Hacker Chronicles 2 (Alt)/The_Hacker_Chronicles_Volume_II-CD1.iso/misc/v05i116.txt

Internet Message Format | 1992-09-28 | 33.4 KB

From:       Kenneth R. van Wyk (The Moderator) <[e-mail]>
Errors-To: [e-mail]
To:       [e-mail]
Path:      cert.sei.cmu.edu!krvw
Subject:   VIRUS-L Digest V5 #116
Reply-To:  [e-mail]
--------
VIRUS-L Digest   Monday, 15 Jun 1992    Volume 5 : Issue 116

Today's Topics:

Re: Zipped Viruses (PC)
Screaming Fist-696 analysis (PC)
Re: VIRx version 2.3 released (PC)
New virus? (PC)
VET anti-virus software (PC)
Re: ISPNews and why 100% is the only good enough (PC)
Re: McAfee VIRUSCAN V91 uploaded to SIMTEL20 (PC)
Re: Virus Program for a Macintosh? (Mac)
"Menem's Revenge" virus (Amiga)
Re: MVS Virii (IBM MVS)
re: Mainframe viruses (was: MVS Virii)
Virus Detection Software Review
Re: Taxonomy of viruses
Polymorphic Virii
Re: BAD IDEA (was: Where can I find Virus signatures)
Misinformation does more damage than viruses themselves
McAfee CLEAN-UP 91B and WSCAN91 uploaded to SIMTEL20 (PC)
Scan updates available (PC)
F-PROT 2.04 (PC)

VIRUS-L is a moderated, digested mail forum for discussing computer
virus issues; comp.virus is a non-digested Usenet counterpart.
Discussions are not limited to any one hardware/software platform -
diversity is welcomed.  Contributions should be relevant, concise,
polite, etc.  (The complete set of posting guidelines is available by
FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu or upon request.) Please sign submissions with
your real name.  Send contributions to [e-mail]
(that's equivalent to VIRUS-L at LEHIIBM1 for you BITNET folks).
Information on accessing anti-virus, documentation, and back-issue
archives is distributed periodically on the list.  A FAQ (Frequently
Asked Questions) document and all of the back-issues are available by
anonymous FTP on cert.org (192.88.209.5).  Administrative mail
(comments, suggestions, and so forth) should be sent to me at:
<[e-mail]>.

   Ken van Wyk

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 06 Jun 92 07:09:18 -0400
From:    [e-mail]
Subject: Re: Zipped Viruses (PC)

In VIRUS-L v005i111 Magnus Olsson <[e-mail]> writes:
>[e-mail] writes:
>
>[excellent description of stealth viruses deleted]
>
>Thanks for a very informative article! There's one point I think
>you're missing, though, when describing the dangers of using scanners
>on an infected system:
>
>>Here's what happens: Your virus scanner is infected with a stealth,
>>fast infecting virus.  It isn't currently active.  You run the scanner,
>>telling it to scan your entire hard drive.  First the virus gets control:
>>It goes resident, takes over, then runs the scanner.  Now the scanner
>>attempts to perform a self-check on its file.  This detects nothing,
>>because the virus disinfects the file as it reads it.  Now your scanner
>>goes through your entire hard drive, reading all programs.  Not only
>>does it have no chance of catching the virus in any program, but every
>>program (even ones which weren't infected before) will get infected!!!
>
>At least McAfee's scanner doesn't only check files on the disk and
>make a self-check, but also scans memory for viruses before doing
>anything else. Doesn't this cure the above problem, as the
>memory-resident stealth virus would be detected in memory?

Not if the afore mentioned virus is a new one which the scanner does not
yet detect.  In that case, you're in big trouble.  Note that this is not
merely a problem with McAfee's scanner, but with any; also note that the
memory check is a excellent idea, it just isn't perfect.

But then again, what is?

>Magnus Olsson                   | \e+      /_
>Dept. of Theoretical Physics    |  \  Z   / q
>University of Lund, Sweden      |   >----<
>Internet: [e-mail]     |  /      \===== g
>Bitnet: THEPMO@SELDC52          | /e-      \q

Regards,
David R. Conrad
[e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    07 Jun 92 02:23:05 -0400
From:    "Tarkan Yetiser" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Screaming Fist-696 analysis (PC)

   Hello everyone,

We have analyzed the polymorphic (semi-poly :-)) variant of the
Screaming Fist (696) virus. It should be mentioned that the virus is
simply encryptive, and therefore, the decryptor can be used as a scan
string to search for the virus in both COM and EXE files. It uses a
16-byte XOR-type decryption routine with a variable key (obtained from
BIOS timer area 0:046c), and one instruction is modified to be either
an INC AX or a DEC AX. It is a fast infector, but not stealth;
therefore, it is advisable to boot from a clean floppy before
scanning. McAfee's SCAN 91 does recognize it [Scr-2], though F-PROT
2.03a does NOT.  If you add the given signature to F-PROT, make sure
you use SECURE scan, otherwise, it will be missed. Heuristic scan
flags it as a possible virus.  We have used DIS86 by Mr. James Zandt
(available at Simtel archives under /msdos/disasm/dis86212.zip) to
analyze it. Here are the details:

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
Suggested Name: Screaming Fist-696-pm
Date/Location : May 1992, USA
Scan string   : 5d 8b f5 56 b0 ?? b9 a3 02 (40 or 48) 2e 30 04 46 e2 f9 c3
Damage trigger: None
Payload       : None
Interrupts    : 21h & 24h
hooked          21h is hooked using direct memory reference to IVT, but
                Int 24h is hooked in a standard manner using DOS 25h/35h
                subfunctions of Int 21h.
Peculiarity   : Reduces BIOS base memory indicator (0:0413) by 2 just like
                an MBR/BR virus, though it is a file infector type. So,
                CHKDSK will report 2K less of base memory size.
Targets       : COM and EXE files when FILE OPEN (3d), RENAME (56),
                LOAD/EXEC (4b), GET/SET ATTRIB (43) services are requested.
                It will infect C:\COMMAND.COM after the first time it goes
                resident by issuing a file open call with mode set to FF,
                which is an invalid open mode value. Only the copy of
                COMMAND.COM in the root directory is infected.
                COM files are appended at the end, EXE files are modified
                by changing the header to point to virus. The COM
                files are always increased by 696 bytes, but EXE files
                depend on what the victim has in the header.
                COM files less than 300 bytes or greater than 64000 bytes
                will not be infected.

RU-there call : mov  AX, 0FFFFh
                int  21h
                or   AX, AX
                jz   virus_is_resident

        In English: The virus extends INT 21h services by setting up a
                    handler which responds to a request FFFF with a 0000
                    in AX register.

Comments  : This is an encryptive virus that uses BIOS timer value (1 byte
            at 0:046c), and either INC AX or DEC AX in the decryption
            routine. The virus is not encrypted in memory. The decryptor
            is 16 bytes long, and it is located at the end of infected
            files.
            It appears to be a research virus in that it includes no
            damage trigger, and it is fairly bug-free! It is a resident
            COM/EXE file infector that does nothing but replicates.
            It uses handle-oriented file access routines, and does NOT
            implement stealth to evade detection.
            The virus INT 21h handler offset is always 0088 in memory.
            Inside the virus there is a text which reads:

               Screaming Fist

            therefore, the name.
            The virus determines if a program is infected as follows:
            For COM-type files:
               if the fourth byte of the file plus 1 is equal to thevirus will
infect
            C:\COMMAND.COM and return control over to the host program.
            From then on, it monitors INT 21h services (see above).
            File extension as well as 'MZ' signature is checked before
            infection. Decoys can be used to capture the virus easily.

Regards,

Tarkan Yetiser
VDS Advanced Research Group               P.O. Box 9393
[phone]                            Baltimore, MD 21228
e-mail:  [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 07 Jun 92 23:20:00 +0100
From:    Anthony Naggs <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: VIRx version 2.3 released (PC)

Vesselin Bontchev ([e-mail]) says:
> [e-mail] (C. Glenn Jordan -- Virex-PC Development Team) writes:
>
> >    2.  VIRx now detects all files encrypted with the "Mutating Engine"
> >    attributed to the Dark Avenger that are not already destroyed by the
> >    Engine's attempts to encrypt them (and most of those, as well).
>
> This requires a bit of clarification. No files are "destroyed by the
> Engine's attempts to encrypt them". ...

Vesselin you are over looking the fact that there are already 2
versions of MtE in circulation, one ('0.92' I think) is found on
"Dedicated" & "Fear" and the other ('0.90') is on "Pogue".  I have
only looked at the one on "Pogue" so far, and around 20% of the files
I infected were corrupt.

These corrupt files usually crash when executed, sometimes with video
effects as display memory is overwritten and sometimes the crash was
postponed until a subsequent program was executed.  This seems to
coincide closely with Glenn Jordan's description.

To generate infected files with out crashing the PC (as happens when
infecting at execution time), I simply had a batch file which copied
each new host file to NULL.

> ... However, the MtE sometimes (a bit
> too often, IMHO) generates something that I call a "zero-key
> decryptor". It does not encrypt the body of the virus and generates a
> decryptor which essentially does nothing else than juggling a few
> constants around some registers. No attempt to perform decryption is
> present in these cases.

IMHO not often enough!  This feature means that a proportion of
infected files will not have the polymorphic endowments of MtE, and
established more reliable detection methods can cope with these in the
same way as any other virus.  Given an infected hard drive the
presence of same copies of the virus in this form will give
reassurance that the virus is known, rather than something new hiding
under the MtE cloak.

If the MtE detection tests that you are performing are going to be of
relevance you will need to test for the variations produced by "Pogue"
as well.

Regards, Anthony Naggs

Internet:  [e-mail]  or  [e-mail]
Janet:     [e-mail]  (  cbs%uk.ac.brighton.vms::amn  )
    or     [e-mail]        (  cbs%uk.ac.city::xa329        )

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 08 Jun 92 16:11:38 -0400
From:    [e-mail] (Braden Glen)
Subject: New virus? (PC)

   One of the Managers here has a virus on his home computer. I
haven't been keeping up on my reading for all the VIRUS-L since at
least May. If I may post some of the symptoms he is experiencing and
hopefully, it hasn't been a hot subject over the past month someone
will know what it is or isn't (like a virus :-) ).
   He has harddrives C thru G. When he executes a program, the system
hangs and after rebooting the exe module is gone. This only happens
when he tries to executes a module. Also, he starts getting bad
clusters. when he uses PC Tools and changes these bad clusters to
files and then looks at them, he finds his lost modules. After
cleaning up these clusters and trying to figure what is wrong he will
create new bad clusters which contain his EXE's.
  Using Scan 86 revealed no virus. He then used CPAV with no virus,
then he used FPROT203 which said he had a virus. He knew that the use
of CPAV produces false positives so he rebooted and reran FPROT203
which showed no virus.
  I will write up a better description of what he is experiencing and
what EXE's he is running that get converted to bad clusters. I wanted
to get this out right away. I also gave him a copy of scan89b and
asked him to run it after booting from a write-protected disk. If
anyone has any ideas, please let me know, as you usually do.

Glen Braden             [e-mail]
                        804 865-9387


------------------------------

Date:    09 Jun 92 09:18:42 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (A. V. Le Blanc)
Subject: VET anti-virus software (PC)

Has anyone used, and can anyone comment on the VET anti-virus
software from Australia?  It does not seem to be reviewed in
the standard places, and I don't recall seeing any mention of
it on this list.  I ask because the University of Manchester
has bought a site license for this package, apparently because
it is cheaper than the licenses for better known packages.

     -- Owen
     [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    10 Jun 92 12:51:17 -0400
From:    "David.M.Chess" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: ISPNews and why 100% is the only good enough solution (PC)

(Sorry for the delayed reply; missed this in my mailbox...)

> From:    [e-mail] (Vesselin Bontchev)

>BTW, we discussed the problem with David Chess and agreed that
>- -disinfection- of MtE-based viruses is even more difficult than
>- -detecting- them!

Only because it's hard to do just what the degarbler would have done,
when the degarbler can be any one of zillions.  You'd have to write a
subset-interpreter for the chip, which (while useful for various
purposes) is a pain, and doesn't tend to be fast.  Any good hacker, of
course, will be able to recover a few critical files manually, but
replacement is much safer.  That's true of just the plain old
Jerusalem, too, though!  Nothing too new there...

> So, if a system is found to be infected by such a
> virus, the recomended solution is to remove all executable files and
> to replace them with clean copies.

If you trust your scanner (and I'm sure we'll have trustable scanners
for the MtE before long; probably before there are any MtE viruses
bothering real users), you only have to remove and replace the
*infected* executables.  Which is probably what you meant, but I
thought I'd make the point explicitly...

- - -- -
David M. Chess                |  "Some look at the world as it is,
High Integrity Computing Lab  |   and ask 'why?'. I look at the world as it is,
IBM Watson Research           |   and say 'Hey, neat hack!'."  - J. R. H.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 05 Jun 92 13:54:56 -0500
From:    Sten M. Drescher <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: McAfee VIRUSCAN V91 uploaded to SIMTEL20 (PC)

"Jean-Pierre Engel (CMU Geneva)" <[e-mail]> writes:

>I have Uploaded from SIMTEL20: NETSC91B, CLEAN91, SCANV91, VSHLD91. I
>have found the following value with the validation prog.:

>netsc91b.zip    S:  116,543    D:  6-2-1992    M1:  16DC    M2:  12FC
>clean91.zip    S:  141,577    D:  6-2-1992    M1:  FD45    M2:  0101
>scanv91.zip    S:  129,268    D:  6-2-1992    M1:  F2C3    M2:  0AC7
>vshld91.zip    S:  107,574    D:  6-2-1992    M1:  71B7    M2:  190B

>Where is the probleme?

    Problem 1: You ran validate on the .ZIP files, not the .EXE
files.  Try unZIPping it.
        Problem 2: The validate data from McAfee for NETSCAN is for
v91, NOT v91b.

            Sten

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 05 Jun 92 23:30:00 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Brian S. Lev)
Subject: Re: Virus Program for a Macintosh? (Mac)

[e-mail] (David Carlin) writes...
>Two weeks ago, while at Computer class, I poped in a disk at our
>schools Macintosh Classic. A program I had bought that is on the
>System Utilities disk, Said there was a virus, and not to use the
>disk. I am only in 7th grade, and don't know much about Macintosh
>Viruses. Can anyone tell me of a Public Domain Program that I might be
>able to use?

One that I like a *lot* is John Norstad's "Disinfectant" (currently at
version 2.8) -- it's free, and it works!  It's available via FTP from
an almost infinite variety of sites on the Internet... if you have a
problem doing FTPs, contact me and I'll be glad to send you a copy of
the "MacSecure" anti-viral tool kit we use here at Goddard (it's based
on Disinfectant and includes some neat HyperCard stacks as well).

- -- Brian Lev

 +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
 |              NASA SCIENCE INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER              |
 |                  Code 930.6, Goddard Space Flight Center                   |
 |                          Greenbelt, MD  20771  USA                         |
 +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
 |                   Phone: [phone]    FAX: [phone]                 |
 |     NSINIC::NSIHELP  or  [e-mail]  or  NSIHELP@DFTBIT      |
 +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 07 Jun 92 11:31:00 +0100
From:    Anthony Naggs <[e-mail]>
Subject: "Menem's Revenge" virus (Amiga)

The following is lifted from the news pages of the British mag "Just Amiga
Monthly" (JAM), which I received yesterday.  I am unable to confirm the
accuracy of this material, and the Metropolitan Police Computer Crime Unit
(London) didn't mention it to me when I spoke to them recently.

+   FRESH WARNINGS AS NEW VIRUS SPREADS
+
+   A new Amiga virus called Menem's Revenge is sweeping the country.
+
+   It is a particularly nasty file or 'link' virus that starts a task
+   called a single space.  This task's sole job is to patch the LoadSeg
+   vector in DOS.  It thus infects programs that are run.
+
+   It is triggered through the Amiga's internal time clock will write its
+   messages to files on DH0: and/or DF0:.  The message it writes and then
+   displays as an alert is "Menem's Revenge has arrived / Argentina still
+   alive".
+
+   Because it can write to executable files, those files may very well
+   crash, or not run at all, after being infected.  Menem's Revenge adds
+   3,076 bytes to each file it infects.

The news item recommends the use of Virus_Checker as protection from this
virus, and as it advertises version 6.05 on a JAM disk later in the magazine
I presume you should use at least that version.

Anthony Naggs

Internet:  [e-mail]  or  [e-mail]
Janet:     [e-mail]  (  cbs%uk.ac.brighton.vms::amn  )
    or     [e-mail]        (  cbs%uk.ac.city::xa329        )

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 05 Jun 92 21:51:03 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Robert Slade)
Subject: Re: MVS Virii (IBM MVS)

While not, in the very strictest sense, a virus, the CHRISTMA EXEC of
1987 nevertheless was a self-reproducing object which operated with
IBM mainframe systems and over mainframe network links.

While no data was at risk, CHRISTMA resulted in denial of service and
extra time expended in its removal.

I will be covering it and similar mainframe/network programs in coming
columns.

=============
Vancouver      [e-mail]         | Lotteries are a tax
Institute for  [e-mail]      | on the arithmetically
Research into  [e-mail]         | impaired.
User           CyberStore Dpac 85301030 |
Security       Canada V7K 2G6           |

------------------------------

Date:    10 Jun 92 13:06:17 -0400
From:    "David.M.Chess" <[e-mail]>
Subject: re: Mainframe viruses (was: MVS Virii)

"Tim Hare" <[e-mail]> (in a posting that's been
sitting in my mailbox for quite awhile) asks about mainframe viruses,
trojan horses, and the like.  Such programs certainly exist, and a few
(the CHRISTMA EXEC for VM/CMS/RSCS, for instance) have become briefly
widespread.  In general, though, we have not seen any viruses become
endemic in the mainframe area the way we have on all popular
microcomputers.  The reasons for this are partly technical and partly
cultural.  Viruses don't become widespread unless they can spread
faster than they are caught.  Access controls help to slow spread
(although I would claim that the access controls that separate my PC
from your PC are as strong as any mainframe access controls that
separate one userid from another!).  But at least as importantly,
there are many fewer people at this moment walking around with 9-track
tapes reels in their back pockets than there are people with
diskettes.  The micro world is just a more tightly-connected graph
(and it has many more nodes) than is the mainframe world.  Someone
could write a mainframe virus (as Cohen has shown, this is technically
possible on, roughly, any general-purpose computer), but it'd be
unlikely to get anywhere before going extinct.

- - -- -
David M. Chess                    |   * Undecidable Signature ?Virus *
High Integrity Computing Lab      |  Copy me to your .sig iff you don't
IBM Watson Research               |     think I'm a signature virus!

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 06 Jun 92 01:12:55 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Doren Rosenthal)
Subject: Virus Detection Software Review

Doren Rosenthal
Rosenthal Engineering
3737 Sequoia
San Luis Obispo, CA USA 93401

This  June  '92 issue of "Shareware Update"  magazine  (P.O.  Box
2454,  White City, OR 97503-9901) is devoted to  virus  detection
software  and includes several articles including  an  especially
insightfull one from Ross Greenberg.

Doren Rosenthal

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 05 Jun 92 22:22:08 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Mary K. Kuhner)
Subject: Re: Taxonomy of viruses

[e-mail] (Vesselin Bontchev) writes:

[discussion of parsimony analysis]

>Well, this is essentially what we are doing now... Unfortunately, it
>cannot be automated or even formalized - as you said, it reflects our
>intuitive ideas about virus relationship.

Taxonomy was originally based on the biologists' intuitive ideas about
organism relationships too, but algorithms for describing and
systematizing these intuitions still proved useful.

I agree, however, that it will be very hard to do anything mechanical
about classifying viruses.  It was hard for biologists, and a
biological organism is easier to get a grip on than a computer virus.

Mary Kuhner [e-mail]

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 06 Jun 92 18:26:53 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Tom Downs)
Subject: Polymorphic Virii

I appreciate the discussion on polymorphic viruses. One of the users
suggested moving the discussion to E-Mail. I would prefer that you
didn't because I feel that the subject of Polymorphism is very
pertinent. We are going to have to understand them to combat those
types of viruses.

Tom Downs

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 07 Jun 92 04:57:15 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Mark Diamond)
Subject: Re: BAD IDEA (was: Where can I find Virus signatures?)

Zmudzinski recently replied to a query on this bulletin board by
saying to the enquirer that "if you haven't already got a collection
of virus signatures then you aren't a legitimate researcher".  I think
this is a olish view that smacks of a guild memtality.

Those in the business of producing anti-viral software obviously have
little difficulty in acquiring new viruses. Others, like me, who have
an academic research interest in virus algorithms,always seem to have
an impossible time obtaining copies of new viruses.  I have had to
rely on the high turn-over of foreign students in our department
(mostly from Indonesia and Pakistan) to bring infected discs with
them.  I always check their discs before they can use them in a
Department machine, and I trade them a clean disc for their infected
ones.  It has been an extremely slow and tedious process obtaining the
viruses this way, and could have been made a hell of a lot easier if
some of the other people working in the field had been willing to
share their knowledge.  Also, with the number of bulletin boards open
to virus-producers, its about time that those of us of the other side
of the line began being a little bit more free in sharing what we've
learned.

M A R K  R  D I A M O N D   markd@ psy.uwa.edu.au

------------------------------

Date:    07 Jun 92 11:51:53 +0000
From:    [e-mail] (Rob J. Nauta)
Subject: Misinformation does more damage than viruses themselves

Unfortunately misinformation about viruses still does more damage than
the viruses itself. The following article appeared in the Dutch
magazine 'Computable' dd. june 5 1992:

"Professional computer users underestimate the threat of computer
viruses, that are no longer exclusively spread by illegal games and
bulletin boards.

This conclusion was made by the Pilotteam Computer Criminality of the
Dutch police in a report about the Michelangelo virus.

[...] "

The article continues with conclusions that almost nobody of the users
hit by the virus had a backup to fall back on.

It's sad to see the police, and especially the special Pilotteam who
really should know better, spread such misinformation. I've attened
several lectures of the chief of that team, H. Onderwater recently, and
his stories consist mostly of popular folklore and fables about
hackers, which seem to have originated from 'Wargames' and the press
reports of the German CCC. He continues to spread the fables of hackers
being able to increase their bank account and highschool grades, that
every hacker supports the CCC 'freedom of information for all' policy,
and is out to view your hospital data. He also claims many companies
prefer to employ hackers, even though not a single case of this claim
is known.

The story of viruses being spread only by hobbyists via bulletion
boards and cracked games is a very persistent one. It is a very popular
theory because it allows companies to ban use of all games and public
domain software to prevent viruses. They then rely on this policy as
sole protection, just like an ostrich sticks his head in the sand. If a
virus does show up, it is blamed on some employee who brought in a game
or public domain software.

Recent discoveries of viruses in shrink-wrapped software and demo disks
has proved relying on the assumption of viruses spread by games and
BBSes is a big risk, which leads to a false sense of security.
Unfortunately companies are more interested in formal policies than
practical security. Unless this attitude changes, false information and
virus panic will cause more damage than the occasional virus itself.

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 06 Jun 92 02:20:09 -0400
From:    [e-mail] (McAfee Associates)
Subject: McAfee CLEAN-UP 91B and WSCAN91 uploaded to SIMTEL20 (PC)

I have uploaded to WSMR-SIMTEL20.Army.Mil

pd1:<msdos.trojan-pro>
CLEAN91B.ZIP    CLEAN-UP Version 91-B virus disinfector for PC's, LAN's
WSCAN91.ZIP     SCAN for Windows Version 91 shell program

CLEAN-UP VERSION 91-B, WSCAN91 RELEASED

     Version 91-B of CLEAN-UP has been released.  This version replaces V91
and adds a remover for the Multi-2 virus which has been reported as widespread.

     Version 91 of WSCAN has been released.  This version brings all of SCAN
V91's features to the Windows environment.

VALIDATE VALUES FOR CLEAN and WSCAN:
CLEAN-UP 91B (CLEAN.EXE)            S:96,124   D:06-01-92   M1: C7BA  M2: 019B
SCAN FOR WINDOWS V91 (WINSTALL.EXE) S:13,263   D:05-28-92   M1: 0251  M2: 09F0
SCAN FOR WINDOWS V91 (WSCAN.EXE)    S:87,870   D:06-04-92   M1: 13C4  M2: 08FD

Aryeh Goretsky
McAfee Associates Technical Support
- - - -
McAfee Associates        | Voice [phone] | [e-mail]  (business)
3350 Scott Blvd, Bldg 14 | FAX   [phone] | ObQuote: "Log... from Blammo"
Santa Clara, California  |                      |
95054-3107  USA          | BBS   [phone] | CompuServe ID: 76702,1714
ViruScan/CleanUp/VShield | USR Courier DS 14.4Kb| or GO VIRUSFORUM

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 06 Jun 92 22:25:37 -0400
From:    Jon Freivald <jaflrn![e-mail]>
Subject: Scan updates available (PC)

I have the following available on my mail-server now:

     scan91.zip
     clean91b.zip
     netsc91b.zip
     vshld91.zip
     wscan91.zip
     virus-l.faq

Please be advised that I have changed my mail-server software, however,
it should properly process all requests sent to the old one.  To
retrieve any of the files listed above, send a message to:

     jaflrn![e-mail]

Include in the message body the line (here "filename" represents the
file you wish to retrieve from the list above) below - the part in
brackets ([]) is optional, as it will automatically send .zip files in
uuencode format:

     get dos/virus/filename [uuencode|xxencode]

For a list of all available files, include the line "get index" in your
message.  If anyone has any problems using the new mail-server, please
let me know right away.

Jon

=============================================================================
           Jon Freivald ( jaflrn![e-mail] )
     Nothing is impossible for the man who doesn't have to do it.
=============================================================================

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 15 Jun 92 08:42:09 +0700
From:    [e-mail] (Fridrik Skulason)
Subject: F-PROT 2.04 (PC)

Version 2.04 - major changes:

   The program can now scan into DIET-compressed files

   Variant identification is now even more accurate than before - in
   particular regarding EXE-infecting viruses.

   The disinfection capabilities have been improved somewhat - the
   program can now disinfect several viruses which were only detected in
   previous versions.

   The program is now faster than before - for example the scanning speed
   on our primary development machine went from 23 files/sec to 40
   files/sec, but the relative speed increase might be even greater on
   slower machines.

Version 2.04 - corrections:

   The heuristic analysis produced a false alarm on a program named
   DDIR.COM, (C) Charles Petzold - fixed.

   The scanner reported some versions of 123.COM as "Possibly infected
   with a new version of Frogs" - fixed.

   The program only detected around 99.86% of MtE encrypted files - this
   should be fixed now.

   OPTLINK-packed programs, such as the Norton Utilities are no longer
   flagged as packed in heuristic analysis.  The programs are actually
   packed, but users were not aware of that, which has caused considerable
   confusion.

Version 2.04 - minor improvements:

   The following command-line switches have been added:

       /APPEND - used with /REPORT. Append to an existing file.
       /NOBREAK command line switch added - disables ESC during scanning
       /NOWRAP - do not wrap text in the report.

Version 2.04 - new viruses:

   The following 72 new viruses can now be detected and removed.

    _16850
    Black Jec-(4B, 6B, 8B and Digital F/X)
    Breeder
    Cascade (1621 and 1704-B2)
    Close
    Cossiga (883 and Friends)
    Creeper (252 and 475)
    Danish Tiny (191 and Brenda)
    Dark Avenger (1687 and Milana)
    Datalock-1043
    Diamond-Rock Steady
    Dutch Tiny-99
    Eddie 2 (B and C)
    Europe '92 (424)
    FGT
    Fichv EXE 1.0
    Flash-Gyorgy
    Freew-718
    Gotcha-E
    Got You
    Intruder-B
       Jerusalem (AntiCad-Tobacco, CNDER, IRA, Mummy-1.0, Mummy-1.2 and Triple)
    Joe's Demise
    Keypress-1744
    Kit
    Ko (407 and Birdie)
    Macedonia
    Malaga (only file infections)
    Murphy-Tormentor-D
    Nines Complement (706 and 776)
    Plaice (1129 and 1273)
    Plovdiv-1.3B
    Possessed-2443
    RNA-1
    Shirley-Vivaldi
    Squawk
    Stupid-Profesor
    Suriv 1 (Anti-D and Xuxa)
    SVS
    Swedish Boys (Data Molester, Headache and Why Windows)
    Tabulero
    Terminator-918
    Troi II
    Vienna (637, Betaboys, BNB, Memo 2.0, Parasite-2 and Violator-B2)
    Violetta-1024
    Yankee (1909 and Login)

   The following 21 new viruses can now be detected but not removed,
   only deleted.  This is because they overwrite infected files, or
   damage them irreversibly.

    BloodLust
    Burger (560-J, 560-K)
    Leprosy (B2,Busted and Scribble)
    SHHS
    Tack
    Trivial (30D,31,35,45B,Banana,Hastings and NKOTB)
    Vengence (A,B,C,D,E and F)

   The following 14 new viruses can now be detected but not removed.

    _572
    Denzuko-PC Club
    Ear-6
    EMF
    Enemy
    Hafenstrasse-1641
    HH&H
    Munich
    Phoenix
    Scion
    Screamer II
    Starship
    Vienna-712
    Vsign
    Yankee-Micropox

   The following 43 viruses that could be detected but not removed with
   earlier versions of F-PROT can now be disinfected.

    _5792
    Anthrax
    Best Wishes (970 and 1024)
    Caz-1159
    Compiler (1 and 2)
    Cookie (7360 and 7392)
    Diamond (Damage-A, Damage-B, David and Greemlin)
    Forger
    Freew-692
    Gotcha-D
    Halloween
    Helloween
    Hero (394 and 506)
    Intruder
    Liberty-SSSSS
    Many fingers
    Mosquito-Pisello
    Murphy (Bad Taste, Cemetery, Kamasya, Migram-1, Migram-2, Tormentor-A
        and Tormentor-B)
    Nov. 17.
    Peach
    Possessed-2446
    RNA2
    Sadist
    Sentinel-1
    Shirley
    STSV
    Swiss-143
    TV
    Vcomm-2
    VVF 3.4

------------------------------

End of VIRUS-L Digest [Volume 5 Issue 116]
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