Hackers Toolkit v2.0/Hackers_Toolkit_v2.0.iso/HTML/archive/Rainbow/ncsc/blue2ncsc.txt

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NCSC-TG-029

Library No. S-239,954

Version 1

FOREWORD

The National Computer Security Center is publishing Introduction to Certification and
Accreditation as part of the "Rainbow Series" of documents our Technical Guidelines Program
produces. This document initiates a subseries on certification and accreditation (C&A) guidance,
and provides an introduction to C&A including an introductory discussion of some basic concepts
related to C&A, and sets the baseline for future documents on the same subject. It is not intended
as a comprehensive tutorial or manual on the broad topic of information systems security. It should
be viewed, instead, as guidance in meeting requirements for certification and accreditation of
automated information systems.

The combination of the information age, technology, and national policy, has irrevocably
pushed us into an Information Systems Security age. The explosion in the uses of
telecommunication devices and automated information systems has resulted in a corresponding
explosion in opportunities for unauthorized exploitation of valuable information. The technology
necessary to perform this exploitation is available not only to our foreign adversaries but also to
criminal elements.

As the Director of the National Computer Security Center, I invite your suggestions for
revising this document. We plan to review and revise this document as the need arises. Please
address all proposals for revision through appropriate channels to:

National Computer Security Center

9800 Savage Road

Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

Attention: Chief, Standards, Criteria, and Guidelines Division

January 1994







Patrick R. Gallagher, Jr.

Director

National Computer Security Center

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This document has been produced under the guidance of U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander
Candice A. Stark. This version of the document was developed with the assistance of many
organizations, in addition to the NSA groups, and include: Aerospace Corp.; Beta Analytics, Inc;
Boeing Aerospace Co.; Booz, Allen and Hamilton; Bureau of the Census; Central Intelligence
Agency; Computers & Security; Computer Sciences Corp.; CTA, Inc.; Cybercom Research Corp.;
Defense Intelligence Agency; Defense Logistics Agency; Defense Mapping Agency; Defense
Nuclear Agency; Department of Justice; Defense Information Systems Agency; Drug Enforcement
Administration; Dynetics Inc; Gemini Computers, Inc.; Grumman Data Systems; General Services
Administration; GTE; Harris Corp. ESD; Honeywell Federal Systems; ITT Research Institute;
Information Security International, Inc.; Internal Revenue Service; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Lesnett
and Associates, Inc; Lockheed; Locus, Inc; Los Alamos National Laboratories; Martin Marietta
Defense Space and Communications; MITRE Corp; NASA AIS Security Engineering Team;
National Defense University; National Institute of Standards and Technology; Office of the
Secretary of Defense; On-Site Inspection Agency; Robert M. Wainwright & Assoc; RCAS; SAIC
Communication Systems; Seidcon & Company; Space Application Corp.; Suffern Associates;
Trusted Information Systems; TRW; U.S. Air Force; U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps;
University of Southern California Information Sciences Institute. Individuals in these
organizations gave generously of their time and expertise in the useful review and critique of this
document.

ABSTRACT

This document, which provides an introduction to certification and accreditation (C&A) concepts,
provides an introductory discussion of some basic concepts related to C&A and sets the baseline
for further documents. Its objectives are the following: (1) to provide an overview of C&A, its
function and place within the risk management process; (2) to clarify the critical roles the
Designated Approving Authority (DAA) and other key security officials must assume throughout
the C&A process; (3) to identify some of the current security policies, emphasizing some key
policy issue areas; and (4) to define C&A-related terms. The details of the actual C&A process are
not included in this document, but will be provided in a follow-on document(s).

Suggested Keywords: certification, accreditation, Designated Approving Authority (DAA),
INFOSEC, security policy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Forward

Acknowledgments

Abstract

1.      Introduction

        1.1     Background
        1.2     Scope
        1.3     Purpose
        1.4     Evaluation Versus Certification

2.      Overview of C&A

        2.1     Risk Management andC&A
        2.2     C&A High-Level Process
        2.2.1   Certification and Associated Security Disciplines
        2.2.2   Factors That Influence the Certification Process
        2.3     Recertification and Reaccreditation

3.      Primary C&A Roles

        3.1     DAA
        3.1.1   Joint Accreditors
        3.1.2   Multiple Accreditors
        3.2     Certification Agent/Certification Team
        3.3     Other Security Roles

4.      Security Policy

        4.1     Current Security Policy
        4.1.1   National Security Policy
        4.1.2   DoD /DCI Security Policies
        4.2     Policy Related Issues
        4.2.1   Rapid Technology Changes
        4.2.2   Planning for C&A
        4.2.3   Certification Boundaries
        4.2.4   Acceptable Level of Risk

Appendix A Terminology

Appendix B Identifying the Appropriate DAA

Appendix C DoD Component AIS Security Policies

Appendix D Acronyms

Appendix E List of References

LIST OF FIGURES

2-1.    High-Level C&A Process

2-2.    INFOSEC Security Discipline Interrelationship

4-1.    Information Security Policy and Guidance

LIST OF TABLES

B-1.    Identification of Service DAAs and Applicable Policies

B-2.    Identification of Other Agency DAAs

B-3.    DAAs for Separately Accredited Networks

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1     Background

In recent years, there has been a shift in perspective of information systems security (INFOSEC)
from viewing it as a number of independent, loosely coupled disciplines to a more cohesive,
interdependent collection of security solutions. The current environment of declining resources
and the rapid advances in technology have demanded changes in assessing the security posture of
systems and implementing an INFOSEC systems engineering process. These changes are
necessary to reduce fragmentation and to ensure and maintain consistency and compatibility
among all aspects of the security of a system. In addition, the dynamic threat environment
necessitates a more efficient, integrated view of INFOSEC disciplines.

In considering the overall security of a system, two essential concepts are (1) that the (security)
goals of the system be clearly stated and (2) that an analysis be made of the ability of the system
to (a) satisfy the original goals and (b) continue to provide the attributes and security required in
the evolving environment. The Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal agencies have
formalized these concepts. DoD policy states that any automated information system (AIS) that
processes classified, sensitive unclassified, or unclassified information must undergo a technical
analysis and management approval before it is allowed to operate [1]. The technical analysis
establishes the extent to which the system meets a set of specified security requirements for its
mission and operational environment. The management approval is the formal acceptance of
responsibility for operating at a given level of risk. The technical analysis and management
approval processes are called certification and accreditation (C&A), respectively. These concepts,
however, are quite general and can be applied with different levels of formality and within different
organizational structures.

One of the most important tasks required to provide an integrated, cost-effective information
systems security program, is to develop uniform certification and accreditation guidance. The use
of AISs within all aspects of operations, the dynamic organization of systems, and the exchange of
information among systems point to the need for uniform guidance when certifying and accrediting
systems. The National Security Agency (NSA), in support of its mission to provide guidelines on
the acquisition, certification, accreditation, and operation of systems, plans to publish a series of
documents focusing on these issues. This introductory document discusses the basic concept of
C&A of systems in an effort to provide improvements in the secure development, operation, and
maintenance of systems.

1.2     Scope

This document provides an overview to some basic concepts and policies of C&A. Individuals
serving as system accreditors, system certifiers, program managers (PMs), developers, system
integrators, system engineers, security officers, evaluators, and System users will benefit from this
document by gaining a basic understanding of C&A. People in each of the many roles involved in
C&A will have a different focus and emphasis on related activities. Therefore, it is important that
everyone involved has a basic understanding of the high-level process and uses common
terminology. This document provides a basic overview of C&A, but it is not a replacement for
reviewing and understanding the specific national, federal, department, and service/agency
policies and guidelines in the actual performance of C&A.

The concepts of C&A presented in this document apply to all types of systems: existing and
proposed systems, stand-alone systems, personal computers (PCs), microcomputers,
minicomputers, mainframes, large central processing facilities, networks, distributed systems,
embedded systems, workstations, telecommunications systems, systems composed of both
evaluated and unevaluated components, other security components, and systems composed of
previously accredited systems (particularly when some of these accredited systems have not been
certified or have been certified against differing criteria). Guidance on applying the high-level
C&A process to particular types of systems, as well as associated activities, will be provided in
subsequent documents in this series.

1.3     Purpose

The purpose of this C&A concepts document is to discuss the high-level C&A process, authority
for C&A, C&A policy, and C&A terminology. This document sets the baseline for a series of
documents and has the following objectives:

╖       Discuss the high-level C&A process and its relationship to risk management and
INFOSEC disciplines.

╖       Clarify the critical roles the DAA and key security officials must assume throughout the
C&A process.

╖       Identify several current security policies, emphasizing areas that are ambiguous or not
addressed in current policy.

╖       Define basic C&A terms.

1.4     Evaluation Versus Certification

Evaluation is a term used in many different ways causing much confusion in the security
community. Sometimes it is used in the general English sense meaning judgment or determination
of worth or quality. Based on common usage of the term in the security community, one can
distinguish between two types of evaluations: (1) evaluations that exclude the environment, and
(2) evaluations that include the environment. This second type of evaluation, meaning an
evaluation conducted to assess a systems security attributes with respect to a specific operational
requirement(s), is what this series of documents refers to as certification. Evaluations that exclude
the environment are analysis against a standard or criteria. There are a number of examples of this
type of evaluation:

╖       Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products evaluated against the Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) (Orange Book) [2] or the Canadian or European
Criteria

╖       Compartmented Mode Workstations (CMW) evaluated against the Compartmented
Mode Workstation Evaluation Criteria, Version 1 (CMWEC) [3] and the TCSEC

╖       Communications products with embedded communications security (COMSEC)
components evaluated against the FSRS (NSA Specification for General Functional
Security Requirements for a Telecommunications System (FSRS) [4])

╖       Products evaluated against the TEMPEST criteria (DoD Directive (DoDD) C-5200.19
[5])

Products that have been evaluated against the FSRS and that satisfactorily meet the minimum
requirements (and are successfully considered for NSA approval) are generally said to be endorsed
products. Products evaluated against the TCSEC are often referred to as evaluated products. While
current usage of these terms varies widely, in this document, the term evaluation will refer to a
security analysis of a component against a given set of standards or criteria without regard to the
environment, while certification refers to a security analysis of a system against a given set of
security requirements in a given environment.

SECTION 2

OVERVIEW OF C&A

Certification and accreditation constitute a set of procedures and judgments leading to a
determination of the suitability of the system in question to operate in the targeted operational
environment.

Accreditation is the official management authorization to operate a system. The accreditation
normally grants approval for the system to operate (a) in a particular security mode, (b) with a
prescribed set of countermeasures (administrative, physical, personnel, COMSEC, emissions, and
computer security (COMPUSEC) controls), (c) against a defined threat and with stated
vulnerabilities and countermeasures, (d) within a given operational concept and environment, (e)
with stated interconnections to other systems, (f) at an acceptable level of risk for which the
accrediting authority has formally assumed responsibility, and (g) for a specified period of time.
The Designated Approving Authority(s) (DAA) formally accepts security responsibility for the
operation of the system and officially declares that the specified system will adequately protect
against compromise, destruction, or unauthorized modification under stated parameters of the
accreditation. The accreditation decision affixes security responsibility with the DAA and shows
that due care has been taken for security in accordance with the applicable policies.

An accreditation decision is in effect after the issuance of a formal, dated statement of accreditation
signed by the DAA, and remains in effect for the specified period of time (varies according to
applicable policies). A system processing classified or sensitive unclassified information should be
accredited prior to operation or testing with live data unless a written waiver is granted by the
DAA. In some cases (e.g., when dealing with new technology, during a transition phase, or when
additional time is needed for more rigorous testing), the DAA may grant an interim approval to
operate for a specified period of time. At the end of the specified time period, the DAA must make
the final accreditation decision.

Certification is conducted in support of the accreditation process. It is the comprehensive analysis
of both the technical and nontechnical security features and other safeguards of a system to
establish the extent to which a particular system meets the security requirements for its mission and
operational environment. A complete system certification must consider factors dealing with the
system in its unique environment, such as its proposed security mode of operation, specific users,
applications, data sensitivity, system configuration, site/facility location, and interconnections
with other systems. Certification should be done by personnel who are technically competent to
assess the systems ability to meet the security requirements according to an acceptable
methodology. The resulting documentation of the certification activities is provided to the DAA to
support the accreditation decision. Many security activities support certification, such as risk
analysis, security test and evaluation, and various types of evaluations.

Ideally, certification and accreditation procedures encompass the entire life cycle of the system.
Ideally, the DAA is involved from the inception of the system to ensure that the accreditation goals
are clearly defined. A successful certification effort implies that system security attributes were
measured and tested against the threats of the intended operational scenarios. Additionally,
certification and accreditation are seen as continuing and dynamic processes; the security state of
the system needs to be tracked and assessed through changes to the system and its operational
environment. Likewise, the management decision to accept the changing system for continued
operation is an ongoing decision process. The following sections provide a description of risk
management, the high-level C&A process, and recertification/reaccreditation.

2.1     Risk Management and C&A

Risk management is the total process of identifying, measuring, and minimizing uncertain events
affecting resources [1]. A fundamental aspect of risk management is the identification of the
security posture (i.e., threats and vulnerabilities) of the system, and stating the characteristics of
the operational environment from a security perspective. The primary objective of risk
management is to identify specific areas where safeguards are needed against deliberate or
inadvertent unauthorized disclosure, modification of information, denial of service, and
unauthorized use. Countermeasures can then be applied in those areas to eliminate or adequately
reduce the identified risk. The results of this activity provide critical information to making an
accreditation decision.

Risk management may include risk analysis, cost-benefit analysis, countermeasure selection,
security test and evaluation (ST&E), countermeasure implementation, penetration testing, and
systems review. For DoD organizations, enclosure 3 to DoDD 5200.28 mandates a risk
management program for each AIS to determine how much protection is required, how much
exists, and the most economical way of providing the needed protection. Other federal departments
and agencies have similar policy documents that should be referenced for guidance.

Risk analysis minimizes risk by specifying security measures commensurate with the relative
values of the resources to be protected, the vulnerabilities of those resources, and the identified
threats against them. Risk analysis should be applied iteratively during the system life cycle. When
applied to system design, a risk analysis aids in countermeasure specification. When applied during
the implementation phase or to an operational system, it can verify the effectiveness of existing
countermeasures and identify areas in which additional measures are needed to achieve the desired
level of security. There are numerous risk analysis methodologies and some automated tools
available to support them.

Management commitment to a comprehensive risk management program must be defined as early
as possible in the program life cycle. In scheduling risk management activities and designating
resources, careful consideration should be given to C&A goals and milestones. Associated risks
can then be assessed and corrective action considered for risks that are unacceptable.

2.2     C&A High-Level Process

The C&A process is a method for ensuring that an appropriate combination of security measures
are implemented to counter relevant threats and vulnerabilities. This high- level process consists
of several iterative, interdependent phases and steps illustrated in Figure 2.1. The scope and
specific activities of each step depend upon the system being certified and accredited (see section
2.2.2).

Step 1 of the C&A process focuses on identifying and assessing the specific security-relevant
aspects (i.e., tailoring factors) of a system. It involves gathering and developing relevant
documentation (e.g., policy implementation guidance, security regulations/manuals, previous
certification reports, product evaluation reports, COTS manuals, design documentation, design
modification, and security-related waivers). This identification provides the foundation for
subsequent phases, and is critical to determining the appropriate C&A tailoring guidance to be used
throughout the C&A process. Aspects to be considered include:

╖       Mission criticality

╖       Functional requirements

╖       System security boundary

╖       Security policies

╖       Security concept of operations (CONOPS)

╖       System components and their characteristics

╖       External interfaces and connection requirements

╖       Security mode of operation or overall risk index

╖       System and data ownership

╖       Threat information

╖       Identification of the DAA(s)

Step 2 involves C&A planning. Since security should have been considered with system
conception, planning for C&A is a natural extension of system security planning. That is, the
schedule (milestones) and resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, and training) required to
complete the C&A process are identified. C&A planning information is incorporated into and
maintained in program documentation. This information is also used to estimate the C&A budget.
Aspects to be considered in this step include:

╖       Reusability of previous evidence

╖       Life-cycle phase

╖       System milestones (time constraints)



Figure 2.1. High-Level C&A Process

Step 3 involves analyzing the security aspects of the system as a whole (i.e., how well security is
employed throughout the system). During this phase, the certification team becomes more familiar
with the security requirements and the security aspects of individual system components.
Specialized training on the specific system may be necessary depending upon the scope of this
phase as well as the experience of the certification team. C&A activities include determining
whether system security measures adequately satisfy applicable requirements. To accomplish this
objective, security measures of the various disciplines are assessed and tested collectively.
Additionally, system vulnerabilities and residual risks are identified.

Step 4 involves documenting/coordinating the results and recommendations of previous phases to
prepare the certification package and accreditation package. The certification package is the
consolidation of all the certification activity results. It will be used as supporting documentation
for the accreditation decision, and will also support recertification/reaccreditation activities. The
compilation of the supporting documentation should be done consistently and cost-effectively. The
types of documentation generally included as part of the certification package include:

╖       System need/mission overview

╖       Security policy

╖       Security concept of operation or security plan

╖       System architectural description and configuration

╖       Reports of evaluated products from a recognized government evaluation (e.g., NSA
product evaluation, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/NSA compartmented mode
workstation (CMW) evaluation)

╖       Statements from other responsible agencies indicating that personnel, physical,
COMSEC, or other security requirements have been met (e.g., Defense Message System
(DMS) component approval process (CAP) functional testing)

╖       Risks and INFOSEC countermeasures (e.g., risk analysis report)

╖       Test plans, test procedures, and test results from security tests conducted (including
penetration testing)

╖       Analytic results

╖       Configuration Management plan

╖       Previous C&A information

╖       Contingency plan

The accreditation package presents the DAA with a recommendation for an accreditation decision,
a statement of residual risk, and supporting documentation which could be a subset of the
certification package. It may be in the form of a technical document, technical letter, or annotated
briefing. The information generally included as part of the accreditation package includes as a
minimum:

╖       Executive summary of mission overview, architectural description, and system
configuration, including interconnections

╖       Memorandum of Agreements (MOA)

╖       Waivers signed by the DAA that specific security requirements do not need to be met or
are met by other means (e.g., procedures)

╖       Residual risk statement, including rationale for why residual risks should be accepted/
rejected

╖       Recommendation for accreditation decision

Step 5 is optional and involves the DAA(s) or his/her representative(s) conducting a site
accreditation survey to ensure the security requirements meet the requirements for the system.
Final testing can be conducted at this time to ensure the DAA(s) are satisfied that the residual risk
identified meets an acceptable level of risk to support its purpose. The activities include:

╖       Assess system information (this is the certification package review)

╖       Conduct site accreditation survey

Step 6 involves the DAA making the accreditation decision. This decision is based on many
factors, such as global threats, system need/criticality, certification results and recommendations,
residual risks, the availability or cost of alternative countermeasures, and factors that transcend
security such as program and schedule risks, and even political consequences. The DAA has a
range of options in making the accreditation decision, including the following:

╖       Full accreditation approval for its originally intended operational environment, including
a recertification/reaccreditation timeline

╖       Accreditation for operation outside of the originally intended environment (e.g., change
in mission, crisis situation, more restrictive operations)

╖       Interim (temporary) accreditation approval, identifying the steps to be completed prior to
full granting of accreditation and any additional controls (e.g., procedural or physical
controls, limiting the number of users) that must be in place to compensate for any
increased risk

╖       Accreditation disapproval, including recommendations and timelines for correcting
specified deficiencies

Step 7 involves maintaining the system accreditation throughout the system life cycle.
Accreditation maintenance involves ensuring that the system continues to operate within the stated
parameters of the accreditation. For example, that the stated procedures and controls of the system
stay in place and are used, that the environment does not change outside of the stated parameters,
that other types of users are not added to the system (e.g., users with lower clearances), that no
additional external connections are made to the systems or that additional security requirements
are not imposed on the system. Any substantial changes to the stated parameters of the
accreditation may require that the system be recertified or reaccredited. It is important to note that
recertification and reaccreditation activities may differ from those performed in support of a
previous accreditation decision. For example, the system security mode of operation may change
from system-high to compartmented mode, requiring more stringent security measures and an in-
depth analysis of these measures. Applicable security policies/regulations, C&A team members,
and/or DAA(s) may also change. Section 2.3 provides more information on events that affect
system security that might require a system to be recertified or reaccredited.

2.2.1   Certification and Associated Security Disciplines

Certification activities and the associated results/recommendations are performed in support of the
accreditation decision. Certification is a method for ensuring that an appropriate combination of
system security measures are correctly implemented to counter relevant threats and vulnerabilities.
That is, the certification effort must assess the effectiveness and interdependencies of security
measures, as well as possible interferences or conflicts among them. These measures are typically
based on the system security policy and operational requirements. It must be emphasized that in
order to provide a realistic and effective analysis of the security posture of a system, all appropriate
security disciplines (an INFOSEC perspective) must be included in the scope of the certification.
For example, while a system may have very strong controls in one area (e.g., COMPUSEC), weak
controls in another area (e.g., lax procedures) may undermine the systems overall security posture.
The security disciplines to be considered include:

╖       COMPUSEC

╖       COMSEC

╖       Technical security (TECHSEC) (e.g. emission security, TEMPEST, tampering)

╖       Physical security

╖       Personnel security

╖       Administrative security

╖       Others as appropriate (e.g., operations security (OPSEC), electronic security, signals
security, transmission security (TRANSEC), cryptosecurity)

The concept and definitions (see appendix A) of some of these disciplines were developed at a time
when security was viewed more as independent, loosely coupled disciplines, without an INFOSEC
perspective to tie many of these various concerns together. In addition, the boundaries between the
disciplines are unclear. Some disciplines are considered subsets of another; others are equivalent
terms, but used by different communities of interest. While independent analyses of the security
measures within a discipline may be done as part of the certification, the key is that the results of
these analyses must be viewed together, not individually, to assess the overall security posture of
the system.

Figure 2.2 illustrates one possible interrelationship of the security disciplines. The placement of
the disciplines shows one possible overlap among the boundaries, and provides a categorization of
the disciplines into three general areas: communications related, AIS related, or manual/
information related. Depending on the particular system or environment, other relationships are
possible. The remainder of this section presents a high-level overview of some representative
security measures that may be appropriate for a given system for the first six disciplines listed
above. The other disciplines will not be expanded in this section.

COMPUSEC measures may play an important role in mediating system risk. Certification
activities include assessing the pervasiveness of these measures. For instance, the certification
effort will determine whether the measures provide sufficient protection and whether they
adequately enforce system security policies and requirements. How well these measures work in
conjunction with or complement non-COMPUSEC measures must also be considered.

When computer equipment (e.g., workstation, hosts, and peripherals) is interconnected (e.g., via a
local area network (LAN) or wide area network (WAN)), certification activities include assessing
the protection, control, and adequacy of COMSEC measures. In this context, interconnection
means the operational exchange of information among systems or within a system via data
communications or networks. Certification will assess whether appropriate COMSEC policies and
procedures are applied and approved equipment is used to counter threats and vulnerabilities of
network components (e.g., packet switches, gateways, bridges, repeaters, transmission media).

Certification activities may include determining whether processing facilities or equipment
comply with the appropriate national policy on compromising emanations.

For example, as part of certification, TEMPEST tests may be conducted, equipment installation or
physical control space inspected, and encrypted/clear text (also known as Red/Black) separation
procedures reviewed. The selection and evaluation of TEMPEST countermeasures are based on
several factors such as data sensitivity level, amount of sensitive data, equipment used, and facility
location.

A combination of physical security measures is needed to protect most systems. Consequently,
certification activities often include inspecting the system in its operational environment/
configuration to determine the adequacy of physical security measures. For some environments, a
technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) survey may be conducted to identify exploitable
technical and physical security vulnerabilities.



Figure 2.2. INFOSEC Security Discipline Interrelationship

Personnel security measures are also considered as part of system certification. Certification
activities must ensure that personnel are appropriately cleared and/or approved for access to the
system or portions thereof. Additionally, a determination of whether personnel security measures
are commensurate with the overall risk index or system security mode of operation (e.g., dedicated,
system-high, compartmented, or multilevel) must be made.

Administrative security procedures are used in conjunction with or in lieu of automated measures.
Certification activities include inspecting relevant documentation (e.g., Trusted Facility Manual
and Standard Operating Procedures) to determine the adequacy of administrative controls and
ensuring that the procedures are followed. Additionally, certification activities will verify that
security personnel (e.g., information system security officers) have been appointed and that these
individuals thoroughly understand their responsibilities for ensuring compliance with system
security policies and procedures.

2.2.2   Factors That Influence the Certification Process

A number of factors may influence the determination of the C&A activities to be performed and
the appropriate level of effort for those activities. While the high-level C&A process provides a
uniform framework for performing C&A, more specific guidance is needed in order to apply the
process to a given system in a specific environment or situation. This section briefly outlines some
of the important factors that are key to tailoring the C&A process for a specific environment.

The security requirements that apply to a system are interpretations of generic requirements in the
context of the system's mission, operational concept, and threat environment. C&A activities must
be tailored to address the system's specific security requirements. For example, the C&A activities
associated with a network whose mission is to deliver fixed format messages between the systems
that use that network's services with assurances of message integrity and delivery within a set time
will be different from those associated with a local-area network used by a collection of individual
users for office automation.

The complexity of a system involves both the architectural complexity of the information system
(i.e., the variety of components and functions) and the operational complexity of the total system
(including user activities that perform the mission). Clearly, the depth of technical analysis and
testing required for a local area network with workstations, file servers, and gateways to wide area
networks is far greater than that needed for a stand-alone PC. The level of operational complexity
will be primarily reflected in the evaluation of non-technical safeguards and in the risk analysis.

The risk environment in which the system operates (or is intended to operate) includes not only the
sensitivity of the data the system handles and the clearances/authorizations of system users and
external interfaces, but also the system criticality and the nature and level of the threats against it.
C&A activities should be tailored to the level of potential risk associated with the system. For
example, relatively little technical analysis may be required for a system that handles routine
information and is not mission critical (e.g., office automation system).

The scope of C&A activities should depend on whether the system incorporates (a) previously
evaluated products or (b) products or subsystems used in a system that has already been certified
and accredited. The effort should be able to make use of C&A work done by other organizations.
In addition, if inadequate attention has been paid to C&A up to some point in a system's life cycle,
the C&A activities after that point will have to be tailored to compensate for prior inadequacies.

2.3     Recertification and Reaccreditation

Various recertification and reaccreditation cycles are currently prescribed. Typically these range
between three and five years. For example, current DoD policy states that a system shall be
reaccredited every three years, regardless of change [1]. On the other hand, Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) policy requires a five year reaccreditation cycle [6]. During this time, periodic
reviews of the system should be conducted to ensure that no changes in the system have occurred
that might necessitate reaccreditation before the three or five-year cycle.

Another reason for reaccrediting (and recertifying) a system is that major changes have been made
to some aspect of the system that impacts security. The level of effort, in this case, for
recertification and reaccreditation will depend on the certification factors (such as those described
in section 2.2.2) as well as the possible impact of the changes made. In this situation, the
recertification activities should concentrate on those aspects of the system that have changed since
the original certification. The results of previous certification activities related to unchanged parts
of the system will likely be able to be reused with no (or only minor) changes. The following is a
partial list of events affecting system security that might require a system to be recertified and
reaccredited:

╖       A change in criticality and/or sensitivity level that causes a change in the
countermeasures required

╖       A change in the security policy (e.g., access control policy)

╖       A change in the threat or system risk

╖       A change in the activity that requires a different security mode of operation

╖       Additions or a change to the operating system or to software providing Security features

╖       Additions or a change to the hardware that requires a change in the approved security
countermeasures

╖       A breach of security, a breach of system integrity, or an unusual situation that appears to
invalidate the accreditation by revealing a flaw in security design

╖       A significant change to the physical structure of the facility or to the operating procedures

╖       A significant change to the configuration of the system (e.g., a workstation is connected
to the system outside of the approved configuration)

╖       For networks, the inclusion of an additional (separately accredited) system(s) or the
modification/replacement of a subscribing system that affects the security of that system

╖       Results of an audit or external analysis

For systems with multiple accreditors, recertification and reaccreditation requirements and
responsibilities should be identified in the MOA. For example, if a jointly accredited system is
governed by the requirements of both DoDD 5200.28 [1] and DCI Directive (DCID) 1/16 [6], the
DAAs, as part of their agreements documented in the MOA, should resolve the conflict in
accreditation cycles.

SECTION 3

PRIMARY C&A ROLES

This section identifies the DAA and the certification agent as primarily responsible for the C&A
of systems. The certification agent provides direct support to the DAA in making the accreditation
decision. DoD component regulations define various security roles and responsibilities, and while
the titles may vary, the responsibilities are similar.

In addition to the DAA and certification agent, the following roles are identified in this guideline
as being key to the successful accreditation of some systems: Program Manager (PM), product
vendors, systems integrator, systems engineers, and applications developer. Not all roles will be
necessary for the C&A of all types of systems. The size, complexity, and status (e.g., new
acquisition, upgrade, existing system) will determine the need for these additional roles. For
example, accrediting a stand-alone PC will probably not require any effort from these additional
roles. The following sections discuss the DAA, the certification agent/certification team, and other
roles in terms of their responsibilities in the C&A process. Appendix B provides guidance on
identifying the appropriate DAA for a given system.

3.1     DAA

By accrediting a system, the DAA formally assumes the responsibility for the operation of the
system within a specified environment. The DAA must have the authority to allocate resources to
achieve an acceptable level of security and to remedy security deficiencies. The accreditation
decision shows that due care has been taken to balance security requirements, mission, and
resources against a defined risk. More or less stringent security measures than those stated in
applicable policies may be established by the DAA, if deemed appropriate. The accreditation
decision also is a recognition by the DAA that an acceptable level of risk has been attained and that
the DAA accepts the operation of this system under the stated parameters of the accreditation.

The DAA may delegate the authority to accredit systems; however, specific service/agency
regulations need to be reviewed for guidance in this area. For example, Army Regulation (AR)
380-19 [7] policy states that for critically sensitive Army systems (i.e., systems that process any
Top Secret data) operating in the dedicated, system-high, or partitioned modes, Major Command
(MACOM) commanders may further delegate, in writing, accreditation authority to general
officers or Senior

Executive Service personnel within their commands. Factors to consider before delegating
accreditation authority are the resources available to the DAA and his or her supporting staff for
realistically assessing the security posture of the system, both in technical expertise and clearance
for or accessibility to the appropriate threat data.

The DAA will probably not be involved in day-to-day monitoring of the certification activities and
in making many of the routine decisions regarding the system. Normally, the DAA appoints a
representative(s) to act as a security focal point and to assist in making routine decisions, attending
meetings, and providing coordination. While the DAA retains final responsibility to accredit the
system, many of the accompanying duties will be delegated to this representative(s). The DAA
representative(s) will actively coordinate with the certification agent (and PM, if applicable) to
ensure that all security requirements are met and that all activities in support of accreditation are
completed in accordance with procedures. All major decisions made during the system life cycle
in support of the accreditation decision should be formally documented and coordinated with the
DAA.

Some environments may require multiple DAAs to accredit the system. These environments can
generally be divided into two types: (1) those systems requiring joint accreditation and (2) those
systems composed of the interconnection of separately accredited systems. A working group,
composed of individuals representing each of the accrediting organizations, may be necessary to
resolve accreditation issues. The representative(s) for each of the DAAs responsible for the system
accreditation are likely participants in this working group. The primary function of this group
would be to ensure that all organizations involved understand the conditions and major agreements
affecting the system accreditation, and that these conditions and agreements are documented in an
MOA. The definition of the security requirements and the assignment of security responsibility
among the involved organizations are examples of the types of decisions to be documented. The
following sections provide additional information on identifying the DAA in these two types of
systems.

3.1.1   Joint Accreditors

Some types of systems that will be accredited as a single system might require multiple accreditors.
Examples include the following:

╖       A system that processes different types of information (e.g., cryptologic, Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI), or Single Integrated Operational Plan-Extremely
Sensitive Information (SIOP-ESI))

╖       A system used by multiple data owners who process the same type of information

╖       A system supporting multiple organizations (where the DAAs from each organization
will be responsible for collectively accrediting the system)

╖       A system connected to a backbone network (where the system (e.g., host system)
accreditor and the network accreditor jointly accredit the system as a whole)

Joint accreditation occurs when different components of the overall system come under the
jurisdiction of different DAAs, and the responsible DAAs collectively accredit the system.

Systems that have joint accreditors require additional planning and coordination to ensure that all
parties involved have a common understanding of their responsibilities in the C&A process, the
risks involved, and the security posture of the system. When a system is to be jointly accredited,
the roles and responsibilities of the DAA(s), certification agents, and other key security roles of all
participating organizations must be clearly defined and documented. An MOA should be used to
identify security responsibilities and to document all agreements made. In addition, the
requirements for the system and the criteria used to accredit the system should be clearly
documented. C&A milestones should be coordinated with the DAA(s) and their representatives,
and documented in C&A planning documents.

3.1.2   Multiple Accreditors

When separately accredited systems managed by different DAAs are interconnected, negotiation
must occur among the DAAs to address the interconnection requirements of each system involved.
MOAs are required when systems interconnect, for example, within their own sponsoring agency/
service, with another agency, or with government contractors. An MOA documents the results of
the negotiations, forming an agreement signed by the participating DAAs. Each DAA must,
therefore, carefully examine the additional potential risks imposed on the system by connecting to
other systems. Additional certification activities may be required to determine the security posture
of the overall systems before the separately accredited systems may be interconnected.

In some cases, the agreement for interconnection is among peer organizations. In this situation, the
MOA will formalize the agreement among the DAAs on the division of responsibilities and the
criteria used to accredit each system. The MOA should include, at a minimum, the following
information:

╖       Classification range of data maintained on or transmitted between systems

╖       Clearance level(s) of the users

╖       Intended use of the system

╖       Identification of the authority to resolve conflicts among the DAAs

╖       Countermeasures to be implemented prior to interconnection

╖       Statements of accreditation of each interconnected system

╖       Procedures for notification of changes in the system

╖       Procedures for notification of proper parties in case of security violations

╖       Accreditation criteria

╖       Recertification/reaccreditation requirements and responsibilities

In other cases, when identifying the DAA(s) for a given system, consideration must be given to
interconnections separately accredited multiuser telecommunications networks. Special
consideration must be given to additional risks when connecting to networks because of the
potential exposure of data in the system to the larger community of network users. The DAA(s)
must consider the security posture of each network component, in addition to their individual
systems, before accepting the risk of connecting to other systems. In addition, the accreditor(s) of
these networks may require C&A documentation from the subscriber system before allowing
interconnection.

3.2     Certification Agent/Certification Team

The certification agent is the individual(s) responsible for making a technical judgment of the
systems compliance with stated requirements and to identify and assess the risks associated with
operating the system. In addition, the certification agent has the responsibility for coordinating the
various activities of the certification process and merging all the pieces of the final accreditation
package that will be presented to the DAA. Although the fundamental role of the certification agent
does not differ among certification efforts, the activities and level of effort required may vary (see
section 2.2.2).

Some characteristics, such as technical expertise, impartiality (i.e., unfair bias toward achieving a
particular result), and objectivity (i.e., minimum subjective judgment or opinion) are important
considerations when selecting the appropriate certification agent. In general, certification activities
should be performed by competent technical personnel in cooperation with but as independent of
the system developer and the PM as possible.

The certification team is the collection of individuals and/or organizations involved in some aspect
of the certification process. Given the increasing complexity of many AISs and the wide variety of
security disciplines that must be assessed during certification, most organizations do not have
adequate or appropriate in-house resources to perform many of the required certification activities
(e.g., product evaluations, testing). To perform some of these activities, the certification agent may
rely on the resources of other organizations that have the specialized skills necessary (e.g.,
TEMPEST).

3.3     Other Security Roles

Although the PM is not typically responsible for performing daily security activities, the PM is
responsible for seeing that they are implemented. The PM has the responsibility for the overall
procurement, development, and possibly operation of the system, and must coordinate all security-
relevant portions of the program with the DAA and the certification agent. The PM provides the
resources, coordinates the scheduling of security milestones, and determines priorities. The PM
should not be (or should not be above) the DAA, as this may place security subordinate to the
programs cost, schedule, and performance imperatives.

Depending on the type of system and the type of program (e.g., development effort, COTS
acquisition, system upgrade), other roles will be involved in the overall security of the system,
from requirements definition through operations and maintenance. System integrators, systems
engineers, security engineers, application developers, product vendors, the independent
verification and validation (IV&V) assessors, and others may be responsible for addressing
security concerns during system development, including activities such as specifying
requirements, testing, reviewing documentation, developing procedures, conducting installations,
and performing component evaluations.

For some systems (e.g., a large acquisition, a complex distributed system), an information system
security working group (ISSWG) may be necessary to direct security activities and identify/resolve
security-related issues throughout the system development life cycle and operation of the system.
The ISSWG may include the DAAs representative, whose role is to identify, address, and
coordinate security accreditation issues with the DAA. The ISSWG normally manages and
performs security-related activities that include identifying and interpreting security regulations
and standards, preparing and/or reviewing security portions of the Request for Proposal (RFP),
overseeing major acquisition strategy decisions, and managing C&A issues. Ideally, the technical
security representatives from or consultants to the appropriate participating service or agency
organizations should be involved in these activities. These participants serve as security
consultants to the PM throughout the entire acquisition life cycle.

SECTION 4

SECURITY POLICY

4.1     Current Security Policy

Security policy exists at different levels of abstraction. Federal- and national-level policy is stated
in public laws, Executive Orders (EOs), National Security Directives (NSDs), National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security (NSTISS) issuances, Federal Information
Processing Standard Publications (FIPS PUBS), Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
circulars, and other resources. DoD-level policy includes DoD directives, regulations, and
standards that implement the National-level policy and set additional requirements. Similarly,
service and agency policies further interpret the DoD and national-level policies, as appropriate,
and may also impose additional requirements. Together with mission specific security
requirements, the collection of these policies can be used to produce a system security policy. A
system security policy comprises a comprehensive presentation of the system derived from
national/federal level policy, local policy, and mission specific security requirements. The security
policy for a system should be well defined at the beginning of the system life cycle and must be
considered throughout each phase. Figure 4.1 illustrates the partial hierarchy of policies and
guidance. The national and federal policies apply to both civil and defense agencies; however,
individual civil agency policies are not listed in this document. Defense policies are listed, in part,
in Appendix C.

Current security policy does not reflect the evolving perspective of system security as an
interdependent, cohesive collection of security disciplines. At the DoD and component levels,
separate policies exist for each discipline (or set of related disciplines), adding to the proliferation
of policy. As a result, the policies applicable to a given system are sometimes not well coordinated
or consistent. The following sections briefly highlight the key national- and DoD-level security
policy.

4.1.1   National Security Policy

National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information
Systems provides initial objectives, policies, and an organizational structure to guide the conduct
of activities directed toward safeguarding systems that process or communicate national security
information [8]. It is intended to assure full participation and cooperation among the various
existing centers of technical expertise throughout the executive branch. It assigns the Director,
NSA, as the National Manager for NSTISS, responsible to the Secretary of Defense as Executive
Agent for carrying out assigned responsibilities. Among the assigned responsibilities is to act as
the government focal point for cryptography, telecommunications systems security, and
information systems security.



Figure 4.1 Information Security Policy and Guidance

EO 12356, National Security Information, prescribes a uniform system for classifying,
declassifying, and safeguarding national security information [9]. Although the public should be
informed of the activities of its government, the interests of the United States and its citizens
require that certain information concerning the national defense and foreign relations be protected
against unauthorized disclosure. Information may not be classified under this EO unless its
disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, directs the DCI, as one responsibility, to ensure
the establishment by the Intelligence Community (IC) of common security and access standards
for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information, and products. [10]

OMB Circular No. A-I 30, Management of Federal Information Resources, establishes policy for
the management of federal information resources [11]. The term information resources
management means the planning, budgeting, organizing, directing, training, and control associated
with government information. The term encompasses both information itself and the related
resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and technology. The policies established in this
circular apply to the information activities of all agencies of the executive branch of the federal
government. Information classified for national security purposes should also be handled in
accordance with the appropriate national security directives.

FlPS PUB 102, Guideline for Computer Security Certification and Accreditation, a national-level
document, provides guidance to managers and technical staff in establishing and carrying out a
program for C&A of sensitive computer applications [12]. It identifies and describes the steps
involved in performing C&A, the important issues in managing a C&A program, and the principal
functional roles needed within an organization to carry out such a program. The FIPS PUB 102
guidance applies to all federal agencies and departments.

The Computer Security Act of 1987, also known as Public Law 100-235, creates a means for
establishing minimum acceptable security practices for improving the security and privacy of
sensitive unclassified information in federal computer systems [13]. This law assigns
responsibility to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NlST) for developing
standards and guidelines for federal computer systems processing unclassified data. However, the
Warner Amendment (section 2315 of title 10, United States Code) exempts AISs processing
sensitive unclassified information if the function, service, or use of the system (1) involves
intelligence activities, (2) involves cryptologic activities related to national security, (3) involves
the command and control of military forces, (4) involves equipment that is an integral part of a
weapon or weapon system, or (5) is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence
missions. The law also requires establishment of security plans by all operators of federal computer
systems that contain sensitive information.

4.1.2   DoD/DCI Security Policy

DoDD 5200.28, Security Requirements for Automated Information Systems (AISs), the high-level
security policy, sets the security requirements for AISs within the DoD [1]. The directive assigns
responsibility to the heads of DoD components to assign official(s) as the DAA responsible for
accrediting each AIS under his or her jurisdiction and for ensuring compliance with the AIS
security requirements. The DAA is responsible to review and approve security safeguards of AISs
and issue accreditation statements for each AIS under the DAAs jurisdiction based on the
acceptability of the security safeguards for the AIS. Enclosure 3 of this directive sets minimum
security requirements that must be met through automated or manual means in a cost effective,
integrated manner. Enclosure 4 of this directive describes a procedure for determining the
minimum AIS computer-based security requirements based on the system security mode of
operation, user clearance levels, and classification of data in the AIS. Enclosure 5 recommends
using the Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria in Specific Environments for evaluating networks [14]. The TNI provides guidance for the
specification, development, evaluation, and acquisition of trusted networks.

Issued under the authority of DoDD 5200.28 are DoD 5200.28-M, Automated Information System
Security Manual [15], and DoD 5200.28-STD, Department of Defense Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria [2]. DoD 5200.28-STD provides a set of criteria against which the security
features of a product may be evaluated. There is currently a joint NSA/NIST effort to produce the
Federal Criteria, as an eventual replacement to DoD 5200.28-STD.

DCID 1/16, Security Policy for Uniform Protection of Intelligence Processed in Automated
Information Systems and Networks, and its supplement apply to all IC agencies, all other U.S.
Government departments and agencies, and allied governments processing U.S. intelligence
information [6]. The directive establishes the minimum administrative, environmental, and
technical security requirements for the allowed operating modes of all applicable AISs (e.g., AISs,
separately accredited networks and connected AISs, and PCs). Additional security measures may
be established by the accrediting authority. It also defines the accreditation and reaccreditation
responsibilities and procedures applicable to AISs processing intelligence information.

Although DoDD 5200.28 and DCID 1/16 are the key security directives, they primarily focus on
COMPUSEC. The C&A process must consider the spectrum of security measures, including
administrative, physical, environmental, personnel, COMSEC, emissions, and technical security.

4.2     Policy Related Issues

As discussed in section 4.1, a multitude of security policy documents exist. This proliferation of
policy makes it difficult for the responsible security personnel to keep up with changes in policy
and to be aware of all the applicable policies for a given system. The problem increases when
different service/agency systems are interconnected; in those cases, the policies relevant to all
involved components may then be applicable. On the other side, the rapid advancement of
technology and the required streamlining and consolidation of efforts are forcing a reexamination
of current policy. This section highlights some of the C&A-related issues that this series of
documents are attempting to, at least partially, address.

4.2.1   Rapid Technology Changes

Rapidly changing technology has made it difficult for policy to keep up with new security
challenges brought about by advances in capabilities and technology. For example, current policy
provides little guidance for the range of systems that span large, central computer facilities to
stand-alone PCs or intelligent workstations often tied together over LANs or connected via
complex networks. These systems have significant differences in functionality and vulnerabilities,
and current policy provides little guidance to DAAs on determining an acceptable level of risk
based on the technology, environmental factors, and operational requirements. Improved guidance
is needed on how to certify and accredit all types of systems: networks, distributed systems,
systems with integrated workstations, database management systems (DBMSs), and multilevel
secure (MLS) systems. Differences among component policies also cause difficulties as many
individually certified and accredited systems from multiple components are being integrated into
a larger system.

4.2.2   Planning for C&A

Determining a reasonable and realistic level of effort for certification (and recertification) is key to
a successful accreditation. The analysis, evaluation, and testing requirements to support
certification may require substantial commitments of resources that must be planned for early in
the system life cycle (for example: as part of the RFP). However, in some cases, for example an
environment needing a low assurance system, the benefit of spending any additional resources for
certification may be questionable. For example, in an acquisition of COTS products (e.g., database
management system (DBMS)) (assuming the requirements stated met the need), a determination
must be made regarding how much, if any, additional evaluation and testing is necessary outside
of the acceptance testing normally associated with the acquisition. In many cases, the functionality
and security attributes of COTS products are well known and documented, and perhaps only the
operating environment in which the COTS product will be used must be evaluated. As another
example, a reasonable and justifiable effort (both in time and dollars) for certifying a dedicated or
system-high system operating in a secure environment should be determined.

4.2.3   Certification Boundaries

Encryption has become an increasingly common component in systems, and better guidance is
needed for determining when COMSEC or COMPUSEC criteria are applicable in a given system.
In some cases, the AIS will have to be examined by NSA (the responsible authority for COMSEC)
to make informed COMSEC decisions. In other cases, an approved embedded COMSEC
component (e.g., an encryption chip on a board in a PC) may not require a separate COMSEC
evaluation. In these cases, configuration management of the AIS must also consider COMSEC.

Another area with little guidance available concerns the use of the results of product/component
evaluations (e.g., products on the Evaluated Products List (EPL), Preferred Products List (PPL),
Degausser Products List (DPL) [16]) or other evaluations (e.g., DMS component deployment
approval) as input to a system certification. In some cases, those evaluation results are used as
substitutes for system certification. For example, a component deployment approval (as done by
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) as part of the DMS component approval process)
merely certifies that the AIS (or component) properly implements the message-handling
requirements. It does not supplant the need for overall system certification.

As the number and complexity of networks and distributed systems increase, the confusion over
areas of responsibility for the components of the system also increases. Various authorities will
have responsibility for different components, such as the actual communications components (e.g.,
communications lines, switches, routers), host computers, shared devices on the network (e.g.,
printers, servers), and the end-user terminals or workstations. During the certification of these
complex systems, the boundaries of each of the components and the responsibility for certification
of each area must be clearly defined to ensure that the entire system is covered in the effort, as well
as ensuring that the entire system is viewed as a whole.

4.2.4   Acceptable Level of Risk

Part of the accreditation decision is the acceptance of a given level of risk against a defined threat.
In order to make an informed decision, the DAA must be aware of both the definition of risk and
the identification of the specific threat as it applies to the system being considered for accreditation.
The DAA must balance (1) the risk of disclosure, loss, or alteration of information; (2) the
availability of the system based on the vulnerabilities identified by the certification process; (3) the
threat that these vulnerabilities may be exploited in the specific environment in which the system
is being used; and (4) the operational need and benefits.

In addition, there may be situations where the DAA must balance the risk against operational
requirements mandating acceptance of higher risk, such as during a crisis situation. While
operational needs can dramatically change during a crisis, the need for security is even more
critical during these times. For example, in a crisis situation, perhaps tightened procedural and
physical controls and the removal of connections to users in less secure areas could compensate for
the increased risk of connecting the systems.

APPENDIX A

TERMINOLOGY

Key C&A terms are defined herein. Numerous national, DoD, and service/agency policies were
consulted in defining these terms. Existing national or DoD-level definitions were used, as
appropriate. Where necessary, discussion paragraphs are included to expand on a definition in an
attempt to clarify possible ambiguities in its interpretation.

Accreditation

Formal declaration by a designated approving authority (DAA) that an AIS is approved to
operate in a particular security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards.

Note:   Accreditation is the formal declaration by a DAA that a system is approved to operate:
(a) in a particular security mode; (b) with a prescribed set of countermeasures (e.g.,
administrative, physical, personnel, COMSEC, emissions, and computer security controls); (c)
against a defined threat and with stated vulnerabilities and countermeasures; (d) within a given
operational concept and environment; (e) with stated interconnections to other systems; (f) at
an acceptable level of risk for which the accrediting authority has formally assumed
responsibility; and (g) for a specified period of time.

Accreditation Package

A product of the certification effort and the main basis for the accreditation decision.

Note:   The accreditation package, at a minimum, will include a recommendation for the
accreditation decision and a statement of residual risk in operating the system in its
environment. Other information included may vary depending on the system and/or the DAA.

Administrative Security

The management constraints and supplemental controls established to provide protection for
a system. Synonymous with Procedural Security.

Note:   Examples include operational procedures (e.g., how to shut down the system securely),
administrative procedures (e.g., granting access to a computer facility), and accountability
(e.g., audit procedures for the system administrator to follow).

AIS Security

Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information
processed and stored by an AIS.

Assurance

A measure of confidence that the security features and architecture of an AIS accurately
mediate and enforce the security policy.

Note: Assurance refers to a basis for believing that the objective and approach of a security
mechanism or service will be achieved. Assurance is generally based on factors such as
analysis involving theory, testing, software engineering, validation, and verification. Life-
cycle assurance requirements provide a framework for secure system design, implementation,
and maintenance. The level of assurance that a development team, certifier, or accreditor has
about a system reflects the confidence that they have that the system will be able to enforce its
security policy correctly during use and in the face of attacks. Assurance may be provided
through four means: (1) the way the system is designed and built, (2) analysis of the system
description for conformance to requirement and for vulnerabilities, (3) testing the system itself
to determine its operating characteristics, and (4) operational experience. Assurance is also
provided through complete documentation of the design, analysis, and testing.

Audit

An independent review and examination of the records and activities to assess the adequacy of
system controls, to ensure compliance with established policies and operational procedures,
and to recommend necessary changes in controls, policies, or procedures.

Audit Trail

A chronological record of system activities to enable the reconstruction, and examination of
the sequence of events and/or changes in an event.

Authentication

A security measure designed to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or originator,
or a means of verifying an individual's eligibility to receive specific categories of information.

Authenticity

The service that ensures that system events are initiated by and traceable to authorized entities.
It is composed of authentication and nonrepudiation.

Automated Information System (AIS)

Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that is used in the
automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display,
switching, interchange, transmission or reception of data, and includes computer software,
firmware, and hardware.

Note: The term "AIS" includes stand-alone systems, communications systems, and computer
network systems of all sizes, whether digital, analog, or hybrid; associated peripheral devices
and software; process control computers; security components; embedded computer systems;
communications switching computers; PCs; workstations; microcomputers; intelligent
terminals; word processors; office automation systems; application and operating system
software; firmware; and other AIS technologies, as may be developed.

Availability

The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity.

Baseline

A set of critical observations or data used for a comparison or control.

Note: Examples include a baseline security policy, a baseline set of security requirements, and
a baseline system.

Category

A restrictive label that has been applied to both classified and unclassified data, thereby
increasing the requirement for protection of, and restricting the access to, the data.

Note: Examples include SCI, proprietary information, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
information. Individuals are granted access to special categories of information only after
being granted formal access authorization.

Certification

The comprehensive analysis of the technical and nontechnical security features and other
safeguards of a system to establish the extent to which a particular system meets a set of
specified security requirements.

Note: Certification is done in support of the accreditation process and targets a specific
environment. Certification includes risk analysis, security testing, and evaluations, as well as
other activities, as needed.

Certification Agent

The individual(s) responsible for making a technical judgment of the system's compliance
with stated requirements, identifying and assessing the risks associated with operating the
system, coordinating the certification activities, and consolidating the final certification and
accreditation packages.

Certification and Accreditation Plan

A plan delineating objectives, responsibilities, schedule, technical monitoring, and other
activities in support of the C&A process.

Certification Package

A product of the certification effort documenting the detailed results of the certification
activities.

Note: The contents of this package will vary depending on the system.

Classified Information

National security information that has been classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356.

Communications Security (COMSEC)

Measures and controls taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from
telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such communications.

Note: COMSEC includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and
physical security of COMSEC materials.

Component

Any of the constituent parts of a system.

Note: A component may be a small element of a system or the whole system. It can be physical
(e.g., circuit board), logical (e.g., software routine), or support personnel.

Computer

The hardware, software, and firmware components of a system that are capable of performing
calculations, manipulations, or storage of data. It usually consists of arithmetic, logical, and
control units, and may have input, output, and storage devices.

Computer Security (COMPUSEC)

Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information
processed and stored by a computer.

Confidentiality

Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized entities or processes.

Configuration Management

The management of features and assurances through control of changes made to hardware,
software, firmware, documentation, test, test fixtures, and test documentation of a system
throughout the development and operational life of the system.

Contingency Plan

A plan maintained for emergency response, backup operations, and post-disaster recovery for
a system, as part of its security program, that will ensure the availability of critical resources
and facilitate the continuity of operations in an emergency situation.

Countermeasure

Any action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that reduces a risk or a
vulnerability.

Covert Channel

An unintended and/or unauthorized communications path that can be used to transfer
information in a manner that violates a system security policy.

Note: Covert channels may be storage or timing channels. A covert storage channel involves
the direct or indirect writing to a storage location by one process and the direct or indirect
reading of the storage location by another process. A covert timing channel is one in which one
process signals information to another process by modulating its own use of system resources
in such a way that this manipulation affects the real response time observed by the second
process.

Cryptosecurity

The component of COMSEC that results from the provision of technically sound
cryptosystems and their proper use.

Data Security

The protection of data from unauthorized (accidental or intentional) modification, destruction,
or disclosure.

Designated Approving Authority (DAA)

The official with the authority to formally assume responsibility for operating a system at an
acceptable level of risk.

Note: FIPS PUB 102 uses the term "Accrediting Official" for the DAA [12]. "Accrediting
Authority" is another term used. The DAA must have the authority to evaluate the overall
mission requirements of the system and to provide definitive directions to system developers
or owners relative to the risk in the security posture of the system. Generally, the more
sensitive the data processed by a system, the more senior the DAA. A DAA may be responsible
for several systems, and each system may have a single or multiple DAAs. When there are
multiple accreditors, the sharing of responsibilities must be carefully defined in an MOA.

DoD Component

Refers to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments and Services
within those departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the
unified and specified commands, the defense agencies, and the DoD field activities.

Electronic Security

Protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of
value that might be derived from the interception and analysis of non-communications
electromagnetic radiations, such as RADAR.

Emission Security

Protection resulting from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of
value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from
cryptoequipment, AISs, and telecommunications systems.

Endorsement

NSA approval of a commercially developed telecommunications or AIS protection equipment
or system for safeguarding national security information.

Environment (System)

The aggregate of procedures, conditions, and objects that affects the development, operation,
and maintenance of a system.

Note: Environment is often used with qualifiers such as computing environment, application
environment, or threat environment, which limit the scope being considered.

Evaluation

The technical analysis of a component's, product's, subsystem's, or system's security that
establishes whether or not the component, product, subsystem, or system meets a specific set
of requirements.

Exception

With respect to C&A, an exception indicates the implementation of one or more security
requirements is temporarily postponed and that satisfactory substitutes for the requirements
may be used for a specified period of time. (see Waiver)

Formal Access Approval

Documented approval by a data owner to allow access to a particular category of information.

Implementation

The phase of the system development process in which the detailed specifications are
translated into actual system components.

Information Security

The result of any system of policies and procedures for identifying, controlling, and protecting,
from unauthorized disclosure, information that requires protection.

Information System

Any telecommunications and/or computer related equipment or interconnected system or
subsystems of equipment that is used in the acquisition, storage, manipulation, management,
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission or reception of voice and/or
data, and includes software, firmware, and hardware.

Information Systems Security (INFOSEC)

The protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or modification of
information, whether in storage, processing, or transit, and against the denial of service to
authorized users or the provision of service to unauthorized users, including those measures
necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats.

Note: The term "INFOSEC," as it applies to this concept of the totality of security applied to
a system, has evolved. This series of documents will use the term INFOSEC--Information
Systems Security--to reflect that concept of the totality of system security.

Information Systems Security Products and Services Catalogue (INFOSEC Catalogue) (also
referred to as the Products and Services Catalogue) [16]

A catalogue issued by NSA that incorporates several security product and services lists. It is
available through the Government Printing Office. Some of the lists included in the catalogue
are the following:

Degausser Products List (DPL) - a list of commercially produced degaussers that have been
evaluated against specific requirements for the erasure of classified data from magnetic
media.

Endorsed Cryptographic Products List - a list of products that provide electronic
cryptographic coding (encrypting) and decoding (decrypting), and which have been
endorsed for use for classified or sensitive unclassified U.S. Government or Government-
derived information during its transmission.

Endorsed Tools List (ETL) - a list of those formal verification systems recommended by
the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) for use in developing highly trusted
systems.

Evaluated Products List (EPL) - a documented inventory of equipment, hardware, software,
and/or firmware that have been evaluated against the evaluation criteria found in DoD
5200.28-STD.

Protected Network Services List - a list of the names and points of contact for commercial
carriers providing government-approved "protected services" for your communications.
The companies listed offer protection service (e.g., bulk trunk encryption) rather than a
product.

NSA Endorsed Data Encryption Standard (DES) Products List - a list of cryptographic
products endorsed by NSA as meeting Federal Standard 1027 [17]. These DES products
have been endorsed for use in protecting U.S. Government or U.S. Government-derived
unclassified sensitive information during transmission. They may not be used to secure
classified information.

Off-Line Systems - a description of a variety of off-line capabilities that NSA can provide
to meet customer requirements. Off-line refers to those cryptosystems for which encryption
and decryption are performed separately from the transmitting and receiving functions.

Preferred Products List (PPL) - a list of telecommunications and information processing
equipment and systems that conform to the current national TEMPEST standard.

Integration

The synthesis of a system's components to form either larger components of the system or the
system itself.

Integrity

Data integrity is that attribute of data relating to the preservation of (a) its meaning and
completeness, (b) the consistency of its representation(s), and (c) its correspondence to what
it represents.

System integrity is that attribute of a system when it performs its intended function in an
unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the
system.

Interim Approval

The temporary authorization granted by the DAA for a system to process information in its
operational environment based on preliminary results of a security evaluation of the system.

Note: Interim approval allows the activity to meet its operational requirements for a given
period of time while further assessing and improving its security posture. It gives the DAA the
needed latitude to approve operational implementation of individual components of a system
as they develop. Final approval is mandatory before full implementation.

Mission

A specific task with which a person, or group of individuals, or organization is entrusted to
perform.

Mission Criticality

The property that data, resources, and processes may have, which denotes that the importance
of that item to the accomplishment of the mission is sufficient to be considered an enabling/
disabling factor.

Mode of Operation (Security Mode)

Description of the conditions under which a system operates, based on the sensitivity of data
processed and the clearance levels and authorizations of the users.

Note:   The DAA accredits a system to operate in a given mode of operation. Inherent in each
of the five security modes (dedicated, system high, compartmented, multilevel, and
partitioned) are restrictions on the user clearance levels, formal access requirements, need-to-
know requirements, and the range of sensitive information permitted on the system. Modes of
operation are part of a paradigm based on confidentiality (information disclosure policy.) The
applicability and/or usefulness of these modes of operation to a system whose principal
security objective was integrity or availability is unclear.

Compartmented Mode: Security mode of operation wherein each user with direct or indirect access
to the system, its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts has all of the following:

a.      Valid security clearance for the most restricted information processed in the system

b.      Formal access approval and signed non-disclosure agreements for that information to
which a user is to have access

c.      Valid need-to-know for information to which a user is to have access

Dedicated Mode: Security mode of operation wherein each user, with direct or indirect access to
the system, its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts, has all of the following:

a.      Valid security clearance for all information within the system

b.      Formal access approval and signed non-disclosure agreements for all the information
stored and/or processed (including all compartments, subcompartments, and/or special
access programs)

c.      Valid need-to-know for all information contained within the system

Note: When in the dedicated security mode, a system is specifically and exclusively dedicated to
and controlled for the processing of one particular type or classification of information, either for
full-time operation or for a specified period of time.

Multilevel Security: Concept of processing information with different classifications and
categories that simultaneously permits access by users with different security clearances, but
prevents users from obtaining access to information for which they lack authorization.

Partitioned Security Mode: Security mode of operation wherein all personnel have the clearance,
but not necessarily formal access approval and need-to-know, for all information handled by the
system.

Note: This security mode encompasses the compartmented mode and applies to non-intelligence
DoD organizations and DoD contractors.

System High Mode: Security mode of operation wherein each user, with direct or indirect access
to the system, its peripherals, remote terminals, or remote hosts, has all of the following:

a.      Valid security clearance for all information within the system

b.      Formal access approval and signed non-disclosure agreements for all of the information
stored and/or processed (including all compartments, subcompartments and/or special
access programs)

c.      Valid need-to-know for some of the information contained within the system

Need-to-Know

Access to, or knowledge or possession of, specific information required to carry out official
duties.

Network

A communications medium and all components attached to that medium whose responsibility
is the transference of information. Such components may include AISs, packet switches,
telecommunications controllers, key distribution centers, and technical control devices.

Network Security

Protection of networks and their services from unauthorized modification, destruction, or
disclosure, and provision of assurance that the network performs its critical functions correctly
and there are no harmful side-effects.

Note:   Network security includes providing for data integrity.

Non-Repudiation

Method by which the sender of data is provided with proof of delivery and the recipient is
assured of the sender's identity, so that neither can later deny having processed the data.

Operations Security (OPSEC)

A process denying to potential adversaries information about capabilities and/or intentions by
identifying, controlling, and protecting generally unclassified evidence of the planning and
execution of sensitive activities.

Penetration Testing

Security testing in which the evaluators attempt to circumvent the security features of a system
based on their understanding of the system design and implementation.

Note: The evaluators may be assumed to use all system design and implementation
documentation, which may include listings of system source code, manuals, and circuit
diagrams. The evaluators work under no constraints other than those applied to ordinary users
or implementors of untrusted portions of the component.

Personnel Security

The procedures established to ensure that all personnel who have access to sensitive
information have the required authority as well as appropriate clearances.

Physical Security

The application of physical barriers and control procedures as countermeasures against threats
to resources and sensitive information.

Procedural Security

See Administrative Security.

Product

A package of software, firmware, and/or hardware providing functionality designed for use or
incorporation within a multiplicity of systems.

QUADRANT

Short name referring to technology which provides tamper-resistant protection to crypto-
equipment.

Reaccreditation

The official management decision to continue operating a previously accredited system.

Note: Reaccreditation occurs (1) periodically, regardless of system change (based on policy
(e.g., DoDD 5200.28 requires a 3 year reaccreditation cycle)) or (2) if major changes have been
made to some aspect of the system that impact security.

Recertification

A reassessment of the technical and nontechnical security features and other safeguards of a
system made in support of the reaccreditation process.

Note: The level of effort for recertification will depend on the nature of changes (if any) made
to the system and any potential changes in the risk of operating the system (e.g., changes in the
threat environment may affect the residual risk).

Residual Risk

The portion of risk that remains after security measures have been applied.

Risk

A combination of the likelihood that a threat will occur, the likelihood that a threat occurrence
will result in an adverse impact, and the severity of the resulting adverse impact.

Note: Risk is the loss potential that exists as the result of threat and vulnerability pairs. It is a
combination of the likelihood of an attack (from a threat source) and the likelihood that a threat
occurrence will result in an adverse impact (e.g., denial of service), and the severity of the
resulting adverse impact. Reducing either the threat or the vulnerability reduces the risk.

Risk Analysis

Process of analyzing threats to and vulnerabilities of an information system to determine the
risks (potential for losses), and using the analysis as a basis for identifying appropriate and
cost-effective measures.

Note:   Risk analysis is a part of risk management, which is used to minimize risk by
specifying security; measures commensurate with the relative values of the resources to be
protected, the vulnerabilities of those resources, and the identified threats against them. The
method should be applied iteratively during the system life cycle. When applied during the
implementation phase or to an operational system, it can verify the effectiveness of existing
countermeasures and identify areas in which additional measures are needed to achieve the
desired level of security. There are numerous risk analysis methodologies and some automated
tools available to support them.

Risk Assessment

Synonymous with Risk Analysis.

Risk Management

The process concerned with the identification, measurement, control, and minimization of
security risk in information systems.

Note: Risk management encompasses the entire system life cycle and has a direct impact on
system certification. It may include risk analysis, cost/benefit analysis, countermeasure
selection, security test and evaluation, countermeasure implementation, and systems review.
Enclosure 3 of DoDD 5200.28 mandates a risk management program be in place for each AIS
to determine how much protection is required, how much exists, and the most economical way
of providing the needed protection.

Security

Establishment and maintenance of protective measures intended to ensure a state of
inviolability from hostile acts and influences, design deficiencies, system/component failure/
malfunction, or unintentional misuse.

Security Architecture

A detailed description of all aspects of the system that relate to security, along with a set of
principles to guide the design. A security architecture describes how the system is put together
to satisfy the security requirements.

Note: A security architecture is basically an architectural overlay that addresses security. It is
increasingly important in distributed systems, since there are many ways in which security
functions can be distributed and care is needed to ensure that they work together.

Security CONOPS

A high-level description of how the system operates and a general description of the security
characteristics of the system, such as user clearances, data sensitivity, and data flows.

Security Policy

The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how sensitive or critical information is
managed, protected, and distributed.

Note: A security policy may be written at many different levels of abstraction. For example, a
corporate security policy is the set of laws, rules, and practices within a user organization;
system security policy defines the rules and practices within a specific system; and technical
security policy regulates the use of hardware, software, and firmware of a system or product.

Security Requirements

Types and levels of protection necessary for equipment, data, information, applications, and
facilities to meet security policy.

Security Safeguards

Protective measures and controls that are prescribed to meet the security requirements
specified for a system.

Note: Safeguards may include security features as well as management constraints, personnel
security, and security of physical structures, areas, and devices.

Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E)

An examination and analysis of the safeguards required to protect a system, as they have been
applied in an operational environment to determine the security posture of that system.

Security Testing

A process used to determine that a system protects data and maintains functionality as
intended.

Note: Security Testing may include hands-on functional testing, penetration testing, and
verification.

Security Working Group

A group, representing various organizational entities, that meets to discuss security issues
throughout a system's life cycle.

Note: Identification of security issues and suggested solutions are outputs of the group.

Sensitive Information

Information designated to require protection because its unauthorized disclosure, alteration,
loss, or destruction could cause damage.

Note: It includes both classified and sensitive unclassified information.

Sensitive Unclassified Information

Any information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of which could
adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of federal programs, or the privacy to
which individuals are entitled under 5 U.S.C Section 552a (the Privacy Act) [18], but that has
not been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of
Congress to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

Note: Systems that are not national security systems, but contain sensitive information, are to
be protected in accordance with the requirements of the Computer Security Act of 1987
(Public Law 100-235) [13].

Sensitivity

The characteristic of a resource which implies its value or importance, and may include its
vulnerability.

Note: As an example, the DoD uses a set of hierarchically ordered sensitivity levels (i.e.,
Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) to indicate the sensitivity of data. In addition, in many
environments, labels such as Procurement Sensitive, Investigations, Medical, Payroll, or
Project XYZ are used to refer to specific sets of information.

Signals Security

Generic term encompassing COMSEC and electronic security.

Subsystem

A secondary or subordinate system, usually capable of operating independently of, or
asynchronously with, a controlling system.

System

A collection of components that may include computer hardware, firmware, software, data,
procedures, environment, and people, so related as to behave as an interacting or
interdependent unit.

Note: A system has a particular purpose and operational environment. A system may contain
one or more components, subsystems, or products. The operational environment may
encompass the computing facility or the site installation.

System Life Cycle

The duration of time that begins with the identification of a need to place a system into
operation; continues through the system's design, development, implementation and operation;
and ends with the system's disposal.

System Security Plan

A description of the risks, system security requirements, and how the system will meet the
security requirements.

Systems Security Engineering

The efforts that help achieve maximum security and survivability of a system during its life
cycle and interface with other program elements to ensure security functions are effectively
integrated into the total systems engineering effort.

Technical Security (TECHSEC)

Equipment, components, devices, and associated documentation or other media that pertain to
cryptography, or to security of telecommunications and AISs.

TEMPEST

A short name referring to investigation, study, and control of compromising emanations from
telecommunications and AIS equipment.

Testbed

A system representation consisting partially of actual hardware and/or software and partially
of computer models or prototype hardware and/or software.

Threat

Capabilities, intentions, and attack methods of adversaries to exploit any circumstance or event
with the potential to cause harm to information or an information system.

Transmission Security (TRANSEC)

The component of COMSEC that results from the application of measures designed to protect
transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis.

Trust

Confidence that an entity, to which trust is applied, will perform in a way that will not
prejudice the security of the user of the system of which that entity is a part.

Note:   Trust is always restricted to specific functions or ways of behavior (e.g., "trusted to
connect A to B properly"). Trust is meaningful only in the context of a security policy; an
entity may be trusted in the context of one policy, but untrusted in the context of another
policy.

Trusted Computer System

A system that employs sufficient hardware, firmware, and software assurance measures to
exhibit correct behavior in terms of operations defined by its security policy.

Trusted Computing Base (TCB)

Totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system, including hardware, firmware,
and software, the combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security policy.

Note: The ability of a TCB to enforce correctly a unified security policy depends on the
correctness of the mechanisms within the TCB, the protection of those mechanisms to ensure
their correctness, and the correct input of parameters related to the security policy.

Type Accreditation

Official authorization by the DAA to employ a system in a specified environment.

Note: Type accreditation includes a statement of residual risk, delineates the operating
environment, and identifies specific use. It may be performed when multiple copies of a
system are to be fielded in similar environments.

Unclassified Information

Any information that need not be safeguarded against disclosure, but must be safeguarded
against tampering, destruction, or loss due to record value, utility, replacement cost, or
susceptibility to fraud, waste, or abuse.

User

Person or process accessing a system by direct connections (e.g., via terminals) or indirect
connections.

Note: ``Indirect connections''  relates to persons who prepare input data or receive output that
is not reviewed for content or classification by a responsible individual.

Verification

The process of comparing two levels of a system specification for proper correspondence or
of proving that some property of a specification is correctly implemented by the system (e.g.,
security policy model with top-level specification, top-level specification with source code, or
source code with object code).

Note: Verification may be formal or informal, or automated or not automated. Formal
verification is the process of using formal proofs (complete mathematical argument) to
demonstrate the consistency between formal specification of a system and formal security
policy model (design verification) or between formal specification and its high-level program
implementation (implementation verification). Formal implies using a formal mathematical
language.

Vulnerability

A weakness in an information system or component (e.g., security procedures, hardware
design, internal controls) that could be exploited.

Waiver

With respect to C&A, a waiver implies that s security requirement has been set aside and need
not be implemented at all (See Exception.)

APPENDIX B

Identifying The Appropriate DAA

The DAA for a given system is determined based on several factors: the type of information
processed (e.g., SCI, SIOP-ESI, collateral), the office of primary responsibility (owner) of the
system, and interconnections with separately accredited networks or systems. For some types of
information, a single accrediting authority exists (the data owner), regardless of the system owner.
However, for other information, the accreditor is determined primarily by the owner of the system.
For example, in a system processing collateral information, the services/agencies may accredit the
system.

In addition, the applicable security policies for a given system depend on the accrediting authority.
A high-level mapping from the identified DAA for a system to the applicable security policies can
be made. When a system has a single DAA, this mapping is simple. The DAA is generally aware
of the appropriate service/agency (and DoD-level) policies that govern the system under his or her
jurisdiction. However, when multiple DAAs are involved, this mapping of DAA to applicable
policies can be more complex. When the DAAs are from other organizations, in particular from
other services/agencies, the responsible individuals cannot be expected to be aware-of the
governing policies from other organizations. Systems that come under the responsibility of
multiple accreditors may be subject to the requirements from the policies of all participating
organizations. These policies must be clearly identified and documented (in the MOA) early in the
C&A process.

Tables B-1 and B-2 identify the appropriate DAA and applicable policies for the services/
agencies. Service/agency policies should be consulted for details about authority to delegate
accreditation responsibilities. Before connecting to a separately accredited network, the DAA of
the system requesting connection must consider the additional risks of operation associated with
connection. In addition, the DAA of the network will need to consider the security posture of the
system requesting connection before allowing a connection to be made. The requesting system will
have to comply with any additional security requirements of the network system before
interconnecting. Table B-3 identifies the applicable policies, security mode of operation, and
DAA(s) for the following separately accredited networks. Tables B-1, B-2, and B-3 appear at the
end of this appendix.

╖       AUTODlN/DMS

╖       Military Network (MlLNET)

╖       Defense Secure Network 1 (DSNET1)

╖       Defense Secure Network 2 (DSNET2) or the Top Secret WWMCCS Information
Network Computer System (WINCS)

╖       Defense Secure Network 3 (DSNET3) or the Sensitive Compartmented Information
Network (SCINET)

╖       Defense Information Systems Network (DISN)

╖       Integrated Tactical Strategic Data Network (ITSDN)

╖       Critical Intelligence Communications (CRITICOMM) System

╖       Special Intelligence Communication (SPINTCOM) Network

╖       STU-III (Secure Telephone Unit-III)

╖       Red Switch

Table B-1. Identification of Service DAAs and Applicable Policies



Type of
Information
Processed

Applicable
Policy(ies)

Navy DAA

Marine Corps
DAA

Army DAA

Air Force DAA

Special
Intelligence
(All
classification
levels)

NSA/CSS 10-27

NSA/CSS 90-5

NSA/Central
Security Service
(CSS)

NSA/CSS

NSA/CSS

NSA/CSS

Sensitive
Compartment
Information
(SCI) (All
classification
levels)

DCID 1/16

DCID 1/19

DIAM 50-3

DIAM 50-4

DIA/DS-SIM

DNI

DIA/DS-SIM

Director,
Intelligence Div.
(CMC Code INT)

DIA/DS-SIM
MACOM
Commander,
Heads of DA
Staff Agencies
(dedicated
mode); HQDA
(DAMI-CIC-AS)
(Other Modes)

DIA/DS-SIM

HQ USAF/INS,
AFIS/IND

SIOP-ESI (All
classification
levels)

MJCS 75-87

JCS/J36;
coordinate with
Chief of Naval
Operations
(CNO)

JCS/J36;
coordinate with
CNO

JCS/J36;
coordinate with
HQDA (DAMI-
CIC-AS)

JCS/J36;
coordinate with
HQ USAF/XOX

Top Secret (All
classification
levels)

DoD

Policies*,
Appropriate
Service
Policies**

Commander

CMC (Code CC)

MACOM
Commander,
Heads of DA
Staff Agencies

MAJCOM
Commander

Secret/
Confidential
(All
classification
levels)

DoD

Policies*,
Appropriate
Service
Policies**

Commander

Commanding
General

MACOM
Commander,
Heads of DA
Staff Agencies,
General Officer
Commanders

MAJCOM
Commander

Sensitive
Unclassified

DoD Policies*,
Appropriate
Service
Policies**

Commander

Director of AIS
Activity

Post, installation,
or field
operation or staff
support activity
commanders or
equivalent

MAJCOM
Commander

*       DoD policies include DoDD 5200.28, 5200.28-STD, 5200.28-M, and other DoD policies for each
security discipline, as listed in section 4.1.2.

**      Appropriate service/agency policies include the primary service/agency policy as listed in Appendix C
and other service/agency or command-level policies, as appropriate, in the other security disciplines.

Table B-2. Identification of Other Agency DAAs



Type of
information
Processed

Applicable
 Policy(ies)

DIA DAA

NSA DAA

DISA DAA

JCS DAA

DLA DAA

DMA DAA

DNA DAA

Other
Agency
DAA

Special
Intelligence (All
classification
levels)

NSA/CSS

10-27

NSA/CSS
90-5

NSA/
Central
Security
Service
(CSS)

NSA/CSS

NSA/CSS

NSA/CSS

NSA/CSS

NSA/CSS

NSA/CSS

NSA/CSS

Sensitive
Compartmented
Information
(SCI) (All
classification
levels)

DCID 1/16

DCIS 1/19

DIAM 50-3

DIAM 50-4

DIA/

DS-SIM

DIA/

DS-SIM

DIA/

DS-SIM

DIA/

DS-SIM

DIA/

DS-SIM

DIA/

DS-SIM

DIA/

DS-SIM

DIA/

DS-SIM

SIOP-ESI (All
classification
levels)

MJCS 75-
87

JCS/J36;

coordinate
with DS-
SIM

JCS/J36;
coordinate
with J06

JCS/J36

JCS/J36

JCS/J36;
coordinate
with DLA-I

JCS/J36;
coordinate
with HQ-IS

JCS/J36

JCS/J36

Top Secret (All
classification
levels)

DoD
Policies*
Appropriate
 Agency
Policies**

DIA/

DS-SIM

NSA/Office
of
Operational
 Computer
Security

Director,
DISA

Director
Joint Staff
or Director
J6

Deputy
Director/
PLFA
Commander

HQDNA

Secret/
Confidential (All
classification
levels)

DoD
Policies*,
Appropriate
 Agency
Policies**

DIA/

DS-SIM

NSA/Office
of
Operational
 Computer
Security

Director,
DISA

Director
Joint Staff
or Director
J6

Deputy
Director/
PLFA
Commander

Appropriate
 DAA

Sensitive
Unclassified

DoD
Policies*,
Appropriate
 Agency
Policies**

DIA/

DS-SIM

NSA/Office
of
Operational
 Computer
Security

Director,
DISA

Director
Joint Staff
or Director
J6

Deputy
Director/
PLFA
Commander

Appropriate
 DAA

*       DoD policies include DoDD 5200.28, 5200.28-STD, 5200.28-M, and other DoD policies for each
Security discipline, as listed in section 4.1.2.

**      Appropriate service/agency policies include the primary Service/agency policy as listed in Appendix C
and other service/agency or command-level policies, as appropriate, in the other security disciplines.

Table B-3. DAAs for Separately Accredited Networks



Network

Applicable Policies

Security Mode of
Operation

DAA(s)***

AUTODIN/DMS

DCAC 370-195-3

Multilevel

DISA/DA

DIA/DS-SIM

JCS/(DJS/J6)

NSA/Office of
Operational Security

DSN

System High

DISA

MILNET

DoD Policies*

System High

DISA/DA

DSNET1

DoD Policies*

System High

DISA/DA

DSNET2

DoD Policies*

System High

JCS/J6

DSNET3

DCID 1/16**

System High

DIA/DS-SIM

DISN

System High

DISA

ITSDN

Multiple System High
Nets

DISA/DIA/NSA/JCS

CRITICOMM

NSA Poilicies

System High

NSA/Office of
Operational Security

SPINTCOM

DCID 1/16**

System High

DIA/DS-SIM

STU III

Multilevel

NSA

Red Switch

DCID 1/16**

DoDD C-5030.58

System High

DIA

*       DoD policies include DoDD 5200.28, 5200.28-STD, 5200.28-M, and other DoD policies for each
security discipline, as listed in section 4.1.2.

**      Includes DCI policies for the other security disciplines as well.

***     For some networks, the DAA(s) depends on the accreditation range of

the network. The applicable policy(ies) should be consulted for additional information in this area.

APPENDIX C

DOD COMPONENT AIS SECURITY POLICIES

The following list identifies selected DoD references in some INFOSEC security disciplines. Each
service/agency has its own security regulations that implement DoDD 5200.28 and the other DoD
policies for each security discipline. The primary service/agency security policies are the
following:

╖       DoD, 7 June 1982, Information Security Program, DoDD 5200.1, and June 1986, with
Change No.1, 27 June 1988, Information Security Program Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R
[19].

╖       DoD, October 1981, Communications Security (COMSEC) (U), DoDD C-5200.5, (This
document is classified.) 20].

╖       DoD, February 1990, Control of Compromising Emanations (U), DoDD C-5200.19,
(This document is classified.) [5].

╖       NSA/Central Security Service (CSS), December 1990, TEMPEST Security Program,
NSA/CSS Regulation 90-5 [21].

╖       NTISSC, October 1988, TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities (U), NTISS
Instruction (NTISSI) 7000, (This document is classified.) [22].

╖       DoD, July 1980, Security of Military Installations and Resources, DoDD 5200.8 [23].

╖       DoD, April 1984, Security of DoD Communications Facilities, DoDD 5210.73 [24].

╖       DIA, Physical Security Standards for Construction of Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facilities (U), DIA Manual (DIAM) 50-3, (For Official Use Only (FOUO))
[25].

╖       DCI, September 1987, U.S. Intelligence Community Physical Standards for Sensitive
Compartmented Information, DClD 1/12 [26].

╖       DoD, December 1979, DoD Personnel Security Program, DoDD 5200.2 [27].

╖       DCl, April 1986, Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing
Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, DCID 1/14 [28].

╖       DoD, July 1983, DoD Operations Security Program, DoDD 5205.2 [29].

╖       DoD, September 1986, Computer Security Technical Vulnerability Reporting Program,
DoD Instruction 5215.2 [30].

╖       DoD, July 1978, Defense Special Security Communications System: Security Criteria
and Telecommunications Guidance, DoD C-5030.58-M [31].

╖       Defense Communications Agency (DCA), March 1987, DCS AUTODIN Category III
Operational Acceptance Test, DCA Circular (DCAC) 370-D1 95-3 [32].

╖       DoD, December 1985, Industrial Security Regulation, DoDD 5220.22-R [33], and
January 1991, Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information, DoD
5220.22-M [34] (issued under the authority of DoDD 5220.22, DoD Industrial Security
Program, December 1980).

╖       Department of the Air Force, 2 June 1992, The Air Force Computer Security
(COMPUSEC) Program, Air Force System Security Instruction (AFSSI) 5100.[35]

╖       Department of the Air Force, May 1983, Control of Dissemination of Intelligence
Information, AFR 205-19 [36].

╖       Department of the Navy, November 1989, Department of the Navy Automated
Information Systems (AIS) Security Program, Secretary of the Navy Instruction
(SECNAVINST) 5239.2 [37] (under revision as of date of this document).

╖       Department of the Navy, April 1985, Department of the Navy Automated Data
Processing Security Program, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
(OPNAVINST) 5239.1A [38].

╖       Department of the Navy, July 1990, Department of the Navy SCl/lntelligence, Automated
Information Systems (AIS) Security Program, Naval Intelligence Command Instruction
(NAVINTCOMINST) 5239.3 [39].

╖       Marine Corps, 1982, Marine Corps Automatic Data Processing Security Manual, Marine
Corps Order (MCO) Publication 5510.14, Change 1 [40].

╖       Department of the Army, August 1990, Information Systems Security, AR380-19 [7].

╖       Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 1980, Security of Compartmented Computer
Operations (U), DIA Manual (DIAM) 50-4, (This document is classified.) [41].

╖       DIA, March 1979, Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
Systems, DIA Regulation 50-23 [42].

╖       NSA, January 1990, Security for Automated Information Systems and Networks (U),
NSA/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) Directive No. 10-27, (FOUO) [43].

╖       NSA, 17 October 1990, NSA/CSS Operational Computer Security Manual, NSA/CSS
Manual 130-1 [44].

╖       Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), April 1988, Security Policy for the WWMCCS Intercomputer
Network, JCS Pub 6-03.7 (applies to all Worldwide Military Command and Control
Systems (WWMCCS) sites) [45].

╖       JCS, May 87, Safeguarding the Single Integrated Operational Plan (U), Memorandum,
JCS (MJCS) 75-87 (applies to all systems processing SIOP-ESI), (This document is
classified.) [46] (under revision as of date of this document).

╖       DCI, February 1987, Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information, DCID 1/
19 [47].

╖       Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), August 1991, Security Requirements for
Automated Information Systems (AISs), DCA Instruction 630-230-19 [48].

╖       Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), July 1990, Automated Information Systems Security
Requirements, DMA Manual 5200.28 [49] (under revision as of date of this document).

╖       Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), 31 August 1989, Security Requirements for Automated
Information Systems (AISs), DNA 5200.28D [50] (under revision as of date of this
document).

╖       Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), October 1991, Security Requirements for Automated
Information and Telecommunications Systems, DLA Regulation (DLAR) 5200.17 [51].

APPENDIX D

ACRONYMS

ADP     Automatic Data Processing

AF      Air Force

AFR     Air Force Regulation

AFSSI   Air Force System Security Instruction

AIS     automated information system

AR      Army Regulation

AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network

C&A     certification and accreditation

CAP     component approval process

CMC     Commandant, Marine Corps

CMW     compartmented mode workstation

CMWEC   CMW Evaluation Criteria

CNO     Chief of Naval Operations

COMPUSEC        computer security

COMSEC  communications security

CONOPS  concept of operation

COTS    commercial off-the-shelf

CRITICOMM       Critical Intelligence Communications

CSS     Central Security Service (of NSA)

DA      Department of the Army

DAA     Designated Approving Authority

DBMS    database management system

DCA     Defense Communications Agency (now DISA)

DCAC    DCA Circular

DCI     Director of Central Intelligence

DCID    DCI Directive

DES     Data Encryption Standard

DIA     Defense Intelligence Agency

DIAM    DIA Manual

DISA    Defense Information Systems Agency

DISN    Defense Information Systems Network

DLA     Defense Logistics Agency

DLAR    DLA Regulation

DMA     Defense Mapping Agency

DMS     Defense Message System

DNA     Defense Nuclear Agency

DNI     Director of Naval Intelligence

DoD     Department of Defense

DoDD    DoD Directive

DPL     Degausser Products List

DSNET1  Defense Secure Network 1

DSNET2  Defense Secure Network 2

DSNET3  Defense Secure Network 3

EO      Executive Order

EPL     Evaluated Products List

ETL     Endorsed Tools List

FIPS PUB        Federal Information Processing Standard Publication

FOUO    For Official Use Only

FSRS    Functional Security Requirements for a Telecommunications System

HQDA    Headquarters, Department of the Army

HQDNA   Headquarters, Defense Nuclear Agency

IC      Intelligence Community

INFOSEC         information systems security

ISSWG   Information System Security Working Group

ITSDN   Integrated Tactical Strategic Data Network

IV&V    independent verification and validation

JCS     Joint Chiefs of Staff

LAN     local area network

MACOM   Major Command (Army)

MAJCOM  Major Command (Air Force)

MCO     Marine Corps Order

MILNET  Military Network

MJCS    Memorandum, JCS

MLS     multilevel secure

MOA     Memorandum of Agreement

NAVINTCOMINST   Naval Intelligence Command Instruction

NCSC    National Computer Security Center or National Communications
Security Committee

NIST    National Institute of Standards and Technology

NSA     National Security Agency

NSD     National Security Directive

NSTISS  National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems
Security

NTISS   National Telecommunications and Informations Systems Security

NTISSI  National Telecommunications and Informations Systems Security
Instruction

OMB     Office of Management and Budget

OPNAVINST       Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction

OPSEC   operations security

OSD     Office of the Secretary of Defense

PC      personal computer

PLFA    Primary-Level Field Activity

PM      Program Manager

PPL     Preferred Products List

RFP     Request for Proposal

SCI     Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCINET  Sensitive Compartmented Information Network

SECNAVINST      Secretary of the Navy Instruction

SIOP-ESI        Single Integrated Operational Plan-Extremely Sensitive Information

SPINTCOM        Special Intelligence Communication

STU-III Secure Telephone Unit-III

TCB     Trusted Computing Base

TCSEC   Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria

TECH SEC        technical security

TEMPEST         Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard

TNI     Trusted Network Interpretation

TRANSEC         transmission security

TSCM    technical surveillance countermeasures

U       Unclassified

U.S.    United States

USA     United States Army

USAF    United States Air Force

USN     United States Navy

WAN     wide area network

WINCS   WWMCCS Information Network Computer System

WWMCCS  Worldwide Military Command and Control System

APPENDIX E

List of References

1.      Department of Defense (DoD), 21 March 1988, Security Requirements for Automated
Information Systems (AISs), DoD Directive 5200.28.

2.      DoD, December 1985, Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria,
DoD 5200.28-STD.

3.      Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), June 1991, Compartmented Mode Workstation
Evaluation Criteria, Version 1 (CMWEC), document number DDS-2600-6243-91.

4.      NSA, 2 June 1991, NSA Specification for General Functional Security Requirements for a
Telecommunications System, (FSRS)(U). (This document is classified.)

5.      DoD, February 1990, Control of Compromising Emanations (U), DoDD C-5200.19, (This
document is classified.)

6.      DCI, 19 July 1988, Security Policy for Uniform Protection of Intelligence Processed in
Automated Information Systems and Networks (U), DCID 1/16, (This document is classified.),
and Security Manual for Uniform Protection of Intelligence Processed in Automated
Information Systems and Networks (U), supplement to DCID 1/16, (This document is
classified).

7.      Department of the Army, August 1990, Information Systems Security, AR 380-19.

8.      Office of the President, July 1990, National Policy for the Security of National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems (U), (This document is classified.).

9.      Executive Order 12356, 2 April 1982, National Security Information.

10.     Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, United States Intelligence Activities.

11.     Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 12 December 1985, Management of Federal
Information Resources, OMB Circular No. A-130. (Revision currently in process.).

12.     National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 27 September 1983, Guideline for
Computer Security Certification and Accreditation, FIPS PUB 102.

13.     Public Law 100-235,101 STAT. 1724, 8 January 1988, Computer Security Act of 1987.

14.     National Computer Security Center, 31 July 1987, Trusted Network Interpretation of the
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, NCSC-TG-005, Version-1.

15.     DoD, January 1973, Automated Information System Security Manual, DoD 5200.28-M.
(Revision currently in process.).

16.     NSA, Information Systems Security Products and Services Catalogue (INFOSEC Catalog).

17.     NIST, April 1982, General Security Requirements for Equipment Using the Data Encrvption
Standard, Federal Standard 1027.

18.     Title 5, U.S. Code, Section 552a, Privacy Act of 1974.

19.     DoD, 7 June 1982, Information Security Program, DoD Directive 5200.1, and June 1986, with
Change No. 1, 27 June 1988, Information Security Program Regulation, DoD 5200.1-R.

20.     DoD, October 1981, Communications Security (COMSEC) (U), DoDD C-5200.5, (This
document is classifed.).

21.     NSA/CSS, December 1990, TEMPEST Security Program, NSA/CSS Regulation 90-5.

22.     NTISSC, October 1988, TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities (U), NTISSI 7000, (This
document is classified.).

23.     DoD, July 1980, Security of Military Instahations and Resources, DoDD 5200.8.

24.     DoD, April 1984, Security of DoD Communications Facilities, DoDD 5210.73.

25.     DIA, Physical Security Standards for Construction of Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facilities (U), DIAM 50-3, (This document is for offical use only.).

26.     DCI, September 1987, U.S. Intelligence Community Physical Standards for Sensitive
Compartmented Information, DCID 1/12.

27.     DoD, December 1979, DoD Personnel Security Program, DoDD 5200.2.

28.     DCI, April 1986, Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing
Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information, DCID 1/1 4.

29.     DoD, July 1983, DoD Operations Security Program, DoDD 5205.2.

30.     DoD, September 1986, Computer Security Technical Vulnerability Reporting Program, DoD
Instruction 5215.2.

31.     DoD, July 1978, Defense Special Security Communications System: Security Criteria and
Telecommunications Guidance, DoD C-5030.58-M.

32.     DCA, March 1987, DCS AUTODIN Category III Operational Acceptance Test, DCAC 370-
D195-3.

33.     DoD, December 1985, Industrial Security Regulation, DoD Regulation 5220.22-R.

34.     DoD, January 1991, Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information,
DoD 5220.22-M.

35.     Department of the Air Force, 2 June 1992, The Air Force Computer Security (COMPUSEC)
Program, AFSSI 5100.

36.     Department of the Air Force, May 1983, Control of Dissemination of Intelligence Information,
AFR 205-19.

37.     Department of the Navy, November 1989, Department of the Navy Automated Information
Systems (AIS) Security Program, SECNAVINST 5239.2.

38.     Department of the Navy, April 1985, Department of the Navy Automatic Data Processing
Security Program, OPNAVINST 5239.1A.

39.     Department of the Navy, July 1990, Department of the Navy SCI/Intelligence, Automated
Information System (AIS) Security Program, NAVINTCOMIN ST 5239.3.

40.     Marine Corps, 1982, Marine Corps Automatic Data Processing Security Manual, MCO
P5510.14, Change 1.

41.     DlA, 1980, Security of Compartmented Computer Operations (U), DIAM 50-4, (This
document is classified.).

42.     DIA, March 1979, Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems,
DIA Regulation 50-23.

43.     NSA, January 1990, Security for Automated Information Systems and Networks (U), NSA/
CSS Directive No. 10-27, (This document is for official use only.).

44.     NSA, 17 October 1990, NSA/CSS Operational Computer Security Manual, NSA/CSS Manual
130-1.

45.     JCS, April 1988, Security Policy for the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network, JCS Pub 6-03.7.

46.     JCS, May 1987, Safeguarding the Single Integrated Operational Plan (U), MJCS 75-87, (This
document is classified) (under revision as of date of this document).

47.     DCI, February 1987, Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information, DCID 1/1 9.

48.     Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), August 1991, Security Requirements for
Automated Information Systems (AISs), DCA Instruction 630-230-19.

49.     Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), July 1990, Automated Information Systems Security
Requirements, DMA Manual 5200.28 (under revision as of date of this document).

50.     Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), 31 August 1989, Security Requirements for Automated
Information Systems (AISs), DNA 5200.28D (under revision as of date of this document).

51.     Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), October 1991, Security Requirements for Automated
Information and Telecommunications Systems, DLA Regulation (DLAR) 5200.17.

        PUBLICATION INFORMATION

Single copies of this document may be obtained by contacting:

DIRECTOR

National Security Agency

ATTN: INFOSEC Awareness Division

Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

(4l0) 766-8729

Multiple copies may be obtained by contacting:

Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402

[phone]

(Mastercard and Visa are accepted)

For further assistance or information write to:

ATTN: X8

National Security Agency

9800 Savage Road

Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000


Pre-certification Phase
Certification Phase


Step 1

Assess System
Requirements/Assess
Tailoring Factors


Step 2

Plan for C&A


Step 3

Perform System

Analysis
Step 4

Report Findings/

Recommendations
Accreditation Phase
Step 5

Conduct

Site Survey
Step 6

Make

Accreditation

Decision
Post-Accreditation Phase
Step 7

Maintain

Accreditation
INFOSEC
Communications

Related
COMSEC

Cryptosecurity

Emission Sec.

Electronic Sec.

Transmission Sec.

Technical Sec.
AIS Related
Information Sec.

Administration Sec.

Personnel Sec.

Environmental Sec.

Physical Sec.

Operations Sec.

Manual/Information

Related
COMPUSEC

Data Sec.


Executive Orders


National Security

Agency


Public Laws


OMB Circulars


FIPS PUBS


Security for

Intelligence

Systems


Security for

Compartmented

Systems


Technical Security


Computer

Security


Information

Security


Communications

Security


TEMPEST


Personnel

Security


Operations

Security


Physical

Security


Industrial

Security


NCSC Guidance


Agency/Service

Regulations


FIPS PUBS


OMB Circulars


Public Laws


National Security

Agency


Executive Orders


Security for

Intelligence

Systems


Security for

Compartmented

Systems


Technical Security


Computer

Security


Information

Security


Communications

Security


TEMPEST


Personnel

Security


Operations

Security


Physical

Security


Industrial

Security


NCSC Guidance


Agency/Service

Regulations