Classic Fond 5/ClassicFond05_nopass.iso/STRATEGI/CIVILWAR.RAR/DBDATA/ARTTACT.ENG

Text File | 1995-07-04 | 4KB | 85 lines

~sARTILLERY TACTICS~

~bArtillery is the great killer on the battlefield.~

In the Napoleonic Wars, artillery accounted for around 50 percent of
all battlefield casualties. In the first and second World Wars
the figure was 50 percent to 60 percent. In the Gulf War, well over 70 percent
of battlefield casualties were attributable to artillery.

But in the American Civil War, artillery was sometimes far less
effective than in the Napoleonic Wars, fought decades earlier.

At Malvern Hill, at the end of June 1862, Confederate losses to
artillery reached 50 percent. "It was not war - it was murder," said
Confederate General D.H. Hill. But at Fredericksburg, in
December 1862, Union losses to artillery were lower, at 20 percent.
And in @Grant@'s 1864 Wilderness Campaign, his losses to
artillery were only 6 percent. This was slightly less than the 7 percent caused
by accidents or by self-inflicted wounds.

For all that, artillery was important: it could take the place of
close-quarter fighting. "There is one thing our government does
that suits me to a dot. That is, we fight mainly with artillery. The
rebels fight mostly with infantry," observed one New Yorker.
For all that, Confederate General @Lee@ sometimes reached
a ratio of 10 guns to 1,000 men. This was three times higher than
the Napoleonic norm, and was perhaps due to @Lee@'s lack of
infantry.

~sWhy was artillery so relatively ineffective?~
Terrain had a big impact. It led @Grant@ to send 120 guns back
to Washington during the Wilderness Campaign, while
@Sherman@, on his march through Georgia, reduced his
artillery to one gun per 1,000 men.

And so mobility was one consideration; lack of clear lines of fire
was another.

A great deal also depended on where, and how, the guns were
sited, and whether they were used in two-gun sections, four-
to six-gun batteries, or were massed together. Massing guns
was unusual in the American Civil War, the norm being two-gun
sections. By contrast, during the Napoleonic War, a grand battery
could be 80 guns or more.

Organization was also partly to blame for diminished
effectiveness. Early in the war, guns tended to be used in
small "penny packets", with a battery of guns attached to a
brigade of infantry, or a section of guns to a regiment. Only
later were guns put under the command of a brigade artillery
commander who might mass several batteries into an artillery
battalion (CSA), or artillery brigade (USA). Ideally, such an
outfit would be allocated to each infantry division, and several
to a corps.

When guns were organized en masse it became easier to deploy
them en masse, but they still needed to be placed and used properly.
There is a world of difference between many field guns being fired
at will, and many guns under one command, and either firing on the
same target at the same time, or else coordinated to best effect.

Ammunition supply was another problem. There was seldom
enough to sustain the long and intensive bombardments
needed to "soften up" a position. Antietam, Fredericksburg,
and the third day of Gettysburg all exemplified this problem.

Ranging tended to be an approximate art rather than an exact
science. Fire was often opened up at too long a range. Trajectory
problems worsened the hazards of "friendly fire", with the
trajectory of the new rifled cannon being so flat and straight
that the guns could seldom support their attacking infantry
safely. But the old faithful 12 lb Napoleon gun / howitzer
could, to some extent, lob its shot over the heads of men in
front, and over the top of enemy obstacles.

One of the myths of the Civil War is that the range and effect
of the infantry weapons forced the artillery to unlimber "out of
range" or else suffer frightful losses. This is not so. Guns often
fought within the effective ranges of 100 to 300 yards and survived
unscathed. Even when suffering hits, the artillery usually endured
less than infantry. An artillery battery might consider it had borne
enough after taking 10 percent to 20 percent casualties, and so withdraw earlier
than the infantry. Of course, there were exceptions, with some units
fighting on after sustaining 50 percent casualties.@@@