Understanding North Korea, says a former U.S. intelligence official, is "like putting together a jigsaw puzzle with only 5 percent of the pieces."
There is no consensus within the U.S. intelligence community or the Clinton administration on even the most fundamental questions about North Korea. "We're inherently uncertain as to their motivations," admits a senior administration official. "We're inherently uncertain about their capabilities."
But whether the Clinton administration negotiates an end to the nuclear standoff between Pyongyang and the world or blunders into a war nobody wants depends in part on how well American officials can put the North Korean puzzle together. Some U.S. officials worry that President Clinton, who warned in November that "North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb," already may have painted himself into a corner. "The question then becomes, well, if they get a bomb, what are you going to do about it?" says a U.S. official.
Last week the Pentagon agreed to send Patriot air-defense missiles to South Korea to counter a possible Scud missile attack from the North. And as the North Koreans continue to haggle with the International Atomic Energy Agency over allowing IAEA inspections of their nuclear facilities to resume, there is a sharp split in the U.S. intelligence community over the wisdom of continuing to negotiate with North Korea.
In a Special National Intelligence Estimate produced last fall, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency (which oversees electronic eavesdropping) took a dim view of the prospects for diplomacy. The hawks think Pyongyang is stalling for time and that the negotiations are merely an effort to extract concessions from the West.
Doves in the State Department and elsewhere, however, think a group of moderates within the North Korean leadership has realized that Pyongyang's only hope for survival is to follow the Chinese model, seeking economic help from the West while preserving its authoritarian political system. They believe the North Koreans are now trying to find out how much they can get in return for giving up their nuclear program.
Hawks dismiss the notion that there are any moderates in North Korea, where officials who stick their necks out sometimes end up as casualties in "unexpected traffic accidents."
There is plenty of room for disagreements about North Korea, a senior U.S. intelligence official admits, because "the quality of our intelligence is lousy." There are three main sources of information about North Korea: "imagery" from photoreconnaissance and other satellites, human intelligence from travelers and the occasional defector and intercepts of North Korean communications and other electronic signals.
Hard target. Imagery is the most important, but it is hampered by the fact that the North Koreans build some secret facilities underground and by the clouds that often blanket the country. The United States has had no luck inserting spies or recruiting agents in North Korea, and insight into the thinking of the country's leader, Kim Il Sung, is rare. Finally, because the North Koreans rely on underground cables rather than microwave communications, electronic eavesdropping is of limited value.
Other nations are faring little better. China still talks to the North more than any other country does, but Chinese officials privately admit that they do not have a clear idea of what is motivating Pyongyang these days. The Chinese are "very frustrated with the North Koreans," says a Western diplomat in Beijing. "They find them impossible to deal with."
Not surprisingly, most of the conclusions U.S. analysts reach are tentative at best, and few of them are unanimous. The most recent Special National Intelligence Estimate, for example, says only that there is a "better than even" chance that the North Koreans can build a nuclear bomb. And while U.S. officials believe Pyongyang has reprocessed enough plutonium for one or two 10-to-20-kiloton nuclear devices, intelligence officials say there is no evidence that it has built or tested a bomb. Even if it has, many experts doubt that North Korea has been able to miniaturize a weapon so it can be delivered by an airplane or a missile.
Analysts also disagree about the size and meaning of North Korea's military buildup in the demilitarized zone. Last July or August, satellite imagery revealed that Pyongyang had moved some 64 big 170-mm naval guns mounted on tracks and 240-mm multiple rocket launchers with ranges of 30-40 miles into the mountains near the DMZ that divides North Korea from South Korea. Hawks think the buildup is offensive; doves say it began during the Persian Gulf war when, for reasons known only to themselves, the North Koreans concluded that the war was a prelude to an impending invasion of North Korea.
Pentagon officials do not even agree on how many North Korean troops are massed near the DMZ: Some claim there are 600,000; others say there are only 400,000 -- and that they lack the support troops needed to attack the South.
While hawks and doves duel, a third school of thought thinks it is pointless to speculate on any of these questions. "We don't know and possibly the North Koreans themselves don't know their bottom line," says a top U.S. official. But given the alternatives, chief U.S. negotiator with North Korea Robert Gallucci believes the only way to proceed is to test whether North Korea is willing to negotiate an end to the nuclear standoff.
Bad move. Most hawks, doves and fence sitters, however, agree that threatening to seek United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea is probably the worst step for the United States. "If you don't leave the door open for the tiger, he's going to fight," warns former Pentagon Asia expert Carl Ford.
Gallucci disagrees. "The worst outcome," he says, "is to have the international community ignore the North Koreans thumbing their nose at the [nuclear] safeguards regime. It could have a catastrophic outcome in Asia and the rest of the world."
So far, though, the North Koreans are outmaneuvering the Clinton administration. By withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pyongyang turned the negotiations on allowing international inspections of its nuclear facilities on their head. Then Pyongyang won a second tactical victory by persuading the United States and South Korea to discuss a "package deal" in which the United States would consider economic assistance, diplomatic relations and even aid to Pyongyang's civilian nuclear power program if North Korea would agree to resolve the nuclear issue.
The North Koreans, famous for backtracking on agreements and haggling over spelling, have agreed on the "principle" of continuing nuclear safeguards and agreed to "take the steps necessary" to assure that. But when North Korean officials traveled to Vienna to flesh out the details with the IAEA, they rejected tests the U.N. agency says are necessary. Now, American officials fear the crisis could come to a head if North Korea does not allow inspections to resume before the IAEA board of governors meets on February 22.
If Pyongyang wants nuclear weapons for deterrence, a compromise may yet be possible. But if North Korea wants them as an instrument for regional domination, a showdown may be inevitable.
