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- From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
- Subject: Re: DETERMINISM 1: `Refutation' the first
- Message-ID: <1992Nov5.191446.15657@mp.cs.niu.edu>
- Organization: Northern Illinois University
- References: <spurrett.17.720882610@superbowl.und.ac.za> <spurrett.23.720960465@superbowl.und.ac.za>
- Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1992 19:14:46 GMT
- Lines: 37
-
- In article <spurrett.23.720960465@superbowl.und.ac.za> spurrett@superbowl.und.ac.za (David Spurrett) writes:
- >DETERMINISM 1: `Refutation' number one.
-
- > The argument starts from a factual observation. Our legal systems
- > (this is not a modern Western point, it seems universal) acknowledge a
- > distinction between `do-ers' and `do-ees' in a fundamental and strong
- > way.
-
- The legal system is designed by people with the intention that it will
- affect the behavior of people. You cannot use it to draw conclusions
- about inanimate objects. The legal system is an expression of our
- culture, so cannot easily be applied to questions such as the validity
- of determinism.
-
- > For example when one person pushes another over a cliff we direct
- > our criticism/ revenge/ abuse/ rehabilitation/ whatever at the person who
- > `did' the pushing. Some archaic legal systems had different economies of
- > `do-ers' and, for example, tried crows for crop damage. NO LEGAL SYSTEM
- > HAS EVER `TRIED' A LAW OF NATURE, OR A MECHANICAL DEVICE.
-
- This is simply not true. Mechanical devices are sometimes subjected to
- scientific and engineering tests, and the results of these tests are
- brought to a court for decision. The decision might, in effect, be a
- judgment of summary execution (perhaps in the form of a product recall).
- Certainly the treatment of mechanical devices is different, but this is
- because mechanical devices are presumed not to have free will, and thus
- unable to change their behavior.
-
- > An analysis of the workings of the proceedings shows that what is
- > presupposed of a `doer', what defines him/her is that there is believed
- > to be someting like a `possibility for having done otherwise.' (ie Free
- > Will) Indeed if it is possible to prove that the person who did the
-
- You seem to be arguing that "based on a presupposition that inanimate
- objects do not have free will, we conclude that determism is false."
- This does not strike me as valid reasoning.
-
-