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- THE MASSACRE OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
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- A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVER UP
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- January 28, 1994
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- By Carol Moore, (c) 1994 [1]
-
-
-
- In consultation with:
-
- Alan Forschler
- Ian Goddard
- James A. Long
- Richard J. Sanford
- Timothy Seims
- Andrew Williams
-
-
-
- COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE, P.O. Box 33037, Washington, D.C. 20033,
- 202/986-1847 202/797-9877
-
- Please Feel Free to Copy and Distribute! Copying for non-commercial
- distribution encouraged.
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-
-
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- _________________________________________________________________
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- TABLE OF CONTENTS
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- INTRODUCTION
-
-
- 1. The Public Must Know the Truth
- 2. Justice Must Be Done
- 3. Past Wacos: Government's "Historic Interest in Breaking Up Armed
- Groups"
- 4. BATF and FBI Persecution of Randy Weaver
- 5. Government Reliance on "Private Spies" and "Cult Busters"
- 6. The History of the Branch Davidians
- 7. Non-Weapons-Related Allegations Against David Koresh
-
- BATF-TREASURY DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVERUP:
- THE FEBRUARY 28, 1993 RAID ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
- 1. BATF Ignored Branch Davidians' Legal Gun Business
- 2. BATF Found No Evidence Weapons Were Purchased Illegally
- 3. "Probable Cause" Based on Biased Information About Intent
- 4. "Probable Cause" Based on Religious and Political Beliefs
- 5. Other Irregularities in the February 25, 1993 Affidavit
- 6. BATF Ignored Branch Davidian Attempts to Cooperate
- 7. Questionable Grounds for a Paramilitary Raid
- 8. Government Multi-Task Force Makes for "Partners in Crime"
- 9. Dubious Drug Allegations to Obtain Helicopters for Free
- 10. Chronology of the February 28, 1993 BATF Raid
- 11. BATF Used Excessive Force to Serve Warrant
- 12. Allegations BATF Agents Shot First
- 13. Allegations Agents Shot Indiscriminately and from Helicopters
- 14. Allegations Friendly Fire Injured or Killed Some Agents
- 15. BATF Intimidation of the Press
- 16. BATF Coverup
- 17. Treasury Department Coverup
- 18. Committee for Waco Justice Conclusions
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- FBI-JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVERUP:
- THE 51 DAY SIEGE AND APRIL 19, 1993 ASSAULT ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
-
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- 1. FBI Control of the Press and Media
- 2. Possible Illegal Use of Tanks
- 3. FBI Impatient with Conciliatory Measures
- 4. FBI Relied on Experts and Cult Busters Urging Tactical Pressure
- 5. FBI Pressure Tactics Replaced Negotiations
- 6. FBI Destroyed Crime Scene Despite Complaints
- 7. FBI Plan to Gas, Disassemble Mount Carmel
- 8. FBI Refused to Believe Final Koresh Promise to Surrender
- 9. FBI Misled Janet Reno on Need for and Dangers of Assault
- 10. Questions About President Clinton's Hostility Toward the Branch
- Davidians
- 11. Chronology of the April 19, 1993 Gassing, Demolition and Fire
- 12. Fatal Decision to Escalate to Demolition
- 13. Suspicious Activity by FBI Agents
- 14. Lack of Fire Precautions
- 15. Branch Davidian Statements that Demolition Trapped People
- 16. Branch Davidian Statements that Demolition Started the Fire
- 17. FBI Allegations that Branch Davidians Started the Fire
- 18. FBI and BATF Crime Scene Coverup
- 19. "Independent" Fire Investigator Coverup
- 20. Justice Department Coverup
- 21. Committee for Waco Justice Conclusions
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- FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
-
-
- 1. The Charges
- 2. Pre-Trial Motions and Jury Selection
- 3. The Prosecution Case
- 4. The Defense Case
- 5. Civil Rights and Wrongful Death Law Suits
-
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- SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UPHEAVALS AND THE YEAR 2000
-
-
- 1. Millennialists and Survivalists
- 2. Drug-Prohibition-Related Violence
- 3. Gun-Prohibition-Related Violence
- 4. Economic Unrest and Tax Rebellion
- 5. Secessionists and Separatists
-
-
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- COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE RECOMMENDATIONS - RESPECT THE BILL OF RIGHTS
-
-
- 1. Protect Right to Freedom of Religion, Speech, Press, etc.
- 2. Protect Right to Keep and Bear Arms
- 3. Protect Right to Refuse Quartering of Soldiers
- 4. Protect Right to be Secure Against Unreasonable Searches, etc.
- 5. Protect Right to Indictment by Grand Jury, Trial by Jury, etc.
- 6. Protect Right to a Speedy Public Trial, Impartial Jury, etc.
- 7. Protect Right to Trial By Jury In Civil Suits
- 8. Protect Freedom from Excessive Bail, Excessive Fines, etc.
- 9. Protect Rights Retained by the People
- 10. Protect Powers Reserved to the States or the People
-
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- CONCLUSION
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-
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- DIAGRAMS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (UNFORTUNEATLY, NOT INCLUDED IN THIS FILE)
- 1. Treasury Department and BATF Chains of Command
- 2. Diagram and Drawing of Mount Carmel Center
- 3. White House, Justice Department and FBI Chains of Command
- 4. April 19th Diagram of Tank Damage to Mount Carmel
- 5. April 19th Infrared Photo of 11:59:16 of
- 6. Tank Rammings and Collapsed Gymnasium
- 7. April 19th Infrared Photo of 12:10:40 Fires
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- _________________________________________________________________
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- THE MASSACRE OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
- A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVER UP
- THE PUBLIC MUST KNOW THE TRUTH
-
-
- Several year end television reviews of 1993 portrayed the deaths of 86
- or more members of the Branch Davidian [2] religious group in Waco,
- Texas as a symbol of Attorney General Janet Reno's "heroism" for
- taking responsibility for their fiery deaths. Representative J.J.
- Pickle, chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and
- Means Committee, summed up the feelings of many when he said of David
- Koresh, "The leader of that compound was a nut, and his followers
- agreed to live with a nut." [3] Many Americans consider the Branch
- Davidians to be the religious fanatics, child abusers and violent "gun
- nuts" government and the press have portrayed them as being.
-
- Footnote [2] Six Branch Davidians died during the February 28, 1993
- raid and, at least 80 during the April 19, 1993 fire. According to
- several Branch Davidians, in the last few years the group had come to
- call themselves "Students of the Seven Seals." However, survivors do
- accept the use of the term "Branch Davidian" since it is so well known
- at this point (private communication).
-
- However, many other Americans believe that nothing the Branch
- Davidians did, or were accused of doing, justified either the February
- 28 or April 19, 1993 assaults against them. Representative Harold
- Volkmer charged the initial attack on the Branch Davidians was part of
- a pattern of "Gestapo-like tactics" at the bureau. "I fail to see the
- crimes committed by those in the Davidian compound that called for the
- extreme action of BATF on Feb. 28 and the tragic final assault." [4]
-
- Representative John Conyers branded the April 19th gas and tank attack
- a "military operation" and called it a "profound disgrace to law
- enforcement in the United States." He told Janet Reno, "you did the
- right thing by offering to resign. I'd like you to know that there is
- at least one member of Congress who is not going to rationalize the
- innocent deaths of two dozen children." [5]
-
- As the trial of eleven surviving Branch Davidians for "conspiracy to
- murder federal officers" proceeds in San Antonio, Texas, the public
- may finally learn the disturbing and even shocking truth about U.S.
- government violations of rights, excessive use of force and coverup.
- There is a possibility that the jury will be so disgusted by trial
- revelations it will acquit most of the Branch Davidians on most or all
- charges.
-
- The Committee for Waco Justice is a group of individuals committed to
- ensuring that the public does learn the truth about violations of
- rights, use of excessive force and coverup of wrongdoing in the Bureau
- of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' (BATF) initial raid upon, and the
- Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) destruction of, the Branch
- Davidians. Our report--"The Massacre of the Branch Davidians"--is a
- systematic presentation of evidence of government agents' and
- officials' misconduct and crimes. Our sources include the Treasury
- Department's September 30, 1993 report, the Justice Department's
- October 8, 1993 report, Senate and House of Representatives hearings,
- news reports and other published materials, news video tapes,
- conference audio tapes and personal interviews. Our report:
-
- * examines similar government actions towards dissident groups and
- individuals and the government's growing reliance on private spies and
- "cult busters";
-
- * reviews the history of the Branch Davidians and the questionable
- evidence used to support non-weapons allegations against David Koresh;
-
- * outlines the most important current evidence of BATF and FBI
- violations of rights, excessive use of force and the ongoing coverup,
- a coverup in which both the Treasury and Justice Departments are
- participating;
-
- * describes the charges facing the eleven Branch Davidians, their
- expected defenses, and civil suits against the government by surviving
- Branch Davidians and families of the deceased;
-
- * delineates an inevitable rise in the number and variety of dissident
- religious and political groups as we approach the "magic" year 2000;
-
- * offers recommendations to ensure that local, state and federal
- governments end violations of Americans' rights.
-
- Despite the Committee's limited resources, and our primary reliance on
- public sources, we have made some important and startling findings
- which seem to be evidence of official misconduct and crimes against
- the Branch Davidians. Our most disturbing findings are:
-
- * After BATF could find no evidence that weapons were purchased
- illegally, it based its "probable cause" on biased information about
- "intent" from "cult busters" committed to destroying the Branch
- Davidians and former members influenced by them and on words and deeds
- protected by the First Amendment.
-
- * BATF ignored David Koresh's past cooperation with more serious
- investigations as well as Koresh's 1992 invitations to BATF agents and
- the local Sheriff's Department to inspect his guns. BATF also engaged
- in flagrant "undercover" surveillance which may have convinced the
- Branch Davidians that the government was preparing to destroy them and
- that armed defense was their only recourse.
-
- * BATF decided to conduct a paramilitary raid because of the
- overly-aggressive mentality of raid planners, biased information from
- cult busters, shoddy intelligence, a need to bolster BATF's image, and
- the desire to punish a BATF critic.
-
- * BATF knew former tenants probably had set up a methamphetamine lab
- at Mount Carmel and that Koresh had dismantled it years before;
- nevertheless, they used that information to get free support from the
- Texas National Guard.
-
- * Although the magistrate who signed the warrants did not designate
- this a "no knock" raid, BATF had no plan to serve the warrant
- peacefully and even expected a shootout! BATF may have shot first and
- did fire indiscriminately. BATF raid commanders in helicopters may
- have fired from them. Attorney General Janet Reno has not completed an
- investigation into 911 tapes whose time sequence was re- ordered,
- possibly to discredit Davidians' claims helicopters were firing at
- them.
-
- * The savage BATF assault may have convinced some wounded Branch
- Davidians the government meant to slaughter them, so they committed
- suicide or had themselves shot.
-
- * After the raid, BATF intimidated two important witnesses who could
- attest to the Branch Davidians' innocence. They tricked one into
- accepting "protective custody" and then kept him away from the press
- and the FBI; they brushed off another's offer of help and then put him
- on the "armed and dangerous" list when he left town.
-
- * The Justice Department knowingly violated its own interpretation of
- the posse comitatus law by using tanks against the Branch Davidians,
- including in the final, fatal assault; it also misled President
- Clinton about their use.
-
- * The FBI controlled, intimidated and lied to the press and the media.
-
- * Richard M. Rogers, the FBI Hostage Rescue Team Commander at Waco,
- repeatedly sabotaged negotiations by pressuring the siege commander to
- use harassment tactics and later CS gas against the Branch Davidians.
- Rogers is now under investigation and may be indicted for his overly
- aggressive tactics in the 1992 standoff with Randy Weaver in Idaho.
- The FBI's impatience to end the standoff may have been related to
- their fear the upcoming Weaver trial would bring out facts about FBI
- misconduct in that case.
-
- * The FBI and Justice Department covered up its reliance on "cult
- busters"--including a long-time FBI advisor-- because of criticism of
- their use, because one advisor was indicted for "unlawful
- imprisonment," and because of a lawsuit against the FBI and Attorney
- General Janet Reno regarding the FBI's use of the term "cult."
-
- * The FBI convinced Attorney General Reno to approve their plan to gas
- and demolish Mount Carmel by evidently withholding from her David
- Koresh's very credible April 14th letter promising to surrender, even
- as they showed her his defiant April 9th and 10th letters. Evidently
- this letter also was withheld from the press and not mentioned to
- Justice Department outside experts during FBI briefings. It was
- included in the Justice Department report, but mislabeled as a mere
- "request."
-
- * The FBI convinced Attorney General Reno that April 19th would not be
- "D-Day"--that they would proceed with a safe operation and continue to
- negotiate. However, they obtained authority to "return fire" and speed
- up demolition of Mount Carmel and evidently never informed Reno of
- their expectations there would be casualties.
-
- Despite FBI and Justice Department statements to the contrary, FBI
- agents were seen outside their tanks near the building before the
- fire. Under the FBI rules of engagement they had the authority to
- shoot Branch Davidians, may have done so, and now may be covering up
- their acts.
-
- The Justice Department and FBI are refusing to admit that there was an
- order to begin the demolition of Mount Carmel right before noon and
- have not revealed who--FBI ground commanders or FBI or Justice
- officials--gave that order.
-
- Nearly simultaneous FBI tank attacks from three sides trapped Branch
- Davidians in the building and started some or all of the fires from
- which most could not escape. There was no mass suicide; there were
- desperate suicides by a few trapped victims of the fire. If two or
- three despairing Branch Davidians did light fires, as the government
- claims, it was because government assaults had convinced them
- martyrdom was preferable to capture and enslavement by evil
- authorities.
-
- During the April 19th fire, FBI tanks destroyed important evidence by
- bulldozing burning walls into the rubble. BATF and FBI agents were all
- over the "crime scene" during Texas Rangers investigation and may have
- destroyed or even fabricated evidence.
-
- * The BATF-influenced chief fire investigator issued a biased fire
- report blaming the Branch Davidians for their own deaths. The
- government then bulldozed the ruins of Mount Carmel before defense
- attorneys could send in an independent fire investigator.
-
- The Treasury Department and Justice Department reviews of the BATF
- investigation and raid and the FBI siege and final assault contain
- dubious assertions and leave too many questions unanswered. Neither
- "review team" was authorized to take under oath testimony of BATF and
- FBI agents and Treasury and Justice Department officials. Many
- consider these reviews and reports to be little more than systematic
- coverups of official crimes.
-
- * Despite Treasury Department report findings that BATF's February 28,
- 1993 raid commanders lied repeatedly to investigators and their
- superiors, and that BATF officials covered up these lies, no one has
- been prosecuted.
-
- * The Justice Department's review team is tainted by conflicts of
- interest regarding Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, and
- reviewers Edward S.G. Dennis and Willie Williams.
-
- * There are suspicions that cronyism among Arkansans involved in Waco
- decision-making--President Clinton, Webster Hubbell, Bruce Lindsay and
- the late Vince Foster--might extend to covering up any errors or
- crimes related to the massacre of the Branch Davidians.
-
- * The trial of the eleven Branch Davidians is bringing out important
- evidence of coverup such as missing vital evidence, changing
- statements by several BATF agents, and evidence that BATF agents were
- wounded by friendly fire--not to mention prosecutorial misconduct in
- the form of withholding evidence favorable to the defense.
-
- JUSTICE MUST BE DONE
-
- If our small committee could discover so much damning evidence of
- wrongdoing, we believe an Independent Counsel appointed by the
- Attorney General could discover much, much more. The Independent
- Counsel would be empowered to identify and prosecute government agents
- and officials responsible for official misconduct, violations of
- rights, and excessive use of force which resulted in the deaths of
- over 86 people, and for any and all related crimes. She or he would be
- empowered to investigate the actions of Treasury Department and
- Justice Department officials, BATF and FBI officials and agents, and
- officials and agents of any other departments, agencies and law
- enforcement involved in the incident. She or he could also investigate
- White House officials and employees. She or he would have full power
- to subpoena witnesses to give testimony under oath and to grant
- immunity in exchange for evidence of criminal wrongdoing-- power which
- neither the Treasury nor the Justice Department's "review teams" had.
-
- The Committee for Waco Justice believes the facts already available
- provide compelling evidence that BATF and the FBI, through a
- combination of negligence and arrogance bordering on intentionality,
- did indeed massacre the Branch Davidians. No matter how the April 19th
- fires started, those who gassed Mount Carmel Center and rammed it with
- military tanks ultimately are responsible. This would be the largest
- massacre of civilians by federal agents on U.S. soil since the
- slaughter of 300 Native Americans--also mostly women and children--at
- Wounded Knee in 1890. Americans must ensure that law enforcement
- agents never again initiate or participate in another such massacre.
-
- PAST WACOS: GOVERNMENT'S "HISTORIC INTEREST IN BREAKING UP ARMED GROUPS"
-
- The word "Waco" has become synonymous with two opposing scenarios. To
- many Americans--and especially authorities-- it means crazed religious
- fanatics arming themselves to make war on the U.S. government and
- committing mass suicide when they lose the war. However, to other
- Americans "Waco" means a questionable, clearly illegitimate or even
- vicious and murderous government destruction of a dissident group.
-
- Appendix G of the Treasury Department report, "A Brief History of
- Federal Firearms Enforcement," states: "The raid by ATF agents on the
- Branch Davidian compound resulted from its enforcement of contemporary
- federal firearms laws. In a larger sense, however, the raid fit within
- an historic, well-established and well-defended government interest in
- prohibiting and breaking up all organized groups that sought to arm or
- fortify themselves. . .>>>From its earliest formation, the federal
- government has actively suppressed any effort by disgruntled or
- rebellious citizens to coalesce into an armed group, however small the
- group, petty its complaint, or grandiose its ambition. The collection
- of large arsenals by organized groups lent itself, ultimately, to the
- violent use of those weapons against the government itself or portions
- of its citizenry. Indeed, federal agents who tried to disband the
- groups frequently became the targets." (TDR:Appendix G:7)
-
- Footnote [6] >>>From the Report of the Department of the Treasury on
- the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon
- Wayne Howell also known as David Koresh, September, 1993. All
- references from the report will be included within the text, with the
- page number after the colon, e.g., (TDR:#).
-
- The report's history does not mention that both a federal
- statute--Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Sec. 21--and a
- judicial decision--United States vs. Anders, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir.
- 1989) --hold that there is nothing per se wrong with the ownership of
- large numbers of legal arms. Obviously, the decision and the statute
- have not reined in BATF.
-
- Appendix G describes the following as examples of the federal
- government's most successful tax, alcohol and firearm law enforcement
- efforts: suppression of angry farmers facing foreclosure in Shay's
- Rebellion (1786); enforcement of tax and firearms laws during the
- Whiskey Rebellion (1794); enforcement of a tax on houses during Fries
- Rebellion (1799); suppression of those guilty of "fugitive slave
- rescues" during the 1850s; thwarting of John Brown's attempt to steal
- firearms from Harpers Ferry and distribute them to slaves; suppression
- of the Ku Klux Klan during the 1870s; suppression of old west outlaws
- during the 1880s; suppression of "violent" union organizing during the
- 1890s; enforcement of the 1918-1933 prohibition of alcohol; and
- enforcement of the National Firearms Act of 1934 (a tax on guns)
- prompted by the Prohibition-related rise in crime and use of firearms.
- In 1972 the Treasury Department created the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
- and Firearms to enforce gun, explosives and arson-related laws.
-
- Appendix G notes that "In recent times, the federal government has
- shown itself even less patient with armed groups than it had
- historically. Radical extremists of both the Right and the Left have
- been pursued aggressively once they began breaking the law."
- (TDR:Appendix G:11.) The appendix lists the following triumphs:
- destruction of the Symbionese Liberation Army in a gun battle and
- house fire that killed all members; pursuit and capture Gordon Kahl, a
- tax protester who killed a police officer, in a gun battle and house
- fire which killed him; pursuit and capture of bank-robber and assassin
- Robert Matthews, leader of "The Order," in a gun battle and house fire
- which killed him; three-day siege of the heavily armed, 80-member
- Covenant of the Sword and Arm of the Lord religious group. The
- appendix closes with the line, "The raid on the Branch Davidian
- compound occurred in the context of that historical background."
- (TDR:Appendix G:4) Evidently, the Branch Davidians' fiery deaths fit
- well within that "historical background" as well. (Local Philadelphia
- police, not federal agents, were responsible for the 1985 fire that
- killed 11 members of the MOVE group and destroyed two city blocks.)
-
- Tony Cooper, a law enforcement consultant on anti- terrorism and
- professor of negotiations and conflict resolution at the University of
- Texas at Dallas, describes "the formation of a curious crusading
- mentality among certain law enforcement agencies to stamp out what
- they see as a threat to government generally. It's an exaggerated
- concern that they are facing a nationwide conspiracy and that somehow
- this will get out of control unless it is stamped out at a very early
- stage." [7]
-
- In its attempt to "stamp out" out fundamentalist Muslim
- "conspiracies," the FBI may have allowed its hired informant to build
- and plant the bomb that exploded at the World Trade Center two days
- before the BATF raid on the Branch Davidians. In tapes he secretly
- recorded, the informant, former Egyptian army officer Emad Salem,
- allegedly tells FBI agent John Anticey that his high April expenses
- were due to the costs of his building the World Trade Center bomb. [8]
- The exact transcript reads: "We was start already building the bomb,
- which is went off in the World Trade Center. It was built, uh, uh, uh,
- supervising, supervision from the Bureau and the DA and we was all
- informed about it. . .And we know that the bomb start to be built. By
- who? By your confidential informant." Defense attorneys say Salem
- drove the van with the bomb in it to the Trade Center garage and then
- stayed nearby until the explosion. [9] (Ironically, in his April 20,
- 1993, news conference defending the FBI's assault on the Branch
- Davidians, President Clinton boasted, "This is the same FBI that found
- the people that bombed the World Trade Center in lickety-split, record
- time." [10] )
-
- During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing on Waco,
- then-BATF Director Stephen Higgins defended the tactics used at Waco
- by stating, "In the 18 months prior to the Branch Davidian incident,
- ATF Special Response Teams had carried out 341 actual activations to
- high risk situations," including "diverse sects and survivalists."
- [11] However, many believe these figures are merely evidence that
- BATF is out of control. In April, 1991, 23 BATF agents raided the home
- of Del Knudson, endangering his wife and two young children, but found
- only legal weapons and parts. In December, 1991, BATF agents, with two
- television crews in tow, raided John Lawmaster's home, broke up
- furniture, doors, walls, and gun and filing cabinets. They found
- nothing illegal and left without shutting the door, leaving guns and
- ammunition strewn about the unsecured house. At the request of the
- government, the court sealed the affidavit that led to the search
- warrant and the break-in and denied Lawmaster's request for its
- release. Lawmaster appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals. BATF refused
- to pay damages. [12] In 1991, BATF agents also entrapped Randy Weaver,
- an act which eventually led to the FBI's fatal "standoff" described in
- the following section. On February 5, 1993, the BATF ransacked the
- home of a Portland, Oregon black woman, and terrorized her children
- for several hours in a case of mistaken identity. [13]
-
- BATF AND FBI CRIMES AGAINST RANDY WEAVER
-
- The Justice Department and FBI are now investigating possible criminal
- misconduct on the part of FBI agents and officials in the killing of
- Idaho white separatist Randy Weaver's wife and son. Significantly,
- these are many of the same agents and officials who were in charge of
- the FBI's actions against the Branch Davidians: former FBI Director
- William Sessions, former FBI Deputy Director Floyd I. Clarke,
- Assistant Director for the Criminal Investigative Division Larry Potts
- and Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) Commander Richard M. Rogers. This
- account includes the most recent revelations about their irresponsible
- behavior, much of which was repeated in Waco. [14]
-
- Randy Weaver had retreated to rural Idaho with his wife, four children
- and a family friend, Kevin Harris. In 1990 a BATF undercover agent
- entrapped Weaver into selling him two illegally sawed-off shotguns for
- $300. Weaver alleges BATF charged him after he refused to inform on
- other white separatists. The government then gave him the wrong date
- for a court hearing, March 20 instead of February 20, 1991.
-
- Rather than take immediate action when Weaver failed to appear, U.S.
- Marshals began almost 18 months of surveillance. Finally, on August
- 22, 1992, six Marshals, one equipped with an assault rifle with a
- silencer, approached Weaver's cabin and threw rocks at his dog in an
- effort to lure Weaver closer so they could arrest him. When the agents
- shot the dog, Harris and Weaver's 14-year-old son Samuel, not knowing
- who the attackers were, ran towards them shooting. Their shots killed
- U.S. Marshal William Degan. Samuel was shot in the back and killed as
- he retreated. The armed Weaver and Harris then refused to surrender to
- authorities.
-
- The National Guard and the FBI Hostage Rescue Team were called in.
- (The Hostage Rescue Team's motto is "To Save Lives.") According to
- court records, the U.S. Marshals falsely told the FBI that Weaver
- himself had ambushed them and that the Weavers and Harris would kill
- anyone who approached them. U.S. Marshals never did tell the FBI that
- Samuel had been killed by a Deputy Marshal. They did tell them Mrs.
- Weaver was a fanatic capable of killing herself and her own children
- as an end to the siege. However, they provided no evidence of this to
- FBI agents, who took the Marshals on their word. FBI agents admit they
- actually believed the Weavers had killed Samuel.
-
- Finally, U.S. Marshals never told the FBI that they knew that when the
- adults went outside the cabin they always carried weapons. FBI HRT
- Commander Richard M. Rogers authorized "rules of engagement" which
- gave snipers the go- ahead to shoot any adult carrying a weapon
- outside the cabin. (The standard FBI rules of engagement are "Agents
- are not to use deadly force against any person except as necessary in
- self-defense or the defense of another, when they have reason to
- believe they or another are in danger of death or grievous bodily
- harm. Whenever feasible, verbal warnings should be given before deadly
- force is applied." [15] ) However, the FBI never advised the Weavers
- or Harris they would be in jeopardy if the FBI saw them armed on the
- property.
-
- The day after the first shootings, Harris and Weaver, carrying their
- guns, left the cabin to visit Samuel's body. FBI sniper Lou Horiuchi
- first shot Weaver in the shoulder and then tried to shoot Harris.
- However, he accidentally shot Vicki Weaver as she stood in the doorway
- of their cabin holding her baby. She died instantly, dropping the baby
- to the ground. Harris was wounded by shrapnel. During the standoff the
- Rogers Hostage Rescue Team used psychological warfare techniques.
- Court records show that the FBI taunted the Weavers after Vicki
- Weaver's death, calling out over their loudspeakers, "Good morning,
- Mrs. Weaver. We had pancakes for breakfast. What did you have?" [16]
-
- Weaver and Harris surrendered nine days later, after the FBI allowed
- Populist Party presidential candidate Bo Gritz to serve as a "third
- party" negotiator. They were charged with conspiracy to murder federal
- officers. Their trial before a federal jury and U.S. District Judge
- Edward Lodge began five days before the April 19th fire that killed 75
- or more Branch Davidians.
-
- Most of the above disturbing information came to light during the
- trial. It was also revealed that FBI agents had fabricated evidence
- (staged critical photographs), failed to provide the defense with
- information they were legally obligated to give it, and delayed in
- producing requested information and evidence. Weaver's defense
- attorney was Gary Spence, who had won notable trial victories for
- Karen Silkwood's children and Imelda Marcos. Spence did not call any
- witnesses or present a defense, but simply told jurors the government
- had failed to prove its case.
-
- In July, 1993, the jury acquitted Weaver and Harris for Degan's
- murder, saying Harris had acted in self-defense. The jury also
- rejected charges that the two men conspired to provoke a confrontation
- with federal officers. Weaver was convicted of failing to appear for
- the weapons charges trial and was sentenced to 18 months in prison,
- with credit for time already served. Spence told reporters, "A jury
- today has said that you can't kill somebody just because you wear
- badges and then cover up those homicides by prosecuting the innocent."
- Juror Janet Schmierer of Boise, Idaho said, "I think they built their
- whole scenario out of how they perceived someone else should be living
- their lives, and if someone believed differently. . .they must be
- abnormal." Spence also said, "federal law enforcement agents should be
- indicted for murder in the deaths of Mrs. Weaver and Samuel." [17] In
- November, 1993, Judge Edward Lodge rebuked the FBI, saying its
- behavior in fabricating evidence and delaying presentation of crucial
- evidence "served to obstruct the administration of justice." He
- asserted, "the Government, acting through the FBI, evidenced a callous
- disregard for the rights of the defendants and the interests of
- justice."
-
- According to a November 25, 1993, New York Times article, the Justice
- Department inquiry, led by Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann,
- is "focusing on whether officials misjudged the danger the agents
- faced and knowingly violated the agency's limits on the use of deadly
- force by killing Mrs. Weaver. The inquiry is also examining whether
- officials failed to consider less aggressive tactics and later closed
- ranks to avoid scrutiny of their actions." Justice investigators are
- warning "top managers, agents, prosecutors and former officials that
- they could face civil or criminal charges, including obstruction of
- justice and violations of civil rights law." Further, "some FBI
- officials said they also feared that a separate investigation by a
- state prosecutor in Boundary County, Idaho, where the incident took
- place, could lead to homicide charges against FBI agents."
-
- Some members of the Hostage Rescue Team, "including Richard M. Rogers,
- its commander, have refused to cooperate with investigators." Other
- agents have criticized Rogers for being overly aggressive and failing
- to consider negotiations. Larry Potts, the senior FBI official who
- would have had to approve the new rules of engagement, told FBI
- investigators he does not remember giving Rogers a clear go-ahead to
- change them. [18] According to the Washington Times, in December,
- 1993, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh told FBI agents that indictments
- against some FBI agents were a "virtual certainty." [19]
-
- GOVERNMENT RELIANCE ON "PRIVATE SPIES" AND "CULT BUSTERS"
-
- Because of government spying upon and disruption of peaceful political
- groups during the 1960s and 1970s, the Justice Department set
- guidelines prohibiting investigations of groups "based solely on
- activities protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise
- of any other rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United
- States." [20] As an agency of the Treasury Department, BATF does not
- work under such restrictions. Both agencies are free to investigate
- groups suspected of engaging in criminal activity.
-
- Once an investigation is underway, most government agencies, including
- BATF and the FBI, seem willing to receive information from such groups
- as the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) and the Cult
- Awareness Network (CAN). These groups, and others like them, clearly
- have their own agendas. They keep copious files of biased and
- prejudicial information on private individuals and organizations and
- share these with law enforcement.
-
- The Anti-Defamation League keeps files on Arab- American, Jewish
- peace, anti-apartheid, and other human and civil rights groups. A
- year-long investigation by the San Francisco District Attorney found
- that the ADL had infiltrated groups, stolen membership lists and other
- private documents, and swapped files with police, sometimes illegally.
- However, the ADL escaped prosecution. "In an unusual procedure,
- (District Attorney) Smith filed a civil suit accusing the ADL and (ADL
- investigator) Bullock of illegally possessing confidential documents,
- then promptly accepted a settlement that contained no admission of
- wrongdoing." Shortly after this, 19 individuals filed a suit seeking
- damages for 1,100 people who allegedly were the targets of illegal
- surveillance and seeking court orders against such surveillance. [21]
- The government's lenience towards ADL suggests it does not frown on
- ADL's spying activities.
-
- The ADL supplied information about the Branch Davidians to federal
- authorities. In a front page article about the ADL, Herb Brin,
- publisher of Heritage, which serves the Los Angeles Jewish community,
- wrote: "U.S. and Texas authorities have precise documentation (from
- ADL, of course) on the Branch Davidian cult in Waco and how it
- operated in the past." [22]
-
- The Cult Awareness Network (CAN) actively urges the press, Congress
- and law enforcement to act against any non- mainstream religious,
- psychological or even political movement which it describes as a
- "cult." After interviewing CAN's executive director Cynthia Kisser, a
- reporter wrote: "no one knows how many destructive cults and sects
- exist in the United States. Kisser's binder holds 1,500 names gleaned
- from newspaper clippings, court documents and thousands of calls to
- the network's hotline. Some of the groups have legitimate purposes,
- Kisser says. But her group's efforts show that most, despite wildly
- diverse beliefs, share stunningly similar patterns of mind control,
- group domination, exploitation and physical and mental abuse." [23]
- CAN critics point out that so-called "mind control" techniques are not
- much different than the techniques used in education and socialization
- efforts used by all schools, churches, ideologies and philosophies.
-
- According to CAN critic Dr. Gordon Melton of the Institute for the
- Study of Religion in Santa Barbara, California, CAN has used a number
- of means to try to destroy small religious groups: they unsuccessfully
- tried to expand "conservatorship" to allow families to remove members
- from "cults"; they unsuccessfully tried to have laws passed against
- "cults"; they unsuccessfully sued the American Psychological
- Association for rejecting their views on "brainwashing." However, they
- have found one successful method of disrupting groups: false anonymous
- charges of child abuse. Anonymous reports are legal under current law.
- [24]
-
- Priscilla Coates, former executive director of CAN, told reporters, "I
- know how these types of groups work and the children are always
- abused." [25] CAN has been on a crusade against the Christian
- religious group The Children of God, known in the United States as
- "The Family." CAN alleges the group practices indiscriminate sex,
- including with children. [26] Many Family members accuse CAN of making
- false child abuse complaints which have resulted in dozens of arrests
- in at least 10 countries. Most of the charges are quickly dropped and
- there have been no convictions. The Family has demanded a
- Congressional investigation of CAN. [27]
-
- The Cult Awareness Network's other successful approach is referring
- relatives of group members to "deprogrammers" who charge thousands of
- dollars for their services and, according to a former national
- director of CAN's predecessor, the Citizens Freedom Foundation, "kick
- back" some of the money to CAN. [28] Deprogramming often includes
- kidnapping individuals, subjecting them to sleep and food deprivation,
- ridicule and humiliation, and even physical abuse and restraint until
- they promise to leave the alleged cult. Because deprogrammers usually
- involve family members in these kidnappings and deprogrammings,
- victims rarely press charges. However, in the last few years 5
- deprogrammers have been prosecuted for kidnapping or "unlawful
- imprisonment." One such deprogrammer is Rick Ross, a convicted jewel
- thief, who has boasted of more than 200 "deprogrammings." CAN
- executive director Cynthia Kisser has praised him as being "among the
- half dozen best deprogrammers in the country." In the summer of 1993
- Rick Ross was indicted in Washington state for unlawful imprisonment.
-
- Nancy Ammerman, a Visiting Scholar at Princeton University's Center
- for the Study of American Religion, was one of the outside experts
- assigned by the Justice Department to evaluate BATF and FBI's handling
- of the Branch Davidians. She was particularly critical of Rick Ross
- and the Cult Awareness Network. "Although these people often call
- themselves `cult experts,' they are certainly not recognized as such
- by the academic community. The activities of the CAN are seen by the
- National Council of Churches (among others) as a danger to religious
- liberty, and deprogramming tactics have been increasingly found to be
- outside the law. . .Mr. Rick Ross, who often works in conjunction with
- the Cult Awareness Network (CAN), has been quoted as saying he was
- `consulted' by the BATF. . .The Network and Mr. Ross have a direct
- ideological (and financial) interest in arousing suspicion and
- antagonism against what they call `cults'. . .It seem clear that
- people within the `anti-cult' community had targeted the Branch
- Davidians for attention." (JDR:Ammerman:1)
-
- Footnote [29] All references from the Justice Department report will
- be included within the text, with the page number after the colon. The
- report consisted of 4 books and an unbound paper. (JDR:#) refers to
- the largest book, the factual report. All other references will
- include the name of each specific contributor, e.g., (JDR:Dennis:#) or
- (JDR:Stone:#).
-
- Nancy Ammerman compared Waco and Jonestown: "There, too, an
- exceptionally volatile religious group was pushed over the edge,
- inadvertently, by the actions of government agencies pushed forward by
- `concerned families.'" (JDR:Ammerman:8) What she may not have realized
- is that CAN's President is Patricia Ryan, daughter of Congressman Leo
- J. Ryan. It was he who threatened and hounded Jim Jones and his
- Peoples' Temple members until they murdered him and committed mass
- suicide in Guyana in 1978. Carrying on what seems to have become a
- family tradition, on April 8, 1993, Patricia Ryan told the Houston
- Chronicle, "Officials should use whatever means necessary to arrest
- Koresh, including lethal force." [30]
-
- Ross definitely deprogrammed one (and possibly more) of the Branch
- Davidians who fed questionable but damaging evidence to BATF. He also
- provided negative information to the Waco Herald-Tribune for its
- February, 1993, series on the Branch Davidians. The paper quotes Ross
- declaring, "The group is without a doubt, without any doubt
- whatsoever, a highly destructive, manipulative cult. . .I would liken
- the group to Jim Jones." The authors write, "Ross said he believes
- Howell (Koresh) is prone to violence. . .Speaking out and exposing
- Howell might bring in the authorities or in some way help those `being
- held in that compound through a kind of psychological, emotional
- slavery and servitude.'" Ross told the Houston Chronicle that Koresh
- is "your stock cult leader. They're all the same. Meet one and you've
- met them all. They're deeply disturbed, have a borderline personality
- and lack any type of conscience. . .No one willingly enters into a
- relationship like this. So you're talking about deception and
- manipulation (by the leader), people being coached in ever so slight
- increments, pulled in deeper and deeper without knowing where it's
- going or seeing the total picture." [31]
-
- CAN representatives made numerous television and radio appearances
- during the siege. Ross bragged on the "Up to the Minute" public
- television program that he "consulted with ATF agents on the Waco sect
- and told them about the guns in the compound." On April 19th he told
- the "Today Show," "I was a consultant offering ideas, input that was
- filtered by their team and used when they felt it was appropriate."
- The Justice Department report mentions a Rick Ross television
- appearance during the siege where he declared he hoped Koresh would be
- a coward and surrender rather than end up as a corpse. (JDR:167) After
- the April 19th fire, CAN associate Louis West said on a MacNeil/Lehrer
- Newshour broadcast that the FBI "knew they were dealing with a
- psychopath. Nobody is more dangerous or unpredictable than a
- psychopath in a trap."
-
- After the fire, CAN "counselor" Brett Bates tried to arrange contacts
- with survivors by meeting with their families. He told the N.Y. Daily
- News, "Before they can become productive witnesses in the prosecution,
- they have to realize they were victims of mind control." Columnist
- Alexander Cockburn wrote, "the deprogrammers are demanding that they
- be allowed to exercise their dark arts on the burned Davidian
- survivors so that they testify correctly and desist from
- maintaining--as they have--that no mass suicide was under way. The FBI
- says `this is worth considering,' but the decision is up to the U.S.
- attorney." [32] The only Branch Davidian to turn state's evidence is
- Katherine Schroeder who was confined in a mental institution after
- leaving Mount Carmel in March, 1993 (private communication.) It is
- unknown if she was "deprogrammed."
-
- After the April 19th fire Methodist Minister Joseph Bettis wrote
- Attorney General Reno, "from the beginning, members of the Cult
- Awareness Network have been involved in this tragedy. This
- organization is widely known for its use of fear to foster religious
- bigotry. The reliance of federal agents on information supplied by
- these people, as well as the whole record of federal activity deserves
- your careful investigation and public disclosure. . .Cult bashing must
- end, and you must take the lead." Larry Shinn, a vice president of
- Bucknell University wrote to the chair of the House Subcommittee on
- Civil and Constitutional Rights, "media, legal institutions, and
- law-makers too often rely on the word of self-styled cult experts like
- C.A.N. whose overly negative agenda often slides into purely anti-
- religious attack." And in early May, a coalition of 16 religious and
- civil liberties organizations, including the American Civil Liberties
- Union, the American Conference on Religious Movements, Americans
- United for Separation of Church and State, the Episcopal Church, the
- General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, the National Association
- of Evangelicals, the National Council of Churches of Christ and the
- Union of American Hebrew Congregations issued a statement which read
- in part, "We are shocked and saddened by the recent events in Waco. .
- .Under the religious liberty provision of the First Amendment, the
- government has no business declaring what is orthodox or heretical, or
- what is a true or false religion. It should steer clear of
- inflammatory and misleading labels. History teaches that today's
- `cults' may be tomorrow's mainstream religions." President Clinton
- seems to have jumped on the anti-cult bandwagon. On April 23, 1993,
- Clinton said, in what some see as a thinly veiled threat, "I hope. .
- .that others who will be tempted to join cults and become involved
- with people like Koresh will be deterred by the horrible scenes they
- have seen. . .There is, unfortunately, a rise in this sort of
- fanaticism all over the world. And we may have to confront it again."
-
- Attorney General Janet Reno also has expressed anti- cult sentiments.
- During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing,
- Representative William Hughes advised Janet Reno to consult groups
- like the Cult Awareness Network for advice on "mind control." Reno
- replied that she was concerned about the negative affect of cults on
- children, that "if a child is in a cult situation for any length of
- time," he or she might experience "permanent damage."
-
- BATF is still investigating so-called cults. In November, 1993, acting
- director John W. Magaw stated that he was determined that other
- religious "cults" not develop into "armed compounds." He said,
- "They're out there. They don't yet have the kind of weaponry that we
- saw in Waco. . .but they will develop if society allows them to."
- Magaw said BATF is keeping tabs on "cult-like organizations" in "three
- or four places around the country. . .We're trying to monitor way
- early in the game." [33]
-
- In his November 22, 1993, American Academy of Religion presentation,
- Dr. Melton condemned the government's calling on groups like the Cult
- Awareness Network for information on "cults." He compared it to the
- government calling on Nazis for information on Jews or Ku Klux Klan
- members for information on African-Americans.
-
- At least one group is fighting FBI use of the "cult" term and its
- reliance on private spies. In May, 1993, the New Alliance Party, its
- presidential candidate Dr. Lenora Fulani, and other members of the
- party sued the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Janet Reno, and other
- officials. Referring to "cult," the party is "seeking a declaratory
- judgment that defendants' description as the predicate or
- justification for investigative activities, use of force, criminal
- prosecution, or governmental regulation is a violation of the First,
- Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States."
- The suit also claims the FBI excused its "virtual liquidation of the"
- Branch Davidians as "appropriate law enforcement action to take
- against a `cult'." And the suit attacks the FBI's having "consulted
- with one or more persons associated with a Chicago-based organization,
- the Cult Awareness Network."
-
- THE HISTORY OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
-
- To provide a fuller perspective on government action against the
- Branch Davidians, we present a history of the group and analyze former
- members' most damning non-weapon related allegations. The Branch
- Davidians are an offshoot of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Like
- the church, they believe in the "advent" or "Second Coming" of Jesus
- Christ, complete with the end of the world in a fiery apocalypse, the
- death of all sinners and the salvation of true believers. [34] In 1935
- Seventh Day Adventist Victor Houtoff declared himself a prophet,
- formed the Shepherd's Rod Church and established the first Mount
- Carmel Center in Waco. In 1955 Houtoff died and his wife Florence took
- over and established the current Mount Carmel further outside Waco.
- When the Second Coming of Christ did not occur on April 22, 1959, as
- she predicted, the group split. The largest contingent followed
- another "prophet," Ben Roden, who changed the Church's name to the
- Branch Davidians.
-
- In 1978 Ben Roden died and his wife Lois Roden, a woman well-known in
- evangelical circles because of her pronouncement that the Holy Spirit
- was female, became the new Branch Davidian prophet. However, she soon
- found herself in power struggles with her son George Roden, whom most
- Branch Davidians considered too poorly versed in Scriptures and too
- erratic to lead the group. In 1981, after being "disfellowed" from the
- Seventh Day Adventist Church for proclaiming himself a prophet, rock
- musician and handyman Vernon Howell joined the Branch Davidians. His
- knowledge of Scripture and personable manner quickly gained him the
- confidence of Lois Roden and many Branch Davidians. It also earned him
- the enmity of George Roden, who saw Howell as his prime rival for
- Branch Davidian leader and prophet. In 1984 Howell married 14-year-old
- Rachel Jones. The battle between Roden and Howell escalated until
- finally, in 1985, a gun-toting George Roden drove Howell and his
- followers out of Mount Carmel. They established a community in shacks
- and buses on property they purchased in Palestine, Texas.
-
- Howell visited Israel in 1985 and studied the Bible with several
- rabbis. There he had, as he explained in a February 28, 1993, KRLD
- radio interview, "an encounter" or, as he told FBI negotiators, "a
- miraculous meeting with God," (TDR:43) which instructed him to study
- and fulfill the prophecies of the Seven Seals of the Book of
- Revelation.
-
- The rivalry with the paranoid and gun-obsessed Roden heated up after
- Lois Roden's death. In late 1987 Roden dug up the coffin of a
- long-dead Branch Davidian and challenged Howell to raise her from the
- dead. Howell complained to authorities about "corpse abuse," but they
- demanded proof of a crime. When Howell and seven armed followers snuck
- onto the property to photograph the coffin, Roden caught them and a
- gunfight ensued. All eight were tried for attempted murder of Roden;
- seven were acquitted and Howell's trial ended in a hung jury.
-
- By now George Roden had lost most of his followers, was in debt, and
- was renting out Mount Carmel's ramshackle houses, including to at
- least two drug traffickers. [35] After writing threatening letters to
- a Texas Supreme Court Justice, Roden was jailed for six months. Howell
- took this opportunity to encourage the county to put a lien on Mount
- Carmel for 16 years of unpaid taxes. Howell paid the taxes in 1989,
- thereby gaining control of Mount Carmel. By this time he also had full
- use of a follower's large house in LaVerne, California and travelled
- back and forth between the two locations. George Roden continued to
- threaten Howell and his followers. In 1989 Roden murdered a man with
- an ax and was incarcerated in a mental institution. Nevertheless,
- Branch Davidians feared he would return and attack them and therefore
- remained armed and alert. Roden did escape briefly in late 1993.
-
- In early 1990 Vernon Howell legally changed his name to David (for
- King David) Koresh (Hebrew for Cyrus, the Persian king who freed the
- Jews from Babylon). Koresh collected even more followers, almost half
- of whom were of African, Hispanic or Asian descent. They all believed
- that he was a prophet--the "Lamb of God"--destined to unlock the
- secrets of the Seven Seals, show the way of repentance to society and
- thereby hasten the return of Jesus Christ. And they concurred with his
- view that he must create a "House of David" where his many wives would
- bear him children who would become the rulers of a purer new world.
-
- During the siege Wayne Martin, a Harvard-educated African-American
- attorney, told negotiators his view of Koresh's importance. The
- Justice report describes it thusly: "America's political system was in
- decay and in conflict with God's law, and that Koresh had been chosen
- by God as `the Lamb' to rule over his kingdom on earth. Martin claimed
- that America and the world were witnessing the birth of a new nation
- founded on the Seven Seals." (JDR:41) Koresh asserted his prophetic
- greatness would inevitably attract evil authorities--the "Babylonians"
- or "Assyrians"-- who would try to crush him. If the Branch Davidians
- died defending Koresh's prophecies, they would be resurrected and
- return to conquer the Babylonians and rule the world.
-
- Some have said that Koresh's first prophesizing the government would
- come to attack him and then collecting a lot of weapons--including
- allegedly illegal ones--just "invited" a government attack. They call
- it a "self- fulfilling prophecy." However, intelligent law enforcement
- should be able to deal with such situations without violence and
- without massive loss of innocent lives.
-
- At the November 22, 1993, American Academy of Religion panel Jamaican
- Branch Davidian Janet McBean summarized David Koresh's appeal: "We are
- spiritual people. And we feel that God is watching what happens to
- this world. That's the reason why David protected his people and David
- felt the way he did. . .He felt compelled to give us the revelation as
- he did. And you can't blame him for that. And we studied it for
- ourselves. Now if you people study revelations and you see something
- different, then it is your responsibility to show it to the nation and
- show it to the world. . .David could speak to anyone on any level,
- from fourth grade to doctorate."
-
- In 1989 Koresh began having troubles with breakaway members,
- especially Marc Breault, a follower from 1984 to 1989, who left and
- joined his wife in Australia. Breault claims that he became
- disillusioned because power had corrupted Koresh. He charged Koresh
- manipulated members through fear of hellfire, physically abused adults
- and children for minor infractions of capricious rules, seduced and
- impregnated young girls, took other men's wives, and demanded a
- willingness to die for him and his prophecies. [36]
-
- Branch Davidians admit Koresh devised various "tests" of his
- followers' faith in God and his prophecies--from long study sessions,
- to communion twice a day, to food deprivation, to relinquishing wives
- to Koresh. However, they assert Breault's claims are exaggerations or
- lies and that he had challenged Koresh for control of the group.
- Breault replied to such charges in November, 1993. "If I was trying to
- take over the group I wouldn't have gone to the authorities. I
- wouldn't have tried to have justice done and had the group
- dismantled." [37] In his book Breault admits he "became a cult
- buster." For the next three years Breault devoted himself to the
- destruction of the Branch Davidians. Breault's often confused,
- contradictory or emotionally dishonest statements, in his book and
- elsewhere, reinforce the view that his motives were less than pure.
-
- During 1990 Breault managed to convince a dozen or so discontented
- Branch Davidians in Australia, New Zealand, England and the United
- States to join his efforts. The Australians hired a private detective,
- Geoffrey Hossack, and signed affidavits alleging that Koresh was
- guilty of the statutory rape of two teenage girls, tax fraud,
- immigration violations, harboring weapons, child abuse, and exposing
- children to explicit talk about sex and violence. However, Hossack's
- visits to California and Texas local police, the Texas Department of
- Public Safety, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the
- Internal Revenue Service resulted in no action. Breault and his wife's
- visits to California and Waco in 1991 were also fruitless. He laments
- that McLennan County Sheriff Gene Barber said that "Breault's
- complaints, along with the others, stemmed from `sour grapes.'" [38]
-
- Linedecker writes in Massacre at Waco, Texas that in October, 1990,
- Robyn Bunds told Koresh she was leaving the group with their son. They
- were in LaVerne, California at the time and he immediately sent the
- child back to Waco. She reported the child missing to LaVerne Police
- who gave Koresh 48 hours to bring the child back, which he did. Bunds
- also told police that Koresh was having sex with the underage Aisha
- Gyarfas, but when they returned to investigate, Gyarfas and Koresh had
- returned to Texas. [39] (Bunds also instigated an INS investigation of
- illegal immigrants, as Breault later did in Texas, but neither
- investigation led to government action.) In September, 1991, Jeannine
- Bunds, who like her daughter Robyn Bunds was Koresh's lover, left the
- Branch Davidians, claiming that she was upset that Koresh had asked
- her if she was "capable of killing her children." [40] Her husband
- Donald Bunds remained a member of the group.
-
- Breault brought his allegations about Koresh and the Branch Davidians
- to the Australian television producers of "Current Affair." Reporter
- Martin King, who co-wrote Breault's book, visited Mount Carmel and
- interviewed Koresh in January of 1992. The program that eventually
- aired portrayed Koresh as a sex-crazed, gun-loving religious fanatic.
- Breault alleges Koresh saw it and was furious. Breault also informed
- Kiri Jewell's father, David Jewell, that Kiri was slated to become one
- of Koresh's wives. Jewell sued for custody and in January, 1992,
- Breault and other former Branch Davidians testified at the custody
- hearing in Michigan. Kiri's mother Sherri relinquished primary custody
- and promised to keep Kiri away from Koresh during visitations. (As we
- shall see, Jewell used his daughter in continuing attacks on the
- Branch Davidians.) Breault claims that the custody trial "panicked"
- Koresh and that he began planning for mass suicide over Easter
- weekend. [41] Breault and Jewell wrote Michigan Representative
- Frederick Upton with this allegation and Breault contacted the U.S.
- consulate in Melbourne which sent warning wires to Washington, D.C.
-
- According to Linedecker, when Kiri Jewell told her father that two
- other young girls were also slated to become Koresh's brides, Jewell
- called the Texas Department of Human Services, which instigated the
- February-April, 1992, child abuse investigation. [42] Many of the
- Branch Davidian "defectors" eagerly cooperated with BATF and FBI
- investigators in 1992 and 1993.
-
- That a number of former members were willing to make these allegations
- certainly suggests that there were problems with Koresh's leadership
- of the Branch Davidians. However, most of these individuals were
- influenced by either amateur cult buster Marc Breault or by
- professional cult busters Rick Ross and Patricia Coates, individuals
- committed to turning former members' genuine concerns or personal
- disappointments into action by law enforcement to destroy the alleged
- "cult."
-
- NON-WEAPONS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST DAVID KORESH
-
- The allegations against Koresh have been so sensationalized that
- Koresh's alleged crimes seem to excuse the massacre of 86 or more
- Branch Davidians. The use of the most damning allegations to demonize
- the group necessitates that the allegations be explored. As we shall
- see, there is much truth in Dr. Gordon Melton's statement to the
- American Academy of Religion panel on the Branch Davidians: "As I
- examined the evidence of all the horrible things that Koresh had
- allegedly done, those horrible things began to melt away; they were
- unsubstantiated charges from witnesses who were biased and whose
- credibility was very low. The various accusations made had no
- foundation in fact. . .The question shifted to why did the government
- misuse its power in such a horrendous way?"
-
- Child Abuse: The Justice Department report quotes just two 1990
- affidavits by former members. Ian and Allison Manning alleged that
- Koresh insisted disobedient children be spanked with a wooden paddle
- and that such beatings sometimes severely bruised the children's
- bottoms. Michelle Tom alleged that Howell spanked her eight-month-old
- daughter for forty minutes because she would not sit on his lap and
- once threatened to kill a child if her mother gave her a pacifier.
- (JDR:224-226)
-
- On February 27, 1992, Texas Department of Human Services social worker
- Joyce Sparks visited Mount Carmel with two other Human Services
- employees and two McLennan County Sheriff's deputies. They made two
- more visits and Koresh visited their offices. The case was closed on
- April 30, 1992. The Department offered this summary of the nine- week
- investigation: "None of the allegations could be verified. The
- children denied being abused in any way by adults in the compound.
- They denied any knowledge of other children being abused. The adults
- consistently denied participation in or knowledge of any abuse to
- children. Examinations of the children produced no indication of
- current or previous injuries." [43]
-
- Dr. Bruce Perry, who interviewed children released from Mount Carmel
- during the siege, told the FBI on March 26, "these children had a
- number of strict behavioral and verbal prohibitions. Violations of
- these resulted in punishment, sometimes severe. The children, for
- example, expected to be hit when they spilled. The style of discipline
- often involved being beaten with what these children labeled `the
- Helper'. . .some variation on a wooden spoon. Other forms of
- discipline included restrictions of food, sometimes for a day. . ."
- (JDR:224) Steve Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman says that members
- never used the word "beatings" to describe the discipline. "The term
- they used was `Christian discipline'. . .Discipline is not abuse."
- [44] At a May, 1993, press conference Perry confessed: "We can't
- say, `Aha, physical abuse,' that's the crux of the issue. President
- Clinton and Janet Reno say `child abuse.' Child protective services
- say, `Well, we didn't see any.'. . .It's very complicated. It is an
- ongoing dilemma for what is the threshold for saying what is abuse."
- [45]
-
- Sex with Minors: According to Daniel Wattenberg, Texas statutory rape
- laws are rather confusing, since the age of consent is 14 if the girl
- is promiscuous, but 17 if she is not. Nationwide, because so many
- young girls are having sex today, statutory rape laws frequently are
- not enforced; when they are, the sentences are usually light, assuming
- the girl fully consented. Hillary Rodham Clinton herself has
- criticized "the so-called status offenses," including for "sexual
- precociousness". [46] There are, of course, serious moral questions
- about the authenticity of a 14-year-old girl's consent to sex with an
- adult in any small community which considers sex with the leader to be
- a privilege. Government agencies found that Koresh's alleged victims
- were unwilling to cooperate and therefore they did not have enough
- evidence to convict Koresh of sex with minors. More importantly,
- civilized societies do not deal with sexual abuse of minors by
- attacking the perpetrator and his victims with heavily armed officers
- and then burning them to death when they refuse to surrender!
-
- BATF agent Davy Aguilera's February 25, 1993 affidavit, which was used
- to secure search and arrest warrants against Koresh, states: "Mrs.
- (Jeannine) Bunds also told me that Howell had fathered at least
- fifteen (15) children from various women and young girls at the
- compound. Some of the girls who had babies fathered by Howell were as
- young as 12 years old. . . He also, according to Mrs. Bunds, has
- regular sexual relations with young girls there. The girls' ages are
- from eleven (11) years old to adulthood." There are no other
- allegations he had children with girls that young.
-
- Mrs. Bunds herself had made love to Koresh and told Newsweek that
- being chosen by Koresh was an eagerly sought honor. Koresh "wouldn't
- do it unless you wanted it. . .It wasn't about sex, but he was a very
- appealing, sexual person." Robyn Bunds, who first slept with Koresh
- when she was 17, said, "he's perfect, and he's going to father your
- children. What more can you ask for?" [47] According to 1990
- affidavits by former members Ian and Allison Manning, and Marc Breault
- in his book, Koresh had bragged in Bible study about having sex with
- Michelle Jones and Aisha Gyarfas when they were 14. (JDR:219-221)
- However, even Marc Breault admitted that Aisha Gyarfas was "completely
- captivated by Vernon. She was like his little puppy dog tied to his
- leash. Aisha would do anything for Vernon." [48] Both girls, then ages
- 17 and 18, died with their children in the April 19th fire.
-
- According to the Justice report, on February 22, 1993, a young girl
- told Texas Child Protective Services social worker Joyce Sparks "that
- on one occasion, when she was ten years old, her mother left her in a
- motel room with David Koresh. He was in bed and he told (her) to come
- over to him. She got into the bed. David had no pants on. He took off
- her panties and touched her and got on top of her. . .We talked about
- how she was feeling when this happened and she responded. . .scared. .
- .scared but privileged." (JDR:219) The Justice report concedes, "This
- evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause to indict or
- prove beyond a reasonable doubt to convict." (JDR:215) Evidently this
- is the same girl the Treasury Department report states was "unwilling
- to testify about what happened." (TDR:64) Similarly, the Washington
- Post reported that a LaVerne, California sergeant said that "one of
- the underage girls alleged as a victim was out of the cult, in her
- father's custody. . .she eventually confirmed she had sex with
- Koresh." The sergeant also admitted that while he'd garnered enough
- evidence to arrest Koresh, he doubted he had enough to convict him.
- [49]
-
- Both reports and the sergeant are probably talking about the same
- young girl--who may be Kiri Jewell. According to Linedecker, in
- mid-February David and Kiri Jewell flew to Texas at the BATF's expense
- to speak to agents. [50] Kiri had been given over to her father's
- custody. And David Jewell was in constant contact with Marc Breault
- who, according to his book, had been working closely with a LaVerne,
- California sergeant. If this is indeed Kiri Jewell, one wonders if Mr.
- Jewell had joined the "cult busters" committed to destruction of the
- group and even was using his daughter in that effort. He even exposed
- her to public scrutiny by allowing her to appear on a March, 1993
- "Donahue" show to talk about her experiences with the Branch
- Davidians.
-
- Polygamy: In 1879, Reynolds vs. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
- ruled that polygamy could not be protected by freedom of religion
- because it was "subversive of the public order" due to mobs rioting
- against hated polygamous Mormons. It is questionable whether
- criminalizing bigamy and polygamy would stand such a questionable
- court ruling today. Nevertheless, individuals are still prosecuted for
- bigamy and polygamy, be they liberals promoting plural marriage as a
- more fulfilling lifestyle or Christian, Mormon and Muslim
- fundamentalists, citing Scriptures. Further, those who practice
- "plural marriage" are open to the charge they are abusing children
- exposed to the lifestyle.
-
- Koresh and Branch Davidian Paul Fatta have admitted publicly that
- Koresh was a polygamist. On February 28, 1993, Koresh told CNN, "There
- are a lot of children here. I've had a lot of babies these past two
- years. It's true that I do have a lot of children and I do have a lot
- of wives." [51] On the same day he told KRLD radio, "I'm a polygamist.
- Which is not according to your laws, I understand that, but according
- to the laws of God."
-
- Paul Fatta told reporters that Koresh did believe he had a right to
- take any consenting Branch Davidian woman as wife. "Mr. Fatta said
- that Mr. Koresh presented this behavior as a test of faith for the men
- who had lost their wives." [52] However, Branch Davidians deny that
- Koresh controlled the sex lives of the members. Ruth Riddle told an
- interviewer, "No. Not true. It was totally up to the couples what they
- wanted to do." She said she and her husband were planning to have
- children. [53] Stan Sylvia, who was forced to go through a parental
- training course to regain custody of his son, calls the allegations
- that his daughter Holly was really Koresh's child "government and
- tabloid lies." [54] Involuntary Servitude: Davy Aguilera's February
- 25, 1993 affidavit contends that Poia Vaega alleged that in June,
- 1991, Koresh and Stan Sylvia "falsely imprisoned" and physically and
- sexually abused Mrs. Vaega's sister, Doreen Saipaia, for three and a
- half months. Despite this allegation, Ms. Saipaia's relatives Neal and
- Margarida Vaega remained at Mount Carmel and died in the April 19th
- fire. Moreover, the FBI opened and closed a possibly-related
- investigation on "involuntary servitude" during 1992 but did not press
- charges. (TDR:Appendix D:4) Charges of "involuntary imprisonment" or
- "involuntary servitude" are frequently made by those influenced by
- cult busters. The fact that BATF and FBI failed to make this
- allegation to the media indicates even they questioned it.
-
- Mass Suicide: As mentioned above, Marc Breault claims that Koresh
- planned mass suicide during Easter, 1992. In his book, he asserts that
- members began calling families to say goodbye, selling assets, and
- returning to Mount Carmel. Linedecker writes that David Jewell wrote
- Representative Upton that Steve Schneider had told his family goodbye
- and that a young woman fled the group with her children because of her
- fear of a slaughter. [55] Surviving Branch Davidians who heard these
- allegations at the time say those at Mount Carmel laughed them off as
- absurd (private communication). And Koresh told Waco Tribune-Herald
- reporter Mark England, "I'm not ready to die. It's all lies. Every
- year we've gathered for Passover. Every year. Look, the place is being
- built up. We're spending lots of money. A lot of people are putting
- time and effort in. . .I've got the water-well man coming in. I mean,
- two weeks in a row we're supposed to be committing suicide. I wish
- they'd get their story straight." [56]
-
- The Treasury Department report states that a child had told a
- California police officer that she had been trained by Koresh and his
- advisers "to commit suicide in several different ways, including
- placing the barrel of a handgun in her mouth and pulling the trigger."
- (TDR:46) Edward Dennis identified this child as Kiri Jewell.
- (JDR:Dennis:37) (Reportedly, she said the same thing on the Donahue
- television show.) According to Edward Dennis, after the fire, former
- member Dana Okimoto alleged that "Koresh's biggest fear was someone
- would take his wives away and that he felt that rather than letting
- someone take his wife, the wife should kill herself and if she could
- not do so one of the `Mighty Men' should do it, since this was one of
- their duties." (JDR:Dennis:34)
-
- Despite the statements of some former members that the Branch
- Davidians might commit suicide, the FBI had collected statements from
- many more Branch Davidians that they would not. FBI spokesperson Bob
- Ricks said after the April 19th fire: "We went thought the world and
- interviewed former cult members, associates of cult members, the
- number that I last checked was 61 people. The vast bulk, the
- substantial majority of those believed that they would not commit
- suicide." [57]
-
- Propensity Towards Violence: During the siege, numerous neighbors and
- acquaintances of the Branch Davidians were interviewed. Most made
- statements like that of A.L. Dreyer, an 80-year-old farmer living near
- Mt. Carmel: "I've never had no trouble with them people. . .I have no
- fear of those people." [58] McLennan County Commissioner Lester Gibson
- was shocked that Branch Davidian Wayne Martin was involved in any
- violence. "He was very friendly and quiet. It was common knowledge
- that he was a Davidian, but he never talked religion." [60]
-
- Nevertheless, Koresh and the Branch Davidians, like many Christian
- fundamentalists, firmly believed that the "advent" or "Second Coming"
- of Jesus Christ would be accompanied by violence. Millions have
- studied the Book of Revelations and believe that 144,000 devout
- Christians will be called up into heaven just before the end of the
- world and that the sinful remainder of humanity will die horrible
- deaths. Millions believe that before Jesus appears there will be
- natural, economic and political disasters for which Christians should
- be prepared with food stocks and weapons to fight off the
- "Babylonians"--government agents, evil doers and hungry hordes from
- the cities.
-
- A reporter who interviewed Lonnie Kliever, professor of religion at
- Southern Methodist University wrote: "Koresh was typical of the
- leaders of the millennarian sects who use their ability to interpret
- Biblical prophecy to gain power and influences. But Koresh's style
- also should be familiar to millions of Americans, Kliever said after
- listening to the 58-minute message broadcast the first week of the
- siege. `I listened to the tape,' Kliever said. 'I grew up in a
- fundamentalist Baptist church. I heard that preaching all my
- childhood. You can hear that same sermon in thousands of churches any
- Sunday or Wednesday night in this country.'" [61]
-
- Koresh was convinced that he was the "Lamb of God" who would "break"
- the Seven Seals and bring on the Apocalypse and the Second Coming of
- Christ, as prophesized in the Book of Revelation. These prophecies are
- very bloody and violent. As the Lamb breaks each of the Seals, the
- Book of Revelation prophesizes, in summary: 1--a rider on a white
- horse rides forth to conquer; 2--a rider on a red horse takes away
- peace so men may slaughter; 3--a rider on a black horse is holding a
- pair of scales; 4--a rider of a pale horse named death has power over
- a quarter of the earth to kill by sword, famine, pestilence and wild
- beasts; 5--those slaughtered for God's word are told to rest a little
- longer until all brothers in Christ's service are put to death; 6--
- after a violent earthquake the great day of wrath comes; 7-- "now when
- the Lamb breaks the seventh seal, there was silence in heaven for
- about half an hour." [62] When BATF raided Mount Carmel and killed six
- Branch Davidians, Koresh and his followers were convinced that they
- had to wait a little longer, and then they too would be put to death,
- as a fulfillment of the Fifth Seal.
-
- Former Branch Davidians claimed that Koresh was obsessed with members
- proving their loyalty to him and his prophecies by promising to kill
- or die for them. David Block told BATF agents that he "left the cult
- group because (Koresh) would always remind them that if they were to
- have a confrontation with the local or federal authorities, that the
- group should be ready to fight and resist." (TDR:45)
-
- Branch Davidian Kathryn Schroeder, who has agreed to testify for the
- prosecution to obtained reduced charges, claims that Koresh "told his
- followers that soon they would have to go into the world, turn their
- weapons on individual members of public, and kill those who did not
- say they were believers. As he explained to his followers, `you can't
- die for God if you can't kill for God.' Koresh later canceled the
- planned action, telling his followers that it had been a test of their
- loyalty to him." [62] Some former members claim Koresh had a "hit list
- to eliminate former members who were complaining to law enforcement
- authorities and the media." (TDR:28) Breault, Jeannine and Robyn Bunds
- and Dana Okimoto also alleged that Koresh believed "law enforcement
- officers have to be the vehicle for his death in order for his
- prophesies to come true." (JDR:Dennis:38)
-
- It is true that after the raid and during the siege Koresh several
- times challenged negotiators to fight and even claimed that he and his
- followers had been preparing for battle with authorities since 1985.
- (JDR:51) If Koresh's statements had been merely "all talk" before the
- February 28, 1993 BATF raid, they certainly began to appear much more
- threatening once he and his followers vigorously defended themselves
- against the raid. Nevertheless, it was government action that prompted
- their violent reaction.
-
- These allegations of (non-defensive) violence certainly would be
- alarming to the public if made by a criminal or a radical political
- group--even though the First Amendment protects such "alarming"
- speech. However, these statements must be viewed differently when made
- within a Christian apocalyptic framework. In her recommendations to
- the Justice Department, Nancy Ammerman wrote that authorities
- responsible at Waco "should have understood that new or dissident
- religious groups are often `millennialist' or `apocalyptic.' That is,
- they foresee the imminent end of the world as we know it and the
- emergence of a new world, usually with themselves in leadership
- roles."
-
- "They should have understood that new groups almost always provoke
- their neighbors. . .They defy the conventional rules and question
- conventional authorities. . .Not surprisingly, then, new groups often
- provoke resistance. . .organized `anti-cult' response that make
- predictable charges (such as child abuse and sexual `perversion')
- against groups that are seen as threatening. . .The corollary to their
- provocation of neighbors is that they themselves are likely to
- perceive the outside world as hostile. This almost always takes the
- form of rhetoric condemning the evil ways of non-believers, and that
- rhetoric can sometimes sound quite violent. It may also be
- supplemented by rituals that reinforce the group's perception that
- they are surrounded by hostile forces. . .as the (Branch Davidians)
- talked about the evils of the federal government and went through the
- ritual motions of rehearsing a confrontation with their enemies, they
- may have been reinforcing their own solidarity more than they were
- practicing for an anticipated actual confrontation. The irony, of
- course, is that their internal group rhetoric did eventually come
- true." (TDR:Ammerman:5-6)
-
- Branch Davidian Stan Sylvia expresses the duty incumbent on all of us
- to study the massacre of the Branch Davidians. "Let's have mercy for
- the people who died there. Let's examine what really happened there.
- Regardless of what your opinion of us is. Whether we were bizarre.
- Whether we were inhumane. Whatever you think of us. It doesn't give
- anybody a right to come in and kill helpless women and children." [63]
-
- THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
-
- Outside Mount Carmel February 28*: Donald Bunds Paul Fatta, 35 Janet
- McBean Janet Kendrick Stan Sylvia
-
- Arrested on Feb 28, 1993: Delroy Nash, 29 Woodrow Kendrick, 63
-
- Left Mount Carmel During Siege: Brad Branch, 34 Livingston Fagan, 34
- Nahara Fagan, 4 Renae Fagan, 7 Oliver Gyarfas, 19 Victoria
- Hollingsworth, 59 Heather Jones, 10 Kevin Jones, 11 Mark Jones, 3
- Margaret Lawson, 75 James Lawten, 70 Christyn Mabb, 8 Jacob Mabb, 10
- Scott Mabb, 12 Daniel Martin, 7 Jaime Martin, 11 Kimberly Martin
- Sheila Judith Martin, 46 Catherine Matteson, 77 Natalie Nobrega, 11
- Gladys Ottman, 67 Anita Richards, 64 Rita Fay Riddle, 35 Ophelia
- Santoya, 62 Bryan Schroeder, 3 Kathryn Schroeder, 34 Angelica Sonobe,
- 6 Crystal Sonobe, 3 Joshua Sylvia, 7 Jaunessa Wendel Landon Wendel, 4
- Patron Wendel, 1 Tamara Wendel, 5 Kevin Whitecliff, 31
-
- Survived April 19th Fire Renos Avraam, 29 Jamime Castillo, 24 Graeme
- Leonard Craddock, 31 Clive Joseph Doyle, 52 Misty Ferguson, 17 Derek
- Lloyd Lovelock, 37 Ruth Ottman Riddle, 29 David Thibodeau, 24 Marjorie
- Thomas, 30
-
- Died February 28, 1993: Winston Blake, 28 Peter Gent, 24 Peter
- Hipsman, 28 Perry Jones, 64 Michael Schroeder, 29 Jaydean Carnwell
- Wendel, 34
-
- Died April 19th, 1993**: Katherin Andrade, 24 Jennifer Andrade, 19
- Aldrick Bennett, 35 Susan Benta, 31 Mary Jean Borst, 49 Pablo Cohen,
- 38 Yvette Fagan, 34 Doris Fagan, 60 Lisa Marie Farris, 26 Ray Friesen,
- 76 Dayland Gent, 3 Diana Henry, 28 Paulina Henry, 24 Phillip Henry, 22
- Stephen Henry, 26 Vanessa Henry, 19 Zilla Henry, 55 Novellette
- Hipsman, 36 Floyd Houtman, 61 Cyrus Howell, 8 Rachel Howell, 23 Star
- Howell, 6 Sherri Lynn Jewell, 43 David Michael Jones, 38 Michelle
- Jones, 18 Serenity Sea Jones, 4 Bobbie Lane Koresh, 16 months David
- Koresh, 33 Jeffery Little, 31 Nicole Elizabeth Gent Little, 24
- Livingston Malcolm, 26 Douglas Wayne Martin, 42 Lisa Martin, 13 Sheila
- Martin, 15 Abigail Martinez, 11 Audrey Martinez, 13 Juliete Santoyo
- Martinez, 30 Crystal Martinez, 3 Joseph Martinez, 30 Jillane Matthews
- Alison Bernadette Monbelly, 31 Melissa Morrison, 6 Rosemary Morrison,
- 29 Sonia Murray, 29 Theresa Noberega, 48 James Riddle, 32 Rebecca
- Saipaia, 24 Judy Schneider, 41 Mayanah Schneider, 2 Steve Schneider,
- 48 Laraine B. Silva, 40 Floracita Sonobe, 34 Scott Kojiro Sonobe, 35
- Aisha Gyarfas Summers, 17 Gregory Allen Summers, 28 Startle Summers, 1
- Isiah Martinez, 4 Hollywood Sylvia Lorraine Sylvia, 40 Rachel Sylvia,
- 13 Doris Vaega Joanne Vaega, 4 Margarida Joanna Vaega, 47 Neal Vaega,
- 37 Martin Wayne, 20 Mark H. Wendell
-
- This is not a complete list.
-
- * Several dozen more Branch Davidians lived elsewhere or were
- temporarily outside Mount Carmel on February 28, 1993.
-
- ** Most of those not named were children, including two unborn
- children.
-
- Source: Associated Press, Justice Department Report and other sources.
-
- BATF-TREASURY DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND
- COVERUP: THE FEBRUARY 28, 1993 RAID ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
-
- In May of 1992 the United Parcel Service informed the McLennan County
- Sheriff's Department that the Branch Davidians were receiving
- "suspicious" deliveries, including shipments of firearms worth more
- than $10,000, inert grenade casings, and a substantial quantity of
- black powder. (Like the Anti-Defamation League and Cult Awareness
- Network, UPS evidently turns over information about citizens' legal
- activity to authorities.) The Sheriff's Department contacted BATF and
- Special Agent Davy Aguilera was assigned to investigate. Around the
- same time, the Waco Tribune- Herald, which had been contacted by
- former members, began researching an expose about the Branch
- Davidians' alleged arms stockpiling.
-
- From June until August, Aguilera investigated companies which had
- sold weapons to David Koresh and discovered the Branch Davidians
- bought about $43,000 worth of weapons from March 26 to August 12,
- 1992, after which such purchases virtually ceased. The case
- effectively was dropped for more than two months. It was picked up
- again in November, after the "60 Minutes" television show contacted
- BATF about a planned expose of the agency, and after the Waco
- Tribune-Herald contacted BATF about their planned expose of the
- Branch Davidians' arms buildup (TDR:67).
-
- In November Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Johnston held that "there
- already was sufficient evidence of illegal activity to meet the
- threshold of probable cause for a search warrant. . .and tactical
- planning for an enforcement operation began in earnest." (TDR:37)
- However, BATF Director Stephen Higgins admitted to the House Judiciary
- Committee on April 28, 1993, that despite the information collected
- about Koresh's 1992 weapons purchases, "We had a review here at
- headquarters office in December with respect to whether we had
- probable cause. We decided at that point that we did not, and we
- continued to gather information. We brought people in from Australia;
- we got the undercover agent in; we interviewed any number of people."
- [64] Higgins was referring to the December 24, 1993 meeting in
- Washington where BATF Associate Director of Enforcement Daniel
- Hartnett and his Deputy Director Edward Conroy demanded that more
- probable cause should be developed and tactical plans should be slowed
- down. (TDR:Appendix D-7)
-
- What BATF did in early December was to begin interviewing disgruntled
- former members and to set up an undercover house across the street
- from Mount Carmel Center. However, David Koresh and the Branch
- Davidians were aware throughout the investigation that some agency was
- monitoring them. At different points they invited the BATF and the
- Sheriff's Department to look at their guns, complained to the
- Sheriff's Department about blatant undercover activities and purposely
- befriended individuals they knew were undercover agents. Meanwhile
- BATF went forward with plans for a full scale paramilitary raid on
- Mount Carmel.
-
- On February 12, 1993, BATF Director Higgins was first fully briefed on
- the plan. (TDR:Appendix D-11) On February 25th, BATF agent Davy
- Aguilera, with the assistance of U.S. Attorneys Bill Johnston and John
- Phinizy, produced a "Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of Search
- Warrant." On the basis of that affidavit, Magistrate Judge Dennis S.
- Green signed a search warrant for illegal weapons and explosives for
- Mount Carmel and the "Mag Bag" garage and an arrest warrant for David
- Koresh for possession of an unregistered destructive device. [65]
- However, Treasury Department officials nixed the raid plan when they
- discovered its existence Friday, February 26th. BATF Director Higgins
- convinced officials that because of the Waco Herald-Tribune series on
- the Branch Davidians, February 28th might be the last opportunity to,
- as one put it, "catch the cult members unprepared and away from their
- stockpile of heavy weaponry." [66] And Higgins told officials that
- raid planners had assured him that the raid would be called of if the
- element of surprise was lost. They did not tell him they were
- expecting a shootout.
-
- Saturday, February 27th the Waco Herald-Tribune began their series,
- "The Sinful Messiah." And on Sunday, February 28th, despite their
- knowledge that the Branch Davidians had been forewarned, 76 armed BATF
- agents stormed Mount Carmel Center. The assault left four BATF agents
- and five Branch Davidians dead. Another Branch Davidian would be
- killed later that afternoon trying to return home.
-
- In this section the Committee for Waco Justice report describes BATF
- violations of constitutional rights and excessive use of force in
- their investigation of and February 28th raid upon the Branch Davidian
- religious group and the subsequent BATF and Treasury Department
- coverup. The report then presents the Committee for Waco Justice
- conclusions: that BATF agents drove the Branch Davidians to violent
- self-defense, resulting in the deaths of four agents and six Branch
- Davidians, and that the Attorney General should appoint an Independent
- Counsel to identify and prosecute responsible agents and officials for
- official misconduct, violations of rights, and negligent homicide. We
- will present further recommendations in the last section of this
- report.
-
- It should be noted that none of the testimony given to Treasury
- Department "review teams" or to Congress was given under oath. Also,
- the Treasury Department report does not include information which
- might effect the prosecutions of the Branch Davidians now on trial.
-
- TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND BATF CHAINS OF COMMAND FEBRUARY 28, 1993
- TREASURY DEPARTMENT
-
- Lloyd Bentsen - Secretary of the Treasury
- John P. Simpson - Acting Assistant Secretary
- Ronald K. Noble - unconfirmed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
- for Enforcement (a consultant at this point)
-
- BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
-
- Stephen Higgins-Director
- Daniel Hartnett - Associate Director of Enforcement
- Edward Conroy - Deputy Associate Director of Enforcement
- David Troy - Chief of Intelligence Division@@"National
- Response Plan" Assignments for "Waco Operation"
- SAC Philip Chojnacki - Incident Commander
- ASAC Chuck Sarabyn - Tactical Coordinator
- SAC Pete Mastin - Deputy Incident Commander
- ASAC Jim Cavanaugh - Deputy Tactical Coordinator
- SA Sharon Wheeler - Public Information Officer
- RAC Bill Buford - Special Response Team 1 leader
- SAC Curtis Williams - Special Response Team 2 leader
- SAC Gerald Petrilli - Special Response Team 3 leader
- SAC Ted Royster - planner, untitled raid coordinator
- SA Earl Dunagan - investigator
- SA Davy Aguilera - investigator
- SA Robert Rodriquez - undercover agent@@Note:
- SAC-Special Agent-in-Charge
- ASAC-Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge
- RAC-Resident Agent-in-Charge
- SA-Special Agent
-
- 1. BATF IGNORED BRANCH DAVIDIANS' LEGAL GUN BUSINESS
-
- These first five sections will review the process by which BATF agents
- gathered evidence of probable cause to serve a search warrant on the
- Branch Davidians and to arrest David Koresh. Some might consider this
- detailed review unnecessary, given government assertions that illegal
- weapons were found after the fire. However, it is important to
- understand that a raid was conducted despite the facts that Branch
- Davidians ran a legal business, BATF found no evidence of illegally
- purchased weapons, and the Branch Davidians attempted to cooperate
- with investigators. Moreover, the "probable cause" to obtain a search
- warrant was based largely on biased information, information used to
- excuse a full paramilitary raid by 76 armed agents. Such unnecessary
- paramilitary raids on any American undermines all our rights.
-
- Some Branch Davidians "confirmed that they stockpiled weapons in
- preparation for what Mr. Koresh long prophesized would be an
- apocalyptic firefight with law enforcement officials that could be a
- precursor to the end of the world. But they insisted that the weapons
- were obtained legally." [67] However, others will testify during the
- trial that only certain members of the group had known about the
- weapons or handled them. [68] In any case, it is not illegal to
- stockpile guns for defense against some future illegal attack by
- government agents.
-
- More importantly, BATF investigative agents either never
- discovered--or completely ignored--the fact that the Branch Davidians
- ran a profitable legal gun business. According to the Washington Post,
- its "biggest moneymaker was its thriving trade in guns and ammunition,
- bought from mail-order firms and local gun stores and resold at a
- profit at gun-fancier fairs throughout Texas. Among the products it
- marketed at these fairs were souvenir plaques made of hand grenade
- casings mounted on wood." [69] Even Marc Breault mentions that of the
- Branch Davidian businesses, the "most important of all" was trade in
- weapons. [70] Clifford L. Linedecker writes, " (Paul) Fatta was a
- regular at gun shows in Austin, Dallas, Forth Worth, San Antonio, and
- other cities in Texas and sold everything from camouflage clothing to
- military-type ready-to-eat meals, gun grips, and weapons." [71] The
- September, 1993, indictment against Fatta and other Branch Davidians
- admits that "Paul Fatta acquired a Texas Sales and Use Tax Permit in
- the name of "The Mag Bag." (JDR:Indictment:4)
-
- Koresh and the Branch Davidians were working with gun dealer Henry
- McMahon, who held a Class III dealer's license allowing him to legally
- own, sell, and buy, any type of weapon. In April of 1993, McMahon told
- the Pensacola television show "Lawline" that Koresh had purchased a
- large number of legal military-style semi-automatics as an investment,
- assuming that their value would increase if the government somehow
- restricted their manufacture or sales in the future. Considering that
- this had happened with other guns in the past, this was a reasonable
- business investment. McMahon said most of these guns were kept boxed
- and never fired, to enhance resale value. [72] During the first days
- of the Branch Davidian trial, Paul Fatta's attorney Mike DeGeurin told
- the jury: "Koresh and Fatta saw that a tremendous investment could be
- made by buying these guns (semiautomatic rifles). They thought the
- guns may be outlawed in Washington and that they would triple or
- quadruple in price." [73]
-
- BATF Agent Davy Aguilera wrote in his February 25, 1993, affidavit:
- "June 9, 1992, I requested a search of the records of the Firearms
- Licensing Section of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
- Atlanta, Georgia, to determine if Howell, Fatta or the `Mag-Bag'
- Corporation were licensed as Firearms dealers or manufacturers. The
- result of this search was negative." He did not search under the names
- David Koresh or Michael Schroeder, who also signed for guns, or any of
- a number of other adults who lived at Mount Carmel. Nor did he do a
- second search when the case was reactivated in late November.
-
- Aguilera's affidavit mentions that David Block said that "he attended
- two gun shows with Vernon Howell, Mike Schroeder, Paul Fatta, and
- Henry McMahon who is a Federally licensed firearms dealer." Yet
- Aguilera was unable to discover they all had legal business dealings.
- If he had, perhaps BATF might not have been so alarmed by the Branch
- Davidians buying $200,000 in weapons over a 16 month period. [74]
-
- 2. BATF FOUND NO EVIDENCE WEAPONS WERE PURCHASED ILLEGALLY
-
- Davy Aguilera's investigation of shipments from various arms vendors
- to the "Mag-Bag" and of gun dealer Henry McMahon's records indicated
- that during 1992 the Branch Davidians acquired the following firearms
- and related explosive paraphernalia: one hundred four (104)
- AR-15/M-16, upper receiver groups with barrels; eight thousand, one
- hundred (8,100) rounds of 9mm and .223 caliber ammunition for
- AR-15/M-16; twenty (20), one hundred round capacity drum magazines for
- AK-47 rifles; two hundred sixty (260), M-16/Ar-15, magazines; thirty
- (30) M-14 magazines; two (2) M-16 EZ kits; two (2) M-16 Car Kits; one
- M-76 grenade launcher; two hundred (200) M-31 practice rifle grenades;
- four (4) M-16 parts set Kits "A"; two (2) flare launchers; two cases
- (approximately 50) inert practice hand grenades; 40-50 pounds of black
- gun powder; thirty (30) pounds of Potassium Nitrate; five (5) pounds
- of Magnesium metal powder; one pound of Igniter cord (A class C
- explosive); ninety-one (91) AR/15 lower receiver units; twenty-six
- (26) various calibers and brands of hand guns and long guns; 90 pounds
- of aluminum metal powder; 30-40 cardboard tubes. The amount of
- expenditures for the above listed firearm paraphernalia, excluding the
- (91) AR-15 lower receiver units and the (26) complete firearms, was in
- excess of $44,300."
-
- All these guns, gun parts, powders, inert grenades, and other
- equipment were lawfully purchased and may be legally owned. None per
- se established probable cause that Koresh had violated or was about to
- violate federal law. As has been noted, the seemingly large amounts
- are not illegal either according to the Firearms Owners' Protection
- Act of 1986 and the Supreme Court decision United States vs. Anders,
- nor are they unusual for someone dealing in weapons or holding them as
- an investment.
-
- Aguilera did not investigate the one dealer who might possibly have
- sold Koresh illegal arms. In the affidavit he states, "because of the
- sensitivity of the investigation" he did not contact "vendors with
- questionable trade practices" who had sold to Koresh, including one
- suspected of "unlawful possession of machineguns, silencers,
- destructive devices, and machinegun conversion kits." In effect,
- Aguilera refused to check to see if Koresh had bought illegal items
- from this source and instead inferred probable cause. This is
- blatantly unconstitutional. Aguilera suspected the Branch Davidians
- were breaking laws regarding machineguns and explosives. It is only
- legal to own a machinegun--or machinegun conversion kit-- manufactured
- before May 19, 1986. Both must be registered and one must also pay a
- $200 transfer tax upon buying the machinegun. Uncertainty arises
- because these conversion kits can be used to turn other guns into
- machineguns. According to former enforcement chief Robert Sanders,
- this area remains so unclear that, "There are no published rulings
- telling you what is and what isn't (a violation) ." [75]
-
- What would probably be illegal is: a) buying a registered machinegun
- without paying the $200 tax; b) owning unregistered conversion kits;
- c) using a registered conversion kit to convert a gun into a
- machinegun, but not paying the $200 tax; d) using an insufficient
- number of parts from a registered conversion kit to convert a gun into
- a machinegun, even if the tax is paid; e) owning an unregistered
- conversion kit; f) owning all parts necessary to assemble a brand new
- machinegun, even if the parts are not assembled; g) unregistered
- manufacturing of conversion parts; h) using illegally manufactured
- parts to convert guns into machineguns; i) buying an illegal
- machinegun produced in any of ways above.
-
- As of December, 1992, Aguilera's only evidence that the Branch
- Davidians were doing one or more of these things was that they had
- bought a number of legal weapons and legal gun parts which, with the
- help of a few parts they did not have, can be converted into
- machineguns. Aguilera states that Firearms Enforcement Officer Curtis
- Bartlett told him that the firearms parts which Howell had received,
- and the method by which he had received them, was consistent with
- findings in other BATF investigations which resulted in the seizure of
- illegal machineguns. However, BATF's suspicions remained pure
- conjecture.
-
- It is also legal to own all the destructive device- related items
- Aguilera listed--the grenade launcher, M-31 practice rifle grenades,
- inert practice hand grenades, black gun powder, potassium nitrate,
- magnesium metal powder, aluminum powder, and igniter cord. What would
- not be legal is to manufacture these materials into grenades or other
- destructive devices. Aguilera asserted in the affidavit that BATF
- explosives expert Jerry A. Taylor had concluded that these materials
- could be used to manufacture explosives. However, according to Paul H.
- Blackman, Ph.D. "the assertion that possession of the black powder and
- inert grenades constitutes an explosive grenade because it is possible
- to make one is misleading. Not only are more materials needed, along
- with the machinery to drill and plug a hole, but without intent, there
- is no violation of the law." Blackman asserts the Branch Davidians
- were using the explosive materials for construction projects and for
- refilling ammunition, both legal uses. [76] It was because of this
- lack of probable cause that in December BATF officials instructed
- Aguilera to gather information about Koresh's "intent."
-
- 3. "PROBABLE CAUSE" BASED ON BIASED INFORMATION ABOUT INTENT
-
- The credibility and reliability of witnesses in an affidavit is very
- important. Yet all Aguilera's witnesses as to Koresh's "intent" had
- some credibility problems. Neighbor Robert L. Cervenka, who alleged to
- Aguilera he actually had heard machinegun fire on the property, had
- been involved in a property dispute with the Branch Davidians. [77]
- Joyce Sparks' evidence on intent was delivered to Aguilera through
- another BATF agent and, as we shall see, was probably a garbled
- transmission. All other evidence on intent came from disaffected
- former Branch Davidians, all of whom were influenced by "cult busters"
- Marc Breault and Rick Ross.
-
- a. Rick Ross
-
- Aguilera began contacting former members in November, 1992. He
- obtained their names from the 1990 affidavits Breault and other former
- members left with the local Sheriff's Department and from Rick Ross.
- Nancy Ammerman, who had access to all BATF and FBI files, wrote "The
- ATF interviewed the persons (Ross) directed to them and evidently used
- information from those interviews in planning their February 28th
- raid." (JDR:Ammerman:Addendum) Rick Ross "deprogrammed" David Block,
- who lived at Mount Carmel only three months, in the summer of 1992 in
- the home of CAN national spokesperson Priscilla Coates in Coates' home
- in California. [78] He or California CAN representatives were probably
- in close contact with Jeannine, Robyn and Debbie Sue Bunds, all of
- whom gave BATF information. (Linedecker writes that in 1991 California
- police said Robyn was being deprogrammed. [79] )
-
- Evidence that Rick Ross had a financial motivation for inciting BATF
- against the Branch Davidians is contained in Marc Breault's January
- 16, 1993, diary entry, where he describes a conversation with Branch
- Davidian Steve Schneider's sister. "Rick (Ross) told Sue that
- something was about to happen real soon. He urged her to hire him to
- deprogram Steve. Rick has Sue all scared now. The Schneider family
- doesn't know what to do. Rick didn't tell them what was about to
- happen, but he said they should get Steve out as soon as possible. I
- know that Rick has talked to the ATF." [80] It is unknown how many
- other families Ross contacted offering his expensive services "before
- it's too late."
-
- b. Former Members' Allegations About Intent
-
- Marc Breault, David Block, Poia Vaega and Jeannine, Robyn and Debbie
- Sue Bunds provided Aguilera with the following evidence of "intent"
- about illegal machineguns: Robyn Bunds said she found what David Bunds
- called a "machinegun conversion kit" in their LaVerne home in 1991,
- but Aguilera did not interview David; Jeannine and Debbie Sue Bunds
- said they saw a Branch Davidian shooting a gun that must have been a
- machinegun because it shot so fast; Debbie Sue said she head Koresh
- say he wished he owned a machinegun; Poia Vaega said that Koresh had
- passed an "AK-47 machinegun" around at a meeting (AK-47s also come in
- legal, semi-automatic versions); Marc Breault said Koresh told him how
- easy it was to convert a gun to a machinegun; David Block told
- Aguilera that Donald Bunds, a mechanical engineer, who remained with
- the group after his family left it, operated a metal lathe and milling
- machine that had the capability to fabricate firearm parts and that he
- had observed Bunds designing a machinegun on a computer.
-
- Jeannine Bunds, Breault and Block provided Aguilera with the following
- evidence of intent to produce illegal explosives: Jeannine Bunds said
- she had seen one "grenade", but not that she knew it contained
- explosive materials; Marc Breault said that sometime before 1989
- Koresh said he wanted to "obtain and/or manufacture" grenades; David
- Block said he had heard Koresh ask if anyone "had any knowledge about
- making hand grenades" and another time he "heard discussion about a
- shipment of inert hand grenades and Howell's intent to reactivate
- them"; both Breault and Block asserted that Koresh had expressed
- interest in the (legally available) book Anarchist Cookbook which
- explains how to make explosives.
-
- While such allegations might be credible in most witnesses, they must
- be regarded skeptically when coming from individuals involved with
- professional or amateur cult busters. The Treasury report itself
- notes, "the planners failed to consider how Block's prior relations
- with Koresh, and his decision to break away from the Branch Davidians
- at the Compound, might have affected the reliability of his
- statements. Although the planners knew Block had met with a
- self-described `deprogrammer,' Rick Ross, they never had any
- substantive discussions with him concerning Block's objectivity about
- and perspective of Koresh and his followers." (TDR:143-144) All those
- who gave BATF the all important "evidence of intent" had similar
- credibility problems!
-
- c. BATF and Treasury Department Use of Former Members' Allegations
-
- It is interesting to note that none of the most inflammatory
- allegation's about Koresh's violent criminal intent made by former
- members--that he had made up a "hit list" against former members, that
- he had once "tested" them by saying they would have to turn their guns
- on the public, that Branch Davidians were considering "mass suicide,"
- or that they had renamed Mount Carmel Center "Ranch Apocalypse" [81]
- -- were included in the Aguilera's February 25th affidavit. Yet the
- Treasury report claims these allegations--some of which may not have
- been made until after the raid--were a prime excuse for the raid
- because Koresh "might soon have been inspired to turn his arsenal
- against the community of nonbelievers." (TDR:127)
-
- It is particularly disturbing to see that these cult buster stories
- even convinced top Treasury Department officials to support the plan.
- Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement Ronald K. Noble
- told the April 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing that
- from what BATF officials had told him, the Branch Davidians were
- "people who were feared to be gathering machineguns and automatic
- weapons and explosives for either a mass suicide or for some kind of
- assault near Waco, Texas; that they had bad intentions, evil
- intentions." [82]
-
- 4. "PROBABLE CAUSE" BASED ON RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL BELIEFS
-
- In his February 25th affidavit Aguilera includes third hand
- information--from social worker Joyce Sparks to Special Agent Carlos
- Torres to himself--that "during her conversation with Koresh, he told
- her that he was the `Messenger' from God, that the world was coming to
- an end, and that when he `reveals' himself, the riots in Los Angeles
- would pale in comparison to what was going to happen in Waco, Texas.
- Koresh declared that it would be a `military type operation' and that
- all the `non- believers' would have to suffer." However, it is likely
- Sparks misinterpreted Koresh's Biblically prophetic statements,
- statements fully protected under the First Amendment freedom of
- religion provision.
-
- The affidavit also used other statements fully protected under the
- First Amendment freedom of speech provision as evidence of criminal
- intent. These include Koresh's talk about the desire to own
- machineguns and the fully legal Anarchist Cookbook and his telling
- undercover Agent Robert Rodriguez it is possible to purchase a "drop-
- in-sear" to convert an AR-15 rifle into an illegal machinegun. Former
- member Robyn Bunds said that "she and the other residents were
- subjected to watching extremely violent movies of the Vietnam War
- which Howell would refer to as training films." However, the movies
- alluded to were popular Hollywood films "Hamburger Hill," "Platoon"
- and "Full Metal Jacket." [83]
-
- Particularly disturbing is the affidavit's mentioning Koresh's
- assertion of his right to bear arms and his criticism of BATF as
- evidence of criminal intent. "David Koresh stated that the Bible gave
- him the right to bear arms. . .David Koresh then advised Special Agent
- Rodriguez that he had something he wanted Special Agent Rodriguez to
- see. At that point he showed Special Agent Rodriguez a video tape on
- ATF which was made by the Gun Owners Association (G.O.A.). This film
- portrayed ATF as an agency who violated the rights of Gun Owners by
- threats and lies." A later March 9, 1993 affidavit signed by BATF
- agent Earl Dunagan actually listed as objects for which BATF wanted to
- search audio and video tapes which criticized "firearms law
- enforcement and particularly the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
- Firearms (ATF)." BATF wanted to present these as "evidence of Howell's
- or other cult members' motive for wanting to shoot and kill ATF
- agents."
-
- 5. OTHER IRREGULARITIES IN THE FEBRUARY 25, 1993 AFFIDAVIT
-
- Davy Aguilera's February 25, 1993 affidavit contains stale, inaccurate
- and misleading information and presents an "indefensible" probable
- cause theory. Considering the sloppiness of Aguilera's February 25,
- 1993 affidavit, it is not surprising that the Treasury report does not
- bother to include a copy as one of its several appendixes!
-
- a. Stale Information
-
- All Aguilera's supporting information regarding the purchase of
- possibly suspicious weapons was more than eight months old. According
- to David Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin, the February 25th affidavit
- contained "stale information" under the 1932 Supreme Court case Sgro
- v. United States which holds: "the magistrate (has to) conclude that
- what they are searching for is there now, not that it was there at
- some time in the past." [84] Similarly, United States v. Ruff, 984,
- F.2d 635 5th Cir., 1993 holds that evidence must be fresh. [85] Most
- former members' allegations that they had heard Koresh discuss
- machineguns or seen Koresh use alleged machineguns came from 1989 and
- 1991. David Block's allegations that he'd heard Koresh discuss making
- machineguns and grenades were also more than six months old.
-
- b. Inaccurate Information
-
- Aguilera's affidavit contained glaring errors of fact that attest to
- the shoddy nature of the "supporting information." Despite Aguilera's
- swearing to be familiar with federal firearms and explosives laws, he
- confused the legal definition of "destructive devices" and "firearms."
- He called E-2 Kits, "E-Z kits" and did not mention that they are legal
- gun parts kits, not machinegun conversion kits. He claims that the
- AK-47 has an upper and lower receiver, when in fact it has a one-piece
- receiver. [86] And he claims the legal .50 caliber rifle Block
- describes is probably an illegal .52 caliber Boys rifle, though Paul
- H. Blackman believes it is unlikely such a gun even exists. [87] (In
- its discussion of the probable cause investigation, the Treasury
- report corrects Aguilera's errors without mentioning it has done so.)
-
- It is important to note that none of the former Branch Davidians who
- claimed they had seen or heard machineguns were knowledgeable about
- firearms, nor did Aguilera swear that they were. All identified the
- guns from pictures and from the fact that they fired more rapidly than
- normal shotguns. And none seemed to be aware the Branch Davidians
- owned "hellfire" devices that make the guns sound like machineguns.
- David Bunds, who Aguilera claims had arms' expertise, was never even
- interviewed.
-
- Two non-weapons factual errors are of note. The affidavit states a
- former member "observed at the compound published magazines such as,
- the `Shotgun News' and other related clandestine magazines." However,
- Shotgun News is a legal, aboveboard publication with a distribution of
- 150,000. [88] Also, the affidavit repeats Joyce Sparks' inaccurate
- statement that Koresh made comments about the Los Angeles riots on a
- date three weeks before the riots began. The Treasury report claims
- that, despite this error, Sparks' records show she did visit Koresh at
- Mount Carmel the day after the beginning of the riots. (TDR:125-126)
-
- c. Misleading Information
-
- In 1978 the Supreme Court held in Franks vs. Delaware that a search
- warrant is invalid if the agent has misled or lied to the magistrate
- in order to get it. Aguilera's affidavit describes child abuse
- allegations and the Texas Department of Protection and Regulatory
- Services investigation, but does not mention that the case was closed
- on April 30, 1992, with no evidence of child abuse. Similarly, the
- affidavit states that a relative of an ex- member alleges "a false
- imprisonment for a term of three and one half (3 1/2) months," but
- does not mention that the FBI opened a (probably-related) case for
- "involuntary servitude" in April, 1992, and closed it in June, 1992.
-
- The affidavit states that Branch Davidian neighbor Robert L. Cervenka
- reported what sounded like machinegun fire in February, but does not
- mention that the Branch Davidians discussed this allegation with a
- McLennan County Sheriff who assured them the "hell fire" devices they
- were using were legal. It states that a Deputy Sheriff heard a large
- explosion and saw smoke at Mount Carmel on November 6, 1992, but does
- not mention that the Sheriff didn't consider it important enough to
- investigate--or that the Branch Davidians were excavating for a large
- underground tornado shelter at the time.
-
- The affidavit states that INS records show most foreign nationals had
- overstayed their entry permits or visas and that "it is a violation of
- Title 18, United States Code, Section 922 for an illegal alien to
- receive a firearm"; it does not provide evidence that any illegal
- alien was using a firearm. The affidavit states, "Howell forced
- members to stand guard at the commune 24 hours a day with loaded
- weapons," but does not mention that in 4 weeks of observation from the
- undercover house, agents saw no such armed guards. (TDR:53)
-
- BATF experts told Aguilera that Koresh's gunpowder and igniter cord
- "were themselves explosives requiring proper registration and
- storage--neither of which Koresh provided." (TDR:124) However, Paul H.
- Blackman writes that since there was no attempt to contact Koresh to
- ask him what kind of storage he was providing, BATF did not know if it
- was being illegally stored. Moreover, the amount of gunpowder Koresh
- had was expressly exempt from the law, and no registration is required
- for igniter cord (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 841 et.seq.; Title 26,
- Sec.5845(f) [89]
-
- d. Indefensible Probable Cause Theory
-
- Aguilera's February 25th affidavit includes several serious
- allegations related to matters which are not under BATF's authority to
- investigate: child abuse, involuntary servitude, illegal drugs, and
- tax avoidance. The Treasury report defends Aguilera's presenting this
- inflammatory material to the Magistrate. "While reports that Koresh
- was permitted to sexually and physically abuse children were not
- evidence that firearms or explosives violations were occurring, they
- showed Koresh to have set up a world of his own, where legal
- prohibitions were disregarded freely." (TDR:27) Paul H. Blackman
- writes, "Such a theory would allow law enforcement agencies to allow
- any allegations of any serious criminal activity to help to establish
- probable cause that all other criminal activities were also being
- engaged in. In law, the theory is currently indefensible." [90]
-
- 6. BATF IGNORED BRANCH DAVIDIAN ATTEMPTS TO COOPERATE
-
- The Treasury report alleges: "Aguilera wisely sought to keep his
- investigation a secret from Koresh and his followers. . . (and) . .
- .sharply circumscribed his inquiries about Koresh to third parties,
- including arms dealers and former cult members." (TDR:123) However,
- the Branch Davidians clearly knew that they were under surveillance,
- were worried about it and even tried to cooperate to with authorities.
- Evidence of their worry comes from Marc Breault's February 18, 1993,
- diary entry where he writes that Steve Schneider told his sister Sue:
- "Vernon is worried about the arms he has and what the Government might
- do about them. I asked Sue whether Steve mentioned illegal weapons.
- She assured me that Steve did not mention illegal weapons, but only
- arms in general. Steve also said Vernon is searching Reuters and AP
- news services to find out anything about Government involvement in
- arms cases. . . Steve said Vernon is particularly interested in the
- Randy Weaver case." [91] The Branch Davidians were wise to worry that
- the fate that befell the Weaver family might befall them.
-
- a. Koresh Had Cooperated with More Serious Investigations
-
- The Treasury report claims, "There was, in fact, no evidence that
- Koresh was prepared to submit to law enforcement authorities or that
- he had done so in the past." (TDR:135) In fact, Koresh had been
- investigated on more serious charges than gun law violations and had
- cooperated fully with law enforcement. In 1987, when Koresh and seven
- Branch Davidians were indicted for attempted murder after the shoot
- out with George Roden, the Sheriff called Koresh and told him they
- should turn themselves in and surrender their weapons. When Deputies
- showed up to arrest them, they complied. Former McLennan County
- District Attorney Vic Feazell, who prosecuted Koresh in that case
- criticized federal agents, and said, "If they'd called and talked to
- them, the Davidians would've given them what they wanted." [92] In his
- February 25th affidavit Aguilera reports on the shootout but not
- Koresh's full cooperation with authorities. The Treasury report
- dismisses this evidence, given Koresh's "disdain for fire arms laws
- and hatred for those charged with their enforcement." (TDR:135) The
- report includes a photograph of Koresh and followers dressed in
- fatigues and armed with weapons, allegedly right before the shootout.
- (TDR:19-20)
-
- In 1991, when LaVerne, California police demanded Koresh return their
- child to Robyn Bunds, he did so immediately. Koresh and Sherri Jewell
- cooperated fully with the Michigan court which awarded custody of Kiri
- Jewell to her father. And between February and April, 1992, Koresh
- allowed Texas Department of Protection and Regulatory Services and
- McLellan County Sheriff's Department personnel to inspect Mount Carmel
- on three occasions and visited their offices once.
-
- b. Koresh Invited Sheriff to Inspect Weapons in 1992
-
- As mentioned above, in February, 1992, Robert L. Cervenka complained
- to the Sheriff's office that he had heard machinegun fire at Mount
- Carmel. According to Aguilera's affidavit, he even "offered to allow
- the Sheriff to use his property as a surveillance post." Several
- months later Branch Davidians contacted the local Sheriff about this.
- The New York Times reports, "According to Mr. Fatta, the weapons the
- Davidians were firing at that time were legal AK-47s and AR-15s
- outfitted with a `hellfire trigger' that allowed for rapid firing
- without converting the rifles into fully automatic weapons. `We had
- heard that one of the neighbors had been approached about using their
- property as a listening post,' Mr. Fatta said several weeks ago, `and
- we went to the local sheriff's department and asked them if the
- hellfire triggers were legal, just to make sure. We were told that
- they were legal.'" [93] According to another article, they told the
- Sheriff, "why don't you come and ask us what we've got." [94]
-
- c. Koresh Invited BATF to Inspect Weapons in 1992
-
- The Treasury report alleges: "During the compliance inspection of
- Henry McMahon. . .Special Agent Aguilera deliberately led McMahon to
- believe that the inspection was a routine administrative inquiry."
- (TDR:186-188) However, it fails to mention McMahon's version of the
- visit. Because Aguilera and another BATF agent were asking Henry
- McMahon a lot of questions about Koresh, he immediately called Koresh
- to inform him. According to McMahon, "He said, `If there's a problem,
- tell them to come out here. If they want to see my guns, they're more
- than welcome.' So I walked back in the room, holding the cordless
- phone and said, `I've got (Koresh) on the phone. If you'd like to go
- out there and see those guns, you're more than welcome to.' They
- looked at each other and Aguilera got real paranoid, shaking his head
- and whispering, `No, no!' And so I went back to the phone and told
- David they wouldn't be coming out." [95]
-
- After Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin mentioned the incident during a
- media panel in September, 1993, reporters from two Houston papers
- contacted Jack Killorin, Chief of BATF's Public Affairs. He told one
- reporter he was not surprised that a federal agent rejected an offer
- to inspect weapons. "The preferred method by the law is going with the
- standard of getting a warrant before entering a home. We execute such
- warrants." [96] He told the other reporter, "Koresh's learning of the
- investigation in July 1992 had no effect on the raid or the resulting
- standoff between agents and cult members." [97]
-
- d. Lieutenant Lynch Statement on Another Service of Warrant
-
- McLennan County Sheriff's Lieutenant Larry Lynch told the June 9,
- 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing about having visited
- Mount Carmel with only a few officers to serve a warrant on an
- individual who no longer resided there. [98] One lawmaker asked BATF
- Chief of Intelligence David Troy about Lynch's statement. "Did you
- have a conversation with the local law enforcement officials regarding
- their previous service of arrest warrants and search warrants?" Troy
- replied, "That is the first time I had ever, myself, had heard that
- there had been an attempt that was not related to that shootout that
- occurred in 1987, to serve any type of legal document at the compound
- by any other enforcement agency. . .I don't believe they ever
- considered seriously driving up in that front yard and telling him we
- had a Federal search warrant for the place." [99]
-
- This attests to the BATF's failure to consult adequately with local
- authorities. BATF Associate Director Daniel Hartnett informed the
- subcommittee that at least one McLellan County Sheriff's Lieutenant
- was assigned full time to BATF planners. [100] This may have been
- Lieutenant Barber, who had had numerous contacts with both former and
- current Branch Davidians. Lieutenant Larry Lynch stated during the
- hearing that Lieutenant Barber was his superior during the February
- 28, 1993 raid. [101] Marc Breault claims it was Lieutenant Barber who
- called his complaints "sour grapes." [102] Clifford L. Linedecker
- writes that Branch Davidians discussed the Cervenka complaint and the
- hellfire devices with Lieutenant Barber. [103] It is unknown if the
- officer assigned to BATF--be it Lieutenant Barber or someone
- else--conveyed information about Branch Davidians past cooperation to
- BATF planners or if BATF ignored such information. One reason for any
- "communications breakdown" might be found Marc Breault's allegation,
- "ATF believes there might be a leak to Vernon from the McLennan County
- Sheriff's Department. They are bypassing the local authorities." [104]
-
- e. Koresh Befriended Undercover Agents
-
- On January 11, 1993, eight undercover agents were assigned to pose as
- students living in the two bedroom house across the street from Mount
- Carmel Center. Branch Davidians immediately visited that house, but
- undercover agents refused to let them come in, despite their repeated
- requests. A few days later Koresh visited the family next door to the
- undercover house and told them he thought the "students" were FBI
- agents and that he was expecting a visit from the FBI. (TDR:Appendix
- D:8-9) Koresh said he doubted the men were students because they were
- too old, their cars were too new, they carried brief cases, and the
- owner had previously refused to rent the house to anyone. However,
- Koresh remained unsure as to which government agency had him under
- surveillance. (TDR:187)
-
- Koresh then went out of his way to befriend agent Robert Rodriguez
- (who was working under the name "Gonzales"). He invited him to visit
- Mount Carmel Center, listen to music, and shoot guns in the back of
- Mount Carmel. (TDR:D-11) Koresh invited Rodriguez to take Bible
- studies and even invited him to join the Branch Davidians. After the
- fire Rodriguez admitted to reporters that Koresh's teachings did
- affect him. "`He was close,' he finally said, his voice cracking at
- the memory." [105] Koresh told KRLD radio reporters February 28th that
- he was disappointed that after his talks with Rodriguez, he and his
- superiors did not "understand" that Koresh was a serious religious
- person worthy of "respect." On Sunday, February 28th, Koresh was in a
- Bible study with Rodriguez when he was told that BATF and National
- Guard were approaching. Rather than take Rodriguez hostage, as he
- easily could have, he told Rodriguez that he knew BATF and the
- National Guard were coming and shook Rodriguez' hand as the agent
- left.
-
- f. Koresh Complained to Sheriff about UPS Surveillance
-
- On January 27, 1993, a special agent posed as a UPS trainee and
- accompanied a UPS delivery person to the MagBag and Mount Carmel
- Center. His attempts to get into the buildings made Koresh suspicious.
- He told the delivery person "I know we're being watched." According to
- the Treasury report, "This undercover effort was so transparent that
- Koresh complained to the local sheriff's department. He accused the
- department of trying to infiltrate the Compound." (TDR:187-188)
-
- g. After Raid, Koresh Stated He Would Have Cooperated
-
- The above evidence lends credence to Koresh's claims on the publicly
- released February 28, 1993, "911" tape that he would have cooperated
- with authorities if they had contacted him. On the 911 tape Koresh
- told 911 operator Lieutenant Larry Lynch, "You see, you brought your
- bunch of guys out here and you killed some of my children. [106] We
- told you we wanted to talk. No. How come you guys try to be ATF
- agents? How come you try to be so big all the time?" Later in the tape
- he says, "Now, we're willing, and we've been willing, all this time,
- to sit down with anybody. You've sent law enforcement out here before.
- . .And I've laid it straight across the table. I said, if you want to
- know about me, sit down with me and I'll open up a book and show you
- Seven Seals."
-
- After the February 28 raid, Koresh said to KRLD radio reporters, who
- asked how he felt about the 4 agents who died, "Unnecessary, my
- friend. These men, they don't know anything about me. They don't know
- what I teach. I respect law enforcement. I loved the Waco Sheriff
- Department. They treated me good. When we had the child accusations
- against us, some Sheriff department guys came out and they treated us
- with the highest respect. . .Larry Abner. I loved the guy. I took him
- and I showed him around and everything. They took the children off
- where they can talk to them personally. Those kind of people I can
- deal with." When a reporter asked if he would have gone to town and
- discussed the weapons with the Sheriff's Department, Koresh answered,
- "I would have come. I would have come. I would have come."
-
- The Houston Chronicle obtained tapes of telephone conversations
- between Koresh and BATF agent Jim Cavanaugh shortly after the assault.
- Koresh told the agent, "It would have been better if you just called
- me up or talked to me. Then you could have come in and done your
- work." [107]
-
- 7. QUESTIONABLE GROUNDS FOR A PARAMILITARY RAID
-
- Former New York City Police commissioner Benjamin Ward said of the
- BATF's February 28th raid on Mount Carmel, "They did it backwards. The
- accepted way is to talk first and shoot second." [108] Dr. Robert
- Cancro, one of the outside experts the Justice Department asked to
- review BATF and FBI's actions, wrote, "David Koresh asked why they did
- not serve him the warrant directly rather than through an armed
- assault. . .The issue is why was this not considered and evaluated
- more thoroughly and with adequate behavioral input." (JDR:Cancro:2)
-
- One explanation is BATF's negative attitude towards what Time called
- "determined and fanatical groups." BATF spokesperson Jack Killorin
- declared, "We've gone about them in a number of different ways--ruse,
- ambush, siege and talk. In almost every one we lose law enforcement
- officers." [109] That BATF had no intention of allowing Koresh to
- cooperate is evidenced by Aguilera's rejection of Koresh's invitation,
- via gun dealer Henry McMahon, to look at his guns. Also, Marc Breault
- writes in his book that in December, 1992, Aguilera told him "that he
- felt Vernon was a lunatic and needed to be put away." [110]
-
- The Treasury report admits that BATF planners decided immediately that
- their only options were a siege (surrounding Mount Carmel until
- residents surrendered) or a "dynamic entry" or paramilitary raid.
- (TDR:38-43) Below are the highly questionable reasons BATF rejected
- both a simple search and a more complicated but less dangerous siege
- and went forth with a paramilitary raid by 76 heavily armed agents.
-
- a. Paramilitary Raids Are Preferred BATF Modus Operandi
-
- As BATF Director Stephen Higgins told the House Judiciary Committee,
- BATF "Special Response Teams" (SRTs) had made hundreds of similar
- "activations" during the last several years. Such "dynamic entry"
- raids--armed agents busting down doors and otherwise smashing into
- unsuspecting individuals' homes and businesses with barely a moment's
- notice of "search warrant"--are clearly BATF's preferred modus
- operandi. The Gun Owners of America video tape Koresh showed Agent
- Rodriguez criticized these Gestapo- like tactics.
-
- Two BATF top planners were noted for their raid and siege experience.
- Dallas Special Agent-in-Charge Ted Royster had led many high profile
- raids, including the destructive and controversial raid on John
- Lawmaster's home. [111] And William Buford, Resident Agent-in- Charge
- of the Little Rock BATF office, had planned and participated in the
- 1985 siege of the white supremacist group "The Arm and Covenant of the
- Sword." (TDR:38) SAC Chuck Sarabyn, who would become co-commander of
- the February 28th raid, may have favored such a raid because it would
- be the first opportunity to test the "National Response Plan" which he
- had "played a significant role in drafting." This would also be only
- the fifth time more than one Special Response Team had been used in an
- operation. (TDR:62) BATF grandiosely named the operation "Operation
- Trojan Horse," because the agents were to be hidden in cattle
- trailers. (TDR:Appendix B:40)
-
- b. Cult Busters Advised Against Simple Search
-
- Considering BATF's bias in favor of paramilitary raids, it is easy to
- understand why BATF investigators Davy Aguilera and Bill Buford
- accepted so uncritically cult buster "scare stories," which reinforced
- their commitment to such a raid. Marc Breault writes in his diary
- entry of January 8, 1993, that "ATF" asked him, "If Vernon received a
- summons to answer questions regarding firearms, would he show up?"
- Breault answered, "No way." ATF asked, "If the good guys came with a
- search warrant, would Vernon allow it?" Breault answered, "If Vernon
- were not expecting it, no. If Vernon had prior warning, yes. He'd have
- time to shift all the firearms. . .There is a considerable amount of
- danger because Vernon feels that since he is Jesus Christ, he has
- already died. Therefore he can skip that phase of things. Since he
- does not have to die, there is no resurrection and therefore he may
- well feel he can start shooting beforehand." [112]
-
- Breault similarly had informed the U.S. Embassy in Australia in
- February, 1992, that "there would be a shootout with authorities if
- they attempt to enter the cult's Waco property to take away any of the
- children now living there, or investigate living conditions." [113]
- This had not happened when social workers and local sheriffs visited
- Mount Carmel, yet BATF heeded Breault's questionable advice.
- Doubtless, Rick Ross also was telling BATF investigators what he told
- the Waco Tribune-Herald--that Koresh was violent and dangerous.
-
- The "deprogrammed" David Block told agents that he "left the cult
- group because (Koresh) would always remind them that if they were to
- have a confrontation with the local or federal authorities, that the
- group should be ready to fight and resist." The Treasury report
- admits, however, "as far as former cult members knew, Koresh had not
- specifically trained his followers to repulse law enforcement officers
- or other visitors perceived to be hostile." (TDR:45)
-
- This cult buster-induced belief that Koresh would not cooperate was
- communicated all the way to the top. Chief of Public Relations Jack
- Killorin claimed after the raid that Koresh was "sworn to resistance"
- and it was only prudent to have firepower. [114] And David C. Troy,
- chief of BATF's intelligence division, told a House Ways and Means
- subcommittee: "Once we had probable cause (to arrest him), he was so
- kinked up over government. . .that he would not come off the compound.
- . .And the people behind Vernon Howell (Koresh's birth name) were just
- as violent." [115]
-
- c. Cult Buster Mass Suicide Scare Stories
-
- The Treasury report mentions a legitimate reason for not implementing
- a siege--the Branch Davidians might destroy evidence. However, it goes
- into greater detail about a more questionable reason--former Branch
- Davidians' concerns about the possibility of mass suicide should the
- government attempt a siege. Not surprisingly, Marc Breault promoted
- this idea "most forcefully." (TDR:46) In fact, the Treasury report
- admits, "The planners ultimately rejected the siege option mainly
- because the intelligence obtained in January from former cult members.
- . .Most significantly, they noted the distinct danger that Koresh
- would respond to a siege by leading his followers in mass suicide."
- (TDR:141) Doubtless, Rick Ross promoted his "Jim Jones" comparison.
-
- d. Shoddy Intelligence
-
- BATF planners decided they could only consider a siege if Koresh was
- arrested away from Mount Carmel when he was out jogging or in town.
- Agents believed that without Koresh's leadership, the other members
- would offer little resistance to a BATF search of Mount Carmel. The
- Treasury report admits agents received inaccurate information from
- social worker Joyce Sparks and undercover agent Robert Rodriguez that
- Koresh rarely left Mount Carmel. It also admits that the agents at the
- undercover house could not identify who left and entered by
- automobile. (TDR:136-140) Only after the raid did BATF receive
- information that Koresh had left Mount Carmel a number of times during
- December, January and February, 1993. BATF did attempt to convince
- Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services to summon
- Koresh to town for a meeting so that BATF could arrest him, but they
- refused to become involved. BATF also tried obtain a Texas arrest
- warrant for Koresh for sexual activities with a young girl, but that
- fell through when the girl refused to testify. (TDR:64)
-
- e. Publicity Stunt to Bolster BATF's Image
-
- In early 1993, BATF was a beleaguered agency. Ronald Reagan and others
- had been calling for its abolition since the early 1980s. A newly
- elected liberal Democrat just might try to do it. The Waco
- Tribune-Herald was calling to find out why BATF wasn't doing something
- about the Branch Davidians weapons build up. And in mid-November,
- 1992, CBS's "60 Minutes" contacted BATF about an upcoming expose
- about female BATF agents who charged routine sexual harassment and
- even attempted rape. The expose, which aired January 10, 1993,
- included damning statements by BATF agents. Agent Bob Hoffman
- exclaimed, "the people I put in jail have more honor than the top
- administration in this organization." Agent Lou Tomasell said, "I took
- an oath. And the thing I find abhorrent and disgusting is that these
- higher-level people took that same oath and they violate the basic
- principles and tenets of the constitution and the laws and simple
- ethics and morality." A few weeks later, 15 black agents accused the
- agency of discrimination in hiring and promotion. [116]
-
- Facing Congressional appropriations hearings on March 10, 1993, BATF
- leadership may have felt it needed some good publicity to illustrate
- its effectiveness, something like the sight of BATF agents arresting
- dozens of religious fanatics and displaying a big weapons cache. Any
- later story that the guns were found to be legal and that charges had
- been dropped would never go beyond the local papers. Mike Wallace
- reran this January episode May 23, 1993, and declared, "Almost all the
- agents we talked to said that they believe the initial attack on that
- cult in Waco was a publicity stunt--the main goal of which was to
- improve the ATF's tarnished image."
-
- During the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearings
- lawmakers grilled BATF Public Information Officer Sharon Wheeler to
- determine if BATF Washington or local offices had been concerned with
- "the BATF image and whether or not this operation would impact on that
- image?" (Committee members did not ask the same question of Wheeler's
- superior David Troy, who was also at the hearing.) Wheeler denied two
- reporters' contentions that when she called them for weekend phone
- numbers she had told them, "we have something big going down" on
- Sunday. She also asserted that she was told not to send out a press
- release "until we knew if there was significant things found in the
- compound, you know, evidence of violations." [117] The Treasury report
- contends it was not BATF, but a private ambulance driver who tipped
- off the local television station KWTX. Their cameraman inadvertently
- tipped off a Branch Davidian to the impending raid. (TDR:159)
-
- f. Desire to Punish BATF Critic
-
- Aguilera's February 25th affidavit asserts: "David Koresh stated that
- the Bible gave him the right to bear arms" and then showed undercover
- agent Robert Rodriguez a video tape which "portrayed ATF as an agency
- who violated the rights of gun owners by threats and lies." During the
- January, 1992 interview with Martin King for the Australian television
- program "Current Affair," Koresh gave his opinion about guns: "This is
- not Europe, not where a country overthrows a bunch of people, takes
- away their weapons so the people cannot argue any issues. Guns are the
- right of Americans to have. Yeah, we've got a gun here and there. Most
- of the guns were sold. A lot of people say: `He's got guns, that makes
- him bad, that makes him a cult.'" When asked if he would use a gun if
- "someone" trespassed, Koresh answered, "They come in here with a gun
- and they start shooting at us, what would you do?. . .Our constitution
- states every citizen in American has the right to rebuttal the
- government. Guns? Yes, we have guns." [118]
-
- It may well be that the Branch Davidians perceived "secessionist"
- tendencies disturbed BATF--and later the FBI. Sheriff Harwell said,
- "They were like living in another little country out there. They had
- their property line and they were basically good people. All of `em
- were good people. . .I don't know about Vernon Howell. I think he
- really believed he was what he told everybody he was, and I think he
- was probably sincere in everything that he taught. But the other thing
- that he did was to teach the philosophy that once anyone crossed that
- property line out there it would be just like someone invading the
- United States." [119] Columnist Joseph Sobran wrote: "We are already
- being told how threatening David Koresh is to society at large, when
- apparently all he ever wanted to do was to secede from it. And this, I
- think, is the real nature of a cult: its desire to withdraw. Even
- before its physical isolation, it has rejected the moral and cognitive
- authority of the larger society. This disturbs everyone who feels
- wholly at home in that society and dependent on it." [120]
-
- 8. GOVERNMENT MULTI-TASK FORCE MAKES FOR "PARTNERS IN CRIME"
-
- The Treasury report describes the "multi-task force" of federal, state
- and local authorities used to carry out the BATF's February 28th raid.
- While BATF agents from three Special Response Teams carried out the
- actual raid, support was provided by the National Guard, Texas
- Department of Public Service employees, including the Texas Rangers,
- and the McLennan County Sheriff's Department. (TDR:79) At the June 9,
- 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearings, BATF Associate
- Director Hartnett explained that a Drug Enforcement Agency team was on
- hand to disassemble any methamphetamine laboratory which might be
- found, something not mentioned in the Treasury report. He also said
- that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S Marshals
- Service were involved. [121]
-
- The problem with such federal, state and local "multi-task forces" is
- that they make all participants defacto "partners in crime," should
- crimes be committed against citizens--especially if federal agents
- commit the crimes. National legislation and federal funding for state
- and local law enforcement ensure that many state and local authorities
- may not be very aggressive in preventing or investigating federal
- crimes against citizens.
-
- The Treasury report states, "The Texas Rangers (were) deputized as
- U.S. Marshals for the criminal investigation and prosecution." (TDR:7)
- and "opened a formal homicide investigation" of the murder of federal
- agents by Branch Davidians. (TDR:116). (According to a Texas Rangers
- public affairs representative, they were deputized by the U.S.
- Attorney's office in Waco, Texas.) As we shall see, BATF and FBI
- interfered with Texas Rangers' attempts to conduct a complete and
- impartial investigation. After the fire, several Texas residents tried
- to file formal complaints with the Texas Rangers regarding what they
- believed to be the FBI murder of the Branch Davidians. Texas Rangers
- and a representative of the Texas Attorney General told them that
- since all Texas Rangers investigators were deputized as U.S. Marshals,
- there was nothing that the state of Texas could do. [122]
-
- 9. DUBIOUS DRUG ALLEGATIONS TO OBTAIN HELICOPTERS FREE
-
- The 1878 posse comitatus law, Section 1385 of the U.S. code, states
- U.S. military forces and state national guards cannot be used as
- police forces against civilians. However, courts have given law
- enforcement wide leeway in using military and national guard equipment
- and facilities. As BATF Associate Director Hartnett told Congress, "We
- use the military all the time for support with reimbursement." [123]
- More recent modifications of the posse comitatus law (32 U.S.C. =15112
- and 10 U.S.C. =15371) allow the military and national guard to provide
- "non-reimbursable" (i.e., free) support to civilian law enforcement if
- they are engaged in counter-drug operations.
-
- The Treasury report states BATF wanted to use military training
- facilities and equipment at Fort Hood, and Texas National Guard aerial
- reconnaissance before, and diversionary helicopters during, the raid.
- "However, in the absence of a drug nexus, ATF was told by both the
- U.S. military and the National Guard that the assistance would be
- reimbursable." (TDR:213) To get that free assistance, BATF constructed
- drug allegations from extremely shaky and dated evidence.
-
- Marc Breault had told BATF that Koresh claimed that after he took over
- Mount Carmel from George Roden, "he had found methamphetamine
- manufacturing facilities and recipes on the premises." Koresh told
- Breault he had asked the local Sheriff to take them away, but the
- Sheriff had no record of doing so. (TDR:30) Breault never alleged
- having seen such a lab in his years at Mount Carmel. Undercover agent
- Robert Rodriguez told BATF, "Koresh had told him that the Compound
- would be a great place for a methamphetamine laboratory because of its
- location." Also, one Branch Davidian had a "prior conviction for
- possession of amphetamines and a controlled substance" and 10 others
- had been either arrested or investigated for drug violations in the
- past. (TDR:212)
-
- However, as revealed to Congress, BATF admitted it knew the identity
- of the individuals most likely responsible for building this lab.
- "Roden allowed others to stay on the property and pay rent. Convicted
- narcotics trafficker Donny Joe Harvey and his associate, Roy Lee
- Wells, Jr., were verified by the McLennan County Sheriffs Department
- as residing at the compound. Both Harvey and Wells are incarcerated."
- BATF also admitted that it knew the last Branch Davidian to be
- convicted on drug charges was Brad Branch, back in 1983. [124]
- Finally, the statement Koresh allegedly made to the agent may well
- have been made within the context of George Roden tenants' former
- activities.
-
- On the basis of this shaky information, Army Lieutenant Colonel
- Walker, who advised BATF on obtaining "training or equipment or
- support in a counter-drug operation," recommended BATF solicit Texas
- National Guard services. [125] BATF convinced the Texas National Guard
- to do two overflights of the buildings to look for "hot spots" that
- might indicate drug laboratory activity. A hot spot was found but,
- since it could indicate construction, cooking or other activities
- requiring heat, "no official interpretation of the `hot spot'" was
- provided. (TDR:213)
-
- Given this dubious evidence, it is not surprising that in the month
- after the raid, BATF denied to reporters that it had used allegations
- of a drug laboratory to obtain the helicopters. After press reports
- that BATF had obtained the helicopters under "false pretenses" angered
- Texas Governor Ann Richards, Hartnett sent her a March 27, 1993 memo
- to assure her that there had been sufficient evidence to invoke the
- drug "nexus" exception to the posse comitatus law and obtain free use
- of Texas National Guard helicopters.
-
- 10. CHRONOLOGY OF FEBRUARY 28, 1993 BATF RAID
-
- @ This chronology has been assembled largely from Appendix D of the
- Treasury Department report on Waco, other parts of the report and the
- February 28, 1993 "911" audio tapes.
-
- 7:30 am--BATF convoy arrives at Bellmead civic center.
-
- 7:45--KWTX television reporter and cameraman arrive nearby Mount
- Carmel.
-
- 8:00--Undercover agent Robert Rodriguez enters Mount Carmel for Bible
- study. --Raid Commander Chuck Sarabyn briefs ATF convoy at Bellmead
- Civic Center.
-
- 8:30--KWTX cameraman warns postman David Jones, a Branch Davidian,
- that a "shootout" is about to occur. Jones returns to Mount Carmel and
- warns Koresh.
-
- 8:45--Three Waco Tribune-Herald cars arrive nearby Mount Carmel.
-
- 9:05--Rodriguez leaves Mount Carmel, hurries to undercover house
- across the street, calls raid, Commander Sarabyn and tells him that
- Koresh knows BATF and National Guard are coming. Commanders Sarabyn
- and Philip Chojnacki and SAC Ted Royster decide to go ahead with raid.
-
-
- 9:10--Chojnacki calls BATF National Command Center in Washington and
- informs them operation is a go.
-
- 9:25--Sarabyn arrives at Bellmead, announces operation is to proceed,
- tells agents "Hurry. They know we're coming." ATF agents board cattle
- trailers.
-
- 9:29--Helicopters carrying Chojnacki and Royster are on the way to
- Mount Carmel to create a "diversion."
-
- 9:30--A long convoy of cars, vans and 3 cattle trailers heads towards
- Mount Carmel.
-
- 9:45--Cattle trailers enter drive way of Mount Carmel, followed by
- KWTX television vehicle.
-
- 9:47--Sarabyn and Chojnacki end cellular telephone contact. --Raid
- begins; helicopters and agents "taken under fire". --KWTX video crew
- takes cover behind bus.
-
- 9:48--Wayne Martin calls 911 to report 75 armed men are attacking
- Mount Carmel. "Attempts continue (19 times) to reach ATF. Contact is
- finally established via TSTC Patrolman `197' at 10:20 am."
-
- 9:55--Associate Director Hartnett and Director Higgins are informed
- agents are under fire.
-
- 10:03--911 Lieutenant Lynch calls back Mount Carmel after
- disconnection and talks continue. Martin complains about shooting from
- helicopters.
-
- 10:20--911 finally contacts ATF and Lieutenant Lynch helps Chojnacki
- and Royster negotiate cease fire.
-
- 10:34--Koresh calls 911, soon disconnects.
-
- 10:42--Koresh calls 911 again, soon disconnects.
-
- 10:46--Schneider and Koresh call 911 and discuss cease fire.
-
- 10:49--911 call disconnects. Lynch gives Koresh's cellular phone
- number to Royster who passes it to agent Cavanaugh at the undercover
- house.*
-
- 10:59--Lynch negotiates with Martin and Schneider on one line and
- Chojnacki and Royster on the other.
-
- 11:27--Cavanaugh finds telephone number on undercover house
- refrigerator door and calls into Mount Carmel and continues
- negotiations.*
-
- 11:30--Hartnett unilaterally requests FBI Hostage Rescue Team support.
-
-
- 11:39--Agents move in to pick up wounded and dead agents.
-
- 11:54--Ambulance moves in to pick up agents.
-
- 12:45pm Approx.--ATF agents physically assault KWTX cameraman taking
- pictures of dead agents.
-
- 12:37--Lynch gives Schneider Cavanaugh's phone number and direct
- contact is established.* Mid-afternoon--Branch Davidian Donald Bunds
- arrested as tries to return to Mount Carmel by car.
-
- 4:55--Agents fire on three Branch Davidians trying to re- enter Mount
- Carmel, Michael Schroeder killed, Delroy Nash arrested, Bob Kendrick
- escapes.
-
- 4:00-12:00--David Koresh gives KRLD and CNN radio interviews and tape
- of his sermon is played several times over KRLD. Four children leave
- Mount Carmel.
-
- 5:30--FBI Special Agent-in-Charge Jeffrey Jamar arrives at command
- post. --Royster holds first press conference.
-
- 10:00pm--Hartnett and FBI Hostage Rescue Team arrive via FBI HRT
- plane. FBI takes charge at 10:00 am March 1, 1993.@@* Seeming
- conflicts occur between accounts in Treasury report text and
- Chronology in Appendix D.
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- Diagram and Drawing from Treasury Department Report - Not to Scale
- Drawing includes undercover house, the lake, Mount Carmel Center and
- hay barn. Altered to include concrete room, water tower, buried bus,
- missing room names.
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- 11. BATF USED EXCESSIVE FORCE TO SERVE WARRANT
-
- BATF's executing search and arrest warrants upon the Branch Davidians
- with 76 heavily armed agents utilizing a plan which provided no
- opportunity for the Branch Davidians to cooperate peacefully by itself
- constituted an excessive use of force. As we shall discuss in the
- section on the Branch Davidians' defense, their attorneys can make a
- strong argument that BATF's excessive use of force alone gave the
- Branch Davidians the legal right to shoot back in self- defense.
-
- a. Excessive Numbers of Agents and Weapons
-
- During the June 9 House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, BATF
- Chief of Special Operations Richard L. Garner described the arms
- carried by 76 agents: every agent had a Sig Sauer 9mm semiautomatic
- pistol; 27 agents carried tactical carbine MP-5 9mm semiautomatics;
- snipers were equipped with .308 caliber high power sniper rifles;
- agents also carried 8 AR-15s and 12 shotguns. [126] Agents also
- carried "flash bang" percussion grenades. 9mm rounds in submachine
- guns are highly-penetrating rounds available only to law-enforcement
- special operations teams and the military, and are specifically
- designed to cut through body armor. James L. Pate alleges that it was
- not humanitarian concerns or negotiations that ended the hour- long
- assault, but the fact that agents ran out of ammunition. They had only
- 40 rounds left when they finally backed off. [127]
-
- b. Evidence BATF Did Not Properly Serve Warrants
-
- Nothing in Aguilera's affidavit indicated that Koresh or his followers
- would use force to resist service of search and arrest warrants. Nor
- did the Magistrate give the necessary explicit permission for such a
- "no knock" warrant which would permit agents to bypass giving notice
- that they were serving a search warrant. Title 18, U.S.C. 3109 states
- that an officer must give notice of his legal authority and purpose
- before attempting to enter the premises. Only if an officer is refused
- entry is it legal for him or her to use force to gain entry.
-
- Before the trial there was much suspicion that BATF never properly
- served the warrants. BATF spokesperson Jack Killorin told USA Today,
- "We needed 60 seconds of them not being prepared and we would have
- neutralized the compound and gotten the children out." [128] However,
- 60 seconds is barely time for an agent to walk to the front door of a
- large building, knock, wait for an adult to answer the door and
- formally announce that he was there to serve a search warrant. What
- BATF had planned was more like a military search and destroy mission
- than any constitutional effort. News reports describe an armed attack.
- "According to witnesses, federal agents hid in livestock trailers as
- they drove up to the compound. As three National Guard helicopters
- approached, the 100 law officers stormed the main home, throwing
- concussion grenades and screaming `Come out!' For a moment, there was
- no response. Then the shooting began. `It was a large barrage of
- gunfire from several places in the house at once,' said Dan Mulloney,
- a KWTX-TV news photographer who followed the agents onto the
- compound." [129] Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin asserted Branch
- Davidians alleged, "these two cattle trailers roar up, and people
- start screaming out of the back of them, screaming at the tops of
- their lungs, not anything like, `This is a search' or `We're agents'
- or `Put up your hands' or anything like that. It was just screaming,
- yelling, like Marines storming the beach." [130] An FBI spokesman
- explained to a reporter why BATF agents would not have identified
- themselves, "you don't want to give these guys a chance to get their
- guns. In Waco, there was no announcement of who was there and the fact
- they're there for the lawful purpose of executing a warrant." [131] It
- is obvious from Koresh's 911 conversation that even though he had
- heard it was BATF that was about to raid him, and even though he
- answered the front door himself, a half hour after the raid he was
- still confused about who was attacking him and why. He told Lieutenant
- Larry Lynch of the Sheriff's office, alluding to past talks with the
- office, "We told you we wanted to talk. No. How come you guys try to
- be ATF agents?"
-
- On the fourth day of the trial BATF Special Agent Roland Ballesteros,
- the first to arrive at the front door, took the stand for six hours.
- Ballesteros acknowledged that BATF planners had never had a plan for
- peacefully serving the search and arrest warrants. He said no agent
- had been designated to announce the purpose of the raid. "Basically,
- we all announced. We practiced knocking, announcing, and then going
- through the front door." Asked if he ever rehearsed a peacefully
- entry, he answered, "No, we did not." Ballesteros was armed with a 12
- gauge shotgun, 9mm pistol, and a 38 caliber handgun. He and two other
- agents were also armed with a battering ram.
-
- Ballesteros testified he saw Koresh in the doorway, and yelled,
- "Police, lay down!" He said Koresh answered, "What's going on?" He
- yelled back, "Search warrant, lay down." However, defense attorneys
- pointed out that this was the first time he had mentioned seeing
- Koresh in the door or announcing he was serving a search warrant.
- During his February 28, 1993 interview with the Waco police, his March
- 10th interview with the Texas Rangers, and a September 30th pre-trial
- hearing, he did not mention these facts. Ballesteros testified he had
- changed his story because during earlier testimony pain killers from a
- wound he suffered during the raid had dulled his memory.
-
- What "jogged" Ballesteros' memory was a meeting with U.S. Customs
- agents who interviewed him as part of the Treasury Department's review
- of the raid. As a result of this interview, "He changed that version
- of the incidents. . .His Tuesday account of the early minutes of the
- bloody raid agreed with the account he gave customs agents." [132]
- Considering that the Treasury Department was interested in exonerating
- BATF, it seems likely that U.S. Customs agents "helped" Ballesteros
- remember a version more consistent with the Treasury Department's
- version of events. Two days later another BATF agent, Robert Champion,
- testified that agents had identified themselves as police with a
- search warrant--something he also did not tell Texas Rangers in March.
- When questioned by defense attorneys, Champion said the Texas Rangers
- had not specifically queried him about that issue. [133] Branch
- Davidians and their attorneys see Ballesteros and Champion's new
- testimony as one more example of a massive government coverup.
-
- 12. ALLEGATIONS BATF AGENTS SHOT FIRST
-
- The Treasury report describes a slightly different version of events
- than Ballesteros' version: "Koresh appeared at the front door and
- yelled, `What's going on?' The agents identified themselves, stated
- they had a warrant and yelled `freeze' and `get down.' But Koresh
- slammed the door before agents could reach it. Gunfire from inside the
- Compound burst through the door. The force of the gunfire was so great
- that the door bowed outward." (TDR:96) Branch Davidians tell the
- opposite story: Koresh told BATF he wanted to talk and agents started
- shooting at him, hitting the front door. (Note that the front door was
- actually a set of two doors, not a single door.)
-
- a. Agents Expected A "Shootout"
-
- The Branch Davidians learned of the impending raid when KWTX camera
- man James Peeler asked directions of Branch Davidian David Jones, who
- was driving his mailman's truck. (Something which would BATF would not
- reveal to the public until six months after the raid.) Two slightly
- different versions of what Jones told Dick DeGuerin about the incident
- confirm the idea that agents were actually expecting a shootout.
- According to a news account, DeGuerin said Peeler told Jones, "Well,
- you better get out of here because there's a National Guard helicopter
- over at TSTC and they're going to have a big shootout with the
- religious nuts." [134] According to the Treasury report, Jones told
- DeGuerin that Peeler told him there were going to be "60 to 70 TABC
- (Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission) guys in helicopters and a
- shoot-out would occur." (TDR:85) Since KWTX's initial information came
- from a private ambulance driver working with BATF (TDR:189), BATF
- agents' expectations of a shoot-out were indirectly transmitted to the
- Branch Davidians.
-
- Moreover, the morning of the raid, many agents read the Waco
- Herald-Tribune's February 27th story about the Branch Davidians and
- raid co-commander Chuck Sarabyn discussed the article with them during
- a briefing. (TDR:82) The story was filled with cult buster accusations
- that the Branch Davidians were dangerous fanatics. Finally, at the
- trial, BATF agent Ballesteros admitted that BATF agents had been
- briefed that they would encounter 20 to 30 or more "Mighty Men." He
- said, "We anticipated we would be met with force." [135]
-
- b. Over Sixty Agents Knew Branch Davidians Were Warned of Raid
-
- After Jones discovered that a raid was imminent, he rushed back to
- Mount Carmel and told Koresh. Koresh then told Rodriguez that he knew
- "ATF and National Guard" were coming and Rodriguez hurried across the
- street and called raid co-commander Chuck Sarabyn. After consulting
- with co-commander Philip Chojnacki, Sarabyn decided to go forward with
- the raid anyway and dashed out to the staging area shouting, "Get
- ready to go, they know we're coming!" and "Koresh knows the ATF and
- National Guard are coming!" (TDR:91) "Over sixty agents who heard
- Sarabyn on the day have since recounted" they heard him given these
- warnings. (TDR:195) On top of the propaganda they had absorbed about
- the Branch Davidians' alleged ferocity, this information must have
- unnerved many agents.
-
- c. Agents Confused by Poor Planning
-
- Besides expectations of a "shootout" and knowledge that the Branch
- Davidians knew they were coming, obvious flaws in the planning may
- have heightened agents' anxiety. According to the Treasury report,
- there had never been a contingency plan for bad weather, the loss of
- surprise, armed resistance or retreat. The commanders of the raid were
- in a helicopter and a cattle truck where they could not communicate
- effectively with agents. Two-way radio communications quickly broke
- down between agents. (TDR:143-156) The Houston Post wrote, "Unless you
- have a very disciplined group, you can expect all hell to break loose
- once any shot is fired; and according to Charles Beckwith, a retired
- Army colonel and founder of the military's anti-terrorist Delta Force,
- the ATF's raid was `very amateur.'" [136]
-
- d. Branch Davidians Did Not Use "Tactical Advantage"
-
- Despite an excellent opportunity to shoot at oncoming
- vehicles--perched as they were in a large building on a hill with an
- excellent view of all oncoming vehicles-- the Branch Davidians did not
- do so. Justice Department outside expert Alan A. Stone commented, "The
- BATF investigation reports that the so-called `dynamic entry' turned
- into what is described as being `ambushed'. As I tried to get a sense
- of the state of mind and behavior of the people in the compound the
- idea that the Branch Davidians' actions were considered an `ambush'
- troubled me. If they were militants determined to ambush and kill as
- many ATF agents as possible, it seemed to me that given their
- firepower, the devastation would have been even worse. . .The ATF
- agents brought to the compound in cattle cars could have been cattle
- going to slaughter if the Branch Davidians had taken full advantage of
- their tactical superiority." (JDR:Stone:18-19)
-
- Agent Ballesteros testified that BATF was "ambushed" because the
- Branch Davidians didn't shoot at them until they were up close to the
- compound. Needless to say, this is a rather nefarious way of
- describing what was more likely their prudently waiting to see if
- BATF's intentions were violent. Defense attorney Dan Cogdell dismissed
- the theory BATF was "ambushed" by dozens of heavily armed Davidians.
- "If there were 46 individuals that used fully automatic weapons we
- wouldn't have four agents dead, we'd have 100 dead," said Dan Cogdell
- [137] In fact, "another Branch Davidian survivor who asked not to be
- named acknowledged that some people inside began to return fire:
- `People were running around everywhere, asking if anybody had any
- guns. Nobody had any handy. Most of what we had was new, still in the
- box.'" [138]
-
- e. David Koresh's Allegations
-
- On the evening of the February 28 raid Koresh described the first
- shots to a KRLD radio reporter: "I begged these men to go away. I had
- wives and I had children. But they didn't listen. . .They came out. I
- was at the front door. I had the front door open so they could clearly
- see me. And then what happened was, I told them, I said `Get back.
- There's women and children here. Get back. I want to talk.' and all of
- the sudden 9mm rounds started firing at the front wall." The reporter
- asked, "Was that when you got wounded?" Koresh answered, "No. They hit
- the metal doors which deflected them. I had my face out where they
- could see me. And then I moved back and all of a sudden the guy
- started firing." That evening Koresh told CNN, "They fired on us
- first. Like I said, they were scared."
-
- Deceased Branch Davidian Steve Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman
- says of Koresh's version, "That was confirmed by a number of people
- who heard him say that" and that ATF's version "is a lie." [139] One
- evidence of this is that just 15 minutes after the raid began, Wayne
- Martin told 911 Sheriff's Deputy Larry Lynch, "I have a right to
- defend myself. They started firing first." According to a news report,
- "On his way to a court hearing Wednesday, cult member Livingston
- Fagan, who left the compound Tuesday, told reporters ATF agents fired
- the first shots--a charge the ATF has denied." [140]
-
- f. Agent Ballesteros' Previous Allegations BATF Shot First
-
- In earlier testimony to Waco police and Texas Rangers Agent
- Ballesteros said he thought that agents shooting at the Branch
- Davidians' dogs fired the first shot. At the trial, he changed his
- story and testified that the Branch Davidians did so, shooting through
- the front door. Again, he blamed medication for impairing his memory.
- [141] (The only non-agent to testify that the Branch Davidians shot
- first was Waco Tribune-Herald reporter Marc Masferrer, who was about
- 300 yards away at the time. He testified that he thought the first
- shots came from inside the building. A defense attorney commented, "At
- that distance, those people would look like ants." [142] )
-
- g. Photos of Agents Firing Before Bullet Holes Appear in Front Door
-
- Waco Tribune-Herald photos introduced at the trial show agents firing
- before any holes can be seen in the front door. [143] This certainly
- contradicts BATF agents' story that the Branch Davidians fired first,
- out through the front door and that "the force of the gunfire was so
- great that the door bowed outward," as the Treasury report puts it.
-
- h. Evidence Gun Shots Were Fired Inward through the Front Door
-
- Contrary to BATF and Treasury assertions the Branch Davidians fired
- out through the door, Branch Davidians claim the first shots were
- fired at David Koresh and entered inward through the front door.
- Attorney Jack Zimmermann, who had an opportunity to examine the hollow
- metal front doors before the fire, stated that Branch Davidians would
- have fired out through windows, not the door. "What would cause that
- front door to be peppered with holes like that?" [144] The door was
- first rammed by tanks and then burned in the fire. Nevertheless, at
- the trial a Texas Ranger testified they did find one of the two front
- doors. One news report said the door was "crumpled, bullet-
- pocked"--but did not mention in which direction the bullets had
- entered. The Texas Ranger said "that while other doors and many metal
- objects had survived the fire, he believed that the missing door was
- destroyed in the intense heat." When asked if FBI or BATF agents had
- access to the site immediately after the fire, he answered, "I'm sure
- they were both out there." [145] The possibility that BATF or the FBI
- destroyed this evidence after the fire must be investigated.
-
- i. Unreleased BATF Video Tape
-
- Waco television station KWTX had not yet set up their camera when the
- first shots were fired. According to an Associated Press wire press
- story, "ATF associate director Conroy said a video tape taken from an
- ATF helicopter during the raid may help clarify the question of who
- fired the first shots in the deadly shootout that left four ATF agents
- and at least two cult members dead." Supposedly BATF was operating
- more than one video camera, but it has refused to release any tapes.
- [146]
-
- U.S. District Court Judge Walter A. Smith, Jr. ordered that all BATF
- audio and videotapes be persevered and presumably these will be
- released during the trial of the eleven Branch Davidians. [147]
- However, "the judge stopped short of ordering what the lawyers for
- Koresh and his lieutenant, Steve Schneider, had requested, which was
- that they be held by the court and not federal officials." [148]
- (Judge Smith is the judge who will be presiding over the Branch
- Davidian trial.) If the government does not release these tapes during
- the trial, attorney's for Branch Davidians suing the government may
- subpoena them, or other individuals may seek to obtain them under the
- Freedom of Information Act.
-
- j. Audio Analysis from Video Tapes
-
- Even if video cameras were not focused on the scene of the first shots
- as they were fired, the audio portion of the videotapes can still
- provide valuable information, such as, who shot first, whether a
- "flash-bang" grenade was thrown through a window, and whether there
- was shooting from helicopters. Because the audio comes from video
- tapes, the exact location from which the recordings were made will be
- easy to gauge and therefore the exact "geometry" of many of the echoes
- will be ascertainable with great accuracy. The sounds of shooting from
- inside the building, as opposed to from outside it, will be
- significantly different and provide useful evidence. Today
- IBM-compatible sound-analysis software is available which will allow
- anyone to do such analysis with great precision. [149]
-
- k. Law Enforcement Allegations
-
- James L. Pate writes that two law enforcement sources confirmed to him
- that BATF shot first, Texas Ranger "sources," and "federal law
- enforcement sources." The latter said that a BATF agent had an
- accidental discharge as he got out of the cattle trailers in front of
- Mount Carmel. He wounded himself in the leg and cried out, "I'm hit!"
- Everyone then opened fire, thinking it was a signal to initiate fire.
- Pate also states that Steve Willis, one of the BATF agents killed in
- the raid, was assigned to "take out" Koresh if necessary and did fire
- an MP5 SD submachine gun at him from the passenger side of the lead
- pickup truck. [150] While this story may sound far fetched, it is
- certainly one of many allegations that must be explored by an
- independent investigator.
-
- 13. ALLEGATIONS AGENTS SHOT INDISCRIMINATELY AND FROM HELICOPTERS.
-
- The Treasury report states that BATF agents "returned fire when
- possible, but conserved their ammunition. They also fired only when
- they saw an individual engage in a threatening action, such as
- pointing a weapon." (TDR:101) However, Branch Davidians claim BATF
- agents fired indiscriminately, including through walls, and that
- helicopters sprayed the building with bullets. News video tapes
- clearly show agents exercising little control over their firing as
- they fire over vehicles with little or no view of what they were
- shooting at. Both BATF Director Higgins at an April 2nd Congressional
- hearing and Treasury Secretary Bentsen during the September 1993
- Treasury Department press conference denied allegations that agent
- fired indiscriminately. [151] BATF may allege that any firing down
- through roofs was done by Branch Davidians firing from the building
- tower or from the water tower.
-
- a. Bullet Evidence in Doors, Walls and Roof
-
- Branch Davidians, and attorneys Dick DeGuerin and Jack Zimmerman who
- visited Mount Carmel during the siege, insist that there was extensive
- evidence that BATF agents shot indiscriminately through Mount Carmel
- Center's front door, walls and roof. They were very concerned with
- preserving this evidence of an out-of-control assault.
-
- The New York Times reported, "both lawyers clearly believed that
- helicopters flying over the compound during the raid had fired into
- upper floors of the main building from above." ATF Spokesperson Jerry
- Singer denied that the helicopters had flown over the compound or
- fired upon it. "The helicopters did not overfly the compound on Feb.
- 28 and I have no information that anyone fired from the helicopters."
- However, Jack Zimmerman stated, and Dick DeGuerin concurred, "an
- expert will be able to tell from the angle of the trajectory plus the
- pattern whether there are entry or exit holes. If it's in the ceiling
- and it's clearly an exit hole, it had to come from above. How else
- could it have come in?" [152] Except for half the front door, all this
- evidence was destroyed by the April 19 tank rammings, the fire, and
- the bulldozing of still burning walls into the rubble.
-
- b. Wayne Martin Allegations on 911 tape
-
- Wayne Martin and an unidentified Branch Davidian complain frantically
- to Lieutenant Lynch 15 minutes after the start of the raid about the
- continuing gun fire from BATF agents, even as they themselves withhold
- fire. Nearly continuous gunfire can be heard in the background of the
- tape.
-
- Martin: Another chopper with more people; more guns going off. They're
- firing. That's them, not us.
-
- Unidentified Davidian: There's a chopper with more of them. Lynch:
- What!?
-
- Davidian: Another chopper with more people and more guns going off.
- Here they come!
-
- Lynch: All right, Wayne, tell . . .
-
- Davidian: We're not firing. That's not us, that's them!
-
- Lynch: Okay. Tha . . . All right. Are you, are you ready to come out
- and give up? Are you ready to terminate this Wayne? Martin: We want to
- cease fire! We'll stop!
-
- Lynch: Standby. (he then tries to get in touch with BATF radio van.
- There is more sound of gunshots)
-
- Lynch: Sta . . . Who's firing now?
-
- Davidian: They are!
-
- Wayne: They are!
-
- Lynch: All right. Standby. I'm tryin' to reach 'em. Stand. Don't
- return fire, okay?
-
- Davidian: We haven't been.
-
- Lynch: What?
-
- Davidian: We haven't been. (sounds disgusted)
-
- During the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, an
- FBI agent gave a staff member an excerpted tape of the "911" calls
- between Lieutenant Larry Lynch and Branch Davidians David Koresh and
- Wayne Martin. [153] The tapes, which the Waco Police Department sells
- to the public, were edited into a 30 minute tape. The FBI claimed the
- tape was a "sampler of voice changes." Lawmakers were led to believe
- the tape was verbatim. However, Waco police said the tape gave a
- "false impression of how the events occurred." [154] If one compares
- the transcript of the tape in the hearing record to the Treasury
- Department's chronology, one finds that the section where Wayne Martin
- complains about helicopters shooting at him has been moved towards the
- end of the tape, which would have been well after the helicopters
- withdrew from the scene. This might be evidence that someone wanted to
- discredit Martin's claims and cover up BATF's illegal actions.
-
- c. Agents Shot from Undercover House
-
- The first days of the Branch Davidian trial confirmed what has been
- long suspected--that agents in the undercover house 300 yards from
- Mount Carmel were firing at the building. A Texas Ranger testified
- they had collected 40 used shell casings found in and around the
- undercover house. [155] The Texas Ranger also said that "friendly
- fire" could have struck the driver's door of one of the BATF pickup
- trucks that pulled cattle trailers on February 28th. [156]
-
- d. Catherine Matteson Allegation
-
- "I seen (sic) those trailers drive up. I was downstairs. I thought it
- strange, but I figured they were delivering firewood or something. I
- picked up the Sunday paper and went upstairs to my room, and started
- reading. When next, bullets came through the roof. I could hear the
- helicopters overhead, I got under my bed." [157]
-
- e. Children's Pictures of Bullets Through Roof
-
- A story about psychologist Bruce D. Perry's interviews with Branch
- Davidian children who left Mount Carmel after the raid mentions,
- "Still another child created a picture of a house beneath a rainbow.
- When Perry asked, `Is there anything else?' the child calmly added
- bullet holes in the roof. That was an allusion to the Feb. 28 shootout
- with federal agents that marked the beginning of a 51-day standoff and
- left the compound near Waco scarred with bullet holes." [158] A May
- 19, 1993 Newsweek story shows this picture with the caption, "A girl
- drew her home's dotted roof. `Bullets,' she said."
-
- f. Questions about Deaths of 6 Branch Davidians
-
- In opening statements on January 12, 1994, lead prosecutor U.S.
- Assistant Attorney Leroy Jahn said, "On February 28 the occupants of
- Mount Carmel (the cult compound) not only killed ATF, they killed
- their own. People who were too wounded to fight were put out of their
- misery." [159] Prosecutors are referring to the deaths of Peter
- Hipsman, Winston Blake and Koresh's father-in-law, Perry Jones. The
- Treasury report alleges Peter Hipsman received a number of allegedly
- non-fatal wounds and was "later killed by a cult member who shot him
- at close range in the back of his skull--an apparent mercy killing."
- (TDR:101) It alleges Winston Blake's death by a shot to the head from
- two to three feet was from a "cult member." (TDR:104) However, it
- describes no other wounds. Neither does it describe other wounds to
- Perry Jones, who it states committed suicide with one shot to the
- mouth. (TDR:101) However, Rita Riddle, who was at Mount Carmel during
- the BATF raid, stated Jones was shot in the stomach by bullets
- piercing the building walls. [160]
-
- If these individuals did commit suicide or were shot in mercy
- killings, it may have been because they believed that the BATF raid
- was in fact the beginning of a prophesized government massacre. They
- may have wanted to die quickly rather than suffer before being killed
- by the "Babylonians." BATF retains direct responsibility for their
- deaths.
-
- The Treasury report conflicts with statements by Branch Davidians that
- some dead members were not even armed at the time of the attack. Brad
- Bailey and Bob Darden write that the "official version"--which agents
- are not supposed to discuss--is that Peter Gent was carrying a gun on
- top of water tower, shot Steven Willis, and was then shot by a
- sniper--"possibly Rodriguez"--from the undercover house. They note
- that the government denies Gent was shot from a helicopter. [161]
- However, attorney Dick "DeGuerin recounted how witnesses reported Gent
- was working, unarmed, in the water tower. `He was scraping the sides
- of the tank. There was very little or no water in it. He heard all the
- noise, came up and stuck his head out to see what was going on and he
- was shot through the heard. He fell within the water tower onto a
- platform.'"
-
- Branch Davidians also claim Jaydean Wendell had just finished nursing
- her baby when a bullet shot from a helicopter came through the ceiling
- and penetrated her skull, killing her. [162] The New York Times
- repeated Rita Riddle's allegation a woman had been shot in her bed.
- [163] The Treasury report offers no explanation for Jaydean
- Wendell's death from a distant shot by agents. Michael Schroeder, who
- was trying to return to Mount Carmel the afternoon of February 28, was
- shot six times, several times in the back. (TDR:104) More details
- about all these deaths may emerge during the trial.
-
- 14. ALLEGATIONS FRIENDLY FIRE INJURED OR KILLED SOME AGENTS
-
- BATF Chief of Intelligence David Troy told the press that "in the
- first two minutes, 16 agents were injured and four were killed." [164]
- It is certainly possible that in those first minutes terrified agents
- firing wildly from the ground and from helicopters injured and killed
- some of their own. During the trial a defense attorney asserted agents
- firing from the undercover house could also have killed or wounded
- some agents. [165]
-
- a. Two Different BATF Versions of Where Two (or Three) Agents Died
-
- The Treasury report states two teams of agents climbed the roof to
- Koresh's second floor living quarters--a bedroom on the west side and
- allegedly an arms room on the east side. Agents Conway LeBleu and Todd
- McKeehan "were to enter Koresh's bedroom from the west side of the
- roof." (TDR:98) They were killed, but the report does not explain
- whether it was on the roof or inside the bedroom, who killed them,
- from what angle the bullets came, what kinds of guns killed them [166]
- and how their bodies were removed from the roof or room. During the
- trial BATF Agent Petrilli said that agents climbed to the roof and
- removed LeBleu and McKeehan's bodies from it. [167]
-
- The Treasury version of two agents killed near or in the bedroom is
- substantially different from the version BATF originally released,
- which held that three agents were killed in the arms room. [168] The
- report admits, "Contrary to some publicly disseminated reports, none
- of the agents that entered the armory were killed." (TDR:100) The fact
- that BATF changed its story has given rise to speculations BATF is
- trying to cover up that McKeehan and LeBleu were killed by friendly
- fire, either from helicopters, ground fire, or agents shooting from
- the roof into the armory. The choppily edited KWTX video tape [169] of
- the entry into the arms room shows an agent throwing a device into and
- then firing into the room after three agents enter. Some claim this
- firing really killed the two agents; some claim it killed all three in
- the arms room, as BATF originally told news reporters.
-
- However, the Treasury report claims that the agents threw the device
- into the window before entering and does not mention the agent firing
- into the room. "At the arms room, Agent Jordan managed to `break and
- rake' (i.e. break the window and clear glass shards) the window and
- Agent Buford threw a distraction device into the room. Buford,
- Constantino and Jordan entered. Inside, Agent Buford saw a person
- armed with an assault rifle backing out of a doorway in the far left
- corner of the room. That individual began firing into the room from
- the other side of the thin walls." Buford was shot twice in the upper
- thigh and Constantino provided cover as Buford and Jordan escaped the
- room. "As Constantino was deciding whether to hold his position or
- make a run for the window, a cult member entered the room aiming an
- assault rifle at him. He fired two or three shots at Constantino.
- Constantino returned fire and the man fell." (TDR:98-100) There is no
- mention of whether Constantino was in or out of the room when he shot.
-
- Some of this confusion was clarified on February 25, 1994 when Agent
- Constantino testified at the Branch Davidian trial. He said that a
- portion of the bullet removed from Agent Jordan was 9mm "hydroshock"
- bullet like his own and acknowledged "it's possible" he may have shot
- Jordan. He did not know if a ballistics test had been done to
- determine if the bullet was from his gun. [170] More investigation of
- this incident and a careful study of the full KWTX videotape of this
- incident remain necessary.
-
- b. "Federal Sources" Admit Evidence Exists
-
- The April 5, 1993 Newsweek reports, "A federal source involved in the
- Waco situation says that `there is evidence that supports the theory
- of friendly fire,' and that during the assault "there was a huge
- amount of cross- fire." [171] Another highly placed federal source
- told James L. Pate "about half of ATF casualties in the raid
- apparently resulted from `friendly fire'." [172]
-
- c. Agents Allege Friendly fire
-
- According to the New York Times, "One agent said that some people
- involved in the raid believed that some agents had been hit by
- so-called friendly fire, although the agent and others said they knew
- of no evidence to support that belief. The agency has strongly denied
- the possibility that any agents were wounded by other agents." [173]
- During January 25, 1994 trial testimony both Agents Constantino and
- later Agent Buford admitted that they suspected or had heard of
- friendly fire incidents. [174]
-
- 15. BATF INTIMIDATION OF THE PRESS
-
- BATF agents and officials were originally convinced that the press had
- purposely tipped off the Branch Davidians. They accused KWTX reporter
- John McLamore and cameraman Dan Mulloney of making a deal with the
- Branch Davidians that they would tip them off if they were allowed to
- hide in a tree and tape the raid. [175] Some BATF agents and families
- accused the publisher of Waco Herald-Tribune of being a "murderer" for
- running his series on the Branch Davidians, despite BATF requests to
- hold it off until after the raid. [176] Later they blamed Waco
- Tribune-Herald reporter Mark England because undercover agent
- Rodriguez heard a Branch Davidian tell Koresh "England" was on the
- phone just before he learned of the raid.
-
- On March 17, 1993, BATF agent John T. Risenhoover filed a lawsuit
- claiming that an unnamed Waco Tribune-Herald employee called David
- Koresh and warned him about the impending BATF raid. Risenhoover, who
- was wounded in the ankle and hip, sought damages for hospital costs
- and mental anguish. According to the Treasury report, BATF agents had
- tried to convince the newspaper not to publish their expose of the
- Branch Davidians until after the raid and mistakenly thought they had
- an agreement to that effect. (TDR:69) Risenhoover's lawsuit also
- claimed the newspaper reneged on an agreement to withhold its series
- on the Davidians until BATF completed its investigation. One assumes
- this is something higher-up BATF officials would have to have told
- Risenhoover. However, the editors denied ever making such an
- agreement, and SAC Chojnacki was very angry or "hot," because editors
- said they were unconcerned about how their series would affect raid
- plans. (TDR:71) BATF immediately distanced itself from Risenhoover's
- lawsuit. "This is strictly between the agent and the newspaper," said
- BATF spokeswoman Sharon Wheeler. [177] However, many suspect that this
- was just part of a broader government effort to intimidate the press
- and the media.
-
- 16. BATF COVERUP
-
- The Treasury Department report admits only that BATF commanders tried
- to cover up their decision to go ahead with the raid despite the loss
- of surprise, and that several officials disregarded evidence that they
- were covering up. Below we list evidence that this admitted coverup is
- but one of many.
-
- a. Dubious Allegations about Koresh Statements
-
- Undercover agent Robert Rodriguez alleged in the second, March 5, 1993
- affidavit that when Koresh learned of the impending BATF assault he
- said to Rodriguez, "Neither ATF or the National Guard will ever get
- me. They got me once, and they will never get me again." However,
- neither the BATF or the National Guard had ever arrested or "gotten"
- Koresh before, so this statement would seem to be either a fabrication
- or a misunderstanding of a Koresh statement.
-
- b. Unverified Reports of Machine Gun Fire and Grenades
-
- The Treasury report alleges "unrelenting automatic and semiautomatic
- weapons fire" from the Branch Davidians. (TDR:101) However, according
- to Paul Blackman, "firearms experts who have heard videotapes of the
- incident have heard no such regular rapid fire." [178] Also, news
- reports state, "Officials said today that two of the wounded agents
- were hit by fragments of hand grenades lobbed from the compound."
- [179] Again, we will not have certain evidence until the government
- releases all audio and video tapes. We do not know if it is possible
- to distinguish between BATF "flash-bang" grenades and explosive ones.
-
- c. False Report Members Try to "Shoot their Way Out"
-
- At 4:55 p.m. on February 28 Branch Davidians Michael Schroeder, Delroy
- Nash and Woody Kendrick together approached Mount Carmel in an effort
- to re-enter it. They came upon BATF agents Dyer, Brigance and Appel
- who were moving away from the hay barn and towards the evacuation
- point. The agents claim that when they identified themselves, the
- three shot at them and the agents returned fire. (TDR:111, Appendix
- D:19) Schroeder was shot six times but escaped into the brush where he
- died. His body was not recovered for several days. Nash was arrested
- and Kendrick escaped; he was arrested a few days later. Initially,
- BATF told the press these individuals were shot trying to shoot their
- way out of Mount Carmel. BATF's original, inaccurate story has raised
- suspicions that BATF agents are trying to cover up an improper attack
- on the three Branch Davidians. Evidently, BATF never adequately
- corrected this story. As late as April 20, the Washington Post
- reported in a sidebar, "Sunday, Feb. 28. . .6 p.m. Three cult members
- storm out of the compound." [180] During the trial, Bob Kendrick and
- Delroy Nash, who were with him at the time, will present the Branch
- Davidian's side of the story about their meeting with federal agents
- near the "hay barn."
-
- d. BATF Denies Branch Davidians Captured and Released Four BATF Agents
-
- Dick DeGuerin and Jack Zimmerman assert that four BATF agents were
- captured inside the compound in the gun battle, disarmed, then
- released during a cease-fire. "They had their arms up, threw down
- their guns, and were taken into custody. That much is clear from the
- videotape. Their release and the entire cease-fire was a suggestion of
- the Branch Davidians." Waco television video tapes of the raid show
- people coming out of the compound with their hands up, but, according
- to news reports "it was not clear whether the people had been caught
- in the crossfire or had come from inside the compound." However, BATF
- spokesperson Jerry Singer "denied that agents of the bureau were
- captured and then released. `No,' he said, `It did not happen.'" [181]
-
- However, during the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee
- hearing, McLennan County Sheriff's Lieutenant Larry Lynch mentioned
- his negotiations with Wayne Martin regarding "ATF wounded." "I still
- had Wayne on the line and was working with Wayne to get ATF into
- the--back into the compound to get their wounded. . .I would talk to
- Wayne and get Wayne's assurance that there would not be firing, that
- ATF was coming in to retrieve their wounded." [182] Perhaps BATF
- prefers to consider its agents "wounded," rather than "captured."
- However, if government- issued weapons had been found after the fire,
- it would support the Branch Davidians' contention and show that BATF
- told yet another lie. We do not know if such guns were found.
-
- e. BATF Takes Gun Dealer McMahon Into "Protective Custody"
-
- On March 1, 1993, BATF agents took custody of gun dealer Henry McMahon
- and his woman friend Karen Kilpatrick who had recently moved to
- Florida. In September, 1993, Dick DeGuerin told the Freedom of
- Information Foundation media panel on Waco: "They told these two
- people they were in danger from Branch Davidians who were not inside
- Mount Carmel who might try to kill them and convinced them to ask for
- protective custody. Mr. McMahon and his friend soon realized they'd
- been tricked into asking for protective custody but ATF flew them to
- Oregon. . .flew them down to Waco. The purpose of that was to prevent
- you from talking to them." [183] In late April, 1993, McMahon and
- Kilpatrick were interviewed on a Pensacola television show "Lawline."
- They stated that during these weeks BATF agents tried to keep them
- away from both the FBI and the press. [184]
-
- James L. Pate alleges that BATF agent Davy Aguilera lied when he
- stated that McMahon had referred to Koresh as "my preacher" and when
- he alleged McMahon tried to hide from him the fact that Howell and
- Koresh were the same person, allegations repeated in the Treasury
- report. (TDR:26, Appendix D:5) Pate writes: "Interviewed by phone
- about the Treasury report's claims, McMahon told SOF that he and his
- girlfriend/business partner Karen Kilpatrick informed Aguilera
- truthfully that Koresh was `a' preacher, not their preacher. `We were
- never members of that church-- never went to a single church service
- out there,' Kilpatrick told SOF. . .As for properly identifying Koresh
- to the ATF, McMahon said gun dealers are required to check drivers'
- licenses for identification on paperwork documenting gun purchases.
- McMahon did so, using a Texas driver's license for identification on
- paperwork identifying the buyer as Vernon Wayne Howell." Knowing
- Koresh had changed his name, McMahon wrote "in parentheses after
- Howell's name on the ATF yellow forms: `AKA David Koresh.' Henry
- McMahon wasn't trying to hide anything from anyone and Aguilera knew
- this. But Aguilera lied. . .in an effort to discredit McMahon's
- knowledge of ATF wrongdoing." [185] McMahon has not been charged with
- conspiracy to manufacture machineguns, despite his selling many
- weapons to the Branch Davidians.
-
- f. Paul Fatta Charged After Leaving Waco
-
- Another individual who could attest to the Branch Davidians' legal gun
- business was Paul Fatta, who ran the business. He was in Austin with
- his son at a gun show on the morning of February 28. When he returned
- to Waco that afternoon, Fatta called radio station KRLD, which had
- been interviewing David Koresh. The station broadcast Fatta telling
- the radio interviewers that authorities had refused to give him
- information, and that he wanted to get back to Mount Carmel.
-
- According to Ron Engelman, who talked to Paul Fatta several times
- during the siege, Fatta then offered his assistance in bringing about
- a peaceful end to the standoff. However, authorities refused his help
- and were abusive towards him. After a week he left Waco for Oregon.
- BATF immediately issued a warrant for his arrest on the charge of
- conspiracy to manufacture and possess unregistered machine guns and
- stated that he was "armed and dangerous." Engelman said this action
- frightened Fatta into believing that BATF would murder him if he
- surrendered to them. [186] Fatta finally surrendered to Texas Rangers
- in Houston on April 26. "Mike DeGuerin, Mr. Fatta's attorney, said his
- client did not surrender earlier because of his mistrust of federal
- agents." [187]
-
- g. Raid Commanders and BATF Officials Covered Up Loss of Surprise
-
- Part Two, Section Seven of the Treasury report is entitled "ATF
- Post-Raid Dissemination of Misleading Information About the Raid and
- the Raid Plan." (TDR:193-209) The report states, "raid commanders
- Chojnacki and Sarabyn appear to have engaged in a concerted effort to
- conceal their errors in judgement. And ATF's management, perhaps out
- of a misplaced desire to protect the agency from criticism, offered
- accounts based on Chojnacki and Sarabyn's statements, disregarding
- clear evidence that those statements were false." (TDR:193)
-
- When BATF finally informed higher Treasury Department officials of the
- planned raid Friday, February 26, 1993, then Acting Assistant
- Secretary of the Treasury John P. Simpson decided the action was too
- dangerous and "directed that the operation not go forward." Also
- expressing reservations was Ronald K. Noble, the designated but
- unconfirmed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Law Enforcement,
- who was acting as a consultant. In a Friday night conference call,
- Higgins told Simpson and Noble that he had obtained reassurance from
- raid co-commander Philip Chojnacki that the "raid could be executed
- safely" and that "the raid would be aborted. . .if things did not look
- right," i.e., if there was any evidence of a "change in routine."
- Simpson allowed the raid to go forward, "after these assurances were
- given." (TDR:75-76) During the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations
- subcommittee hearing Higgins stated he "instructed Dan (Hartnett) . .
- .if there is any indication that we have lost that element of
- surprise, simply do not do the raid. And I was assured that would be
- the case." [188] Noble told the same committee Higgins told him, "if
- for any reason they lose the element of surprise. . .express orders or
- directives to call off the operation." [189]
-
- However, even after Chojnacki learned from his co-commander Chuck
- Sarabyn that the Branch Davidians knew BATF was coming, and after
- consulting briefly with SAC Ted Royster--who did not have an official
- title for the raid, but was still a raid leader, he allowed the raid
- to go forward. Chojnacki even called the National Command Center in
- Washington and reported that the raid was commencing. He did not
- report that the Branch Davidians knew about the raid. When Rodriguez
- learned that the raid was underway he was "distraught." (TDR:89-91,
- 165)
-
- It would be almost two months before this account of what really
- happened that morning would be related to the press and public. >From
- the start, BATF officials denied reports like the Los Angeles Times
- that an agent was heard shouting, "We've gotta move. He's been tipped
- off." [190] BATF's Law Enforcement Associate Director Daniel Hartnett,
- Deputy Associate Director Edward Conroy, and Intelligence Division
- Chief David Troy, who became the principal BATF spokesperson,
- immediately interviewed undercover agent Rodriguez and three other
- agents who were with Rodriguez when he made the important call to
- Sarabyn. All confirmed that Rodriguez had told Sarabyn that Koresh
- knew that BATF raid was imminent.
-
- However, Hartnett and Troy gave less credence to their stories than to
- commander Chuck Sarabyn's story that Rodriguez "was not real
- descriptive as to the ATF-National Guard statement" and commander
- Philip Chojnacki's claim that Sarabyn hadn't told him anything about
- Koresh's foreknowledge. So Troy continued to deny to the press that
- the commanders knew that Koresh had been alerted to the impending
- raid. (TDR:196-199)
-
- Meanwhile, the Texas Rangers were gathering even more evidence,
- including from 60 BATF agents, that raid commanders Sarabyn and
- Chojnacki knew that they had lost the element of surprise. They passed
- this along to Hartnett and Conroy. However, "Hartnett and Conroy
- failed to keep (BATF Director) Higgins informed about the mounting
- weight of evidence that Sarabyn and Chojnacki's account was false," so
- Higgins continued to mislead the press and public. In late March
- Director Higgins wrote a memo to BATF agents denying there was a
- coverup of "mistakes in planning, leadership or both" after he
- discovered some agents were planning to make coverup allegations to
- the media. [191]
-
- Finally in early April, after a number of agents contacted Higgins
- directly to complain about these misstatements, did Higgins ask for a
- copy of Rodriguez statement. Yet for another month he allowed Hartnett
- and Conroy to instruct Troy to keep misleading the press. Only under
- pressure from the Treasury review team did Sarabyn, Chojnacki,
- Hartnett and Conroy finally admit to their roles in the coverup.
- (TDR:199-206) SAC Ted Royster also participated in the coverup,
- claiming he did not know that surprise had been lost. When Noble
- threatened him with disciplinary action, "Royster then sent agents a
- three-page letter outlining personal pressures and career problems
- that caused his memory lapse." [192]
-
- Chojnacki and Sarabyn also tried to cover up their lack of
- professionalism and errors by altering the written plan of the raid,
- which they had not issued before it took place. They did not tell the
- Texas Rangers or the Treasury review team that it had been altered.
- They then tried to blame the alterations on a lower ranking agent who
- had assisted them and finally admitted the truth to the review team.
- (TDR:208-210)
-
- Immediately after the release of the Treasury Department report on
- Waco, Treasury Secretary Bentsen put Hartnett, Conroy, Troy, Chojnacki
- and Sarabyn on administrative leave. Hartnett and Conroy immediately
- resigned. Bentsen also removed BATF Director Higgins, who had another
- month to go before retirement.
-
- The Treasury Department is willing to admit to this coverup because so
- many disgusted and vocal agents had complained about it. However, both
- BATF agents and the Treasury Department continue to defend BATF's
- slipshod investigation and excessive use of force in serving the
- search and arrest warrants. Therefore we cannot rule out the
- possibility of other coverups which only an Independent Counsel
- investigation can discover.
-
- h. Raid Commanders May Have Lied about Firing from Helicopters
-
- According to the Treasury report raid commander SAC Philip Chojnacki
- was in one of the three National Guard helicopters "at the outset of
- the firefight." (TDR:154) According to Clifford L. Linedecker, Ted
- Royster was also in one of the helicopters. [193] Both Chojnacki and
- Royster would go on to lie to their superiors about whether they knew
- if the element of surprise had been lost. Therefore, we must wonder if
- they also lied about whether there was firing from helicopters.
-
- i. Government Keeps Warrants Sealed After Koresh Sees Them
-
- On February 28, 1993 BATF had the Magistrate seal the contents of the
- affidavit and search and arrest warrants "to ensure the integrity of
- an ongoing criminal investigation against Vernon Wayne Howell and
- others. It is believed that evidence may be altered should the
- direction of the investigation become evident." This prevented the
- public from discovering the grounds for the raid. "One problem with
- either criticism or support for the government is that the reasons for
- the raid remain largely secret. The original search and arrest
- warrants remain sealed, and the ATF won't say exactly what it was
- looking for, or what information it has. The agency has insisted that
- it has a legal right to keep the warrants sealed until they have been
- executed." [194]
-
- On March 19th the FBI delivered to Koresh "copies of legal documents
- concerning the ATF warrants." (JDR:74) Despite the fact that Koresh
- now knew the contents of both the February 25th and the later March 5
- affidavit and search warrant, the government refused to release these
- to the press and public until April 20, 1993, the day after Koresh's
- death.
-
- j. Possibility BATF will Tamper with Audio/Video Evidence
-
- Above we noted that U.S. district court Judge Walter A. Smith, Jr.
- ordered that all BATF audio and videotapes be preserved. However,
- defense attorneys had requested that the judge retain the tapes to
- prevent any tampering to delete evidence of government wrongdoing or
- create evidence of Branch Davidian wrongdoing. With modern audio and
- video techniques, such tampering can go virtually undetected;
- therefore, the government's keeping the tapes assures that many will
- continue to doubt whatever evidence they present.
-
- k. BATF Involved with Texas Rangers' Investigation
-
- As we have seen the U.S. Attorney's office in Waco deputized the Texas
- Rangers as U.S. Marshals for the criminal investigation and
- prosecution. Nevertheless, there is evidence of continued BATF
- interference with the investigations--including after the fire. The
- Justice report states, "a memorandum of understanding between the FBI
- and ATF gave the ATF jurisdiction in cases involving the injury or
- death of their own agents." (JDR:23) It was BATF agents Aguilera and
- Dunagan who continued to issue search and arrest warrants during the
- siege.
-
- The Texas Rangers took charge of the ruins of Mount Carmel the
- afternoon of the fire. During the first days of the trial, a Texas
- Ranger "recounted barricading the site after the standoff to assure
- there would be no coverup." [195] Nevertheless, during the next few
- days BATF and FBI agents had access to the crime scene--and ample
- opportunity to tamper with evidence. News video tapes and photos
- clearly show that BATF agents hoisted a BATF flag over Mount Carmel's
- still smoldering ruins. And the Treasury report admits "after the
- Compound was ravaged by fire, ATF firearms explosives experts
- collected evidence of the firearms and other destructive devices
- Koresh and his followers had possessed." (TDR:128) Again, many believe
- that deputizing state investigators as U.S. Marshals prevented them
- from fully investigating possible BATF and FBI crimes against the
- Branch Davidians.
-
- l. Questions About Weapons Found After the Fire
-
- The Treasury report states, "based on the materials recovered, the
- experts concluded that Koresh possessed: 57 pistols, 6 revolvers, 12
- shotguns, 101 rifles, 44+ machineguns, 16+ silencers, 6 flare
- launchers, 3 live grenades plus numerous components, and 200,000
- rounds of unused ammunition." (TDR:128) Two 50 caliber rifles were
- among the rifles found. [196] Among these items, only the machineguns,
- the live grenades, and the silencers would have been illegal. During
- the third day of the trial, Texas Rangers reported finding 48 machine
- guns, one silencer, six pieces of tubing being converted into
- silencers, but no live grenades among the many grenade parts. Also,
- the expert said there was no way of knowing if any of the machineguns
- actually had been fired. [197]
-
- As we have seen, BATF--and FBI--agents had access to the ruins of
- Mount Carmel for 24 hours after the fire. BATF had the time and
- opportunity to tamper with evidence. And they certainly had the
- motive--excusing the February 28 raid which killed four of their
- agents and set in motion the 51 day siege and caused the death of 86
- or more Branch Davidians. These facts, and BATF agents' history of
- coverup in this issue, have prompted wide speculation that BATF
- "planted" evidence in the form of burned illegal weapons. However,
- news reports have not mentioned defense attorneys questioning the
- authenticity of the weapons found.
-
- Further, there has been little discussion of whether the illegal
- machine guns, grenades and silencers were assembled from legal parts
- before the February 28th raid by 76 armed BATF agents, or after it, by
- Branch Davidians, in self-defense. Papers filed at the time Schroeder
- agreed to plea bargain state that she "admitted being an armed guard
- from the day of the initial raid until March 12th, when she left the
- compound. Though she was unarmed during the actual shootout, she
- admitted that after the standoff began, she carried a semiautomatic
- AR-15 rifle and later a fully automatic AR-15 machinegun when she took
- up her guard posts." [198] The fact that she admitted to carrying
- automatic weapons only "later" might be evidence that they were
- manufactured after the BATF attack.
-
- 17. TREASURY DEPARTMENT COVERUP
-
- The Treasury Department report does expose inept planning and
- execution of the BATF raid on the Branch Davidians. However, it
- defends the probable cause basis for the search and arrest warrants
- and excuses the decision to go forward with a paramilitary raid. There
- is other disturbing evidence of coverup which support the argument
- that an Independent Counsel must be appointed to investigate the
- federal government's destruction of the Branch Davidian religious
- group.
-
- a. Ronald K. Noble Conflict of Interest
-
- In late April, 1993, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen selected
- Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Law Enforcement Ronald K.
- Noble to head the investigation of BATF's handling of the raid on the
- Branch Davidians. As we know, Noble approved the decision to go ahead
- with the raid. Since he had not been confirmed, Noble had no formal
- authority at that point. However, he still retains moral
- responsibility. So Noble would seem to have little interest in issuing
- a report that would either challenge significantly BATF's
- investigation or operations modus operandi or energetically seek
- evidence of criminal behavior on the part of BATF agents or officials.
-
-
- b. No Testimony Taken Under Oath
-
- There is no indication that any individuals gave testimony under oath
- to those who conducted the review. In fact, the Treasury's "review
- team" seems to have been hampered in getting at the whole truth by
- "employment contracts," the "Privacy Act" and the "Federal Advisory
- Committee Act." (TDR:6) There is also no evidence that any of the BATF
- officials who testified before Congressional committees were sworn in,
- though they still could be prosecuted were it proved they had lied to
- a Congressional committee. Therefore, much of the truth about what
- really happened at Waco will come out only during the trials of the
- Branch Davidians, civil law suits against the government or through an
- independent investigation.
-
- c. Treasury Department Attempts to Seal Investigation Records
-
- In mid-August 1993 the Treasury Department proposed a rule to exempt
- the Treasury Department's report from public scrutiny. "In accordance
- with the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended,
- Departmental Offices, Office of Enforcement is proposing to exempt a
- system of records, the Waco Administrative Review Group Investigation
- (DO/.207) from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. The exemptions
- are intended to increase the value of the system of records for law
- enforcement and investigative purposes, to comply with legal
- prohibitions against the disclosure of certain kinds of information,
- and to protect the privacy of individuals identified in the system of
- records. The exemptions are intended to increase the value of the
- system of records for the fact finding investigation and
- administrative review performed by the Waco Administrative Review
- Group so as not to reveal local, state or Federal law enforcement
- techniques, sources and methods or affect the ability of law
- enforcement agencies to prosecute people for criminal wrongdoing."
-
- The Treasury Department gave the public a month to comment. It
- received 5,150 telegrams and letters, most in the last few days before
- the deadline. Representative Pat Schroeder wrote: "I strongly oppose
- this rule. While I can appreciate the Treasury Department's desire to
- complete a successful investigation and prosecute people for
- wrongdoing, the public and media's right to know should not be
- compromised." [199]
-
- Austin's Freedom of Information Foundation sent out a press release
- supporting the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. It said
- "any reporters who were targeted in the investigation should have
- access to the findings and be allowed to amend any records about
- themselves. . .In addition, the committee said the notice of the
- exemption is too broad and would exempt all records of the review
- group, not just those that are withheld for the purposes outlined in
- the exemption." [200] David Kopel, director of Firearms Research
- Project in Denver said, "I think it is a scandalous attempt to cover
- up the facts surrounding one of the greatest governmental disasters in
- the 20th century." Larry Pratt of the Gun Owners of America--which has
- protested the fact that BATF considers Koresh's showing its videotapes
- as evidence of criminal intent--asserted, "I think this means that not
- only is the fox in charge of the chicken coop, he's not going to let
- anyone inside to see how many bones he's picked clean." [201]
-
- d. Treasury Department Report Demonizes Koresh and Branch Davidians
-
- The Treasury report excuses any errors in BATF's investigation or
- affidavit of probable cause and its overly aggressive paramilitary
- raid by demonizing Koresh and the Branch Davidians. "The extraordinary
- discipline that Koresh imposed on his followers, which enable him, for
- example, to obtain all their assets and to establish exclusive sexual
- relationships with the Compound's female residents, while not itself
- cause for ATF intervention, made him far more threatening than a lone
- individual who had a liking for illegal weapons. The Compound became a
- rural fortress, often patrolled by armed guards, in which Koresh's
- word--or the word that Koresh purported to extrapolate from the
- Scriptures--was the only law. And the accounts of the former cult
- members, including an abused child, that Koresh was sexually abusing
- minors made it clear that Koresh believed he was beyond society's
- laws. Were Koresh to decide to turn his weapons on society, he would
- have devotees to follow him, and they would be equipped with weapons
- that could inflict serious damage." (TDR:127) Branch Davidians deny
- Koresh took all their assets and controlled their sex lives. And
- government is not empowered to assault individuals or groups merely
- because they could conceivably "decide" to attack others.
-
- It is interesting to note that despite the government's assertion the
- Branch Davidian's were under Koresh's spell, BATF Associate Director
- Daniel Hartnett told the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations
- subcommittee hearing that it would have been difficult to lure Koresh
- away from Mount Carmel because he "feared that some of the people in
- side the compound, his followers, were going to turn against him," and
- "he was almost paranoid--at least the way it was being described to
- me--that something was going to happen to him by his followers." [202]
-
- e. Evidence of Coverup in the Treasury Department Report
-
- Throughout this report we have noted where the Treasury report has
- failed to provide information--even when it would not seem necessary
- to "redact" it per law--or has provided questionable information. The
- examples most indicative of coverup are: no mention of the Branch
- Davidians legal weapons business; ignoring or correcting Davy
- Aguilera's misleading or inaccurate statements without mentioning he
- made them; not including Aguilera's affidavit in the Treasury report;
- supporting Aguilera's contention that McMahon lied to him about Koresh
- and Howell being same person; no acknowledgement of Koresh's past
- cooperation with law enforcement; not discussing whether publicity was
- a BATF motivation for the raid; not admitting that BATF knew that
- George Roden's former tenants were known drug traffickers; not
- admitting that BATF initially denied they had made a claim of a drug
- nexus to obtain free military and National Guard support; not
- admitting that no agent was assigned to announce the search warrant,
- that a battering ram was to be used, or that Chuck Sarabyn warned
- agents to expect gunfire; no mention of allegations of friendly fire
- or agents firing from helicopters; no mention of the false initial
- report that three Branch Davidians tried to shoot their way out of
- Mount Carmel; no mention of Henry McMahon being taken into protective
- custody or of Paul Fatta being put on the "most wanted list" after
- offering his help to BATF.
-
- f. Treasury Department Has Taken No Further Action Against Agents or
- Officials
-
- In early October, 1993, Robert Cesca, Treasury Deputy Inspector
- General, was reviewing whether to launch a full scale investigation of
- agents and officials actions. As we have seen, two BATF agents and two
- BATF officials were immediately put on administrative leave and
- Director Higgins was dismissed one month before the end of his term.
- Any charges the inspector general's office might recommend would be
- referred to the Justice Department. In late September, Representative
- Charles E. Schumer, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime
- said he thought "those involved should be fully prosecuted." However,
- a call to his office revealed he was only calling for prosecuting
- agents for official misconduct, such as lying to superiors. Similarly,
- these are probably the only prosecutions the Treasury Department might
- consider. As of January, 1994, there had been no action to prosecute
- anyone.
-
- g. No Recommendations to Prevent Future Tragedy
-
- What lessons has BATF learned from Waco? Only two, it would seem--they
- need better guns and better spies. An official at the Treasury
- Department's September 30, 1993, press conference can be heard to
- utter a comment about the need for better guns. And John W. Magaw,
- acting director of BATF, stated he was determined that other religious
- "cults" not develop into "armed compounds." "They're out there. They
- don't yet have the kind of weaponry that we saw in Waco. . .but they
- will develop if society allows them to." Magaw said ATF is keeping
- tabs on "cult-like organizations" in "three or four places around the
- country. . .We're trying to monitor way early in the game." [203]
- During an October, 1993 House Appropriations subcommittee hearing
- Philip K. Noble told lawmakers: "Although we cannot prejudge all
- future situations, we must be open to the possibility that a dynamic
- entry--exposing agents, innocent persons and children to gunfire--may
- simply not be an acceptable law enforcement option. [204] Time will
- tell if BATF ends its aggressive modus operandi.
-
- 18. COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE CONCLUSIONS
-
- a. BATF Drove Branch Davidians to Armed Defense
-
- The Committee for Waco Justice believes that the Bureau of Alcohol,
- Tobacco and Firearms drove the Branch Davidian religious group to
- self-defense because of its conspicuous surveillance, its refusal to
- acknowledge Branch Davidian attempts to cooperate, its collusion with
- "cult busters" committed to destruction of the group, and its use of
- excessive force in executing search and arrest warrants. Given their
- religious views that the government was intent on massacring them, it
- is understandable why the Branch Davidians resorted to armed defense.
- While we believe this was not the wisest choice, we believe that it
- was legal self-defense.
-
- b. Independent Counsel Should Prosecute Responsible BATF Agents and
- Officials
-
- Under current law the Attorney General can appoint an Independent
- Counsel to identify and prosecute any BATF agents and officials
- suspected of committing any and all relevant crimes, including the
- following: * Official Misconduct for disobeying superior's orders and
- covering up their disobedience; this would apply to anyone found
- participating in any other to-be-discovered coverups.
-
- * Negligent Homicide for carrying out an unnecessary and ineptly
- planned paramilitary raid, against specific orders, which resulted the
- deaths of four BATF agents and five Branch Davidians;
-
- * Homicide or Manslaughter in the death of Branch Davidian Michael
- Schroeder should it be learned that the alleged "shootout," on the
- afternoon of February 28, 1993 was in fact an unlawful and/or
- excessive use of force against Schroeder;
-
- * Conspiracy against the Rights of Citizens U.S. Code Title 18,
- Section 241 reads: "If two or more persons conspire to injure,
- oppress, threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant of any State,
- Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
- or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
- States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or
- more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
- another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or
- enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured- they shall be fined
- not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both:
- and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
- term of years or for life."
-
- * Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law U.S. Code Title 18, Section
- 242 reads: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
- regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State,
- Territory or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
- immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
- United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on
- account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color,
- or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be
- fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
- both; and if bodily injury results shall not be fined under this title
- or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results
- shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
-
- On the evening of February 28, 1993, the Treasury Department and BATF
- agreed to turn over control of the scene to the FBI. By that time
- Special Agent-in-Charge Jeffrey Jamar of the San Antonio office, who
- had been put in charge of the operation, had already driven up to
- Waco. The FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and several Special Weapons
- and Tactics Teams (SWAT) also began arriving that day. (JDR:9,27)
- [205]
-
- Meanwhile, Koresh and the Branch Davidians were convinced that BATF's
- attack was the opening of the Fifth Seal: that those six Branch
- Davidians slaughtered February 28th were killed for "preaching God's
- word" and the surviving Branch Davidians only would have to "rest a
- little longer" until the remainder were also put to death. Thus would
- begin the countdown to Apocalypse and the Second Coming of Christ.
- They also believed that the siege was an opportunity to spread
- Koresh's message to the world that God was giving humanity its last
- opportunity to repent. [206]
-
- The FBI regarded the Branch Davidians' resistance as "a direct
- challenge to lawful federal warrants and to duly authorized law
- enforcement officials" (JDR:12) and had little sympathy with either
- the Branch Davidians' religious beliefs--or their complaints about
- BATF's excessive use of force. Doubtless, Koresh was looking for a way
- to come out that would be consistent with his religious views and his
- sense of dignity. However, during 51 days of the siege, negotiators'
- efforts to convince them to surrender were continually undermined by
- HRT Commander Richard Rogers' persuading siege commander SAC Jeffrey
- Jamar to allow him to escalate pressure tactics and psychological
- warfare. As early as March 1, 1993, there were predictions that the
- government's intentions towards the Branch Davidians were violent.
- Former McLennan County District Attorney Vic Feazell, who had
- unsuccessfully prosecuted the Branch Davidians for the shootout with
- George Roden, criticized federal agents for "storm trooper" tactics in
- laying siege to Mount Carmel and predicted a grim end to the standoff.
- "The feds are preparing to kill them," he said, noting the
- mobilization of military equipment. "That way they can bury their
- mistakes. And they won't have attorneys looking over what they did
- later at a trial." [207]
-
- FBI-JUSTICE DEPARTMENT VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS, EXCESSIVE FORCE AND COVERUP: THE
- 51 DAY SIEGE AND APRIL 19, 1993 ASSAULT ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
-
- In this section the Committee for Waco Justice report describes the
- FBI's violations of constitutional rights and use of excessive force
- in its handling of both the siege and the April 19th destruction of
- Mount Carmel and the subsequent FBI and Justice Department coverup.
- The report then presents the Committee for Waco Justice conclusions:
- that the FBI effectively massacred the Branch Davidians and that the
- Attorney General should appoint an Independent Counsel to identify and
- prosecute responsible agents and officials for official misconduct,
- violations of rights, and negligent--or even intentional-- homicide.
- We will present further recommendations in the last section of this
- report.
-
- It should be noted that none of the testimony given to the Justice
- Department "review teams" or to Congress was given under oath. Also,
- the Justice Department report does not include information which might
- affect the prosecutions of the Branch Davidians now on trial. (The
- Justice report specifies where material is being withheld by using the
- notation {material redacted as required by statute}.)
-
- The "Justice Department report" issued October 8, 1993, consists of 5
- separate documents. Assistant to the Attorney General Richard Scruggs
- compiled the largest report, the Justice Department factual report.
- Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann issued the short report
- "Lessons of Waco: Proposed Changes in Law Enforcement." Edward S.G.
- Dennis, Jr. issued an "Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch
- Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas." Finally, nine outside experts
- submitted recommendations compiled in "Recommendations of Experts for
- Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement After Waco." The tenth outside
- expert, Alan A. Stone, M.D., submitted a separate report one month
- later.
-
- WHITE HOUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND FBI CHAINS OF COMMAND FEBRUARY 28
- - APRIL 19, 1993
-
- WHITE HOUSE
-
- Bill Clinton - President
- Thomas McLarty - Chief of Staff
- Bernard Nussbaum - White House Counsel
- Vince Foster - Deputy White House Counsel
- Bruce Lindsay - Presidential Advisor
- George Stephanopolous - Communications Director
-
- JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
-
- Stuart M. Gerson - Acting Attorney General (From Feb. 28-March 12)
-
- Webster Hubbell - Assistant to Acting Attorney General
- Gerson, liaison between Clinton and Justice Department
- Janet Reno- Attorney General (From March 12)
- Richard Scruggs - Assistant to the Attorney General
- Philip B. Heymann - Deputy Attorney General
- Webster Hubbell - Associate Attorney General
- Carl Stern, Director of the Office of Public Affairs
- Mark Richard - Deputy Assistant Attorney General
- Ronald Ederer - U.S. Attorney (James DeAtley, his assistant)
- Bill Johnston - Assistant United States Attorney in Waco
- John Phinizy - Assistant Untied States Attorney in Waco
- LeRoy Jahn - Assistant United States Attorney in Waco and lead
- Prosecutor of Branch Davidians
-
- FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
-
- Officials in Washington
-
- William S. Sessions - Director
- Floyd Clarke - Deputy Director
- Doug Gow - Associate Deputy Director for Investigations
- Larry Potts - Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative
- Division
- Danny Coulson - Deputy Assistant Director of Criminal
- Investigative Division
- E. Michael Kahoe -- Section Chief of Criminal Investigative
- Division Violent Crimes
-
- Agents in Waco
-
- Jeff Jamar - Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of the Waco Operation
- SAC Robert Ricks, SAC Richard Schwein, SAC Richard Swensen, aides
- to Jamar
- Richard M. Rogers - Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge and
- commander of Hostage Rescue Team
- Byron Sage - Supervisory Special Resident Agent, Chief negotiator,
- in charge of 24 negotiators.
-
- 1. FBI CONTROL OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA
-
- According to Mad Man at Waco authors Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, the
- FBI used its daily press briefings as a way of "controlling" the media
- and the public's perceptions of David Koresh so that they would
- consider him an unpredictable psychopath. The FBI's other goal was
- "inflaming the already beleaguered cult leader."
-
- a. FBI Restricted the Press and Media
-
- The FBI imposed a number of harsh rules on the media. It prohibited
- reporters from getting closer than three miles to Mt. Carmel, claiming
- the Branch Davidians' .50 caliber rifles could hit anyone closer. The
- FBI strictly controlled its daily press briefings, prevented agents
- and officials from granting media interviews.
-
- Speaking at the September 10, 1993, Freedom of Information Foundation
- panel on "Mt. Carmel: What Should the Public Know," John O. Lumpkin of
- the Associated Press described other examples of government
- restrictions on the media. The FBI refused to allow Koresh to speak to
- the media. It refused to divulge information such as: on whose
- authority they made the original raid, who was alive or dead at Mount
- Carmel, the contents of the warrant against David Koresh, and why
- building walls were bulldozed into the fire. Months after the end of
- the siege, FBI representatives continued to refuse to talk to the
- press. Lumpkin said, "it is my personal opinion. . .the argument could
- be made (that) the situation could have turned out differently, and
- certainly not tragically, if there had been much more open access
- instead." [208]
-
- Lumpkin asserted that because of FBI control of information, the
- public still does not know the truth about what happened in Waco. He
- said a reporter told him it reminded him of U.S. government control of
- the American press in Vietnam. Panelist Shelly Katz, a Time Magazine
- photographer stationed in Waco during the siege, said this was the
- worst suppression of media he had seen in 27 years of journalism.
-
- b. FBI Intimidated the Press and Media
-
- Federal agents intimidated the media by arresting members on flimsy
- pretexts. Federal agents assaulted and arrested a reporter who had
- merely asked about a Branch Davidian arrested after the BATF raid and
- illegally confiscated his film. When journalist Louis Beam, who had
- valid press credentials for the right-wing publication Jubilee, asked
- whether the country was "witnessing a fascist takeover," he was
- whisked out of the press room. When he tried to return the next month
- he was arrested on charges of criminal trespass. [209] After state
- troopers arrested two news photographers and confiscated their film
- near the ruins of Mount Carmel on April 22, 1993, Tony Pederson,
- managing editor of the Houston Chronicle, protested: "In a situation
- already marred by tragic loss of life and questionable actions, this
- seems to be a rather sorry follow-up. One has to wonder seriously if
- the Bill of Rights has been suspended in McLennan County." [210]
- During the Freedom of Information Foundation media panel Dick DeGuerin
- asserted that the press should have done civil disobedience and
- continued getting arrested until they were allowed to get closer to
- the scene of the action.
-
- c. FBI Lied to the Press and Media
-
- Louis Alaniz, a Christian sympathizer who snuck into Mount Carmel for
- several days during the siege and left just before the fire, said the
- Branch Davidians listened to the FBI press conferences. "What really
- got them is they constantly heard the story changing-another lie,
- another lie, another lie. These people were saying, `Why are they
- saying all this about us?' I didn't see anything that (the FBI) was
- telling the press that was true." [211]
-
- We will discuss these various lies as we proceed. One glaring example
- was media spokesperson SAC Bob Ricks' telling the public that
- operations were costing $2 million a day. [212] During the April 22,
- 1993, Senate Appropriations Committee hearings it was revealed that
- actual costs for the operation as of April 22, 1993, were $6,792,000,
- an average of $130,000 a day. [213]
-
- Another example was the FBI's describing the rickety wooden buildings
- of Mount Carmel Center as a "fortress" built for war. They alleged
- that the old concrete building around and on top of which the new
- building had been built was a "concrete bunker;" that the tornado
- shelter under construction was an "underground bunker;" and that the
- underground bus which was used as a tunnel to the tornado shelter, and
- a practice shooting range, was particularly sinister. The
- disinformation grew as the siege continued, to end in a crescendo of
- falsehoods immediately after the April 19th fire.
-
- d. Press and Media Repeated Government Propaganda
-
- During the media panel attorney Dick DeGuerin condemned journalists
- for engaging in "pack journalism" and for regurgitating BATF and FBI
- propaganda by repeating charged words like "cult," "compound,"
- "fortified bunkers," "Ranch Apocalypse," etc. He also criticized
- journalists for merely waiting for the Treasury and Justice Department
- reports as if they would be a final "Warren Commission Report" and not
- doing any investigative reporting to find out the truth.
-
- The FBI's tight control of the news left many media people with only
- government allegations and disinformation about child abuse, arms
- buildups, mass suicide, etc. to write about. Few bothered to dig
- deeper to discover the dubious sources of these allegations. Even
- fewer examined their own prejudices against deeply committed religious
- groups. Much of the media merely repeated Cult Awareness Network
- propaganda and gave CAN spokespersons ample "cult busting" forums.
-
- e. Press and Media Practiced Self-Censorship
-
- Worse than merely repeating government propaganda was the
- self-censorship in which some media engaged, including suppressing
- criticism of the government. In his media panel comments, Dick
- DeGuerin chastised the national media for ignoring two important
- stories: BATF's refusing Koresh's invitation to view his guns before
- the raid and BATF's taking Koresh's gun dealer and business partner
- Henry McMahon into "protective custody" after the raid and forbidding
- him to speak to the press or the FBI. The national media still has not
- reported either story. The producers of Pensacola's television show
- "Lawline" even sent copies of their April 21, 1993, interview with
- McMahon, titled "Fiasco in Waco," to television stations all over the
- country. However, stations ignored McMahon's allegations. [214]
-
- After the April 19th fire there were other incidents of
- self-censorship. Ron Engelman hosted a mid- morning talk show on KGBS
- radio in Dallas from February through June, 1993. The Branch Davidians
- listened to his show and even requested that he be made a negotiator.
- (JDR:Appendix C:3) Even after the fire, Engelman's callers wanted to
- talk about the destruction of the Branch Davidians. Management
- demanded Engelman move his show to 6 a.m., take a co-host and make the
- show "light and fluffy." Engelman refused and resigned. [215]
-
- NBC, which had aired the television movie "Ambush at Waco" about the
- BATF raid on Mount Carmel, originally planned to do a sequel about the
- ending of the siege. However, it canceled the sequel, claiming it
- would be "too violent." Perhaps NBC network executives did not want to
- offend government officials by vividly portraying government tanks
- gassing the Branch Davidians and ramming away at the building until it
- caught fire, killing more than 80 people.
-
- While some newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington Times
- called the Justice report a "whitewash," others applauded it. An
- October 12, 1993 Washington Post editorial declared: "In hindsight, it
- is tempting to say that anything that turned out so badly must have
- been the result of serious error. But it is difficult to cast blame
- after reviewing the evidence. . . (A)n earnest effort was being made
- to talk the group's members out of the buildings. . .The finding of
- mass suicide and/or murder is a reasonable one."
-
- 2. POSSIBLE ILLEGAL USE OF TANKS
-
- The Justice report is not as forthcoming as the Treasury report
- regarding the FBI's obtaining military tanks without violating posse
- comitatus prohibitions on the use of the military as a police force.
- First, the report does not reveal whether the FBI used the allegation
- of a "drug nexus" at Waco to obtain the tanks from the military on a
- no charge, "nonreimbursable" basis. However, a Legal Times reporter
- wrote, "Much of the equipment used at Waco was provided by the Army,
- under an agreement that all costs would be reimbursed." [216]
-
- Next the report states: "the FBI requested Bradley fighting vehicles
- from the U.S. Army. Nine of these-- without barrels, pursuant to an
- agreement between the FBI and the Army to avoid posse comitatus
- prohibitions--were ultimately provided." However, when Koresh claimed
- he had weapons that could blow these vehicles into the air, the FBI
- "sought and obtained from the Army two Abrams (M1A1) tanks and five
- M728 Combat Engineering Vehicles (CEVs)." (JDR:123-124) The report
- does not state if these also were "without barrels," but many claim
- that the tanks do have barrels--which even the Justice Department
- itself admits would be illegal.
-
- Upon learning that tanks had been brought to Waco, "the President
- called (Acting Attorney General Stuart) Gerson, requesting an
- explanation for the deployment of military vehicles. Gerson assured
- the President that no assault was planned. . . (and) that it was legal
- for the FBI to use the military vehicles for safety purposes."
- (JDR:239) Evidently, this means that it was illegal to use the tanks
- for actions like the April 19th assault. However, no government agency
- seems willing to challenge what the Justice report itself infers is
- the illegal use of the tanks.
-
- Fire survivor Ruth Riddle expressed shock at the use of the tanks.
- "Who ever heard of Americans using tanks against Americans on American
- soil?" [217]
-
- 3. FBI IMPATIENT WITH CONCILIATORY MEASURES
-
- The federal government has successfully negotiated past sieges. The
- 1973 siege at Wounded Knee lasted 70 days and, despite the fact that
- two FBI agents had been killed, the siege ended peacefully. Similarly,
- a Native American takeover of Alcatraz (after it was no longer used as
- a prison) was allowed to play itself out peacefully. BATF and the FBI
- had negotiated a peaceful surrender after 3 days with the Covenant of
- the Sword and Arm of the Lord group in 1985. And despite the deaths of
- Samuel and Vicki Weaver, after Bo Gritz became a third party
- negotiator, Randy Weaver did surrender without further bloodshed.
-
- Nevertheless, FBI Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard
- Rogers--evidently an individual with little patience for
- negotiations--convinced siege commander SAC Jeffrey Jamar to allow him
- to use pressure tactics against the Branch Davidians. Justice
- Department outside expert Alan A. Stone, M.D. notes that "pushed by
- the tactical leader (i.e., Rogers) the commander on the ground (i.e.,
- Jamar) began to allow tactical pressures." (JDR:Stone:9) These
- tactical pressures--cutting off power, harassing the Branch Davidians
- with bright lights and loud music, destroying property--went against
- the recommendations of FBI behavioral scientist and many negotiators.
-
- Dr. Stone criticized these actions: "I have concluded that the FBI
- command failed to give adequate consideration to their own behavioral
- science and negotiation experts. They also failed to make use of the
- Agency's own prior successful experience in similar circumstances.
- They embarked on a misguided and punishing law enforcement strategy
- that contributed to the tragic ending at Waco." (JDR:Stone:1) He
- holds: "What went wrong at Waco was not that the FBI lacked expertise
- in behavior science or in the understanding of unconventional
- religious groups. Rather, the commander on the ground and others
- committed to tactical-aggressive, traditional law enforcement
- practices disregarded those experts and tried to assert control and
- demonstrate to Koresh that they were in charge. . . (T)he FBI's own
- experts recognized and predicted in memoranda that there was the risk
- that the active aggressive law enforcement mentality of the FBI--the
- so-called `action imperative'-- would prevail in the face of
- frustration and delay." (JDR:Stone:14-15) (It should be noted that the
- Justice report quotes statements from audio tapes of negotiations. The
- full transcripts of these tapes must be investigated by independent
- reviewers.)
-
- a. Smerick and Young Advised Against Tactical Pressures
-
- The FBI consulted its own behavioral scientists, whose specialty was
- applying psychology to law enforcement situations, but ignored their
- recommendations. Pete Smerick and Mark Young recommended in several
- March 5th to 9th memos that this was not a typical hostage situation
- since the Branch Davidians insisted on staying with their leader. They
- wrote that "tactical presence. . .if carried to excess, could
- eventually be counter productive and could result in loss of life."
- They advised, "If the followers could be made to see that the
- government had no intention of engaging them in an apocalyptic final
- battle, then perhaps they would begin to question the validity of
- Koresh's predictions about the inevitability of such a battle."
-
- Smerick and Young recommended that the FBI "establish some trust with
- Koresh" and even suggested "moving back from the compound, not to show
- law enforcement weakness, but to sap from Koresh the source of his
- powerful hold over his followers--his prediction that the government
- was about to start a war against them." [218] They concluded by saying
- that the FBI could "always resort to tactical pressure, but it should
- be the absolute last option we should consider."
-
- In their last memorandum Smerick and Young did recommend mild
- pressures, like sporadic cutting off of power, sudden movements of
- equipment and manpower, and downplaying Koresh's importance to the
- press, but only if exercised with "extreme caution." (JDR:179-183)
- After reviewing Smerick and Young's recommendations, Alan A. Stone,
- concludes "decision-making at Waco failed to give due regard to the
- FBI experts who had the proper understanding of how to deal with an
- unconventional group like the Branch Davidians." (JDR:Stone:28)
-
- b. FBI Rejected Family and Third Party Intervention
-
- FBI commanders rejected two important negotiation tactics: allowing
- direct communication between families and Branch Davidians and
- allowing third parties to negotiate a surrender. While the FBI would
- send in video and audio tapes from families, in order to "drive a
- wedge" between Koresh and his followers, they forbid them to speak
- directly to family members. Months after the massacre, Balenda Gamen,
- mother of fire survivor David Thibodeau, recalled: "I originally came
- to Waco because I was challenged by the FBI when they said to me
- `there is no room for family in this operation. Perhaps we'll do it in
- the future.' When I heard those words I knew that the writing was on
- the wall for this community. They had a very good chance of never
- coming out." [219] Despite Gamen and other family members' continual
- entreaties to the FBI and Janet Reno via fax and registered letter
- that they be allowed to negotiate directly with relatives inside Mount
- Carmel, the FBI would only allow them to send in and receive
- occasional audio and video tapes. During the April 28, 1993, House
- Judiciary Committee hearings Reno admitted that she had never heard
- about the families' attempts to reach her.
-
- A number of third party negotiators were considered and rejected. On
- March 6th FBI Director William Sessions had discussions with Koresh's
- former attorney Gary Coker--who happens to be a personal friend of
- Sessions from his days in Waco [220] --about negotiating with Koresh.
- However, FBI commanders refused to allow Coker to act as a negotiator
- because they thought he merely was looking for a client. (JDR:131).
- Sessions himself offered to negotiate, but Acting Attorney General
- Gerson forbid it. (JDR:239-241)
-
- On March 7th David Koresh declared he would surrender if some
- theologian could convince him his interpretation of the Seven Seals
- was incorrect, but the FBI made no attempt to pursue that avenue.
- (JDR:58) During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing
- SAC Jamar declared that having theologicians--especially renowned
- ones--negotiate with Koresh would just make him more egomaniacal.
- After the Branch Davidians expressed respect for McLennan County
- Sheriff Jack Harwell, the FBI allowed him to participate in some
- mid-March negotiations. They did not give him a free hand as a third
- party negotiator. (JDR:133-134) They also rejected the Branch
- Davidians' request for radio talk show host Ron Engelman as a
- negotiator and Bo Gritz' offer to be a third party negotiator.
-
- On March 16th frustrated Branch Davidians used flashlights to send a
- Morse code to reporters reading, "SOS, SOS, SOS, SOS. FBI broke
- negotiations. Want negotiations from the press." [221] The FBI soon
- started flashing bright lights at the compound at night, perhaps in
- part to end such communications. Only after the Branch Davidians were
- in Mount Carmel for a full month did the FBI allow David Koresh and
- Steve Schneider to meet with their attorneys. As we will see in a
- later section, peaceful efforts by third parties--attorneys and
- theologians--did result in a credible promise by Koresh to lead the
- Branch Davidians out of Mount Carmel despite FBI tactical pressure.
-
- c. Conflicts between Tactical Agents and Negotiators
-
- The Justice report admits that negotiators criticized the tactical
- commanders for undercutting negotiations: "the negotiators felt that
- the negotiating and tactical components of the FBI's strategy were
- more often contradictory than complementary. . .negotiators emphasized
- to Branch Davidians the `dignity' and fair treatment the group would
- receive upon its exit from the compound. By contrast, the negotiators
- felt that the efforts of the tactical personnel were directed toward
- intimidation and harassment. . .some of the negotiators lamented the
- absence of joint strategy sessions with the on-site commander and the
- tactical commander." (JDR:139-140)
-
- The Justice report alleges that negotiators did not believe
- negotiations alone could have avoided the April 19th fire. (JDR:142)
- Alan A. Stone, who made special efforts to conduct his own interviews,
- found many of these individuals had a different opinion. "FBI's
- behavioral scientists and negotiators. . .share my belief that
- mistakes were made. . . (and) . . .expressed their determination to
- have the truth come out, regardless of the consequences."
- (JDR:Stone:4)
-
- Nancy Ammerman, another outside expert, agreed that the FBI did have
- negotiators and experts giving them good advice. However, this advice
- was not heeded because these individuals were "outranked and
- outnumbered by the tactical types." [222] The tactical leaders had
- more pull than the negotiators because of the FBI's action-oriented
- ethos and because negotiators usually were stationed several miles
- from the site, while the Hostage Rescue Team and Richard M. Rogers
- were stationed at the site with SAC Jamar.
-
- Also, some of the FBI negotiators were as hardnosed as the tactical
- agents, insulting Branch Davidians over the phone, calling Koresh a
- "child molester," and abruptly hanging up when they quoted Scriptures.
- One "negotiator" betrayed his true feelings when, after urging Branch
- Davidians to come out over a loudspeaker, he inadvertently left the
- microphone on and was heard to say: "I've been in the FBI for 27 years
- and I've never seen anything like these people. They think they can
- get away with murder. Well, they'll have another thing coming as soon
- as they come out of there." [223]
-
- 4. FBI RELIED ON EXPERTS AND CULT BUSTERS URGING TACTICAL PRESSURE
-
- The Justice report states, "The FBI has questioned whether its
- negotiations with Koresh could even be characterized as `negotiations'
- at all, but rather as Koresh's attempt to convert the agents before it
- was too late and God destroyed them." (JDR:17) Yet despite Koresh's
- obsession with the Seven Seals, they never allowed anyone who was an
- expert on the subject to have direct contact with him.
-
- Nancy Ammerman believes FBI agents had such a negative view of
- Koresh's religious views for three reasons: some individuals didn't
- understand religion, others were antagonistic towards religion in
- general, and others were antagonistic towards Koresh's specific views,
- which differed from their own. [224] She noted FBI officials' and
- agents' "tendency to discount the influence of religious beliefs and
- to evaluate situations largely in terms of a leader's individual
- criminal/psychological motives" and that their "consensus" was that
- "when they encountered people with religious beliefs, those beliefs
- were usually a convenient cover for criminal activity."
- (JDR:Ammerman:5) For example, siege Commander SAC Jamar expressed his
- contempt for Koresh when he declared at the April 28, 1993, House
- Judiciary Committee hearing that Koresh had merely "corrupted people"
- and "corrupted religion to his own ends" and that there was "no way to
- convince Koresh that he was not the Messiah."
-
- It is evident from the Justice report's description of its
- consultations with seven theologians (JDR:186-189) that the only one
- they took seriously was Dr. Glenn Hilburn of Baylor University. Not
- surprisingly, the report mentions that "Baylor University has one of
- the largest `cult' reference and research facilities in the country."
- However, even Dr. Hilburn had little substantive impact on FBI
- thinking or actions. (JDR:186-189)
-
- Several times the Justice report mentions theologian Philip Arnold--an
- expert on the Seven Seals and apocalyptic groups--but never
- acknowledges his crucial impact on Koresh's decision to come out. We
- will review that in detail in a later section. A study of the Justice
- report makes it clear that psychologists, psychiatrists (JDR:158-185)
- and "cult busters" (JDR:190-193) who reinforced the FBI's own
- prejudices had the greatest impact on the FBI's decisions.
-
- a. Psychologists and Psychiatrists
-
- The FBI was particularly attentive to the advice of psychologists and
- psychiatrists who asserted that Koresh was mentally unbalanced and
- would not surrender voluntarily. Dr. Park Dietz held that, "continuing
- to negotiate in good faith would not resolve the situation, because
- Koresh would not come out." (JDR:168) Dr. Anthony J. Pinizotto said,
- "Koresh displayed psychopathic behavior, that he was a `con artist'
- type, and he had narcissistic tendencies." Dr. Mike Webster opined,
- "Koresh appeared to be manifesting anti- social traits." (JDR:170) Dr.
- Perry and social worker Joyce Sparks, who interviewed children
- released from Mount Carmel, agreed that "Koresh was stalling for time,
- to prepare for his `final battle' with authorities." (JDR:171-174)
-
- Dr. Joseph L. Krofcheck (with FBI psychological profiler Clinton R.
- Van Zandt) held that Koresh appeared to be a "functional,
- paranoid-type psychotic," that he was unlikely to "give up the power
- and omnipotence he enjoyed inside the compound," that there was the
- possibility of a "mass-breakout. . .with women carrying a baby in one
- arm while firing a weapon from the other," and that "the only way the
- FBI could influence Koresh's exit from the compound would be some form
- of tactical intervention." (JDR:176-179)
-
- b. Cult Busters
-
- There is evidence that in response to Nancy Ammerman's sharp
- criticisms, to Rick Ross's being indicted for "unlawful imprisonment"
- in the summer of 1993, and to the New Alliance Party suit against the
- FBI for its abuse of the word "cult," the FBI and Justice Department
- have tried to cover up its association with professional or amateur
- "cult busters." The Justice report asserts the FBI "did not solicit
- advice from any `cult experts' or `cult deprogrammers.'" (JDR:190)
-
- In mid-April the FBI asked Dr. Murray S. Miron, a Professor of
- Psycholinquistics at Syracuse University, to analyze five letters that
- Koresh sent out of Mount Carmel. After reading the first and third
- letters, he concluded that they bore "all the hallmarks of rampant,
- morbidly virulent paranoia. . .In my judgement, we are facing a
- determined, hardened adversary who has no intention of delivering
- himself or his followers into the hands of his adversaries. It is my
- belief that he is waiting for an assault." (JDR:174-176)
-
- What the FBI either did not know--or did not admit--is that Dr. Miron
- is an outspoken cult critic. Reportedly, during the 1970s he had been
- involved with the Citizens Freedom Foundation, the anti-cult group
- which evolved into the Cult Awareness Network. During the week of
- April 14-21--even while he was consulting with the FBI-- Miron
- published an article called "The Mark of the Cult" in the Syracuse New
- Times. The article contains stereotypical anti-cult propaganda: "The
- totalitarianism of the cult banishes dissent and fosters dependence
- upon fallible, power-mad leaders. It is the system of every dictator,
- whether benign or benevolent." [225]
-
- In typically media-savvy cult buster fashion, Miron managed to make
- himself one of the few FBI consultants quoted in major media right
- after the fire--thus using his FBI connections to promote his
- anti-cult propaganda. He told the Los Angeles Times, "I advised the
- FBI that all of his promises as to giving up were only subterfuges,
- deceptions and delaying tactics." [226] He told the Washington Post,
- "There was every indication in my mind that he was not prepared to
- commit suicide." [227] His comments occupied eight paragraphs of a New
- York Times article: "Dr. Miron said that Mr. Koresh had become so
- delusional" that he and his followers may have believed that after
- they set the fire "either that they were invulnerable and that the
- fires would consume the authorities while leaving them untouched, or
- that they were about to ascend to glory no matter what happened to
- their bodies." [228]
-
- Rick Ross' contention that he was in close contact with BATF and the
- FBI is backed up by Nancy Ammerman's September 10, 1993 one page
- addendum to her report. (Which the Justice Department did not bother
- to include in its report.) In it she wrote, "The interview transcripts
- document that Mr. Rick Ross was, in fact, closely involved with both
- the ATF and the FBI. . .He clearly had the most extensive access to
- both agencies of any person on the `cult expert' list, and he was
- apparently listened to more attentively." However, after reviewing
- Ross's contacts with the FBI, the Justice report states: "The FBI did
- not `rely' on Ross for advice whatsoever during the standoff."
- (JDR:192)
-
- The Justice report claims that the FBI determined Breault was talking
- to the media and therefore only accepted his affidavits and electronic
- mail from him, but decided "not to contact him." (JDR:192) However,
- Breault asserts: "as soon as the siege began. . .the FBI tried for
- hours to contact us. . .they almost sent the police to drag us to
- police headquarters. Just before they took that drastic action, the
- negotiators broke through." Breault gave them detailed information
- about the Seven Seals, Koresh and his followers. Breault also writes:
- "The FBI contacted us throughout the siege. They showed us Koresh's
- letters." [229] Clearly, either Breault is lying or the FBI and
- Justice Department are trying to cover up their reliance on him.
-
- During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing FBI
- Director William Sessions admitted that the FBI had consulted "cult
- experts," though he got confused about the advice they had given the
- FBI. And SAC Jamar admitted, "we had a white paper on cults that was
- very, very useful to us." The white paper outlined the traits of cults
- with one "dynamic, manipulative, egomaniacal, psychopathic leader" and
- Jamar asserted that the traits fit Koresh "to a T." Jamar did not tell
- the committee what individual--or organization--gave him the white
- paper. However, considering that it contained typical anti-cult
- stereotypes, one might guess either Dr. Murray Miron or Rick Ross gave
- Jamar the white paper. Despite the Justice report denials, it is
- evident that there was a definite cult buster influence on--and
- justification for-- decisions to replace negotiations with pressure
- tactics against the Branch Davidians.
-
- 5. FBI PRESSURE TACTICS REPLACED NEGOTIATIONS
-
- Alan A. Stone, M.D. writes: "By March 21st, the FBI was concentrating
- on tactical pressure alone. . .This changing strategy at the compound
- from (1) conciliatory negotiation to (2) negotiation and tactical
- pressure and then to (3) tactical pressure alone." (JDR:Stone:10)
- Below is a description of these escalating tactical pressures and the
- Branch Davidians' response to them, grouped into Dr. Stone's three
- phases.
-
- a. Conciliatory Negotiations--February 28-March 6
-
- During this period 23 of the 35 individuals to leave Mount Carmel did
- so. The FBI did not punish Koresh after he reneged on his promise to
- surrender on March 2nd because "God had spoken to him and told him to
- wait." And they dealt gingerly with his various threats of violence
- against federal agents. When the U.S. Attorney's office enraged the
- Branch Davidians by charging with murder the two elderly women who had
- left Mount Carmel, negotiators quickly convinced them to drop the
- charges. However, much to the Branch Davidians dismay, the FBI did cut
- off their phones to everyone but the FBI and sent armored vehicles
- onto Mount Carmel Center's property. [(JDR:21-57)]
-
- The FBI also "bugged" Mount Carmel. "A federal law enforcement
- official said that tiny recording devices had been sent in. . .with
- deliveries of milk, news magazines, a typewriter and various other
- items requested. [230] The Justice report admits there was "court-
- ordered electronic surveillance." (JDR:107-108) A Sunday Times of
- London article asserted that the FBI even used aircraft to pick up
- conversations, infrared devices to pinpoint individual's positions,
- and tiny fibre-optic microphones and cameras inserted in walls to
- relay audio and visual images back to the command center. [231] This
- information has not been confirmed.
-
- b. Negotiation and Tactical Pressure--March 7-21
-
- During this period 11 more people left Mount Carmel. While negotiators
- remained conciliatory, they did try to drive a wedge between Koresh
- and his followers by ridiculing Steve Schneider because his wife had
- born Koresh's child and by playing family and negotiation tapes over
- loudspeakers. The FBI began exposing the "negative part of (Koresh's)
- personality"--including his most inflammatory threats--during press
- conferences because "it is important for the American people to know
- what we are dealing with." [232] The FBI turned the electricity on and
- off as a pressure tactic, turning it off for good on March 13th.
-
- These pressures made the Branch Davidians more distrustful. Koresh and
- Schneider called this "bad faith" by the government and Steve
- Schneider claimed on March 13th that "the government wanted to kill
- all of them and burn down the building." (JDR:68) On March 15th
- negotiators made it clear they would refuse to listen to any more
- "Bible babble." However, they did allow a "cordial and positive"
- face-to-face meeting between chief negotiator Byron Sage and McLennan
- County Sheriff Jack Harwell and Branch Davidians Steve Schneider and
- Wayne Martin. (JDR:70)
-
- After the FBI sent in lawyers' letters and an audio tape from
- theologian Phil Arnold, Koresh told the FBI on March 19th that "he was
- ready to come out and face whatever might happen to him." He even
- joked, "When they give me the lethal injection, give me the cheap
- stuff." (JDR:70-75) Between just March 19th and 21st alone ten people
- left Mount Carmel.
-
- c. Tactical Pressure Only--March 22-April 19
-
- Despite these obvious successes, SAC Jamar, influenced by HRT
- commander Rogers, decided it was time to increase tactical pressures
- and "demonstrate the authority of law enforcement." (JDR:135) On the
- evening of March 21st the FBI started blaring music over its
- loudspeaker system and kept it up despite Branch Davidian complaints.
- At 11:45 p.m. Koresh sent out the message, "Because of the loud music,
- nobody is coming out." The next day Schneider claimed "that the music
- had been counterproductive." On March 22nd the FBI promised Koresh
- that if he surrendered immediately he could communicate with his
- followers in jail, hold religious services and make a worldwide
- religious broadcast. He angrily threw their letter away. (JDR:78-80)
- The last Branch Davidian left Mount Carmel on March 23rd.
-
- The Justice report states the negotiating team recommended escalating
- harassment and the eventual gassing of the compound. (JDR:138) (As we
- know, not all of them agreed that was the best approach.) Except for
- finally allowing Koresh and Schneider to meet with their attorneys,
- over these four weeks the FBI's strategy consisted mostly of
- harassing, insulting and punishing the Branch Davidians.
-
- During the March 24th press briefing, as the Branch Davidians
- listened, "the FBI increased its `verbal assault' against Koresh,
- calling Koresh a liar and coward, and accusing him of hiding behind
- his children." (JDR:83) It may have been during this time that an FBI
- spokesperson declared that Koresh was just a "cheap thug who
- interprets the Bible through the barrel of a gun." [233] The FBI
- harassed the Branch Davidians by blaring loud music night and day and
- playing back audio tapes of negotiation, family members and released
- members greetings tapes. It shined bright lights all night long.
-
- Some of the harassment was quite violent. The FBI declared deadlines
- by which Branch Davidians were to exit on March 23rd, 24th, 27th, and
- 28th. When these were not met, the FBI removed and often crushed and
- destroyed automobiles, vans, go-carts and motorcycles. Also, "Bradleys
- (tanks) were run up and down in front of the compound in what
- negotiators believed was a show of force" (JDR:Dennis:44); individuals
- who left the building without permission were "flashbanged," i.e. had
- loud smoke grenades thrown near them; helicopters brazenly buzzed the
- building; and loudspeakers blared sounds of screeching rabbits being
- slaughtered and played the song "These Boots are Made for Walking"
- which contains the line, "and if you play with matches you know you're
- going to get burned." (JDR:79-109)
-
- Louis Alaniz, who snuck into Mount Carmel for several days, described
- "these Bradley's running around and the guys in them shooting the
- finger at these kids, and one incident where they actually mooned some
- of the girls. These people were scared. They only thing they saw was a
- bunch of people coming and shooting at them." [234] Outside expert Dr.
- Robert Cancro told reporters: "the threats implicit in the use of
- armored vehicles, razor wire, and a tightening perimeter tend to
- negate the positive and friendly tone attempted by negotiators. .
- .Even a person who isn't paranoid would interpret that as lack of
- consistency and good faith in negotiations. A paranoid individual
- needs more reassurance, not less." [235]
-
- Edward Dennis wrote, "Some negotiators believe that as a result of
- these actions the Davidians concluded that the negotiators had no
- influence over the decision makers and that the FBI was not
- trustworthy." (JDR:Dennis:45) Dick DeGuerin told reporters, "They're
- still intimidated by the FBI. We're not coming out until we know the
- media are going to be there." [236] And Balenda Gamen explained why
- many Branch Davidians did not exit or send their children out after
- this point: "Because we're a very arrogant, proud nation of people.
- You challenge Americans to defend their property, and they're probably
- going to do that. The bottom line is, if you truly believe in what you
- are doing that passionately, you don't send your children out to the
- enemy." [237] According to Louis Alaniz, "Koresh kept members in line
- by threatening to force them to leave the compound." [238]
-
- To show his lack of concern about the government's harassment, at one
- point Steve Schneider declared "you can burn us down, kill us,
- whatever." (JDR:87) According to news reports Koresh told the FBI, "If
- they want blood, then our blood is here for them to shed. . .We are
- not afraid of the government. If we have to die for what we stand for,
- we're going to. I don't mind if I die." [239] Dick DeGuerin said,
- "There was a collective feeling that the harassment was making them
- more stubborn." [240] During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
- Committee hearings SAC Jamar dismissed Representative Don Edwards
- question about whether these pressures only brought the Branch
- Davidians closer, saying there was "no way to drive them closer than
- they were."
-
- When Representative William Hughes asked SAC Jamar which experts had
- recommended they use pressure tactics like blasting loud noises all
- night long, Jamar did not answer; he merely repeated his claim the
- purpose of the noise was sleep deprivation. Outside expert Nancy
- Ammerman also could not get a straight answer about who had
- recommended these pressure tactics. She notes that Drs. Miron,
- Krofcheck and Dietz were the most frequently consulted experts. She
- then complains: "It is unclear which of these consultants (if any)
- recommended the psychological warfare tactics (Tibetan chants, sounds
- of rabbits dying, rock music, flood lights, helicopters hovering,
- etc.). None of the persons associated with (National Center for the
- Analysis of Violent Crimes) with whom I have talked claims to have
- favored these tactics, but no one was willing to say who recommended
- them or how the decision was made to use them." (JDR:Ammerman:2) Who
- gave these orders should be investigated.
-
- 6. FBI DESTROYED CRIME SCENE DESPITE COMPLAINTS
-
- One form of harassment which had important legal implications was the
- FBI's moving and destroying vehicles. This enraged the Branch
- Davidians because they believed the vans and automobiles would prove
- that they had done relatively little firing at the agents hiding
- behind them and that BATF was responsible for most of the shooting,
- including of its own agents. The vehicles might also provide evidence
- that helicopters had shot from the air. As early as March 6th Steve
- Schneider had expressed fear that the government wanted to destroy
- evidence that would prove BATF's guilt. He told negotiators: "It
- wouldn't surprise me if they wouldn't want to get rid of the evidence.
- Because if this building is still standing, you will see the evidences
- of what took place." (JDR:53) Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman
- said, "There is no question that the FBI is destroying evidence. If
- nothing else they've moved the location of physical objects from a
- crime scene before they had been photographed." DeGuerin agreed.
- "They're destroying evidence with the bulldozers." [241]
-
- The Texas Rangers were put in charge of investigating the February
- 28th raid. For ten days, SAC Jamar refused to allow the Texas Rangers
- to finish investigating the area behind Mount Carmel Center where the
- shootout between BATF agents and three Branch Davidians occurred. By
- then footprints which might help clarify who shot first had been
- eliminated by rain. Both Texas Rangers and BATF opposed FBI removal of
- the vehicles from the compound. (JDR:229) On March 23rd Assistant U.S.
- Attorney William Johnston wrote Janet Reno to complain. (JDR:81) The
- FBI then agreed to "photograph, graph and grid the portion of the
- compound where the vehicles sought to be moved were located" in order
- to preserve evidence. (JDR:255) However, the Justice report does not
- mention if the FBI told the Branch Davidians about this new policy.
-
- 7. FBI PLAN TO GAS, DISASSEMBLE MOUNT CARMEL
-
- The FBI Hostage Negotiation Training Manual asserts, "Time is always
- in our favor," and urges personnel not to grow impatient in hostage
- situations. [242] London Times bureau chief James Adams, author of a
- number of books on covert warfare, wrote about the government's
- handling of the standoff: "Every professional in the hostage rescue
- business knows that the best chance of survival for all the innocents
- held captive is to play out a waiting game. The theory, which has been
- proved again and again, is that the longer you wait, the better the
- chances of a peaceful resolution." In his article he quotes
- counter-terrorism expert Noel Koch who wrote, "If nothing is
- happening, that is good. The heart of negotiation is patience, and if
- it takes 41 or 151 days it should make no difference. To depart from
- that central idea is crazy." Adams questions whether the deaths were
- necessary and ends by saying, "those responsible must be held
- accountable." [243]
-
- In early April Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard Rogers, who was
- continuing to push for more aggressive action, gave visiting FBI
- officials "a briefing on the use of CS gas and suggested an operation
- plan for such use," a plan which was soon approved by FBI Director
- Sessions. (JDR:256-258) The plan was to "introduce the liquid CS into
- the compound in stages. . .eventually walls would be torn down to
- increase the exposure of those remaining inside." (JDR:262-263) The
- report notes, "While it was conceivable that tanks and other armored
- vehicles could be used to demolish the compound, the FBI considered
- that such a plan would risk harming the children inside." (JDR:260)
-
- Nevertheless, Rogers' plan clearly included defacto demolition of
- Mount Carmel. "If all subjects failed to exit the structure after 48
- hours of tear gas, then a modified CEV would proceed to open up and
- begin disassembling the structure at the location that was least
- exposed to the gas. The CEV would continue until all the Branch
- Davidians were located." (JDR:277-78) The FBI had their plan--and they
- probably did not intend to let anything stand in their way of
- convincing Attorney General Janet Reno to approve it.
-
- 8. FBI REFUSED TO BELIEVE FINAL KORESH PROMISE TO SURRENDER
-
- As noted above, in mid-March, after the FBI sent in the letters from
- lawyers and an audio tape from theologian Phil Arnold, Koresh stated
- that he was ready to come out. However, FBI harassment made him change
- his mind. A few weeks later the FBI allowed Koresh and Schneider to
- meet with their attorneys and they brought Koresh a 30 minute tape by
- Drs. Phil Arnold and Jim Tabor. There is solid evidence that as a
- result of these contacts, in mid-April David Koresh did indeed receive
- his "message from God" and that he and all Branch Davidians would have
- left Mount Carmel had the FBI waited only a few more days.
-
- a. DeGuerin and Zimmerman Visited Mount Carmel
-
- The FBI initially refused to allow the Branch Davidians to consult
- with attorneys. In mid-March U.S. District Judge Walter S. Smith Jr.
- rejected requests from lawyers contacted by Branch Davidian family
- members to enter the compound and negotiate for them, writing, "One
- simply cannot point a gun, literally or figuratively, at
- constitutional authority and at the same time complain that
- constitutional rights are being denied." [244] (Judge Smith is now
- presiding over the Branch Davidians' trial.) However, a number of
- attorneys, including "radicals" like Kirk Lyons of North Carolina's
- Cause Foundation, had filed habeas corpus suits, and the FBI may have
- feared some appellate judge might let them have access to Koresh.
- [245]
-
- Koresh's mother retained Houston criminal defense attorney Dick
- Deguerin who was well known for clients he'd defended in highly
- publicized homicides, including Muneer Deeb who was acquitted on
- charge of killing three teenagers in Waco. [246] The Schneider family
- retained another respected criminal attorney, Jack Zimmerman. Both
- DeGuerin and Zimmerman have frequently told the press that the Branch
- Davidians had very "triable" cases, might have been acquitted by
- juries on the grounds of self-defense, and were committed to leaving
- Mount Carmel and facing juries. Koresh even allowed DeGuerin to meet
- with New York attorneys to discuss film and book rights to Koresh's
- story.
-
- b. Drs. Arnold and Tabor Convinced Koresh to Write "Seven Seals"
-
- Dr. Philip Arnold, executive director of Houston's Reunion Institute
- and an expert in apocalyptic studies and the Seven Seals, read a
- newspaper transcript of David Koresh's February 28th sermon on KRLD
- and immediately resolved to be of assistance. [247] He drove to Waco
- and explained his expertise to SAC Bob Ricks, chief aid to SAC Jeffrey
- Jamar. However, Ricks put Arnold off several times saying, "You could
- never talk Book of Revelation with him. You've never heard anything
- like this." An FBI agent did take Arnold's number and contacted him a
- few days later. Arnold returned to Waco and spoke with the agent over
- the phone but was never contacted by the FBI again. This is not
- surprising considering negotiators March 15th decision to refuse to
- listen to any more "Bible babble." Dr. Arnold has lamented that the
- FBI "took that to be a big joke, all that talk about the Seven Seals.
- The Seven Seals was (Koresh's) language, and if you didn't speak that
- language, there was no way of showing him what he had to do." [248]
-
- On March 17th Branch Davidians happened by chance to hear Dr. Arnold's
- five minute radio show during which he discussed the Book of
- Revelation. They immediately told the FBI they wanted to speak with
- him, but the FBI "denied the request." (JDR:Appendix C:3) Edward
- Dennis notes that Steve Schneider had specifically mentioned Phil
- Arnold as possibly being a "theologian (who) could convince the people
- that Koresh was wrong" about their being in the Fifth Seal of death.
- (JDR:Dennis:15) The FBI's only concession was to send in a March 19th
- tape of Arnold's radio show. [(JDR:186)]
-
- On April 1st Phil Arnold and Dr. Jim Tabor, a professor of religious
- studies at the University of North Carolina who also specializes in
- apocalyptic studies, did a telephone interview on the Ron Engelman
- show. During it they explained to Koresh that the "little season" that
- the Branch Davidians needed to wait was not merely a couple of months,
- but might be a much longer time. They also talked about how great
- prophets like Jeremiah, John, and Paul had gone to prison--and had
- produced great literature there.
-
- Dr. Arnold gave this tape to Dick DeGuerin who brought it to Koresh on
- April 4th. Koresh told his attorneys everyone would be coming out
- after Passover, which would last 10 days. On April 9th and 10th he
- delivered to the FBI two defiant letters filled with Biblical
- allusions-- ones which the FBI has used to excuse their assault on
- Mount Carmel.
-
- However, on April 14th Koresh wrote a very different letter. In it he
- revealed that God finally had spoken to him and that they all would
- come out as soon as he had completed a short book on the Seven Seals.
- The letter to Koresh's attorney Dick DeGuerin reads, in part:
-
- As far as our progress is concerned, here is where we stand:
-
- . . .I am presently being permitted to document, in structured form,
- the decoded messages of the Seven Seals. Upon the completion of this
- task, I will be freed of my "waiting period." I hope to finish this as
- soon as possible and to stand before man to answer any and all
- questions regarding my actions.
-
- I have been praying so long for this opportunity; to put the Seals in
- written form. Speaking the truth seems to have very little effect on
- man.
-
- I was shown that as soon as I am given over into the hands of man, I
- will be made a spectacle of, and people will not be concerned about
- the truth of God, but just the bizarrity of me - the flesh (person).
-
- I want the people of this generation to be saved. I am working night
- and day to complete my final work of the writing out of the "these
- Seals."
-
- I will demand the first manuscript of the Seals be given to you. Many
- scholars and religious leaders will wish to have copies for
- examination. I will keep a copy with me. As soon as I can see that
- people, like Jim Tabor and Phil Arnold have a copy I will come out and
- then you can do your thing with this Beast.
-
- I hope to keep in touch with you by letter, so please give your
- address.
-
- We are standing on the threshold of Great events! The Seven Seals, in
- written form are the most sacred information ever! David Koresh
-
-
- On April 16th Koresh told the FBI he had finished the First Seal
- (JDR:107) and "asked for a word processor and batteries to speed
- production of the other six chapters." [249] At an October 15, 1993,
- congressional briefing sponsored by the Ross & Green consulting group,
- Dr. Tabor said that Koresh and Ruth Riddle, who was typing it for him,
- worked until 9 p.m. Sunday night, April 18th, putting the final
- touches on the First Seal, which was also the longest. That meant they
- would be leaving Mount Carmel in a few days. Tabor said, "they were so
- happy that night, shades of the last supper."
-
- During the April 19th fire Ruth Riddle managed to jump from a hole in
- the second floor wall. She carried Koresh's First Seal on a computer
- disk. The FBI immediately confiscated the disk, but later released it.
- Having read it, Tabor declared, "It's intriguing. It's not my own
- faith system, but it's coherent, logical and quite moving to read.
- What he lived and died for."
-
- After the April 19th FBI assault and the death of Koresh and 80 or
- more other Branch Davidians, Drs. Arnold and Tabor severely criticized
- the FBI. "I think they were convinced from the start that he was evil,
- horrible and wicked. . .They didn't take his religion seriously
- enough. They needed to have input from people who are trained in
- biblical symbols."
-
- c. FBI and Cult Busters Ridiculed Koresh Promise
-
- According to Tabor, as soon as they got Koresh's April 14th letter,
- the FBI began ridiculing Koresh, saying things like, "How long will it
- take a high school dropout to write a book." The April 26, 1993, Time
- (which went to press before the fire) devoted a whole article to
- Koresh's promise to write the book, including a long paragraph
- explaining Dr. Arnold's views on Koresh's possible interpretation of
- the Seven Seals. However, it also described the FBI's frustrations
- because it had taken Koresh 4 days to write 30 pages. "So, FBI men
- sourly note, a surrender may be months off, even if Koresh keeps his
- word. . .`No one at our place is holding his breath.' said FBI special
- agent Dick Swensen." An FBI official, speaking on the condition of
- anonymity, told the Washington Post, "Were we going to sit there and
- wait for this guy to finish his treatises on the Seven Seals?. . .Were
- we going to sit there status quo for another month, another two
- months, another six months?" [250] Bob Ricks' statement on April 16th
- sums up the FBI attitude: "We are going to get them. . .to bring them
- before the bar of justice for the murder of our agents. They're going
- to answer for their crimes. That's the bottom line to this whole
- thing, they're going to come out." [251]
-
- d. FBI Excuses After the Fire
-
- After the April 19th fire the FBI claimed that it had evidence that
- Koresh's contacts with his attorneys were just stalling techniques.
- SACs Jamar claimed that listening devices heard cult members joking
- about DeGuerin's involvement being a ruse [252] , a claim the Justice
- report repeats (JDR:143-144) Koresh attorney Dick DeGuerin "disputed
- claims by FBI spokesman Bob Ricks that cult members had called
- meetings with the attorneys `a fiasco'. `The real fiasco was the
- attack on the compound with tear gas and ripping the walls apart. .
- .If you consider that we got an absolute agreement signed that they
- would come out peacefully. . .'" [253]
-
- Jamar also told the press, "This latest business with the Seven Seals,
- we have intelligence that it was just one more stalling technique."
- [254] Dr. Phil Arnold challenged the FBI's allegation that
- electronic monitoring of Koresh's conversations proved he wasn't
- serious. He said Koresh's "vocabulary was not formed by high school,
- college or television. It's formed by the King James Version of the
- Bible, which he had memorized. It would take those of us who are
- similarly familiar or trained in its constant usage to be able to
- understand him on a depth level where the subtleties of the language
- come through." [255] Many have commented that the FBI's monitoring
- devices must not have been very good if they could not hear Koresh's
- loud dictating of his book to Ruth Riddle.
-
- The only evidence the Justice report presents that Koresh's writing
- his book on the Seven Seals was a stalling technique was provided by
- (defacto cult buster) Dr. Murray S. Miron. Concerning the
- all-important April 14th letter, "Dr. Miron noted that Koresh's
- discussion in the letter appeared to be a ploy designed to buy more
- time for Koresh." He concluded that he did not believe "there is in
- these writings any better, or at least certain, hope for any early end
- to the standoff." (JDR:175-176) Marc Breault alleges the FBI "showed
- us Koresh's letters, which were nothing more than scriptural ramblings
- written down. After reading those we became more and more convinced
- that Koresh had no intentions of coming out. We told the FBI as much.
- . .We told the FBI that Koresh was starting to lose his grip and that
- he would probably end the siege violently." [256]
-
- After DeGuerin, Arnold and Tabor held an October press conference to
- announce the release of Koresh's book, "Bill Carter, an FBI spokesman,
- said the agency could not comment on the tract because of pending
- cases against 11 Branch Davidians." [257] More disturbing than the
- FBI's reliance on Miron, and possibly Breault, to interpret Koresh's
- April 14th letter is strong evidence that the FBI never showed
- Attorney General Reno the April 14th letter so she could judge for
- herself whether Koresh intended to surrender!
-
- 9. FBI MISLED JANET RENO ON NEED FOR AND DANGERS OF ASSAULT
-
- On April 12, 1993, the FBI presented the tear gas plan to Attorney
- General Janet Reno for approval. "Why now? Why not wait?" she asked.
- On April 16th she still disapproved the plan--until an all important
- conversation with FBI Director William Sessions. Whatever he said to
- her swayed her to the point that she asked for a documented statement
- of why the plan should go forward. On April 17th she received the
- documents. "She read only a chronology, gave the rest of the materials
- a cursory review, and satisfied herself that `the documentation was
- there'." (JDR:272) She then approved the gassing plan. The next day
- she informed President Clinton of her decision. Below are the known
- and admitted arguments the FBI used to break down Reno's resistance to
- the plan. Despite Janet Reno's assertions to the contrary, we can see
- that the FBI clearly did mislead, and perhaps even bully, her into
- approving their plan.
-
- a. FBI Misinformed Reno about Progress of Negotiations
-
- On April 15th Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell had a two
- hour conversation with chief FBI negotiator Byron Sage. "Hubbell
- recalls that Sage said further negotiations with the subjects in the
- compound would be fruitless. . .Sage further advised Hubbell that
- Koresh had been disingenuous in his discussions with Sage about the
- `Seven Seals.'. . .Hubbell recalls Sage saying he believed there was
- nothing more he or the negotiators could do to persuade Koresh to
- release anyone else, or to come out himself. . .Hubbell advised the
- Attorney General about this conversation." (JDR:270-271) It is unknown
- if Sage told Hubbell about the April 14th letter or read him its
- contents.
-
- Outside expert Alan A. Stone, M.D. writes: "It is unclear from the
- reports whether the FBI even explained to the AG (Reno) that the
- agency had rejected the advice of their own experts in behavioral
- science and negotiation, or whether the AG was told that FBI
- negotiators believed that they could get more people out of the
- compound by negotiation. By the time the AG made her decision, the
- noose was closed and, as one agent told me, the FBI believed they had
- `three options - gas, gas, and gas.'" (JDR:Stone:10-11)
-
- This is not surprising, since Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard
- Rogers himself met with Reno. "Rogers and others offered the following
- additional reasons (for the assault): Koresh had broken every promise
- he had made; negotiations had broken down; no one had been released
- since March 23rd; and it appeared that no one else would surrender."
- (JDR:269) In effect, HRT Commander Rogers, who had pushed SAC Jamar to
- use the tactical harassment that had so disrupted negotiations, now
- informed Attorney Janet Reno that negotiations were not working! Janet
- Reno told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing:
- "Throughout this 51-day process, Koresh continued to assert that he
- and the others inside would at some point surrender. However, the FBI
- advised that at no point did he keep his word on any of these
- promises." It is not known if Rogers' and higher FBI officials'
- impatience to end the standoff was related to their possible fear the
- upcoming Weaver trial would bring out facts about FBI misconduct in
- that case-- however, that should be investigated.
-
- b. FBI Withheld April 14th Promise to Surrender Letter from Reno
-
- Dr. James Tabor lamented at both the October 15 congressional briefing
- and the November 22, 1993, American Academy of Religion panel that, as
- far as he knew, the FBI never gave Janet Reno the details of Koresh's
- decision to write the his book about the Seven Seals or a copy of his
- April 14th letter. As we can see below, there is no evidence that the
- FBI showed this document--what Dick DeGuerin called "an absolute
- agreement signed that they would come out peacefully"--to Attorney
- General Janet Reno. Nor does it seem to have been shown to FBI
- Director Sessions or FBI Deputy Director Clarke before the April 19th
- assault- -or to reporters or even to outside experts after the fire.
- Evidence of this follows.
-
- * The Justice report states only, "The FBI provided the Attorney
- General with copies of the memoranda prepared by Dr. Miron and Dr.
- Krofcheck and SSA Van Zandt analyzing Koresh's April 9th letter."
- (JDR:274)
-
- * At the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing, FBI
- Director Sessions insisted that the last Koresh letter was related to
- Passover, which would have been much earlier in April.
-
- * At the same hearing, FBI Deputy Director Clarke mentions only
- Koresh's April 9th and 10th letters when he declares that Koresh had
- "his own game plan" and the "snare had been set."
-
- * On April 21, 1993, senior FBI officials held a background briefing
- for reporters to explain their decision to gas Mount Carmel. They
- included Koresh's April 9th and 10th letters as examples of "his
- irrational and `insane' behavior during negotiations." [258] However,
- there is no indication they showed reporters the April 14th letter.
- (The only publication we found which mentioned or quoted the letter
- after the fire was Time, in it's May 3, 1993 issue. However, Time had
- been in touch with Dr. Phil Arnold and quoted him extensively in an
- earlier article.)
-
- * The Justice report does include the April 14th letter after the
- April 9th and 10th letters in an appendix. However, only Koresh's
- April 14th phone call is mentioned in the chronology for that date
- (JDR:105), while the April 9th letter is quoted extensively
- (JDR:99-100) and the April 10th letter is analyzed. (JDR:102) The
- Justice report only mentions the letter in the section where Dr. Miron
- dismisses it as a "ploy." The report inaccurately describes it as
- "Koresh's request that the FBI give him time to finish his manuscript
- about the Seven Seals." (JDR:174)
-
- * Outside expert Lawrence E. Sullivan quotes at length from Koresh's
- April 9th and 10th letters to the FBI, trying to find evidence that
- Koresh would have come out--yet he never mentions the April 14th
- letter! He does quote extensively from the earlier, defiant letters,
- ending, "In the briefing the letter seems to play the role of a last
- straw, measuring Koresh's intransigence and provoking the FBI to
- escalate their interventions." (JDR:Sullivan:5-6) Sullivan's reference
- to the "briefing" indicates that the letter was not discussed during
- the Justice Department's briefing of the outside experts! Even Edward
- Dennis, who was appointed to be the most prominent reviewer of the
- Justice report, refers only to the April 9th and 10th letters and
- Koresh's April 14th phone call. (JDR:Dennis:26) Only one outside
- expert, Nancy Ammerman, even refers to the letter. However, it is
- unknown if she got it from the Justice Department or directly from Dr.
- Philip Arnold. Whoever withheld the April 14th letter from the FBI
- Director and the Attorney General Reno ultimately may be responsible
- for the massacre of the Branch Davidians.
-
- c. FBI Told Reno CS Gas is Safe
-
- CS gas is a white crystalline powder that causes involuntary closure
- of eyes, burning of the skin, respiratory problems and vomiting.
- Amnesty International in October of 1992 said that CS is "particularly
- dangerous when. . .launched directly into homes or other buildings."
- The United States was one of 100 countries that signed an agreement
- banning the use of CS gas in war during the Chemical Weapons
- Convention in Paris in January of 1993. FBI officials did not know
- this when they recommended it. [259]
-
- The goal of the gassing was to drive Branch Davidians out of the
- house. However, the U.S. Department of the Army manual on Civil
- Disturbances (October, 1975, FM19-15) notes: "Generally, persons
- reacting to CS are incapable of executing organized and concerted
- actions and excessive exposure to CS may make them incapable of
- vacating the area."
-
- Alan A. Stone was particularly critical of the FBI's decision to use
- CS gas against the Branch Davidians, especially the children: "When
- asked, the Justice Department was unaware whether the FBI had even
- questioned whether these intentional stresses would be particularly
- harmful to the many infants and children in the compound. Apparently,
- no one asked whether such deleterious measures were appropriate,
- either as a matter of law enforcement ethics or as a matter of
- morality, when innocent children were involved. . .I can testify from
- personal experience to the power of C.S. gas to quickly inflame eyes,
- nose, and throat, to produce choking, chest pain, gagging, and nausea
- in healthy adult males. It is difficult to believe that the U.S.
- government would deliberately plan to expose twenty- five children,
- most of them infants and toddlers, to C.S. gas for forty-eight hours.
- . .The official reports are silent about these issues and do not
- reveal what the FBI told the AG about this matter. . .Based on my own
- medical knowledge and review of scientific literature, the information
- supplied to the AG seems to minimize the potential harmful
- consequences for infants and children." (JDR:Stone:29-30)
-
- Dr. Stone quotes a case of an unprotected child's two to three hour
- exposure to CS gas which resulted in first degree facial burns, severe
- respiratory distress typical of chemical pneumonia and an enlarged
- liver. "The infant's reactions reported in this case history were of a
- vastly different dimension than the information given the AG
- suggested. . .Whatever the actual effects may have been, I find it
- hard to accept a deliberate plan to insert C.S. gas for forty-eight
- hours in a building with so many children. It certainly makes it more
- difficult to believe that the health and safety of the children was
- our primary concern." (JDR:Stone:35)
-
- As for whether CS gas is flammable, "one manufacturer of CS gas. .
- .said. . .he was not certain if the chemical--when spread as a fine
- powder throughout buildings and exposed to fire--would act as a
- catalyst for flames." [260] Chemical consultant Dr. Jay Young said
- that a mixture of CS gas and air could be ignited, but only if the
- ratio of the gas and air was within a very narrow range. [261]
- Attorney Jack Zimmerman, who spoke with military experts, asserted,
- "All three types of CS can spontaneously ignite if occurring in a
- high-enough concentration in a confined space that is exposed to open
- flame." [262] Nevertheless, "the FBI informed (Reno) that the tear gas
- would not cause a fire." (JDR:266)
-
- The two methods of delivery which the FBI used are also dangerous. The
- Mark-V system, "a liquid tear gas dispenser that shoots a stream of
- liquid tear gas (propelled by noncombustible carbon dioxide)
- approximately 50 feet for a duration of approximately 15 seconds,"
- (JDR:287) might suffocate a child in direct line of fire. Even more
- dangerous were the "ferret liquid tear gas rounds", more than 400 of
- which were used to deliver gas. (JDR:277,292,294)
-
- The Justice report admits the ferret tear gas rounds, which it claims
- are not "pyrotechnic," are "launched by a M79 grenade launcher," and
- that, "when fired from 20 yards or less the rounds are capable of
- penetrating a hollow core door." (JDR:277) According to Dick DeGuerin,
- survivors claim that during the gas attack the grenades did in fact
- penetrate multiple walls before exploding.
-
- d. FBI Pushed Reno's Child Abuse "Hot Button"
-
- The Justice report states: "during the week of April 12, someone had
- made a comment in one of the meetings that Koresh was beating babies.
- When Reno inquired further, she had the clear impression that, at some
- point, since the FBI had assumed command and control of the situation
- they had learned that the Branch Davidians were beating babies. She
- had no doubt that the children were living in intolerable conditions.
- Moreover, she had been told that Koresh had sexually abused minors
- previously, and that he continued to have sex while recovering from
- his wounds." (JDR:275) Dr. Park Dietz wrote in a memorandum: "Koresh
- may continue to make sexual use of any female children who remain
- inside." (JDR:223)
-
- FBI Director Sessions went on at length during the April 28, 1993,
- House Judiciary Committee hearings about Victoria Hollingsworth's
- allegation that her 13- or 14-year- old daughter, who she had left
- inside Mount Carmel when she left in March, was one of David Koresh's
- child brides. We must wonder if this is one of the things Sessions
- told Reno during the private phone conversation which evidently
- convinced her to accept the gassing plan. To our knowledge, no other
- government agent or official has made this specific allegation.
- Despite all this discussion of child abuse, the Justice report relates
- that in retrospect Reno "did not believe that anyone at the FBI
- deliberately played up the issue of child abuse." (JDR:275-276)
-
- e. FBI Threatened to Withdraw Hostage Rescue Team
-
- On April 14th Hostage Rescue Team commander Richard "Rogers advised
- that his team had received sufficient breaks during the standoff that
- they were not too fatigued to perform at top capacity in any tactical
- operation at the time. He added, however, that if the standoff
- continued for an extended length of time, he would propose that the
- HRT stand down for rest and retraining. When Reno asked about using
- SWAT teams to take the place of the HRT, she was told that the HRT's
- expertise in dealing with the powerful weapons inside the compound,
- driving the armored vehicles, and maintaining the security of the
- perimeter was essential." She was also discouraged from using the
- Army's "Delta Force" or other forces because of posse comitatus
- restrictions. (JDR:268) The FBI warned Reno that "Koresh might
- actually mount an offensive attack against the perimeter security,
- with Branch Davidians using children as shields. This would have
- required the best trained forces available to the FBI." (JDR:269)
-
- On April 15th FBI chief negotiator Byron Sage told Associate Attorney
- General Webster Hubbell that "law enforcement personnel at Waco were
- getting tired and their tempers were fraying." Hubbell passed this
- information on to Reno. Upon hearing on April 16th that Reno had
- turned down the gassing plan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark
- Richard told Hubbell "that the FBI would not be pleased, that they
- would nonetheless accept the decision, and that they may then talk in
- terms of withdrawal." (JDR:271) Despite these threats to withdraw the
- FBI Hostage Rescue Team, the Justice report asserts Reno believes,
- "The FBI did not try to `railroad' her." (JDR:275-276)
-
- f. FBI De-emphasized Suicide
-
- BATF had used rumors that the Branch Davidians might commit suicide to
- excuse a paramilitary raid against the Branch Davidians. And the FBI
- had alluded to the possibility of mass suicide, as when SAC Bob Ricks
- told the press in March, "We're very concerned that part of Koresh's
- grand scheme is he would like to see a large number of his people die,
- which would be justification for his pronouncements of the fulfillment
- of the Scriptures." [263] However, when it came to promoting their
- gassing plan, mass suicide suddenly became a minor issue. "(T)he FBI
- told the Attorney General they regarded the possibility of mass
- suicide as remote." (JDR:274) Attorney General Reno told the April 28,
- 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing "she would not have given the
- go-ahead if she thought cult members would commit suicide. She said
- the FBI had interviewed former Branch Davidian members throughout the
- world and had concluded Mr. Koresh would not kill himself or lead a
- mass suicide effort." [264] She also asserted during the October 8,
- 1993, Justice Department press conference on Waco, "I don't think
- there were any misleading statements about suicide because we talked
- about it..." [265] FBI Director Sessions also has said "none of us
- expect them to commit suicide." [266]
-
- The Justice report does not mention if FBI agents ever told Sessions
- or Reno that: "one former resident who left during the standoff told
- investigators that on March 2nd Koresh intended to leave the compound
- with his followers and commit mass suicide, until Koresh changed his
- mind when God told him `to wait.'. . .On March 5th, 1993, released
- child Joan Vaega had a note pinned to her clothes stating that her
- mother (Marguerite Vaega) would be dead by the time other relatives
- had read the note." Nor is it known if FBI agents had told Sessions
- and Reno they were aware of Kiri Jewell's allegations about having
- been taught to commit suicide. (JDR:Dennis:37)
-
- Even if there was no mass suicide, the FBI's withholding such evidence
- of potential suicide from Sessions and Reno certainly misled them.
- Moreover, the FBI's mere plan to gas and demolish the building was as
- irresponsible as yelling "jump" to a person threatening to jump from a
- ledge or waving a red flag at a raging bull. Dr. Stone, who believes
- the Branch Davidians did commit suicide, wrote he is "convinced that
- the FBI's noose-tightening tactics may well have precipitated Koresh's
- decision to commit suicide and his followers to this course of mass
- suicide. The official reports have shied away from directly
- confronting the possible causal relationship." (JDR:Stone:15)
-
- g. FBI Assured Reno "This Is Not D-Day"
-
- The Justice report states: "The action was viewed as a gradual,
- step-by-step process. It was not law enforcement's intent that this
- was to be `D-Day.' Both the Attorney General and Director Sessions
- voiced concern for achieving the end result with maximum safety. (FBI
- Deputy Director Floyd) Clarke made it clear that the goal of the plan
- was to introduce the tear gas one step at a time to avoid confusing
- the Branch Davidians and thereby maintain the impression that they
- were not trapped." (JDR:267) Reno asserted at her April 19th press
- conference, "Today was not meant to be D-Day. We were prepared to
- carry it out tomorrow and the next day, and do everything we could to
- effect a peaceful resolution of this matter." [267] In her April
- telephone briefing of President Clinton, Reno "emphasized that the
- operation was intended to proceed incrementally, and that it might
- take two or three days before the Branch Davidians surrendered. The
- Attorney General told the President that Monday, April 19th was not
- `D-Day'." (JDR:280)
-
- The Justice report states that during planning of the assault, Reno
- said she "made it clear that if children were endangered, i.e. if they
- were held up to windows and threatened to be shot, the FBI was to
- `back off.'" She recalls her exact words were "Get the hell out of
- there. Don't take any risks with the children." (JDR:273) Reno told
- the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing: "I directed
- that if at any point Koresh or his followers threatened to harm the
- children, the FBI should cease the action immediately. Likewise, if it
- appeared that, as a result of the initial use of teargas, Koresh was
- prepared to negotiate in good faith for his ultimate surrender, the
- FBI was to cease the operation."
-
- h. Reno's "Rules of Engagement" Authorized "D-Day"
-
- Despite Janet Reno's concern for the safety of the Branch Davidians
- and their children and her desire to "effect a peaceful resolution of
- this matter," she authorized rules of engagement which ensured the
- resolution would be violent.
-
- It is unknown if the FBI told Reno about Koresh's early threats to
- "blow the tanks to pieces" if agents attacked Mount Carmel again. He
- had threatened, "if something messes up on this side or on your side,
- then World War III again." (JDR:45) As late as April 18th, when tanks
- were moving Koresh's favorite automobile, agents reported seeing a
- sign in the window reading, "Flames await." (JDR:109) However, Reno
- did tell the House Judiciary Committee hearing she thought the
- possibility of the Branch Davidians firing on the tanks was the most
- important "contingency." If they did so, she had authorized the FBI
- "to return fire." She also said that she thereafter would leave
- decisions up to the FBI because she was not "an expert in tactical law
- enforcement."
-
- The Justice report states, "If during any tear gas delivery
- operations, subjects open fire with a weapon, then the FBI rules of
- engagement will apply and appropriate deadly force will be used,"
- (JDR:288) and "It was also agreed that once she approved the overall
- plan, decisions would be made on the scene. Although she had the
- specific authority to stop the action and tell the FBI to leave,
- tactical decisions were to be made by law enforcement officers in
- Waco." (JDR:273) It is difficult to believe that Janet Reno meant that
- once the Branch Davidians fired, the FBI could do what it pleased,
- women and children be damned--yet, in effect, that is what she
- authorized.
-
- Evidently, Reno did not make the rules of engagement clear to
- President Clinton. He told reporters during his April 20th press
- conference: "The plan included a decision to withhold the use of
- ammunition, even in the face of fire, and instead to use tear gas that
- would not cause permanent harm to health, but would, it was hoped,
- force the people in the compound to come outside and to surrender. .
- .I was further told that under no circumstance would our people fire
- any shots at them even if fired upon."
-
- FBI agents have not admitted to firing any guns on April 19th--but
- they did fire over 400 dangerous ferret grenades. However, Reno's
- instructions gave the FBI enough leeway to begin the aggressive
- gassing and dismantling of Mount Carmel. Evidently, ground commanders
- Jeffrey Jamar and Richard Rogers did not fully explain to Reno or even
- their FBI superiors what kind of "tactical decisions" they might make
- if fired upon. Even FBI Assistant Director Larry Potts told reporters,
- "We thought we could induce the gas, get some people out and get the
- rest of the people to negotiate. We always had a fear that maybe
- there's going to be a few of the people who would fight with us to the
- very end." [268] On the other hand, Potts is also the official who
- doesn't remember approving Richard Rogers' changing the rules of
- engagement in the Weaver case. Whether this indicates incompetence on
- his part or duplicity on Rogers' part should be investigated.
-
- If Potts or his aide Danny Coulson communicated the Attorney General's
- final directives that the operation be a safe one and that
- negotiations remain an option to the siege commanders, the directives
- did not "take". According to one news report: "The F.B.I. has
- acknowledged that it foresaw a high probability of casualties. Bob
- Ricks, one of the agents in charge at Waco, said the day after the
- fire that the assault had two basic goals: rescuing the children, and
- doing so without injuries to any Federal agents. `We knew that the
- chances were great that the adults would not come out unharmed,' Mr.
- Ricks told the Dallas Morning News. `So we felt that if we got any of
- them out safely, that would be a great bonus.'" [269] And despite the
- Branch Davidians signalling they wanted to negotiate that morning,
- during the 10:30 a.m. FBI press conference on April 9th, SAC Ricks
- said, "We're not negotiating. We're saying come out. . .this matter is
- over." [270]
-
- 10. QUESTIONS ABOUT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HOSTILITY TOWARD THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
-
- The Justice report devotes a section to describing President Clinton
- and the White House's involvement in the siege and the FBI decision to
- assault Mount Carmel. Clinton initially supported negotiations. When
- his chief counsel Bernard Nussbaum first told Clinton about the plan
- to gas Mount Carmel he reminded the President that the decision was "a
- Department of Justice call, not a White House call," and Clinton
- responded that he had great confidence in the Attorney General and the
- FBI. When Janet Reno called him on April 18th regarding the plan he
- told her he supported her decision. (JDR:241-248)
-
- What we wonder about is Clinton's hostility towards the Branch
- Davidians. In his April 20th news conference he growled that Janet
- Reno should not have to resign "because some religious fanatics
- murdered themselves." Two days later he asserted, "I do not think the
- United States government is responsible for the fact that a bunch of
- fanatics decided to kill themselves." Also, Janet Reno told the House
- Judiciary Committee hearing that early April 20th, "The second call I
- got was from the president of the United States, saying,
- `That-a-girl'." [271] If this was an exact quote, it would also seem
- to be a highly insensitive remark.
-
- One explanation might be Clinton's having been influenced by anti-cult
- propaganda, evidenced by this anti- cult comments quoted in an earlier
- section. Another explanation might be Clinton's past association with
- agents wounded and killed on February 28th. In a March 18th, 1993
- speech before employees of the Treasury Department Clinton said, "My
- prayers and I'm sure yours are still with the families of all four of
- the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents who were killed in Waco--Todd
- McKeehan and Conway Lebleu of New Orleans, Steve Willis of Houston,
- and Robert Williams from my hometown of Little Rock. Three of those
- four were assigned to my security during the course of the primary or
- general election." The Wall Street Journal reported that Clinton
- wanted "to know the condition of one particular ATF agent who was
- wounded at Waco: Jay William Buford, an acquaintance of his from
- Arkansas." [272] As we know, Resident Agent-in-Charge Buford was a
- primary investigator and planner in the botched February 28th raid on
- Mt. Carmel. Also, Clinton may have been angered by potential criticism
- of Clinton family friend Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell.
- He was deeply involved in Waco decision-making and the highest ranking
- official in the FBI Operations Center during the last fatal April 19th
- attack.
-
- The New York Times wrote in its October 12, 1993, editorial, "The Waco
- Whitewash," "the report is silent on the most glaring deficiency of
- the tragic episode: the lack of judgement at the top and the reasons
- for it."
-
- 11. CHRONOLOGY OF APRIL 19TH GASSING, DEMOLITION AND FIRE
-
- During the morning of April 19, 1993 five tanks [273] flying American
- flags began the attack on Mount Carmel Center. Ironically, the Branch
- Davidians were flying the Star of David on this day, the 50th
- anniversary of the Nazi attack on the Warsaw ghetto. This was also
- "Patriots' Day"- -the 217th anniversary of the first battle of the
- American Revolution, when a British expedition to raid Revolutionary
- Minutemen weapons stockpiles in Concord, Massachusetts resulted in the
- Battles of Lexington and Concord. [274]
-
- This chronology only outlines the FBI's prolonged and brutal attack on
- the Branch Davidians. Because the Committee for Waco Justice did not
- have the resources to obtain from news networks the full seven-hour
- footage of the tank attack and fire, and because the Justice report's
- account is very sketchy, this chronology may contain gaps and
- inaccuracies. Our chronology was assembled from what the Justice
- report text did reveal, from its infrared photos, and from newspaper
- accounts, survivors' reports, and news video tapes. Unless otherwise
- noted, all times and events are from the Justice report.
-
- The FBI took aerial infrared video tapes of the gassing, demolition
- and fire at Mount Carmel. On infrared photos, heat shows up as light,
- but the light may not show up for a minute or more after a fire first
- erupts. We include here two of the eight still shots of the infrared
- video tape from the Justice report. When the government finally
- releases all this footage, the public will finally see the true
- savagery of the assault that led to the deaths of 80 or more people.
-
- 5:55 a.m.--CEV1 goes to front left and CEV2 to right side of building.
-
-
- 5:59--FBI tells Steve Schneider gas attack is about to begin. He
- throws phone out the window.
-
- 6:00--FBI announces over loudspeakers "If you come out now, you will
- not be harmed." and "You are under arrest."
-
- 6:00--CEV1 ordered to inject gas using Mark-5 system.
-
- 6:00 Approx.--Bradley vehicle delivers ferret tear gas rounds into
- "unoccupied construction area near the main structure" (tornado
- shelter) (Justice report and video footage)
-
- 6:04--Agents allege the Branch Davidians are firing on the tanks. FBI
- opts to speed up delivery of gas and demolition of building. Tank
- punches first hole, 8 feet high and 10 feet wide in middle front
- building, left of the front door. [275]
-
- 6:07-6:31--CEVs poke holes in building and insert gas at front left
- and right side of building; 4 Bradleys deploy ferret tear gas rounds
- through the windows. Tanks run back and forth over buried bus tunnel
- leading to tornado shelter and collapse debris over the tunnel,
- denying access to it. (Videotape and Fire Report)
-
- 6:24--FBI told Davidians to hang out a white flag if phone is not
- working; they hold a white banner, pull it back and replace with dark
- blanket. FBI gives them two minutes to surrender.
-
- 6:45-7:04--Tanks deliver more ferret tear gas rounds to every part of
- the building.
-
- 7:30--CEV1 rips hole in front right first floor of building and
- inserts gas.
-
- 7:58--CEV2 breaches a hole in the second floor back right corner of
- building. CEV rips into second floor womens' quarters. [276]
-
- 9:10--Branch Davidians hang out banner, "We want our phones fixed."
-
- 9:17--CEV1 breaks through the front door and agents can see both the
- upstairs and the downstairs.
-
- 9:28-10:00--CEV1 enlarges the opening in middle front of building.
- CEV2 breaks down and a new CEV2, which is not equipped with tear gas,
- replaces it and breaches the rear side of the building near the
- gymnasium.
-
- 9:49--FBI says phone will be connected only if there is a clear signal
- it is for surrender purposes. The Davidians give no signal.
-
- 9:54--Graham Craddock gets the phone, indicates it has been severed.
- FBI does not reconnect it.
-
- 10:00--Attorney General Janet Reno leaves the Justice Department for a
- speech in Baltimore.
-
- 10:00-11:00--Bradleys continue delivering ferret tear gas rounds
- through various openings.
-
- 11:00--Janet Reno calls President Clinton.
-
- 11:30--Agents try to call into compound. New CEV-2 breaches back side
- of compound near the gymnasium. (Justice report) Tank rams middle
- front of building and something that looks like flame is seen comes
- from boom of tank. (Assistant to Attorney General R. Scruggs 10/8/93
- press conference.)
-
- 11:40--Last ferret tear gas rounds delivered. Unknown time--Tank boom
- rams through window and wall of David Koresh's second story bed room.
-
- 11:45--12:05 p.m. Approx.--Tank rams whole north back of gymnasium,
- collapsing half of its roof at approximately
-
- 11:59. (Justice report account, infrared photos and news footage) Tank
- rams back wall of concrete room and dining room and blocks back exits.
- (Survivors' reports) Tank may have started a fire here. 11:59-12:02
- Approx.--Largest tank smashes through front door. (See Infrared Photo
- #1) Survivors say tank knocked over lanterns and crushed a propane
- tank. Survivors say tank started a fire here.
-
- 12:00 Approx.--Removal of part of the southeast corner of exterior
- wall, ground floor level. (Fire Report, news report [277] and photos)
-
- 12:01--A loudspeaker message mocks Koresh: "David, we are facilitating
- you leaving the compound by enlarging the door. David, you have had
- your 15 minutes of fame. . .Vernon is no longer the Messiah. Leave the
- building now."
-
- 12:06 (12:08 in Justice Report)--Tank rams second story, right front.
- "A few minutes later, from the section of the building, a flicker of
- orange could be seen." [278] Video footage shows smoke coming from the
- building and what appears to be an agent riding on top of this tank.
- Survivor says tank started a fire here.
-
- 12:07:41--Infrared photo indicates fire on second floor, right front.
-
- 12:08:11--Infrared photo shows large fire on back wall near dining
- room. Tank can be seen sitting behind collapsed gymnasium wall.
-
- 12:09:25--Infrared photo shows fire in front door/piano area.
-
- 12:09--CNN announcer says "This is a roaring fire. This fire is really
- burning out of control." [279]
-
- 12:09:50--Infrared photo shows fire near window of chapel; fire in
- front door/piano area is well-developed. (See Infrared Photo #2)
-
- 12:10--An agent 300 yards from building reports seeing man start fire
- near piano, near front door.
-
- 12:10:22--Gymnasium engulfed in fire. (Fire Report)
-
- 12:10:40--Infrared photo shows room between chapel and collapsed
- gymnasium on fire and wall near dining hall fully inflamed. 12:13--FBI
- calls fire department.
-
- 12:20--A Houston Chronicle April 20, 1993, photo shows more than half
- of building fully engulfed in fire.
-
- 12:25--Agents report sounds of gunfire inside Mount Carmel Center.
- 12:34--Fire vehicles arrive.
-
- 12:40-1:20 Approx.--Tanks with plows push remaining walls and debris
- into rubble of Mount Carmel.
-
- 12:41--Fire vehicles approach remains of building. A Houston Chronicle
- April 20, 1993, photo shows most of Mount Carmel is completely
- destroyed.
-
- 12. FATAL DECISION TO ESCALATE TO DEMOLITION
-
- As we have seen, Attorney General Janet Reno directed that the
- operation was to proceed incrementally. She had specified that
- negotiations should remain an option and that the FBI should pull back
- if there was a chance the children would be harmed. However, she also
- had agreed that if the Branch Davidians fired on the tanks, the FBI
- would be allowed to return fire and the ground commanders could make
- tactical decisions. The Attorney General or, it is assumed, anyone
- delegated that power, could still call off the assault at any time.
- Again, it is unknown if she knew of FBI expectations that "the chances
- were great that the adults would not come out unharmed."
-
- The Justice report mentions, "On Monday morning, the Attorney General
- and several senior Justice Department representatives gathered with
- senior FBI officials in the FBI SIOC (Strategic Information Operations
- Center) , where they monitored events throughout the morning via CNN
- footage and a live audio feed directly from the FBI forward command
- post in Waco." (JDR:285) The report does not mention who these
- officials in the Washington FBI Operations Center were--nor did a
- number of news reports we read. It was revealed during the April 28,
- 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearing that two of them were
- Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell and Assistant Deputy
- Attorney General Mark Richard. After Reno left for a speech at 10:00
- a.m., they were the highest ranking officials in the FBI Operations
- Center. They remained in phone contact with ground commanders
- throughout the siege. Despite Justice Department claims that the
- ground commanders would make tactical decisions (JDR:273), it is
- difficult to believe that these high officials were not consulted at
- crucial junctures. a. FBI Believed April 19th Was "D-Day"
-
- It seems clear that FBI siege commander Jamar, HRT commander Rogers
- and chief negotiator Sage did have every intention of making April
- 19th "D-Day." The text of the script that chief negotiator Sage read
- to the Branch Davidians over the loud speaker throughout the gassing
- illustrates this. (Emphasis below is ours.) "We are in the process of
- placing tear gas into the building. This is not an assault. We are not
- entering the building. This is not an assault. Do not fire your
- weapons. If you fire your weapons, fire will be returned. Do not
- shoot. This is not an assault. The gas you smell is a non-lethal tear
- gas. This gas will temporarily render the building uninhabitable. Exit
- the compound now and follow instructions. You are not to have anyone
- in the tower. The tower is off limits. No one is to be in the tower.
- Anyone observed to be in the tower will be considered to be an act of
- aggression and will be dealt with accordingly. If you come out now,
- you will not be harmed. Follow all instructions. Come out with your
- hands up. Carry nothing. Come out of the building and walk up the
- driveway toward the Double-E Ranch Road. Walk toward the large Red
- Cross flag. Follow all instructions of the FBI agents in the Bradleys.
- Follow all instructions. You are under arrest. This standoff is over.
- We do not want anyone hurt. Follow all instructions This is not an
- assault. Do not fire any weapons. We do not want anyone hurt."
-
- b. FBI Alleged Branch Davidians Shoot Back
-
- It is questionable whether the Branch Davidians could have understood
- the FBI saying that "this is not an assault." Fire survivor Ruth
- Riddle explains, "I remember hearing crackling-type voices coming over
- the speaker. It was hard to make out what they were saying. Some kind
- of warning. And the next thing we knew they were ramming into the
- building." [280] Whether or not they could hear what the FBI was
- saying, the Branch Davidians must have considered the gas, the
- rampaging ferret rounds, and the tanks smashing into the building to
- be an assault--and the fulfillment of the 5th Seal, where they all
- would be killed. Some Branch Davidians may have decided to fight what
- the saw as a murderous assault by "Babylonians." Surviving Branch
- Davidians deny that they fired at the tanks. The New York Times
- reported that FBI "eavesdropping devices picked up someone saying
- `don't shoot until the very last minute' and `Stay low, stay ready and
- loaded' and `have you been gassed yet?'" [281] These alleged
- statements were not mentioned in the Justice report. No FBI agent who
- alleges hearing shots has been questioned under oath about their
- statements.
-
- As soon as FBI agents reported automatic and semi-automatic gun fire,
- the "FBI"--who actually made the decision is not revealed--immediately
- moved to apply the Reno-approved "rules of engagement," i.e.,
- "appropriate deadly force will be used" and "opted to escalate the
- gassing operation." The Justice report emphasizes that: "In fact, the
- FBI did not fire a shot during the entire operation." (JDR:288-289)
- (Their emphasis.) The FBI obviously does not consider the more than
- 400 ferret tear gas rounds that grenade launchers shot into the
- building to be artillery, even though they are "capable of penetrating
- a hollow core door." The Justice report admits: "Some observers,
- including FBI employees who were not privy to the operations plan,
- have questioned whether it was proper for the FBI to escalate the
- operation once the Davidians opened fire, given that the HRT agents
- were not threatened by the gunfire while they were inside the CEVs and
- Bradleys" and then notes the Attorney General's prior approval, danger
- to tanks' drivers from rounds penetrating tank openings and the fact
- that the FBI had "exercised remarkable restraint" during 51 days.
- (JDR:289)
-
- Fire survivor David Thibodeau recalled he was listening to the Ron
- Engelman radio show in the chapel as the tanks gassed and rammed the
- building. When Engelman reported that the FBI alleged the Branch
- Davidians had fired on the tanks, Thibodeau's reaction was: "I knew it
- was over. I didn't hear any shots from my side of the building. . .I
- could see they were setting up the American people for a disaster. I
- was prepared to die at that point." [282]
-
- c. FBI Refused to Negotiate
-
- As we have seen, Reno told Congress she instructed the FBI that "if it
- appeared that, as a result of the initial use of teargas, Koresh was
- prepared to negotiate in good faith for his ultimate surrender, the
- FBI was to cease the operation." However, SAC Bob Ricks stated the
- FBI's opinion on negotiations during the 10:30 a.m. press conference
- on April 19th: "We're not negotiating. We're saying come out. . .this
- matter is over." [283]
-
- At 6:24 a.m., a half hour after Steve Schneider threw the phone out
- the window, FBI loudspeakers instructed the Davidians to fly a white
- flag to signal "their phone was not working and they wanted to
- reestablish phone contact." They did so, but quickly replaced it with
- a non-surrender dark blanket. Chief negotiator Sage then gave them two
- minutes to surrender. They did not. At 9:10 the Davidians hung out a
- white banner reading, "We want our phones fixed." It is not known if
- Janet Reno, who was at the Washington FBI Operations Center, saw the
- banner or inquired about the Branch Davidians' willingness to
- negotiate. At 9:49 the FBI negotiators announced over loudspeakers
- that "the phone would be reconnected only if the Davidians clearly
- indicated they intended to use the phone to make surrender
- arrangements." However, this would require an agent walking on foot
- near the building. "The FBI was unwilling to expose its agents such a
- risk (sic) absent a clear signal from the Davidians that they would
- use the reconnected phone to make surrender agents (sic) with the FBI.
- The Davidians never provided such a signal." Graeme Craddock retrieved
- the phone but never gave the "signal." (JDR:289-293)
-
- SAC Jeffrey Jamar told reporters that although the signs coming from
- the compound seemed to indicate that the cult members were willing to
- talk, "We tried to figure out a way to get a line, but we couldn't
- figure out a way to do it safely." [284] Obviously, it never occurred
- to the FBI to stop its gas attack and pull back its tanks. What does
- seem clear is that the FBI interpreted Reno's "ultimate" surrender to
- mean "immediate" surrender.
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- Diagram from Treasury Department Report - Not to Scale Altered to
- include concrete room, water tower, buried bus, missing room names,
- tank damage
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- Infrared photo page
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- Infrared photo page
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- d.FBI Did Begin Demolition of Mount Carmel
-
- The FBI did not expect gassing alone to work. One reporter wrote that
- SAC Bob Ricks "did not expect cult members to begin leaving the
- complex, despite the power of the tear gas." [285] In fact, the FBI
- described the next step--the plan to demolish Mount Carmel--to the
- press during an April 19th morning press briefing. Besides the
- gassing, "A secondary plan, according to authorities, was to knock the
- compound down building by building. Some of the armored vehicles that
- surrounded the Branch Davidian complex had been fitted with battering
- rams." [286]
-
- Just before noon, the FBI began demolition of the building. Edward
- Dennis calls this "an apparent deviation from the approved plan"
- because the FBI did not wait 48 hours before it "dismantled" the
- building. (JDR:Dennis:59) However, speeding up demolition was implicit
- in Reno's approving the new rules of engagement. Despite Dennis'
- acknowledgement that the tanks began demolition, Justice Department
- and FBI officials have been reluctant to admit that the tanks smashing
- through walls and into the building--what the FBI calls "breaching
- activities"--was in fact the beginning of demolition. They have given
- differing explanations for the accelerated tank rammings.
-
- During an April 21st press briefing, unnamed senior Justice Department
- officials told reporters, "agents began battering the walls of the
- compound to make bigger holes so long booms or `arms' attached to the
- vehicles could inject the gas deeper into the building to counteract
- high winds outside that appeared to be dispersing it." [287] And FBI
- Deputy Director Floyd Clarke told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
- Committee hearing that in the final assault the FBI drove the tank in
- through the front door, the side of the building and the back of the
- building, "to give these people ways to exit the building, which some
- later used." Whether FBI ground commanders Jamar and Rogers
- unilaterally began demolition of Mount Carmel, or first consulted with
- officials in the Washington FBI Operations Center, has not be
- revealed.
-
- Justice Department officials did admit to the press that "the net
- result was that the actual operation may have appeared more
- threatening to Koresh and his followers than the more cautious plan
- approved by Reno. Asked yesterday if agents in Waco had exceeded the
- plan she approved, Reno said `I don't think so,' according to
- department spokesman Carl Stern." [288] We have not found a specific
- comment from Attorney General Reno herself on this issue.
-
- 13. SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY BY FBI AGENTS
-
- Indianapolis attorney Linda Thompson created a controversial and
- widely distributed video tape called "Waco, the Big Lie." It details
- important BATF and FBI violations of rights, use of excessive force
- and coverup in the massacre of the Branch Davidians. [289] The video
- tape footage clearly shows suspicious activity by agents (or suspected
- agents) which the Justice report does not explain and which must be
- explained by FBI agents and personnel under oath.
-
- a. Agents Jumping in and Out of Tanks
-
- The Justice report frequently mentions that FBI agents were in
- constant danger of being shot at by Branch Davidians. According to
- Newsweek, "HRT was under orders not to leave its tanks or enter the
- compound on foot. . .HRT agents did have authority to leave their
- tanks but only in the rarest circumstances, such as children being
- killed or held hostage." [290] During the April 19th, 10:30 a.m. press
- conference SAC Bob Ricks stated, "We are not exposing any of our
- agents individually to firearms." [291] The Justice report never
- mentions such directives, only that during the fire agents left their
- tanks to arrest Branch Davidians who were exiting the burning building
- and to look for survivors in the buried bus.
-
- However, in one portion of the "Waco, the Big Lie" agents clearly can
- be seen jumping in and out of the swung-open back of a tank, near the
- buried bus and a large hole in the building, during the gassing and
- before the fire. The Fire Report states that the M79 grenade launchers
- were "hand held." (JDR:Fire Report:8) Therefore, to use them agents
- would have to open the hatches of, or even leave, their tanks to fire
- the grenades. Neither the FBI nor the Justice report admits that
- agents left their tanks until after the fire was well underway.
-
- Later video footage shows what looks like a dark-clothed individual
- riding on top of a tank which is pulling away from right side of the
- building as wisps of smoke are seen coming from second floor.
- (However, some think it may not be a person but either debris or the
- tank's boom.) If it is a person, his activities, and those of all the
- agents outside their tanks, must be investigated.
-
- The agents being outside their tanks, plus news reports that survivors
- last saw David Koresh at 10:00 a.m. and Steve Schneider at 10:30 a.m.
- [292] and autopsy reports that both died of gunshot wounds, have
- fueled speculation that agents may have killed Branch Davidians inside
- the building. The Reno-approved rules of engagement--fire only if
- fired upon--still would have given FBI agents wide leeway to fire at
- Branch Davidians, since allegedly they were firing out of Mount
- Carmel. This would be especially true if any agents decided to apply
- the rules of engagement Richard Rogers approved in the Weaver
- case--fire if you see anyone with a gun. The hostility expressed by
- Jamar, Ricks, Rogers and Sage may have communicated the message that
- FBI agents were permitted to use "any means necessary" to end the
- siege.
-
- Pathologist Cyril H. Wecht, who conducted an independent autopsy on
- the body of David Koresh, said because the bullet wound was in the
- middle of the forehead, he did not "`rule out' the possibility that
- Koresh and Schneider were shot by outside snipers." [293] Dick
- DeGuerin admitted, "I have heard a rumor that six or eight specially
- trained (men) were sent in to shoot people. . .when you look at some
- of the wounds, they were not suicide wounds. Not typical suicide
- wounds." [294] Darren Borst, son of Mary Jean Borst who died from
- gunshot wounds in the back, insisted that an "FBI hit team" killed his
- mother and other Branch Davidians found with gunshot wounds. [295]
- Some even speculate one or more Branch Davidian fire survivors will
- testify they saw government agents shooting Branch
- Davidians--accusations they will have withheld for their own safety's
- sake until the trial.
-
- b. Questions About Individual Who Jumps Off Roof
-
- There are also questions about the individual seen jumping off the
- front roof, and, untouched by fire, walking away almost nonchalantly.
- He takes off a hood and then the walks at least 150 feet away from the
- burning building with his hands at his side, seemingly carrying a long
- stick or a rifle. These actions are contrary to the FBI's repeated
- instructions to individuals to put up their hands and not carry
- anything.
-
- Only one Branch Davidian male, Renos Avraam, jumped off the roof. The
- Justice report states, "Avraam then jumped off the roof, and walked
- toward one of the Bradleys with his hands up." (JDR:298) Newsweek
- reports, "One cult member, Renos Avraam, appeared on top of the
- burning roof. He fell to the ground, and FBI agents rescued him."
- [296] Time reports, "A man appeared on the roof, clothes aflame,
- rolling in pain; he fell off the roof, and the agents ran over, tore
- off his burning clothes and got him safely inside the armored
- vehicle." [297] And during the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
- Committee hearing, FBI Deputy Director Floyd Clarke said HRT members
- had seen a man "consumed by fire" fall off the roof and ran over to
- help him into a vehicle. Considering that these accounts do not
- describe the individual seen on "Waco, the Big Lie," further
- investigation of who this individual was must be done.
-
- 14. LACK OF FIRE PRECAUTIONS
-
- According to the Justice report, "In one of the meetings held in Waco
- in early April. . . (Assistant U.S. Attorney) LeRoy Jahn raised the
- possibility of fire at the compound and suggested to the FBI that fire
- fighting equipment be placed on standby at the scene. . . (Deputy
- Assistant Director Danny) Coulson explained . . .due to the range of
- the Branch Davidians' weapons, fire fighting equipment could not be
- brought into the proximity of the compound. Coulson further explained
- that structural fires cannot be fought from the outside. The only way
- a fire could have been fought at the compound would have required fire
- fighting personnel to enter the compound. That option would have posed
- an unacceptable risk to the fire fighters." (JDR:302-303) (Again, one
- wonders why the FBI was concerned about fire fighters and not about
- the agents seen jumping in and out of tanks on "Waco, the Big Lie.")
-
- Janet Reno admits she gave little thought to the possibility of fire.
- Her worse case scenario "would be an explosion, not a fire. . .She
- recalls lying awake at night asking herself. `Oh my God, what if he
- blows the place up?'" (JDR:274) Reno did assert at the April 28, 1993,
- House Judiciary Committee hearing: "I was concerned about intentional
- or accidental explosions and ordered that additional resources be
- provided to ensure that there was an adequate emergency response."
- During her April 19th press conference, "Ms. Reno said she thought
- that the fire department had been" given advance notice. However, the
- Waco fire department said it had not been given advance notice of the
- assault by Federal agents. [298] Reports that the FBI had called
- Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas about its burn unit were
- confirmed in November, 1993, when Parkland announced it was planning
- to sue the federal government for refusal to pay $370,000 in medical
- bills of three Branch Davidians in the hospital's burn unit. According
- to the Dallas Morning News, Tom Cox, Parkland's legal director "said
- he thinks the government should be held responsible because federal
- authorities called the hospital the day of the assault on the cult
- compound, asking about the burn unit and available bed space. He said
- a call was made to the hospital about 6 a.m. that day, but it was
- unclear if it was during that call or a later call that day that the
- burn unit was mentioned. The FBI began its tear- gas attack about 6
- a.m.; the fire did not begin until shortly after noon. . . (and) . .
- .the Davidians `certainly' were in federal authorities' custody when
- they were taken to Parkland." [299]
-
- Fire trucks were not summoned until 10 minutes after the fire broke
- out. The FBI then held them up for 16 minutes after they arrived.
- "Although the fire crews did not approach the burning building until
- 31 minutes after the fire had first been reported, it would not have
- been safe for them to do so earlier given the reports of gunfire from
- inside the compound." (JDR:303) Of course, Houston Chronicle photos
- and video tapes show that 31 minutes after fire was first reported,
- the building is entirely gone! SAC Ricks "conceded, officials in
- charge of the operation had not expected a fire." [300] After the
- fire, Representative James Traficant commented on the FBI plan. "When
- you have 100 TV crews but not one fire truck, that's not a well-
- thought out plan, that's box office." [301]
-
- 15. BRANCH DAVIDIAN STATEMENTS THAT DEMOLITION TRAPPED PEOPLE
-
- The streams of gas from the Mark-V delivery system, the rampaging
- ferret tear gas rounds and the ramming tanks drove Branch Davidians
- into the interior of the building where they were trapped when the
- fire started.
-
- a. Effects of the Gas
-
- The gassing had relatively little effect on the Branch Davidians
- because they wore gas masks and because stiff winds rushing through
- the large holes created by tanks quickly dispersed the gas. Some
- children's masks were made to fit with the help of wet towels; other
- children were placed in the concrete room with wet blankets over their
- heads to protect them from the gas. "During the hours before the fire,
- when the building was under assault, (attorney Jack) Zimmerman said,
- cult members donned gas masks and went about their normal routines
- while Koresh checked to see if everyone was all right. . .It bothered
- them, but it didn't cause pandemonium," he said of the tear gas.
- "People remained calm." [302] Zimmerman also said: "They thought they
- were going to spray some tear gas and retreat," and added that the
- survivors thought Koresh would be allowed to finish his book about the
- Seven Seals, after which they'd go to court. [303] What was terrifying
- was the dangerous ferret tear gas rounds smashing through the building
- which drove most Branch Davidians into the concrete room or to the
- second floor hallways. And those who were most severely affected by
- the gas may have been too debilitated to leave the building once the
- fire began.
-
- b. Effects of the Tanks
-
- At the April 19th 10:30 a.m. press conference SAC Ricks told
- reporters, "The pounding of the compound that you see is really a
- necessary function of the insertion of the gas. . .So, it's not
- necessarily, at this point, one of destruction to the compound." When
- reporters asked if they warned those inside each time a tank was about
- to smash into the building, Ricks answered, "We are not advising them
- ahead of time. We are continuing to advise them to please exit the
- compound." (Remember it was Ricks who also told the Dallas Morning
- News, "we felt that if we got any of them out safely, that would be a
- great bonus.")
-
- According to the Justice report, "Members of the HRT were assigned to
- be tank drivers, tank commanders, Bradley vehicle crew, snipers, and
- sniper's support. . .An orbiting helicopter with SWAT personnel aboard
- would apprehend and arrest subjects attempting to flee from the crisis
- site." (JDR:279) Well before April 19th FBI agents had been criticized
- for their sloppy tank driving techniques, especially after a Bradley
- Personnel Carrier driver trying to move a Waco Tribune-Herald vehicle
- stranded on the property, ran over and crushed it. [304] Doubtless,
- the tanks were driven with similar carelessness as they rammed their
- way into the building.
-
- Tanks rammed the front staircase, pushed in the bullet-riddled front
- door, collapsed the walls and then the roof of the gymnasium as they
- pushed their way back towards the back of the building where they
- bashed in the dining room walls and the back doors. And then, around
- noon, the tanks began the final, fatal round of tank attacks. FBI
- Deputy Director Floyd Clarke told the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
- Committee hearing admitted to simultaneous tank attacks when he said:
- "at this time we made some openings in the building where we actually
- drove the tank in here through this door, through this side of the
- building and through the back side here to give these people ways to
- exit the building--which some later used." That the FBI believed it
- needed to punch out new "ways to exit" indicates they knew they
- already had blocked the existing exits.
-
- News reports provide more details of the damage caused by the tanks.
- "By noon, whole sections of the exterior walls had been demolished.
- Portions of the roof were collapsing. Cult members inside had been
- forced into an ever-narrowing circle of interior rooms." [305]
- According to Associated Press, "Then the FBI sent in its biggest
- weapon--a massive armored vehicle larger than the others [306] and
- headed for a chamber lined with cinder blocks where authorities hoped
- to find Mr. Koresh and Mr. Schneider and fire the chemical irritant
- directly at them. When the tank rumbled in, it produced such trembling
- it felt like an earthquake. The tank took out everything in its path.
- The front door went. So did an upright piano standing as a barricade
- behind it." [307] "(E)very assault by a tank rattled the poorly
- constructed buildings, and cult members dodged falling sheet rock and
- doors." [308]
-
- Attorney Jack Zimmerman said, "People were trapped: the building was
- falling down, the damn tanks had just destroyed the structure and
- nobody knew where they were because the ceiling had fallen in." [309]
- He also said the big tank's "concussion tipped everything over on the
- second floor, collapsed the walls and stairwells, trapping women and
- children upstairs." [310] Dick DeGuerin told the television show
- "Prime Time" that those who sought shelter in the second floor
- hallways were trapped because doors were twisted and jammed by the
- tanks ramming the building and they could not get into rooms that had
- windows from which they could escape.
-
- Fire survivor Jaime Castillo "tried to move around the building, but
- the repeated pounding on the exterior had left piles of rubble
- everywhere. The central stairway between the first and second floors
- was littered with plasterboard and wood and had partially collapsed."
- [311] Ruth Riddle explained why people didn't get out when the fire
- started: "I believe that they couldn't get out. Where the buildings
- were rammed is where the staircases were." [312] David Thibodeau told
- "Good Morning America," "I could see people being trapped, 'cause when
- the tanks did go in there, there were hallways, there were places that
- were cut off." [313] Survivors recall that after the fire started,
- even those who had been in the outside rooms "fled them for interior
- areas, but within a few minutes these were ablaze, too." [314] David
- Koresh's mother Bonnie Haldeman told a television interviewer that a
- survivor told her that "all the back exits had been blocked. The whole
- back building had been pushed in. The back doors had been pushed in.
- There was no way for anyone to get out the back." [315]
-
- After the fire SAC Jeffrey Jamar said: "Mr. Koresh obviously intended
- for the children to die or he would have put them in a safe
- place--such as the buried bus beneath the compound. . .`When our
- (hostage rescue team) was able to get down into the bus, hoping we
- could find the children. . .in that bus, the air was cool--and no gas.
- Had Koresh wished those children to survive, that was one place they
- could have been put safely when he had the fire started." [316]
- President Clinton also mentioned this "fact" during his April 20 press
- conference. However, as we know-- and Jamar should have--during the
- morning tanks had been running back and forth over the tunnel and part
- of the house had been pulled down on top of it. The Fire Report also
- admits that "a significant amount of structural debris was found in
- this area indicating that the breaching operations could have caused
- this route to be blocked." (JDR:Fire Report:10)
-
- c. Position of Bodies and Autopsy Reports
-
- The Justice report confirms that most of the 80 or more people who
- died were found in the furthest interior areas: inside the concrete
- room (32), in front of it (3), in the nearby kitchen (16), in hallways
- (6), in the communications room (3). During the April 28, 1993, House
- Judiciary Committee hearings, Representative James Sensenbrenner, who
- himself had barely escaped a disastrous house fire, questioned why so
- many bodies were found near the middle front of the building, which
- caught fire later than the back and the side. Assistant Director for
- the Criminal Investigative Division Larry Potts answered that the FBI
- had "statements from people in there who chose to come out" that
- others had "chosen not to come out." However, no such statements were
- included in the Justice report.
-
- The Justice autopsy report notes that one unidentified 30-50 year old
- female "died of multiple fractures of the cervical spine, caused by
- blunt force trauma probably associated with a fall. Her body was found
- in front of the bunker." (JDR:322) It is possible the woman was either
- crushed by a tank or that the tank brought down part of the second
- floor, killing her. There may be no survivors from this area of the
- building to testify as to what happened to the woman.
-
- Despite all this evidence, the Justice report refuses to admit the
- possibility that the gassing attack-- including more than 400 ferret
- rounds--and tanks ramming the building trapped the Branch Davidians.
- "While the fire was burning the negotiators repeatedly broadcast
- repeated messages to the compound, pleading with the residents to
- leave. Only a few of the Davidians heeded those pleas." (JDR:300)
-
- 16. BRANCH DAVIDIAN STATEMENTS DEMOLITION STARTED THE FIRE
-
- Below we detail the statements of fire survivors that FBI tank
- activity caused the fire that consumed Mount Carmel and killed 80 or
- more people. Later sections will present FBI and fire investigators'
- conclusions that the fires were started by Branch Davidians.
-
- a. Building Filled with Flammable Fuel
-
- After the FBI cut off the building's electricity, the Branch Davidians
- became totally dependent on flammable fuel for light and heating.
- Attorney Jack Zimmerman noted that "almost every room had a coleman
- lantern." [317] These lamps use kerosene as fuel. Renos Avraam's
- attorney Dick Kettler said of that morning, "As they awoke, kerosene
- lamps hanging on the outside walls were lit." According to the same
- news account, "Some of the upper rooms also contained butane gas
- heaters, and propane gas tanks were located throughout the compound."
- [318]
-
- b. Ferret Rounds and Tanks Dispersed Fuel
-
- A Branch Davidian survivor told Dr. James Tabor that rocketing ferret
- rounds knocked over the kerosene lamps, spilling so much kerosene and
- making the floor so slippery, they sometimes had to go down on "all
- fours" to get around (private communication). The Fire Report does
- admit that due to "structural damage. . .it is possible that some
- flammables were spilled inside the building as a result. These
- flammables could have contributed to the destruction of the building
- as the fire spread to them. There is no positive proof of this but it
- cannot be eliminated." (JDR:Fire Report:9)
-
- c. Allegations Final Tank Assaults and Demolition Started Fire
-
- As our chronology illustrates, there were major tank assaults in the
- areas where the fires started just minutes before fires were first
- seen by outsiders. The assaults on the back of the compound--at the
- dining room and concrete room--and the collapse of half of the huge
- gymnasium were never shown in television news reports and no
- newspapers included them in their diagrams. Television footage and
- newspaper photographs did show clearly the fire which began on the
- second floor, the fire in the back of the building, once it reached
- the second story of the tower, and the fact that the middle and left
- front of the building caught fire later than either of those sections.
- The Justice report does not include a very clear description--or any
- graphics--of these last tank assaults before the fire, leaving anyone
- who has not studied the full aerial infrared video tape of the tank
- attack somewhat confused.
-
- The two "official" descriptions of the tank attacks below seem to
- describe tank attacks at the rear of the building that collapsed the
- gymnasium. Evidently the tanks were blocked by fuel tanks from
- reaching the back of the building from the left side of the building,
- so they tried to squeeze through the narrow space between the swimming
- pool and the gymnasium walls. In so doing, they brought down those
- walls, and half the gymnasium roof. Justice Department report reviewer
- Edward Dennis writes that the "CEV2 was ordered to clear a path
- through the compound in order to clear a path to the main tower so
- that CEV-1 could insert tear gas in that area. In that endeavor the
- CEV started to knock down a corner of the building and a portion of
- the roof collapsed. Very shortly after this happened, fire was
- observed in several locations in the compound." (JDR:Dennis:59) (The
- "tower" was the three stories built on top of the concrete room.)
- During the Justice Department press conference October 8, 1993,
- Assistant to the Attorney General Richard Scruggs, who compiled the
- factual report, explained: "Four to five minutes before the fire broke
- out the vehicle went through the tower area and breached a hole in
- there and saw what he believed to be a group of people inside, he
- believed women and children." [319] (Because we do not have a video
- tape of the press conference, we assume that Scruggs was pointing to
- photographs of the back of the building; however, he may have been
- pointing to entry of the tank through the front door.)
-
- The Associated Press account in a section above describes the entry
- through the front door. "Then the FBI sent in its biggest weapon--a
- massive armored vehicle larger than the others and headed for a
- chamber lined with cinder blocks." i.e., the concrete room. "
- (Survivors) said the tank took out a barrel of propane, flattening the
- container and spilling its contents. And as the tank thundered through
- the house it tipped over lit camping lanterns, spitting flames that
- ignited the propane and other flammables. . .The building erupted. It
- happened too fast to pull fire extinguishers from the walls." [320]
- Although Branch Davidian survivors claim it was this tank entry which
- started the fire, the Justice report does not mention its entry in its
- section on the final tank attacks. (JDR:294) The report does include
- the 11:59:16 infrared photo of the tank at the front door.
-
- "Jack Zimmermann, who said he spoke Wednesday with four survivors and
- attorneys for two others, said all six survivors say an armored
- vehicle that smashed through a wall hit the propane tank and started
- the fire. `One person heard someone screaming from the area where the
- tank was, `A tank has come in! There's a fire started!' They said the
- smoke was so black, that one of them said within seconds he couldn't
- see where he was.'" [321] According to the New York Times, "The
- survivors said that the fire began after an especially violent tank
- collision plowed far into the building. The (tank) crushed a container
- of propane, according to the account that lawyers gave the news
- agency. It also tipped over lighted camping lanterns, which spit
- flames that ignited the propane and other flammables. . .escape
- attempts were hampered because gas masks clouded up in the smoke and
- heat." [322]
-
- It is possible that the tank which rammed the second story at about
- 12:06 p.m. also started a fire--the "flicker of orange" one reporter
- described shortly after the ramming. Attorney Dick Kettler reported
- his client Renos Avraam "was with a number of people squeezed into a
- hallway on the second floor when the fire started. He heard a tank
- crashing against the wall in a room near them. Then that room caught
- fire. He said it was terrifying. The tanks were crashing into the
- walls, and the whole building was shaking. He thought he would get
- crushed between the walls. Others in the hallway didn't have time to
- escape. The fire went too fast. It was total blackness and confusion.
- In seconds, everybody was disoriented." The story notes that Avraam
- was apparently the only survivor from that hallway, having found a
- window to crash through that led to the front roof. [323]
-
- Even with this sketchy evidence, we can see that the tank that rammed
- through the back wall near the dining room clearly could have started
- the fire seen minutes later which quickly consumed and collapsed the
- tower above the concrete room. And the big tank that rammed through
- the front door towards the tower could have started both the second
- story fire and fires deeper inside the chapel, including near the
- dining room. Alternately, the tank ramming the second floor may have
- started that fire. Either the second story fire or any other internal
- fire could have spread rapidly through the puddles of spilled lantern
- fuel into the chapel area to the back of the stage where infrared
- photos show flames raging a few minutes later.
-
- The collapse of half the huge gymnasium's roof also could have started
- a fire in that back area. A California gun rights organization
- obtained CBS footage of the April 19th attack and found that news
- footage clearly shows the gymnasium collapsing sometime between 11:55
- and 11:59 a.m. The group claims that a heat plume indicating fire in
- the gymnasium area can be seen in the 11:59:16 infrared photo included
- in the Justice report. [324]
-
- d. Questions about "Flaming" Tank
-
- The most controversial part of the video tape "Waco, the Big Lie" is a
- scene of a tank pulling out of the middle front of the building (not
- the front door) which appears to be shooting flames from the end of a
- boom. Thompson claims this is "proof" that the government
- intentionally started the fire. A number of FBI critics, including
- some Branch Davidians, doubt the tank is shooting flame, based on
- other footage of the same scene which makes the alleged "flames" look
- like a reflection from building debris or from escaping gasses. Others
- claim that no such light can be seen on high resolution tape of the
- same footage.
-
- Because Thompson had distributed her video to television stations and
- politicians all over the country, the Justice report answers
- Thompson's allegations in a section entitled "False Accusations that
- the FBI Started the Fire." (JDR:304-307) Note that the Justice
- Department did not bother to address survivors' more credible accounts
- of how FBI tanks "started the fire." Right after the fire, Justice
- Department spokesperson Carl Stern's dismissed the six survivors'
- statements saying, "That stuff is preposterous." [325]
-
- The report asserts that the time when that shot was filmed is
- "unclear." (JDR:305) However, earlier the report mentioned the
- existence of "split-screen video prepared by the FBI laboratory,
- containing the infrared footage from the air on one side, with the
- televised footage from the ground on the other." (JDR:296) Analysts
- should have been able to ascertain the time through the videos' "time
- meters." The report also asserts that infrared photos show no
- indication of heat coming from the front of the tank (they do show
- heat from the exhaust at the back of the tank). Evidently, Justice
- report experts did not watch the whole tape for signs of heat coming
- from the front of all the tanks.
-
- The Justice report asserts that the army "has examined all the CEVs
- used on April 19th to see if they had been outfitted with a
- flame-emitting device or if there was any evidence of charring or
- fire. "No such evidence was found." Of course, this investigation
- probably was not launched until mid or late summer, when "Waco, the
- Big Lie" began to have political impact. By that time, the tanks, some
- of which had pushed burning debris into the fire, would probably have
- been cleaned, refitted and repaired. The report does not mention if
- maintenance or repair records were checked.
-
- A reporter asked about the "flaming tank" at the Justice Department's
- October 8, 1993 press conference. Richard Scruggs provided more
- information from "preliminary assessments" by University of Maryland
- "experts." Scruggs speculated that a flame could have come from a
- "busted hydraulic line or something like that" but said that the
- Justice Department had inspected the CEV's and found no evidence of
- broken parts. During his statement Scruggs asserted that "carbon
- monoxide"--a poisonous and sometimes flammable gas--was used to propel
- the CS gas into the compound. [326] Because the Justice report states
- the dispersant was carbon dioxide (JDR:287), this prompted speculation
- that the Scruggs had accidently "let the cat out of the bag." However,
- Scruggs later told Washington Times reporter Jerry Seper that he had
- in fact made an error (private communication). (The fact that the Fire
- Report labels "CS" gas "CN" gas (JDR:Fire Report: 8) has also prompted
- speculation.) Further, investigation is in order as to whether any
- tanks were somehow spewing flames or casting off sparks that caused
- one or more of the fires that consumed Mount Carmel Center.
-
- e. Evidence Fire Drove Some to Suicide
-
- Because gun shots were heard during the fire and twenty-one Branch
- Davidians died from gun shot wounds, various FBI and Justice
- Department officials, and the mass media, have alleged the fire and
- shootings were either "mass suicide" or "mass murder" as a few Branch
- Davidians set the fires and shot those who tried to escape. SAC
- Jeffrey Jamar said, "maybe some were forced to stay" because gunshots
- were heard as fire started and one body bore a bullet hole in the
- head. [327]
-
- However, given the fact that most exit routes were blocked by debris
- from the tanks when the fire roared through the building, survivors
- and others believe that some of those trapped in the fire chose
- suicide over asphyxiation or burning to death. Fire experts who viewed
- video tape of the fire opined, "it was a text-book example of a deadly
- fire involving a unsafe building and a 30-mile-an-hour wind. Cult
- members may have had less than five minutes to escape after the fire
- began. . .Once one room had become engulfed by fire, a point referred
- to as flashover. . .the fire produces an enormous amount of toxic
- gases that cause confusion." [328]
-
- When asked about the fact that bodies had been found with gunshot
- wounds to the head, Branch Davidians denied there was a suicide pact.
- David Thibodeau said, "No, there was not a suicide pact. . .I know
- that if I were trapped in a fire and there was a fire next to me, and
- I was. . .it was very probable that I was going to burn, that I may, I
- may just taken the easy way out." When the interviewer asked why
- people didn't try to get out, Thibodeau answered, "I believe some
- people did try to get out or else I wouldn't be sitting here. .
- .obviously." [329]
-
- Fire survivor Ruth Riddle said, "Given the fact that they may have
- been trapped, they may have opted for that rather than burning to
- death, that's a terrible way to die." [330] Jaimie Castillo told a
- reporter, "If I was in that situation, where I couldn't get out and
- the fire was coming my way, I'd probably take myself out." [331] Derek
- Lovelock said Koresh "didn't want to commit suicide and he didn't want
- to be killed. . .We knew the end was coming, but we honestly thought
- it would all pass peacefully, David included." [332] Louis Alaniz, the
- "visitor" who left Mount Carmel a few days before the fire, also
- agreed that there was no suicide pact. [333]
-
- Pathologist Dr. Rodney Crowe told the Maury Povich audience, "I think
- they did what you would have done, what I would have done and I've put
- myself in that position. If I was on fire, if my child was on fire, if
- the heat was so unbearable, I'd shoot my child. I would hope I'd have
- the strength to shoot myself. As we were examining these people we
- hoped that we would find gunshot wounds because we knew that they went
- out quickly that way rather than suffer the horrible death that we
- knew some of them did."
-
- Dr. Crowe was also incensed by some newspaper interpretations of the
- autopsy findings. "In our local Fort Worth paper on the front page it
- said `Cultist Children Executed'. . .and mentioned that children were
- shot, stabbed, beaten to death. . . (The paper wrote) `It is apparent
- that the parents turned on their children in favor of David Koresh's
- teachings.' This is why I'm here because our product has been twisted.
- . .Nowhere did we say execution. Nowhere did we say beaten to death.
- It was blunt force trauma. Three children had blunt force trauma. But
- it was from the falling concrete in the bunker that fell on them.
- There's an opening in the top of the bunker eight feet approximately
- in diameter and large chunks of concrete fell on these people. And to
- say these children were beaten to death is unconscionable."
-
- The Justice report alleges (JDR:7), and some papers repeated, that one
- child had been stabbed to death. Dr. Crowe later told an audience
- member that the child who reportedly had been stabbed may also have
- been hit by falling concrete or other materials; the mark on a rib
- which suggested stabbing might also have been an old wound from a
- childhood accident (private communication.)
-
- 17. FBI ALLEGATIONS BRANCH DAVIDIANS STARTED THE FIRE
-
- As soon as the fire started, SAC Ricks, who earlier in the day had
- assured reporters the FBI was confidant there would be no mass
- suicide, proclaimed, "Oh, my god, they're killing themselves!" as if
- that was the only possible cause of the fire. Below is evidence the
- government presents that the Branch Davidians started the fire, plus
- comments on that evidence. Discussion of the Fire Report follows in a
- later section.
-
- a. Testimony by Agents
-
- The Justice report states, "At 12:10 p.m. another HRT agent, who was
- 300 yards away from the compound at Sierra One post, actually saw a
- Branch Davidian start the fire. The agent later reported to
- investigators what he had seen: `. . .he noticed the man was moving
- back and forth behind the piano and the individual then assumed a
- kneeling position. (The HRT agent) noticed the man's hands moving and
- immediately after that (he) noticed that a fire started in that
- position. The man immediately departed the area of the piano. At the
- same time (the HRT agent) noticed a fire start on the red or right
- side of the building." (JDR:296) However, as the Justice report's own
- 12:09:50 p.m. infrared photos show, by the time the agent made that
- report the whole front and right of the building were fully aflame.
-
- The report goes on to say, "The HRT agent reported what he had seen
- over the radio. Two HRT snipers simultaneously noticed fire breaking
- out in two different parts of the building -- at the front-right
- corner, and at the third or fourth floor of the tower on the back-left
- side." (TDR:297) However, at that time they would have seen
- well-developed fires. The report adds, "Another HRT sniper thought it
- odd that, from his vantage point, the fire appeared to spread in the
- opposite direction of the wind, which was blowing from the right side
- to the left side of the complex." (TDR:297) The implication seems to
- be that the fires were deliberately started, since they go against the
- direction of the wind. However, fires started by tanks also could go
- against the direction of the wind.
-
- The Justice report does not mention SAC Jeffrey Jamar's April 20th
- allegation to reporters that, "At least 3 people observed a (cult
- member) spreading something. . .with a cupped hand and then there was
- a flash of fire." [334] (Two other reporters also mentioned Jamar's
- claim: one described it as "three FBI sharpshooters had seen a
- fireball shortly after they had watched cult members sprinkling liquid
- inside." [335] The other described it as "three snipers, peering
- through binoculars from a station 100 yards away from the compound,
- could see a cult member start the blaze." [336] ) Nor does the Justice
- report mention Bob Rick's account of an agent's version reported in
- the Washington Post: "someone appeared on the second floor of the
- compound wearing a gas mask and made a throwing motion. Flames
- erupted, and the person signaled to agents he did not want to be
- rescued." [337] There is no evidence either version was "redacted" in
- the Justice report. SAC Jamar and these agents must be interviewed
- under oath so that we may discover if any agents fabricated stories
- about seeing Branch Davidians start the fire.
-
- b. Surveillance Recordings
-
- During his opening statement in the Branch Davidian trial, lead
- prosecutor LeRoy Jahn alleged that surveillance devices had picked up
- voices saying, "spread the fuel," and "light the fire." [338] Jahn
- told jurors that they would hear an audio tape in which one individual
- asks, "What's the plan?" A second individual laughs and answers:
- "Haven't you always wanted to be a charcoal briquette?" [339]
-
- However, the prosecutor will have to prove that the individuals
- speaking are Branch Davidians (since we know FBI agents were outside
- their tanks); that they are referring to spreading fuel to start a
- fire--not moving fuel out of the way of tanks to prevent one; that the
- individual says "light the fire" and not something indistinguishable--
- or something closer to "a tank's light a fire". In relation to the
- "charcoal briquette" joke, the prosecution will have to prove that
- this is a statement of intention to light a fire--not a joking
- response about what will inevitably happen if they don't leave the
- building--a firetrap surrounded by rampaging tanks! One reporter
- writes that the FBI has admitted that the listening devices "had
- yielded only fragmentary and inconclusive information about Mr. Koresh
- and the conditions inside the complex." [340] This may well be true of
- these surveillance tapes as well.
-
- c. Alleged Testimony By Fire Survivors
-
- FBI agents interviewed surviving Branch Davidians as they escaped the
- burning buildings. "During those interviews three of the survivors
- made statements about the cause of the fire. Renos Avraam told the
- agents that he had heard someone inside the compound say, `The fire
- has been lit, the fire has been lit.' Clive Doyle told the Texas
- Rangers that the fire was started inside the compound with coleman
- fuel. Doyle said the fuel had been distributed throughout the compound
- in specific, designated locations." (JDR:300) However, on April 20th
- Renos Avraam called to the press as he was led into court, "The fire
- was not started by us. There were no plans for mass suicide." [341]
-
- The report describes at length only Graeme Craddock's alleged comments
- to the FBI: "Craddock advised that when the Bradley came in through
- the front entrance, they started moving fuel. Craddock believes that
- the compound had a total of approximately one dozen, one gallon
- containers of lantern fuel and that they had been located in the lobby
- area. He said he saw a lot of people grabbing fuel containers and
- moving them to other areas. Craddock believes that possibly three or
- four of these containers had been put next to the window that had
- already been knocked out by the Bradley on the southern side of the
- chapel area. Craddock said he had heard someone talking about shifting
- the fuel from the hallway near the chapel . . .He said he had heard
- someone complain about fuel being spilled inside. . .Craddock
- indicated that he had heard shouts about starting the fire. .
- .Craddock also said that he had heard someone say, `Light the fire,'
- and that he had also heard someone else say, `Don't light the fire.'"
-
- Craddock allegedly told the Texas Rangers: "He said he went into the
- chapel area with several other people. He heard the word passed to
- `start the fires.' He said that someone said `make sure.' He said that
- word was then passed to not start the fires . . .Craddock said that if
- there was a suicide pact, he knew nothing about it. He said that he
- knew nothing about a plan to burn the building until he heard someone
- pass the word to start the fire." (JDR:300-301) However, Craddock has
- told the press, "No one inside set any fires. The tanks knocked over
- the gas lanterns. . .There was no suicide pact." [342]
-
- 18. FBI AND BATF CRIME SCENE COVERUP
-
- The FBI's disinformation campaign--and their disregard for preserving
- the "crime scene"--only increased after the April 19th fire.
-
- a. FBI Disinformation After the April 19th Fire
-
- SAC Jeffrey Jamar's claim that some Branch Davidians may have shot
- others trying to escape is just one example of the kind of
- disinformation the FBI, and especially SAC Bob Ricks, disseminated
- after the fire. Other examples are:
-
- * On April 19th, Ricks told the press: Koresh "wanted to have as many
- people killed as possible. That's why it was called Ranch Apocalypse."
- [343] ; and "David Koresh, we believe, gave the order to commit
- suicide and they all followed his order." [344] and Koresh "was
- demanding provocation to get in a fight with us. . .We believe they
- were preparing for another armed standoff." [345]
-
- * On April 19th, "Mr. Ricks said it was only speculation at this
- point, but that authorities had received reports, apparently from some
- of the survivors, that the children had been injected with some kind
- of poison to ease their pain." [346] However, the Justice report made
- no such claim.
-
- * During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary Committee hearings, Ricks
- told lawmakers that when a released child heard his father and Koresh
- were dead he said, "I don't care. No more beatings." and the children
- had asked if their new home had a "beating room." The social workers
- have not revealed publiclly that any child making such a statement.
- During the hearing Texas Representative John Bryant said that he was
- bothered that the FBI seemed to make a lot of statements whose purpose
- was to create public opinion supportive of the FBI.
-
- * In August of 1993, in a speech before a Tulsa, Oklahoma civic group,
- Bob Ricks speculated that David Koresh ordered the cult compound
- burned down to kill followers and federal agents, but screamed, "Don't
- light it up!" when he realized agents were retreating. However, the
- order to hold back came too late. "What we think was in his mind was
- that he expected us to come in and mount a frontal tactical assault
- against the compound. Once we were inside, he would light it up and
- burn us up with his own people." Ricks added, "I never wish ill will
- on anybody, but he's one guy I'm glad who was in there." [347] A later
- news report quoted Ricks' speculation that Steve Schneider had shot
- Koresh out of anger. "In the end, he probably realized he was dealing
- with a fraud. After (Koresh) had caused so much harm and destruction,
- (Koresh) probably now wanted to come out, and Mr. Schneider could not
- tolerate that situation." Officials familiar with the evidence
- questioned Ricks' comments and FBI officials refused to comment."
- [348]
-
- b. April 19th Destruction of Evidence and the Crime Scene
-
- News videotapes like those in "Waco, the Big Lie" clearly show tanks
- equipped with plows pushing burning walls into the flaming rubble.
- These walls might have contained evidence that BATF agents had shot
- indiscriminately and illegally through them. The FBI may assert this
- was done to prevent injuries from detonating ammunition and
- explosives. However, news video tape shows agents walking close to the
- building as it burns and walking through the rubble the evening of the
- fire with little concern for their safety. At the end of "Waco, the
- Big Lie," Branch Davidian Brad Branch cries out over a phone from
- jail, "They're destroying the crime scene, this is the biggest lie
- ever put before the American people."
-
- c. FBI and BATF Assisted Texas Rangers In Search for Evidence
-
- As we have seen, the Texas Rangers took "official" control of the
- scene after Mount Carmel burned to the ground. "Immediately following
- the April 19th fire the Texas Rangers, working with the FBI, arranged
- to take command of the remains of the compound. . .The Texas Rangers
- assumed primary responsibility for combing through the crime scene and
- recovering evidence. The FBI provided substantial assistance to the
- Rangers in performing this task." (JDR:308) The Justice report notes
- that during the search, "The Rangers divided the physical area of the
- compound into sectors, rows and grids, then formed teams comprised of
- Rangers, FBI and other technicians, and other law enforcement agents."
- (JDR:309) The Justice report does not mention the presence of BATF
- agents, as does the Treasury report which states, "after the Compound
- was ravaged by fire, ATF firearms and explosives experts collected
- evidence of the firearms and other destructive devices."(TDR:128)
-
- Defense attorney Dan Cogdell commented that it was mere "window
- dressing" to have the Texas Rangers put in charge of the criminal
- investigation. "The Texas Rangers are very respected around here, but
- it's stretching it to say they are bringing any kind of true
- independent judgement. They are in charge, but Federal agents are
- dissecting the crime scene and cross-checking all the evidence." Also
- some legal experts called for greater separation between the Texas
- Rangers, FBI and BATF, including "a completely independent panel. .
- .to do the criminal investigation. `When the Challenger exploded, we
- didn't have NASA investigate the accident.' said Bruce Fein, a
- Washington lawyer who was an associate deputy Attorney General in the
- Reagan Administration and wrote guidelines of the Federal Bureau of
- Investigation on procedures for conducting investigations." [349]
-
- Whatever little separation there was between state and federal
- officials quickly ended. The New York Times reported: "State officials
- overseeing the investigation announced, in an apparent shift in
- policy, that once the voluminous amount of evidence from the compound
- is all collected, it would be shipped to Federal laboratories. `Our
- crime laboratory in Austin has to be available to handle criminal
- matters that come up in Texas,' said Mike Cox, a spokesman with the
- Texas Department of Public Safety. Earlier, officials conducting the
- investigation into how the fire started said that they were using
- private laboratories in an effort to avoid any appearance of conflict
- of interest that might arise from a Federal laboratory making
- conclusions about evidence in a case in which Federal agents' actions
- were being questioned." Cox told reporters, "The Texas Rangers are
- investigating the crime scene and if you are concerned about a
- conflict of interest, you should talk to the U.S. Attorney's office."
- However, the reporter writes that when he tried to do so: "The U.S.
- Attorney referred inquiries to the Department of Justice, and Carl
- Stern, a department spokesman, said, `All the shifts in police (sic) I
- know of, are the ones you invented,' referring to the news media."
- [350]
-
- d. May 12th Destruction of the Crime Scene
-
- Two weeks after the release of the "independent" fire investigators'
- report, but before Branch Davidian attorneys could send in their own
- fire investigators, bulldozers rolled across the burned rubble of
- Mount Carmel Center, filling in all the holes with dirt and burned
- rubble. SAC Jeffrey Jamar defended this action. "They're just filling
- holes so people won't fall in the pits. That's just part of taking
- care of the scene." And Mike Cox, spokesman for the Texas Department
- of Public Safety, said bulldozing was necessary so the Texas Health
- and Water departments could begin work at the site. However, attorney
- Jack Zimmerman said, "I guess what it does, it forever prevents any
- checking on the ATF's rendition that the fire was intentionally set."
- [351] Defense Attorney Jeffrey Kearney told local reporters:
- "Government agents can say what they want now and there's little
- physical evidence to dispute it." [352]
-
- e. Possibility FBI will Tamper with Audio/Video Evidence
-
- There exists a full record of what happened during the siege and on
- April 19th--news footage, aerial infrared and other video tapes, and
- surveillance audio tapes. However, as we have said, because modern
- audio and video techniques allow tampering which can go virtually
- undetected, any such taped evidence the prosecution uses against
- Branch Davidians will remain suspect.
-
- 19. "INDEPENDENT" FIRE INVESTIGATOR COVERUP
-
- The head of the so-called "independent" fire investigation team was
- Paul C. Gray, Assistant Chief of the Houston Fire Department. However,
- Gray had very close ties to BATF. BATF officials recommended him. He
- had served as a member of the BATF's National Arson Response Team and
- taught classes for BATF agents. And his wife was a secretary in BATF's
- Houston office." [353] Attorney Jack Zimmerman revealed, ">From 1982
- to 1990, (Gray's) office was on Imperial Valley Drive, in the ATF
- office. . .He carried a card that identified himself as a special
- agent of ATF. He handed that card out to people when he interviewed
- witnesses." [354] Finally, Gray had socialized with BATF agent Steve
- Willis, who was killed February 28th, and attended his funeral. [355]
-
- Zimmerman criticized Gray's selection and his conclusions that Branch
- Davidians set the fires. "Until I see the evidence from an
- independent, impartial expert, I choose to believe the firsthand
- account of eyewitnesses who were in the center who said there was no
- fire started by the Branch Davidians." [356]
-
- The Fire Report does not mention if investigators interviewed any of
- the fire survivors, something which would be done routinely in other
- fires. In fact, the Fire Report rejects "media" accounts of the
- survivors very similar statements about how the fire started--despite
- the fact survivors left the building at different exit points, were
- immediately arrested, and had little opportunity to get together to
- "concoct" similar stories.
-
- a. Fire Report Asserts People Not Trapped In Building
-
- Despite the extensive testimony about people being trapped by falling
- debris, blocked stairways, jammed doors, caved-in walls, and rapidly
- spreading smoke and fire, the Fire Report concludes, "Considering the
- observable means of exit available, we must assume that many of the
- occupants were either denied escape from within or refused to leave
- until escape was not an option." (JDR:Fire Report:9) The report does
- not mention what other fire experts would emphasize: "Cult members may
- have had less than five minutes to escape after the fire began. . .
- the fire produces an enormous amount of toxic gases that cause
- confusion." [357]
-
- b. Fire Report Implies Flammables Present for Purpose of Arson
-
- The Fire Report notes, "the physical evidence collected at the scene
- included the remains of several metal containers commonly used for the
- storage of flammable liquids." (JDR:Fire Report:3) It does not bother
- to mention that the 90 or more inhabitants of Mount Carmel were
- totally reliant on coleman lanterns fueled by kerosene, on butane gas
- heaters, and on propane gas for heat and light. Again, the Fire Report
- does admit that, "it is possible that some flammables were spilled
- inside the building as a result" of the tanks activities. (JDR:Fire
- Report:9)
-
- The report also exhaustively lists all the flammable materials found
- on survivors' shoes and clothes, as if this is evidence of arson.
- However, since fire investigators evidently did not interview
- survivors, they had no way of knowing that Davidians sometimes had to
- crawl on their hands and knees because of fuel knocked over by ferret
- rounds.
-
- According to Newsweek, just after the fire arson investigators found
- "metal lantern-fuel containers with what appeared to be deliberate
- punctures." [358] However, neither the Justice factual report or the
- Fire Report mentions such punctures in the containers and this may
- have been more FBI disinformation. The Fire Report also denies that
- the "CN" gas, as it mistakenly calls CS gas, could have started or
- contributed to the fire.
-
- c. Fire Report Asserts Accidental Fire Impossible
-
- The report attempts to debunk what it calls "another theoretical
- explanation reported by the media," i.e., that tanks rupturing "a
- propane cylinder or flammable liquid container" started the fire.
- Again, it does not admit that this is survivors' testimony. The Fire
- Report claims, "if this had happened, an immediate vapor air explosion
- or flash fire would have occurred involving the vehicle itself. It did
- not happen. All law enforcement vehicles were well away from the
- building prior to the start of the fire." (JDR:Fire Report:9) However,
- one assumes that the tanks are sufficiently well armored to withstand
- proximity to such a relatively small fire. And, as we have seen, tanks
- smashed into the building minutes before the fires began.
-
- d. Fire Report States Separated Points of Origin Means Arson
-
- The report states, "Fires were set in three separate areas of the
- structure identified as points of origin 1, 2, and 3. This
- investigation establishes that these fires occurred in areas
- significantly distant from each other and in a time frame that
- precludes any assumption of a single ignition source or accidental
- cause." (JDR:Fire Report:3) In an April 26, 1993, news conference,
- Gray told reporters, "We believe it was intentionally set by persons
- inside the compound. . .It is the opinion of the investigative team
- that this fire started in the interior of the building in at least two
- separate locations, at approximately the same time." These locations
- "were significantly distant enough from each other that they couldn't
- have been set by the same source at the same time." [359] He asserted
- "evidence showed a time gap between the last battering of the compound
- by an FBI armored vehicle and the appearance of the blaze." [360]
-
- Again, the fire investigator is denying what we can plainly see, that
- a last barrage of tank attacks occurred in separate locations within
- the six to eight minute period during which the fires began. He also
- rejects simple common sense: if even one massive tank smashes deep
- inside a rickety wooden building filled with dozens of lighted
- lanterns, propane tanks and other flammable containers, that one tank
- alone could start two or three fires in widely separated parts of the
- buildings. If two or three tanks do so within a short time period, all
- three could start fires. Also, the further inside the building the
- fire starts, the longer it will take after tanks have withdrawn for
- outsiders to see the fire. And even if outsiders see fires appearing
- at about the same time, it does not mean they started at the same
- time. Depending on how great the "fire load" of flammable materials in
- each room, fires could have started several minutes apart, but appear
- to outsiders to start virtually simultaneously.
-
- e. Fire Report Downplays Breaching's Role in Spreading Fire
-
- The report lists as "contributory factors" to the fire's spread: poor
- construction; highly combustible stored products such as baled hay,
- large quantities of paper, and other flammables; strong wind; and
- "breaching operations." The report admits "the FBI removed several
- large sections of the building's exterior walls. . .these openings are
- contributory to the fire's spread." However, it asserts that the
- "fresh air" the openings let in ". . .while fanning the flames. .
- .would have also lowered the concentration of carbon monoxide. .
- .increasing the amount of time a person might have survived if trapped
- inside." This weak apology for the breaching operation's contribution
- to spreading the fire at least admits that people might have been
- trapped inside. (JDR:Fire Report:6)
-
- f. Gray Inaccurately Claimed Escape Tunnel Was Usable
-
- During his press conference Paul Gray claimed, "I do believe that a
- person could have survived the fire. I could speculate that there was
- ample room in the open pit area for everybody to have gotten into."
- [361] However, this statement directly contradicts what Gray put in
- his own report regarding the buried bus that served as a tunnel system
- connected to the open pit: "It is also possible that the escape route
- planned included the aforementioned tunnel system accessible through
- an opening in the floor at the west end of the building. A significant
- amount of structural debris was found in this area indicating that the
- breaching operations could have caused this route to be blocked."
- (JDR:Fire Report:10)
-
- 20. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT COVERUP
-
- Because Justice Department officials were involved more deeply in the
- disastrous decisions at Waco than were their Treasury Department
- counterparts who approved the original BATF raid, the Justice
- Department coverup is much more systematic than the Treasury
- Department coverup. The Treasury Department had to explain only ten
- deaths and the Department could easily blame several agents and
- officials for going against orders and covering up their misdeeds.
- However, the Justice Department had to explain away the horrible
- deaths by fire of more than 80 people--25 of them children--who had
- made a very credible promise to surrender within a few days. The
- Justice Department did dismiss FBI Director Sessions shortly after the
- April 19th fire, but on other grounds related to incompetence and
- misconduct, not on his handling of the Waco standoff.
-
- a. Conflicting Statements About Reasons for the Assault
-
- In the days after the fire, Attorney Janet Reno and her
- representatives, and President Clinton and his representatives,
- emphasized "humanitarian" reasons for the assault, ones that
- presumably would play well with the public. Janet Reno began a media
- blitz where she repeatedly said in a press conference and on several
- television programs: "I approved the plan. I am responsible. The buck
- stops here." She explained the prime reasons for the assault were the
- "fatigue" of the hostage rescue team and ongoing evidence that "babies
- were being beaten." [362] Reno's efforts were extremely successful.
- Justice Department spokesperson Carl Stern asserted that while on
- April 19th the reaction from those who contacted the Justice
- Department was 10 to 1 against the assault, on April 20th, 8 out of 10
- said they agreed with Janet Reno! [363]
-
- In his April 20th news conference Bill Clinton emphasized that Reno
- had told him that the primary reason for the assault was: "It's
- because of the children. They have evidence that those children are
- still being abused, and that they're in increasingly unsafe
- conditions." [364] White House communications director George
- Stephanopoulos said, "I think there is absolutely no question that
- there was overwhelming evidence of child abuse in the Waco compound."
- He alleged David Koresh was "marrying children" and "sexually abusing
- children" and that children were "being taught how to commit suicide,
- how to put guns in their mouths, how to clamp down on cyanide. That is
- child abuse by any definition of the word. It was continuing, it was
- going on." [365] However, in the months after the assault, Attorney
- General Reno has come to admit that "she may have misunderstood (FBI)
- comments to her and that there was no evidence of recent child abuse
- by the Davidians." [366]
-
- Clinton also attacked Koresh. "The bureau's efforts were ultimately
- unavailing because the individual with whom they were dealing, David
- Koresh, was dangerous, irrational and probably insane. . .Mr. Koresh's
- response to the demands for his surrender by Federal agents was to
- destroy himself and murder the children who were his captives as well
- as all the other people there who did not survive." [367] Reno agreed.
- "I have absolutely no doubt at all that the cult members set (the
- fire) , based on all the information that has been furnished to me."
- [368]
-
- However, while Janet Reno and Bill Clinton may have stressed
- "humanitarian" concerns and Koresh's "wickedness," it is obvious that
- the FBI had other concerns. In a briefing for reporters FBI Director
- William Sessions said his agency had "no contemporaneous evidence" of
- child abuse during the siege. A reporter writes that Larry Potts,
- Assistant Director of the FBI's Criminal Division, asserted that the
- FBI's prime reason for going forward with the assault was that Koresh
- had "treated their efforts to negotiate with contempt," he was never
- going to surrender voluntarily, and "it was not in the nature of law
- enforcement officials who had seen the Federal agents killed during
- the initial raid on Feb. 28, to let the cult go on with its way of
- life." Potts told the reporter, "These people had thumbed their noses
- at law enforcement." [369] Columnist Paul Craig Roberts wrote of the
- true concerns underlying the government's action: "If the Branch
- Davidians could hold out, others might get the same idea. Heavens,
- people might stop paying their taxes. There was too much rebellion in
- the defiance of authority." [370]
-
- b. Justice Department Attempted to Forgo Full Investigation
-
- During his April 20th news conference President Clinton said: "We want
- an inquiry to analyze the steps along the way. Is there something else
- we should have known? Is there some other question they should have
- asked?" He appointed Philip B. Heymann, a Harvard Law School professor
- who had been nominated to be Deputy Attorney General, to lead the
- Justice Department investigation of the incidents at Waco. The New
- York Times reported that not-yet-confirmed Heymann told an interviewer
- that "investigators would not look at the decision to assault the
- compound with tanks and tear gas, which was made by Attorney General
- Janet Reno and William S. Sessions, Director of the Federal Bureau of
- Investigation. Department officials have not yet decided whether even
- to pose questions to Ms. Reno, he added. `I never wanted us to claim
- that we're doing a Warren Commission report that will try to stand for
- the agents, or that this will be the ultimate truth about what
- happened,' said Mr. Heymann." Because Congress and Americans
- overwhelmingly supported Reno and blamed the Branch Davidians for the
- fire, other unnamed officials "concluded that nothing could be gained
- by looking more closely at her order to carry out the assault." The
- article also reports, "Ms. Reno urged that there be `no
- recriminations,' and Justice Department officials involved in the
- investigation have interpreted that to mean that the decisions of the
- department and the FBI would be immune from review." [371]
-
- The day after the story appeared, and after several Congressional
- representatives criticized this revelation, the Justice Department
- contended that Heymann "had erred" and that there would be a full
- investigation. Officials gave different reasons for Heymann's
- inaccurate statement, including his not being fully briefed, his
- attempt to reduce expectations about the review, and, most
- revealingly, that his "remarks reflected a division within the Justice
- Department about how closely it should look at the events, with some
- high officials arguing forcefully that the inquiry should be more
- limited, to focus only on what should be done in future cases." [372]
-
- c. No Testimony Taken Under Oath
-
- Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann told reporters the review
- group did "not have the authority to issue subpoenas or grant immunity
- but could refer findings of wrongdoing for criminal prosecution."
- [373] Presumably, this means that agents and officials were not
- interviewed under oath. The Justice Department report makes no
- reference at all to these issues. There is also no evidence that any
- of the FBI agents or officials who testified before Congressional
- committees were sworn in, though they still could be prosecuted were
- it proved they had lied to a Congressional committee. As we noted in
- the BATF section, much of the truth about what really happened at Waco
- will come out only during the trials of the Branch Davidians, civil
- law suits against the government or through an independent
- investigation.
-
- d. Review Team and Outside Expert Conflicts of Interest
-
- First, it is questionable whether Deputy Attorney General Heymann or
- Assistant to the Attorney General Richard Scruggs, working as they do
- under Attorney Janet Reno, could do any "independent" investigation of
- errors in the Justice Department decision-making or in the actions of
- the FBI. Heymann was also the head of the Criminal Division under
- President Jimmy Carter, so he has a long history of loyalty to the
- institution, as well as to his superiors.
-
- The most noted conflict of interest is Heymann's appointing another
- former Chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, Edward
- S.G. Dennis, Jr., to review the procedures, decisions and actions of
- the Justice Department in the Waco matter. This choice came under
- scathing attack by William Safire who noted that Dennis was in charge
- of the botched investigation of Banca Lavoro and its relation to
- Iraq-gate: "Ms. Reno's Criminal Division directed Atlanta prosecutors
- to shoot down the explosive case with a plea bargain, avoiding a
- public trial that would have exposed the machinations of the Bush-
- Thornburgh-Dennis crowd. How could Ed Dennis not be grateful? His
- judgment about the Waco fiasco: `there is no place in the evaluation
- for blame, and I find no fault.' One hand whitewashes the other."
- [374] Mary McGrory also criticized the decision to end the Iraq-
- gate inquiry: "During the campaign, Bill Clinton indignantly promised
- to get to the bottom of it. But a deep incuriosity has set in, and so
- far his Justice Department has accepted the finding of an in-house
- whitewash headed by retired Judge Frederick Lacey." [375]
-
- According to James L. Pate, as U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia, Dennis
- also oversaw the investigation of the Philadelphia police department's
- bombing of MOVE in 1985. Another MOVE veteran assigned to review the
- Waco disaster was Los Angeles Police Department Chief, who was
- formerly Philadelphia's police commissioner. Pate writes: "If one was
- looking for two guys who might empathize with heavy- handed cops who
- screwed up, the phone numbers of Willie Williams and Eddie Dennis
- would be a must." [376]
-
- Another questionable Heymann appointment was Israeli professor Ariel
- Merari of Tel Aviv University as an outside expert. Professor Merari
- currently has a contract with Mr. Heymann to write a book, something
- which technically does not violate federal guidelines. Professor
- Merari's report does not offer any criticisms, only suggestions for
- improving future law enforcement efforts. Another former Heymann
- associate was more critical. Harvard's Alan A. Stone, M.D. first
- requested a "complete record of the events at Waco." [377] When he
- finally issued his report it was extremely critical.
-
- Former FBI director William Webster also was asked to be an outside
- expert and review the Justice Department's action. Since Webster
- authorized the creation of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team, it is not
- surprising he writes, "the unfortunate tragedy at Waco does not in any
- way diminish my admiration for the men and women who serve in HRT."
- However, he does urge that such "special response teams," including
- BATF's, should not be used without the approval of the Attorney
- General. (JDR:Webster:4)
-
- e. Possible Clinton-Hubbell-Lindsay-Foster Coverup
-
- Associate Attorney General Webster L. Hubbell, the third ranking
- official in the Justice Department, was the liaison for Waco between
- the Attorney General's office and the White House and attended
- meetings there. He passed on FBI chief negotiator Byron Sage's
- negative assessment of negotiations to Attorney General Reno and was
- involved in decision-making regarding gassing Mount Carmel. He was
- with Janet Reno in the FBI Operations Center on April 19th and was the
- highest ranking official there after she left. On April 19th Janet
- Reno told television viewers that Hubbell had called President Clinton
- the afternoon of the fire. During the April 28, 1993, House Judiciary
- Committee hearing, Representatives Hughes and Sensenbrenner expressed
- great interest in Hubbell's role in decision-making and about Reno's
- assertion Hubbell had spoken with Clinton April 19th. One even asked
- "whether Sessions and Reno were `out of the loop' with Hubbell." Reno
- told the Committee she had been in error and the Justice report claims
- Hubbell called White House Chief of Staff Thomas McLarty. (JDR:245)
-
- Webster Hubbell was one of Hillary Rodham Clinton's law partners in
- the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock as was Clinton's Deputy White House
- Counsel Vince Foster, who was also involved in Waco decision-making.
- Foster's July suicide may be linked to mismanaged or even illegal
- Clinton business dealings associated with the Madison Guaranty Savings
- and Loan Association and the Whitewater Development Corporation.
- Hubbell's father-in-law also received a questionable loan from the
- savings and loan.
-
- Another Clinton-Hubbell-Foster crony, Presidential Advisor Bruce
- Lindsay, also was involved in Waco decision-making with Hubbell.
- Lindsay was a senior partner at a law firm which, like the Rose Law
- firm, received hundreds of thousands of dollars in bond counsel fees
- from the Arkansas Development Finance Authority. Allegedly doing
- business with the Authority was a form of "payoff" for Clinton
- supporters. [378] Many suspect that Clinton-Hubbell-Lindsay-Foster
- cronyism would certainly extend to covering up any errors or crimes
- related to the massacre of the Branch Davidians. Therefore, the
- matters of whether Hubbell had some outside-the-chain-of-command
- contact with Clinton, whether Hubbell helped withhold Koresh's April
- 14th letter from Reno, whether he was involved in a decision to
- proceed with the demolition that led to the April 19th fire, all might
- be subject to investigation as part of Independent Counsel Robert
- Fiske's probe of obstruction of justice in the "Whitewater" affair.
-
- f. No Fault Finding for FBI and Justice Department Errors or Crimes
-
- At the October 8, 1993, press conference where the Justice Department
- presented its report on FBI actions at Waco, outside "reviewer" Edward
- Dennis stated, "I find no fault in the performance of law enforcement
- during the standoff and the tear gas assault," and asserted
- "speculation regarding them coming out is irresponsible." Likewise,
- Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann said, "We can't come out with a
- scapegoat when there's no severe blame to be placed." [379] However,
- outside expert Alan M. Stone disagreed, writing: "There is a view
- within the FBI and in the official reports that suggests the tragedy
- was unavoidable. This report is a dissenting opinion from that view."
- (Justice:Stone:46)
-
- Reporters at the press conference asked Heymann if the Justice report
- was a "whitewash," especially compared to the Treasury Department
- report. Heymann answered that the Treasury report found "recklessness
- (in the initial raid) followed by a coverup," and that in the FBI and
- Justice Department's handling of the Branch Davidians, the "underlying
- facts are different." [380] Attorney General Janet Reno said: "I'm
- always concerned about the perception of a white-wash. But I don't go
- out to seek mea culpas and I don't go out to seek (a report that says)
- we didn't do anything wrong. I go out to seek the truth..." [381] When
- Alan M. Stone issued his highly critical report of the FBI/Justice
- Department handling of the siege, Janet Reno refused to comment. The
- FBI released a statement defending its actions. [382]
-
- Despite Reno and Heymann's denials that the Justice report was a
- whitewash, a number of publications and respected columnists called it
- just that: the New York Times ("The Waco Whitewash," 10/12/93); the
- Washington Times ("The truth about Waco, still untold," 10/13/93);
- Paul Greenberg, editorial page editor of the Arkansas Democrat
- Gazette; Leonard E. Larsen, a columnist for Scripps Howard News
- Service; columnist Paul Craig Roberts, former assistant secretary of
- the U.S. Treasury; and many others.
-
- g. Evidence of Coverup in Justice Department Report
-
- Throughout this report we have noted where the Justice report has
- failed to provide information--even when it would not seem necessary
- to "redact" it per law--or has provided questionable information. The
- examples most indicative of coverup are: no mention of disinformation
- spread by SACs Jeffrey Jamar and Bob Ricks; failure to specify whether
- the use of the tanks was illegal; refusal to admit FBI reliance on
- Rick Ross and Marc Breault or knowledge of Dr. Miron Murray's
- anti-cult sympathies; failure to name those who recommended and
- ordered the use of harassment techniques; failure to admit that
- Koresh's letter was a promise to surrender; failure to state whether
- the letter was shown to FBI Director Sessions or Attorney General Reno
- and if not, who withheld the letter from them; failure to mention
- whether the ground commanders kept control of the whole operation or
- were given any orders from the FBI Operations Center regarding the
- speed up of gassing and the order to proceed with demolition; refusal
- of factual report and Justice Department officials to admit there was
- an order to proceed to demolition, as Dennis does; no mention of
- whether agents used "handheld" grenade launchers and why agents were
- outside their tanks; no mention of discrepancy between Jamar's April
- 19th comment that three agents saw Branch Davidians starting fires and
- Justice reports' account of only one; no mention that both Renos
- Avraam and Graeme Craddock deny the statements the Justice report says
- they made about Branch Davidians starting fires; no mention of tanks
- pushing burning debris into the fire; no mention that BATF agents
- aided in the post-fire investigation; no mention of the chief fire
- investigator's ties to BATF.
-
- h. No Justice Department Report on Tampering with 911 Tapes
-
- As indicated earlier, during the June 9, 1993, House Appropriations
- subcommittee hearing, an FBI agent gave a staff member an excerpted
- tape of the "911" calls between Lieutenant Larry Lynch and Branch
- Davidians. Waco police said it gave a "false impression of how the
- event occurred" and Janet Reno promised the department would
- investigate the editing and dissemination of the tape. [383] In the
- tape, the section where Wayne Martin complains about helicopters
- shooting at him has been moved to a time period after the helicopters
- withdrew from the scene. The Subcommittee Clerk told us that as of
- January 19, 1994 the Justice Department had not reported back on this
- possible tape tampering.
-
- i. Weak Recommendations to Prevent Another Tragedy
-
- Representative Don Edwards, chair of the Judiciary subcommittee that
- oversees the FBI, expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the
- Justice Department report. "This is essentially an in-house review. It
- seems to me there is nothing in the report to indicate that if the
- same crisis arose tomorrow we wouldn't have the same tragic results."
- [384] Outside expert Alan Stone wrote: "One might think that the
- highest priority after a tragedy like Waco would be for everyone
- involved to consider what went wrong and what would they now do
- differently. I must confess that it has been a frustrating and
- disappointed experience to discover that the Justice Department's
- investigation has produced so little in this regard. (JDR:Stone:37)
-
- Deputy Attorney General Philip B. Heymann's report, "Lessons of Waco:
- Proposed Changes in Federal Law Enforcement," recommended increasing
- the size of the Hostage Rescue Team, closer consultations between
- Hostage Rescue Team tactical people and negotiators, better behavioral
- science understanding of non-traditional groups, better crisis
- management training for special agents-in-charge, and replacing them
- with more highly trained managers in some crisis situations.
- (JDR:Heymann:5-14) The new FBI Director Louis Freeh has instituted
- many of these measures and even insisted that Janet Reno undergo
- "dramatic tactical training" to help improve the Justice Department's
- response to crises like the 51-day standoff" with the Branch
- Davidians. However, according to news reports, Freeh continues to
- defend the FBI's handling of the tragic episode at Waco. [385]
-
- j. Refusal to Consider Discipline or Prosecution of Agents or
- Officials
-
- During the October 8, 1993 Justice Department press conference, Deputy
- Attorney General Heymann said that the report had been given to the
- FBI's new Director Louis J. Freeh who would decide if any disciplinary
- action was needed. [386] A few days later Freeh said a final review of
- the bureau's handling of the incident was continuing. However, he
- added, "I do not know at this time or contemplate at this time that
- any disciplinary action would be taken." [387]
-
- The FBI has been conducting investigations into the overly aggressive
- and irresponsible actions of the FBI Hostage Rescue Team, and its
- commander Richard Rogers, in the Randy Weaver case, and of the
- officials who supported them. Freeh has even spoken to agents about
- possible prosecutions in the matter. And Freeh suspended Assistant FBI
- Director James Fox for violating repeated judicial admonitions to
- refrain from commenting on the World Trade Center bombing to the news
- media. Therefore, Freeh's refusal to look at the overly aggressive and
- irresponsible actions of the very same FBI agents and officials at
- Waco must be questioned in terms of a larger, ongoing Justice
- Department coverup.
-
- 21. COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE CONCLUSIONS
-
- a. FBI and Justice Department Actions Responsible for Branch Davidians
- Deaths
-
- The Committee for Waco Justice believes that FBI gassing and
- demolition actions trapped Branch Davidians in fires caused by massive
- military tanks, causing the deaths of more than 80 people. Therefore,
- FBI agents and FBI and Justice Department officials responsible for
- the decision to gas and disassemble Mount Carmel are legally
- responsible for the deaths of the Branch Davidians. Even if it should
- be proved beyond a doubt that any fires were started by one or more
- Branch Davidians, we still believe these decision- makers remain
- legally responsible for driving the perpetrator(s) to this desperate
- act and for causing the destruction that trapped so many people in the
- building when the fires started.
-
- b. Independent Counsel Should Prosecute Responsible FBI Agents and FBI
- and Justice Officials
-
- Under current law, the Attorney General can appoint an Independent
- Counsel to identify and prosecute any FBI agents and FBI and Justice
- Department officials suspected of committing any and all relevant
- crimes, including the following:
-
- * Official Misconduct for giving the Attorney General misleading
- information that led to the decision to gassing and demolishing Mount
- Carmel Center and for any role in covering up any irresponsible or
- illegal acts.
-
- * Multiple Counts of Intentional or Negligent Homicide or Manslaughter
- for carrying out an unnecessary and violently executed gassing and
- demolition of Mount Carmel. Decisions of whether to charge FBI agents
- with intentional or negligent homicide would depend on further
- investigations.
-
- * Conspiracy against the Rights of Citizens U.S. Code Title 18,
- Section 241 reads: "If two or more persons conspire to injure,
- oppress, threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant of any State,
- Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right
- or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
- States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or
- more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
- another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or
- enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured- they shall be fined
- not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both:
- and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
- term of years or for life." [388]
-
- * Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law U.S. Code Title 18, Section
- 242 reads: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
- regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State,
- Territory or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
- immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
- United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on
- account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color,
- or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be
- fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
- both; and if bodily injury results shall not be fined under this title
- or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results
- shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
-
- Footnote [388] John McCaslin's August 4, 1993 Washington Times column
- quotes Stacy Koon, one of the two Los Angeles policemen convicted in
- federal court of felony violations of Rodney King's civil rights: "The
- government used the same arguments in Waco--the suspect(s) set the
- tone and the officers responded to it. . .The difference is that we
- had 82 seconds; the federal government had 50-plus days in Waco. .
- .They had time to think and analyze and come up with game plans and
- they had the ability to wait out--we didn't have that. They used the
- same argument, and, in that case, people died, multiple people died."
- Speaking of Janet Reno, he said, "She, like I, took responsibility. .
- .Then there was a negative outcome--50 people died. The state of Texas
- should try her for multiple cases of murder. If the state of Texas
- then does not find her guilty, the federal government should come in
- and try her for civil rights violations." Similarly, Paul Craig
- Roberts wrote in his April 22, 1993, syndicated column, "If Rodney
- King's civil rights were violated, what happened in Waco?. . .If a
- billy club is excessive force, what is a tank?"
-
- FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIANS
-
- The federal prosecution of eleven Branch Davidians began January 10,
- 1994 in San Antonio, Texas. The trial was moved to San Antonio from
- Waco because of the "notoriety" of the case in that town. In his
- opening statement, lead prosecutor Assistant U.S. Attorney LeRoy Jahn
- claimed David Koresh expected his disciples to "kill for God." The
- defense blamed the raid on a faltering government agency that had
- "declared war on its citizens." [389]
-
- Many people believe that the government has "rigged" the trial to
- prevent a repeat of the Randy Weaver case, where a disgusted jury
- found the defendants innocent of most charges. The trial judge, U.S.
- District Judge Walter Smith of Waco, has already announced that he
- will not allow the defense to "put the government on trial." [390]
- >From the evidence of the first days of the trail, suspicions that
- BATF and FBI will withhold, delay and even fabricate evidence, as they
- did in the Randy Weaver trial, appear to be well founded. A crucial
- piece of evidence--one of Mount Carmel's two front doors--is missing.
- At least two BATF agents have made different statements during the
- trial-- after they spoke to the Treasury Department review team and
- prosecutors--than they made earlier to Waco police and Texas Rangers.
- The prosecution did not warn the defense it had a witness who could
- identify a defendant--and only later told the defense it had withheld
- evidence that the witness was previously uncertain he could in fact
- identify the defendant!
-
- Below we review the charges, pretrial motions and jury selection, and
- the cases the prosecution and defense can be expected to make.
- Finally, we will briefly describe Branch Davidian law suits against
- the government.
-
- THE CHARGES
-
- Between March 30 and July 20, 1993, a series of indictments were
- returned against several Branch Davidians. On August 6, 1993, the
- United States Attorney's office in Waco, Texas obtained a
- "superseding" indictment from a grand jury that combined all previous
- indictments into one. Charged with conspiracy to murder federal
- officers were: Paul Fatta, who was in Austin on February 28th; Norman
- Washington Allison (aka Delroy Nash) and Woodrow "Bob" Kendrick who
- tried to return to Mount Carmel on February 28th; Brad Branch,
- Livingston Fagan, Kathryn Schroeder and Kevin Whitecliff who left
- Mount Carmel during the 51-day siege; and Renos Avraam, Jaime
- Castillo, Graeme Craddock, Clive Doyle, and Ruth Riddle who survived
- the April 19th fire. Conviction on conspiracy charges could mean up to
- life in prison and a $250,000 fine for each defendant. [391]
-
- On September 9, 1993, Kathryn Schroeder pled guilty to one count of
- armed resistance to a federal officer, which still could result in 10
- years in jail. She also agreed to testify against the remaining eleven
- defendants in return for the government dropping the original charges
- against her. A Washington Post reporter commented on this fact:
- "Originally, 12 Branch Davidians were expected to face trial, a fact
- not lost on those who draw parallels between Koresh and Jesus
- Christ--son of a carpenter, dead at 33, survived by 12 disciples, one
- of whom turned against him." [392] Below is an outline of the ten
- counts of the August 6, 1993, indictment against the eleven Branch
- Davidians.
-
- Count One--Conspiracy to Murder Federal Officers: This is the most
- detailed count against all twelve defendants. The charge reads, in
- part, "It was part of this conspiracy that Vernon K. Howell, also
- known as David Koresh, would and did advocate and encourage an armed
- confrontation, which he described as a `war' between his followers and
- the United States government." Other parts of the conspiracy included:
- creating the "Mighty Men" unit, establishing the "Mag Bag" business
- location; acquiring or assisting in the acquisition of weapons to be
- used in this "war," assisting in converting legally purchased
- semi-automatic rifles to fully automatic rifles and inert hand grenade
- shells into live grenades, preparing for the arrival of Federal agents
- on February 28th, endeavoring to enter Mount Carmel after the
- shootout, forcibly resisting the execution of a search warrant from
- February 28th until each individual left Mount Carmel, firing upon
- tanks on April 19th, co-conspiring with David Koresh and Steve
- Schneider to spread flammable liquids throughout Mount Carmel and to
- start the fires within Mount Carmel. The remaining counts below are
- quoted directly from the Justice Department report.
-
- Count Two--Aiding and Abetting the Murder of Federal Officers: All
- twelve defendants were charged with aiding and abetting the murders of
- the four ATF agents on February 28, 1993.
-
- Count Three--Using a Firearm During a Crime of Violence: Schroeder,
- Branch, Whitecliff, Castillo, Fagan, Fatta, Craddock, Avraam and
- Riddle were charged with using a firearm during a crime of violence in
- connection with the first ATF shootout on February 28, 1993.
-
- Count Four--Aiding and Abetting the Attempted Murder of a Federal
- Officer: Allison (Nash) and Kendrick were charged with aiding and
- abetting the attempted murder of an ATF agent during the second
- shootout on February 28.
-
- Count Five--Using a Firearm During a Crime of Violence: Kendrick was
- charged with using two firearms in connection with the second ATF
- shootout on February 28.
-
- Count Six--Using a Firearm During a Crime of Violence: Allison (Nash)
- was charged with using a firearm during the second ATF shootout on
- February 28.
-
- Count Seven--Possession of an Unregistered Destructive Device:
- Craddock was charged with possessing an explosive grenade on April 19,
- 1993.
-
- Count Eight--Conspiracy to Possess an Unregistered Destructive Device:
- Craddock was charged with conspiring with Koresh to possess an
- explosive grenade during the 51- day standoff.
-
- Count Nine--Conspiracy to Possess and Unlawfully Manufacture
- Machineguns: Fatta was charged with conspiring to manufacture and
- possess machineguns during 1992 and early 1993.
-
- Count Ten--Aiding and Abetting the Unlawful Possession of Machineguns:
- Fatta was charged with aiding and abetting Koresh in the unlawful
- possession of machineguns during 1992 and early 1993.
-
- The government's "conspiracy theory" is based on the "Pinkerton
- doctrine" that holds that a person involved in only a minor part of
- crime, like driving a getaway car, is as responsible for a crime like
- robbery or murder as the person doing the crime. Robert Dawson, a
- professor of criminal law at the University of Texas Law School, said
- that if the government is using the Pinkerton standard, then the
- standard will be the "`should have anticipated' standard--should the
- Branch Davidians have been able to anticipate that stockpiling weapons
- and other firearms violations could result in the death of those
- Federal agents?"
-
- Defense attorney Tim Evans insisted, "Conspiracy has become the
- darling of the government's nursery. It allows the Government to throw
- a huge net over everyone connected to a case and makes the jury sort
- it all out. The danger of that is that sometimes people get convicted
- based upon guilt by association." Graham Craddock's attorney Stanley
- Rentz said, "If their theory is `in for a penny, in for a pound,' then
- they should have indicted everyone who was in the compound. They've
- left some people out of the indictment altogether. The sad thing is
- that most of the people who were really active leaders perished in the
- fire. So now the Government is going after whoever is left just to
- placate themselves. I guess it's just hard for them to walk away from
- it." [393]
-
- >From currently available evidence, it would seem the government has
- pursued a strategy of selective prosecution. Three individuals
- especially seem to have been spared prosecution, even though evidence
- against them may be as strong as that against some of those being
- prosecuted.
-
- * Donald Bunds: One of BATF Agent Davy Aguilera's most convincing
- evidences of "intent" to manufacture illegal weapons mentioned in his
- February 25, 1993 affidavit was David Block's allegation that Donald
- Bunds, a mechanical engineer, operated a metal lathe and milling
- machine that had the capability to fabricate firearm parts. Block said
- he had observed Bunds designing a machinegun on a computer.
- Prosecutors have already entered into evidence equipment that one
- Texas Ranger said could have been used to fabricate firearm parts.
- [394] Bunds drove towards Mount Carmel on February 28th, but was
- prevented by police from returning. It is quite possible he was not
- prosecuted because his wife Jeannine and daughter Robyn may be two
- important prosecution witnesses. Even if they are not, this may be a
- "reward" for their cooperating with BATF Agent Aguilera in the
- original investigation.
-
- * David Thibodeau: Earl Dunagan's April 18, 1993 affidavit does not
- list him as being seen carrying a gun during the February 28th
- shootout or standing guard after it. It is quite possible he was not
- prosecuted because his mother, Balenda Gamen, was the most vocal and
- articulate of the Branch Davidian family members. She appeared on
- numerous television shows and surely would have conducted a damaging
- media campaign against the government had her son been indicted.
-
- * Rita Riddle: Earl Dunagan's April 18, 1993 affidavit does list Rita
- Riddle as having carried a gun on February 28th. She has been an
- active organizer for the defense since the fires. It is possible she
- was not prosecuted because her daughter Misty Ferguson was seriously
- disfigured during the April 19th fire and the government feared the
- girl would appear at the trial, displaying her wounds. Riddle's
- sister-in-law Ruth Ottman Riddle has been charged, even though
- Dunagan's April 18, 1993 affidavit mentions only that she was seen
- sewing tactical vests. It is possible she is being prosecuted because,
- as David Koresh's typist during his writing of the First Seal, she
- could testify convincingly about his efforts to finish his book so
- that he and his followers could leave Mount Carmel. She was a very
- effective spokesperson on television following the April 19th fire.
-
- PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS AND JURY SELECTION
-
- Certainly the early stages of the trial have only reinforced beliefs
- that the trial is rigged. A prejudiced judge seems to have
- "handpicked" the jury--and done all he can to ensure the jury does not
- see any literature that might persuade them to "vote their
- conscience."
-
- In December of 1993, Judge Smith "ordered that jurors' identities be
- kept a secret and attorneys not talk to the media. (He) indicated that
- he is taking unusual steps to ensure the safety of the defendants,
- jury members and witnesses in the trial." [395] Defense attorneys Joe
- Turner and Terry Kirk immediately filed an objection to Smith's order
- for an anonymous jury, believing it would hurt the jury's presumption
- of innocence. Their motion stated, "The prospective jury members are
- likely to assume that because their names are being kept secret, they
- must have reason to fear the defendant or her fellow Branch
- Davidians." [396] In January Smith explained to the press he was
- concerned Branch Davidian jurors might be mistaken for "jurors in an
- organized crime trial going on at the courthouse." [397]
-
- However, it turns out that the real reason Judge Smith demanded an
- anonymous jury was his fear that the jury would receive information
- from an organization called the Fully Informed Jury Association
- (FIJA). FIJA intended to send jurors leaflets containing general and
- well-documented information about jury rights--including the right of
- the jury to find defendants innocent if they disagree with the law or
- feel that the government acted improperly. They had done the same
- thing in the Randy Weaver case and some believe this helped win
- acquittal for Weaver. Smith had first taken the unusual step of
- restricting public access to the names of all potential jurors in the
- federal jury "wheel" for the Western District of Texas. On December
- 30, the judge admitted "The Court is not as concerned about the
- possibility of the Defendants or their associates threatening the jury
- members," instead, it was concerned with protecting the jury panel
- because, "It (has) been reported that an organization plans to attempt
- to hand out leaflets to potential jurors about how they should ignore
- the law and follow their conscience." [398]
-
- Some believed Judge Smith silenced the eleven defendants' numerous
- attorneys so that their statements to the media could not affect
- potential jurors. Once the trial started, television news broadcasts
- showed some attorneys speaking freely to the press. However, in late
- January Judge Smith again barred defense attorneys from speaking to
- the press, saying "statements or information intended to influence
- public opinion regarding the merits of this case" would not be
- tolerated. Smith said he would monitor media sources and threatened
- daily contempt proceedings for any comments he found attorneys had
- made. [399] This is just one more evidence of a prejudiced judge
- participating in a government coverup of crimes against the Branch
- Davidians.
-
- During the jury selection process, Judge Smith demanded defense
- attorneys submit questions to him and disallowed their directly
- questioning potential jurors. Instead, he asked the questions. The
- only choice left for the attorneys was a limited number of "strikes."
- This selection process makes it more difficult for the attorneys to
- weed out prejudiced individuals. [400] Meanwhile the Dallas Morning
- News filed a motion seeking to overturn Smith's decision to bar most
- of the media and public during juror questioning, stating the public
- and the media have a "constitutional right of access to the
- examination of potential jurors in a criminal trial." [401] The fact
- that Judge Smith interviewed potential jury members in his
- shirtsleeves, without his judicial robes, so that he would not
- "intimidate" them was widely reported by the press. Jury selection was
- complete in two days--an unusually short period for such a complicated
- trial with so many defendants- -and the trial began on January 12,
- 1994. Should any Branch Davidians be convicted, the restrictive jury
- selection process might provide grounds for appeal.
-
- Paul Fatta's attorney Mike DeGeurin requested Judge Smith prohibit
- prosecutors and witnesses from using the word "cult" because it has a
- "negative and dangerous" connotation that might influence a jury
- against the defendants. The motion noted that Assistant U.S. Attorney
- J. Ray Jahn has already stopped using the word. [402] The judge
- rejected the request. [403] Defense lawyers then asked Judge Smith to
- prohibit prosecutors from using prejudicial words like "compound,"
- "Ranch Apocalypse," and "Mighty Men." [404] We assume he also rejected
- this request because some of the terms have been used in the trial.
-
- As in all trials, the prosecution will first present its evidence of
- the defendant's guilt. Defense attorneys will have the opportunity to
- cross-examine all witnesses. Assuming the case is not dismissed for
- lack of evidence, the defense will then present its case. The
- prosecutors will also have the opportunity to cross-examine defense
- witnesses, including the defendants, should they decide to testify.
- Below is an outline of the expected cases to be presented by the
- prosecution and the defense--and some questions likely to be asked and
- points raised in cross- examinations.
-
- THE PROSECUTION CASE
-
- The eleven Branch Davidians were charged with conspiracy, in part,
- because there was little or no solid evidence that any of them shot at
- or killed any of the four BATF agents who died February 28, 1993. Nor
- was there evidence that any of them shot at tanks on April 19th or
- started the fires that destroyed Mount Carmel. Listed below is the
- evidence the U.S. Attorneys are expected to present to support the ten
- counts of the indictment:
-
- Physical Evidence: Weapons distributors invoices and United Parcel
- Service records of legal weapons purchases; hundreds of legal guns,
- grenade casings and explosives plus any illegal machineguns, silencers
- and live grenades found after the April 19th fire; any remaining
- evidence of the February 28th raid, including photographs and charts
- of bullet ridden vehicles and their positions before being moved by
- FBI tanks; explosives-related materials allegedly found at the
- LaVerne, California home; clothing, shoes, other materials soaked with
- fuel taken from fire survivors; other "evidence" of arson such as fuel
- containers, wood planks, etc.
-
- Undercover Eavesdropping Devices: While the government admits these
- recordings are of poor quality, prosecutors will try to use them to
- prove that the Branch Davidians started the April 19th fire, and
- probably to prove other aspects of the "conspiracy."
-
- Video tapes: KWTX and BATF footage of the BATF raid, including--if it
- exists--BATF aerial videotape evidence that Branch Davidians fired
- first; television news footage and any government video tape of the
- siege; video tapes of Koresh and other members made inside Mount
- Carmel during the siege and sent out to be shown to the FBI and family
- members; television news footage; and aerial infrared video tape and
- any other government video tape of the April 19th assault and fire.
- Should the government introduce Gun Owners of America video tapes
- which are "derogatory to ATF" as evidence Branch Davidians were
- "indoctrinated" to kill federal agents, the defense can argue both the
- First Amendment right to free speech and the Second Amendment right to
- bear arms.
-
- Audio tapes: These might include tapes of the 911 calls, of Koresh's
- negotiations with BATF agent Cavanaugh, of negotiations during the 51
- day siege, of KRLD and CNN radio interviews, and tapes of Koresh's
- sermons which allegedly show his propensity towards violence.
-
- Documents: These would include any relevant Koresh or Branch Davidian
- correspondence and Koresh's April 9, 10 and 14th letters to the FBI.
- (Will the prosecution, like the FBI and Justice Department, only
- present the first two letters and ignore the last?)
-
- Witnesses--BATF and FBI Agents: Prosecutors will ask them to testify
- about the planning and execution of the February 28th raid, during the
- siege, during the April 19th destruction of Mount Carmel, and during
- the investigation of the pre-and post-fire "crime scene." Defense
- attorneys are challenging these agents' credibility by exposing
- inconsistencies in their testimonies and asking them about the lies
- told by BATF raid commanders.
-
- Gerard E. Lynch, a Columbia University law professor and former
- Federal prosecutor said, "The defense will clobber them with every
- mistake everyone ever made in pursuing the case. They will make it a
- trial on the Government's tactics." [405] Former Koresh attorney Gary
- Coker, who is now representing some Branch Davidian material
- witnesses, told reporters, "I think people see that almost everybody
- from (former BATF Director Stephen) Higgins on down has at one time or
- another lied about this case. And if they would lie about those
- matters, why wouldn't they lie about other matters that are specific
- as to criminal charges?" [406] David Thibodeau's attorney Gary
- Richardson asserted, "Our clients said the Feds were lying all along,
- and they were. . .What our clients were telling us was true. Heads
- would roll when the truth eventually came out. That's just what
- happened." [407] Some defense lawyers told a reporter privately that
- they relished the idea of cross- examining the government's witnesses,
- particularly the BATF's February 28, 1993 raid commanders. Said one
- attorney, "It'll be the old `Were you lying then and are you lying now
- routine.'" [408] Judge Smith has so far refused to let the defense
- introduce as evidence the Treasury Department report that criticizes
- BATF's handling of the raid. However, the judge has allowed defense
- attorneys to ask questions which have resulted in Texas Ranger and
- BATF agent testimony that BATF raid commanders lied to them about
- certain issues.
-
- Witnesses--Paul Gray and other Fire Investigators: Chief fire
- investigator Paul Gray's close ties with BATF will lower the
- credibility of his testimony.
-
- Witness--Former "Co-conspirator" Kathryn Schroeder: Prosecutors may
- call Kathryn Schroeder, whose husband Michael Schroeder was killed on
- February 28th and whose four children left Mount Carmel early in the
- siege. She also left during the siege. Papers filed at the time
- Schroeder agreed to plea bargain state that she "admitted being an
- armed guard from the day of the initial raid until March 12th, when
- she left the compound." [409] She probably will testify about Koresh's
- alleged plan to have his followers turn their weapons on the public in
- Waco, Texas. [410] Defense attorneys may question Schroeder's motives:
- her desire to ensure that she will be able to see her children again;
- the fact that she was incarcerated in a mental institution for two
- months and possibly "deprogrammed"; her possible fear that her
- September, 1990 arrest in El Paso, Texas, for possession of marijuana
- and cocaine might have influenced the jury, sentencing judge or future
- parole boards against her. [411]
-
- Witnesses--Branch Davidians Who Left Mount Carmel after February 28th,
- i.e. "Material Witnesses": Any of those who were at Mount Carmel on
- February 28th or during the siege may be called. Most probably may not
- be very cooperative witnesses. However, some may be. Davy Aguilera
- states in his April 18, 1993 affidavit that on March 6th he talked to
- a "cooperating individual" who had lived at Mount Carmel for long
- period of time. This individual claimed to have seen machineguns,
- grenades and silencers manufactured and had "observed that Howell was
- attempting to construct a radio-controlled aircraft which can be used
- to carry explosives." Dunagan's affidavit states that released Branch
- Davidians claimed that on February 28th they had seen two boxes of
- hand grenades and Wayne Martin wearing a string of grenades around his
- neck. It also lists Branch Davidians seen wearing fatigues and
- carrying rifles, before and during the shooting. Defense attorneys
- will give these witnesses an opportunity to speak about their
- religious convictions and the savagery of the BATF attack and the FBI
- siege against them.
-
- Witnesses--Branch Davidian Children: Defense lawyers believe that if
- few or none of Mr. Koresh's adult followers prove to be valuable
- witnesses, prosecutors may call some of the 21 children who left Mount
- Carmel during the standoff. The law does not shield children from
- being forced to testify against their parents. [412]
-
- Witnesses--Breakaway Branch Davidians: To prove "conspiracy"
- prosecutors may call some former Branch Davidians. Since most of those
- who made the most damning statements about Koresh and the Branch
- Davidians--especially Marc Breault, the Bunds and David Block--have
- been associated with cult busters, defense attorneys may attempt to
- undermine their credibility by probing their motivations and their
- association with "cult busters" committed to destroying "cults" like
- the Branch Davidians.
-
- Witness--Joyce Sparks: Prosecutors may ask her to repeat her
- allegations about Koresh's statement about "military action" against
- Waco. Defense attorneys would question her to discover if she
- misunderstood a Biblical reference.
-
- Witness--Henry McMahon: Prosecutors may demand Koresh's arms dealer
- and sometimes partner Henry McMahon testify about the weapons he sold
- to Koresh and about Koresh's motivations. Davy Aguilera's April 18,
- 1993 affidavit repeats McMahon's story that Koresh had "observed the
- `ATF S.W.A.T. Team' training at a vacant house approximately 500 yards
- toward the compound next to the `Mag Bag'" and that Koresh believed it
- was "conducted by ATF to assault the compound/Mount Carmel property."
- The government claims this police training was Koresh's motivation for
- his arms buildup.
-
- In cross-examination, the defense will ask McMahon to repeat his
- stories that Koresh keeping guns as an investment, that Koresh invited
- BATF to see his guns, that Aguilera lied when he said McMahon tried to
- confuse him about how many guns he had sold to Koresh, and that BATF
- lured McMahon into "protective custody" and kept him away from the
- press and the FBI. If the prosecution does not call McMahon, the
- defense surely will.
-
- Witnesses--Government Experts: The prosecution may call government
- "experts" to defend the BATF raid, to testify about David Koresh and
- the Branch Davidian's alleged mental problems, or to defend the
- pressure tactics used during the siege and the final assault on Mount
- Carmel. The defense will try to expose their prejudices and/or lack of
- competence in dealing with committed religous groups like the Branch
- Davidians.
-
- THE DEFENSE CASE
-
- Below we list the various counts and the defendants' expected defenses
- against the charges. Since the main defense is "self-defense" against
- excessive government force, it will be important to show that the
- government violated Branch Davidians rights, used excessive force and
- then tried to coverup their mistakes throughout the whole tragic
- operation. Attorneys and defendants pray that, as in the Weaver case,
- a disgusted jury will find the defendants innocent of murder and most
- or all other charges. Weaver's attorney Gary Spence said at that time,
- "A jury today has said that you can't kill somebody just because you
- wear badges and then cover up those homicides by prosecuting the
- innocent." [413]
-
- Count One--Conspiracy to Murder Federal Officers, Count Two--Aiding
- and Abetting the Murder of Federal Officers, Count Three--Using a
- Firearm During a Crime of Violence, all related to initial February
- 28, 1993 shootout, forcible resistance of arrest, firing on tanks, and
- starting the April 19th fire. Attorneys' arguments will probably
- include the following defenses:
-
- * Legal Right to Shoot Back In Self-Defense Against Out- of-Control
- Law Enforcement--Defense attorneys may argue that BATF's lack of a "no
- knock warrant" and obvious use of excessive force in sending 76
- heavily armed agents to serve simple search and arrest warrants gave
- the Branch Davidians the legal right to shoot back in self-defense.
- They may point to evidence: that BATF raid commanders had done a
- sloppy job of investigating and were overly influenced by "cult
- busters"; that they had ignored Koresh's past cooperation with law
- enforcement, that they planned an unnecessary and dangerous
- paramilitary raid; that they disobeyed orders and proceeded with a
- raid despite the loss of surprise; that agents were expecting and
- prepared for a shootout; that agents shot first and indiscriminately--
- including from helicopters; and that agent friendly fire even injured
- or killed their own. This evidence of an out- of-control government
- agency will support the case that the Branch Davidians had a right to
- shoot back in self-defense. The fact that the FBI ground commanders
- also may have exceeded orders in proceeding with the demolition of
- Mount Carmel despite Branch Davidians' willingness to negotiate will
- point to an FBI that is similarly "out-of-control." If Justice
- Department officials are implicated in that fatal command, the defense
- can argue that "Gestapo"-like action against citizens starts right at
- the top.
-
- The self-defense argument may also be used regarding the Branch
- Davidians' resisting arrest during the siege and allegedly shooting at
- the tanks. It should be noted that the Randy Weaver jury acquitted
- Weaver and Kevin Harris of charges of resisting arrest, despite the
- eleven day standoff, because they evidently considered it part of
- their self-defense against government violence.
-
- Regarding the right to self-defense, one former senior BATF official
- said, "Irrespective of the situation inside, the notice of authority
- and purpose must be given. . .Unless the occupants of a dwelling are
- made aware that the persons attempting to enter have legal authority
- and a legal warrant to enter, the occupants have every right to defend
- themselves." [414] The Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986
- recognizes the Common Law rule of self-defense, which is that the
- defender must have reasonable belief that the circumstances of
- immediate danger warrant self-defense. Section 9.31 of the Texas Penal
- Codes states: "The use of force to resist an arrest or search is
- justified: (1) If, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace
- officer (or persons acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use
- greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search; and (2)
- When and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is
- immediately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer's
- (or other person's) use or attempted use of greater force than
- necessary." [415] Whether or not the Branch Davidians knew the law at
- that moment, they may well have been acting within it.
-
- Even one of the Justice Department's handpicked outside experts, Dr.
- Robert Cancro, suggested the Branch Davidians were within their rights
- to defend themselves. "Certainly an armed assault by 100 agents had to
- be seen as an attack independent of who fired the first shot. If an
- armed individual enters your home by force and you have reason to
- believe that person represents a mortal threat, you are allowed to
- fire a weapon in self-defense in most states. The law does not usually
- allow the potential attacker to fire first before a response can be
- called self- defense [(JDR:Cancro:3)]
-
- Dick DeGuerin, who believed he would have obtained an acquittal of
- David Koresh had he lived, explained, "if a warrant is being
- unlawfully executed by the use of excessive force, you or I or anybody
- else has a right to resist that unlawful force. If someone's trying to
- kill you, even under the excuse that they have a warrant, you have a
- right to defend yourself with deadly force, and to kill that person."
- [416] A reporter wrote, "several lawyers said they expected to see a
- defense of self-defense, and possibly a claim that residents of the
- compound were unaware that the attackers were law-enforcement
- officers." [417] Defense attorneys can provide witnesses and tapes to
- prove Koresh had a sincere fear of attack by George Roden, by others
- who had threatened the Branch Davidians, and even by
- government--especially as it continued its surveillance of him even as
- he tried to cooperate. On February 28th Koresh told KRLD interviewers,
- "Let me explain the weapons from the beginning. The weapons were
- bought originally because in the prophecies. . .2000 years ago Christ
- tried for three and a half years to present the Gospel, right? And the
- night of his Crucifixion he told his servants, he said, before I sent
- you out without cloak nor purse nor sword so now I say unto you, if
- you do not have a sword go sell your cloak and buy one. The Christian
- Church was not to stand idly by and be slaughtered."
-
- Koresh told Dick DeGuerin in an audio taped March 28th telephone
- conversation: "I don't care who they are, nobody is going to come to
- my home, with my babies around, shaking guns around, without a gun
- back in their face. That's just the American way." Branch Davidian
- Stan Sylvia, who was in California the day of the raid, expressed his
- feelings on national television. "These people were on their own
- property. That didn't give the government right to come in shooting. .
- .For once in people's lives they stood up for God and what they
- believed." [418]
-
- * First Amendment Rights to Freedom of Speech, Religion and
- Association--The defense certainly could raise the issue of the rights
- of religious minorities to arm themselves for the Second Coming. Kelly
- Shackleford, an attorney for the Rutherford Institute, said of groups
- arming themselves for the Apocalypse, "There are a ton of these groups
- out there, and part of their faith is to ready themselves for the end.
- They have to be ready to fight on the side of the Messiah. There is
- nothing illegal about that." [419]
-
- The defense may argue that defendants are being prosecuted merely for
- associating with Koresh; it does not mean defendants necessarily
- agreed with all his ideas, were in on all his plans or followed all
- his orders. According to the New York Times, pretrial motions showed a
- split in the defense team about whether to depict Koresh as a
- "sincerely motivated teacher of Scripture, whose talks and writings
- were greatly misunderstood; others have suggested that he cruelly led
- his innocent followers astray. Still, no defendant has pleaded
- temporary insanity or suggested. . .being brainwashed." [420]
-
- * Government Tanks Started Fire: The government argues setting Mount
- Carmel on fire was part of the conspiracy. If the prosecution shows
- the complete infrared video tapes of the tank assaults and resulting
- fire, the jurors--and the public--finally will have a chance to study
- the full details of this brutal attack. Defense attorneys and the
- prosecution probably will differ in their interpretations of the video
- tapes. Defense attorneys will try to discredit the prosecutions'
- evidence--surveillance audio tapes, FBI Hostage Rescue Team agents,
- the "independent" fire investigator--that the Davidians started the
- fire. If any Branch Davidian survivors take the stand, they will
- describe how tanks knocked over lighted kerosene lamps and crushed a
- propane tank, starting the fires in one or more different areas within
- a few minutes. The defense may provide experts who will explain just
- how the tank rammings easily could have trapped people in the building
- and started one or more fires.
-
- Count Four--Aiding and Abetting the Attempted Murder of a Federal
- Officer and Counts Five and Six--Using a Firearm During a Crime of
- Violence, all related to Bob Kendrick, Delroy Nash and Michael
- Schroeder's attempts to reenter Mount Carmel on February 28, 1993. The
- prosecution will have to convince the jury that Kendrick and Nash
- resisted arrest by BATF agents. The defense may argue the Kendrick and
- Nash did not fire at agents or that if they did so they fired in
- self-defense.
-
- Count Seven--Possession of an Unregistered Destructive Device on April
- 19, 1993 and Count Eight--Conspiracy to Possess and Unregistered
- Destructive Device related to Graeme Craddock's carrying a live
- grenade. The prosecution will have to prove Craddock was indeed
- carrying a live grenade; Craddock's defense may argue he was not, that
- someone planted a live grenade on him, or that he carried the grenade
- in self-defense.
-
- Count Nine--Conspiracy to Possess and Unlawfully Manufacture
- Machineguns and Count Ten--Aiding and Abetting the Unlawful Possession
- of Machineguns Paul Fatta's defense attorney may assert he had no
- knowledge of machineguns produced or planned for production before
- February 28, 1993.
-
- The defense will try to call witnesses who can prove their defense
- points. Considering that Judge Smith is obviously prejudiced against
- the Branch Davidians and has announced he will not let the defense put
- the government on trial, he may reject many of their requests to call
- specific witnesses. Those they may try to call include:
-
- Witnesses--Sympathetic: In addition to cross-examining sympathetic
- witnesses called by the prosecution, the defense will try to call
- Branch Davidians and other witnesses who can provide information to
- discredit prosecution witnesses or provide evidence that the Branch
- Davidians were not crazed fanatics totally under David Koresh's
- control. They will call individuals who can testify that the Branch
- Davidians knew they were under surveillance and tried to cooperate and
- to talk about their experiences during the February 28th raid or
- during the siege. Doubtless, they will also try to call David Koresh's
- attorney Dick DeGuerin and Steve Schneider's attorney Jack Zimmerman,
- both of whom saw evidence of BATF damage to the building during the
- raid, and experts like Dr. Phil Arnold and Dr. James Tabor who
- convinced David Koresh to exit despite the FBI's ignoring his efforts.
- They may even try to call the Justice Department's most critical
- outside experts--Dr. Nancy Ammerman, Dr. Lawrence E. Sullivan, Dr.
- Robert Cancro and Dr. Alan M. Stone.
-
- Witnesses-former BATF Director Steven Higgins, former FBI Director
- William Sessions, Attorney General Janet Reno, Other High Government
- Officials: Defense attorneys have asked that these individuals be
- called as witnesses. They may be used to discredit lower ranking
- officials and agents who lied to them or to show that governmental
- incompetence, violations of rights and excessive force were approved
- by top officials.
-
- Witnesses--The Defendants: Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
- Constitution, the prosecution cannot compel defendants to take the
- stand or testify. If any defendant agrees to testify, he or she can
- not take the Fifth Amendment in response to any questions about
- alleged crimes relevant to the case but must answer honestly. It is
- unknown whether any defense attorneys will call their clients to
- protest their innocence or to describe their self-defense against an
- out-of-control goverment assault on February 28, 1993.
-
- CIVIL RIGHTS AND WRONGFUL DEATH LAWSUITS
-
- On May 3, 1993, attorney John P. Coale filed three notices of claim
- against the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. He is
- seeking $18.06 million for the deaths of his wife, Lorraine, and two
- daughters, Rachel, 14, and Hollywood, 2. Questions about who started
- the fire, or deaths by gunshot, are irrelevant to the case, Mr. Coale
- asserted. "We're alleging no matter what happened to these children
- and this woman, it was foreseeable." [421] Sylvia said the survivors
- should regroup and build a school at the site. Referring to possible
- forfeiture of the property, he declared, "Why should the FBI of all
- people be awarded that land, with what they did to my people, to my
- wife and children? Their lives were lost on that land, and I don't
- want to see that done in vain." [422]
-
- In October the first of numerous lawsuits under the Federal Civil
- Rights Act was filed in Waco by North Carolina's Cause Foundation on
- behalf of Oliver Gyarfas, Sr. and Elizabeth Gyarfas. Their daughter
- Aisha Gyarfas Summers, 18, and her child Startle Summers, 1 year, died
- in the April 19th fire. According to Kirk D. Lyons, attorney and
- executive director of the Cause Foundation, the suits are intended
- less to compensate the victims of the government's excessive use of
- force, as they are to defend the Constitution from government
- encroachment and to see that another situation like Waco never happens
- again. The Foundation intends to file more suits after the conclusion
- of the Branch Davidian trials. Both suits should shed additional light
- on the governments' violations of rights, excessive force and coverup.
-
- It is possible that some BATF and FBI agents and officials could be
- held individually liable in such law suits. In January, 1993, a U.S.
- District judge ruled that the city of Philadelphia and senior
- officials would have to face trial in a civil law suit brought by
- survivor Ramona Africa. Philadelphia police fire bombed MOVE
- headquarters to drive members out of their home, killing 11 members of
- the group. While former Philadelphia Mayor Wilson Goode was immune
- from the lawsuit because he was not involved in the decision to fire
- bomb the MOVE house, his three top lieutenants can be sued. [423]
-
- SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UPHEAVALS AND THE YEAR 2000
-
- Justice Department outside expert Lawrence E. Sullivan wrote in his
- report: "If history be any judge, the change of millennium only seven
- years from now will be viewed as a momentous, highly charged turning
- point in history for many religious communities. The shift of
- millennia will likely be viewed as a seismic rupture in time, a break
- through which one may glimpse powers that transcend time, and provoke
- many to act in unconventional ways as they respond to messages read in
- the signs of an unconventional time." (JDR:Sullivan:11) We cannot
- ignore indications that religious zealots, survivalists, gun-toting
- drug gangs, gun- loving "right to bear arms" activists, tax
- protesters, and even secessionists will all begin or increase
- challenges to local, state and federal authorities as we approach the
- year 2000.
-
- MILLENIALISTS AND SURVIVALISTS
-
- Religious believers put the "Laws of God"--or some spiritual
- entity--above laws made by governments. Most consider government, and
- especially the federal government, to be enemies of religious freedom.
- In America millions of Christians are apocalyptics or millenialists
- convinced that Jesus will return in the midst of violent apocalypse,
- very possibly in the year 2000. There are also "new age"
- millenialists. Elizabeth Clare Prophet's Church Universal and
- Triumphant has predicted nuclear war as a precursor to a new age of
- enlightenment. And tens of thousands who celebrated the "Harmonic
- Convergence" in the late 1980s believe that as the millennium
- approaches we will experience economic collapse and the dissolution of
- nation states, followed by a rebirth of civilization. Many
- millenialists are survivalists, preparing for the inevitable collapse
- of law, order and food distribution networks during the time of
- tribulation. Many millenialists and survivalists arm themselves out of
- fear that governments, roving gangs, or hungry hordes from the cities
- will attack them during these coming times.
-
- One millennialist movement which particularly alarms law enforcement
- is the Christian Identity movement, also called Christian patriots,
- who believe that Northern European whites are the racial descendants
- of the Biblical people of Israel and want to break up the United
- States into racially and culturally separate nations. The movement has
- about 25,000 hardcore adherents and another 150,000 hangers- on. One
- of its leaders, Pete Peters, has a cable television show, "Truth for
- Our Times," which promotes their views. [424]
-
- Many millennialist groups regard the government's destruction of the
- Branch Davidians to be a symbol of the government's eagerness to
- destroy their religious groups as well. Some may even believe it was
- indeed one in a series of prophesized events that will lead to the
- Second Coming of Christ--especially because, much in line with the
- Book of Revelation, floods ravaged the midwest and fires and
- earthquakes ravaged California after Koresh's death.
-
- Millennialist groups surely will arise in other parts of the world. In
- November of 1993, thousands of followers of self-styled messiah Maria
- Devi Khrystos, leader of the "White Brotherhood," poured into Kiev,
- Ukraine. They were expecting the end of the world, to be marked by her
- crucifixtion, resurrection and ascension in to heaven in a ball of
- flame. Authorities arrested hundreds of followers, who promptly went
- on hunger strikes, and then arrested Khrystos and her husband for
- hooliganism and seizing state property. [425]
-
- Sociologist James Aho of Idaho State University predicts, "As we get
- closer to the millennium, there will be more and more people arming
- themselves for the end of the world." [426] The Washington Post
- writes, "Experts on millennial groups said that if there is a lesson
- to be learned from Waco, it may well be that law enforcement officials
- ought to be aware of the potency of millennial beliefs. Throughout the
- 1990s, interest in end-of-time prophecy will grow, as the current
- millennium draws to a close." [427]
-
- DRUG-PROHIBITION-RELATED VIOLENCE
-
- The Treasury Department appendix which reviews the history of BATF
- mentioned the "prohibition-related rise in crime and use of firearms"
- during the 1920s and 1930s. Much of today's violent crime is also
- prohibition-related, but now it is related to the prohibition of
- psychoactive drugs, not alcohol. The twenty-five-year-old "War on
- Drugs" has suppressed supplies of the popular and relatively safe drug
- marijuana and ensured that dealers promote dangerous and
- addictive--but more easily smuggled and transported--drugs like
- cocaine and heroin. The attraction of hefty illegal profits has led to
- just the sort of struggles over territory and violence between armed
- gangs that occurred during alcohol prohibition. (Rising taxes on
- cigarettes also increases cigarette-bootlegging-related crime!)
-
- Because such a high percentage of criminal arrests and imprisonments
- are related to non-violent drug crimes, the justice system must give
- early paroles to violent rapists, thieves and murderers to make room
- for those given long mandatory sentences for using or distributing
- small amounts of marijuana or cocaine. There is little doubt that 25
- years of drug prohibition has created far more prohibition- related
- violence than 15 years of alcohol prohibition. Moreover, there is far
- greater random violence and violence by children than ever experienced
- under alcohol prohibition. Gang violence is decimating the young black
- male population since poor, inner-city black males see few
- opportunities as lucrative as dealing illegal drugs.
-
- Some consider drug prohibition itself to be a form of religious
- persecution against new religious movements which arose during the
- 1960s and advocated using psychoactive drugs as a path to spiritual
- enlightenment. It was a case related to Native Americans' use of
- peyote which led to the U.S. Supreme Court's Oregon vs. Smith ruling
- that so undercut religious rights. In response, hundreds of religious
- groups of every description joined together to pressure Congress to
- pass the 1993 Religious Restoration Act. However, even this act
- provides scant protections for those who want to use psychoactive
- drugs for religious purposes.
-
- The War on Drugs has led to serious abuses of American's
- constitutional rights and freedoms by law enforcement: use of
- unreliable informants, inadequate investigations of alleged crimes,
- increasing use of entrapment, judicial rubber-stamping of search
- warrants, improper use of deadly force, growing use of unjustified "no
- knock" warrants, increasing violations of due process of law, improper
- use of forfeiture proceedings to augment law enforcement budgets, and
- growing use of the military in domestic law enforcement.
-
- One tragic forfeiture-motivated case is that of Donald Scott, a
- California millionaire who owned property bordered on three sides by a
- national park. On October 2, 1992, Los Angeles Sheriffs, National Park
- and Forest Service representatives, national and California Drug
- Enforcement agents and the National Guard raided Donald Scott's home,
- on a tip that marijuana was located on the property. Hearing a
- commotion, Scott ran to the living room, gun in hand, and was killed
- as he obeyed demands he drop his weapon. The local District Attorney's
- office admitted that one reason for the raid was the "desire to seize
- and forfeit the ranch for the government." [428] Drug prohibition has
- fostered accelerating gang and police violence.
-
- GUN-PROHIBITION-RELATED VIOLENCE
-
- Alcohol-prohibition-related gun violence led to the first national gun
- laws. Likewise, drug-prohibition-related gun violence is prompting
- calls for more and stricter enforcement of these laws. After many
- years of effort, the Brady Bill handgun registration law was recently
- passed. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen has proposed putting 80 per
- cent of gun dealers out of business by raising the annual licensing
- fee by 2000%. Many politicians call for banning "assault weapons" and
- President Clinton has discussed registering all guns.
-
- The "right to bear arms" community is furious. Nationwide its
- organizing efforts are mushrooming. Unlike outlawing drugs, regulating
- and restricting gun ownership goes against a powerful American
- mythology--that only an armed citizenry can protect itself against an
- oppressive government. (Members of the Committee for Waco Justice
- believe that during this century non-violent action has proved to be
- more successful; nevertheless, individuals should not be deprived of
- their right to defend themselves in extreme situations where they have
- no other choice.) Many groups nationwide currently are planning
- demonstrations for April 19th, "Patriots' Day." That it is also the
- anniversary of the government's destruction of the Branch Davidians in
- its attempt to enforce gun laws is not lost on gun owners' rights
- activists.
-
- The tragedy in Waco may be just a foretaste of what will happen as the
- government tries to restrict the ownership of guns in the United
- States. While some columnists and politicians said Waco was an example
- of why we need gun control, the Committee for Waco Justice is one of
- many groups that insist that it was the enforcement of gun laws that
- triggered the disaster. We fear that we may someday see a "War on
- Guns" more terrifying than the current War on Drugs. Gun prohibition
- will only expand the already huge black market in illegal guns and
- bring about a rise in gun-prohibition-related crimes and gangs. The
- same attitudes and practices that have undermined the rights of drug
- users and dealers are undermining the rights of gun owners and gun
- dealers. More and more innocent legal gun owners--as well as
- individuals merely accused of owning illegal guns--may find themselves
- raided and assaulted by out-of-control law enforcement.
-
- The massacre of the Branch Davidians is an important factor in
- bringing together those who oppose drug prohibition with those who
- oppose gun prohibition. On January 10, 1993, the date of the opening
- of the trial of the eleven Branch Davidians, a coalition consisting of
- two leading drug legalization groups, four gun owners' rights groups,
- and four civil liberties groups wrote President Clinton requesting he
- create a commission to review unlawful policies of all federal law
- enforcement agencies. [429] We include more details about the
- coalition in a later section.
-
- ECONOMIC UNREST AND TAX REBELLION
-
- Disorganized economic protest, like the Los Angeles riots, remains a
- continuing threat. However, government often is less concerned about
- these crisis than about organized economic protest, especially tax
- resistance. Today the average individual pays almost 50 per cent of
- his or her income in local, state, and federal taxes, a percentage
- which will only continued to rise. Already 18 percent of Americans
- fail to file tax returns and many more grossly underreport their
- incomes. Most are people without political ideology. However, many are
- religious or political ideologues convinced that the government is
- ripping them off, that the income tax is illegal, or that God has
- better purposes for their wealth than sending it to "Godless"
- politicians. Some are libertarians who believe taxation is theft and
- others are war tax resisters who will not pay for war or for
- government violence against citizens. A small percentage are "20
- somethings" convinced that the social security system will fold before
- they receive a cent.
-
- Meanwhile, millions of people who do pay taxes have joined local,
- state and national anti-tax groups which recommend and engage in
- lobbying to bring taxes down. America's growing federal deficit, ever
- rising taxes, and economic stagnation are already giving rise to
- radical anti- tax movements. However, it is unlikely they will be able
- to effect the kind of change they want through the electoral system
- because the majority of those who bother to vote are recipients of tax
- benefits: government employees, social security, medicare and medicaid
- recipients, pensioners, and employees of government contractors. If
- national health care is passed even more people will be drawn into the
- welfare net.
-
- SECESSIONISTS AND SEPARATISTS
-
- In fact, the passage of any compulsory national health care program
- might be the last straw not only for tax protesters, but for millions
- of Americans who still abhor what they consider to be socialist
- solutions. One indication of this is an October, 1993 column by
- libertarian conservative columnist Walter Williams: "Bill Clinton's
- efforts to forcibly impose socialized medicine on our nation has
- answered a question gnawing at me for quite some time. The question is
- whether we have reached a point where those of us who love liberty,
- private property rights, rule of law and the Constitution given us by
- our Founding Fathers should organize to make preparations to secede
- from the Union. . .The fundamental question totally ignored is whether
- federalized medicine is authorized by the U.S. Constitution. My
- thorough reading of our Constitution found no authorization for Mr.
- Clinton's plan. . .The only peaceful resolution is that of secession.
- . .After all, the right to part company is the most effective human
- safety valve, no matter whether it's divorce, quitting a job or
- secession. If there's a ban on parting company, somebody's likely to
- be treated like a dog. . .I hope that secession wouldn't be bloody.
- And it wouldn't be if the nation's socialists adopted the attitude of
- live and let live. But if they don't, liberty-loving people shouldn't
- roll over, play dead and take socialists' abuses without imposing high
- costs in return." [430]
-
- Williams read this column to millions of people when he filled in for
- vacationing talk show host Rush Limbaugh during the last week of 1993.
- During the show he explained that the moral justification for
- secession is found in the Declaration of Independence which contains
- in its first paragraph the sentence: "Whenever a government becomes
- destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or
- abolish it."
-
- On the December 28, 1993 show, Williams described the Utah-based
- Committee of 50 states, which is chaired by former governor Jay
- Bracken Lee. The Committee has proposed "The Ultimate Resolution," a
- resolution which--if endorsed by 38 state legislatures--would dissolve
- the entire federal apparatus when the federal debt reaches $6
- trillion. The president, Congress and the federal judiciary would be
- fired. Each of the 50 states would become a separate and sovereign
- nation, free to come together to form a new confederation. The
- Ultimate Resolution contains a provision whereby any attempt to
- suspend or eliminate the U.S. Constitution would automatically cause
- the states to take back all the powers they have delegated to the
- federal government. [431] Williams endorsed this resolution.
-
- A number of ideological groups--anarchists, libertarians, greens,
- bioregionalists, states' rights-ists and African- American,
- Hispanic-American and white separatists--endorse secession or
- recommend the break up of the United States into a number of nations
- or into confederations of communities. Many citizens of Hawaii, Texas,
- Alaska, and Vermont already have strong secessionist sentiments.
- Should economic and political turmoil increase in the future, American
- secessionist movements might grow as well. Should Quebec break away
- from the rest of Canada, it doubtless will further inspire
- secessionists in this country.
-
- Demographics also has secessionist implications. Demographers predict
- that by the year 2050 the population of the United States could be
- more than 50% African-American, Hispanic, and Asian. In 1992 Columnist
- Carlos Alberto Montaner wrote: "It would be interesting to predict the
- United States' reaction if faced with a possible ethnic secession.
- Would it be necessary, like in Yugoslavia, to send in U.N. troops to
- keep the peace, or would the country react in a civilized manner like
- Czechoslovakia? Fortunately, this question won't have to be answered
- for 50 years. We shall see then." [432]
-
- COMMITTEE FOR WACO JUSTICE RECOMMENDATIONS RESPECT THE BILL OF RIGHTS
-
- How will politicians and law enforcement react to growing social,
- political and economic unrest? Will they return to surveillance and
- disruption of legal, non-violent political and religious groups?
- Oregon's Backwoods Home Magazine reports that U.S. Senate Bill 8, the
- Crime Control Act of 1993 would allow the seizure of homes, computers,
- vehicles and other property used to plan or stage any activity that
- results in violence, even if that violence is done by hooligan
- passerbys or political opponents. Will the federal government continue
- to entrap innocent citizens into breaking laws, as it did Randy
- Weaver? Should the federal government detect any hint of illegal
- action, will it continue making forceful executions of search and
- arrest warrants on shaky and biased evidence, as it did against the
- Branch Davidians? Will the federal government continue to persecute
- any political or religious group that merely discusses armed
- self-defense against potential illegal violent state attacks upon
- them? Or will it reform law enforcement practices so that citizens no
- longer have to fear such illegal attacks?
-
- Finally, will the FBI expand its program of hiring informants and
- "agents provocateurs" to infiltrate potentially violent groups, even
- to the point of helping them carry out their violent acts? Will it be
- proven that the FBI's hired informant did in fact build and plant the
- World Trade Center bomb? Law enforcement has a legitimate role in
- stopping violent attacks against citizens or government facilities
- once it has credible evidence that such an attack is imminent.
- However, law enforcement should not be paying informants to use
- violence against Americans!
-
- Federal agents' murder of Vicki and Samuel Weaver, Donald Scott, 86 or
- more Branch Davidians--and possibly the six World Trade Center bombing
- victims--demonstrates that federal law enforcement agencies are out of
- control. The Committee for Waco Justice believes that these violations
- of Americans' rights are inevitable with the growth of "big
- government." For big government needs ever growing power to enforce
- more and more laws, to intervene in more and more foreign nations'
- affairs, to levy more and more taxes--and to handle public discontent
- with these laws, interventions and taxes. Barring the unlikely event
- of a rapid and thorough downsizing in the scope, size and taxing
- powers of local, state and federal governments, how can we protect
- ourselves from governmental violations of rights, excessive use of
- force and collusive coverups of those crimes? Below, the Committee for
- Waco Justice presents a list of recommendations for protecting
- citizens against abuses of government power. Perhaps the most
- important way to stop government crimes against citizens is to revive
- respect for the Bill of Rights. The BATF and FBI assaults on the
- Branch Davidians violated eight of the ten sections of the Bill of
- Rights. Therefore we present our recommendations categorized under
- each of these first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These
- recommendations are based on lessons learned from government excesses
- in the above- mentioned incidents and other, less prominent, ones.
- While this is not an exhaustive list, enacting these suggestions would
- certainly prevent another government massacre like the massacre of the
- Branch Davidians.
-
- 1. Protect Right to Freedom of Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly and to
- Petition the Government
-
- * Issue a Presidential Executive Order to ensure that only the
- President or the Attorney General may approve any law enforcement
- actions against "non-traditional" religious or political groups in
- order to ensure that there is credible probable cause, that
- non-coercive avenues of resolving possible violations are explored and
- that excessive force is not used. (As proposed by Justice report
- outside experts Lawrence E. Sullivan and Richard J. Davis.)
-
- * Ensure that only the President or the Attorney General may designate
- a group or category of groups suspected of breaking federal laws as
- being "violent" and therefore subject to governmental surveillance.
- Such groups should also have the right to appeal to these highest
- authorities if they discover such surveillance and want to challenge
- it.
-
- * End all governmental spying on peaceful political and religious
- groups, including new religious movements some call "cults." Ensure
- that acting BATF director John W. Magaw ends his monitoring of
- "cults."
-
- * End the use of the term "cult" as a category justifying
- investigative activities, use of force, criminal prosecution, or
- governmental regulation or liquidation of any group labeled a "cult."
-
- * Release all currently classified files relating to Reverend Jim
- Jones and the Jonestown incident in Guyana.
-
- * Prevent law enforcement agencies from receiving information from
- organizations--such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Cult
- Awareness Network--bent on harming or destroying other groups with
- which they have political or religious differences.
-
- * Consider Justice Department investigation of the Cult Awareness
- Network, its representatives and any allied groups for "conspiracy
- against the rights of citizens" for possible false allegations to law
- enforcement regarding various religious groups, including the Branch
- Davidians and The Family.
-
- * Make no laws or regulations restricting the press and media from
- covering law enforcement actions. Allow them access to allegedly
- dangerous situations on an "at-your-own- risk" basis. (During the June
- 9, 1993, House Appropriations Subcommittee meeting, WNBC reporter John
- Miller said "having an ongoing cooperative mechanized procedure for
- bring the media on such operations where appropriate. . .lessens the
- potential of having stragglers." [433])
-
- 2. Protect Right to Keep and Bear Arms
-
- * Repeal all laws regulating or banning the ownership, manufacture,
- transfer, or sale of firearms and munitions, except those prohibiting
- individuals certified to be mentally unbalanced or felons convicted of
- violent crimes from owning weapons. However, private homeowners,
- businesses, and communities should retain the right to ban such
- weapons from their private property.
-
- * Abolish the Bureau of Tobacco, Firearms and Firearms and turn any of
- its legitimate functions over to state and local authorities.
-
- * Ensure all agencies enforcing regulations and laws regarding
- firearms and munitions act in accordance with and be held accountable
- to provisions of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act.
-
- 3. Protect Right to Refuse Quartering of Soldiers
-
- * Repeal all laws which permit government to quarter soldiers in
- wartime; while the U.S. Constitution allows this--"in a manner to be
- prescribed by law"--such laws are unnecessary.
-
- * Repeal any existing laws or regulations permitting federal agents to
- occupy private property for surveillance or other law enforcement
- activity without the express permission of the innocent property
- owner.
-
- 4. Protect Right to be Secure Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
- including Necessity for Probable Cause before Issuance of Warrants
-
- * Include in all statutory and administrative regulations "first
- warning" provisions insuring investigators first warn individuals and
- corporate entities of possible violations; this insures individuals
- are not investigated, searched, arrested, tried and punished for
- violations of arcane, confusing and conflicting regulations.
-
- * Establish a method by which individuals discovering themselves to be
- under investigation regarding violations of administrative regulations
- or non-violent crimes may cooperate with such investigations to
- prevent warranted searches and arrests with the potential for
- employing excessive force.
-
- * Require federal agents assure the judge or magistrate not only that
- they have probable cause but: (a) that local and/or state authorities
- have been consulted about any suspect's past cooperation with law
- enforcement; (b) that agents justify the use of extraordinary force or
- unconventional entry methods, and explain why these do not constitute
- a "no knock" raid; (c) that agents certify that abandonment of any
- ongoing negotiations in a siege situation are merited; (d) that agents
- report if any jurisdictions involved in, or informed of, any action
- against a property subject to forfeiture have attempted to purchase
- the property in the past.
-
- * Establish disciplinary procedures to prevent judges and magistrates
- from simply "rubber stamping" search and arrest warrants.
-
- * Educate law enforcement agents regarding individuals' common law and
- statutory right to self-defense against excessive police force or
- against searches where the police do not announce who they are or
- provide the citizen with sufficient identification. Because of the
- national spate of break-ins by criminals claiming to be police, this
- right to self-defense might need to be strengthened by appropriate
- statutes.
-
- * Do not ease restrictions on the use of illegally obtained
- evidence--the exclusionary rule--as the 1993 Crime Control Act would
- do.
-
- 5. Protect Right to Indictment by Grand Jury, Trial by Jury, Avoid Double
- Jeopardy, Refuse to Bear Witness against Oneself, Due Process of Law, and Just
- Compensation for Public Taking of Property
-
- * Require judges to inform jurors of the common law right to judge the
- law, as well as the facts of the case, and to acquit a criminal
- defendant, or to find against the government in a civil trial,
- whenever they consider the law unjust or oppressive.
-
- * Require judges to inform jurors of the common law practice that if
- the jurors find the government's conduct unacceptable, even if the law
- is valid, they may acquit the defendant.
-
- * Offer just government financial restitution for all losses suffered
- by persons who suffer searches and property damage where no crime has
- been committed or where damages are disproportionately high in
- relation to the alleged violation.
-
- * Offer just government financial restitution to those arrested,
- indicted, tried, imprisoned, or otherwise injured in the course of
- criminal proceedings that do not result in their conviction.
-
- * End the practice of pre-conviction seizures of property in civil and
- criminal cases.
-
- 6. Protect Right to A Speedy Public Trial, Impartial Jury, Knowledge of
- Accusations, Confront Witnesses, Compel Favorable Witnesses, and Assistance of
- Counsel
-
- * Permit criminal defendants and civil parties in a court of law a
- reasonable number of peremptory challenges to proposed judges, similar
- to the right to challenge proposed jurors.
-
- * Educate all law enforcement agents, including members of "elite"
- special response teams, to the fact that loyalty to the unit does not
- excuse the violation of individual or constitutional rights or
- participation in coverups of same. They frequently must be reminded
- that they have taken an oath of loyalty to the constitution, not to
- their unit.
-
- * End the increasingly common practice of charging attorneys as
- co-conspirators to justify violations of the attorney-client
- privilege.
-
- 7. Protect Right to Trial By Jury In Civil Suits
-
- * Eliminate the doctrine of "Sovereign Immunity" which holds that the
- State--or its agents--may not be sued without its permission or held
- accountable for its actions under civil law; replace it with the
- principle of full liability for damages. Government employees and
- agents should be held personally legally and financially liable for
- any violations of citizens rights, including excessive use of force.
-
- 8. Protect Freedom From Excessive Bail, Excessive Fines, or Cruel and Unusual
- Punishment
-
- * Repeal the Racket Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) laws
- which have been applied too indiscriminately, used to compel excessive
- fines and jeopardize First Amendment rights of all Americans to
- organize political demonstrations, and, especially, civil
- disobedience. Crimes like repeated trespass and destruction of
- property should be dealt with through existing local and state laws.
-
- * It should not be considered an "excessive fine" for any government
- employee or agent involved in rights violations, excessive use of
- force, and other illegal activity to lose not only their jobs, but all
- law enforcement-related government pensions and benefits.
-
- 9. Protect Rights Retained by the People
-
- * Facilitate the people's access to government information by ending
- secret classifications which prevent the public from obtaining
- information regarding government policies and actions (exceptions
- being such matters as private information coerced by government agents
- and defensive military plans). Government should expedite the
- processes by which individuals may obtain such information.
-
- * End restrictions on the people's right to use some or all currently
- restricted psychoactive drugs. (This should also be considered under
- First Amendment religious rights.)
-
- * Repeal the drug exemption to the posse comitatus law.
-
- * Work for non-violent resolution of conflicts over sovereignty should
- communities, regions or states assert their right to secede from the
- United States of America.
-
- 10. Protect Powers Reserved to the States or the People
-
- * End the practice of creating local-state-federal "multi-task forces"
- which override local powers so that local and state authorities cannot
- protect their citizens from excessive federal power.
-
- * Ensure that the people retain the power to prevent local and state
- involvement in federal law enforcement actions and to press criminal
- and civil suits against local and state law enforcement which
- participates in any federal violations of rights.
-
- * Restrict the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigating only
- narrowly defined federal crimes like espionage, kidnapping across
- state lines, etc.; it should not become a national police force
- overriding the authority of local and state governments.
-
- * Pass an Independent Counsel law to prosecute crimes in the executive
- branch of government--including any massive governmental violations of
- citizens rights, as occurred in Waco, Texas--if the Attorney General
- refuses to appoint one.
-
- CONCLUSION
-
- The Committee for Waco Justice encourages civil liberties, political
- and religious organizations and the media to re-educate the public and
- politicians about the necessity for protecting individual liberty and
- restraining governmental power. We therefore support the January 10,
- 1994, letter to President Clinton from the American Civil Liberties
- Union, Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, the
- Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, the Drug Policy Foundation, the
- Independence Institute, the International Association for Civilian
- Oversight of Law Enforcement, the National Association for Criminal
- Defense Lawyers, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the
- National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Affairs, and the
- Second Amendment Foundation. The letter calls for "a national
- commission to review the policies and practices of all federal law
- enforcement agencies and to make recommendations regarding steps that
- must be taken to ensure that such agencies comply with the law"--and,
- we would add, the Bill of Rights.
-
- The letter's signers note that "federal police officers now comprise
- close to 10 percent of the nation's total law enforcement" and that
- "some fifty-three separate federal agencies have the authority to
- carry firearms and make arrests." The signers recommend that the
- national commission be composed of law enforcement experts,
- constitutional scholars, criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors,
- judges, representatives of federal law enforcement professional and
- labor organizations, and representatives of organizations that monitor
- police practices. They end their letter by asserting that "the
- creation of a high level national commission will contribute greatly
- to the continued improvement of federal police agencies by helping to
- ensure that federal police not only enforce the law in an effective,
- humane and constitutional manner, but that they also serve as models
- for local and state law enforcement agencies."
-
- The Committee for Waco Justice believes all local, state and federal
- law enforcement agencies must overhaul their investigative and
- enforcement procedures to prevent another massacre like that of the
- Branch Davidians. We believe strict adherence to the Bill of Rights
- will help accomplish this. However, we also believe that our citizenry
- and our political culture must become more tolerant of unconventional
- religions and lifestyles. And we believe our government must be more
- willing to apply non- violent conflict resolution to the inevitable
- challenges to the social, economic and political status quo as we
- approach the year 2000.
-
- _________________________________________________________________
-
- FOOTNOTES
-
- 1. (c) 1993 Carol Moore. Copying for non-commercial distribution
- encouraged.
-
- 2. Six Branch Davidians died during the February 28, 1993 raid and, at
- least 80 during the April 19, 1993 fire. According to several Branch
- Davidians, in the last few years the group had come to call themselves
- "Students of the Seven Seals." However, survivors do accept the use of
- the term "Branch Davidian" since it is so well known at this point
- (private communication).
-
- 3. April 22 and 28, 1993 House Ways and Means subcommittee hearing, p.
- 5.
-
- 4. Associated Press wire story, April 26, 1993, 01:26 EDT. 5/ Michael
- Isikoff, "Reno Strongly Defends Raid on Cult," Washington Post, April
- 29, 1993.
-
- 5. (Reference missing in original ASCII file.)
-
- 6. >From the Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of
- Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell
- also known as David Koresh, September, 1993. All references from the
- report will be included within the text, with the page number after
- the colon, e.g., (TDR:#).
-
- 7. Louis Sahagun and Doug Conner, "Pair Acquitted of Murder in Idaho
- Mountain Shootout," Washington Post, July 9, 1993.
-
- 8. "Informant said he built Trade Center Bomb," Washington Times,
- December 15, 1993, A5.
-
- 9. Stephen Millies, "Did Government Agent Set World Trade Center
- Bomb?" Workers World Service, New York, NY 10011, January, 1994.
-
- 10. All quotations from Clinton press conferences are from electronic
- mail transcripts.
-
- 11. >From BATF Director Stephen Higgins written statement to the April
- 28, 1993 House Judiciary Committee hearings. Because the hearing
- transcripts are still in draft form, no page numbers are given.
-
- 12. >From National Rifle Association April 19, 1993 Press Release,
- "NRA Calls for Congressional Inquiry into Waco Raid," and James L.
- Pate, "No Longer Untouchable," American Spectator, August, 1993, page
- 35. Pate also notes in the article that on April 19, 1993, the day of
- the fatal fire in Waco, 1500 BATF agents celebrated their hero Eliot
- Ness's birthday in Baltimore.
-
- 13. McAlvany Intelligence Advisor, July, 1993.
-
- 14. Account drawn from following articles: Associated Press wire
- story, "U.S. plods on in case against 2 white separatists in Idaho,"
- May 10, 1993; Jerry Seper, "White separatist acquitted in marshal's
- murder," Washington Times, July 9, 1993; David Johnston and Stephen
- Labaton, "F.B.I. Shaken by Inquiry into Idaho Siege," New York Times,
- November 25, 1993; Jerry Seper, "FBI's Idaho firefight linked to
- misinformation from marshals," Washington Times, December 1, 1993.
-
- 15. FBI Legal Handbook for Special Agents, Section 3-6.4. 16/ Jerry
- Seper, "FBI Agents waged war on minds," Washington Times, September
- 22, 1993.
-
- 17. Michael Hedges, "FBI fined for delays in trial of Weaver,"
- Washington Times, October 29, 1993.
-
- 18. David Johnston and Steven Labaton, November 25, 1993. 19/ Jerry
- Seper, "FBI agents likely to face charges in deadly siege," Washington
- Times, December 14, 1993, A14.
-
- 20. "Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
- Enterprise and Domestic Security Terrorism Investigations," 1976.
-
- 21. "Anti-Defamation League Still Faces Legal Action," Washington
- Post, November 28, 1993, A12.
-
- 22. Herb Brin, "ADL's travails bring glee to enemies of the Jews,"
- Heritage, April 16, 1993, p. D.
-
- 23. Associated Press wire story, April 23, 1993, 10:25 EDT.
-
- 24. Dr. Gordon Melton presentation at American Academy of Religion
- panel on the Branch Davidians, Washington, D.C., November 22, 1993.
-
- 25. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, "Abuse Allegations Unproven:
- Koresh Was Investigated in Texas, California," Washington Post, April
- 25, 1993, A20.
-
- 26. "30 Members of Children of God Arrested," Washington Post,
- September 2, 1993.
-
- 27. December, 1993 Letter to Senators from Charles Russell of The
- Family, Los Angeles, CA.
-
- 28. Information on CAN and unfootnoted quotes are from the Ross &
- Green Report "What is the Cult Awareness Network and What Role Did It
- Plan in Waco?", 1993. Available from Ross & Green, 1010 Vermont
- Avenue, NW, Suite 118, Washington, D.C., 20005. ("Ross" is no relation
- to Rick Ross.)
-
- 29. All references from the Justice Department report will be included
- within the text, with the page number after the colon. The report
- consisted of 4 books and an unbound paper. (JDR:#) refers to the
- largest book, the factual report. All other references will include
- the name of each specific contributor, e.g., (JDR:Dennis:#) or
- (JDR:Stone:#).
-
- 30. A description of Representative Leo Ryan's actions against Jim
- Jones and their similarity to the Cult Awareness Network's actions
- against the Branch Davidians is contained in Peter McWilliams Ain't
- Nobody's Business If You Do in the chapter on "Unconventional
- Religious Practices," pgs. 621- 639. (Santa Monica: Prelude Press,
- 1993).
-
- 31. Steven R. Reed, "Would-be Messiah gave death, not life," Houston
- Chronicle, April 20, 1993, 18A.
-
- 32. Alexander Cockburn, ">From Salem to Waco, by Way of the Nazis,"
- Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1993.
-
- 33. Scott Shepard, "ATF chief vows to keep an eye on religious cults",
- Washington Times, November 2, 1993, A3.
-
- 34. Information from Clifford L. Linedecker, Massacre at Waco, Texas,
- (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) and Brad Bailey and Bob Darden,
- Mad Man in Waco, (Waco, Texas: WRS Publishing, 1993).
-
- 35. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Treasury,
- Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, p. 189.
-
- 36. Unless otherwise noted, material on or attributed to Marc Breault
- is from his book, Inside the Cult, co-authored by Martin King, (New
- York: Signet Books, 1993).
-
- 37. Maury Povich television show, November 9, 1993. Povich presented
- two interview shows about the Branch Davidians on November 8 and 9,
- 1993.
-
- 38. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 245.
-
- 39. Clifford L. Linedecker, pgs. 144-147.
-
- 40. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 27.
-
- 41. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, April 25, 1993, A20. 42/
- Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 144.
-
- 43. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, April 25, 1993, A20. 44/ "Cult
- kids' discipline tough, but wasn't abuse, says doctor," Washington
- Times, May 6, 1993.
-
- 45. Sue Anne Pressley, "Waco Cult's Children Describe Beatings,
- Lectures, War Games: Experts Fail to Confirm Abuse of Cult's
- Children," Washington Post, May 5, 1993, A17.
-
- 46. Daniel Wattenberg, "Gunning for Koresh," American Spectator,
- August, 1993, p. 38.
-
- 47. Newsweek, May 17, 1993, p. 50.
-
- 48. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 92.
-
- 49. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, April 25, 1993.
-
- 50. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 153.
-
- 51. Associated Press wire story, March 1, 1993.
-
- 52. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, "FBI places full blame on
- Koresh for Tragedy," New York Times, April 20, 1993, A20.
-
- 53. Ruth Riddle interview on "Dateline NBC", June 15, 1993.
-
- 54. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
-
- 55. Clifford L. Linedecker, pgs. 151-152.
-
- 56. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 152.
-
- 57. Michael deCourcy Hinds, April 20, 1993, A20.
-
- 58. Houston Post, March 8, 1993, p. A10.
-
- 59. Houston Post, March 9, 1993, A13.
-
- 60. Steven R. Reed, "Would-be Messiah gave death, not life," Houston
- Post, April 20, 1993.
-
- 61. "Seven Seals rich in imagery," Houston Post, April 20, 1993, 16A.
- This version is from the Oxford Study Bible.
-
- 62. The fact that Kathryn Schroeder made the allegation is from
- Associated Press wire story, October 2, 1993, 12:18 EST. The actual
- quotation is from the Treasury report, p. 127.
-
- 63. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
-
- 64. Paul H. Blackman report, "Affidavit to Kill," Institute for
- Legislative Action, National Rifle Association, p. 9.
-
- 65. Federal Search Warrant Case Number W93-15M: issued on the probable
- cause to believe that unregistered machineguns and destructive devices
- concealed in violation of 18 and 26 USC.; Federal arrest warrant for
- Vernon Wayne Howell Case Number W93-17m issued in the belief he was in
- unlawful possession of an unregistered destructive device in violation
- of 26 USC. >From June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee
- hearing, p. 93..
-
- 66. Michael Isikoff, "Treasury Balked at First At ATF's Raid on Cult,"
- Washington Post, May 1, 1993. Then consultant, now Assistant Secretary
- for Law Enforcement, Philip K. Noble made the comment.
-
- 67. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Scores die as cult compound is set afire," New
- York Times, April 20, 1993.
-
- 68. "Cult Had Illegal Arms, Expert Says," New York Times, January 15,
- 1994.
-
- 69. Jim McGee and William Clairborne, "The Transformation of the Waco
- 'Messiah'," Washington Post, May 9, 1993, A19.
-
- 70. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 223.
-
- 71. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 10.
-
- 72. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 4.
-
- 73. Associated Press wire story, January 13, 1994, 12:36 EST.
-
- 74. Hugh Aynesworth, "President calls for investigation," Washington
- Post, April 21, 1993.
-
- 75. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 33.
-
- 76. Paul H. Blackman, report, p. 51.
-
- 77. Ibid. 23.
-
- 78. Ross and Green report, p. 12.
-
- 79. Clifford L. Linedecker, pgs. 144-147.
-
- 80. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 317.
-
- 81. Clifford L. Linedecker, on pgs. 17-18, presents the only available
- evidence of the alleged name change. Member Perry Jones allegedly paid
- a bill at "Central Rental" in Waco and said Mount Carmel's new name
- was "Ranch Apocalypse." However, this seems to have been an in-house
- joke, not an official name change.
-
- 82. June 9, 1993 House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 15.
-
- 83. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 36.
-
- 84. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 33.
-
- 85. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 10.
-
- 86. Ibid. pgs. 12-13.
-
- 87. Ibid. p. 17.
-
- 88. Larry Pratt, Gun Owners of America Special Report, "Could a Search
- Warrant Be Your Death Warrant?," 1993, p. 2. 89 Paul H. Blackman
- report, p. 6.
-
- 90. Ibid. p. 21.
-
- 91. Marc Breault and Martin King, pgs. 317-318.
-
- 92. Roy Bragg, "Ex-prosecutor laments agents' `storm trooper'
- tactics," Houston Chronicle, March 2, 1993.
-
- 93. Dirk Johnson, "40 Bodies of Cult Members are Found in Charred
- Ruins," New York Times, April 22, 1993, B12.
-
- 94. Lexington (KY) Herald-Leader, March 7, 1993, A2.
-
- 95. James L. Pate, "Waco: Behind the Cover-Up," Soldier of Fortune,
- November, 1993, pgs. 36-41, 71-72.
-
- 96. Marc Smith, "Agent allegedly refused Koresh's offer," Houston
- Chronicle, September 11, 1993.
-
- 97. Associated Press, "Gun Dealer Alerted Koresh to ATF Probe, Lawyer
- Says," Houston Post, September 11, 1993.
-
- 98. April 9, 1993 House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 137.
-
- 99. Ibid. pgs. 163-164.
-
- 100. Ibid. p. 77.
-
- 101. Ibid. pgs. 130, 137-138.
-
- 102. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 245.
-
- 103. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 16.
-
- 104. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 318.
-
- 105. Dallas Morning News, May 13, 1993, 8A.
-
- 106. While here he may have meant "children" in the larger sense of
- his followers, Koresh's claim elsewhere on the tape that his
- 2-year-old daughter had been killed was not true, according to his
- attorney Dick DeGuerin and surviving Branch Davidians.
-
- 107. "Koresh to agents: Should have called me," Washington Times, May
- 26, 1993.
-
- 108. Newsweek, March 15, 1993, p. 55.
-
- 109. Time, March 15, 1993, p. 39.
-
- 110. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 299.
-
- 111. Larry Pratt report, p. 15.
-
- 112. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 306-307.
-
- 113. Gustav Nieguhr and Pierre Thomas, April 25, 1993, A20.
-
- 114. "A Botched Mission in Waco, Texas," U.S. News and World Report,
- March 5, 1993.
-
- 115. Associated Press wire story, April 22, 1993, 13:04 EDT.
-
- 116. Stephen Labaton, "Firearms Agency Struggles to Rise >>From Ashes
- of Waco Raid," New York Times, November 5, 1993, A21.
-
- 117. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, pgs.
- 144-145.
-
- 118. Marc Breault and Martin King, p. 106.
-
- 119. Daniel Wattenberg, August, 1993, p. 32.
-
- 120. Joseph Sobran, "Applying the Cult Label," Washington Times, March
- 22, 1993.
-
- 121. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p.
- 77-78.
-
- 122. Private communication with Terry Liberty Parker of Austin, Texas.
-
- 123. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 342.
-
- 124. Ibid. p. 189.
-
- 125. Ibid. pgs. 177-178.
-
- 126. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 175.
-
- 127. James L. Pate, "Gun Gestapo's Day of Infamy," Soldier of Fortune,
- June, 1993, p. 62.
-
- 128. USA Today, April 21, 1993, A4.
-
- 129. Associated Press wire story, February 28, 1993.
-
- 130. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 40.
-
- 131. Scott Pendleton, "Waco Siege Prompts Scrutiny of Agency,"
- Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 1993, p. 8.
-
- 132. Account from four January 19, 1994 news stories: Kathy Fair, "ATF
- agent testifies about cult ambush," Houston Chronicle, 8A; "1st
- Eyewitness Testifies at Branch Davidian Trial," Washington Post; Chip
- Brown, "Davidians fired first, agent says," Washington Times; "Witness
- Says Cult Ambushed Agents but Acknowledges Blunders," New York Times.
-
- 133. Kathy Fair, "Witnesses testify Koresh cultists fired first,"
- Houston Chronicle, January 21, 1994, 23A.
-
- 134. Lee Hancock, "Television Photographer Says He Tipped Waco Cult,"
- Washington Post, August 28, 1993.
-
- 135. Washington Post, January 19, 1994.
-
- 136. Houston Post, March 4, 1993, A20.
-
- 137. Kathy Fair, "Cult assembled weapons in compound, FBI says,"
- Houston Chronicle, January 15, 1994, 36A.
-
- 138. James L. Pate, "What the Feds Don't Want you to Know about Waco,"
- Soldier of Fortune, October, 1993, p. 102.
-
- 139. James L. Pate, October, 1993, p. 10.
-
- 140. Associated Press wire story, March 24, 1993, 20:09 EST.
-
- 141. "Witness Says Cult Ambushed Agents but Acknowledges Blunders,"
- New York Times, January, 19, 1994.
-
- 142. Scott W. Wright, "Agents at Branch Davidian Trial Describe Blitz
- of Bullets at Raid," Austin American- Statesman, January 21, 1994, B3.
-
- 143. Ibid.
-
- 144. James L. Pate, October 1993, pgs. 93 and 101.
-
- 145. "Much Evidence and Conflict in Branch Davidians' Trial," New York
- Times, January 17, 1994.
-
- 146. Stephen Labaton and Sam Howe Verhovek, "U.S. Agents Say Fatal
- Flaws Doomed Raid on Waco Cult," New York Times, April 28, 1993, A20.
-
- 147. Order, April 20, U.S. v. Vernon Wayne Howell, U.S. District Court
- of the Western District of Texas, Waco Division.
-
- 148. "FBI Places Full Blame on Koresh for Tragedy," Los Angeles Times,
- April 21, 1993, A6.
-
- 149. Information from letter to editor of Portland Oregonian submitted
- by Jim Bell, November, 1993.
-
- 150. James L. Pate, June, 1993, pgs. 51-52.
-
- 151. "Sect's Lawyers Dispute Gunfight Details," New York Times, April
- 5, 1993, A10 and transcript of September 30, 1993 Treasury Department
- press conference.
-
- 152. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
-
- 153. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, pgs.
- 99-129.
-
- 154. Associate Press story, "FBI tape of Waco talks probed,"
- Washington Times, June 17, 1993.
-
- 155. "Much Evidence and Conflict in Branch Davidians' Trial," New York
- Times, January 17, 1994.
-
- 156. Kathy Fair, "Cult assembled weapons in compound, FBI says,"
- Houston Chronicle, January 15, 1994, 36A.
-
- 157. Interview with Catherine Matteson, August 30, 1993, on file at
- Gun Owners of America.
-
- 158. Sue Anne Pressley, May 5, 1993, A17.
-
- 159. Kathy Fair, "Cult members `executed' injured, prosecutors say,"
- Houston Chronicle, January 13, 1994, A6.
-
- 160. "3 Waco Cultists Shot Point-Blank, Autopsies Show," Washington
- Post, July 15, 1993, A4.
-
- 161. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, pgs. 172-173.
-
- 162. James L. Pate, October, 1993, pgs. 101-102.
-
- 163. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
-
- 164. Roy Bragg, "Ill-fated ATF raid: the beginning of the end,"
- Houston Chronicle, April 20, 1993, 17A.
-
- 165. New York Times, January 17, 1994.
-
- 166. On page 104 the Treasury Report does describe in detail the type
- of guns which killed Branch Davidians.
-
- 167. "ATF agent tells of retrieving dead," Washington Times, January
- 25, 1994.
-
- 168. Dallas Morning News, March 3, 1993; Newsweek, March 15, 1993, p.
- 54.
-
- 169. On December 7, 1993 KWTX's Ray Deaver told us station employees
- had edited the tape and that it had not been impounded by the
- government. Nor had the tape been subpoenaed for the Branch Davidian
- trials.
-
- 170. "ATF agent says he may have shot comrade," Washington Times,
- January 26, 1994.
-
- 171. "Was It Friendly Fire?", Newsweek, April 5, 1993, p. 50.
-
- 172. James L. Pate, July, 1993, 53.
-
- 173. Stephen Labaton and Sam Howe Verhovek, March 28, 1993.
-
- 174. Washington Times, January 26, 1994.
-
- 175. John McLamore and Dan Mulloney statement on Maury Povich
- television show, November 9, 1993.
-
- 176. >From audio tape of John O. Lumpkin, Texas Bureau Chief of the
- Associated Press, speaking at September 10, 1993 Freedom of
- Information Foundation panel on "Mt. Carmel: What Should the Public
- Know."
-
- 177. Associated Press wire story, March 13, 1993, 02:57 EST.
-
- 178. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 51.
-
- 179. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, "Cult Leader Wants to Die a
- Martyr in `All-Out Firefight'," Washington Post, March 9, 1993.
-
- 180. "The Seven Week Siege," Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A8.
-
- 181. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
-
- 182. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 137.
-
- 183. >From audiotape of September 10, 1993 Freedom of Information
- Foundation media panel.
-
- 184. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 50.
-
- 185. James L. Pate, "Government's Waco Whitewash," Soldier of Fortune,
- January, 1994. p. 69.
-
- 186. Ron Engelman, "Ron's Waco Update," The Freedom Report, September,
- 1993.
-
- 187. Hugh Aynesworth, "Koresh followers set fires," Washington Times,
- April 27, 1993.
-
- 188. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p. 60.
-
- 189. Ibid. p. 18.
-
- 190. Newsweek, March 15, 1993, p. 55.
-
- 191. Jerry Seper, "ATF chief denies Waco cover-up,' Washington Times,
- April 19, 1993, A3.
-
- 192. Kathy Fair, "Report on Waco cult raid likely to be scathing,"
- Houston Chronicle, September 26, 1993, 9A.
-
- 193. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 27.
-
- 194. Associated Press wire story, March 11, 1993, 16:23 EST.
-
- 195. "Jury Told of Gunfire and Horror in Texas Siege," New York Times,
- January 13, 1994.
-
- 196. "How David Koresh Got All Those Guns," U.S. News and World
- Report, June 7, 1993, p. 42.
-
- 197. "Cult had illegal Arms, Expert Says," New York Times, January 15,
- 1994 and Kathy Fair, "Jurors see a parade of cult weapons," Washington
- Times, January 14, 1994, 26A.
-
- 198. "Koresh Follower Pleads Guilty to Resisting Officer," New York
- Times, September 12, 1993.
-
- 199. Lee Hancock, "Thousands protest proposal to limit access to cult
- data," Dallas Morning News, September 23, 1993.
-
- 200. Freedom of Information Foundation Press Release, September 25,
- 1993.
-
- 201. Jerry Seper, "Treasury wants to hid reports on Waco raid,"
- Washington Times, September 2, 1993.
-
- 202. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearings, pgs. 69
- and 84..
-
- 203. Scott Shepard, "ATF chief vows to keep an eye on religious
- cults", Washington Times, November 2, 1993, A3.
-
- 204. Jerry Seper, "New ATF chief tells panel his bureau will be ready
- for Waco-like situations," Washington Times, October 23, 1993.
-
- 205. In the coming weeks law enforcement agencies would deploy the
- following number of personnel: FBI-668, ATF-136, U.S. Customs-6, Waco
- Police-18, McLennan County Sheriff's Office-17, Texas Rangers-31,
- Texas Dept of Public Safety Patrol-131, U.S. Army-15, Texas National
- Guard-13. (JDR:10).
-
- 206. Dr. Philip Arnold and Dr. James Tabor, "Comments and
- Clarifications" section of "The Decoded Message of the Seven Seals of
- the Book of Revelation" by David Koresh.
-
- 207. "Ex-prosecutor laments agents' `storm trooper' tactics," Houston
- Chronicle, March 2, 1993.
-
- 208. Audio tape of the September 10, 1993 Freedom of Information
- Foundation media panel on Waco.
-
- 209. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 232.
-
- 210. Paul McKay, "Photographers for Chronicle, AP arrested," Houston
- Chronicle, April 22, 1993.
-
- 211. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 206.
-
- 212. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, May 9, 1993, A1.
-
- 213. April 22, 1993, Senate Committee on Appropriations hearing, p.
- 122.
-
- 214. Paul H. Blackman report, p. 56.
-
- 215. Libertarian Party of Dallas 1993 promotional materials on Ron
- Engelman talk video tape.
-
- 216. Naftali Bendavid, "The Costs of Cult Standoff: Were Estimates Too
- High?" Legal Times, May 3, 1993, p. 18.
-
- 217. Interview on "Dateline NBC," June 15, 1993.
-
- 218. During the April 28, 1993 House Judiciary Committee hearings
- probably-confused FBI Director William Sessions asserted that "cult
- experts" had advised the government to leave the area and give up on
- arresting the Branch Davidians.
-
- 219. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
-
- 220. James L. Pate, October, 1993, p. 73.
-
- 221. Associated Press wire story, March 16, 1993, 4:42 EST.
-
- 222. Nancy Ammerman presentation at November 22, 1993 American Academy
- of Religion panel on Branch Davidians.
-
- 223. "Bad Attitude Turns Fatal," The Balance, August, 1993.
-
- 224. Nancy Ammerman presentation, November 22, 1993.
-
- 225. Information from Dr. Gordon Melton talk at the November 22, 1993
- American Academy of Religion panel on the Branch Davidians and private
- communication.
-
- 226. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, "FBI Places Full Blame on
- Koresh for Tragedy," Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1993.
-
- 227. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "Reno, FBI Took Fatal Gamble,"
- Washington Post, April 21, 1993, A15.
-
- 228. Sam Howe Verhovek, "F.B.I. Saw the Ego in Koresh But Missed
- Willingness to Die," New York Times, April 22, 1993, B13.
-
- 229. Marc Breault and Martin King, pgs. 335-336.
-
- 230. Sam Howe Verhovek, April 21, 1993, A20.
-
- 231. "FBI brings out secret electronic weapons as Waco siege drags
- on," Sunday Times of London, March 21, 1993.
-
- 232. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, March 8, 1993.
-
- 233. "Primetime Live" television special on Waco, January 13, 1994.
-
- 234. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 246.
-
- 235. Dan Friedman, "Wealth of advice seen as costly to FBI at Waco,"
- Washington Times, October 8, 1993.
-
- 236. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
-
- 237. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
-
- 238. JoAnn Zuniga, "Outcome shocks compound visitor," Houston
- Chronicle, April 20, 1993, 16A.
-
- 239. Associated Press wire story, March 25, 1993, 03:53 EST.
-
- 240. Dirk Johnson, "Inside the Cult: Fire and Terror on the Final
- Day," New York Times, April 26, 1993, B10.
-
- 241. New York Times, April 5, 1993, A10.
-
- 242. Paul Craig Roberts, "Unsettling questions in probe of Waco,"
- Washington Times, June 1, 1993, E3.
-
- 243. James Adams, "They Could Have Waited: A Lesson in How Not to Play
- the Hostage Game," Washington Post, April 25, 1993, C3.
-
- 244. Associated Press wire story, March 16, 1993, 04:25 EST.
-
- 245. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 233.
-
- 246. Clifford L. Linedecker, p. 215.
-
- 247. Much of information about Dr. Arnold's experience from November
- 22, 1993 interview at Reunion Institute dinner in Washington, D.C.
-
- 248. Time, May 3, 1993, p. 42.
-
- 249. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "Reno Says, `I Made the
- Decision,'" Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A9.
-
- 250. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, April 20, 1993, A9.
-
- 251. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 205.
-
- 252. U.S. News and World Report, May 3, 1993, p. 30.
-
- 253. Mark Smith, "Cult leaders lawyers urge probe of FBI," Houston
- Chronicle, April 20, 1993, 13A.
-
- 254. Sue Ann Pressley and Mary Jordan, "Cultist may have been forced
- to stay," Washington Post, April 21, 1993.
-
- 255. Associate Press wire story, April 21, 1993, 18:24 EDT.
-
- 256. Marc Breault and Martin King, pgs. 336-337.
-
- 257. Associated Press wire story, October 10, 1993, 15:23 EDT.
-
- 258. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "FBI Negotiators Detail
- Koresh's Threats to Avoid Being Captured," Washington Post, April 22,
- 1993, A14.
-
- 259. Jerry Seper, "FBI used chemical banned for war," Washington
- Times, April 22, 1993.
-
- 260. Ibid.
-
- 261. Malcolm W. Browne, "Chemical Isn't Meant to Cause Fire," New York
- Times, April 20, 1993.
-
- 262. James L. Pate, October, 1993.
-
- 263. Associated Press wire story, March 18, 1993, 21:40 EST.
-
- 264. Jerry Seper, "House Panel Looks at FBI's assault on Waco
- cultists," Washington Times, April 29, 1993.
-
- 265. Michael Isikoff, "FBI Clashed Over Waco, Report Says," Washington
- Post, October 9, 1993, A10.
-
- 266. James L. Pate, July, 1993.
-
- 267. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "Reno Says, `I Made the
- Decision,'" Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A9.
-
- 268. David Johnston, "U.S. Saw Waco Assault as Best Option," New York
- Times, April 25, 1993, A32.
-
- 269. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, B10.
-
- 270. James L. Pate, July, 1993.
-
- 271. Hugh Aynesworth, "President calls for investigation," Washington
- Post, April 21, 1993.
-
- 272. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, "A Week in the Life," Wall Street Journal,
- March 9, 1993.
-
- 273. Sue Anne Pressley, April 20, 1993, A20.
-
- 274. Carol Moore, primary author of this report, is the
- great-great-great-great grand daughter of Colonel James Barrett,
- commander of the militia at Concord. Most of the weapons were stored
- at Barrett's farm, which was the primary target of the British
- expedition. Barrett later gave the order to fire upon the British,
- should they fire first.
-
- 275. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, B10.
-
- 276. Ibid. B10.
-
- 277. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 24.
-
- 278. Ross E. Milloy, "An Angry Telephone Calls Signals the End of the
- World for Cult Members," New York Times, April 20, 1993, A21.
-
- 279. Graphics box, New York Times, April 20, 1993, A20.
-
- 280. Interview on Dateline NBC, June 15, 1993.
-
- 281. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, B10.
-
- 282. Comments at Reunion Institute Dinner, November 22, 1993.
-
- 283. James L. Pate, July, 1993.
-
- 284. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, B10.
-
- 285. Sue Anne Pressley, April 20, 1993, A20.
-
- 286. "Reno cleared FBI's assault on cult complex," Washington Times,
- April 20, 1993.
-
- 287. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, April 22, 1993, A14.
-
- 288. Ibid. A14.
-
- 289. The 1993 video tape is a dramatic and effective introduction to
- the subject. However, it does include several inaccurate or dubious
- assertions. To obtain the tape contact WACO, P.O. Box 14, Beech Grove,
- IN 46107, 1-800-758-0308.
-
- 290. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 28.
-
- 291. Transcript of the April 19, 1993, 10:30 a.m. FBI press
- conference.
-
- 292. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 26 and Sue Anne Pressley and Mary
- Jordan, "Cult survivors offer glimpse inside waco inferno," Washington
- Post, April 24, 1993.
-
- 293. Sue Anne Pressley, "Koresh Wound Not Typical of a Suicide, Doctor
- Says," Washington Post, May 18, 1993, A3. 294 James L. Pate, October,
- 1993.
-
- 295. "Mark Potok, "Davidian trial's hoopla mirrors strange case," USA
- Today, January 11, 1994, A3.
-
- 296. Newsweek, April 5, 1993, p. 26.
-
- 297. Time, May 3, 1993, p. 31.
-
- 298. Stephen Labaton, "Reno Says Suicides Seemed Unlikely," New York
- Times, April 20, 1993, A21.
-
- 299. Laura Bell, "Parkland to Sue Over Davidians' Medical Bills,"
- Dallas Morning News, November 4, 1993.
-
- 300. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Scores Die as Cult Compound is Set on Fire,"
- New York Times, April 20, 1993.
-
- 301. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, "FBI Places Full Blame on
- Koresh for Tragedy," Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1993.
-
- 302. Associated Press wire story, April 22, 1993, 08:26 EDT.
-
- 303. Sue Anne Pressley and Mary Jordan, April 24, 1993, A7.
-
- 304. Brad Bailey and Bob Darden, p. 211.
-
- 305. Ross Milloy, April 20, 1993, A21.
-
- 306. The Abrams is the largest tank used against the Branch Davidians.
- HRT Commander Richard Rogers was in the one Abrams tank used on April
- 19. Whether he was in fact inside the tank which survivors claim
- started the fire should be investigated. (JDR:281,285) (Also, one
- former Army enlistee told us that because of its huge weight, the tank
- has brake problems which are exacerbated if the tank is exposed to
- particulate matter, like CS gas.)
-
- 307. Associated Press story, "Tanks, chemicals couldn't break resolve
- of cultists," Washington Times, April 23, 1993.
-
- 308. "Workers Pick Through Cult's Compound," New York Times, April 23,
- 1993, A20.
-
- 309. Associated Press wire story, April 22, 1993, 08:26 EDT.
-
- 310. James L. Pate, October, 1993, p. 75.
-
- 311. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 26.
-
- 312. Interview on "Dateline NBC," June 15, 1993.
-
- 313. Interview on "Good Morning America," May 15, 1993.
-
- 314. Time, May 3, 1993, p. 42.
-
- 315. Interview on "Good Morning America," June, 1993.
-
- 316. Hugh Aynesworth, "President calls for investigation," Washington
- Post, April 21, 1993.
-
- 317. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 25.
-
- 318. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, "Examiners Work to Identify
- Bodies," Washington Post, April 23, 1993.
-
- 319. >From audio tape of October 8, 1993, Justice Department press
- conference.
-
- 320. Associated Press story, "Tanks, chemicals couldn't break resolve
- of cultists," Washington Times, April 23, 1993.
-
- 321. Associated Press wire story April 22, 1993, 08:26 EDT.
-
- 322. New York Times, April 23, 1993, A20.
-
- 323. Mary Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, April 23, 1993.
-
- 324. James L. Pate, "Waco Whitewash Continues," Soldier of Fortune,
- February, 1994, p. 59-60.
-
- 325. Sue Ann Pressley and Mary Jordan, April 23, 1993, A16.
-
- 326. Jerry Seper, "FBI still probing video of tank at Waco,"
- Washington Times, October 9, 1993, A9.
-
- 327. Sue Anne Pressley and Mary Jordan, April 21, 1993, A1.
-
- 328. Michael deCourcy Hinds, "Fire Experts, Fire Tapes Provide Rare
- Evidence," New York Times, April 28, 1993, A16.
-
- 329. Interview on "Good Morning America," May 17, 1993.
-
- 330. Interview on "Dateline NBC," June 15, 1993.
-
- 331. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Investigators Puzzle Over Last Minutes of
- Koresh," New York Times, May 5, 1993, A18.
-
- 332. Michael Hedges, "Search for corpses starts," Washington Times,
- April 22,1993, A1.
-
- 333. JoAnn Zuniga, April 20, 1993.
-
- 334. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, April 21, 1993, A6.
-
- 335. Sam Howe Verhovek, April 21, 1993, A1 and A20.
-
- 336. Dirk Johnson, April 26, 1993, A1.
-
- 337. "Waco Siege Ends in Dozens of Deaths as Cult Site Burns After FBI
- Assault," Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A8.
-
- 338. Sue Anne Pressley, "Waco Cult Adept in `Theology of Death,' Trial
- Told," Washington Post, January 13, 1994.
-
- 339. Kathy Fair, "Cult members `executed' injured, prosecutors say,"
- Houston Chronicle, January 13, 1994, 6A.
-
- 340. Stephen Labaton, "Officials Contradict One Another on Rationale
- for Assault on Cult," New York Times, April 21, 1993, A21.
-
- 341. Sam Howe Verhovek, April 21, 1993, A1.
-
- 342. Louis Sahagun and J. Michael Kennedy, April 22, 1993. 343/ Sue
- Anne Pressley, April 20, 1993, A8.
-
- 344. Michael deCourcy Hinds, April 20, 1993, A20.
-
- 345. Sue Anne Pressley, April 20, 1993, A20.
-
- 346. Sam Howe Verhovek, April 20, 1993, A1.
-
- 347. Associated Press wire story, August 26, 1993, 05:29 EDT.
-
- 348. "FBI Agent Suggests Koresh Was Killed by Vengeful Aide," Dallas
- Morning News, September 5, 1993.
-
- 349. Michael deCourcy Hinds, "Arson Investigators Say Cult Members
- Started Fire," New York Times, April 27, 1993.
-
- 350. Michael deCourcy Hinds, "For Experts, Fire Tapes Provide Rare
- Evidence," New York Times, April 28, 1993, A16.
-
- 351. "Cultist's lawyer calls bulldozing of site a cover-up,"
- Washington Times, May 13, 1993.
-
- 352. Sue Anne Pressley and Mary Jordan, April 21, 1993.
-
- 353. J. Michael Kennedy, "Waco Cult Set Fire, Texas Officials Say,"
- Los Angeles Times, April 27, 1993, A7 and Michael deCourcy Hinds,
- April 27, 1993.
-
- 354. James L. Pate, October, 1993.
-
- 355. James L. Pate, "Waco:Behind the Cover-Up," Soldier of Fortune,
- November, 1993, pgs. 74-75.
-
- 356. Associate Press wire story, April 27, 1993, 04:10 EDT.
-
- 357. Michael deCourcy Hinds, April 28, 1993, A16.
-
- 358. Newsweek, May 3, 1993, p. 26.
-
- 359. Hugh Aynesworth, "Koresh followers set fires," Washington Times,
- April 27, 1993.
-
- 360. Sue Ann Pressley, "Cultists Started Fire in Waco, Probers Say,"
- Washington Post, April 27, 1993.
-
- 361. "Cultists had tunnel to escape fire, arson prober says,"
- Washington Times, May 1, 1993, A5.
-
- 362. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, "Reno Says, `I Made the
- Decision,'" Washington Post, April 20, 1993, A9.
-
- 363. Stephen Labaton, "U.S. Opens Up to Avoid Backlash on Cult
- Attack," New York Times, April 22, 1993, B13.
-
- 364. Stephen Labaton, "Officials Contradict One Another on Rationale
- for Assault on Cult," New York Times, April 21, 1993, A1.
-
- 365. Associated Press wire story April 21, 1993, 18:15 EDT.
-
- 366. Michael Isikoff, "Waco Siege Prompts Crisis Training for Top
- Justice Department Officials," Washington Post, December 9, 1993.
-
- 367. Federal News Service transcription of April 20, 1993 press
- conference.
-
- 368. Michael Isikoff and Pierre Thomas, April 20, 1993, A9.
-
- 369. Stephen Labaton, April 21, 1993, A21.
-
- 370. Paul Craig Roberts, "Rallying Round Reno," Washington Times, May
- 7, 1993.
-
- 371. Stephen Labaton, "Inquiry Won't Look at Final Waco Raid," New
- York Times, May 16, 1993, A20.
-
- 372. Stephen Labaton, "Justice Inquiry Will Now Examine Assault on
- Cult," New York Times, May 18, 1993.
-
- 373. Michael deCourcy Hinds, "Toll is Lowered for Sect Dead to Around
- 72," New York Times, April 30, 1993, A12.
-
- 374. William Safire column, "Waco, Reno, Iraq-gate", October 14, 1993.
-
-
- 375. Mary McGrory, "Clinton Closes the Iraqgate," Washington Post,
- November 14, 1993.
-
- 376. James L. Pate, "One Hand Whitewashes the Other," Soldier of
- Fortune, February, 1994, pg. 60.
-
- 377. Stephen Labaton, "Report on Siege to Blame Agents, Law Officials
- Say," New York Times, October 2, 1993, A8.
-
- 378. Jerry Seper, "Whitewater probe grows to include state agency,"
- and "State agency Major Source of funds for Clinton backers,"
- Washington Times, January 24, 1994, A1, A9.
-
- 379. Jerry Seper, "Tragedy Blamed on Cult: Reno Says Report is Not A
- Whitewash," Washington Times, October 9, 1993.
-
- 380. Michael Kirkland, "Justice Department rejects charges of Waco
- `whitewash,'" United Press International, October 14, 1993.
-
- 381. Michael Isikoff, "FBI Clashed Over Waco, Report Says," Washington
- Post, October 9, 1993, A10.
-
- 382. Stephen Labaton, "Harsh Criticism of F.B.I. in Review of Cult
- Assault," New York Times, November 16, 1993.
-
- 383. Associated Press story, "FBI tape of Waco talks probed,"
- Washington Times, June 17, 1993.
-
- 384. Michael Isikoff, October 9, 1993.
-
- 385. Associated Press wire story, 12/08 18:31 EST.
-
- 386. Jerry Seper, "Tragedy Blamed on Cult," October 9, 1993.
-
- 387. "No sanctions expected in Waco raid," Washington Times, October
- 14, 1993.
-
- 388. John McCaslin's August 4, 1993 Washington Times column quotes
- Stacy Koon, one of the two Los Angeles policemen convicted in federal
- court of felony violations of Rodney King's civil rights: "The
- government used the same arguments in Waco--the suspect(s) set the
- tone and the officers responded to it. . .The difference is that we
- had 82 seconds; the federal government had 50-plus days in Waco. .
- .They had time to think and analyze and come up with game plans and
- they had the ability to wait out--we didn't have that. They used the
- same argument, and, in that case, people died, multiple people died."
- Speaking of Janet Reno, he said, "She, like I, took responsibility. .
- .Then there was a negative outcome--50 people died. The state of Texas
- should try her for multiple cases of murder. If the state of Texas
- then does not find her guilty, the federal government should come in
- and try her for civil rights violations." Similarly, Paul Craig
- Roberts wrote in his April 22, 1993, syndicated column, "If Rodney
- King's civil rights were violated, what happened in Waco?. . .If a
- billy club is excessive force, what is a tank?"
-
- 389. "Jury Told of Gunfire and Horror in Texas Siege," New York Times,
- January 13, 1994.
-
- 390. Hugh Aynesworth, January 7, 1994, A7.
-
- 391. Hugh Aynesworth, "Prosecution to begin for Davidian cultists,"
- Washington Times, January 7, 1994, A7.
-
- 392. Sue Anne Pressley, "An Opportunity for the Branch Davidians,"
- Washington Post, January 9, 1994, A4.
-
- 393. "Prosecutors Expand Case Against Texas Cult," New York Times,
- August 22, 1993.
-
- 394. New York Times, January 15, 1994.
-
- 395. "Branch Davidian judge wants anonymous jury," Washington Times,
- December 14, 1993.
-
- 396. Associated Press wire story, December 29, 1993, 21:22 EST.
-
- 397. Associate Press wire story, January 11, 1994, 18:00 EST.
-
- 398. Lone Star FIJA Press Releases, January 3, 1994 and January 11,
- 1994. To contact Lone Star FIJA on this matter call Larry Dodge
- (214)357-0902 or Ruth Claus or San Antonio FIJA at (210)349-1897.
-
- 399. Mark Smith, "ATF agent admits he may have shot colleague,"
- Houston Chronicle, January 26, 1994, 19A.
-
- 400. December, 1993, report from Larry Dodge of Lone Star FIJA.
-
- 401. Associated Press wire story January 11, 1994, 14:08 EST.
-
- 402. "Lawyer doesn't want to hear the term `cult' at trial," Houston
- Chronicle, December 30, 1993.
-
- 403. Sam Howe Verhovek, "Texas Sect Trial Spurs Scrutiny of
- Government," New York Times, January 10, 1994, A10.
-
- 404. "An Anonymous Jury is Seated in Trial of Branch Davidians,"
- Washington Post, January 12, 1994.
-
- 405. Richard Perez-Pena, "U.S. Braces for a New Test by Branch
- Davidians, in Court," New York Times, April 30, 1993.
-
- 406. Jennifer Lenhart, "Report on flawed raid may aid Davidians'
- defense, lawyer says," Houston Chronicle, October 1, 1993.
-
- 407. Sam Hone Verhovek, "Criticism of Raid Heartens Cult Members," New
- York Times, October 1, 1993.
-
- 408. Hugh Aynesworth, January 7, 1994, A7.
-
- 409. New York Times, September 12, 1993.
-
- 410. Associated Press wire story, October 2, 1993, 12:18 EDT.
-
- 411. BATF information submitted to June 9, 1993 House Appropriations
- subcommittee hearing, p. 188.
-
- 412. Richard Perez-Pena, "U.S. Braces for a New Test by Branch
- Davidians, in Court," New York Times, April 30, 1993.
-
- 413. Michael Hedges, "FBI fined for delays in trial of Weaver,"
- October 29, 1993.
-
- 414. James L. Pate, "Waco's Defective Warrants," Soldier of Fortune,
- August, 1993, page 74.
-
- 415. Larry Pratt report, page 6.
-
- 416. Houston Press, July 22, 1993.
-
- 417. Richard Perez-Pena, April 30, 1993.
-
- 418. Maury Povich television show, November 8, 1993.
-
- 419. Howard Schneider, "Waco Cult Lawyers Prepare Themselves for Long
- Legal Siege," Washington Post, March 26, 1993.
-
- 420. Sam Hone Verhovek, "Texas Sect Trial Spurs Scrutiny of
- Government," New York Times, January 10, 1994, A10.
-
- 421. Andrew Blum, "Waco Tragedy Spawns Litigation," National Law
- Journal, May 17, 1993.
-
- 422. Associated Press wire story, May 11, 1993, 10:25 EDT.
-
- 423. "Philadelphia faces trial in MOVE fire suit," Washington Times,
- January 5, 1994, A9.
-
- 424. Leonard Zeskind, "And Now, The Hate Show," New York Times,
- November 16, 1993.
-
- 425. Associated Press story, "Ukraine cult waits in vain for end of
- world," Washington Times, November 15, 1993 and "Ukraine Seizes Chiefs
- of End-of-World Cult," New York Times, November 12, 1993.
-
- 426. "A botched mission in Waco, Texas," U.S. News and World Report,
- March 15, 1993, page 26.
-
- 427. Gustav Nieguhr, "Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: To Cults, Badges Can
- Signal the End of Time," Washington Post, April, 21, 1993.
-
- 428. Larry Pratt report, pgs. 25-26.
-
- 429. A copy of the letter can be obtained by contacting the American
- Civil Liberties Union in Washington, D.C. (202 544-1881)
-
- 430. Walter Williams, "When Love of Liberty Lapses," Washington Times,
- October 22, 1993.
-
- 431. Committee of 50 States, 4808 Quailbrook Circle, Salt Lake City,
- UT 84118. Or contact Tom Wood, an attorney who helped draft it, at
- 801-561-2200.
-
- 432. Carlos Alberto Montaner, "Tribal conflicts and the U.N. role",
- Washington Times, August 25, 1992.
-
- 433. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, pgs.
- 221-226.
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