Hacker Chronicles 2 (Alt)/The_Hacker_Chronicles_Volume_II-CD1.iso/cud3/cud300b.txt

Text File | 1992-08-18 | 14.1 KB | 289 lines

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                  >C O M P U T E R   U N D E R G R O U N D<
                                >D I G E S T<
              ***  Volume 3, Issue #3.00 (January 6, 1991)   **
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MODERATORS:   Jim Thomas / Gordon Meyer  ([e-mail])
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From: Various
Subject: From the Mailbag
Date: January 6, 1991

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***  CuD #3.00: File 2 of 6: From the Mailbag                    ***
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From: [e-mail](Peter Wayner)
Subject: Re: Cu Digest, #2.19
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 91 14:27:26 -0500

This is in reply to John Debert's note in CuDigest #2.19:

He writes:
"Now, suppose that someone has used this method to encrypt files on his/her
system and then suppose that Big Brother comes waltzing in with a seizure
warrant, taking the system along with all the files but does not take the
code keys with them. Knowing Big Brother, he will really be determined to
find evidence of a crime and is not necessarily beneath (or above) fudging
just a bit to get that evidence. What's to keep him from fabricating such
evidence by creating code keys that produce precisely the resultsthat they
want-evidence of a crime? Would it not be a relatively simple procedure to
create false evidence by creating a new key using the encrypted files and a
plaintext file that says what they want it to? Using that new key, they
could, in court, decrypt the files and produce the desired result, however
false it may be. How can one defend oneself against such a thing? By
producing the original keys? Whom do you think a court would believe in
such a case?

One should have little trouble seeing the risks posed by encryption."

This is really unlikely, because in practice most people only use one-time
pads for communication. They are not in any way practical for on-site
encryption. Imagine you have 40 megabytes of data. If you want to encrypt
it with a one-time pad, you need 40 megabytes of key. If you did this,
it would be very secure because there exists a perfectly plausible 40 Meg key
for each possible 40 meg message.

But, if you were going to keep the 40 megs of encrypted data handy, you
would need to keep the 40 megs of key just as handy. When the government
came to call, they would get the key as well. That is why it is only
practical to use systems like DES and easy to remember, relatively short
keys to do the encryption. That way there is nothing to seize but your
brain.

---Peter Wayner
Dept. of Computer Science, Cornell Univ.
([e-mail])

++++++++++++++++++++++++++

From: CuD Dump Account <works![e-mail]>
Subject:   BBSs as Business Phones?
Date: Thu, 03 Jan 91 15:57:49 EDT

Ok this is just a quick question.

How can it be legal to make BBS' operators shell out extra money for a
hobby, answering machines aren't something people have to pay extra for,
and in some cases thats what BBS's are used for. If its a public BBS, it is
receiving no true income from its users, unless they pay a standard,
billable time, (ie. A commercial BBS) What gives them the right to charge
us now? They don't force you to pay for special business class lines/fiber
optic lines to call lond distance do they? No its by choice. Most SysOps
buy the cheapest line available which is usually local only, no dial out,
etc. SysOp's in the long run absorb most, if not all the costs of running a
BBS, that means power, servicing, and the phone. The phone line at minimum,
is going to cost at least a hundred or so per year. Then power, its absurd.
In my case, I run a BBS to share information, and I allow everyone on for
free.  I've seen the old FCC proposals to have people using modems pay
more, but I don't rightly see why. If I am not mistaken this is bordering
on their greed to make more money for the growing modem populous.

Do they have a right to charge us? are they providing any type of special
service because we have a modem on the line, instead of an answering
machine, FAX, phone, or other? we are private citizens, it should be up to
us how we use the phones. TelCo's still a monopoly

There are a lot of rumours about this type of thing, only I've never seen
it actually put into action.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++

From: Paul Cook <[e-mail]>
Suject: Response to "Hackers as a software development tool"
Date: Fri, 4 Jan 91 06:44 GMT

%Andy Jacobson <[e-mail]> writes:%
>
>I received one of those packs of postcards you get with comp.  subscription
>magazines (Communications Week) that had an unbelievable claim in one of
>the ads. I quote from the advertisement, but I in no way promote,
>recommend, or endorse this.
>
>"GET DEFENSIVE!
>YOU CAN'S SEE THEM BUT YOU KNOW THEY'RE THERE.
>Hackers pose an invisible but serious threat to your information system.
>Let LeeMah DataCom protect your data with the only data security system
>proven impenetrable by over 10,000 hackers in LeeMah Hacker Challenges I
>and II. For more information on how to secure your dial-up networks send
>this card or call, today!" (Phone number and address deleted.)
>
>So it seems they're claiming that 10,000 hackers (assuming there are that
>many!) have hacked their system and failed. Somehow I doubt it. Maybe they
>got 10,000 attempts by a team of dedicated hackers, (perhaps employees?)
>but has anyone out there heard of the LeeMah Hacker Challenges I and II?

Yes, Lee Mah is for real.  They make a some nice computer security
equipment to stop folks from trying to gain access to your dialup modems.

The "Hacker Challenge" is for real too.  They publicized it for a long
time, and I recall reading about it in PC Week, Byte, and possibly
InfoWorld.  I don't know how accurate the "10,000" hackers is (maybe it was
10,000 call attempts?) but they ran a couple of contests where they gave a
phone number of one of their devices, and offered some kind of a prize to
anyone who could figure out how to get in.  I have seen the Lee Mah
catalog, and I don't recall how they provide security, but I think some of
their gear uses dialback modems that call pre-programmed user numbers when
the right code is entered.

++++++++++++++++++++++

From: [e-mail](John Stanley)
Subject: Re: a.k.a. freedom of expression
Date: Fri, 04 Jan 91 23:45:31 EST

In CuD 2.19, balkan!dogface![e-mail](Bob Izenberg) writes:

> I read this in issue 2.16 of the Computer Underground Digest:
>
>          [ quoted text follows ]
>
>           ADAM E. GRANT, a/k/a The             :
>           Urvile, and a/k/a Necron 99,         :
>           FRANKLIN E. DARDEN, JR., a/k/a       :
>           The Leftist, and                     :
>           ROBERT J. RIGGS, a/k/a               :
>           The Prophet                          :
>           [ quoted text ends ]
>
> The assumption here, that an alias employed in computer communications is
> the same as an alias used to avoid identification or prosecution, doesn't
> reflect an awareness of the context within which such communications
> exist.

The only reason "The Prophet" was used was to avoid identification.
But, that doesn't really matter. The reason it was included in the
Government doohicky was to identify the one legal name and alternates
chosen by the defendant used by him as his sole identification at specific
times.

> The very nature of some computer operating systems demands some
> form of alias from their users. Management policy also affects how you
> can identify yourself to a computer, and to anyone who interacts with you
> through that computer.

How you identify yourself in communications is entirely up to you.  You
do not need to use your computer User ID as your sole identity. Note that
the From: line of your original post identified you, as does mine.  If I
add a .sig that identifies me as "Draken, Lord of Trysdil", and remove the
From: comment name, then you know me as Draken, and bingo, I have an a.k.a.
Am I doing it to commit a crime? Probably not. It doesn't really matter.

> If we strip the implication from those three letters
> that the party of the leftmost part is calling themselves the party of the
> rightmost part to avoid getting nabbed with the goods, what's left?

You are left with the fact that they are also known as ..., which is
just what the a.k.a stands for. It does NOT stand for Alias for Kriminal
Activity, as you seem to think it does. The "implication" you speak of is
an incorrect inferance on your part. Guilty conscience?

> In using a computer communications medium, particularly an informal one
> like a BBS, the name you choose can set the tone for the aspect of your
> personality that you're going to present (or exaggerate.)

You mean, like, the name you chose is how you will be known? Like, you
will be known to some as "Bob Izenberg", but on the BBS you will be also
known as "Krupkin the Gatherer"? Like a.k.a.?

> Are radio
> announcers using their "air names" to avoid the law?  How about people with
> CB handles?  Movie actors and crew members?  Fashion designers?  Society
> contains enough instances of people who, for creative reasons, choose
> another name by which they're known to the public.

And if any of them go to court, they will have a.k.a., too. There will
be their legal name, followed by the a.k.a. There is no implication of
criminal activity from just having an a/k/a, just the indication that the
prosecution wants to make sure the defendants are identified. "Him.  That
one, right there. His legal name is X, but he is also known as Y and Z. All
the evidence that says that Y did something is refering to him, X, because
the witness knows him by that."

> Whenever somebody uses a.k.a., correct them%!

Ok, consider this a correction, at your own demand.

+++++++++++++++++++++++

From: [e-mail]
Subject: Response to Encryption dangers in seizures
Date: Sat, 5 Jan 91 14:19:07 PST

>Subject: Encryption dangers in Seizures
>Date: Sat, 29 Dec 90 11:20 PST

[misc background on encryption and its use to thwart Big Brother deleted.]

>Now, suppose that someone has used this method to encrypt files on his/her
>system and then suppose that Big Brother comes waltzing in with a seizure
>warrant, taking the system along with all the files but does not take the
>code keys with them. Knowing Big Brother, he will really be determined to
>find evidence of a crime and is not necessarily beneath (or above) fudging
>just a bit to get that evidence. What's to keep him from fabricating such
>evidence by creating code keys that produce precisely the results that they
>want-evidence of a crime? Would it not be a relatively simple procedure to
>create false evidence by creating a new key using the encrypted files and a
>plaintext file that says what they want it to? Using that new key, they
>could, in court, decrypt the files and produce the desired result, however
>false it may be. How can one defend oneself against such a thing? By
>producing the original keys? Whom do you think a court would believe in
>such a case?  > >One should have little trouble seeing the risks posed by
encryption.

I think it unlikely that if the Feds wanted to frame you or fabricate
evidence that they would bother to use the encrypted data found at your
site.  Instead, I think, they would fabricate the whole wad -- plaintext,
key, and ciphertext.  For this reason, it is not only one-time key
encryption that is threatened, but iterative algorithms as well.

So, if I have data encrypted, and the feds are going to "fix" it, why is
this any more dangerous than having NO DATA?  If they want to frame me,
they're going to (try), regardless of whether they found encrypted data or
not!  Thus, I see encryption as preventing the feds from really KNOWING
what you do and do not have.  This is very valuable.  I think that even in
our mostly corrupt government that it would be difficult to fabricate
evidence to the tune of posession of AT&T source code.

Similar tactics can be applied JUST AS EASILY to physical crimes.  The
crime lab finds a dead guy with a .44 slug in him.  The suspect owns a .44,
but not the one used in the shooting.  What is to prevent the (now seized)
.44 of the suspect to be fired and the slug swapped for the slug discovered
in the body?  This is trivial to accomplish, assuming the poeple involved
are sufficiently crooked.

Now, I'm not saying that the Feds don't fabricate evidence.  But I do not
think that encrypting one's data makes one a more vulnerable target to such
injustice.

>jd / [e-mail]     netcom![e-mail]

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