Coal deposits were formed eons ago when great prehistoric swamps submerged and decomposed under enormous pressure to form a solid, carbon-based inflammable material. In most areas, coal was deposited in a series of layers known today as seams which record the development of vegetation at different periods. Grades of coal are determined by the material's comparative age and the amount of pressure to which it was subjected during formation. The hardest, purest and as a result best burning coal is anthracite, found in only a few areas of the world. More common is bituminous coal which comes in a variety of grades and contains more impurities, usually in the form of some sulphur. Softer than anthracite, it burns faster with more smoke and fumes. Lignite is the lowest grade of coal deposit. Usually found close to the surface, it is the softest, least pure and poorest burning. Peat is a combustible but comparatively inefficient surface deposit, composed of only partially decayed vegetable matter. At the other end of the spectrum oil and natural gas, like coal, are fossil fuels but have been formed by a different process. They are much more efficient than coal for most purposes.
Europeans and Asians have used coal as a heating fuel since ancient times. By the time Europeans first arrived in America, there were well-established trading patterns in Western Europe and the uses of coal were being expanded. Methods had been established to test the burning qualities of various grades of coal by the eighteenth century and some governments were regulating the mining of coal in their own interest. Generally, this control took the form of restraints on the trading of coal between competing countries and the imposition of licensing arrangements on mining entrepreneurs. Like the royal forests, salt deposits and other great natural resources, coal was brought under the supervision of the state, first as a source of income, and ultimately as the means of directing the economic future of nations. As well, the alienation of coal reserves became a means of rewarding political friends and relations.
Coal was an important commodity in cold, damp climates where wood for heating was increasingly scarce. In Western Europe coal was used principally for heating, but it gave off a sooty black smoke. This property of the fuel resulted in the restriction of its use in some cities. Yet increasingly coal was adopted for industrial uses, especially by blacksmiths and other iron workers who valued its long, steadier heat. The introduction of steam driven engines towards the end of the eighteenth century provided another impetus for the expansion of coal's uses. Not only was there a steady demand for coal to power such engines, but the introduction of steam driven pumps and haulage equipment permitted a technological revolution within the coal industry itself. By the end of the century, coal was viewed as the essential ingredient in the industrial revolution then well underway in England and France, the two nations most directly involved in the colonization of North America.
Several early European explorers in North America observed coal deposits but mentioned the resource only casually in their journals. There was little prospect of coal becoming a competitive staple commodity to rival fish or furs, for it was in ready supply in Western Europe where producers were not prepared to countenance competition from their own colonies. Besides, coal was too inexpensive and too bulky a cargo to sustain transatlantic carrying costs at this early period. The coal located deep in the interior of the continent was far too removed to attract more than cursory attention. But along the Nova Scotia coastline, deposits provoked a bit more speculative interest for the simple reason that they were so readily accessible. Nevertheless, even those deposits were left undeveloped until the eighteenth century.
The Nova Scotia Coal Fields
The are four major deposits of coal in Nova Scotia, two on the mainland and two on Cape Breton Island. All contain bituminous coal, though there are variations in quality. On both sides of Spanish Bay later Sydney Harbour the principal Cape Breton coal deposits outcropped close to the shore. The Pictou fields, located near Pictou Harbour on the shores of Northumberland Strait, were smaller in extent than those of Cape Breton. Some seams there were purer and would be preferred for certain industrial uses when they came under development later in the nineteenth century. The third major coal field is located in Cumberland County, on the Bay of Fundy side of the isthmus connecting mainland Nova Scotia to New Brunswick. Except for some smaller deposits located on the shoreline at Joggins, Cumberland coal is generally less immediately accessible by water than the Pictou or Cape Breton deposits. Finally, there are a series of deposits in Inverness County, on the Northumberland coastline of Cape Breton. Those deposits were discovered only later in the nineteenth century and developed as a supplement to the larger workings in Pictou and Cape Breton Counties.
Unlike deposits which are near the surface in some other parts of the world, Nova Scotia's coal lies deep underground, sometimes kilometres under the sea. Generally coal seams overlay one another, separated by strata of clay or rock. They are anywhere from six feet (1.82 metres) to only a few inches (several centimetres) in thickness, though only those of two feet (sixty-one centimetres) or more were considered at all economical. In some areas there were substantial faults which could prove perilous in systematic mining, but many seams were mined for as much as five miles from the surface and well out under the ocean with no substantial interruption. One consequence of this natural phenomenon has been that Nova Scotia coal has tended to be comparatively more expensive to mine than most other coal; for as a mine gets older the distance from the surface is always longer and the haulage time for both men and coal become prohibitive. The provision of fresh air for miners and power for pumping water and hoisting coal from such depths has taxed the ingenuity of a succession of the world's best mining engineers over the years. Though high degrees of mechanization were eventually achieved, Nova Scotia's industry remained for its most active period one of the most labour intensive in the world.
Pre-Industrial Coal Mining
in Nova Scotia
While the French occupied Acadia there was only a casual interest in the coal reserves. There are occasional references to coal being cut near Joggins in Cumberland County by the Acadian settlers, but there was no systematic mining. In 1713 the French, defeated by the British in one of a series of conflicts that embroiled Acadia throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, gave up possession of mainland Nova Scotia. Restricted to Cape Breton (renamed ╬le Royale) the French built the Fortress of Louisbourg, just a few miles south of the major coal deposits at Spanish Bay. It was the first large-scale European settlement on the Island, which had previously served only as a base for the fisheries. French military engineers quickly became interested in the coal deposits, sent samples home for analysis and experimented with coal as fuel for their lime kilns. As Louisbourg proved one of the dampest and coldest locations on the whole Atlantic seaboard, there was a steady demand for coal as a heating fuel for the garrison.
The emergence of Louisbourg as a major trading entrep⌠t facilitated the use of the coal reserves in the illicit trade which began to develop between French and New England merchants. With no ready source of coal along the seaboard, the New Englanders were forced to go elsewhere to cut coal from outcrops immediately accessible by sea. We should not, however, exaggerate the extent of this early involvement. Little coal was taken and there were no settlements established to support the activity. Rather, individual ship captains visited the shorelines near the outcrops and their crews cut and loaded whatever amount of coal they had room for in addition to their regular clandestine cargoes of fish and West Indies produce from Louisbourg. This usually amounted to only a few tons. Apart from a few holes in the ground, most of them within a few yards of the shore, few traces of these early activities remained when the British finally defeated the French and took possession of Cape Breton in 1758.
Following the final exclusion of the French from eastern North America by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, British colonial administrators tended to alienate large blocks of territory or other concessions in North America to privileged British entrepreneurs. For instance, Prince Edward Island was separated from Nova Scotia in 1769 and entirely disposed of by royal decree to a group of speculators; similar territorial concessions were made throughout the colonies. There were, after all, many political debts to be repaid following the long war with the French. British and colonial entrepreneurs had expressed immediate interest in the coal resources of Cape Breton, but British officials had some inhibitions regarding the natural resources of their expanded American empire. Concerned that uncoordinated colonial development might lead to competition with British manufacturers, London-based officials attempted to direct and consolidate development for the maximum benefit of the homeland. In Nova Scotia the immediate result was a total prohibition of development and discouragement of any form of settlement on Cape Breton Island, which had been annexed to Nova Scotia in 1763. The British feared that any exploitation of coal would lead inevitably to the emergence of colonial manufacturers. This explicit mercantilism characterized British colonial policy on the eve of the American Revolution.
These pre-revolutionary restrictions were eased somewhat in 1784, when Cape Breton once again became a separate colony. Set aside as a Loyalist refuge, it was to provide another opportunity for those who had lost their property and homes in support of the Crown. Although Cape Breton never in fact became an important Loyalist settlement, the establishment of a capital for the colony at the head of Spanish Bay (renamed Sydney after the British Secretary of State) brought its coal reserves under the close scrutiny of the British. The Cape Breton coal fields were subsequently opened for exploitation and the government of the Island sought a suitable lessee. But the British would approve only short-term leases; the maximum allowable was just seven years. This restriction discouraged large-scale investment and those London entrepreneurs who had earlier expressed interest drew back. Halifax merchants entered the field and established a limited market in the region.
While a separate colony 1784 to 1820 Cape Breton's coal output remained relatively insignificant, seldom exceeding 10,000 tons (9000 metric tons) per annum; by comparison, Britain's annual output during the same period was approaching 10,000,000 tons (9,000,000 metric tons). Halifax, Saint John, St. John's, Charlottetown and, occasionally, Boston were the usual destinations for coal shipments. While Cape Breton was busy servicing this local market, primarily with heating fuel, the imperial government continued to prohibit the development of any of the mainland deposits. Various entrepreneurs approached the provincial government for concessions in Pictou, but all requests were refused by the imperial authorities even though supported by the local government. The London-based Board of Trade finally permitted leases in Pictou on the same terms as those for Cape Breton in 1811. But prior to the 1820s the output of the Pictou mines was much less significant than that of Cape Breton.
Coal mining in Nova Scotia during this period never became an industrially-based pursuit. Though the mines were operated on a more or less continuous basis, the actual work remained seasonal, as was the case in the contemporary timber industry. With mining, however, the working season tended to be reversed; coal was cut and shipped mostly in the spring, summer and fall. The work force was similar as well, being generally made up of inexperienced, transient single men, many of them Irish immigrants newly arrived by way of Newfoundland. Workers were housed in large bunkhouses and employed for the season. Few appear to have remained for more than one season; low wages were mostly eaten up by company charges for room and board. As a result, there was little community development at the site of the mines. In both Pictou and Sydney, the mines themselves were somewhat removed from the main town sites and the local population tended to look upon mining as rough and unrefined, which it certainly was. The primitive social conditions associated with such extractive industry seemed insurmountable at the time and the coal towns which were to emerge later could never escape this characterization.
The mines themselves were similarly underdeveloped, few of the newer European techniques being introduced. With no steam technology present for removing water or ventilating the workings, deep shafts were not attempted and most of the coal was taken from very near the surface. The short leases further inhibited the investment necessary for such development though the local government did build the necessary shipping piers. Thus, the activity between 1785 and 1820 was not much more permanent than the more casual exploitation of the previous half-century. Colonial governments, however, were becoming increasingly aware of the importance of the coal deposits, not only for the direct and indirect employment provided, but also for royalties the mines might supply, to their revenue-poor treasury. When Cape Breton was rejoined to Nova Scotia in 1820, considerable interest was expressed in Halifax about possible benefits from the coal reserves, but there was no immediate change in either policy or investment by either the Nova Scotia or imperial governments.
The General Mining Association
A dramatic change in the direction of the industry came about in 1826, when the imperial government intervened to grant a long-term monopoly lease over all the mineral resources of Nova Scotia, including the coal mines, to a London-based firm, the General Mining Association (G.M.A.). This development was a consequence of the revival of a moribund grant of Nova Scotia's mineral resources to Frederick the Duke of York, a younger brother of King George IV. The grant had been made to him in the 1790s in response to a rumour that there were major deposits of precious metals in the province. When those rumours proved unfounded, the grant was never taken up. The Duke was notoriously profligate and had run up huge debts. His advisors convinced the firm of Bridge, Rundell and Bridge, one of his most important creditors, to accept the mineral grant in Nova Scotia in lieu of payment. This transfer was arranged through Treasury officials in London, with no consultation with the government of Nova Scotia and almost none with officials of the Colonial Office. London advised the Nova Scotia authorities that all existing leases should be liquidated to make way for the new arrangement a typical decision at a time when the natural resources of the empire were considered fair game for the plunder and profit of British capitalists and statesmen.
Within the year, the necessary facilitating arrangements had been accomplished and a reluctant provincial legislature brought into line. There were sharp protests from existing leaseholders and some discussion as to whether or not Cape Breton was to be included in the grant, since it had not been a part of Nova Scotia when the Duke had received his concession. The G.M.A., however, soon took complete control of the industry and agreed to pay a royalty to the provincial government as well as fixed rental fee to the Duke of York's estate. The Duke died less than a year after the arrangements were completed, but the G.M.A.'s exclusive lease was for sixty years and the rents continued to be paid to his estate.
After some discussion in London and a cursory mineral survey of the province, the company decided that coal offered the most promise and it hired and sent out Richard Smith as general manager. Smith, who based himself in Pictou, had extensive experience in Britain's Newcastle coal fields and came to Nova Scotia with instructions to modernize the industry. Richard Brown, another British mining engineer, was sent out to look after the Cape Breton interests. These men and their successors applied themselves steadily to the development and expansion of the industry in the province. The G.M.A.'s leaders had predicated expansion on access to markets beyond the region, especially in New England where they immediately established commercial connections. Unable to control the American tariff, their access to that market was intermittent. Output increased steadily but not dramatically over the next three decades.
In addition to increasing output, the G.M.A. propelled Nova Scotia into the industrial revolution. The most modern steam technology available and an experienced work force were brought from the mining communities of northern England and Scotland. Steam engines solved the haulage, drainage and ventilation problems of deep mines. On the surface, a steam railway, the first in British North America, was constructed at the Albion mines in order to improve the movement of coal from the pithead to the docks in Pictou; small steamships were introduced to aid in the loading process. Moreover, large amounts were invested to improve the productivity of the mines; it was estimated at the time that about ú250,000 was invested by the G.M.A. over the first two decades of its operation, an enormous amount by colonial standards.
The miners brought out from Britain introduced the most up-to-date techniques for mining the coal. Employed on a contract basis, they were paid according to the amount of coal that they dug and sent to the surface rather than by the season or at an hourly or daily rate. The Association also developed the support systems necessary for the permanence of the mining communities. Following the British example, they built houses for the miners and encouraged them to bring out or establish families. Company stores, a primitive medical insurance scheme and a host of other services were provided and miners were forced to use a checkoff system which saw their earnings docked for these items. Management also supplied and maintained the tools and power needed in the underground workings. Under these arrangements, the miners were often deeply in debt, almost from the day that they agreed to work for the G.M.A. Altogether, it produced a highly integrated but somewhat paternalistic community.
By stimulating the demand for a number of goods and services, the increasing output of the coal mines generated ripple effects throughout the Nova Scotia economy and quieted opposition which had been sparked by the initial grant. Horses and fodder necessities for the underground workings were in constant demand, as was timber for shoring up the workplaces. Hundreds of Nova Scotians found work in and around the mines where there was work available in the haulage of coal and various kinds of construction on the surface. They would soon join the skilled British miners at the face, first as labourers and later as skilled miners. Bulky coal cargoes contributed substantially to the expansion of provincial shipping. The Halifax mercantile and legal community represented the interests of the G.M A. before the provincial authorities and arranged all aspects of the company's activities, from the acquisition of parcels of land to the negotiation of rights of way for their railroads. Samuel Cunard, who later established the famed steamship line, was the Halifax agent of the Association in the 1840s and J.W. Johnstone, later Premier of Nova Scotia, was its solicitor for a time.
But the G.M.A.'s expansion and monopolization was not entirely unopposed. When a political reform group emerged in the 1840s to challenge the Tory hegemony, the monopoly position of the G.M A. was made a central issue in the legislature and in the opposition press. Entrepreneurs excluded by the monopoly had been its first opponents, but eventually it was the politicians, arguing that there was more potential in the industry than was being realized by the G.M.A., who took the lead. Curiously, the more successful the G.M A. was at expanding output and penetrating the American market, the more forceful became the political opposition. The reason for this is relatively straightforward. The revenue produced by the coal mines under the G.M.A. lease was to some extent fixed by the terms of the lease and was always subject to dispute. The reformers were demanding complete control over all natural resources in the province in order to set the stage for Responsible Government. It was a key point in the debate and a logical step in the development of a provincial consciousness. After all, New Brunswick had gained control over its vast forest reserves two decades earlier. The monopoly arrangement was also out of step with the changing attitude of British officials towards the mercantilist system which had been the empire's foundation stone in the late eighteenth century. With the abolition of the Corn Laws, the preferences on colonial timber and other imperial trade regulations, the coal reserves monopoly was becoming less defensible. When a reform government was finally formed in 1848 the G.M A. lease soon became the subject of protracted negotiations.
Discussions were brought to a head after 1854 when the British government successfully negotiated a Reciprocity Treaty with the United States on behalf of its North American colonies. The inclusion of coal on the free list of that treaty and the consequent potential for expansion of the American market made the G.M A.'s monopoly all the more odious to provincial politicians. The fluctuating American tariff had finally been overcome and there was a surge of interest in Nova Scotia coal from investors, not only in Halifax but in New England as well. In 1857-58, the Nova Scotia government finally concluded negotiations with the imperial government and the G.M A.; complete control over all mineral resources was passed to the colony. It was a decisive step and Nova Scotia's reformers felt they had acquired the potential for directing their economy.
The G.M.A. would continue to hold those properties that it had developed up to 1857 and enough additional property to guarantee expansion. In fact, it would remain one of the province's most important producers until the turn of the century. The remaining coal reserves were opened to general investment. The major areas left free for the new entrepreneurs were the south side of the Sydney Harbour fields in Cape Breton, much of Cumberland and a good portion of the Pictou fields. With the free American market and the subsequent stimulus of the American Civil War, coal output zoomed from a pre-1854 level of about 100,000 tons (90,000 metric tons) per annum to almost 700,000 tons (630,000 metric tons) by 1865, the last full year of operation for the treaty. It was a pivotal period for the coal industry. New producers, rapid expansion and a new provincial Department of Mines reflected the vigour of the industry, not only as a significant factor in the Nova Scotia economy, but as a source of revenue for the local government as well. Some politicians were even coming to recognize the important links between the availability of coal and the development of manufacturers, one of the dominant themes of the latter third of the nineteenth century.
The National Period
The period of American market domination over the industry was relatively short-lived. Over two-thirds of output during reciprocity went to New England, but when the United States turned back towards protection following its Civil War the prospects for the Nova Scotia coal trade were at best precarious. Coal producers looked very hard to find alternatives to the American market. At that point, the British North American colonies began discussion of political and economic integration. The coal operators supported union, arguing that the St. Lawrence region might compensate for their lost American market. With the promise of an Intercolonial Railroad in the British North America Act and the prospect of higher tariffs on foreign manufactured products it was expected, by some pro-confederates at least, that the industrial future of Nova Scotia would be expansive within the new nation. All of these factors combined to commit the coal interests and the Conservative provincial government led by Charles Tupper, himself a representative of Cumberland County and coal speculator, to Confederation as the only alternative to reciprocity. They persevered over the substantial opposition of much of the commercial community and the province entered Confederation in 1867.
The recession following the closure of the free American market was neither as substantial nor as sharp as anticipated. In fact New England continued to be an important, if declining, portion of the total market, especially for some Cape Breton producers who were financially tied to Boston and New York consumers. The St. Lawrence market, which had been negligible prior to Confederation, soon assumed dimensions anticipated by only the most sanguine. This led eventually to a dramatic increase in coal production to 3,000,000 tons (2,700,000 metric tons) per annum by the end of the century and almost 7,000,000 tons (6,300,000 metric tons) when output levelled off just prior to World War I. The completion of the Intercolonial Railroad in the mid-1870s and the gradual expansion of railroad facilities within the Maritimes provided one immediate local market; but regional industrial expansion, especially in the northern and eastern sections of Nova Scotia, was probably more important in the long run. The industrial revolution took hold in Nova Scotia in the 1880s, when a host of manufacturing establishments transformed towns like New Glasgow, Truro and Amherst. The biggest development of this kind, however, came with the establishment of massive primary steel complexes in Trenton and Sydney at the turn of the century. Those steel mills alone would consume over one-third of total output during the decade preceding the war. Indeed, even the most enthusiastic predictions regarding the impact of Confederation seemed fulfilled as Nova Scotia entered the twentieth century.
Following the breaking of the G.M.A. monopoly in 1857, the tendency was towards fragmented ownership with a number of companies establishing independent collieries, each vying for a share of the market. There was some investment by central Canadian entrepreneurs, especially after Confederation, and still some by Americans, particularly in Cape Breton. In addition, there was some movement of Nova Scotia's commercial capital into the industry. During this period consumers of coal tried to control their source of supply and central Canadians and Americans became involved in the coal industry in an attempt to guarantee supplies or control the price. Since coal was essential for such a variety of industrial processes, its cost had to be kept at the lowest possible level. Most Nova Scotia coal was exported from the region and, consequently, control over the industry moved out of the area during this period as well.
After the economic slump of the 1870s a major consolidating trend occurred in the industry. During the 1880s the Nova Scotia Coal and Steel Corporation (N.S.C.S.C.) was formed and in 1893 the Dominion Coal Corporation (DOMCO), an American-based combination led by H.M. Whitney of Boston, was created. Designed to promote the reentry of Nova Scotia coal into the New England Market, DOMCO ended up controlling most of the active mines on the very productive south side of the Cape Breton coal fields. Centred in the town of Glace Bay, the company transformed mining in the area by unifying management and revamping organization of the mines. In 1900 the N.S.C.S.C. bought out the General Mining Association's remaining properties in Sydney Mines and also established a steel mill there. The Dominion Steel Corporation, centred in Sydney and involving many of the same people who had set up DOMCO, was formed the same year to further exploit the south Sydney fields.
Tension resulted when various financial interests and personalities attempted to dominate DOMCO and Dominion Steel. The American-based Whitney interests were soon overwhelmed by central Canadian entrepreneurs and bankers based in MontrΘal and Toronto; a brief struggle for control finally resulted in their amalgamation into the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation in 1909. Included in this merger was the Cumberland Coal and Railroad Corporation which operated the major mine in Springhill. A final merger, this time involving N.S.C.S.C. and Dominion Steel and Coal, created the British Empire Steel and Coal Corporation (BESCO), in its day one of the largest industrial conglomerates in the country. Formed in 1919, the organization controlled most of the important coal reserves of Nova Scotia and all of the steel-making facilities as well. Thus, after several decades of fragmented control, the Nova Scotia coal industry gradually came under a unified management with virtual monopoly control control which remained largely intact until the 1960s, although the ownership changed hands from time to time. Along the way, BESCO and its successors picked up several subsidiaries in the region, including several branch railroads and the Halifax Shipyards, which had emerged during the war as a major repair station supporting the war effort. A giant company by any standards, BESCO promised initially to expand the coal and steel industry in Nova Scotia, but control from central Canada and inexperience in the coal trade proved its undoing. The history of the industry following BESCO's establishment was one of almost continuous crisis, as a constricted market and inefficient management bled the industry till it was no longer viable.
The industry had come full circle since its G.M.A. monopoly days, only this time with the active encouragement of the provincial government. The British North America Act had left the direct regulation of all natural resources in the hands of the provinces and the royalties derived from alienation of these resources became the prime source of income for provinces caught in the squeeze between rising costs and limited revenue.
Once committed, the province was in no position to tolerate interruptions. Royalty revenue expanded steadily till, by the eve of World War I, it made up over half of all provincial revenues. The result was an association of interests between the government and the companies, presenting a formidable obstacle to the interests of the miners.
The World of Work in the Mines
The British miners brought to Nova Scotia in the 1830s and 1840s took with them a long tradition of organized and highly skilled labour which included a large degree of control over the actual place of work and firmly established patterns for regulating the relationship between workers and management. Inside the mines the organization of work was strictly hierarchical, with the experienced miners themselves occupying the preferred position at the face. Miners displayed a firm pride in the exclusive nature of their profession and were quick to protest whenever they felt that their established rights or privileges were being contravened. The association of these men with the G.M.A. and its managers gave the industry a distinctly British cast, a characteristic which persisted long after the British miners had lost their numerical superiority. In the early years, few native Nova Scotians worked as miners; later the situation changed dramatically.
The G.M.A. introduced the contract system to its Nova Scotia collieries. In essence it was piecework, whereby miners were paid according to the amount of coal extracted rather than by the number of hours spent in the mine. While preserving his apparent independence this arrangement also involved the miner in a reciprocal relationship with mine managers which resulted in a loyalty that was mutually self-serving but ultimately very restricting for both parties. The contracts between sponsored immigrant miners and the G.M.A. usually involved repayment of the cost of passage and an agreement to work for the company for a certain number of years at prevailing rates. Preference at the place of work was offered to men in debt to the company. The G.M.A. supplied the necessary tools and equipment, which was normal, but they went far beyond that to the provision of housing and credit at company stores, all designed to ensure the stability of the mining communities. In spite of the comparative regularity of work under the G.M.A., there were still seasons of the year when there was little work available and miners had to be carried over those periods of credit. The result was a cycle of debt from which few miners ever really escaped.
Though there was little sustained protest during the early years of the monopoly, individual instances of conflict demonstrated the miners' determination to preserve their control over the place of work. Most early disputes involved attempts to introduce non-skilled workers, usually Nova Scotians, to the face during times of market expansion. The British miners met these attempts with a solid wall of opposition. Despite their protests, they were bound to the company in so many ways that it was difficult to sustain the defence of their rights. The G.M.A.'s paternalism did not permit much independent action and effectively discouraged organizations among the employees.
The fragmentation of ownership following the demise of the G.M.A.'s monopoly in 1858 resulted almost immediately in confrontation. The miners now had to deal with a variety of operators, few of them as steeped in the traditions of British mining as the G.M.A., and there was inevitable confusion over the terms of work. More important, now there was competition for the limited number of experienced miners. Though a small but steady immigration of British miners continued to serve the expansion of the industry, the proportion of native-born to British-born workers steadily increased. By Confederation those born in Nova Scotia had become the numerically dominant group, which is not to say they dominated the work organization. The British miners continued to give whatever leadership the miners had. Up to 1858 the G.M.A. had operated virtually unfettered by any safety regulations. Once the province assumed control, responsibility for safety passed to the newly established Department of Mines, a weak organization during its early years when the largest number of independent companies entered the field. In 1862 a mines act imposed some order over the industry but the legislation provided little protection for the miners. In 1864, following a strike in Cape Breton, an act was passed prohibiting the formation of workers' combinations that is, unions.
This gradual dilution of the British work force by large numbers of native Nova Scotia labourers and the loss of control over the terms of work eventually provoked the remaining skilled workers to band together to defend themselves. Concern over the lax fashion in which some of the newer coal companies observed government safety regulations created a demand for strict enforcement, especially following major mine disasters in the 1870s. The final result was the Provincial Workmen's Association (P.W.A.); founded in 1879, this was Canada's first industrial union. Immediately successful throughout the coal fields, the organization was largely the creation of a group of British miners led by Robert Drummond, a much-travelled, Scottish-born miner then living at Springhill in Cumberland County. Almost entirely British in orientation, the P.W.A. was primarily concerned with defending the interests of skilled miners by lobbying the government. During its first decade the P.W.A. succeeded in securing improved regulations governing safety in the mines and the conditions of labour, but there was little activity in the area of collective bargaining for the improvement of wage rates. The P.W.A.'s primary tenet was that miners were skilled tradesmen; their demand was that the government intervene to regulate their relationship with the coal masters in the general interest of the industry. At the same time, however, it sought to retain organization of the place of work around the traditional structures of British mining. P.W.A. leaders raised little opposition to the structure of the industry and seemed preoccupied with guaranteeing their own privileged place in the hierarchy. In time, this conservatism would provoke a struggle for the allegiance of the miners. The majority of the work force, especially after the dramatic expansion of the turn-of-the-century period, was not schooled in the British tradition.
Another factor that complicated the relationship between capital and labour in the coal towns was the process of community formation. Virtually all of the coal communities were single industry towns and, generally speaking, one-company towns as well. The establishment of a town was entirely dependent on the decisions of the coal masters; where they decided to sink a shaft a town developed. In fact, they usually ensured control of development by acquiring large blocks of land surrounding the sites of the mines and erecting housing for the workers. The pervasiveness of the companies' dominion over the coal towns paralleled that of the early G.M.A., but on a dramatically greater scale. Through control over real estate, company stores, access to medical service and a host of other social amenities, it was able to dictate the terms of work and life of virtually all members of the community. This was a crucial factor in the development of the unions. Company housing and company stores were designed to control the men. Union militants, for instance, could be removed from the company houses or denied credit at company stores, derisively called "Pluck Me" by the miners. While this sort of setup may have been defensible in the paternalistic days of the early G.M.A., it became increasingly intolerable for the thousands of miners and labourers who flooded into the mine fields after 1880. The almost universal hatred of the miners for the oppressiveness of this system, particularly as administered by DOMCO and later BESCO, was a key factor in prompting the solidarity which became so characteristic of miners after 1900 and, in particular, during the protracted labour strife of the 1920s.
As the new conglomerates came to dominate the industry in the twentieth century it became increasingly apparent that the work force needed a stronger voice in determining conditions of labour and wages. The decade prior to World War I featured internal competition for the miners' support, highlighted by a protracted affiliation strike in 1909. Finally, the newer miners' choice, the American based United Mine Workers of America, was successfully reorganized in 1919. The U.M.W. of A. assumed a much more militant stance than its predecessor, the P.W.A. The conflicts of the prewar period save for the 1909 strike were nothing compared to the almost continuous strife of the early 1920s. BESCO's determination to reduce miners' wages to pre-war levels provoked a series of strikes that brought the industry to its knees in 1922. Finally, in 1925, after another long strike, the miners forced the appointment of a Royal Commission to examine the whole question of their relationship with the company and the government.
Given the fact that the major technological advances of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were applied not so much to the actual mining of the coal as to lifting it from the mines, increased output could only be achieved by the opening of new, larger mines and the introduction of additional workers. Indeed, coal mining emerged as the fastest growing employment sector in the province between 1890 and 1920. At Confederation there were perhaps 3,000 men involved in the industry in Nova Scotia. By the outbreak of World War I there were more than 12,000; the coal and related steel industry accounted for over one-fifth of Nova Scotia's work force. This fact, combined with the importance of coal royalties for provincial revenue, made coal the most important industry in the province and the relations of miners and coal companies a question of primary concern to the government. When there was the prospect of labour strife or the hint of an interruption in normal production, the provincial government identified itself with the interests of the coal companies and intervened on their behalf. Miners, for their part, identified themselves increasingly with more militant objectives of the labour movement: full recognition of the bargaining rights of the miners' elected representatives; shorter hours of work; increased wages; improved working conditions in the mines; and curbs on the discretionary power of the companies.
The miners survived the troubled twenties with their collective spirit intact, if somewhat bruised. At times their communities seemed besieged. BESCO's intransigence, actively supported by both the provincial and federal governments, drove the miners to defend their interests with every tool at their disposal. Mining towns became almost a second home to the federal troops who were sent in to help keep the peace and protect the property of the coal magnates. Time after time during the 1920s the various levels of government supported the company's determination to confront the miners' demands with force. Municipal government in the coal towns had come increasingly under the control of the miners and municipal officials were less willing to bend to company pressures. The situation accentuated the dependence of the coal company on the federal and provincial authorities at times of stress. Strikes led inevitably to confrontation and occasionally to violence; the miners were determined to secure concessions by shutting down the mines, while the company and the government seemed equally determined to thwart them.
In the face of immense opposition, the miners persevered, formulating and promulgating their own consensus regarding the nature of the capitalist system and pursuing increasingly radical postures with regard to the coal industry. By establishing their right to strike for better wages and improved working conditions, they advanced the position of workers throughout the nation. Theirs was the universal response to a loss of control over the place of work during a period of rapid transformation. The failure to gain immediate goals and the protracted economic troubles in the industry in the decades following World War I were not a reflection of their weakness. Rather, it was the venality of a giant company and the inherent shortcomings of an industrial strategy oriented to central Canada that left little room for the development of regional industrial centres which were the root of the problem. When Nova Scotia's production proved surplus to national demand, not only in coal but in steel and a host of secondary industries as well, the regional economy was allowed to languish, and dependence on federal handouts increased. The situation could not but spark continuing re-evaluation of the impact of national policies on the region.
