Hacker Chronicles 2 (Alt)/The_Hacker_Chronicles_Volume_II-CD2.iso/virusl2/virusl2.267

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VIRUS-L Digest   Friday, 22 Dec 1989    Volume 2 : Issue 267

VIRUS-L is a moderated, digested mail forum for discussing computer
virus issues; comp.virus is a non-digested Usenet counterpart.
Discussions are not limited to any one hardware/software platform -
diversity is welcomed.  Contributions should be relevant, concise,
polite, etc., and sent to [e-mail] (that's
LEHIIBM1.BITNET for BITNET folks).  Information on accessing
anti-virus, document, and back-issue archives is distributed
periodically on the list.  Administrative mail (comments, suggestions,
and so forth) should be sent to me at: [e-mail].
 - Ken van Wyk

Today's Topics:

CERT Anonymous FTP available
Re: Gatekeeper and Gatekeeper Aid (Mac)
1st Aid Software vs. WDEF (Mac)
More information about virus hearing and CPSR statement
Beware of AIDS fixes
Motivations & Trends
Finding the source of the "AIDS disk"
New anti-virus and anti-trojan programs at SIMTEL20

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 21 Dec 89 11:39:40 -0500
From:    Kenneth R. van Wyk <[e-mail]>
Subject: CERT Anonymous FTP available

An additional archive site is now available via Anonymous FTP.  The
machine, cert.sei.cmu.edu, carries a complete set of all CERT
advisories to date, the complete (unabridged :-) set of
VIRUS-L/comp.virus archives, as well as several virus documents.

VIRUS-L/comp.virus information is in:

  ~ftp/pub/virus-l/archives
  ~ftp/pub/virus-l/archives/predigest
  ~ftp/pub/virus-l/archives/1988
  ~ftp/pub/virus-l/archives/1989
  ~ftp/pub/virus-l/docs

CERT advisories are in:

  ~ftp/pub/cert_advisories

This information is made available as a public service.  Submissions
to the documentation collection are welcomed, appreciated, and should
be sent to [e-mail].

Regards,

Ken

Kenneth R. van Wyk
Moderator VIRUS-L/comp.virus
Technical Coordinator, Computer Emergency Response Team
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
[e-mail]
[phone]  (24 hour hotline)

------------------------------

Date:    21 Dec 89 16:51:03 +0000
From:    bgsuvax![e-mail] (William C. DenBesten)
Subject: Re: Gatekeeper and Gatekeeper Aid (Mac)

[e-mail] (David Gursky) writes:
> In VIRUS-L Digest V2 #265, "Carl_A.Fassbender" <[e-mail]> was
> asking why the Gatekeeper & Gatekeeper Aid icon did not show up after
> he made the files invisible.
>
> The Mac OS does not load INITs that are part of files with the
> Invisible bit set.  [Editorial comment: Hey Apple!  Why?????]  If you
> want to have Gatekeeper active, you must have the file visible on the
> desktop.

Older versions of the system did not do this.  Apple started this
practice shortly after scores hit the mac.  The reasoning is that
there were if all inits had to be visible, then viruses would have a
harder time hiding from the user.  I believe this to be a good
decision.

On lab disks, I set the entire system folder invisible, but leave the
files visible.

N.B. this is my interpretation and recollection of timeframes.

- --
William C. DenBesten   is   [e-mail]  or   [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    21 Dec 89 12:32:00 -0500
From:    "WARTHMAN" <[e-mail]>
Subject: 1st Aid Software vs. WDEF (Mac)

In VIRUS-L Digest V2 #261, John Norstad writes:

> Unfortunately, when the WDEF virus first appeared, none of the
> current versions of the most popular virus prevention tools were
> able to detect or prevent WDEF infections. This includes Vaccine
> 1.0.1, GateKeeper 1.1.1, Symantec's SAM Intercept 1.10, and HJC's
> Virex INIT 1.12.

Although it may not be one of "the most popular virus prevention
tools", I wish to point out that the Anti Virus Kit published by 1st
Aid Software was able to detect the WDEF virus without modification to
the software or to a resource list. The VirusGuard component of the
package is a cdev which, like SAM Intercept, puts up an alert any time
a suspicious activity is atempted. Unlike SAM Intercept and the other
virus prevention tools, VirusGuard was not fooled by WDEF's attempt to
bypass the protection.  This is an important characteristic of the new
virus. WDEF appears to be a new generation of virus which not only
tries to hide from humans but also goes to some length to hide from
anti virus software. The war is escalating...

I beleive that 1St Aid Software in general, and Bob Reese in
particular, deserve some recognition for being the _only_ tool to
successfully handle WDEF. In fact, if this package was more widely
used perhaps WDEF would have been caught sooner and would have spread
far less than it appears to have...

1St Aid Software can be contacted at [phone]. Bob Reese can be
reached via:
   Compuserve 71141,3061
      Applelink D3791

Disclaimer: I have no connection with the company or the products,
aside from being a satisfied user.

                           -- Jim Warthman

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 20 Dec 89 17:06:21 -0800
From:    <[e-mail]>
Subject: More information about virus hearing and CPSR statement

I've received several requests for the CPSR statement and for more
information about the computer virus hearing.  Please send this
message along to other networks.

The House Judiciary Committee hearing on computer virus legislation
will be aired on C-SPAN on Saturday, December 23 (8:45 am to 11:00 am
EST) and Sunday, December 24 (1:30 am to 3:35 am EST).  For more
information, contact C-SPAN at 202/628-2205. The date of the original
hearing was November 8.

The witnesses included two members of Congress, and representatives
from NIST, ADAPSO, CBEMA, and CPSR.

The prepared statement of CPSR is available from the Washington Office
of CPSR for $5 to cover copying and postage.  The complete statement
is 26 pages long and contains detailed notes about the virus
controversy and computer security policy.  A short summary (about 10k)
is available by e-mail.  If you would like either version, please send
me an e-mail note and indicate your choice.  For the complete
statement, I need your US mail address.

Best holiday wishes,

Marc.

Marc Rotenberg, Director
Washington Office CPSR
1025 Connecticut Ave., NW
Suite 1015
Washington, DC 20036
202/775-1588 (voice)

cdp![e-mail]
[e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    22 Dec 89 05:53:51 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Gene Spafford)
Subject: Beware of AIDS fixes

I've been reading a lot of the traffic about the AIDS trojan disk.
I've noticed that a number of places are claiming they have programs
that "fix" your disks and/or watch for reinfection.

I don't mean to impugn any of those efforts, but let me sound a few notes
of caution about these, as with any security software you are offered:

1) How do you know they work?

2) How do you know they don't have bugs that might trash your system?

3) How do you know that they aren't introducing some other trojan or
virus into your system while cleaning up something else?

In particular, #3 concerns me.  Suppose the authors of the AIDS trojan
are out there, and have created a "fixer" program that cleans up the
AIDS problem but plants a new and far more damaging trojan on the
victim's disk.  Just think -- everyone is in a panic about the AIDS
bit, so they jump at the opportunity to get a fix.  Just think how
much more wide-spread the result might be than the original AIDS
problem.  Furthermore, since a fix might have to write to system files
and do special operations, warning messages from virus monitors like
FluShot+ might be ignored by users as these fixes are run.

Of course, #2 is a problem, too.  Buggy software is all too common,
especially when it is written under pressure.

Be very sure you know what you're running.  If you don't get source
code and build it yourself, be sure to ask yourself how you know it is
doing what you think it is.
- --
Gene Spafford
NSF/Purdue/U of Florida  Software Engineering Research Center,
Dept. of Computer Sciences, Purdue University, W. Lafayette IN 47907-2004
Internet:  [e-mail]   uucp:   ...!{decwrl,gatech,ucbvax}!purdue!spaf

------------------------------

Date:    22 Dec 89 06:19:13 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Gene Spafford)
Subject: Motivations & Trends

At various seminars during the past few months, I've been making a
few statements about the motives behind viruses and related threats
(like the AIDS diskette).  I'd like to share them with this audience,
too.  I hope I'm wrong about these, but....

Theorem #1)  The majority of viruses written so far have been done for
"sport," by people who have been trying to prove that they can write
viruses.  Others are possible experiments that got away, and a few
specific cases of revenge.

Theorem #2) Within a year or so, writing viruses for "sport" will
almost cease to happen.  They are becoming so well known and such a
nuisance, and software guards are such that casual attempts will not
be tried nor will they be successful if tried.

Theorem #3) We will see more cases of viruses, etc. written as acts of
political terrorism and as acts of extortion.  Examples of
politically-related computer attacks have occurred recently: the
Stoned (New Zealand) virus, the Dukakis Mac virus, the FuManchu virus,
the NASA "wank" worm, and perhaps the current AIDS trojan horse.
These will be much more cleverly written and well-funded attacks as
time goes on.  (Imagine viruses that flash messages like: "Experiment
with Computers, not Animals," "Save the Unborn," "Ban Nuclear Power,"
"Free Palestine," etc.)

Theorem #4) Within the next few years, there will be at least one
major problem where some purported anti-viral/security software will
be made available, and it will contain a logic bomb or trojan horse in
it that causes more damage than what it is supposed to fix.  (Minor
thesis: the likely author of such software will be someone marketing
commercial security software, and the logic bomb version will be a
public-domain package not traceable to the author.  The purpose -- to
discredit public domain anti-virus software.)

Theorem #5) Too many people will continue to seek a software solution
even though the problem is only partially in software.  Thus, we
aren't going to see an end to the problem for a long time to come.

Comments?  Discussion?
- --
Gene Spafford
NSF/Purdue/U of Florida  Software Engineering Research Center,
Dept. of Computer Sciences, Purdue University, W. Lafayette IN 47907-2004
Internet:  [e-mail]   uucp:   ...!{decwrl,gatech,ucbvax}!purdue!spaf

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 21 Dec 89 23:55:53 -0800
From:    [e-mail]
Subject: Finding the source of the "AIDS disk"

      It may yet be possible to trace this thing.  The perpetrators
probably didn't plan on the U.S. invading Panama.  If the appropriate
authorities in the UK make the proper requests of the US while there
are still 24,000 US troops in Panama, the needed information might
be extracted.
                                        John Nagle

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 21 Dec 89 14:18:00 -0700
From:    Keith Petersen <[e-mail]>
Subject: New anti-virus and anti-trojan programs at SIMTEL20

I have uploaded the following files to SIMTEL20, obtained from the
HomeBase BBS:

pd1:<msdos.trojan-pro>
AIDSOUT.ARC     AIDS Trojan remover, use after SCANV
A-VIRUS1.ARC    Information on AIDs Trojan
SCANRS52.ARC    Resident virus infection prevention program
SCANV52.ARC     VirusScan, scans your disk for 56 viruses

- --Keith Petersen
Maintainer of SIMTEL20's CP/M, MSDOS, & MISC archives [IP address 26.2.0.74]
Internet: [e-mail], [e-mail]  BITNET: w8sdz@NDSUVM1
Uucp: {ames,decwrl,harvard,rutgers,ucbvax,uunet}!wsmr-simtel20.army.mil!w8sdz

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