes, 2 minutes and 5 minutes respectively. The most common value to change is the first one, for FTP (see ``FTP Nightmares'' below). Note the problems with setting timeouts listed in ``I can't set masquerading timeouts!''. 3.1.6. Checking a packet. Sometimes you want to see what happens when a certain packet enters your machine, such as for debugging your firewall chains. ipchains has the `-C' command to allow this, using the exact same routines that the kernel uses to diagnose real packets. You specify which chain to test the packet on by following the `-C' argument with its name. Whereas the kernel always starts traversing on the input, output or forward chains, you are allowed to begin traversing on any chain for testing purposes. The details of the `packet' are specified using the same syntax used to specify firewall rules. In particular, a protocol (`-p'), source address (`-s'), destination address (`-d') and interface (`-i') are compulsory. If the protocol is TCP or UDP, then a single source and a single destination port must be specified, and a ICMP type and code must be specified for the ICMP protocol (unless the `-f' flag is specified to indicate a fragment rule, in which case these options are illegal). If the protocol is TCP (and the `-f' flag is not specified), the `-y' flag may be specified, to indicate that the test packet should have the SYN bit set. Here is an example of testing a TCP SYN packet from 192.168.1.1 port 60000 to 192.168.1.2 port www, entering the `input' chain. (This is a classic incoming WWW connection initiation): # ipchains -C input -p tcp -y -s 192.168.1.1 60000 -d 192.168.1.2 www packet accepted # 3.1.7. Multiple rules at once and watching what happens. Sometimes a single command line can result in multiple rules being effected. This is done in two ways. Firstly, if you specify a hostname which resolves (using DNS) to multiple IP addresses, ipchains will act as if you had typed multiple commands with each combination of addresses. So if the hostname `www.foo.com' resolves to three IP addresses, and the hostname `www.bar.com' resolves to two IP addresses, then the command `ipchains -A input -j reject -s www.bar.com -d www.foo.com' would append six rules to the input chain. The other way to have ipchains perform multiple actions is to use the bidirectional flag (`-b'). This flag makes ipchains behave as if you had typed the command twice, the second time with the `-s' and `-d' arguments reversed. So, to avoid forwarding either to or from 192.168.1.1, you could do the following: # ipchains -b -A forward -j reject -s 192.168.1.1 # Personally, I don't like the `-b' option much; if you want convenience, see ``Using ipchains-save'' below. The -b option can be used with the insert (`-I'), delete (`-D') (but not the variation which takes a rule number), append (`-A') and check (`-C') commands. Another useful flag is `-v' (verbose) which prints out exactly what ipchains is doing with your commands. This is useful if you are dealing with commands that may effect multiple rules. For example, here we check the behaviour of fragments between 192.168.1.1 and 192.168.1.2. # ipchains -v -b -C input -p tcp -f -s 192.168.1.1 -d 192.168.1.2 -i lo tcp opt ---f- tos 0xFF 0x00 via lo 192.168.1.1 -> 192.168.1.2 * -> * packet accepted tcp opt ---f- tos 0xFF 0x00 via lo 192.168.1.2 -> 192.168.1.1 * -> * packet accepted # 3.2. Useful Examples I have a dialup PPP connection (-i ppp0). I grab news (-p TCP -s news.virtual.net.au nntp) and mail (-p TCP -s mail.virtual.net.au pop-3) every time I dial up. I use Debian's ftp method to update my machine regularly (-p TCP -y -s ftp.debian.org.au ftp-data). I surf the web through my ISP's proxy while this is going on (-p TCP -d proxy.virtual.net.au 8080), but hate the ads from doubleclick.net on the Dilbert Archive (-p TCP -y -d 199.95.207.0/24 & -p TCP -y -d 199.95.208.0/24). I don't mind people trying to ftp to my machine while I'm online (-p TCP -d $LOCALIP ftp), but don't want anyone outside pretending to have an IP address of my internal network (-s 192.168.1.0/24). This is commonly called IP spoofing, and there is a better way to protect yourself from it in the 2.1.x kernels and above: see ``How do I set up IP spoof protection?''. This setup is fairly simple, because there are currently no other boxes on my internal network. I don't want any local process (ie. Netscape, lynx etc.) to connect to doubleclick.net: # ipchains -A output -d 199.95.207.0/24 -j REJECT # ipchains -A output -d 199.95.208.0/24 -j REJECT # Now I want to set priorities on various outgoing packets (there isn't much point in doing it on incoming packets). Since I have a fair number of these rules, it makes sense to put them all in a single chain, called ppp-out. # ipchains -N ppp-out # ipchains -A output -i ppp0 -j ppp-out # Minimum delay for web traffic & telnet. # ipchains -A ppp-out -p TCP -d proxy.virtual.net.au 8080 -t 0x00 0x10 # ipchains -A ppp-out -p TCP -d 0.0.0.0 telnet -t 0x00 0x10 # Low priority for ftp data, nntp, pop-3: # ipchains -A ppp-out -p TCP -d 0.0.0.0/0 ftp-data -t 0x00 0x02 # ipchains -A ppp-out -p TCP -d 0.0.0.0/0 nntp -t 0x00 0x02 # ipchains -A ppp-out -p TCP -d 0.0.0.0/0 pop-3 -t 0x00 0x02 # There are a few restrictions on packets coming in the ppp0 interface: let's create a chain called `ppp-in': # ipchains -N ppp-in # ipchains -A input -i ppp0 -j ppp-in # Now, no packets coming in ppp0 should be claiming a source address of 192.168.1.*, so we log and deny them: # ipchains -A ppp-in -s 192.168.1.0/24 -l -j DENY # I allow connections in for DNS (I forward all requests to 203.29.16.1, so I expect DNS TCP replies from them only), ftp, and return ftp-data only (which should only be going to a port above 1023, and not the X11 ports around 6000). # ipchains -A ppp-in -p TCP -s 203.29.16.1 -d $LOCALIP dns -j ACCEPT # ipchains -A ppp-in -p TCP -s 0.0.0.0/0 ftp-data -d $LOCALIP 1024:5999 -j ACCEPT # ipchains -A ppp-in -p TCP -s 0.0.0.0/0 ftp-data -d $LOCALIP 6010: -j ACCEPT # ipchains -A ppp-in -p TCP -d $LOCALIP ftp -j ACCEPT # Finally, local-to-local packets are OK: # ipchains -A input -i lo -j ACCEPT # Now, my default policy on the input chain is DENY, so everything else gets dropped: # ipchains -P input DENY # NOTE: I wouldn't set up my chains in this order, as packets might get through while I'm setting up. Safest is usually to set the policy to DENY first, then insert the rules. Of course, if your rules require DNS lookups to resolve hostnames, you could be in trouble. 3.2.1. Using ipchains-save . Setting up firewall chains just the way you want them, and then trying to remember the commands you used so you can do them next time is a pain. So, ipchains-save is a script which reads your current chains setup and saves it to a file. For the moment I'll keep you in suspense with regards to what ipchains-restore does. ipchains-save can save a single chain, or all chains (if no chain name is specified). The only option currently permitted is `-v' which prints the rules (to stderr) as they are saved. The policy of the chain is also saved for input, output and forward chains. $ ipchains-save > my_firewall Saving `input'. Saving `output'. Saving `forward'. Saving `ppp-in'. Saving `ppp-out'. $ 3.2.2. Using ipchains-restore . ipchains-restore restores chains as saved with ipchains-save. It can take two options: `-v' which describes each rule as it is added, and `-f' which forces flushing of user-defined chains if they exist, as described below. If a user-defined chain is found in the input, ipchains-restore checks if that chain already exists. If it does, then you will be prompted whether the chains should be flushed (cleared of all rules) or whether restoring this chain should be skipped. If you specified `-f' on the command line, you will not be prompted; the chain will be flushed. You must be root to run this script; it uses ipchains to attempt to restore the rules. For example: # ipchains-restore < my_firewall Restoring `input'. Restoring `output'. Restoring `forward'. Restoring `ppp-in'. Chain `ppp-in' already exists. Skip or flush? [S/f]? s Skipping `ppp-in'. Restoring `ppp-out'. Chain `ppp-out' already exists. Skip or flush? [S/f]? f Flushing `ppp-out'. # 4. Miscellaneous. This section contains all the information and FAQs that I couldn't fit inside the structure above. 4.1. How to organise your firewall rules. This question requires some thought. You can try to organise them to optimize speed (minimize the number of rule-checks for the most common packets) or to increase managability. If you have an intermittent link, say a PPP link, you might want to set the first rule in the input chain to be set to `-i ppp0 -j DENY' at boot time, then have something like this in your ip-up script: # Re-create the `ppp-in' chain. ipchains-restore -f < ppp-in.firewall # Replace DENY rule with jump to ppp-handling chain. ipchains -R input 1 -i ppp0 -j ppp-in Your ip-down script would look like: ipchains -R input 1 -i ppp0 -j DENY 4.2. What not to filter out. There are some things you should be aware of before you start filtering out everything you don't want. 4.2.1. ICMP packets. ICMP packets are used (among other things) to indicate failure for other protocols (such as TCP and UDP). `destination-unreachable' packets in particular. Blocking these packets means that you will never get `Host unreachable' or `No route to host' errors; any connections will just wait for a reply that never comes. This is irritating, but rarely fatal. A worse problem is the role of ICMP packets in MTU discovery. All good TCP implementations (Linux included) use MTU discovery to try to figure out what the largest packet that can get to a destination without being fragmented (fragmentation slows performance, especially when occasional fragments are lost). MTU discovery works by sending packets with the "Don't Fragment" bit set, and then sending smaller packets if it gets an ICMP packet indicating "Fragmentation needed but DF set" (`fragmentation-needed'). This is a type of `destination- unreachable' packet, and if it is never received, the local host will not reduce MTU, and performance will be abysmal or non-existant. 4.2.2. DNS replies. You might think that you can block any incoming TCP connections, but there are two cases where this will break things, and the first is DNS. Your machine uses DNS to turn hostnames into IP addresses. Normally DNS uses UDP, however, if the reply is large, it uses TCP to reply. Blocking these connections will make DNS unreliable. If your DNS queries are always directed at the same external source (either directly by using the nameserver line in /etc/resolv.conf or by using a caching nameserver in forward mode), then you need only allow TCP connections to port domain from that machine. 4.2.3. FTP nightmares. The other classic problem is FTP. FTP has two modes; the traditional one is called active mode and the more recent one is called passive mode. Web browsers usually default to passive mode, but command-line ftp programs usually default to active mode. In active mode, when the remote end wants to send a file (or even the results of an ls or dir command) it tries to open a TCP connection to the local machine. This means you can't filter out these TCP connections without breaking active FTP. If you have the option of using passive mode, then fine; passive mode makes data connections from client to server, even for incoming data. Otherwise, it is recommended that you only allow TCP connections to ports above 1024 and not between 6000 and 6010 (6000 is used for X- Windows). 4.3. Filtering out Ping of Death. Linux boxes are now immune to the famous Ping of Death, which involves sending an illegally-large ICMP packet which overflows buffers in the TCP stack on the receiver and causes havoc. If you are protecting boxes which might be vulnerable, you could simply block ICMP fragments. Normal ICMP packets aren't large enough to require fragmentation, so you won't break anything except big pings. I have heard (unconfirmed) reports that some systems required only the last fragment of an oversize ICMP packet to corrupt them, so blocking only the first fragment is not recommended. While the exploit programs I have seen all use ICMP, there is no reasons that TCP or UDP fragments (or an unknown protocol) could not be used for this attack, so blocking ICMP fragments is only a temporary solution. 4.4. Filtering out Teardrop and Bonk. Teardrop and Bonk are two attacks (mainly against Microsoft Windows NT machines) which rely on overlapping fragments. Having your Linux router do defragmentation, or disallowing all fragments to your vulnerable machines are the other options. 4.5. Filtering out Fragment Bombs. Some less-reliable TCP stacks are said to have problems dealing with large numbers of fragments of packets when they don't receive all the fragments. Linux does not have this problem. You can filter out fragments (which might break legitimate uses) or compile your kernel with `IP: always defragment' set to `Y' (only if your Linux box is the only possible route for these packets). 4.6. Changing firewall rules. There are some timing issues involved in altering firewall rules. If you are not careful, you can let packets through while you are half- way through your changes. A simplistic approach is to do the following: # ipchains -I input 1 -j DENY # ipchains -I output 1 -j DENY # ipchains -I forward 1 -j DENY ... make changes ... # ipchains -D input 1 # ipchains -D output 1 # ipchains -D forward 1 # This drops all packets for the duration of the changes. If you changes are restricted to a single chain, you might want to create a new chain with the new rules, and then replace (`-R') the rule that pointed to the old chain with one that points to the new chain: then you can delete the old chain. This replacement will occur atomically. 4.7. How do I set up IP spoof protection? IP spoofing is a technique where a host sends out packets which claim to be from another host. Since packet filtering makes decisions based on this source address, IP spoofing is uses to fool packet filters. It is also used to hide the identity of attackers using SYN attacks, Teardrop, Ping of Death and the like (don't worry if you don't know what they are). The best way to protect from IP spoofing is called Source Address Verificaion, and it is done by the routing code, and not firewalling at all. Look for a file called /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter. If this exists, then turning on Source Address Verification at every boot is the right solution for you. To do that, insert the following lines somewhere in your init scripts, before any network interfaces are initialised (eg. Debian users would put them in /etc/init.d/netbase if they are not already there): # This is the best method: turn on Source Address Verification and get # spoof protection on all current and future interfaces. if [ -e /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/all/rp_filter ]; then echo -n "Setting up IP spoofing protection..." for f in /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/*/rp_filter; do echo 1 > $f done echo "done." else echo PROBLEMS SETTING UP IP SPOOFING PROTECTION. BE WORRIED. echo "CONTROL-D will exit from this shell and continue system startup." echo # Start a single user shell on the console /sbin/sulogin $CONSOLE fi If you cannot do this, you can manually insert rules to protect every interface. This requires knowledge of each interface. The 2.1 kernels automatically reject packets claiming to come from the 127.* addresses (reserved for the local loopback interface, lo). For example, say we have three interfaces, eth0, eth1 and ppp0. We can use ifconfig to tell us the address and netmask of the interfaces. Say eth0 was attached to a network 192.168.1.0 with netmask 255.255.255.0, eth1 was attached to a network 10.0.0.0 with netmask 255.0.0.0, and ppp0 connected to the internet (where any address except the reserved private IP addresses are allowed), we would insert the following rules: # ipchains -A input -i eth0 -s ! 192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0 -j DENY # ipchains -A input -i ! eth0 -s 192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0 -j DENY # ipchains -A input -i eth1 -s ! 10.0.0.0/255.0.0.0 -j DENY # ipchains -A input -i ! eth1 -s 10.0.0.0/255.0.0.0 -j DENY # This approach is not as good as the Source Address Verification approach, because if your network changes, you have to change your firewalling rules to keep up. If you are running a 2.0 series kernel, you might want to protect the loopback interface as well, using a rule like this: # ipchains -A input -i ! lo -s 127.0.0.0/255.0.0.0 -j DENY # 4.8. Advanced projects. There is a userspace library I have written which is included with the source distribution called `libfw'. It uses the ability of IP Chains 1.3 and above to copy a packet to userspace (using the IP_FIREWALL_NETLINK config option). Things such as stateful inspection (I prefer the term dynamic firewalling) can be implemented in userspace using this library. Other nifty ideas include controlling packets on a per-user basis by doing a lookup in a userspace daemon. This should be pretty easy. The `mark' capability of the firewalls is underutilised: it could easily be used to represent a priority for the Quality of Service code, which would make it simple to control packet priorities. 4.9. Future enhancements. Firewalling and NAT are being redesigned for 2.3. Plans and discussions are available on the netdev archive. These enhancements should clear up many outstanding usability issues (really, firewalling and masquerading shouldn't be this hard), and allow growth for far more flexible firewalling. 5. Common problems. 5.1. Masquerading/forwarding doesn't work! Make sure that packet forwarding is enabled (in recent kernels it is disabled by default, meaning that packets never even try to traverse the `forward' chain). You can override this (as root) by typing # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward # If this works for you, you can put this somewhere in your bootup scripts so it is enabled every time. 5.2. Wildcard interfaces don't work! There was a bug in versions 2.1.102 and 2.1.103 of the kernel (and some old patches I produced) which made ipchains commands which specified a wildcard interface (such as -i ppp+) fail. This is fixed in recent kernels, and in the 2.0.34 patch on the web site. You can also fix it by hand in the kernel source by changing line 63 or so in include/linux/ip_fw.h: #define IP_FW_F_MASK 0x002F /* All possible flag bits mask */ This should read ``0x003F''. Fix this and recompile the kernel. 5.3. TOS doesn't work! This was my mistake: setting the Type of Service field dif not actually set the Type of Service in kernel versions 2.1.102 through 2.1.111. This problem was fixed in 2.1.112. 5.4. ipautofw and ipportfw don't work! For 2.0.x, this is true; I haven't time to create and maintain a jumbo patch for ipchains and ipautofw/ipportfw. For 2.1.x, download ipmasqadm from <url url="http://juanjox.home.ml.org/" name="http://juanjox.home.ml.org/"> and use it exactly as you would have used ipautofw or ipportfw, except instead of ipportfw you type ipmasqadm portfw, and instead of ipautofw you type ipmasqadm autofw. 5.5. xosview is broken! Upgrade to version 1.6.0 or above, which doesn't require any firewall rules at all for 2.1.x kernels. 5.6. Segmentation fault with -j REDIRECT ! This was a bug in ipchains version 1.3.3. Please upgrade. 5.7. I can't set masquerading timeouts! True (for 2.1.x kernels) up to and including 2.1.112. This is being persued vigorously at the moment, and by the time you read this it might have been fixed. My web page will contain a patch when available. 5.8. I want to firewall IPX! So do a number of others, it seems. My code only covers IP, unfortunately. On the good side, all the hooks are there to firewall IPX! You just need to write the code; I will happily help where possible. 6. Appendix: Differences between ipchains and ipfwadm Some of these changes are a result of kernel changes, and some a result of ipchains being different from ipfwadm. 1. Many arguments have been remapped: capitals now indicates a command, and lower case now indicates an option. 2. Arbitrary chains are supported, so even built-in chains have full names instead of flags (eg. `input' instead of `-I'). 3. The `-k' option has vanished: use `! -y'. 4. The `-b' option actually inserts/appends/deletes two rules, rather than a single `bidirectional' rule. 5. The `-b' option can be passed to `-C' to do two checks (one in each direction). 6. The `-x' option to `-l' has been replaced by `-v'. 7. Multiple source and destination ports are not supported anymore. Hopefully being able to negate the port range will somewhat make up for that. 8. Interfaces can only be specified by name (not address). The old semantics got silently changed in the 2.1 kernel series anyway. 9. Fragments are examined, not automatically allowed through. 10. Explicit accounting chains have been done away with. 11. Arbitrary protocols over IP can be tested for. 12. The old behaviour of SYN and ACK matching (which was previously ignored for non-TCP packets) has changed; the SYN option is not valid for non-TCP-specific rules. 13. Counters are now 64-bit on 32-bit machines, not 32-bit. 14. Inverse options are now supported. 15. ICMP codes are now supported. 16. Wildcard interfaces are now supported. 17. TOS manipulations are now sanity-checked: the old kernel code would silently stop you from (illegally) manipulating the `Must Be Zero' TOS bit; ipchains now returns an error if you try, as well as for other illegal cases. 6.1. Quick-Reference table. [ Mainly, command arguments are UPPER CASE, and option arguments are lower case ] One thing to note, masquerading is specified by `-j MASQ'; it is completely different from `-j ACCEPT', and not treated as merely a side-effect, unlike ipfwadm does. ================================================================ | ipfwadm | ipchains | Notes ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -A [both] | -N acct | Create an `acct' chain | |& -I 1 input -j acct | and have output and input | |& -I 1 output -j acct | packets traverse it. | |& acct | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -A in | input | A rule with no target ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -A out | output | A rule with no target ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -F | forward | Use this as [chain]. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -I | input | Use this as [chain]. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -O | output | Use this as [chain]. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -M -l | -M -L | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -M -s | -M -S | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -a policy | -A [chain] -j POLICY | (but see -r and -m). ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -d policy | -D [chain] -j POLICY | (but see -r and -m). ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -i policy | -I 1 [chain] -j POLICY| (but see -r and -m). ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -l | -L | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -z | -Z | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -f | -F | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -p | -P | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -c | -C | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -P | -p | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -S | -s | Only takes one port or | | | range, not multiples. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -D | -d | Only takes one port or | | | range, not multiples. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -V | <none> | Use -i [name]. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -W | -i | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -b | -b | Now actually makes 2 rules. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -e | -v | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -k | ! -y | Doesn't work unless | | | -p tcp also specified. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -m | -j MASQ | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -n | -n | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -o | -l | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -r [redirpt] | -j REDIRECT [redirpt] | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -t | -t | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -v | -v | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -x | -x | ---------------------------------------------------------------- | -y | -y | Doesn't work unless | | | -p tcp also specified. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 6.2. Examples of translated ipfwadm commands Old command: ipfwadm -F -p deny New command: ipchains -P forward DENY Old command: ipfwadm -F -a m -S 192.168.0.0/24 -D 0.0.0.0/0 New command: ipchains -A forward -j MASQ -s 192.168.0.0/24 -d 0.0.0.0/0 Old command: ipfwadm -I -a accept -V 10.1.2.1 -S 10.0.0.0/8 -D 0.0.0.0/0 New command: ipchains -A input -j ACCEPT -i eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/8 -d 0.0.0.0/0 (Note that there is no equivalent for specifying interfaces by address: use the interface name. On this machine, 10.1.2.1 corresponds to eth0). 7. Appendix: Using the ipfwadm-wrapper script. The ipfwadm-wrapper shell script should be a plug-in replacement of ipfwadm for backwards compadibility with ipfwadm 2.3a. The only feature it can't really handle is the `-V' option. When this is used, a warning is given. If the `-W' option is also used, the `-V' option is ignored. Otherwise, the script tries to find the interface name associated with that address, using ifconfig. If that fails (such as for an interface which is down) then it will exit with an error message. This warning can be suppressed by either changing the `-V' to a `-W', or directing the standard output of the script to /dev/null. If you should find any mistakes in this script, or any changes between the real ipfwadm and this script, please report a bug to me: send an EMail to ipchains@wantree.com.au with "BUG-REPORT" in the subject. Please list your old version of ipfwadm (ipfwadm -h), your version of ipchains (ipchains --version), the version of the ipfwadm wrapper script (ipfwadm-wrapper --version). Also send the output of ipchains- save. Thanks in advance. Mix ipchains with this ipfwadm-wrapper script at your own peril. 8. Appendix: thanks. Many thanks have to go to Michael Neuling, who wrote the first releasable cut of the IP chains code while working for me. Public apologies for nixing his result-caching idea, which Alan Cox later proposed and I have finally begun implementing, having seen the error of my ways. Thanks to Alan Cox for his 24-hour EMail tech support, and encouragement. Thanks to all the authors of the ipfw and ipfwadm code, especially Jos Vos. Standing on the shoulders of giants and all that... This applies to Linus Torvalds and all the kernel and userspace hackers as well. Thanks to the diligent beta testers and bughunters, especially Jordan Mendelson, Shaw Carruthers, Kevin Moule, Dr. Liviu Daia, Helmut Adams, Franck Sicard, Kevin Littlejohn, Matt Kemner, John D. Hardin, Alexey Kuznetsov, Leos Bitto, Jim Kunzman, Gerard Gerritsen, Serge Sivkov.