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- From: cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
- Newsgroups: sci.crypt
- Subject: Re: time-release keys
- Message-ID: <1dom9tINNe0g@transfer.stratus.com>
- Date: 10 Nov 92 15:59:57 GMT
- References: <1dohq8INNbs4@transfer.stratus.com>
- Organization: Stratus Computer, Software Engineering
- Lines: 42
- NNTP-Posting-Host: ellisun.sw.stratus.com
-
- Sorry for following-up my own message, but:
-
- >We could encrypt millions of times over, using different keys, but the
- >computation time preparing the secret might take longer than the
- >transmission (or at least a sizeable fraction of it).
-
-
- If we used straight RSA, we could have the station on the moon always apply
- the same transformation:
-
- y = x^d mod N
-
- Each application would result both in removal of one envelope and in a fixed
- time delay, t0. If we wanted to have a real delay of t, we could compute
-
- k = ceil(t/t0)
-
- m = e^k
-
- and encrypt our secret with
-
- y = x^m mod N
-
- noting in the message packet the value of k. Each round trip to the moon
- would strip one envelope and would decrement the value of k -- so that when
- k got to 0, the secret would pop out -- at the promised time.
-
- However, there's still a flaw with this mechanism. Someone wishing to
- prevent disclosure of something embarrassing or criminal could blow up
- the station on the moon or subvert the one on the earth into losing
- or corrupting traffic.
-
-
- So -- any better ideas for doing this?
-
-
-
- --
- -- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
- -- Carl Ellison cme@sw.stratus.com
- -- Stratus Computer Inc. M3-2-BKW TEL: (508)460-2783
- -- 55 Fairbanks Boulevard ; Marlborough MA 01752-1298 FAX: (508)624-7488
-