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- Path: sparky!uunet!ogicse!decwrl!csus.edu!netcom.com!mcclary
- From: mcclary@netcom.com (Michael McClary)
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: A One-Time Way to Thwart Key Registration...
- Keywords: one-time pad
- Message-ID: <1992Nov11.011331.21831@netcom.com>
- Date: 11 Nov 92 01:13:31 GMT
- Article-I.D.: netcom.1992Nov11.011331.21831
- References: <pcw.720808942@access.digex.com>
- Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
- Lines: 18
-
- In article <pcw.720808942@access.digex.com> pcw@access.digex.com (Peter Wayner) writes:
- >
- >>1) Can you trust the criminals to provide the keys to their data and to use
- >> those keys (and no others) when transmitting incriminating data? If not,
- >> what's the point?
- >
- >Actually, my favorite solution to this criminal problem is to use
- >a one-time pad. Then it is possible to come up with two keys. One
- >that decrypts the conversation into a benign one and one that decrypts
- >it into the real message.
-
- This works if they demand the key after the message was sent. It's a tad
- harder if you have to register the key in advance of composing the message.
- B-)
- --
- = = = = = = = = = =
- Michael McClary mcclary@netcom.com
- For faster response, address electronic mail to: michael@node.com
-