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- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Path: sparky!uunet!charon.amdahl.com!pacbell.com!ames!sun-barr!cs.utexas.edu!milano!cactus.org!ritter
- From: ritter@cactus.org (Terry Ritter)
- Subject: Re: Limits on the Use of Cryptography?
- Message-ID: <1992Nov11.222838.27134@cactus.org>
- Organization: Capital Area Central Texas UNIX Society, Austin, Tx
- References: <1992Nov11.061210.9933@cactus.org>
- Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 22:28:38 GMT
- Lines: 41
-
-
- In quotable email, <mike@upolu.gsfc.nasa.gov> Mike Jones responds:
-
-
- >This has little to do with sci.crypt
-
- I disagree. Should society elect to limit the use of cryptography
- by law this will affect cryptographic design. Systems may have
- to archive old message keys, for example, or even ciphertext.
-
-
- >You and I and everyone else knows how to get that
- >information. Put the alleged child molester on the rack and use
- >heated irons
- >until you have the information.
-
- Nonsense. Two possibilities are presented:
-
- 1) Require the use of registered crypto keys; if other keys are
- actually used (as we expect), this would itself be a crime;
-
- 2) Require users of cryptography to reveal their keys (after due
- process); if they did not (or *could* not), this would itself
- be a crime.
-
- Nobody gets heated irons; this is rule of law. The issue is
- whether a normal legislator could be convinced that this would be
- *bad* law.
-
-
- >On a technical level, you know that a registered key will not
- >guarantee the results can be decrypted. It may be XORed with an image of
- >daisies.
-
- The question of whether a defendant has provided the desired
- plaintext can be addressed under oath by experts, and decided by
- juries. Deciding issues of fact is what juries do.
-
- ---
- Terry Ritter ritter@cactus.org
-
-