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- RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Monday 8 May 1989 Volume 8 : Issue 68
-
- FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS
- ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator
-
- Contents:
- Low-Probability / High-Consequence Accidents -- and the Midland 737? (PGN)
- "Probing Boeing's crossed Connections" (Werner Uhrig)
- An Atlantis spacecraft computer problem resolved nicely (PGN)
- "Life's Risks: Balancing Fear Against Reality of Statistics"
- (Marc Rotenberg, Jerry Leichter)
- Hear No Evil (Kevin Driscoll)
- Computer Ethics Course/Resource Volunteers Wanted (long) (Bob Barger)
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Date: Mon, 8 May 1989 8:34:12 PDT
- From: Peter Neumann <neumann@csl.sri.com>
- Subject: Low-Probability / High-Consequence Accidents -- and the Midland 737?
-
- I would like to consider here a class of problems that has not been addressed
- specifically in RISKS, although its components are familiar. The RISKS Forum
- has addressed alarm systems that could not adequately be debugged under truly
- real circumstances. There was also the example of the earliest Antarctic ozone
- depletion data, which was systematically rejected by the analysis program for
- being *too* anomalous. The potential for a combination of these two types of
- problems might occur in aircraft monitoring during flight, as follows.
-
- Sensitive sensors in hostile environments (such as engines) sometimes
- report unrealistic or off-scale readings due to noise or interference.
- Consequently software monitoring the sensor may be programmed to ignore
- values beyond a certain threshold, on the grounds that such extreme
- readings must be the results of extraneous events. If the ignored sensor
- reading was "real", however, other more remote sensors might pick up -- and
- accept -- less extreme readings. This appears to be a potential problem in
- a variety of control systems.
-
- In the absence of any definitive information about the British Midland 737
- crash, such a hypothesis seems just as plausible as any other. The *left*
- engine was reportedly vibrating wildly (possibly due to a broken fan blade),
- but the pilots for some reason(s) shut off the (good) right engine. The
- extreme vibration in the left engine might indeed have produced hitherto
- unexperienced sensor readings that designers -- or the software folks -- felt
- would have to be impossible. The vibration from the left engine would have
- been transmitted -- much attenuated -- through the entire airframe, and might
- have been reported at a much more "reasonable" intensity by the vibration
- sensors of the right-hand engine. It does not take much of a leap in
- imagination for the computer program to conclude that it was the *right* engine
- that was malfunctioning.
-
- In any event, this possible fault mode represents another case of
- LOW-PROBABILITY / HIGH-CONSEQUENCE ACCIDENTS [1], and thus deserves explicit
- attention. Unfortunately it is just one more such combinatory fault mode.
-
-
- [1] See Koshland's editorial (title above, in CAPS) in Science, vol 244 no
- 4903, 28 April 1989, p. 405, discussing the Exxon Valdez spill and conclusions
- that should be drawn from it.
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Mon, 8 May 1989 4:53:45 CDT
- From: Werner Uhrig <werner@rascal.ics.UTEXAS.EDU>
- Subject: ``Probing Boeing's crossed connections''
-
- [The title is that of an article in IEEE Spectrum, May 1989, pp. 30-35,
- subtitled ``Misconnected circuits and hoses found on 94 in-service Boeing
- aircraft raise concern about design, test, and maintenance of aircraft
- safety systems''. Author is Karen Fitzgerald.]
-
- At the very end of the article is a further reference of interest to this
- group:
-
- For a minute-by-minute account of the British Midland crash from knowledge
- gathered to date, see Special Bulletin S2/89 of the Air Accidents
- Investigation Branch of the Department of Transport in Farnborough, England,
- March 20, 1989.
- [I recommend the Spectrum article, and
- would like to see the Bulletin. PGN]
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Mon, 8 May 1989 12:13:25 PDT
- From: Peter Neumann <neumann@csl.sri.com>
- Subject: An Atlantis spacecraft computer problem resolved nicely
-
- One of Atlantis' main computers (one of the processors in the two pairs of the
- 2x2 + 1 backup architecture) failed on 7 May. For the first time ever the
- astronauts made repairs -- in this case by substituting a spare processor. It
- took them about 3.5 hours to gain access to the computer systems by removing a
- row of lockers on the shuttle mid-deck, and another 1.5 hours to check out the
- replacement computer.
-
- It is ironic that such a replacement was so difficult, but not surprising. My
- old friend Al Hopkins, who at MIT Instrumentation Lab (now Draper Lab) designed
- the Apollo on-board guidance computer, told me years ago how carefully they had
- planned the packaging so that the astronauts would be able to make repairs on
- the fly (as it were). NASA officials would have none of it, and buried the
- computer several layers underneath other equipment. Apparently that tradition
- has continued. Perhaps the success of the Atlantis crew will change things.
-
- During STS-9, Nov-Dec 83, multiple primary computers on the Columbia failed at
- the same time, and delayed the return to earth. On one hand, the calculations
- say that losing three processors would be a rare event. However, here we have
- another example of a low-probability / high-consequence accident -- especially
- if it involved the backup and one of each of the pairs. Furthermore, since the
- software is the same in all four of 2x2 the main processors, they would all
- have failed consistently, and been deemed correct. (And we just reported the
- serious problem in the Magellan software caught before Atlantis' launch, noted
- in RISKS-8.67!) In the case of pairwise disagreement among both pairs, there is
- always the fifth, backup, computer, separately programmed. As far as I know,
- the shuttles have never had to rely on the backup computer software, so it
- might be preferable to make processor replacements among the main four rather
- than resort to the backup...
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Mon, 8 May 89 12:14:37 -0700
- From: mrotenberg@cdp.uucp [Marc Rotenberg]
- Subject: "Life's Risks: Balancing Fear Against Reality of Statistics"
-
- Excerpted from today's New York Times:
-
- Is the slight risk of contracting cancer from Alar too high a price to pay
- for crisper apples? Is the dramatic increase in milk production available
- through genetically engineered growth hormones worth the unknown risk to
- children's health? If a few aging aircraft suffer explosive decompressions,
- should all old airlines be grounded?
-
- Risks to health and safety and the complex questions of public policy they
- create are seemingly everywhere these days. And while there is little
- statistical evidence that the hazards of daily life are on the rise, a wide
- range of academic and business experts believe that American's perception of
- increased peril is stifling technology, wasting billions of dollars, and,
- ironically, making it more difficult to contain the most serious risks.
-
- ... by broad statistical measures, Americans have never been safer ...
-
- Even the high-profile threats have not changed the risks of untimely death or
- injury. The skies may be crowded, the planes aging and the pilots
- inexperienced, but the trend in aircraft fatalities is downward. ...
-
- Life-saving medicines have been less dramatically affected, but even here,
- the measures to compensate for risk can radically change the economic of
- distribution ...
-
- The Environmental Protection Agency also regards itself as handicapped by
- Congressional and public misperception of relative risk. ...
-
- What explains the public's decreasing tolerance of some risks and apparent
- indifference to others? ... perceived risk is not always related to the
- probability of injury.
-
- Easily tolerated risks include ones that people can choose to avoid (chain
- saws, skiing), that are familiar to those exposed (smoking), or that have been
- around for a long term (fireworks). Poorly tolerated risks are involuntary
- (exposure to nuclear waste), have long delayed effects (pesticides), or unknown
- effects (genetic engineering).
-
- ... nuclear and chemical technologies fare especially badly in such
- subjective rankings. Indeed the general acceleration of technical change and
- integration of new technology in products helps to explain the increase in
- public anxiety about risk. ...
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Mon, 8 May 89 17:17 EDT
- From: "Jerry Leichter (LEICHTER-JERRY@CS.YALE.EDU)"
- Subject: Life's Risks ...
-
- Today's New York Times (Monday 8 May) has a front-page article title "Life's
- Risks: Balancing Fear Against Reality of Statistics". It's the first of two
- articles on "risk and public policy".
-
- The article is ... well worth reading. Here's an interesting quotation:
-
- Peter W. Huber, and engineer, lawyer and author of "The Legal Revolution and
- its Consequences" notes that ... "safety taxes" [extra costs charged by
- suppliers to pay for potential lawsuits] are added to the price of thousands
- of ... goods and services, distorting production and reducing living
- standards. By Mr. Huber's reckoning, the safety tax represents 30 percent of
- the cost of a step ladder, one-third the cost of a ride on a Long Island tour
- bus and $300 of the cost of giving birth in New York City.
- -- Jerry
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: 7 May 89 22:44:01 GMT
- From: driscoll@draco.src.honeywell.com (Kevin Driscoll)
- Subject: Hear No Evil
-
- On a recent flight, the cabin crew was a bit late in starting the in-flight
- movie. The flight took less time than expected, so the movie's climactic
- showdown scene began just after plane touched down. Many of the passengers
- became noticeably irritated at the flight attendants pre- and post-landing
- announcements which interrupted the movie's audio. This was a tow-in gate
- so the engines were shut down well before arriving at the gate. Without
- engine power, an APU supplies electrical power. On the switch-over,
- however, the power glitch reset the audio channel controllers to the default
- channel (8) which is silent. It is common on commercial aircraft to have
- "unimportant" control systems (such as the individual seat lighting and
- audio) reset on power glitches. This is not a safety problem. Is it?
-
- When the audio went dead on this flight, most of the passengers didn't know
- what happened and pushed their flight attendant call buttons. Same of the
- more irate passengers repeatedly pushed it, causing the alert tone to sound
- almost continuously. (This was what I could see in first class. I can only
- imagine what was happening in the coach cabin where passengers had to
- explicitly pay extra for headsets and where there were more passengers.)
-
- I would suspect that the official justification for the flight attendant
- call button system is to alert the crew to emergencies. During this
- incident, any signaling of an emergency would not have been noticed. I also
- suspect that a failure analysis of the audio system did not foresee the
- implications of a power glitch reseting the channel. This is an example of
- the most common reason for safety problems; the designers don't see all the
- possible circumstances that the design will face, particularly where people
- are involved.
-
- The fix to this problem is trivial; make the default channel one with some
- material on it, preferably one of the movie channels (1 through 4). I
- wonder if the current design was to save some small amount of power.
-
- Another disconcerting observation was that the cabin crew did not seem to
- understand what had happened either. They seemed unable to help the
- passengers. They made repeated visits to the passengers who contined to
- re-press their call buttons. All that had to be done was to switch the channel
- back to where it had been.
-
- Disclaimer: I don't represent Honeywell, neither should Don Dodgen.
-
- Kevin R. Driscoll, Principal Research Scientist (612) 782-7263 FAX: -7438
- POST: Honeywell M/S MN65-2500; 3660 Technology Drive; Mpls, MN 55418-1006
-
- ------------------------------
-
- Date: Wed 03 May 1989 13:51 CDT
- From: Bob Barger <CFRNB@ECNCDC.BITNET>
- Subject: Computer Ethics Course/Resource Volunteers Wanted
-
- Two drafts of the following course were previously printed in RISKS digests.
- These brought a host of suggestions from readers. Almost all these suggestions
- were incorporated into the final version below. Volunteers are now being sought
- to participate in the course this Fall (see Section 3. b. 2. below). These
- volunteers could contribute items relating to computer ethics for posting on the
- class bulletin board, correspond by e-mail with individual students on course
- topics, and/or comment on students' postings on the class bulletin board.
- The course will run from late August to early December. No money is presently
- available as compensation for this service, but I will gladly contribute
- letters of appropriate recognition for those who participate as resource persons
- in all or part of the course. If interested, send a brief "vita" to Bob Barger
- at CFRNB@ECNCDC.BITNET.
-
-
- SENIOR SEMINAR
- EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
-
- 1. Catalog Description
-
- a. Course Number: EIU 4050
-
- b. Title: Computer Ethics
-
- c. Credit: 2-0-2 [2 hrs per week/one semester]
-
- d. Term to be offered: On Demand
-
- e. Short title: Computer Ethics
-
- f. Course Description: The course will investigate current
- ethical issues involving computers. While it is not a "computer
- course," students will make frequent use of postings on the
- electronic bulletin board of the ECN mainframe computer to
- research and discuss ethical issues.
-
- g. Prerequisites: 75 Semester Hours and previous experience
- with computers. [Class size limit = 15 students for Fall, 1989,
- semester].
-
- h. Exclusions: None.
-
- 2. Outline of topics :
-
- Week Topic
-
- 1 Orientation to the course (introduction,
- explanation of course content, class procedures,
- and evaluation methodology). Consideration of
- ethical theory: examination of the metaphysical
- bases and resultant ethical norms of the idealist
- and naturalist theories.
-
- 2 Consideration of ethical theory (continued):
- examination of the metaphysical bases and
- resultant ethical norms of the consequentialist
- and existentialist theories.
-
- 3 On-line reading of the "Discussion of Ethics in
- Computing" list, the "Forum on Risks to the Public
- in Computers and Related Systems" digest, and the
- "Computers and Society" list (all are available on
- the ECN bulletin board); written reactions to
- these readings, and written commentary on other
- students' reactions. [The instructor will insure
- that these activities equate to the activities of
- a traditional two hour class meeting].
-
- 4 Consideration of professional ethics:
- responsibilities between employer/employee,
- client/professional, professional/peer, and
- professional/society.
-
- 5 On-line reading of the "Discussion of Ethics in
- Computing" list, the "Forum on Risks to the Public
- in Computers and Related Systems" digest, and the
- "Computers and Society" list (all are available on
- the ECN bulletin board); written reactions to
- these readings, and written commentary on other
- students' reactions. [The instructor will insure
- that these activities equate to the activities of
- a traditional two hour class meeting].
-
- 6 Consideration of liability for software design,
- manufacture, and use: legal liability; truth-in-
- advertising; contracts; warranties; software as
- product or service?
-
- 7 On-line reading of the "Discussion of Ethics in
- Computing" list, the "Forum on Risks to the Public
- in Computers and Related Systems" digest, and the
- "Computers and Society" list (all are available on
- the ECN bulletin board); written reactions to
- these readings, and written commentary on other
- students' reactions. [The instructor will insure
- that these activities equate to the activities of
- a traditional two hour class meeting].
-
- 8 Consideration of privacy issues: individual
- privacy rights; institutional "right-to-know"
- concerns; system security concerns; data-banking
- concerns.
-
- 9 On-line reading of the "Discussion of Ethics in
- Computing" list, the "Forum on Risks to the Public
- in Computers and Related Systems" digest, and the
- "Computers and Society" list (all are available on
- the ECN bulletin board); written reactions to
- these readings, and written commentary on other
- students' reactions. [The instructor will insure
- that these activities equate to the activities of
- a traditional two hour class meeting].
-
- 10 Consideration of power/control issues: the
- computer as agent of centralization or
- decentralization? the computer as agent of
- conservation or change? the computer as agent of
- alienation?
-
- 11 On-line reading of the "Discussion of Ethics in
- Computing" list, the "Forum on Risks to the Public
- in Computers and Related Systems" digest, and the
- "Computers and Society" list (all are available on
- the ECN bulletin board); written reactions to
- these readings, and written commentary on other
- students' reactions. [The instructor will insure
- that these activities equate to the activities of
- a traditional two hour class meeting].
-
- 12 Consideration of ownership and theft issues:
- copyrights; fair usage; patents; trade secrecy and
- competition; considerations unique to the computer
- market.
-
- 13 On-line reading of the "Discussion of Ethics in
- Computing" list, the "Forum on Risks to the Public
- in Computers and Related Systems" digest, and the
- "Computers and Society" list (all are available on
- the ECN bulletin board); written reactions to
- these readings, and written commentary on other
- students' reactions. [The instructor will insure
- that these activities equate to the activities of
- a traditional two hour class meeting].
-
- 14 On-line reading of the "Discussion of Ethics in
- Computing" list, the "Forum on Risks to the Public
- in Computers and Related Systems" digest, and the
- "Computers and Society" list (all are available on
- the ECN bulletin board); written reactions to
- these readings, and written commentary on other
- students' reactions. [The instructor will insure
- that these activities equate to the activities of
- a traditional two hour class meeting].
-
- 15 Seminar members will reconvene as a group for the
- last meeting to allow for group reflection on the
- seminar experience and course evaluation.
-
- Exam week Final examination
-
- Writing component
-
- Students will type thirteen 30-to-50 line (i.e., one-to-two
- page) reactions to the on-line electronic bulletin board
- readings. Students will "post" these reactions (i.e.,
- electronically send them to the mainframe computer bulletin
- board set aside for members of this seminar). In their
- reactions, students will: 1) identify the particular
- publication or publications to which they are reacting, 2)
- identify the particular issue or issues raised in the
- publication(s), 3) identify the ethical implications of the
- issue or issues, 4) identify the ethical paradigm used by the
- author, 5) add their own reasons for agreement or disagreement
- with the viewpoint of the publication's author, 6) and,
- finally, offer an alternative solution or viewpoint to that
- presented by the author, or present other appropriate
- considerations not raised by the author or covered in their
- own (i.e., the student's own) previous comments. The
- instructor will send weekly, by confidential electronic mail,
- a grade on the student's posted reaction, together with
- whatever comments the instructor thinks helpful. The student's
- original posted reaction will also be open to public comment
- by the other students in the seminar [this is accomplished by
- posting notes to the bulletin board, referencing the original
- posted reaction]. These latter comments by the other students
- in the seminar will be considered along with classroom
- discussion in computing the "participation" factor of the
- student's semester grade.
-
- Evaluation
-
- Each student's semester grade for the seminar will be
- calculated according to the following weighted formula:
-
- - 13 posted reactions (at 5% each) = 65%
-
- - Participation (based on class
- discussion and posted comments
- on other students' reactions) = 20%
-
- - Final Exam = 15%
-
- 3. Implementation :
-
- a. This course will be taught by: Robert N. Barger, Ph.D.
-
- b. Materials in the course will include:
-
- 1) Texts:
- a) Deborah Johnson, Computer Ethics (Englewood
- Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985)
- b) Notes on Systematic Philosophies from Dr. Barger's
- Philosophy 1800 class (furnished without charge to
- seminar members)
- c) Postings on the above-mentioned ECN electronic
- bulletin board lists.
-
- 2) Resource people: Computer professionals (e.g.,
- administrators, systems analysts, programmers, etc.) will
- be utilized as guest contributors to the class. This will
- be accomplished by personal appearances, as well as by
- electronically mediated conferencing (e.g., postings, e-
- mail, relay round-tables, etc.).
-
- c. Exceptional costs: None, unless the student wishes to use a
- modem to access the computer. In this case the student will
- be responsible for any personal equipment costs and/or long
- distance phone charges.
-
- d. Effective date: Fall, 1989.
-
-
- Date approved by Senior Seminar Committee: February 24, 1989.
-
- Date approved by Council on Academic Affairs: April 20, 1989.
-
- ------------------------------
-
- End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 8.68
- ************************
- -------
-