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- The following is a cleaned up version of the slide set for the
- Trusted Administration working group summary report on 7/16/92.
-
- This document will be archived.
-
- Page breaks (via <ctrl>L's) have been included.
-
- TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
-
- Activities:
-
- Item Result
- -------------------------------- --------------------------------------------
- 1. Trusted Admin - Still lack a solid proposal from any
- vendor.
- - Brainstormed the problem at some length
- from the perspective of "If I am a machine
- on the network, in order to be
- administered from a central place I have
- to be able to ..." and generated a list
- of these items (attached).
- - Started sorting/reducing this list into
- musts, high wants and low wants.
- - Need to leverage work from other working
- groups (POSIX etc.) working on the
- general administration problem.
- - May want to further refine this list
- via electronic forum.
-
- 2. Audit Transfer
-
- a. AITP (formally SITP) - We have an updated AITP draft on the
- TSIG archive.
-
- b. Reviewed SNMP/SMP
- capabilities as possible
- audit transfer mechanism.
- Areas of possible concern
- were:
-
- - How does S*MP paradigm (a - At any given time a snap shot of the
- name space corresponding available audit records on a system can
- to a few control elements be indexed field name (column) and
- on a device) map to instance identifier (row). This is
- thousands of audit arbitrary but workable.
- record?
-
- - Can any message priority - Neither S*MP or AITP do this.
- (alarms before bulk data
- upload) be provided.
-
- - Assured delivery, order - AITP relies on TCP where S*MP usually
- and integrity. runs over UDP therefore AITP is "more
- reliable" however if problems occur that
- require resynchronization at the
- application level, the variable and
- instance information built into the
- var-binds may provide better information
- to the application for this purpose.
-
- - Audit data volume (on the - SNMP (w/o bulk transfer) is a non-starter.
- order of 20Mb/user/day) SMP may work but the low information
- density of ASN.1 encoded var-binds (vs.
- raw data) opens a concern regarding the
- amount of network bandwidth needed.
-
-
- TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
-
- Activities (continued)
-
- - Filtering at the source - Filtering capabilities are built into
- for limited extractions. AITP. If the MIB is defined with filter
- variables that can be set by S*MP, then
- similar functions can be performed if the
- instance identifiers are remapped to only
- those records that pass the filters.
-
- - Error feedback from - S*MP and AITP provide similar
- manager node. capabilities.
-
- - Connection maintenance - Not an issue for AITP as protocol defines
- during long data gathering how to drop connection after request and
- and filtering operations. re-establish connection on reply to
- prevent hogging unused resources. Not
- an issue for S*MP when if run over UDP.
-
- BOTTOM LINE:
-
- We need to work though these issues and
- get inputs from TADMIN members that
- were not present at this meeting.
-
- Attachments:
-
- 1. "If I am a machine on the network, in order to be administered from
- a central location, I have to be able to ..." list and partial
- analysis.
-
- 2. Trusted Admin working group document history.
-
-
-
- TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
-
- If I am a machine on the network, in order to be administered from a
- central location, I have to be able to ...
-
- 1. Authenticate an administrator.
-
- 2. Authenticate myself (or be authenticated) to an administrator.
-
- 3. Add/delete/disable users.
-
- 4. Respond to local and remote administration.
-
- 5. Tell other systems that the user has changed his/her password.
-
- 6. Allow users to change their passwords.
-
- 7. Allow user privilege to be modified.
-
- 8. Maintain synchronization with "master database."
-
- 9. Get data from central database.
-
- 10. Synchonize time with all other systems in domain of interest.
-
- 11. Synchonize time with central administrator.
-
- 12. Protect security relevant data.
-
- 13. Provide audit data as requested.
-
- 14. Explicitly audit administrative actions.
-
- 15. Send/Receive alerts of security events.
-
- 16. Administer "privileges" in various vendor formats.
-
- 17. Administrate various vendor labeling formats. [deleted]
-
- 18. Confirm integrity of administration messages (and provide trustworthy
- responses).
-
- 19. Modify privileges of local system.
-
- 20. Modify "accreditation range" of other systems (or self) in response
- to administrative updates.
-
- 21. Change user clearance.
-
- 22. Validate the network (or provide needed information to a centralized
- validation application).
-
- 23. Recover from errors in administrative exchanges.
-
- 24. Guarantee delivery of administrative messages.
-
- 25. Know who I can talk to (other machines).
-
- 26. Not have to know other systems in order to initiate administrative
- actions (i.e. be able to work through another server to allow other
- systems at higher levels to be hidden).
-
-
- TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
-
- "If I am a machine ..." list (continued)
-
- 27. Provide remote proedure API to local administrative functions.
-
- 28. Ensure unique user ID across arbitrarily large admininstrative domain.
-
- 29. Catch up if I am down when administrative changes occur.
-
- 30. "Self audit" to generate minimum number of audit records at the
- granularity of complete administrative actions.
-
- 31. Add a new remote host.
-
-
-
- High Low
- Class Must Want Want Note
- ---------- ------------ ----------- -------------- ----------------
- Managed 1,2,3,4,7,9, 5,6,8,11, 8,11,13,14, Depends on
- Secure 11,12,13,14, 13,14,15, Policy (8, 11,
- Node 18, 19, 13,14,
-
- Not our job (17,
-
- Killed (10,
-
- Manager 16,
-
- ---------------------------
-
-
- TRUSTED ADMINISTRATION
-
- Trusted Admin working group document history.
-
- Document Title
- Number (- history & distinquishing characteristics)
- -------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
- 1. The Need for SITP
- - 1 - 1/26/92 introduced to TSIG 1/28/92
-
- 2. Audit Event Criteria
- - 1 - faxed to TSIG 1/28/92
-
- 3. Security Information Transfer Protocol (SITP)
- - 1.0 - discussed at TSIG 1/29/92
- - 2.0 - added set functionality 4/92
-
- 4. Host Audit Data Event Types and Formats
- (as defined by SAC)
- - 1 - faxed to TSIG 1/18/92
-
- 5. What and When to Audit During Trusted Sessions
- - 1 - 1/28/92
-
- 6. Audit Information Transfer Protocol (AITP)
- - 2.1 - formerly SITP, discussed at TSIG 7/14/92
-
-
- "David Belote" <>
- "Lee Benzinger" <lab@wdl1.wdl.loral.com>
- "Charles Blauner" <chazx@ctt.bellcore.com>
- "Luc Boulianne" <lucb@cs.mcgill.ca>
- "Jeff Case" <case@cs.utk.edu>
- "Robert Cooney" <cooney@wnyose.nctsw.navy.mil>
- "Jeffrey Edelheit" <edelheit@mitre.org>
- "William Huyck" <>
- "Nina Lewis" <nina@cam.unisys.com>
- "Vern McGeorge" <vern@hpda.cup.hp.com>
- "Wally Ramsey" <wbr@mitre.org>
- "Bradley Rhoades" <bdrhoades@mmc.mmmg.com>
- "Paul Vazquez" <vazquez@dockmaster.ncsc.mil>
- "Moira West" <mjw@cert.org>
- "Peter Williams" <p.williams@uk.ac.ucl.cs>
-
-